P 211708Z JAN 87
FM AMBASSADý LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6765
INFO AMBASSADý BOGOTA
AMBASSADý LA PAZ
AMBASSADý QUITO
AMBASSADý SANTIAGO
AMBASSADý CARACAS
AMBASSADý PANAMA
USAFCO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCOS QUARRY HTS PM
DEAQS WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCOS ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LIMA 00711 01 OF 08 211801Z

2. SUMMARY: AN EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SAM A. MOSKOWITZ
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2001 200003845

UNCLASSIFIED
CENTRAL EMERGENCY ZONE, INCLUDING COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NARCOTICS. SECURITY IN AYACUCHO CITY HAS IMPROVED GREATLY. SENDERO HAS SHIFTED MUCH ACTIVITY TOWARD THE JUNGLE OF LA MAR (NORTH) AND EASTWARD. SENDERO UNITS MAY BE SMALLER NOW; SL VIOLENCE IS MORE SELECTIVE, ASSASSINATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PERSONNEL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. SL KILLED AT LEAST 250 PERSONS IN 1986. SECURITY FORCES ARE LOCATED IN SMALL BASES THROUGHOUT THE ZONE. GOP COUNTER- TERRORISM DOCTRINE IS NOT CARRIED OUT WELL IN PRACTICE. MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS AT LOCAL LEVEL ARE A PROBLEM, BUT THERE ARE SOME SUCCESS STORIES. TERRAIN, COMMUNICATIONS, AND, ABOVE ALL, INTELLIGENCE REMAIN FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES. DESPITE HITS TAKEN BY SL, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO END IN SIGHT TO TERRORISM OR THE MILITARY ROLE IN AYACUCHO. THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL MIGRATION FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE. GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DROPPED IN 1985 BUT STILL REMAINED AT SIGNIFICANT LEVELS THROUGH 1986. AYACUCHO HAD ABOUT 35 REPORTED UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES IN 1986 AND AT LEAST SEVEN SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. CRITICS CLAIM THE DISPARITY IN MILITARY-SENDERO CASUALTY REPORTS (ABOUT 20 TO ONE) POINT TO GOP PRACTICE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. POLICE CLAIM ARMY MISTREATMENT OF DETAINES. GOP DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS HAVE INCREASED FIVE-FOLD BUT CONFRONT SEVERE CHALLENGE BY TERRORISTS AS WELL AS TERRAIN AND CLIMATE. POLITICAL PARTIES ARE NOT WELL DEVELOPED. COCA GROWING AND PROCESSING ARE ON THE RISE IN LA MAR, BUT POLICE STATE COUNTERTERRORIST DUTIES TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) TERRORISTS, PERU’S REMOTE AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT REMAINS A SOURCE OF INTEREST ABOUT TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND, MORE RECENTLY, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. POLOFF VISITED AYACUCHO CITY DECEMBER 17-19 AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO INCREASE DIRECT EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT REGIONS MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORISM. VISIT INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH POLICE OFFICIALS (POLICE PROVIDED BODYGUARDS AND VEHICLE FOR VISIT).

SECTION 02 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREP

PANAMA FOR DS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6/2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FTER, PGOV, PHUM; PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

5. SL's rural presence had changed since 1984. According to development officials and journalists who

PAGE 02  LIMA 00711  02 OF 08  211803Z

HAVE TRAVELED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, SL HAS SHIFTED IN A
GENERALLY EASTWARD DIRECTION. FORMER SL STRONGHOLDS
IN CANGALLO AND WESTERN VICTOR FAJARDO PROVINCES ARE
QUIETER, AS IS HUANANGA PROVINCE. SL IS STILL PRESENT
IN THOSE AREAS, HOWEVER. ALL MAJOR ROADS ARE SUBJECT
TO SPORADIC SL ROADBLOCKS. TERRORISTS REMAIN VERY
ACTIVE IN VILCASHUMAN PROVINCE, ONE OF THEIR ORIGINAL
REDOUTS; IT WAS AN ARMY PATROL IN THIS AREA WHICH
CARRIED OUT THE OCTOBER POMATAMBO AND PARCCO EXECUTIONS.
SL IS ALSO PRESENT IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS IN THE FAR
NORTH OF AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT "ALTOS DE HUANTA"). THE
AREA OF GREATEST SL ACTIVITY IS THE JUNGLE AREA OF
LA MAR PROVINCE AND NEIGHBORING AREAS IN APURIMAC
DEPARTMENT. AYACUCHO POPULATION PATTERNS HAVE SHIFTED
ALSO. TOTAL DEPARTMENT POPULATION DECREASED FROM
503,000 IN 1981 TO AN ESTIMATED 450,000 IN 1986. AYACUCHO CITY HAS GROWN FROM 75,000 TO ABOUT 110,000. LIMA, HUANCAVAYO, AND ICA HAVE RECEIVED A TOTAL OF ABOUT 50,000 MIGRANTS. RURAL POPULATION HAS DECLINED DRAMATICALLY; IN MANY AREAS, FARMERS HAVE ABANDONED ISOLATED HUTS TO LIVE IN NEARBY TOWNS.

