MEMORANDUM

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WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION
November 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues

Chronology

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I held very intensive substantive discussions for some twenty-five hours, building on the solid base that we had established in our July conversations. We had an additional five hours of talks at two banquets that he hosted for us and I spent many more sightseeing hours with Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chi Peng-Fei, Acting Foreign Minister, and other officials which lent greater insight into Chinese thinking.

Chou and I met ten times at the Great Hall of the People and our guest house. The opening general session included all my substantive assistants plus Messrs. Chapin and Hughes on our side; our other meetings were private, with usually only one assistant on our side. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally flanked by Acting Foreign Minister Chi, their top American expert in their Foreign Ministry, Chang Wen-Chin, the secretary to the Prime Minister, Hsuing Hsiang-Hui, the Deputy Chief of Protocol, Wang Hai-Jung, plus interpreters and notetakers.

The first session on the afternoon of our arrival, October 20, was devoted to general philosophy, our overall approach to the People's Republic of China, the agenda for our discussions, and the major questions concerning your forthcoming trip. This was followed by over ten hours of very intense discussions in three meetings on Thursday and Friday, at which, in addition to your trip, we explored the major
issues that we had covered in July -- Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Asia, and arms control, as well as touching on other subjects by way of illustrations. Concurrently one of my assistants and the State Department representative held meetings on subsidiary issues such as ongoing diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade. And the technical people met on arrangements for your visit.

These substantive meetings provided the background and framework to enable me to begin discussions on a communiqué for your visit at the end of the meeting on Friday afternoon. On Saturday evening, in my sitting room, Chou and I settled the major remaining issues concerning the arrangements for your trip, and Chou said that his Acting Prime Minister would meet with us the next morning to talk about the communiqué. The next morning Chou showed up instead and delivered a sharp speech. The final five meetings, from Saturday afternoon through the morning of our departure, October 26, were taken up with further discussion on a possible communiqué, more substantive exchanges, and general views of philosophy and principles.

In addition, at the last session we resolved other outstanding technical problems such as the announcements concerning my visit and the date of your visit and the general public line the two sides would take.

Major Results

Against the backdrop of my July conversations with Chou there were no major surprises.

The basic premises on which we have both moved to open a dialogue remain. Both sides know there are profound differences but recognize that domestic and international constraints demand a phased resolution of outstanding issues. Meanwhile the very momentum of our joint initiative carries inherent advantages for them, the burnishing of their global credentials, and the prospect of a lower American military profile in Asia; for us, some assistance in reaching and safe-guarding an Indochina settlement, and built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia; for both of us, less danger of miscalculation, greater exchanges between our peoples, and a counterweight to the Soviet Union.
Chou confirmed an essential ingredient for launching this process and moving it forward -- Chinese willingness, despite their past rhetoric, to be patient on solutions. He was even more explicit than in July that they do not require time deadlines so long as principles are established. Several times he emphasized that the PRC, being a big country, could afford to wait on issues of direct concern, such as Taiwan, while the more urgent matters were those concerning her smaller friends, such as Indochina and Korea, whom one couldn't expect to have a broad perspective. This line is consistent with Peking's virtuous stance of championing the cause of smaller nations and refusing to be a superpower with its characteristics of bullying and overinvolvement.

Another consistent theme, as in July, was Chou's insistence on frankly acknowledging that there is much turmoil in the world and great differences between us. Both in our discussions and in the communiqué drafting, the Chinese showed their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or desirable as an end in itself, for submerging differences in ambiguous formulas of agreement, or for discussing such subsidiary issues as arms control, trade, or exchanges which only serve to make relations look more "normal" than they really are.

Among the general points that I emphasized were the fact that in some areas we could set trends but the policy implementation had to be gradual; that we should not push the process too fast because this would give your domestic opponents a chance to sink your initiative; and that Peking should not try to complicate our relations with our allies.

In brief, the essential outcome on each of the major topics was as follows:

--- Your trip. We achieved all of our major objectives, thanks both to our approach of minimizing our requirements and Chinese willingness to do all within their capabilities. The basic technical and substantive framework has been established: the arrangements have been agreed upon in principle; the substantive discussion clarified both sides' positions; and discussions on a joint communiqué have begun.

--- Taiwan. Both sides understand what can and cannot be done. We can begin gradually to withdraw our Vietnam-related forces from
Taiwan after the Indochina war; any solution of the Taiwan question should be peaceful. The PRC is in no hurry to get all our forces out but wants the principle of final withdrawal established; is most interested in global acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China and its status is not undetermined; will try for a peaceful solution of the issue; and strongly opposes Japanese influence or Taiwan independence.

--- Indochina. Peking will be helpful, within limits. Both in formal and informal talks the Chinese made it clear that they hope we achieve a negotiated settlement and are saying this to Hanoi. They recognize the desirability of tranquility in Indochina for your visit and our relations generally; indeed they consider it the "most urgent" question in the Far East. In addition to sounding these themes, I outlined the history of our private negotiations; stated that Hanoi needed Peking's largeness of view so that there could be a settlement; and warned that we have gone as far as we can.

--- Korea. We are both clearly sticking with our friends, but the working hypotheses are that neither side wants hostilities and neither Korea can speak for the whole peninsula. Chou pushed for equality for Pyongyang and said that a permanent legal resolution of the Korean war was required. I warned against North Korea's aggressiveness.

