1. **ENTIRE TEXT.**

2. **SUMMARY:** A SENIOR RETIRED GENERAL SAID CLANDESTINE "COMACA" ORGANIZING IN THE ARMY IS GROWING. HE HAD HEARD THREATS FROM COMACA OFFICERS TO KILL ARMY COMMANDER HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS IF THEY DID NOT RESIGN. HE SAID THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS WOULD ACCEPT A FULL

PAGE 02  LIMA 05862  01 OF  03  221917Z
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA,
DISPUTING GOP STATEMENTS THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD
PIT ARMY AGAINST CONGRESS. ARMY TRADITION
REQUIRED THAT HERMOZA ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY,
RATHER THAN HIDE OR PIN IT UPON OTHERS. HE
CALLED FOR STEPPED-UP USG PRESSURE AS THE ONLY
WAY TO KEEP FUJIMORI FROM BECOMING MORE
DICTATORIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. **MET WITH POLCOUNS ON MAY 21 TO DISCUSS TENSIONS IN THE ARMY.**

Current Class: [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J. OLSON
DATE/CASE ID: 2 AUG 2001 200003853
4. ____________________
BEGAN BY NOTING AREAS IN WHICH HE
HAD SUPPORTED THE GOP: ITS IMPROVED COUNTER-
INSURGENCY STRATEGY, WHICH HAD PERMITTED THE

PAGE 03  LIMA 05862  01 OF 03  221917Z
ARMY TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS; ITS
ECONOMIC POLICIES; AND THE APRIL 1992 COUP.
FUJIMORI, HOWEVER, WAS NOT CONSTRUCTING
DEMOCRACY, AS HE HAD PLEDGED, BUT RATHER WAS
CONSOLIDATING DICTATORIAL RULE. THE COMBINATION
OF HIS DICTATORIAL AMBITIONS AND BAD ADVICE FROM
MONTESINOS HAD LED TO FUJIMORI'S ATTEMPT TO
SUBJUGATE THE ARMY. ____________________ ADDED THAT HE
BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ABLE TO
CHOOSE HIS ARMY COMMANDER. THE CHOICE, HOWEVER,
SHOULD BE FROM AMONG THE ARMY'S TOP THREE
OFFICERS, AND NOT FROM THE MOST MEDIocre. THE
ISSUE WAS NOT ONE OF ARMY ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN
AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER ONE OF EXCESSIVE
POLITIZATION OF THE ENTIRE ARMY. OFFICERS TODAY
KNEW THAT ADVANCEMENT DEPENDED ON ONE'S TIES TO
MONTESINOS AND ASSOCIATES, RATHER THAN UPON
MERIT.

5. THE ASSAULT ON THE ARMY INSTITUTION HAD
BEGUN UNDER PRESIDENT GARCIA. GARCIA'S TACTIC
WAS TO ENTICE GENERALS INTO CORRUPT ACTIVITIES
AND THEN BLACKMAIL THEM. FUJIMORI, OF COURSE,
HAD GONE MUCH FURTHER: FIRING SENIOR OFFICERS
OR SENDING THEM ABROAD; PROMOTING PLUNKIES;

Current Class: ________

Page: 2
INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER ALL ARMY ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS; AND TURNING THE SIN AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE INTO A "GESTAPO" TO INTIMIDATE OFFICERS FROM RESISTANCE.

6. THAT SAID, THERE WAS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE.

PAGE 04 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 221917Z
THE CLANDESTINE OFFICER GROUP "COMACA" (GROUP OF COMANDANTES - LTC., MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS) HAD BEGUN UNDER GARCIA. HE HAD NO FORMAL ASSOCIATION WITH COMACA, BUT THAT ITS MEMBERS SOUGHT HIM OUT PERIODICALLY, AS DID MANY OTHER ARMY OFFICERS. HE BELIEVED THAT COMACA HAD GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE DECEMBER 1992, DUE TO THE MISTREATMENT BY THE GOP OF GEN. SALINAS AND HIS COUP PLOTTERS. NOW THERE WERE COMACA

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PAGE 01 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z
ACTION SS-00 INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W------C2BBC2 221921Z /38
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8576
INFO DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

SECTION 02 OF 03 LIMA 05862

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PIRN, PHUM, US, PE
SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE CELLS IN THE NAVY, AND EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THEM

Current Class:
IN THE AIR FORCE. HE DID NOT KNOW, AND DID NOT WANT TO KNOW, HOW MANY OFFICERS WERE IN COMACA, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR HOW MANY ARMY BASES REPORTEDLY HAD COMACA MEMBERS. SUCH GROWTH WAS REMARKABLE GIVEN THE SIN'S AND ARMY'S EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE GROUP AND TO ROOT IT OUT.

7. [Redacted] COMACA HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSUME [Redacted]

A LEADERSHIP ROLE AGAINST HERMOZA. HE HAD DECLINED, AND SUGGESTED COMACA INSTEAD SEEK SOME ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL, "BUT ROBLES DID NOT WORK OUT THE WAY THEY HAD HOPED." [Redacted] SAID HE HAD NOT SPOKEN WITH COMACA MEMBERS SINCE THE APRIL 21 "TANCAZO." THEY HAD, HOWEVER, INSISTED THAT IF HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS DID NOT RESIGN, COMACA WOULD ELIMINATE THEM. [Redacted] DISAGREED TOTALLY THAT ASSASSINATION WAS APPROPRIATE OR HELPFUL. HE DID, HOWEVER, TAKE THE COMACA THREAT SERIOUSLY. HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS WERE PUSHING COMACA TOWARDS MORE EXTREME BEHAVIOR.