6. CONTACTS AGREED THAT LOSSES CAUSED BY AGGRESSIVE ARMED FORCES PATROLLING WERE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR SL'S CHANGE. IN ADDITION, THEY SAID, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON CAMPESINOS -- IN LIVES, CROPS, AND FORCED MIGRATION -- HAD COST SL GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT, LEAVING SL MEMBERS EXPOSED. CAUGHT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND SL, MANY CAMPESINOS Sought TO AVOID TAKING SIDES. CONTACTS SPECULATED THAT SL'S NEW GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS MIGHT ALSO OBEY A DESIRE TO OPEN NEW FRONTS, KEEPING THE ARMED FORCES BOGGED DOWN IN AYACUCHO WHILE SL MOVED NORTH (JUNIN), SOUTHEAST (APURIMAC, CUZCO, AND PUNO), AND TO LIMA. NOTING SL'S FASCINATION WITH THE

PAGE 03

CHINESE COMMUNISTS, THEY SUGGESTED SL CHANGES MIGHT BE ITS OWN VERSION OF THE "LONG MARCH." THE POLICE NOTED RECENT INTELLIGENCE THAT SL HAD DISPERSED ITS LEADERSHIP TO VARIOUS CITIES BUT PLANNED TO EXPAND OPERATIONS IN AYACUCHO IN 1987.

7. SENDERO -- CHANGES IN TACTICS:

SL'S MAOIST DOCTRINE HAD LED IT TO SEEK LIBERATED ZONES. ITS ATTEMPTS TO DO SO IN 1982-83 HAD COLLAPSED UNDER MILITARY PRESSURE IN 1983-84, AND SL HAD HAD TO REVERT TO GUERRILLA ACTIONS WITH SMALL, MOBILE UNITS. CONTACTS AGREED SL GENERALLY AVOIDED CONTACT NOW WITH LARGE UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES, PREFERRED TO ATTACK SMALL POLICE POSTS AND TO AMBUSH THE OCCASIONAL ARMY PATROL (NATIONWIDE, ARMED FORCES SUFFERED ONLY 23 KILLED IN 1986 BY TERRORISTS VERSUS 84 POLICE). SL APPEARED FAR MORE SELECTIVE NOW, SETTLING FOR QUALITY INSTEAD OF QUANTITY. PREFERRED TARGETS NOW INCLUDED CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH CORPA. AT RANDOM ROADBLOCKS, TERRORISTS ASSIDUOUSLY CHECK IDENTITY PAPERS, IN ADDITION TO COLLECTING "WAR TAXES." PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS LINKED TO THE GOP FREQUENTLY ARE EXECUTED.

8. COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS: INTERLOCUTORS OFFERED
A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ON GOP MILITARY/POLICE OPERATIONS AGAINST SL. ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS, GOP HAD THE FOLLOWING FORCES IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE: 2,000 PLUS SOLDIERS; 600 MARINES; 1,200 GUARDIA CIVIL POLICE; 300 INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (PIP); AND 100 GUARDIA REPUBLICANA, FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 4,200 MEN (NOT INCLUDED, APPARENTLY, IS A SMALL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AT THE AYACUCHO AIRPORT). (COMMENT: DAO ESTIMATES 4,500 ARMY AND MARINES; SEE PARA 9. END COMMENT.) THE NUMBER OF GUARDIA CIVIL POLICE

PAGE 01 LIMA 00711 03 OF 08 211803Z
ACTION SCT-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-05
NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00 L-02 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-02 CCO-00 INRE-00 CA-02 PAA-00
USSS-00 USIE-00 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 OC-02 FAIM-01 DS-01
DSE-00 ZOVD-00 /028 W

P 211708Z JAN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6767
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
DEAHQS WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

C OMMANDER S ECTION 03 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREPP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/08-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1
AND POLICE FORCES WERE UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE HEAD OF THE AYACUCHO POLITICAL/MILITARY COMMAND, GENERAL JUAN GIL JARA (NOTE: REPLACED JANUARY 1 BY GENERAL JORGE SANCHEZ MANRIQUE.)