--- Japan. We agree that an expansionist Japan would be dangerous, but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relationship could prove to be one of our most difficult problems. The Chinese are painfully preoccupied and ambivalent on this issue -- they seem both genuinely to fear Japanese remilitarism and to recognize that our defense cooperation with Tokyo exercises restraint. The latter point I emphasized, pointing out that Japanese neutralism, which the PRG wants, would probably take a virulent nationalist form. I also warned against Peking's trying to complicate Tokyo-Washington relations, a seductive temptation for the Chinese to date.
-- Soviet Union. The Chinese try to downgrade the Russian factor, but their dislike and concern about the Soviet Union is obvious. I reiterated that we would not practice collusion in any direction, that we would treat both nations equally, and that we have many concrete issues with the USSR. Chou accepted the last point, including the fact that some of our negotiations with Moscow would work objectively to Peking's disadvantage.

-- South Asia. The PRC doesn't want subcontinent hostilities any more than we do. Indeed the Chinese seemed more sober about the dangers than they did in July. Chou reaffirmed their support for Pakistan and disdain for India. In turn I made clear that while we were under no illusions about Indian machinations and were giving Pakistan extensive assistance, we could not line up on either side of the dispute.

-- Subsidiary Issues. The Chinese clearly want to keep the focus on major bilateral and regional issues and not get sidetracked on more technical questions than suggest a regular bilateral relationship. Thus they showed almost no interest in arms control, airily dismissed the subject of trade, and unenthusiastically accepted idea of facilitating scientific, cultural, technical and journalistic exchanges.

Opening Session

A brief rundown of the opening meeting is important, because it set the basic framework and tone for all the subsequent conversations.

I began by delivering the opening statement which you have seen, with some of the rhetoric pruned. My approach was to sketch the general principles which guide our relations toward the PRC and our attitude toward your meetings with the Chinese leaders; lay out the agenda for the following days and secure agreement on how to conduct our business; and raise the principal questions concerning the technical arrangements for your visit.

I described the US attitude toward the PRC as the following:

-- You are personally committed to an improvement in relations;

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Our policy is based on the profound conviction that better relations are in our interest and is not an attempt to create a power combination;

We are aware that our two countries have different views and that neither the PRC nor the US would trade in principles;

We believe that our two countries share many congruent interests and that it is no accident that they have had such a long history of friendship;

Asian and global peace requires Chinese cooperation and we would not participate in arrangements affecting Chinese interests without involving the PRC;

We do not accept the proposition that one country can speak for all socialist countries;

I then set forth the case for gradual resolution of the issues between us, first implicitly by sketching the reactions to the July 15th announcement both at home and among our friends. I said that while we had set new currents in motion, we could not suddenly overturn traditional relationships; the old must coexist for a while with the new. Chou, here and later, acknowledged this but naturally his emphasis was on the importance of new departures. I added that foreign reaction to the July announcement was generally positive, but not all nations (e.g. the Soviet Union and India) really felt that way. I then emphasized the domestic problems you faced from some of your traditional sectors of support and the courage you have shown and which Reston had so much difficulty in acknowledging in his interview with the Prime Minister. (These were themes that I had instructed our whole party to stress in their social conversations.) Chou acknowledged that the PRC also had internal difficulties.

I then became more explicit about the need for gradualism. We had expected some of the adverse reactions and were determined to carry forward the constructive beginning that had been made in July. Both the PRC and we had been meticulous in implementing our understandings to date and were treating each other as men of honor. Looking to the future we had to sort out the questions which could be resolved immediately,
from those on which we could agree in principle but would need time to implement, and those which had to be left to historical processes. We would carry out scrupulously whatever we had agreed to; this phased approach was not a pretext for avoiding fundamental problems but a guarantee that we would be successful in resolving them.

I then suggested an agenda consisting of three types of subjects: (1) the major issues such as we had discussed in July; (2) other issues such as ongoing contacts and exchanges; and (3) the technical arrangements for your visit, the major aspects of which I then touched upon. (See the next section of this report.)

Chou and I then informally agreed on a game plan for the three types of issues. (This game plan was carefully followed over the next five days; On the technical subjects, I laid out the fundamental considerations and handed over the books we had prepared in advance. The Chinese studied these and came back with questions in meetings with technical personnel headed on our side by Messrs. Chapin and Hughes. The major issues were referred back to me and Chou and were settled in social and private sessions. Chou and I held a series of private meetings on the major substantive issues.

Chou made some preliminary comments on the substantive agenda which foreshadowed his approach on subsequent days. He termed Taiwan the crucial issue for normalizing our relations. He called Indochina the most urgent issue in order to relax tensions in the Far East. He moved Korea to third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July, citing both sides' responsibilities for settling this question which the 1954 Geneva Conference had not treated. His fourth and fifth topics were Japan, which he said had a far-reaching influence on reducing Asian tensions, and South Asia where both sides were concerned. He put relations with the Soviet Union sixth and last; this was not a main issue, as Peking was not opposed to our relations with any other country.

Then, clearly for the record, Chou once again said that they would prefer it if you visited Moscow before Peking. I subsequently repeated for the
record that it was we who had set the date for the Moscow summit, and this was based on the ripening of conditions, not on Peking's desires to interfere with US-USSR relations. Chou eagerly assented.

Chou came back to my statement that the old must coexist with the new. He knew that it was impossible for us to cut off all our traditional foreign policy relationships at once, but there was also a need to break with some conventions. He again referenced your July 6 Kansas City remarks about new power relationships and a speech that Prime Minister Heath had just delivered concerning Britain's future role. He said that Heath had shown courage by recognizing the necessities to adapt to the realities of the new Europe, just as you had shown courage in your China initiative. He noted that conservative parties were often the ones to make bold new moves, citing as additional examples Ike's ending of the Korean war, Lincoln's handling of the Civil War, and Britain's expelling of Soviet spies. Following his regular custom, he once again put Chairman Mao's stamp on your visit by saying that when you two meet it should be possible for you to understand each other even though your stands differ greatly.

