MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Initiative

At Tab B is the text of the exchange which President Yahya had with Prime Minister Chou En-Lai and President Yahya's comments on the Chinese reply. Chou En-Lai made the point that the Chinese reply represented the coordinated position of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Piao and himself.

At Tab A is a draft Note Verbale which would respond to the ChiCom communication and:

-- states U. S. pleasure at Peking's offer proffered at the February 20 Warsaw meeting to receive a U. S. representative to discuss outstanding issues between our two Governments;

-- welcomes high level discussions seeking the improvement of relations between our two countries; and

-- proposes a meeting of our respective representatives at the earliest possible moment to discuss the modalities of a higher level meeting.

Attachments

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. President:

The U.S. representative at the meeting between our two sides in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent policy of the United States Government to seek opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between us. The United States was therefore greatly pleased when your representative at the Warsaw meeting of February 20, 1970, expressed the willingness of your government to receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy.

In the light of your remarks to General Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions between our two countries. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, you should know that the policy of the United States Government is to reduce progressively its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.

[Signature]
The United States therefore proposes that representatives of our Governments meet together at the earliest possible moment, either in Rawalpindi or in some other convenient location, to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of our delegation, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in China.

His Excellency
Chou En-lai
Premier of the State Council
People's Republic of China
Peking
Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at 6:05 pm, December 9:

The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacating of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."

Chou En-Lai said, in the course of the conversation:

"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."