PREFACE A supply side strategy for cocaine would concentrate on Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. It would treat the problem as one of foreign policy that requires expert coordination of diplomacy, economic and military assistance, intelligence collection, operations, and sharing. Significant new resources would be required over a multi-year period, upwards of one billion dollars a year. The Andean governments would be expected to do most of the ground work themselves with their police and army, while the U.S. would provide financial and technical assistance. Our objective is to reduce substantially the flow of drugs by eradication (voluntary and involuntary), interdicting chemicals, labs, and equipment, as well as by breaking up the trafficking mafia.

Bolivia, Colombia and Peru are the cocaine problem. From these three countries, the problem emanates outward. A concerted effort to suppress narcotics trafficking in the Andes now will collapse current efforts to expand this illicit industry into Brazil, the Southern Cone, Central America, and Mexico.

The governments of the three producer countries are willing to take on the traffickers, but all are conscious of the cost of success. The U.S. must offer aid to compensate these countries for the social and economic costs of success against the drug trade, and military assistance to enable local forces to fight the trade directly. We should press our OECD allies for help in funding these initiatives, but we must not allow grandiose schemes for development assistance to substitute for the tough enforcement work that needs to be done. Foreign policy tools must do the lion's share of the work: international agreements on seized asset sharing, military and economic assistance in appropriate doses, and assistance in strengthening the Andean judiciary are all required.

It is important to note that these narcotics initiatives are interdependent. Widespread eradication of coca cannot occur without a development plan; interdiction cannot occur without a substantial commitment of intelligence resources; and involvement from multilateral organizations and donors will not happen unless the U.S. takes the lead by presenting a comprehensive plan of attack and a substantial commitment of resources and talent. The following is a list of options that can begin to address these problems.
OPTIONS

--ERADICATION-- Coca eradication remains the most cost-efficient method of reducing the supply of raw material used to make cocaine. An effective eradication program would employ aerially applied coca herbicides, in conjunction with a mechanized manual eradication program in areas that cannot be sprayed.

--Option 1: Press ahead with an aerial eradication program using environmentally safe and effective coca herbicides in Peru and Colombia.

--Option 2: Increase the pace and expand eradication operations beyond the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru and the Llanos area of Colombia to include other areas of coca cultivation.

--Option 3: Engage the Bolivians in negotiations to reconsider their ban on the use of any herbicides to eradicate coca.

--INTERD ICTION-- Narcotics, precursor chemicals, and other materials used to make cocaine are transported freely throughout the Andean region. Narcotics processing laboratories are also numerous and mobile. An upgraded air, river and road interdiction program will be required to target lab sites and shut down illicit traffic.

--Option 1: Initiate comprehensive riverine operations to cover all major waterways in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela. Enhance Brazilian precursor control program, thereby limiting a major source of raw materials.

--Option 2: Develop and deploy an aircraft tracking and interception system with Andean military participation to suppress illegal narcotics air traffic.

--Option 3: Increase the frequency and size of road interdiction operations to cut off coca cultivation areas and lab processing sites.

--Option 4: Enhance targeting and intelligence efforts required to support operations against base and cocaine producing laboratories.

UNCLASSIFIED
Option 5: Utilize DOD mobile training teams and seconded DOD personnel (PASAs) more widely to provide civilian agencies with para-military expertise in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

Option 6: Make the necessary resources available to allow the Andean countries to regularize simultaneous border interdiction operations throughout the year.

Option 7: Establish a legislative task force to recommend changes in security assistance legislation which impedes anti-narcotics enforcement programs in the Andes. Seek legislative changes based upon this study.

Neutralize Trafficking Organizations
Specifically, the Cali and Medellin drug cartels of Colombia appear to be the main organizations responsible for the processing and distribution of cocaine to the U.S. and Europe. Ways should be sought to upgrade law enforcement capabilities in the Andes so that their efforts to put major traffickers in prison and seize their profits are more successful. For a such a program to be successful, particular emphasis must be placed upon upgrading investigative and criminal justice institutions; specifically:

Option 1: Establish a working level ad hoc targeting group to identify major trafficking figures and investments.

