CARRIER DIVISION SIXTEEN

SERIAL 0326

14 DECEMBER 1962

CUBAN QUARANTINE

REPORT OF ASW BARRIER OPERATIONS DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
BY GROUP BUILT AROUND RANDOLPH.

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commander Carrier Division SIXTEEN  
To: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet  

Subj: Cuban Crisis; documentation of

Ref: (a) CNAL msg 291931Z OCT  
(b) CTG 83.2 ltr FB2-16:31:mlw, 3300, ser 0030-62 of 13 Nov 62  
(c) CINCLANTFLTINST 03360.5F  

Encl: (1) LCDR G. B. BIRD, USN, USS RANDOLPH (CVS 15) Memorandum for the Record of 31 Oct 62  
(2) Narrative of CDR L. M. MILLSAPS, USN, VS-36  
(3) Narrative of LT Dwight I. WORRELL, USN, VS-36  
(4) Narrative of CDR George W. COGSWELL, USN, HS-7  
(5) Narrative of LT Russell L. CLEMENT, USN, VS-26  
(6) Narrative of CDR John P. GILLOOLY, USN, VS-36  
(7) Narrative of LTJG William MORONEY, USN, VS-26  
(8) Narrative of CDR Hal A. HAMBERG, USN, VS-26  
(9) Narrative of LCDR Ed R. DAY, USN, VS-36  
(10) NARRATIVE of LT Russell C. DREW, USN, VS-26  
(11) NARRATIVE of LCDR James L. MILLER, USN, VS-26  

1. Enclosures (1) through (11) are submitted in compliance with reference (a). These enclosures originally formed part of reference (b) which was submitted to Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet in accordance with reference (c).

Copy to:
USS RANDOLPH (CVS 15)
COMCVSG 58

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD Dir 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DECLASSIFIED

From: Ldr. G. B. Bird
To: File
Subj: Attempted Contact with Soviet Submarine

1. An account of events in connection with the attempted contact follows:

   a. Helicopter transfer to the U.S.S. LOWRY along with Capt. O. D. MacMillan was accomplished at 0730Q on 26 October 1962 from the U.S.S. RANDOLPH. On arrival, we were taken to the bridge and met with Commodore Dalton with whom we discussed the procedures for attempting a voice contact with the surfaced Soviet sub. At this time the LOWRY began maneuvering toward the sub in order to come alongside. It was decided to go as close as possible but to remain far enough away so as to not endanger the LOWRY in case the sub made an unannounced turn. A sound powered megaphone was brought to the bridge for the contact and the first voice transmission was made as we were going close alongside.

   b. The first transmission was made by Capt. MacMillan in which he asked, "What is your name?" The question was transmitted several times with no response from the sub. The microphone was then handed to me and I attempted to gain response by speaking louder and shouting "attentions, attentions please" several times, followed by asking the name of the ship. Again no response could be observed in any form. I then asked, "Where are you going?" No reply followed.

   c. The captain of the LOWRY then asked the small musical group assembled on the deck, made up of men from the LOWRY, to play marches. It was at this time that the one person standing on the open bridge of the sub showed any sign of recognition. He looked toward the LOWRY and smiled. Commodore Dalton requested that I ask the sub bridge stander if there was any piece of music which he would like to hear. This I did, but still there was no sign of the sub personnel wanting to converse.

   d. Since we were getting no results from the megaphone, I suggested that a signal lamp be used, whereupon I was escorted to the signal bridge and given an Aldis lamp. This proved to be futile because no response was received from the sub to the same questions I asked previously by voice. I purposely signaled my questions very slowly with the Aldis lamp to ascertain they were being received and understood. In addition, I had a Signalman standing by with paper and pencil to assist in copying any reply sent from the sub. Through questioning the signalman assisting me I discovered that some difficulty was experienced by the Signalman the previous night in copying the flashing message being sent by the sub, and most of the message being sent was missed completely.
A. The sub appeared to have been underway for some time because it was sorely in need of paint. External inspection revealed a sonar dome on the bow, a glass-front weather bridge with open bridge above and conventional antennas. A cable approximately 20 ft. long was stretched along the starboard side of the hull below the tower with cloth hanging from it. No number or name was seen, but evidence of a possible over-point appeared on the tower. One person remained on the open bridge at all times during our close-up surveillance and a second person appeared on the bridge for a short period taking photographs of the LOUM. Several more of the crew could be seen through the glass in the lower section of the tower.