I then sounded a warning about Peking's making trouble for us with our allies. First, I noted that we supported Britain's entry into the Common Market and a more unified and autonomous Europe. I added that we didn't seek to drive a wedge between the PRC and its friends, and it would be shortsighted if either side tried to use the improvement in our relations as a device to destroy the traditional friendships of the other side. This would only cause the two sides to draw back into the rigidity from which they were trying to escape.

Chou rejoined this was only part of the story and could not be accepted absolutely. Since we were entering a new era it was necessary that some relations changes; otherwise life would be as it was before. He cited an old Chinese proverb which says that "the helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves; otherwise it will be submerged by the waves."

I replied that we had no intention of avoiding difficult problems, such as Taiwan, but until we were able to cement our friendship we should not give domestic opponents on both sides an opportunity to destroy progress. Many were saying that China was only using the initiative as a trick to destroy
our traditional relationships so as to resume the old hostilities from a better
tactical position. Chou once again said that times were advancing and that
we would either seize upon the opportunities presented or be submerged
by the tides of the times.

This exchange set up the basic philosophic tension in our ensuing
discussions as we sought, generally successfully, to strike a balance
between their imperatives for change and ours for time.

Your Trip

You already know the agreements reached on the arrangements for your
visit through my earlier messages, our conversations, and Dwight Chapin's
separate report. Our approach was to scale down our requirements to the
minimum in advance, present all technical considerations in writing, let
the Chinese come back to us with questions, and not try fruitlessly to
squeeze extra mileage out of them once they told us what they would do.

This approach paid off handsomely. The Chinese appreciated our attitude,
knew that we were not bargaining in conventional fashion, carefully
clarified the issues so that they knew what was involved, and then agreed
to the maximum that their technical capabilities would allow. In each
case they met our essential requirements in terms of numbers and facilities,
and when we left, there remained only a few issues on the itinerary for me
to check with you.

At the opening session I outlined our general approach, stressed that we
would not let technical issues interfere with the historic thrust of your
visit, and then ticked off the major issues to be resolved:

-- On the itinerary, I said that we were thinking of a five-day trip
with perhaps one other stop besides Peking.

-- On communications, I stressed the need for secure and rapid
communications for the President at all times and said a ground
station was the easiest method. Chou asked when a Vice President
could take over some of the responsibilities of a President, and he revealed that he had read extracts of *Six Crises* which showed that you had restrained yourself when President Eisenhower was incapacitated.

-- On **security**, I said that we would rely on them as host country, that we had reduced our numbers drastically, and that the primary function would be for our men to serve as liaison with the Chinese security people.

-- On the **press**, I explained the dimensions of the corps on other Presidential visits and how we had cut back the numbers.

I then explained the books that we had prepared which showed the dimensions of past Presidential visits, the reduced optimum plan for your visit to China, and then the bare minimum plan that we had finally made. (During this exchange Chou revealed that after learning of your liking for it, he had seen the movie *Patton* and believed that you admired the General because he was one to break through conventions.)

Later in this opening meeting, after I made clear that we would still proceed with the summits in the order that they were announced, Chou moved quickly to indicate that the Chinese preferred the February 21 date. He thus made it clear that there would be no haggling over this issue despite whatever other differences might crop up during the next few days. He also indicated that the Chinese were thinking of a visit lasting seven days instead of the five that I had indicated.

During the first part of our first private meeting the next morning, Chou and I explored further some of the major questions concerning arrangements. We pinned down February 21 as the date for your visit, and we confirmed that neither side would say anything to the press during or after your visit which was not first mutually agreed upon.

We then discussed the **meeting between you and Chairman Mao**. Chou said that the Chairman wanted to meet you early during your visit, after greeting the official party, and again towards the end.
On the itinerary, we agreed that I would come back to Washington with two formulas, one for a five day visit and one for seven days. He said that he would accompany you wherever you went, made clear that they would expect you to travel on a Chinese plane, and introduced the idea of an overnight visit in Hangchow. There was further discussion of these issues during which I made another pitch for the ground station, and said that I would have to consult with you on the question of the aircraft, since an American President had never traveled on another nation's plane.

Meanwhile the Chinese technical personnel were studying for twenty-four hours the books we had given them. On Thursday afternoon they began two days of meetings with our counterparts during which they posed a series of questions to clarify the meaning of our presentations.

After a private meeting on late Thursday afternoon, I took Chou aside and expressed Mrs. Nixon's desire to see his country; he said he would check with Chairman Mao.

During our sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and Summer Palace, the Chinese mentioned Hangchow several times, underlining their hope you could go there. (Mao will probably be there, for in July Chou had said that you might be meeting him outside of Peking. Since there will be two meetings between you and Mao, there could be one in Peking early in the visit and one at Hangchow at the end.)

At 9:00 p.m. on October 23 Chou came to my sitting room in the Guest House and proceeded to settle the major outstanding technical issues. He first accepted the overall dimensions of the Presidential party and support group, i.e. some 350 personnel. He said the Chinese had accepted these numbers out of respect for our having cut down the figures drastically in advance. (Chinese acceptance included 80 press. This represents a large incursion for them, but they explained on other occasions that their only concern was whether they could properly accommodate all the journalists, including having sufficient interpreters.)