10. ADDITIONAL BASE SECURITY WAS PROVIDED BY PEASANT SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, KNOWN AS "RONDAS" OR "MONTONERAS," ALMOST ALWAYS CREATED BY THE ARMY. RONDA MEMBERS USUALLY WERE ARMED WITH CLUBS AND SPEARS, BUT SOMETIMES HAD SHOTGUNS. THEY WERE SOMETIMES USED AS GUIDES BY ARMY PATROLS. INTERLOCUTORS WHO HAD HAD CONTACT WITH THE RONDAS, INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT WORKERS AND JOURNALISTS, SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARMY MADE SERVICE IN THE RONDAS OBLIGATORY, IT GENERALLY WAS ACCEPTED BY CAMPESINOS AS A NECESSARY EVIL.

11. CONTACTS AGREED THAT THE MILITARY'S RELATIONS WITH THE CIVILIANS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WERE UNEVEN AT BEST. RACIAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES WERE STRONG BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICERS AND CAMPESINOS. ARMY OFFICERS WERE TRAINED TO DEMAND OBEDIENCE; MANY CAMPESINOS HAD A STRONG SUSPICION OF OUTSIDE AUTHORITY. SOLDIERS FROM THE AREA WERE NEVER USED IN AYACUCHO FOR FEAR OF SL INFRINGEMENT AND RELUCTANCE TO GET TOUGH WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION.


13. DESPITE SCATTERED SUCCESS STORIES, THE MILITARY STILL FACED SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. AYACUCHO'S BROKEN TOPOGRAPHY, A SERIES OF STEEP VALLEYS PUNCTUATED BY HIGH PLATEAUS OR JUNGLE, LIMITED THE TERRAIN THAT A BCG COULD PATROL. PATROLLING HAD DROPPED SHARPLY IN LATE 1985, FOLLOWING THE ACCOMARCA MASSACRE, BUT HAD INCREASED SINCE THEN (BUT NOT TO THE PRE-ACCOMARCA LEVELS). COMMUNICATIONS WERE NONEXISTENT IN MANY PLACES, AND HELICOPTER MOBILITY WAS ALMOST ZERO. BCG'S WERE ROTATED PERIODICALLY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE RONDAS COULD PROTECT THEMSELVES, BUT SL REMAINED SUPERIOR TO THE RONDAS AND, IN SOME CASES, HAD KILLED "DISLOYAL" RONDEROS ONCE THE ARMY HAD LEFT.

14. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY AND INTELLIGENCE REMAINED KEY PROBLEMS AS WELL. SL UNITS WERE SMALL AND MINGLED WITH THE POPULATION. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE HOW MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT WAS COERCED AND HOW MUCH WAS GENUINE. THE ARMY NEEDED INFORMANTS TO
P 211708Z JAN 87
FM AMBASSADRAY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6768
INFO AMBASSADRAY BOGOTA
AMBASSADRAY LA PAZ
AMBASSADRAY QUITO
AMBASSADRAY SANTIAGO
AMBASSADRAY CARACAS
AMBASSADRAY PANAMA
USAPSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
DEA HSQ WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

SECTION 04 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, OS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

IDENTIFY SENDERISTAS BUT USUALLY TRIED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THROUGH THREATS RATHER THAN PERSUASION.

CONFDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LIMA 00711 04 OF 08 211804Z

WHEN IT HAPPENED UPON PROBABLE SL MEMBERS, THE ARMY GENERALLY WOULD EXECUTE THEM AFTER EXTRACTING INFORMATION,
ACCORDING TO POLICE AND CIVILIAN CONTACTS, THERE WAS NO EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE SL MEMBERS TO TURN THEMSELVES IN. HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACTS SAID SL NO LONGER APPEARED TO ENCOURAGE BLOODY INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE. MORE SELECTIVE, SL STILL PROBABLY ACCOUNTED FOR 200 PLUS CIVILIAN DEATHS AND 50 PLUS MILITARY/POLICE DEATHS IN AYACUCHO IN 1986. ALL CONTACTS AGREED THAT GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAD DROPPED SINCE 1983-84 BUT STILL REMAINED AT SIGNIFICANT LEVELS. THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THE 1,100 REPORTED DISAPPEARANCES ON AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S LIST. DISAPPEARANCES HAD DECLINED FROM ABOUT 500 PER YEAR (IN 1983 AND 1984) TO ABOUT 100 PER YEAR IN 1985 AND 1986.

