MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Moscow Trip

This book contains the basic papers relevant to my trip including:

-- the text of my opening statement
-- a summary of the issues
-- a Vietnam strategy paper
-- a discussion of SALT choices
-- a discussion of European problems
-- a summary of current bilateral US-Soviet negotiations
-- a paper on a possible "Declaration of Principles" to be issued at the summit.

Although my proposed opening statement is on the whole a conciliatory one, you will note from the issues paper that the strategy I would follow would involve a tough opening position on Vietnam. I would impress on Brezhnev that you are prepared to do what is necessary to turn back the DRV offensive and that you expect the Soviets, who must share responsibility for the offensive, to use their influence to bring about de-escalation. After laying this groundwork, I would then indicate the substantial areas where we and they can cooperate and improve relations. I would seek to structure the talks in such a way that discussion of Vietnam will precede any detailed discussion of other questions, such as SALT, Europe and bilateral matters.
The most important points apart from the Vietnam issues I would like to discuss with you relate to the question of excluding SLBM's in a SALT agreement and to maintaining some margin of advantage in ABM's if we have to agree to SLBM exclusion. Both these issues will require early settlement in order to complete an agreement by the time of the summit.

The Soviets will probably press for trade concessions but while giving them some general encouragement, I believe we should not go beyond that for a few weeks until we can see how they perform on Vietnam.

I would also like to discuss the general nature of the final communique to be issued at the summit.
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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Issues for My Moscow Trip

The first issue is one of strategy: how do we relate what happens in Vietnam, and the Soviet role with respect to it, to the summit and the substantive issues we are in process of negotiating with the Soviets? I believe it has become clear to the Soviets that you intend to do what is necessary militarily to stop the Communist offensive and in that sense are prepared to subordinate your relationship with the USSR to the immediate requirements of the Vietnam situation. To judge from Soviet behavior -- including, of course, their urgent desire to have me come to Moscow -- Brezhnev does not wish to sacrifice his "Western" policy to Hanoi's purposes. Consequently, we should have some flexibility in insisting on a constructive Soviet role regarding Vietnam before we turn to the summit-related substantive issues of US-Soviet relations.

Vietnam

As regards Vietnam, the following set of propositions would be put to the Soviets:

-- We want the Soviets to use their influence to get the North Vietnamese to desist from their invasion across the DMZ; to pull back to North Vietnam and three NVA divisions, accompanying armor, artillery and anti-aircraft equipment involved in that invasion; and to fully restore the 1968 understandings, including complete respect for the DMZ and no shelling attacks on major South Vietnamese cities.

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-- If this is agreed and, as it is being implemented, we will correspondingly reduce our air and naval bombardments against the DRV and cease them completely when the foregoing has been accomplished.

-- If this is agreed we are also ready to resume public and private talks towards a settlement which could take place as implementation of the above is underway.

-- It would be made clear to the Soviets that we would expect the Soviets to use their material aid to the DRV as leverage.

The Soviets must bear considerable responsibility for the Communist offensive in Vietnam and we should therefore not be expected to "reward" them for using their influence to bring about deescalation. Nevertheless, the most promising tactic for implementing the general strategy will probably be to hold out to Brezhnev the prospect of a broad improvement in relations with us.

In sum, our approach would be to indicate that we will not shy away from the military actions necessary to beat back the Communist offensive in Vietnam; but that if our proposed scenario for deescalation is followed, there will be an opportunity for substantial progress in US-Soviet relations.

SALT

The major substantive subject being negotiated prior to the summit is SALT. It is at the moment stalled on two major issues and several minor, largely technical ones.

The major issues are (1) whether to include SLBMs in the offensive agreement and (2) where each side can deploy its ABMs. We have related these two by taking the position that an offensive agreement excluding SLBMs would confer such numerical advantages to the Soviet Union that it would be impossible for us to accept equality in the defensive agreement. The Soviets argue that the defensive agreement is permanent and therefore should be equal, while the offensive one is merely interim and any imbalances can be worked out in the follow-on talks for a permanent offensive agreement.
We have not yet exhausted all possible fallbacks on the SLBM question. These would involve schemes whereby the Soviets could continue construction of SLBMs in exchange for dismantling older SLBMs and ICBMs. Present evidence, however, suggests that the Soviets are unwilling to include an SLBM even if, as under the above schemes, they could in fact continue their present rate of construction for several years. Thus, we must confront a decision as to whether to accept a SALT agreement without SLBMs and perhaps with only an understanding that submarines will be the first subject of follow-on negotiations. If there is to be a SALT agreement in the next several weeks, we would probably have to take this step.