Having heard our preference for a five day visit and that a trip to Hangchow would increase the numbers, Chou began to back away from that suggestion. He said that we could compromise on a six day visit which included five days
in Peking and one day in Shanghai. Knowing of the intense Chinese interest in Hangchow, I said that I would be prepared to raise this issue with you. He then made clear, in typical Chinese fashion, that Mrs. Nixon would be welcome by saying that once she saw the villa in Hangchow she would not want to spend the night in Shanghai.

Picking up a reference I made to the legal aspects of sovereignty, Chou said they would like to buy the proposed ground station and Boeing 747 processing center, and if not they would rent it. I replied that it would be easier to lease it. As I then acknowledged to Chou, this was clearly an example of their "principled" approach on technical as well as substantive questions. They want to do things themselves and maintain their concepts of sovereignty. Within their capability, they would be as forthcoming as possible. Thus, this equipment was admissible so long as it "belonged" to them.

The only comments on technical matters with an edge to them were Chou's references to security. He made clear that this was the responsibility of the host country and several times noted our requirements with a slight dose of sarcasm. (The Chinese did show some genuine concern about the security problem caused by the large press contingent.)

We settled on the text of the communique for my visit and the October 27 release date and we agreed that the announcement of the date for your visit would be in the latter part of November. After first suggesting that the text of the latter could refer only to "late February," Chou was soon persuaded of the need to be specific about the date.

Chou then was once again very firm on your traveling in a Chinese plane, and I said I would discuss it with you. After some further discussion, which included agreement on what I would say at my backgrounder and my informing them of the upcoming Cannikin test, we adjourned the session.

This exchange left only a few loose ends which we have since tied up. At the final session, I confirmed that there would be another technical advance party, led by General Haig, after the announcement of the date of your visit. Since my return, we have informed the Chinese that Mrs. Nixon will accompany you and that we accept a seven day visit, including an overnight at Hangchow. We have also informed the Chinese
that we believe the date for the announcement of your visit should be November 23, 1600 Washington time. On the question of your travel within China, we should take some more time to respond so that the Chinese will realize that this is a major decision for us.

These discussions on arrangements for your visit confirmed both that our somewhat unconventional approach of presenting our minimal requirements at the outset made sense and that the Chinese do not engage in haggling over technical details once agreement in principle has been reached. Their acceptance of our numbers, their leasing of the ground station and 747, and their insistence on a Chinese plane for your travel within their country illustrate their basic attitude on arrangements.

Chou might have engaged in some brinkmanship by raising shadows about your trip while we were wading through some of the difficult substantive issues. He did not do this, partly because this is his style and partly because he needs the visit as much as we do. In any event, while we had some rough and tough private discussion, there was never any doubt cast by either side on the fact that your visit would proceed as planned.
Taiwan

This remains, as we always knew it would, the single most difficult issue. On the one hand Chou says that the PRC, being a large country, can afford to be patient; and that Indochina, and even Korea, are more urgent problems, because the PRC can be less generous about its allies' interests than about its own. On the other hand, the Taiwan question remains one of fundamental principle for Peking, as it has for 22 years and Chou has made it clear that there will be no normal relations until this problem is resolved.

Resolution of this issue in a way that allows our relations to move forward over the next few years depends on China's willingness to accept our thesis, that to push the process too fast and too explicitly could wreck the whole fabric of our China initiative.

Chou then asked a series of questions which underlined that their primary concern is not so much our policy but Japanese intentions and the possibility of Taiwan independence, neither of which we can completely control.

Chou reinforced this by relating some history including the U.S. role, to demonstrate why the status of Taiwan was not underdetermined and to underline PRC sensitivity to this issue. He then got to his point: what was the U.S. policy? Do we maintain that the status of Taiwan is still undetermined or was it: our view that Taiwan had already returned to China and was a province of China? This was the crucial question. How the Chinese people would solve the question of Taiwan was of secondary importance. He added that, as he had already said in July, the PRC would try to bring about a peaceful settlement of this problem. He acknowledged that this was a difficult question for us.

In response to Chou's question about what we would say if other countries were to raise the question of Taiwan's status, I said that I would have to check this with you.

Chou then raised the issue of our defense treaty, asking whether once Taiwan returned to the Motherland it would still have any effect. Chou
repeated that they considered the treaty illegal and that we should withdraw all our forces from the area. I said that we understood their position and that we hoped for a peaceful solution.

Chou emphatically stated that diplomatic relations between our countries were not possible until our forces had been withdrawn and the defense treaty had lapsed. They could not send an ambassador to Washington if another Chinese ambassador were there; it was possible for you and me to go to China since Peking considered there was but one U.S. and there was no competing U.S. ambassador in Peking. He pointed out that the presence of the Nationalists ping-pong team in the US had prevented the sending of the PRC ping-pong team. (In other contexts the Chinese indicated they still planned to send their team, however.)

I then pressed further on the need for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question.

Chou then dwelt further on his fear of Japanese influence in Taiwan, not only military but also political and economic, and he cited contacts between various Japanese elements and officials on Taiwan. I said that it was relatively easy for us to prevent the projection of Japanese military presence on Taiwan while our forces were there; but if we departed, this was less under our control.

I made the point that before diplomatic relations there should be visible signs of Sino-American cooperation such as exchange programs. I also warned Chou against exploiting US-Japanese differences, saying that we were coming under attack in some quarters for giving up Japan in our initiative toward China. There had to be some restraint on the Chinese side. He then claimed that they had shown restraint toward Japan and said that they would not deal with Sato.