SEVERAL TIMES THAT MANY WERE REPORTED DISAPPEARED, BUT EVENTUALLY WERE TURNED OVER BY THE ARMY TO THE POLICE FOR INVESTIGATION AND, IN MOST CASES, THEREUPON FREED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. MOST OF THE DISAPPEARED IN 1986 AND PREVIOUS YEARS PROBABLY WERE SENDERO MEMBERS AND NOT THE PRODUCT OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE. NOTED FRUSTRATION WITH THE INABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN AYACUCHO TO ADDRESS THE MILITARY ROLE IN DISAPPEARANCES. JUDGES WHO TOOK HABEAS CORPUS ORDERS TO THE MILITARY BASE, SEEKING TO CHECK MILITARY DETENTION CENTERS, WERE NEVER ALLOWED TO ENTER.

16. DENIED THAT CHIEF ATTORNEY (FISCAL DE LA NACION) CESAR ELEJALDE HAD EXERTED PRESSURE TO COVER UP

ABUSES IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES (AS HAS BEEN ALLEGED); HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ARGUED OTHERWISE, NOTING VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF ANY TRIALS FOR THE PRE-1985 DISAPPEARANCES, AS WELL AS LACK OF ANY INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED 1985 UMARU/BELLA VISTA MASSACRE. DISAPPEARANCES HAD INDEED DROPPED IN 1985 AND EARLY 1986, BUT HAD PICKED UP AGAIN IN NOVEMBER WHEN PRESUMED SOLDIERS HAD "KIDNAPPED" 50 PERSONS, OF WHICH ONLY 30 HAD REAPPEARED AS OF DECEMBER.

50 UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS HAD DISAPPEARED ABOUT

Page: 10
DURING 1986. ALTHOUGH THE GREAT MAJORITY LATER TURNED 
UP IN POLICE CUSTODY, ONE PROFESSOR (LUIS RIVERA ARAGON) 
HAD NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE MAY. SEVERAL OF THE STUDENTS 
CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN BEaten DURING ARMY CUSTODY, HE SAID. 
17. ACCORDING TO POLICE OFFICIALS, THE ARMY ROUTINELY 
CARRIED OUT DETENTIONS IN AYACUCHO CITY AND ELSEWHERE. 
THEY USUALLY OCCURRED AT NIGHT, SUPPOSEDLY TO REDUCE 
 THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WITNESSES, AND TO STRIKE A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BLOW AT THE DETAINEE AND HIS FAMILY. THOSE 
DETAINED WERE HELD INITIALLY BY THE ARMY -- NOT THE 
INVESTIGATIVE POLICE. A TERRORIST WHO CONFOssED OR WHO 
WAS CAUGHT WITH COMPROMISING EVIDENCE GENERALLY WAS 
EXECUTED, THEY SAID. THOSE WHO APPEARED POSSIBLY 
INNOCENT WERE TURNED OVER TO THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE. 
MANY OF THESE SUSPECTS HAD BEEN BEATEN AND WERE TURNED 
OVER TO POLICE IN POOR SHAPE; IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEM-
SELVES FROM SUBSEQUENT ACCUSATIONS OF POLICE BRUTALITY, 
THE POLICE ALWAYS HAD A DOCTOR (MEDICO LEGISTA) EXAMINE 
SUSPECTS.