As regards ABMs we can probably expect only a slight advantage, even if we concede on SLBMs. I would not propose in Moscow to accept equality even if the Soviets remain adamant in insisting on it. A number of variants involving certain advantages for us have been examined within our Government. But one special issue needs to be faced: are we prepared to give up our second ABM site at the Malmstrom ICBM field in exchange for an ABM site in Washington? Secretary Laird and Gerry Smith have both recommended this, and there is some evidence that the Soviets might accept a deal whereby each side would have one ABM site in an ICBM field (Grand Forks for us) and one around the national capital. Such a scheme would still permit us to defend a larger number of ICBMs since our ICBM fields contain more launchers than do Soviet fields. If the Soviets continued to make an issue of this "inequality" we would have to consider the matter between my trip and the time of the summit.

A further SALT issue relates to the duration of the offensive agreement. We have argued for an indefinite duration, the Soviets for three years. (If the agreement lapsed after a fixed period we would end up with an ABM-only agreement, which we oppose.) But we can probably accept some fixed duration, e.g. four years, on the understanding that if by that time there was no permanent offensive agreement, we might abrogate the ABM treaty.

European Security

The next major subject — of particular interest to the Soviets — is Europe. As you know, they have been eager to engage us in bilateral talks about their conference proposal but so far they have not shown much interest in MBFR. Our own interest in MBFR has been largely the result of our need to counter Senator Mansfield with a positive position. While at the moment our domestic
pressures for troop reductions are manageable they could of course arise again, and we would probably be in a stronger position to meet them if we had some sort of MBFR negotiation in prospect with the Soviets.

We have already in various ways agreed in principle to preparations for a European conference once the Berlin agreement takes effect. Although the conference idea remains nebulous, we could try to use our agreement to proceed with conference preparations as a means to get the Russians to agree to MBFR preparations. As part of this latter process we could attempt to develop certain principles. As you know, however, we have had little success in coming up with any substantive MBFR position that is both negotiable and in our security interest. Consequently, our main interest will continue to be to use MBFR talks to prevent the unraveling of NATO through unilateral troop cuts.

**Trade and Technical Cooperation**

One of the major Soviet interests in seeking detente with us is to stimulate trade and access to our technology. We have more than a half dozen separate negotiations currently under way that relate in one way or another to these Soviet interests. The Soviets understand that progress here is related to our political relations, though they resent any explicit linkage.

The key decisions that will have to be made on our side in the next several weeks relate to making available EXIM Bank facilities to the USSR and to seeking MFN legislation. Both are essential if there is to be any sizeable volume of US exports to the Soviet Union. You already have legislative authority to move on EXIM Bank facilities; MFN authorizing legislation could probably not be obtained before 1973 although the act of asking for it this year would be read by the Soviets as a move favorable to them.

I would propose in Moscow only to indicate that, assuming a generally favorable trend in our relations, these important political/economic steps will be positively considered in the coming weeks. (Pete Peterson is to meet with his Soviet counterpart in early May. This will afford a chance to try to work out many of the detailed issues involved in an improved overall trade relationship.)
As regards science and technology, the Soviets are eager to have early institutional arrangements for cooperation. As a tactical matter, I would propose to indicate that we will proceed on the merits with each program. In fact, we can easily regulate the pace in accordance with the political situation.

Communique

A final issue to face is the Soviet desire to have a formal US-Soviet declaration of principles promulgated at the summit. They have done this with France and Canada, and they will have even more formal treaty arrangements with the FRG. The principles themselves essentially repeat the basic terms of the UN Charter and they involve a commitment to consult regularly. Historically, since the Eisenhower Administration, we have avoided this kind of declaration because we felt it could be used to undermine our alliance relationships even though the actual terms largely repeated the Charter.

I have given Dobrynin informally a watered-down set of very general principles (dealing with the need for negotiation of disputes, the desirability of restraint and of cooperation and a general clause to consult) to be embodied in the final Summit communiqué. In view of the French precedent it may be difficult to avoid a more elaborate document. If we accepted this, we would have to inform our allies and to include language that made clear that no existing alliances or other commitments were affected.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve this approach to my Moscow meetings.