That afternoon, October 21, Chou picked up the United Nations issue. He dispassionately noted PRC opposition to our position, and I explained that we had chosen this route over one that clearly indicated a two-China policy. Chou emphasized that the status of Taiwan was much more important to them than the UN seat and that they would refuse to go to the UN if our position prevailed. He then revealed that they didn't particularly like the Albanian Resolution either, since it did not specifically address the question of the status of Taiwan. (At our
final meeting which as it turned out, occurred at the very end of the UN debate, Chou pointedly complained that his talking to me at this time was very embarrassing for China's friends at the UN.)

When I invited Chou's views on a successor to U Thant, he offered nothing, saying that they had not thought about the matter. He did take the occasion to praise Hammarskjold and indirectly denigrate U Thant, a sign that the PRC might want an activist Secretary-General.

Chou concluded the brief UN discussion by repeating the need to make progress on the Taiwan question. I again pointed out that if we moved too quickly on this issue our opponents could destroy the fragile relationship that we were trying to build with the PRC. I acknowledged the PRC's need to show some progress, but repeated that if we went too fast, we would tear the whole fabric of our relationship.
Indochina

Our discussions on the afternoon of October 21 on this subject were generally similar to those we held in July.

I underscored the reasonableness of our approach, pointing out that our negotiating proposals had addressed every concern of their allies. I stressed the advantages to the PRC of an Indochina settlement and the risks of continued conflict, on the other hand. Chou reiterated that peace had to be made with Hanoi directly, but explicitly hoped that negotiations would succeed. As in July, he was obviously uninformed about the details of our negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

Chou led off the session by citing Indochina as an urgent issue. He asked why we had not accepted, or at least replied to Mme. Binh's seven points. Chou said that our not setting a date for final withdrawal could prevent your visit to China from being as successful as otherwise, although he made clear that this was not a condition. He repeated the PRC's support for the seven points and said that final decisions on a settlement rested with Hanoi, not Peking.

Telling the Prime Minister that he had been misinformed about the negotiations, I proceeded to give him a rundown of our negotiating efforts over the summer. I pointed out how we had met all of the concerns of the North Vietnamese and the PRG, even to the point of using some of their formulations. We had addressed ourselves primarily to the North Vietnamese nine point proposal which, according to Hanoi, superseded the PRG seven points.

Chou then asked a series of questions about our withdrawals, elections, and the ceasefire. Chou said that our withdrawal would be a "glorious act" for us, and I responded that we had to find someone with whom to negotiate. We would withdraw in any event: the only question was whether it would be slowly through our unilateral policy or more quickly as a result of negotiations.

Chou made a distinction between Vietnamese and Indochina-wide ceasefires. He expressed concern that an Indochina ceasefire would freeze the political situation in the entire region (his main problem being Sihanouk's status, of course). We then had a testy exchange on Cambodia where I pointed out that there would not be any need to arrange a ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops would withdraw and let the local forces determine their own future. Chou did not deny their presence; he said that they were there in sympathy for their South Vietnamese compatriots. In order to explain Hanoi's suspiciousness, he recalled the "deception" of 1954 when the North Vietnamese had been tricked.
and no election had been held. Getting quite excited, he termed this a "dirty act", launching into Dulles. I replied that the guarantee for our actions in a peace settlement lay not in clauses but in the difference in our world outlook compared to the Dulles policy of the 1950's.

I again pointed out the generosity of our proposals. Chou said that he could not comment on our offers since he did not know about them in detail. He maintained that Hanoi's preoccupation and suspicion were understandable for a small, deceived country. The North Vietnamese could not be expected to have a large view like the Chinese. In any event the settlement was up to us and Hanoi. (Marshal Yeh on another occasion told me that Hanoi was too proud; having, as it thinks, defeated the world's largest military power, Hanoi was very reluctant to take advice. In this it was egged on by Moscow. Peking, according to Yeh, genuinely wanted peace, but it did not want to make it easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina.)

I then summed up:

-- I had made several secret trips this year to Paris which was not the activity of a government seeking to prolong the war;

-- We were no long-term threat to the independence of Vietnam and wanted to make peace;

-- We recognized the limits to what the PRC could do and the complications of the Soviet role, but nevertheless if the opportunity presented itself, we would appreciate Peking's telling its friends its estimate of the degree of our sincerity in making a just peace.

Chou again commented that they hoped we could settle and get out, whereas the Soviet Union wished to pin us down. He said it would be impossible not to mention Vietnam in the communique if the war had not been settled. I rejoined that there should be no misapprehension that Vietnam was an extremely sensitive issue for us and that it was impossible to accept a communique that was critical of us. When Chou asked why we had not made a public pledge of final withdrawals, I said this would gain us two to three months of favorable headlines, but we were interested in making a settlement rather than empty propaganda victories.

Chou concluded by again wishing us well in negotiations, calling Indochina the most urgent problem with regard to the relaxation of tension in the Far East, and saying that U.S. withdrawal would be a glorious act. I closed
with the hope that he understood what we were trying to do even though we
recognized that the PRC had to support its allies. When I said that the
Prime Minister should teach his method of operation to his allies, he
commented that the styles of various countries differed and that they
couldn't impose their will on their friends.

In a subsequent session where Chou was bearing down on the issue of foreign
troops, I pointed to the Chinese forces in Laos. He said that these were
ordinary workers plus antiaircraft forces needed to protect them. If peace
came, the latter could be withdrawn "in a day's time." In any event these
personnel were building the road at the request of the "neutralists" and
would all leave when the job was done.

In our last meeting Chou made the rather remarkable comment that he
believed we "genuinely want a peaceful settlement."