Option 2: Assist Andean legal systems to adapt and expand legal concepts to include conspiracy and undercover operations against narcotics traffickers.

Option 3: Resolve impediments blocking extradition and expulsion procedures in the U.S. and the Andes.

Option 4: Engage the European community, Australia, Canada, Japan, etc. in multilateral efforts to overhaul Andean judicial systems, improve investigative procedures, and methods to protect judicial personnel from intimidation.
--Option 5: Clarify and streamline procedures related to sharing U.S. seized assets internationally.

--Option 6: Improve intelligence collection through better use of all available foreign and U.S. community assets. Systematically add to the number and type of assets directed at gathering intelligence on drug activities.

- **MILITARY INVOLVEMENT** In Peru and Colombia, progress against narcotics traffickers is linked to suppressing insurgent groups that have formed alliances of convenience with narcotics traffickers. Law enforcement agencies in these countries, although charged with fighting narcotics, have been unable to match the military skills and equipment of the insurgent groups allied with narcotics traffickers.

--Option 1: Recognize the interlinked nature of narcotics trafficking and insurgent groups in the Andes, and allocate sufficient MAP and IMET funds to allow the Andean military to devote significant personnel and equipment toward counter-insurgency operations.

--Option 2: Encourage the inter-operability of regional counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics forces, recognizing the parallel nature of the threat as well as the links that exist between some trafficking organizations and terrorist groups.

--Option 3: Provide substantial DOD mobile training team assistance directed toward counter-narcotics operations for the Andean military.

- **MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES** There is a need for a series of diplomatic/political initiatives to involve Andean and European countries in cooperatively addressing the drug problem.

--Option 1: Explore the possibility for multilateral action on narcotics following on the October 30, 1988 declaration of the Group of Eight calling for dialogue with the U.S.

--Option 2: Re-open the idea of an Andean Summit that the President would attend in an Andean capital to discuss the drug problem with other leaders in the region.
Option 3: Engage our European allies (France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) in an effort to improve the Andean judiciary.

Option 4: Engage international organizations, such as PAHO, OAS, and UNPDA in narcotics programs, particularly with regard to follow-on development projects.

DEVELOPMENT: In order to induce Andean governments to take tougher action against the coca trade, some economic support (particularly for Bolivia and Peru) will be necessary to mitigate the negative economic consequences of successful actions against the narcotics trade.

Option 1: Consider provision of a "superfund" of up to $500 million that could be used to support Andean countries that achieved set narcotics objectives and economic reform along market lines.

Option 2: Promote alternative income opportunities in the agricultural sector and elsewhere, both in and outside of coca growing zones. Expand agricultural research and extension programs.

Option 3: Seek waivers or legislative changes to lift sanctions on funds that are complementary to narcotics-related objectives. A modification of Brooke-Alexander sanctions should be sought to allow FMS and MAP grants for the Andes when such funding supports narcotics objectives.

Option 4: Increase Congressional awareness of the inter-related problems of drugs and insurgency in the Andes, as well as the role of economic growth in reducing the incentives for migration to coca growing zones, and in decreasing the reliance on narco-dollars to finance the countries' balance of payments.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: Government and public support for increased eradication, law enforcement and military assistance can be generated through a comprehensive public diplomacy program. Disinformation and opposition to vigorous enforcement programs have impeded success; a specific case in point is the campaign exaggerating health and environmental risks from herbicide use against coca.
--Option 1: Initiate a comprehensive, visible campaign to raise government and public (including European) awareness about the following issues:

(a) environmental damage caused by coca cultivators and cocaine traffickers;

(b) threats to stability of governments and institutions from drug trafficking and money laundering;

(c) exploitation of peasants, particularly children, in the cocaine trade;

(d) elements of successful narcotics control programs in other parts of the world.

--Option 2: Begin a comprehensive "civic action" program to build goodwill, leading to greater acceptance of U.S. presence and expertise in drug control initiatives.

--Option 3: Employ psychological operations to weaken support for drug traffickers.