[Signature]

Approve  [Initial]  Disapprove  [Initial]

[Modified Signature]
MEMORANDUM

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: SALT

The most important SALT issues are: the inclusion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ABM levels.

I. INCLUDING SLBMS IN THE INTERIM FREEZE

The critical issue with SLBMs is whether they are included at all in the interim offensive freeze.

We now propose that SLBM launchers be frozen at the number of those operational or under construction as of the date of signature of the new assessment.

-- This proposal would initially allow the Soviets parity in new subs (41) and slightly less than parity in new SLBMs (604-652 for the Soviets versus 656 for us). If the Soviets choose to replace their recently modified, but older G and H subs, they would obtain a slight numerical edge in modern subs and SLBMs (49-51 boats for them versus 41 for us, 704-752 SLBMs versus 656).

A. Alternative Positions for Including SLBMS

Before agreeing not to include SLBMs, we might sweeten the offer. We could:

1. Allow Freedom to Mix from ICBMs to SLBMs. The Soviets have 134 old SS-7s and SS-8s on soft pads and 75 in silos, for a total of 209. This would allow the Soviets to replace them with about 17 more Y-class subs. Alternatively, we might want to limit freedom-to-mix only to replacement of the soft pads or the silos.
While this allows the Soviets a larger numerical advantage in SLBMs, our advantage in forward SLBM bases means that the Soviets need about 60-65 Y-class submarines to have roughly equivalent on-station time as we do with 41 Polaris/Poseidon boats.

2. Make ULMS an Explicit Bargaining Chip. You accelerated ULMS construction in part to encourage the Soviets to accept an interim freeze on SLBMs. We might make the signal explicit by telling the Soviets that we would "reconsider" the accelerated ULMS program if they agreed on SLBMs.

B. Alternative Positions if SLBMs Are Not in the Freeze

If we agree not to include SLBMs, the issue is what quid pro quo should we seek? We might try to get some asymmetry in ABM levels or a more comprehensive freeze on ICBMs. In addition, there are some compromise solutions on SLBMs which might still be negotiable.

1. An Agreed Non-Circumvention Statement. This could be an agreed statement that neither side would increase its SLBM forces beyond a level such that the objectives of the SALT agreements -- e.g., increased stability -- would be undercut.

2. A Unilateral U.S. Statement. If the Soviets balked at an agreed statement, we could make a strong unilateral statement that continued Soviet SLBM construction beyond a certain level could be a threat to our supreme national interests. Consequently, this would be grounds for withdrawing from the SALT agreements.

3. A Special Follow-on Phase of Negotiations on SLBMs. This could be an agreement that the second phase of SALT negotiations would consider only SLBM limits. Moreover, the negotiations would begin promptly and seek early agreement. This arrangement would largely be a face-saver and unlikely to yield concrete results.

A variation of this would be a May 20-type understanding that we would concentrate on or give priority to SLBMs in the general follow-on talks.
II. ABM LEVELS

The key question on ABM levels is whether we want or need some asymmetry? And, if so, how much? The critical variable here is whether or not SLBMs are included in the interim freeze.

-- If SLBMs are not included, then you might want to obtain some asymmetry in our favor on ABMs. (On the other hand, this will present some negotiating problems. Instead, we might use whatever leverage there is from dropping SLBMs to help on issues like mobile ICBMs, duration, or radars.)

-- If SLBMs are included, it is unlikely that we could expect much, if any, asymmetry in ABMs.

At present, we have two proposals on the table. First, there is the 2-or-1 proposal from last August. This allows a choice between ICBM defense sites with 200 interceptors or NCA defense with 100 interceptors. The clear intent of this proposal is to freeze deployments at existing levels, completing only what is under construction.

Second, there is our recently proposed "2-for-2" arrangement, expressly conditioned on the inclusion of SLBMs in the interim freeze. Each country is allowed to choose between two ICBM defense sites, or one ICBM defense site and NCA defense.