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Korea

Chou devoted considerable time and passion to this subject, which he placed as number three on the agenda. In East Asia, the three principal "powder kegs", in his view, were Taiwan, Indochina and Korea, with the last two the most urgent. (This had some quality of being for the record to prove loyalty to allies.)

He opened his presentation on the afternoon of October 22 by regretting, as he had in July, that the 1954 Geneva Conference had not settled the Korean question. A ceasefire had been reached but no treaty had been concluded and a serious crisis could therefore arise. He said that the Panmunjom meetings had gotten nowhere, that North Korea had no participation in the UN debate, and that North Korea could participate in UNCURK only under unacceptable conditions. He noted with approval the recent opening of talks between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea.

Chou continued as follows:

--- U. S. military forces should withdraw from South Korea as Chinese forces had done in 1958. He acknowledged that we had already taken out a third of our troops and said that we had paid a great price to do it, i.e. extensive military assistance.

--- The 1965 treaty with Japan was even more serious and there was the possibility that Japanese military forces would replace American ones.

--- If there were increased military strength and hostilities after we withdrew this could not but directly affect relaxation of tension in the Far East.

--- Their Korean friends were "most tense" and this could not but affect the Chinese Government and people.

Chou then handed over a list of eight points from the North Korean Government, published in April 1971. This document is a generally abusive series of demands upon us to withdraw our forces and military support for Korea, give North Korea equal status, prevent Japanese influence, disband UNCURK, leave the Korean question to the Koreans themselves, and let North Korea
participate in the UN debate unconditionally. Chou reaffirmed the importance of this question and noted that while big China could live with the problem of its divided status for a while, the PRC could not ask its smaller friends, Vietnam and Korea, to be so patient.

I retorted in extremely sharp fashion. I said that the Nixon Administration was dedicated to improving relations and easing tensions in East Asia, but we reject the translation of this goal into a series of unilateral demands upon us. We could not accept a paper which listed all the things that the U.S. "must" do and called our ally a "puppet." The PRC had never done this, and we respected it for standing by its friends. But it was important for North Korea, as it was for North Vietnam, to show some of the largeness of spirit of its ally.

Chou backed off from the abusive language, stating that it was "firing empty guns." I said that the substance was more important in any event. I clarified what the objectives in the peninsula should be. We were prepared to discuss the possibility of a more permanent legal basis for the existing situation in Korea, but we were not interested in a legal situation that made the reopening of hostilities possible (i.e. we would not scrap present arrangements so as to invite aggression). When I noted that our ultimate objective was the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, Chou again raised the fear of Japanese troops replacing ours. I assured him that our policy here was the same as on Taiwan, namely that it was not our objective to replace our forces with Japanese self-defense forces and that we were opposed generally to the military expansion of Japan. Chou declared that the PRC attached great importance to that statement.

I then pressed Chou further to clarify Chinese objectives. I said that if their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, and lessen the danger of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and American interests were quite parallel. If, on the other hand, their goals were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and make it easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the South, then a different situation existed.

Chou stressed that the PRC was interested in equal legal status for both Koreas. Reunification should be left to the future.

In our further exchanges I said that it was our policy:

- Not to allow Japanese military forces to enter South Korea to the extent that we could control this.
At the end of our discussion, Chou in effect accepted our position that the issue of Korea would take time but that opinions could be exchanged in the interim. There was some agreement on general objectives although not about specific methods and we had reached no conclusion about the way peaceful reunification should be effected.

Chou again emphasized that keeping Japanese military forces out was paramount. I said that we would attempt to do this, but that if North Korea should start aggression then one could not be sure of the consequences. I made very clear that whatever we could do in Korea depended on North Korean restraint. Chou agreed that all these issues were mutual and that both of us should use our influence with our friends to keep them from military adventures. He cautioned, however, that the era of negotiations, such as the Red Cross meetings, could be the era of "dragging out!" and while they would wait on Taiwan, it was harder for their smaller friends to be patient.
Japan

In addition to discussing Japan's role in Taiwan and in Korea, reported elsewhere, Chou En-lai and I talked about Japan's future in Asia in our afternoon meeting on October 22. We agreed that neither country wanted Japan to rearm and to resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the 1930's and 1940's. But we disagreed on the best way to assure that this would not happen.

Chou suggested that we drop our mutual defense ties and that Japan pursue a policy of neutralism, and I sharply rejoined that this was the best way to encourage a remilitarized, expansionist Japan and that the security we provided exercised restraint. I think Chou recognized the validity of our arguments, but obviously had difficulty acknowledging the virtues of a U.S.-Japan defense relationship. His ambivalence was reflected in his uncharacteristically lame presentation, during which he seemed unsure of himself, his strategic arguments were weak, and he continued to fall back on pat phrases.

At my invitation, Chou outlined Chinese views of Japan:

-- Japan's "feathers have grown on its wings and it is about to take off", i.e. its tremendous economic expansion was inevitably leading it toward military expansion;

-- Its economic assistance to other countries was not to help them develop but rather to establish Japanese economic domination;

-- The Soviet Union was looking for Japanese investment and markets and was encouraging it to be more aggressive;

-- China was not hostile toward Japan, and great changes have taken place in both countries since the war; the PRC was ready to conduct its relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I questioned Chou on what he meant when he said that the PRC wanted Japan to pursue a policy of "peace and friendship", he defined this as Japan's recognizing the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, giving up all ambitions for both Taiwan and Korea, and respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China. I responded as follows:

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-- China's philosophic view had been generally global while Japan's had been traditionally tribal;

-- Japan had always thought that it could adjust to outside influences and still maintain its essential character;

-- Japan was subject to sudden explosive changes, such as going from feudalism to emperor worship and from emperor worship to democracy in very short periods;

-- These Japanese traits imposed special responsibilities on those who deal with them;

-- We had no illusions about Japanese impulses and the imperatives of their economic expansion;

-- The present situation is a great temptation for everybody, especially the PRC and the USSR, since Japan's orientation has been made uncertain by the July announcement.