3. After running alongside for approximately a half an hour, the LOUM turned to the right and assumed an escorting position at approximately 1000 yds to the starboard forward quarter of the submarine. A helicopter then picked up Captain MacMillan and myself returning us to the RANDOLPH.

4. In the event of any future contacts with Soviet submarines, it is recommended that a movie camera be made available to the signal bridge in order to photograph any and all responses to our signals. This is considered advisable in view of the strange cipher combinations peculiar to certain Russian characters/letters. In addition, all Signalmen should be briefed in advance on the few peculiarities in the Russian Morse alphabet to forego any future misses on possible important intelligence info. Consideration should also be given to the installation of a WwW/KV-3 in a radio receiver on all ASW ships. With a knowledge of broadcast schedules and call signs, a compromise of Soviet sub positions would be realized readily through cross-bearings.
Narrative by CDR L. M. NILLAPS, USN, VC-26, Plane Commander of S2F-3 side number J743 concerning participation in operation of contact 0-19.

A confidential message had been received stating that a Russian "M" submarine had been sighted by a Patrol aircraft operating out of Bermuda, but that the submarine had dived and contact had been lost. The RANDOLPH was ordered to the area to investigate.

Our operating area was covered with heavy weather, including heavy squall line. The briefing officer informed us that the tactics to be used were to be at our own discretion due to the 12-hour old data, plus the ship's inability to communicate with the patrol aircraft presently on station.

The scheduled 0200Z launch on 27 October 1962 was delayed more than two hours due to the weather being zero zero. We were finally catapulted at 0430Z into an extremely dark, rainy flight. CDR L. M. NILLAPS, Executive Officer of Air Anti-Submarine Squadron THIRTY-SIX was the pilot and Flight Leader; LTJG D. T. CONCESSIONY, Jr., the copilot, and our regular crew members were FELTIGNO, ANL, and KNOTT, AN. Three other aircraft were launched to assist us in our mission. Three were two other S2F Trackers, belonging to our sister squadron VC-26, and an E-2C from VAW-127.

We were vectored to the east about 150 miles with orders to establish communications with the patrol aircraft on station, and after evaluating the tactical situation, to set up a suitable search pattern.

About 100 miles east we established communications with the PSH aircraft on station. He was "cold" and had no further information to pass on to us except the initial sighting area 16 hours previous. At that time he had only one useful sonobuoy in the water. Also present in the area was the Russian trawler SHVAYL, and we decided to use this trawler located at 26° 24' N 66° 28' W as our datum. He was dead in the water and would be a good visual and radar datum plus presenting no interference to our sonobuoys. At 0530Z we rendezvoused over the trawler with the PSH, received the SWF report, assumed Contact Area Commander, and laid a DEZEBEL sonobuoy pattern. The position of the trawler was relayed to the RANDOLPH via the E-2, together with information on search plan.

At 0604R, FELTIGNO, our DEZEBEL, arrived in the number two seat of the aircraft, called, "Drawing on RANDOLPH 9" (our westernmost sonobuoy). I asked him for the lines he was receiving on his gram and after discussing it thoroughly, we agreed that it was a definite Russian FOXTROT class submarine signature. Although the other S2F aircraft were not diving, we instructed the aircraft nearest RANDOLPH 9 to close and drop code plants ALPHA and BRAVO while we closed the area.

We commenced plotting on ALFA and BRAVO plants at 0622R. With the use of the relator our best lines gave a bearing of 360° from the plants.
Both aircraft flew 357 degrees magnetic 15 miles to drop plants CHARLIE and DELTA to obtain our cross bearings. Our bearings were 0600 degrees magnetic from plants CHARLIE and DELTA. This gave us a fix, approximately 5 miles, due east of plants C and D and 14 miles north of plants A and B.

Immediately after obtaining the fix, we called for added VS and helicopter (HSS-4M) assistance from the RANDOLPH, plus a surface attack unit of destroyers.

Upon arriving at our fix at 0647Z, we dropped the NAV warning as prescribed by the Department of Defense and broadcast by message to nations of the world, to warn all submarines to surface in the area of the Cuban quarantine.