A. Seeking an ABM Advantage

If we want to seek some ABM advantage if and when we drop SLBMs, we could still stick with our "2-for-2" proposal since, as the Soviets argue, it gives us an advantage in the number of silos protected. (With us presumably selecting two Safeguard sites, we would be able to defend 350 silos while the Soviets could only defend 100 or less silos with one ICBM defense site. Their other site would presumably be Moscow.)

However, we might desire more asymmetry than this.

Alternative positions include:

Option 1: A 2-or-1 deal with equal -- 100 -- interceptors. This might be an initial fallback from our present 2-or-1 proposal, but it is probably not negotiable.
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Option 2: Deferred 2-for-2. (2-for-1 now with equal interceptors, a second Soviet site later.)

This would allow Moscow ABM for two Safeguard sites now. At a specified time, the Soviets could obtain an ICBM defense site with 50-100 interceptors, and we could obtain a matching number of additional interceptors and the right to replace one Safeguard site with NCA defense.

The specified time could be tied to the signing of a (1) specific separate agreement that adds SLBMs to the interim freeze, or (2) the comprehensive follow-on to the interim freeze. If the Soviets refuse to accept this tie to the follow-on talks, the specified time could be three to five years.

Option 3: Deferred 3-for-3. (2-for-1 now, with the extra sites allowed on mutual agreement or eventual SLBM inclusion.)

Like Option 2, this would give us two Safeguard sites now for Moscow ABM. Upon mutual agreement, the U. S. could build NCA defense and the Soviets could build two ICBM sites.

**B. Accepting Equality in ABMs**

If you decided to accept equality in ABMs, there are still some problems. "Equality" can be defined in many ways and it is clear that the Soviet definition differs from ours. The basic dispute is whether "equality" means the two sides should be able to defend approximately equal numbers of ICBM silos.

This dispute has refined itself to two key issues.

--- Whether the U. S. would give up the option of being able to deploy two Safeguard sites and agree to one Safeguard site plus Washington. That is, should we give up Malmstrom for Washington?

--- Whether we should revise the definition of "ICBM defense area" to allow the Soviets to protect more silos.

1. **Malmstrom ABM versus NCA Defense.** The U. S. could eliminate the choice between deployment options in the present proposal and allow each side one ICBM defense site and NCA defense. This "1+1" proposal would allow us to defend only 150 ICBMs. Depending on the field east of the Urals which the Soviets choose, they would be able to defend 30-100 ICBMs.
ABM defense of Washington protects the country's leadership against accidental or limited attacks. Moreover, it would make negotiating easier.

On the other hand, it would require us to stop construction on Malmstrom. (The expenditures which could not be recovered would only be about $100 million. This is because the construction will only be 10-20% complete by the end of May.)

Moreover, it involves the risk of our not getting Congressional approval of NCA defense.

Secretary Laird and the Delegation prefer modifying our present proposal to eliminate the choice of Malmstrom.

2. Expanding an "ICBM Defense Area." Our present proposal allows each "ICBM defense area" to be 70 km in diameter, large enough for either side to protect only one ICBM field per area. By enlarging the size of an ICBM defense area to 150 km, the Soviets could protect two ICBM fields with one ABM site. (With the appropriate two ICBM fields, the Soviets could defend 115-164 silos versus 150 at Grand Forks.)

This gerrymandering approach accepts the Soviet arguments that "equality" must include an equal number of silos defended and that Moscow ABM protects no silos (approximately 320 silos are within the range of Moscow ABM interceptors and radars.)

The Delegation has requested authority to also make this modification.

III. RADARS

There is still much negotiating to be done on radars. Fortunately, the Delegation shows an intense interest in this subject and should be able to take advantage of some recent Soviet moves in the area.

There are two major unresolved issues here: controls on ABM radars for ICBM defense; and, controls on large non-ABM radars (called Other Large Phased Array Radars -- OLPARs).

A. ABM Radars for NCA Defense

The U. S. proposes strict quantitative controls on ABM radars for ICBM defense. (The smaller the number, the more we are assured that we can always penetrate the ABM defense and destroy the radar base.)
The Soviets call for qualitative limits, though precisely how these limits would be defined is not clear.

Even if we increase the allowed numbers, it is uncertain that the Soviets will accept only quantitative limits.

The alternative to quantitative limits alone is a combination of quantitative and qualitative limits. Exactly how these are defined is critical.