18. [ ] CONFIRMED THAT BEATINGS WERE COMMON, BUT 
CLAIMED THAT POLICE CARRIED THEM OUT AS WELL, ALTHOUGH 
NOT AS SEVERELY AS THE MILITARY. (A DIFFERENT POLICE 
OFFICER TOLD POLOFF IN JANUARY 1986 IN AYACUCHO THAT 

---

PAGE 01 LIMA 00711 05 OF 08 211804Z 
ACTION SCT-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-05 
NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00 L-02 AMAD-01 
TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-02 CCO-00 INRE-00 CA-02 FAA-00 
USSS-00 USIE-00 JUSE-00 FBJE-00 OC-02 FAIM-01 DS-01 
DSB-00 ZOVD-00 /028 W 
-----------------------------112123 211808Z /38

P 211708Z JAN 87 
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA 
TO SECSTATE WSHDC PRIORITY 6769 
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 
AMEMBASSY QUITO 
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 
AMEMBASSY CARACAS 
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 

---

UNCLASSIFIED
POLICE ORIGINALY HAD BEEN PRESENT IN MILITARY INTERROGATIONS OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS, BUT COULD NOT STOMACH CONFIDENTIAL

THEIR METHODS: "WE USE THE THIRD DEGREE, BUT THEY USE THE FIFTH DEGREE -- AFTERWARDS THERE IS NOTHING LEFT."

A COLONEL IN THE GUARDIA REPUBLICANA POLICE HAD BRAGGED OF A CASE IN WHICH HE HAD TAKEN A SUSPECT OUT OF THE CITY, ORDERED HIM TO DIG HIS GRAVE, AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM (THE COLONEL CLAIMED HE WOULD NOT HAVE CARRIED OUT THE THREAT). THE SUSPECT FINALLY CONFESSIONED AND WAS RETURNED TO JAIL. NEVERTHELESS, INDICATED SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE POLICE'S NEED FOR INFORMATION FROM TERRORISTS.

ARMY CASUALTIES REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUES -- OVER 20 TO ONE -- INDICATED A PRACTICE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. THEY POINTED TO OCTOBER KILLINGS AT POMATAMBO AND PARCCO, WHICH ORIGINALLY WERE CLAIMED IN ARMY COMMUNIQUES AS FIREFIGHTS, AND ONLY AFTER MEDIA INVESTIGATIONS WERE ADMITTED TO HAVE BEEN SUMMARY EXECUTIONS.

21. REPORTERS SAID POMATAMBO VILLAGERS CLAIMED THE ARMY PATROL HAD A LIST OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING THE SEVEN VICTIMS. THEY SPECULATED AN INFORMER PROVIDED THE NAMES, AND AGREED THAT THOSE EXECUTED POSSIBLY WERE SENDERISTAS -- THIS WAS ONE OF SL’S OLDEST OPERATING AREAS. THE PARCCO KILLINGS APPEARED TO BE MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC GAIN. ONE OF THOSE KILLED WAS THE CHURCH ADMINISTRATOR, AND VILLAGERS CLAIMED THE CHURCH’S CHALICE WAS TAKEN BY THE PATROL. TWO OF THE DEAD WERE OVER 80, AND TWO WERE CHILDREN (12) AND (4), UNLIKELY SL COMBATANTS. ARMY DAO CONTACT PROVIDED A DIFFERENT VERSION. HE SAID THAT SL CANGALLO UNIT LEADER WAS CAPTURED ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM A MEETING. PERSONNEL PRESENT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CONSIDERED GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION AND EXECUTED. (LATTER VERSION DOES NOT COVER PARCCO.)

22. OBSERVERS SAID PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WERE DIM SINCE, IN
THEIR VIEW, PRESIDENT GARCIA WAS UNINTERESTED IN
RISKING HIS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES.

UNCLASSIFIED

n/a

PAGE 01  LIMA 00711 06 OF 08 211804Z
ACTION SCT-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-05
NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00 L-02 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-02 CCO-00 INRE-00 CA-02 FAA-00
USSS-00 USIE-00 JUSE-00 FBJE-00 OC-02 FAIM-01 DS-01
DSE-00 ZOVD-00 /028 W

P 211708Z JAN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6770
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSo QUARRY HTS PM
DEAHQs WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

C OMISSIONED L SECTION 06 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSo ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

