SECRET

P 221359Z JAN 93
FM AMEBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5157
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00756
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, SNAR, PHUM, PE
SUJEBCT: COMMENETS ON FUJIMORI, MONTESINOS, BUT NOT ON BARRIOS ALTOS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

"PRESIDENT FUJIMORI HAS A GOOD THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS; IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, FUJIMORI IS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE PRINCIPLES TO ACHIEVE A QUICK VICTORY."

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OVER TERRORISM. CHARACTERIZED PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS AS CONSUMED BY AMBITION. THE FUJIMORI/MONTESINOS TEAM IS GOVERNED BY AN OBSESSION FOR QUICK RESULTS THAT OFTEN LEADS TO UNWISE POLICY MOVES. BARRIOS ALTOS WAS TOO HOT; TO TOUCH.

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REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

FOIA/PA
( ) Release
( ) Excise
( ) Deny

Mandatory Review
( ) Declassify
( ) Declassify in Part
( ) Class. Ret/Renew

Exemptions

ARP Action Cert. 02/07/02

Page: 1
Fujimori and Human Rights

7. Charge said he had the impression that President Fujimori understood this truth and was applying it in practice. Certainly, Fujimori's discussion of the issue with us and his public speeches reflect a comprehension of the damage human rights violations do to a government's overall strategy, although certain continuing secret practices indicate that the government has not done enough to root out the bad practices of the past.

8. Fujimori shows a good understanding of the theory. In practice, however, he is governed by other considerations. Fujimori is absolutely committed to destroying Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA within his five year term and is prepared to countenance any methods that achieve that goal. The President is convinced that the only way to eradicate SL is by physically eliminating the members of the organization; overall government counter-terrorism policy reflects this.

Sendero Luminoso is a deeply rooted movement and cannot be quickly defeated. It has been badly hurt by the reverses of the past year, but could easily evolve into something equally dangerous, such as a purely terrorist organization based on small, hard to detect cells. Consistent, long term policy approaches are needed to attack it, not quick fixes.

Changes in Statistics
9. **SECRET**

Why human rights abuses declined numerically:

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From mid-1991, noting that many believe that this change reflects a conscious decision on the part of Fujimori. The main reason is that terrorist activity began to decline in this period. SL, the main source of violence, suffered the effects of too rapid a growth in the late 1980’s. From a few hundred activists it ballooned to thousands. Command and control consequently suffered and the group lost a good part of its strategic thrust. Also, internal events in SL, such as the mysterious death of Abimael Guzman’s wife (comrade Norah) thought by many to have been killed by Guzman) and the famous “Zorba the Greek” video which showed Guzman to be a libertine, created dissention that undermined SL’s cohesion and effectiveness. International pressure on human rights also led the security forces to exercise greater control to limit indiscriminate abuses.

Montesinos: Blind Ambition

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10.

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The role of Vladimiro Montesinos, president Fujimori’s advisor, in the counter-terrorism programs of the government. Montesinos is Fujimori’s intelligence coordinator.

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11.

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NODIS, ONLY

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HE ALWAYS SHOWED A DESIRE TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH POWER, AND IN THE 1970’S WAS CLOSE TO THE TOP MILITARY FIGURES OF THE VELASCO REGIME. “HE WAS CASHIERED FROM THE ARMY FOR REASONS THAT ARE OBSCURE.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PTEIR, PINS, SNAR, PHUM, PE
VIDAL SAID. MONTESINOS THEN DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT.

MONTESINOS WAS FOCUSED ON ONE THING: POWER, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. HE WAS INTELLIGENT, ARTICULATE, AND ABLE AND BEGAN HIS SUCCESSFUL LAW CAREER TAKING CLIENTS WHO COULD PAY THE MOST. THIS LED HIM TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS WHO ALWAYS PAID WELL. MONTESINOS ALSO CULTIVATED USEFUL POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, WHICH IN THIS PERIOD MEANT AMONG THE APRISTAS WHO WERE THEN IN POWER. ONE OF HIS KEY ALLIES WAS A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HUGO DENEGRIS, WHO WAS PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO MONTESINOS.
TRIED TO MAKE DENCIGRI ATTORNEY GENERAL, BUT WAS
FORCED TO BACK OFF DUE TO THE MAN'S POOR
REPUTATION.) IN THIS PERIOD, MONTESINOS ALSO
REBUILT HIS TIES TO THE MILITARY. ONE OF HIS
KEY POINTS OF ENTRY WAS VIA THE DEFENSE OF
GENERAL JOSE VALDIVIA DUENAS, THE OFFICER
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAYARA MASSACRE AND COVER-
UP.