I then said that the Soviet Union had made a special effort to exploit the situation and the PRC had too -- I cited a People's Daily September 18 editorial which said that the U.S. could betray Japan at any moment. I sharply warned that such competition could only encourage Japanese nationalism. The present relationship with the U.S. exercised restraint on Japan; conversely, leaving Japan on its own would be a shortsighted policy. Someone would be the victim, for neutralism in Japan would not take the form of Belgian neutralism which had been guaranteed by others, but rather that of Swiss and Swedish neutralism which rested on large national armies. Both those Americans who believed that Japan would blindly follow the American lead and those other foreigners who tried to use Japan against the U.S. were shortsighted. It was therefore important that both the PRC and the U.S. show restraint on this issue.

I then repeated that we opposed a nuclear rearmed Japan no matter what some officials might suggest to the contrary, and that there must be restraint on all sides. When Chou claimed that a nuclear umbrella tended to make Japan aggressive against others, I said that the alternative of Japan's nuclear rearmament was much more dangerous. There was no question that if we withdrew our umbrella they would very rapidly build nuclear weapons. When Chou asked whether we were capable of limiting Japan's self-defense strength, I said that I could not promise this, but that we would have a better opportunity to do this with our present relationship than in a situation
when Japan felt betrayed by us and Japanese nationalism asserted itself, I said that we had no incentive to encourage Japan to be dominant twenty-five years after World War II when we had fought against this very concept.

Chou noted that the Russians were cooperating with the Japanese and trying to use them in Siberia. I commented that I thought that they would pull back once they were confronted with Japanese methods and that in any event it was dangerous for the Russians to what Japanese appetites for Siberia. I thought both sides would play with each other but neither would reorient itself that completely. Chou again was skeptical on whether the U. S. could control the "wild horse" of Japan, and I again rejoined that while we couldn't do this completely, we had a better chance of controlling the military aspects under present arrangements than under the neutralism that he was pushing.

We ended up agreeing to disagree, with my commenting that our two countries had certain parallel interests with regard to Japan.

Chou closed by noting that we had helped Japan greatly to fatten itself, which I acknowledged. I pointed out that we did not need Japan for our own military purposes and that whenever Japan wanted us to withdraw military personnel we would do so. However, this would not be cause for Chinese rejoicing.
South Asia

This issue surprisingly consumed much less time than I expected, and while China clearly stands behind Pakistan, I detected less passion and more caution from Chou than I had in July.

Chou opened up by saying that the situation was very dangerous and asked for our estimate.

I made the following points:

-- At first India had a reasonable complaint about the political and economic burden of the refugees coming from East Pakistan. We had moved to meet this problem by providing over one-half of the foreign relief to refugees in India, or nearly $200 million.

-- However, India might be tempted to take advantage of the crisis as a means of settling the whole problem of Pakistan, not just East Pakistan. The Indian strategy apparently could be to change abruptly the situation in East Pakistan so as to shake the political fabric of West Pakistan.

-- I then outlined U. S. policy and the steps we had taken to support Pakistan in the consortium, debt relief, and other bilateral areas. I emphasized our total opposition to military action by India. I added that we had urged the Russians to exercise restraint. They had told us they were trying to do so, but we were not sure whether this was in fact the case.

-- We thought there was a danger of hostilities in the near future.

-- Finally, I outlined our proposal that both forces withdraw their troops from the border and that Yahya make some political offers so as to overcome hostile propaganda and make it easier to support him in the UN and elsewhere.

Chou thanked me for this information and said that he wished to discuss this issue the next day in more detail. He commented that Tito had been persuaded to the Indian view by Mrs. Gandhi, and this plus Soviet support would increase the risk of Indian miscalculation.
I then stated that we had no national interest in East Pakistan and only wanted the political solution there to reflect the will of the people. We had made many proposals to India to separate the refugee problem from the political evolution in a way that would not prejudge the future. However, India had not responded.

Chou commented that the Soviets were exploiting the situation, as part of their general strategy of exploiting contradictions in Asia so as to free their hand in Asia. He thought this was "a very stupid way of thinking."

Perhaps significantly, Chou, despite his promise, never came back to this subject. This might be partly due to the fact that we spent so much time on other subjects. However, there were opportunities to raise South Asia again in our subsequent meetings if Chou had really wanted to.

In any event, China still stands clearly behind Pakistan. However, I believe the PRC does not want hostilities to break out, is afraid of giving Moscow a pretext for attack, and would find itself in an awkward position if this were to happen.

Chou surely recognized from my presentation that we have too great stakes in India to allow us to gang up on either side. Nevertheless he did not attempt in any way to contrast their stand with ours as demonstrating greater support for our common friend, Pakistan.
Soviet Union

Chou initiated this topic by asking our views, and I replied as follows:

-- The Moscow summit would now take place because the necessary conditions had been met.

-- Our July 15 announcement had not changed the direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners. I had pointed out in my opening statement that this announcement had triggered an extraordinary amount of Soviet diplomatic activity.

-- We have a number of concrete issues with the Soviet Union which we have every intention of pursuing, such as SALT and Berlin. The Russians were now pressing us very hard on a European Security Conference.