This warning brought no results, and we commenced JULIE offset bombing after receiving a close-in "A" range on our datum sonobuoy. While laying our 3000 yard five box JULIE pattern, we were joined by three other VS aircraft. One other VS aircraft was placed in the 3000 yard bombing pattern with us, while the other two aircraft were placed in a 1500 yard MAD pattern around the datum. The entire pattern of sonobuoys was laid and all aircraft in position by 0705Z. A second "A" range was received at this time (0705Z) on our datum JULIE sonobuoy. Indicating close proximity to that sonobuoy, but the perimeter bombing gave negative results.

At 0720Z, after being on station for 20 minutes, the aircraft and helicopter as had previously requested, arrived on station and SWAP was executed. We were told to return to the RANDOLPH, and left station at 0735Z. The incoming aircraft continued to prosecute the contact.

The Russian FOXTROT submarine was subsequently surfaced later in the day, a few miles to the northeast of our datum.

Task Force ALFA, whose primary mission is protection of the Eastern coast of the United States, and to whom the RANDOLPH is assigned as the Anti-Submarine Warfare carrier, did its job when it counted most.

The comparatively new VS aircraft and its associated electronics gear performed splendidly. Coordination between aircraft and sister squadrons plus all other units involved, added up to a "win" for the United States Navy that will long be remembered. Also may we all in closing, it was a personal experience that we will never forget.
On 27 October 1962, I was assigned a JEESEEL search, Air Plan 5. The flight was normal with no indications of any submarines in the area. Recovery was scheduled at 1530Z, and was a CCA. While in control, aircraft number 13, VS-26 sighted a snorkel. I immediately told CCA control that we were losing the radar stack to prosecute the contact. V-10 and myself held MAD contact until relieved by 2 VS aircraft and 3 PH aircraft. The submarine appeared to be changing course rapidly and was moving at a speed estimated at 10 knots.

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Narative by CDR GEORGE V. COSSYBEN, USNR, HS-7, Plain Engraving of USS-10A, side number JT60, concerning participation in prosecution of contact C-19

Halip operations against Soviet FOXTROT Class Submarine, 27 October 1962.

On the afternoon of 27 October 1962 at 1510 hours, three helicopters of HS-7, operating from the USS RANDOLPH in support of ASW operations, were directed to proceed to assist an S2F from VS-28 in the prosecution of a disappearing submarine contact. The helos departed screening stations and vectored S2F for about 60 miles. Helicopters JT61, piloted by LTG WATERS, and JT62, piloted by LTG STEVENS, were first on the scene and gained initial sonar contact at 1605. JT60, piloted by Commander COSSYBEN, Commanding Officer HS-7 followed shortly and gained sonar contact at 1610. The third helicopters, through coordinated tactics, maintained continuous active sonar contact until relieved by destroyers at approximately 1700. During the contact, the helos vectored the S2F's for FM drops and NUDEWS. On several occasions cavitation and machinery noise were heard, and on one occasion, where the S2F surfaced without signal, hatches were heard to slam shut, leaving no doubt that we had a submarine contact.

The helicopters flight departed station, due to low fuel stores, shortly after 1700, and it was learned later that the contact being pursued surfaced at about 2100 on the evening of 27 October 1962.
Upon a 0600 take-off on 28 October 1962 we were almost on our assigned station for the hop as the surfaced FOXTROT submarine was only five nautical miles away from the ship. The ship's position at launch was... 

At about 0700 Raceway was going to come alongside the submarine with the people on board, and requested we take some pictures while they were alongside. We took a picture and continued to orbit the submarine. 

When Raceway pulled away about a half hour later W-1 wanted to test our MAD gear as it was a little early to see if we could hold the sub if it submerged to its test depth. The sub was ready about 0850 at 10 feet, and we made some shallow runs over him at 7000 ft. - simulating the MAD conditions and load in simulating night when we carry a little more altitude. The runs were commenced at about 0915. 

Our MAD operator said he could easily detect the sub at 700 ft. He said he would never call out 5 feet when we were at 1000 ft. as he couldn't see anything, but normal pen marks on the MAD trace. The rest of the hop was uneventful as the sub remained on the surface, and we returned to KANDOLPH and landed at 1210 after being relieved on station.
Narrative by CDR JOHN F. GILLOOLY, USN, VS-35, Plans Commander of S2F-3 side number J743, concerning participation in prosecution of contact C-19.