UNLIKE IN PUNO, THE CHURCH APPEARS TO HAVE PLAYED ALMOST
NO ROLE IN AYACUCHO, DUE TO THE STRONG CONSERVATIVE VIEWS

n/a
TO THE IU. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WERE INTERNAL PROBLEMS (CONTROL OVER THE AYACUCHO PARTY IS DISPUTED BETWEEN CAPPELLETTI AND CONGRESSMAN ALBERTO VALENCEIA). POINTING TO THE FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN 1986 OF DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES FOR AYACUCHO, HE ARGUED THAT THE GOP, AND APRA, WERE OFFERING THE CAMPESINO AN ALTERNATIVE TO SL. TOTAL AID AND CREDITS ROSE FROM INTIS 296 MILLION ($21.1 MILLION AT OFFICIAL 13.94 RATE) IN 1985 TO INTIS 1,295 MILLION ($92.9 MILLION) IN 1986. CAPPELLETTI ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS WOULD KEEP HIM FROM SPENDING THE ENTIRE AMOUNT ALLOCATED FOR 1986. BOTH HE AND IBARRA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR USAID'S SUPPORT OF LOCAL PROJECTS (THROUGH LOCAL CURRENCY GENERATED BY PL 480; TOTAL ABOUT $8 MILLION) BUT WERE CONCERNED THAT USAID SUPPORT WAS COMING TO AN END. (COMMENT: USAID WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GOP ACTIVITIES OF THIS TYPE. END COMMENT.)

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCOSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3CL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES WENT TO SHOWCASE PROJECTS THAT SOMETIMES WERE ILL-CONSIDERED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CORFA BUT NOT INADE PROJECTS AND PERSONNEL. THE REASONS, HE BELIEVED, WERE CORFA'S HIGHER PROFILE AND IDENTIFICATION WITH APA, AND INADE'S CONCENTRATION ON SMALL PROJECTS IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMMUNITIES. SL HAD STOPPED ONE INADE STAFFER IN APURIMAC BUT HAD NOT HARMED HIM.

27. NARCOTICS: SINCE THE EARLY 1980'S, COCA CULTIVATION HAS FLOURISHED IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA IN LA MAR PROVINCE. POLICE SAID COCA LEAVES WERE PROCESSED IN
LOCAL LABORATORIES, AND THE PASTS EITHER FLOWN TO LIMA OR TAKEN BY TRUCK. NO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY AUTHORITY TRIED TO CONTROL TRAFFICKING -- ALL POLICE RESOURCES WERE DIRECTED AGAINST TERRORISM. STATISTICS ON PRODUCTION AND OUTFLOW OF COCA WERE UNAVAILABLE. POLICE AND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, POINTED TO NOTICEABLE PRESENCE AND WEALTH OF SMALL LA MAR LANDHOLDERS, AND OF THE AYACUCHO MERCHANTS WHO SUPPLIED THEM. POLICE SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY NARCO-TERORIST TIES. INDEED, THEY NOTED THAT CAMPESTINS IN THE LA MAR AREA HAD THE BEST RONDAS IN THE DEPARTMENT AND FREQUENTLY FOUGHT SL. (DEA COMMENT: OUR INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMS THIS INFORMATION. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT COCA GROWING IN NORTHERN AYACUCHO IS SPREADING TO NEIGHBORING PARTS OF JUNIN AND APURIMAC DEPARTMENTS. COCA LEAF PRODUCTION IN ALL THREE ZONES IS VIRTUALLY UNCONTROLLED. DRUG POLICE HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME SECURING INFORMATION THERE. OPERATIONS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE ARE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. END COMMENT.)

28. COMMENT: WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF AN OCCUPIED CITY--THE MILITARY AND POLICE PRESENCE IS HUGE--DAILY LIFE APPEARS RELATIVELY NORMAL. THERE WAS NO APPARENT TENSION OR FEAR EVIDENT IN PERSONS ON THE STREET. DESPITE AYACUCHO'S SMALL SIZE, THERE IS A STRIKING LACK OF COMMUNICATION AMONG POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN NON-OFFICIAL CIVILIANS (SUCH AS THE UNIVERSITY) AND THE MILITARY COMMAND. THE MILITARY HAS A FIRM GRIP ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES, AND EVEN THE POLICE CHAFE UNDER THEIR CONTROL. DESPITE THE DROP IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN AYACUCHO CITY AND SOME OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO END IN SIGHT TO TERRORISM OR THE CURRENT MILITARY ROLE IN THE REGION. PART OF THE SOLUTION COULD BE TO ARM CERTAIN RONDAS, BUT THE MILITARY IS LEERY ABOUT ARMING UNTRUSTWORTHY CIVILIANS.

29. TO ITS CREDIT, THE GOP HAS INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE EMERGENCY ZONE AS PART OF ITS MUCH-TOUTED FOUR PART COUNTER-TERORIST STRATEGY (MILITARY, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL). COORDINATION PROBLEMS EXIST, SUCH AS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR ECONOMIC PROJECTS AND WORKERS. THE GOP HAS