Chou commented acidly that in the final days of the Berlin negotiations the Soviet Union had made concessions very rapidly and given up all their principles. He said indeed that the Berlin Agreement had turned out to be much more substantive, with Soviet concessions, than he thought it would be. I responded that the agreement would primarily concern access procedures and asked him what other concessions he thought Moscow had made. He said that the Russians had conceded that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, which they had never done before and which would embarrass East Germany.

I pointed out that the Soviet Union might wish to free its hands in Europe so as to concentrate elsewhere, and Chou admitted this possibility. There was a contradiction in the Soviet policy -- on the one hand they wanted to ease tensions so that they could concentrate on the East, but on the other hand their policy was apt to loosen things up in Eastern Europe. I said that we recognized that the Berlin Agreement increased Chinese problems, and Chou responded "that does not matter." I assured him that we did not make deals for that purpose.

(On the way to the airport Marshal Yeh said that he thought the Soviet Union wanted to settle the Middle East so that it could concentrate on China. He therefore hoped we would settle our problems with China quickly.)
I summed up our discussions by echoing some of the themes I had sounded in my opening statement with regard to our policy toward Moscow. I repeated that we would conclude no agreements that would work against Peking, and that anything Peking heard from other sources about what was going on could not be true.

Throughout our meetings Chou often interlaced disdainful and hostile comments about the USSR, but always in the tone that the PRC was not afraid of any confrontation. He referred to their petty negotiating tactics, their sticking their hands out in various places, and their complicating of efforts for an Indochina settlement (a point reiterated by Marshal Yeh in one of our sightseeing conversations).

As for our policy, the Chinese should be under no illusions that we fully intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking, that we have a number of concrete areas of interest with the Russians, and that while we will not conclude any agreement with the purpose of complicating Chinese problems, we cannot be held accountable when the objective consequences of such dealings have this effect.
Arms Control

Chou reflected the same Chinese disinterest in this subject that was so manifest in July.

He referred to the Soviet proposal for a five power nuclear disarmament conference, and I recalled that we had in effect rejected this proposal also. He then inquired about the new Soviet initiative in the United Nations for a world disarmament conference. I noted that although it was not a formal proposal, we would have to reply; I thought all countries, whether in the UN or not, would be included. When I asked about the Chinese attitude, he responded that he thought the Soviet proposal might be an attempt to reply to the Chinese initiative for a world nuclear disarmament conference, but pointed out that the Soviet idea concerned general disarmament, not just nuclear disarmament. I commented that Khrushchev had made a similar proposal every year and we did not consider it very useful. Chou then labelled the Soviet proposal unrealistic and an exercise in firing an "empty cannon" (a phrase he had used to describe Chinese propaganda against the U.S.). Nobody really needed to pay attention to it; it would waste the time and energies of nations. I said that we would try to deflect discussion on this initiative into specific subjects and try to treat problems on a regional basis rather than on a global one.

I think we have made a useful record of making clear to the Chinese that we are not trying to conclude arms control agreements at their expense, that we recognize their current lack of interest in the subject, and that we are always ready to conclude with them any agreement that we have made with the Soviet Union. While I do not think they will want to discuss these subjects seriously in the near future, our stand should be both reassuring to them and a clear demonstration of reasonableness and equal treatment.
Subsidiary Issues

I knew in advance that the Chinese would be cool to proposals in the commercial and exchange program fields. In the Warsaw talks they resisted our approach of focussing on these side issues. Even now that we are talking about Taiwan and other major issues, they want to keep the emphasis there and away from areas which suggest a "normal" relationship.

I sought to meet this resistance head on in my opening statement by acknowledging their attitude and explaining ours. We considered progress in these fields not as a substitute for fundamental agreements but rather to give impetus to them. It would keep off balance those who wished to see the new U.S.-China dialogue fail. Chou and I agreed that such questions could be discussed by our assistants while we held private talks on the major issues.

These side discussions touched upon three questions: continuing US-PRC contacts; exchanges between the two countries in the fields of science and technology, culture, sports, and journalism, and bilateral trade (in brief and low-key fashion).

On continuing contacts, the Chinese reaffirmed their backing of a proposal Chou had made in July - the sending of a high-level U.S. representative to the PRC from time to time. The Chinese were not interested in more formal contacts such as "liaison offices" or "interests sections" in friendly Embassies on the grounds that the liaison arrangement they had with Japan was entirely non-governmental and that the presence of a Chiang Kai-shek Embassy in Washington precluded their establishing an interests section here.

Cautious interest in exchanges was displayed by the Chinese. Our side explained the rationale for and outlined a broad spectrum of exchanges in a variety of areas, and the Chinese accepted a representative list of possible programs. They indicated that while there would be exchanges, these would be strictly non-governmental and limited in number from the Chinese side.

When we raised the subject of trade and said we were prepared to liberalize our restrictions further, they said bluntly that they had absolutely no interest in the matter. Indeed they were grateful that the USSR and the US had caused them to be self-reliant.
Of possible follow-up interest was a strong statement against hijacking -- whatever the motive -- by Chou in one of our private meetings.

The Chinese disinterest in these subsidiary issues probably stems partly from a wish to focus more on the fundamental issues in the US-PRC relationship, and partly from a desire to preserve as much ideological purity as feasible by not appearing to rush into a too-active program of contacts and exchanges with the U. S. As for trade, they may not have defined their goals and probably see little immediate potential in any event.

On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to appreciate our rationale for seeking to make some progress on subsidiary issues: that this would help make movement possible on the more fundamental questions and convince detractors of improved relations that gains could, in fact, be made from this course.