8. REGARDING ROBLES, [Redacted] SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE HE REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. HE HAD DISLIKED ROBLES' MENTIONING OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS' NAMES IN HIS STATEMENT. [Redacted] SAID ROBLES HAD ALWAYS BEEN BETTER BEHIND A DESK THAN AS A COMMANDER. HE WAS, HOWEVER, HONEST. [Redacted] SAID IT WAS HERMOZA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER PERSON, WHO HAD PUSHED ROBLES TOWARDS HIS ASYLUM REQUEST. HIS READING OF ROBLES' ACTIONS WAS THAT ROBLES HAD USED HIS TWO ARMY OFFICER SONS AS CONDUITS TO COMACA OFFICERS (WHO OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE HAD A HARD TIME APPROACHING ROBLES WITHOUT DETECTION). ROBLES THEN MIGHT HAVE TOLD MILITARY JUDGE GEN. PICON, TO UNDERSCORE THE VALIDITY OF HIS INFORMATION ON LA CANTUTA, THAT IT HAD COME THROUGH HIS SONS. ONCE PICON BETRAYED ROBLES TO HERMOZA, ROBLES REALIZED HE [Redacted]
HAD JEOPARDIZED HIS SONS. THAT WOULD EXPLAIN ROBLES' HASTY DECISION TO PROTECT HIS SONS THROUGH ASYLUM.

9. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW ARMY OFFICERS VIEWED THE TANCAZO, THE ROBLES AFFAIR, AND POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, SEVERAL INSIGHTS:

-- FIRST, GEN. HERMOZA'S APRIL 23 COMMUNIQUE AND DISPLAY OF TANKS WAS, TO AN ARMY OFFICER, AS MUCH AN ADMISSION OF GUILT AS IT WAS A WARNING TO CONGRESS. IT DID NOT BOOST HERMOZA'S PRESTIGE IN THE OFFICER CORPS. AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE COMMUNIQUE AND TANCAZO HAD BEEN APPROVED BY FUJIMORI -- HERMOZA WOULD NEVER HAVE DARED DO IT ON HIS OWN.)

-- SECOND, WHILE NO ONE WOULD CRY OVER DEAD TERRORISTS, THE WAY THAT THE SIN/ARMY GROUP HAD CARRIED OUT THE DISAPPEARANCES HAD LEFT NO DOUBTS THAT THE ARMY HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE, AND HENCE THE DEATH SQUAD HAD DAMAGED THE ARMY'S IMAGE.

-- THIRD, DISMISSED AS ABSURD THE GOP'S CONTENTION THAT A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING SUMMONING LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS TO TESTIFY, WOULD BREAK ARMY MORALE, HURT THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT, INCREASE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, OR LEAD TO CALLS FOR A

PAGE 04 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z CONFRONTATION AGAINST CONGRESS. OFFICERS KNEW THAT IN THESE SITUATIONS, THE COMMANDING OFFICER HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY, STEPPING DOWN IF NECESSARY. FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, WAS A PROBLEM ONLY FOR HERMOZA AND HIS FRIENDS -- NOT FOR THE ARMY.

-- FINALLY, SHOULD THE GOP ONLY PUNISH SEVERAL LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE CRIME, THE RESULT WOULD BE TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY, SINCE HERMOZA WOULD BE SEEN AS GUILTY OF COWARDICE.
10. [ ] HE BELIEVED -- HE HINTED HE HAD INSIDE INFORMATION -- THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONSIDERING REMOVING HERMOZA ON INDEPENDENCE DAY (JULY 28). TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT, FUJIMORI WOULD ALSO CHANGE THE HEADS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER WOULD THEN REPLACE MALCA AS DEFENSE MINISTER, AND INTERIOR MINISTER BRIONES WOULD BECOME ARMY COMMANDER. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS TO ASSIGN FIRST MILITARY

11. NOTING HE WAS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN PERU, [ ] UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY ANSWER
WAS FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN FUJIMORI. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT LISTEN TO ANYONE ELSE IN PERU, HE DECLARED.

12. COMMENT: __________ REMAINS PLUGGED INTO THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS, AND WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS CLAIMS OF CONTACTS WITH COMACA. IN CONTRAST TO ROBLES, HE CAME ACROSS AS SERIOUS AND CONCERNED ABOVE ALL ABOUT THE ARMY INSTITUTION.

13. TWO ELEMENTS STAND OUT IN ANALYSIS. FIRST IS THE THREAT OF VIOLENT COMACA ACTIONS AGAINST THE ARMY LEADERSHIP OR MONTESINOS. WE HAD HEARD THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE FROM A SEPARATE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY SOURCE. SECOND IS __________ JUDGMENT THAT A FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, INCLUDING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JUNIOR OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL, WOULD NOT PROVOKE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ARMY RANK-AND-FILE. THAT, OF COURSE, CONTRADICTS THE GOP’S EXCUSE FOR TRYING TO AVOID A FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION THAT WOULD LIKELY FIND HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS AT LEAST POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES. VIEWS ON U.S. INTERVENTION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN CURBING FUJIMORI’S AUTHORITARIAN INSTINCTS IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY, GIVEN HIS STRONG NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS.

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