At midnight on the evening of 27 October 1962, USS RANDOLPH (CVS-15) launched 2 S2F-3 aircraft to maintain surveillance of a surfaced Soviet "FOKTOM" submarine 20 miles north of the RANDOLPH, in the area of 27°38'N, 65°47'W.

The flight leader of the launch was Commander J. F. GILLOOLY, USN, the Commanding Officer of VS-35. The aircraft were flying as S2F-3 (now designated S2D) aircraft with CMDR W. N. VEIGELEH, USN (CW), as the co-pilot, and Commander Richard L. KIESER, USM (RS), Air Detachment First Class, and Senior D. D. NELSON, Aviation Electronics Technician Second Class. The flight, established from the RANDOLPH in moderate rain and visibility, at three miles, arrived in the contact area having all Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) equipment in an "Up" status.

During the bombing runs, at 3 mile intervals, the submarine was a large group of destroyers of USS RANDOLPH. After takeoff, the flight leader maintained passive contacts for 1 hour and 50 minutes. The submarines were illuminated by photographic runs on the submarine for the entire squadron (from 0030 to 0230).

The S2F-3 flew a night photographic approach at a altitude of 300 feet under the radar guidance of the patrol. The target was identified by a 72 million candlepower searchlight. The photographic flight was at 50 million candlepower, which were 60 feet before flares. The pilot flew the aircraft entirely by instruments, while the co-pilot controls the searchlight and photographic maneuvers.

For the first hour on station, the submarines maintained a course of 020 at five knots. As rain and poor visibility hampered the entire mission USS HARRY (DD 576) provided close aboard searchlight illumination of the submarines to aid in positive identification of the first three photographic runs.

The photographic runs were first made from the north, illuminating the port side of the FOKTOM. At 0120 hours, the submarines and the destroyers approached a heavy squall line rainstorm. Reduced flight conditions forced the aircraft to depart the area to the south for about one hour. At this time, the submarines increased speed to eight knots. As visibility and ceiling with lesser rains, the flight leader closed the area for two more photo runs (from the south, illuminating the submarine's starboard side), and continued constant surveillance until relieved on station by fresh aircraft. CDR GILLOOLY's flight then climbed to altitude and was vectored into position for a COA (carrier controlled approach) recovery on USS RANDOLPH at 0500.

Post flight analysis revealed that both the monitoring of the submarine and the photo runs had been highly successful.
On Staurday 27 October 1962, the 9730 flight launched on schedule. The flight was vectored to the existing datum. Weather deteriorated and the flight orbited in the clear waiting for the squall line to pass. Approximately 11/2 hours after take-off, the datum was considered cold. The A/C were assigned a sector and given permission to drop a JEPHET buoy. JOHNSTON 2B secured its rail and climbed to 2500 feet—the altitude being selected for some reason throughout the search pattern. The weather was broken to overcast at 2500 so the squall line extended into the sector. The aircraft was flown around the fringes of the squall and funnel in behind it to drop the sonobuoy in the area centered. The pilot was on instruments, the co-pilot plotting on the MK-5 board when the #3 operator called out the submarine to starboard. It was on the surface heading north and very close to the heavy rain in the squall. The aircraft was immediately raced over through the broken clouds, the camera perpared and a flash report given. It appeared that the submarine had men in the tower and they spotted the aircraft when it commenced its dive. The decks were awry when 140 arrived on top and was fully submerged on the third pass over it. Burys 10 and 17 were dropped spaced 350° at datum and 600°. MAD hunting circle commenced. The sonobuoy was noisy but using cavitation (as best we could) and the back of the MAD marks, the submarine course and speed were plotted. Initial speed of 3 kts with a turn to the east was plotted. Eventually the track turned completely south and speed estimated to have slowed to 4 kts. 140 arrived to assist but the weather was less than 2000/10 in showers and he was advised by 126 to set up a base line track on JULIE. The submarine track was maintained with solid MAD contacts for approximately 35 minutes. Then it became apparent that 140 was arrowed, for MAD contacts were being recorded on opposite sides of the circle due to the same pattern. 140 was called in immediately with no joy—the circle then expanded to 1500 yards to 3000 yards with JULIE with no results.