13. IN 1990, AS THE GARCIA GOVERNMENT DREW TO A
CLOSE, MONTESINOS LOOKED FOR NEW CONNECTIONS.
HIS APPROACH TO THE MARIO VARGAS LLOSA CAMP WAS
REBUFFED. VARGAS THOUGHT HE WAS A SHOE-IN AND
HAD NO NEED FOR MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS THEN HIT
ON ALBERTO FUJIMORI, VIA A MUTUAL FRIEND,
FRANCISCO LOAYZA. ONCE LOAYZA WAS USED,
MONTESINOS GOT RID OF HIM, "IN TYPICAL FASHION,"
MAKING A GESTURE LIKE FLICKING AWAY
A CIGARETTE BUTT.

14. FUJIMORI NEVER IMAGINED -- OR PLANNED FOR
-- THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY THAT FELL TO HIM IN
1990. HE WAS TOTALLY UNPREPARED IN
TERMS OF A NATIONAL POLICY OR POLITICAL BASE TO
CARRY ONE OUT. CAMBIO-90, HIS PARTY, WAS THROWN
TOGETHER OVERNIGHT AND HAD NO CONSISTENCY.
ENTER MONTESINOS.
MONTESINOS OFFERED FUJIMORI THE ARMY AS HIS
POLITICAL BASE. THAT, ____________ HAS BEEN THE
STORY OF THE FUJIMORI GOVERNMENT.

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15. ____________ MONTESINOS AS A CLEVER AND
ABLE MAN WITH MANY IDEAS, BUT NO STRATEGIC
CONCEPTION. HE IS ACTION ORIENTED, WANTS TO GET
THINGS DONE QUICKLY. IN THIS, HE AND FUJIMORI
ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL. IN ADDRESSING THE SENDERO
PROBLEM, THEY THROW IDEAS AT IT WITHOUT THINKING
THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES OR A STRATEGIC SCOPE.

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16. ANOTHER KEY ELEMENT OF MONTESINOS, IS HIS EXTREME JEALOUSLY OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE WANTS NO OTHER PERSON TO ENJOY THE ACCESS HE HAS AND SYSTEMATICALLY BARS CONTENDERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING PROCESSES FROM CONTACT WITH HIM. HIGHLY DANGEROUS, MAINLY BECAUSE FUJIMORI HAS ALLOWED MONTESINOS TO DO IT. THE REGIME, IS THUS LOCKED INTO THE VERY SHORT TERM POLITICAL CALCULATIONS AND MAKE-SHIFT POLICY IDEAS THAT THE TWO OF THEM DEVELOP.

17. CHARGE ASKED IF HE THOUGHT MONTESINOS STILL MAINTAINED HIS CONTACTS WITH DRUG FIGURES. MONTESINOS NO LONGER NEEDED THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES THAT HIS DRUG CONNECTIONS SECRET

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PAGE 04 LIMA 00756 03 OF 04 221407Z BROUGHT HIM IN HIS LAW PRACTICE.

BARRIOS ALTOS

18. CHARGE SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE LINKED MONTESINOS TO THE BARRIOS ALTOS MASSACRE IN NOVEMBER 1991. RECALLING THE EARLIER DISCUSSION OF PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S REAL VIEWS ON HUMAN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5160

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Case Number: S200000044

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W
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SECRET SECTION 04 OF 04 LIMA 00756

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, SNAR, PHUM, PE
RIGHTS, CHARGE ASKED WHAT WAS THE MEANING
OF BARRIOS ALTOS AND WHETHER MONTESINOS HAD
A CONNECTION TO IT. "THAT IS A VERY SENSITIVE
ISSUE."

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