--- If we accept only vague formulations, the Soviets could deploy many powerful radars. This would give them Hard-Site Defense, without the needed interceptors, for the limited number of ICBMs at the site. More important, it would allow a radar base for territorial defense. The necessary interceptors can be added quickly; large radars are the long lead-time item.

NSDM-158 (March 1972) says that the Delegation, if it obtains the authorization, can explore combinations of quantitative and qualitative ABM radar limits. The Delegation is now requesting that authorization. It would appear that the Delegation should, with this new authority, be able to resolve the ABM radar issue satisfactorily. We will only need made sure that the controls are sufficiently precise.

B. Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs)

Both sides have already agreed in general terms not to give non-ABM radars an ABM capability. However, we seek to impose strict limits on OLPARs. Our rationale is that these radars could perform all the basic functions of ABM radars. As a result, extensive deployment of these radars could provide the base for nation-wide ABM defense. The base could be quickly fleshed out with easy-to-deploy interceptors and smaller, transportable radars.

The Soviets opposed any controls on OLPARs for a long time, arguing that such controls might limit their future air defenses. However, two weeks ago, the Soviets tabled a proposal which, while vague and allowing the Soviets an advantage, accepted the principle of limits on OLPARs.

The issues are confused given the Soviet proposal and the Delegation needs to probe further.
IV. DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

The major unresolved issue here is whether the Interim Offensive Agreement should be of indefinite duration (as the U. S. proposes) or some fixed duration (as the USSR proposes).

Our objectives are (1) to freeze Soviet deployments as long as possible; and (2) to avoid the offensive agreement lapsing quickly, leaving us with an ABM-only arrangement.

While we call for indefinite duration, we modify this with a special provision that either side could withdraw after five years if a follow-on offensive agreement has not been reached. The Soviets have proposed a fixed duration of three years, and oppose any withdrawal provision as unnecessary.

There appear to be three alternatives. These are listed below in declining order of attractiveness to us. We should probably try each in turn.

Option 1: Finite Duration (3-5 years) with automatic renewal if no follow-on agreement has been reached. This would basically be a fig leaf over Soviet acceptance of our proposal for indefinite duration.

Option 2: Finite Duration with Extension by Mutual Agreement. This is largely a fig leaf over U. S. acceptance of the Soviet position, although there would be substantial pressure on the Soviets to review if we want to renew. Our interests would favor a five, rather than three year period.

This is the U. S. Delegation recommendation. The Delegation (less Paul Nitze) favors three years. Mr. Nitze favors five years.

Option 3: Finite Duration Alone. This is the Soviet position. Both sides would still have the option to extend the agreement, possibly with some modification.

V. MOBILE ICBMS

Our position is that all new ICBM launcher construction be halted includes soft and mobile ICBM launchers. Since neither side has deployed mobile systems, this would effectively ban their deployment.
In contrast, the Soviets would freeze only ICBM silo launchers. They argue that neither side is deploying soft ICBMs and that mobile ICBMs should be negotiated on the follow-on talks.

We have considered it very much in our interest to get mobiles banned.

-- We have no mobile program. The Soviets could start deployments of a possible mobile under development in two to three years. Moreover, with its land area, the Soviet Union is better able to undertake mobile deployments than the U. S.

-- Mobiles increase verification problems substantially.

-- If SLBMs are not included in the interim freeze, it becomes increasingly important to make the ICBM freeze as comprehensive as possible to demonstrate that we achieved considerably more than an ABM could deal.

Whatever the ambiguities in the negotiations leading up to the May 20 announcement, we have a strong case that all ICBMs, not certain types, were to be frozen. The Soviets seem to be aiming at a "compromise" which would freeze soft pads, but not mobiles. Without added effort, we might end up with that. If we end up dropping SLBMs, one logical quid pro quo could be Soviet agreement to include mobiles.

If we are unable to include mobiles in the interim freeze (i.e., effectively ban them), there are some alternative positions:

(1) Agree that there is no decision one way or another on banning mobiles, but obtain a parallel understanding that the Soviets would not deploy mobiles for a few years.

(2) Allow replacement of old ICBMs by mobile ICBMs. This would allow deployment, but halt an increase in the overall number of Soviet ICBMs.

(3) A unilateral statement by the U. S. that we would expect both sides to consult on the number of mobiles, etc., before either side started deployments.