Overall the initial contact was classic. The aircraft was completely passive, and hidden in the clouds. The submarine appeared surfaced, feeling protected by the heavy squall line that lay between the force and the sub.
On Saturday 27 Oct 1943, "Navy Day", a flight of 8 P-80's was launched at 1500 to search for a submarine reportedly to the northeast of the launch position. These planes were to relieve 4 other planes that were already out on search missions. About 15 minutes after relief had been accomplished, a contact report was filed that a submarine had been sighted 250°/11 miles from the carrier. These planes were directed to proceed from intended search area to the last contact area, VS 20, 26, and 45 proceeded to the area to relieve the aircraft that had sighted the submarine. MAD and Julis had laid the target for a few minutes but contact was lost with apparent movement to the west. Upon arrival in the area VS 26 laid a C-envelope pattern and had 20 and 45 conduct MAD hunting circles around the target. Before Julis could be utilized 20 and 45 reported MAD contact in the vicinity of western buoy. There was no indication on this buoy. All three planes were directed into MAD trapping circles and contact was held by MAD until VS planes arrived in the area. The helos went to a box pattern over the search area and contact was made by their radar immediately. MADSCO then maintained by VS plane and VS MAD. All international surfacing signals were dropped, but no response was observed from the submarine target. Contact and communication was maintained by the VS and VS aircraft until the submarine target was lost. The surface forces arrived in the area about 30 minutes after the helos departed the area. For the next three hours search contact by the DD's and MAD contact by aircraft from DD MADSCO were maintained. The international surfacing signal was given three or four more times but the target gave no response.

At 1930, VT 20, 26, and 45 were relieved by 4 other VS planes. These planes immediately picked up MAD contact and VS 20, 26, and 45 departed the area to return to homeport. The flight was terminated at 1930.
NARRATIVE BY LCDR ED R. MAY, USN, VA-55, PLANE COMMANDER ON SAR-3 side number J145, concerning participation in prosecution of contact C-12.

At 1500 in the afternoon of 27 October 1962, the USS RANDOLPH launched four SRF-3 (now designated SSR) aircraft, one WQ-2 aircraft, and three HSS-1 helicopters to prosecute an area of earlier submarine contact. The contact was known to be a Russian "Project 641" class submarine. There were numerous mine fields in the vicinity and the visibility was three to four miles.

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron Thirty-Six, aircraft number 45, piloted by LCDR ED R. MAY, USN, the Squadron Operations Officer, proceeded to the area of last contact and advised the Contact Area Commander of this information. We were directed to conduct a large area sonar search in an area 50 miles in radius around the last contact position.

At 1533, one of the aircraft from the previous launch sighted an anomaly while awaiting recovery aboard the USS RANDOLPH. In response, the submarine immediately submerged, and was quickly joined by the other SSR aircraft awaiting recovery. These aircraft were successful in holding contact with the arrival of the SSR aircraft from our launch.

We arrived on station at 1555, and joined the other aircraft in a trapping circle around the last point of contact. At 1600, the three helicopters arrived and shortly gained sonar contact. 45 ran out a line of bearing from one of the boats and gained WQ-2 contact. The submarine was then heard in constant echo and WQ-2 contact until the arrival of the destroyers of surface attack unit before, at 1630.

Upon the arrival of the destroyers, the aircraft were utilized in MADVECS to confirm sonar contact by the destroyers. Contact was continuous until 1730, when 45 was called off station to look for a Russian trawler known to be in the area.

At 1846, 45 was ordered to the west of the WQ-2 for re-arm and re-engage. At 1846, we were vectored in to an undetected surface contact which was identified as a destroyer searching for the same trawler. At 1907, 45 was vectored in to another surface contact, which was identified as a friendly tanker.

At 1946, destroyers ordered us back to the main area to conduct more MADVECS. All units had been in continuous contact during our absence. We arrived at 1959, and joined the other aircraft in the pattern until we were relieved on station by another squadron aircraft at 2035. At this time, 45 had had 35 consecutive MAD contacts on this submarine.

We proceeded to the marshaling point, conducted a CCA approach to the USS RANDOLPH, and landed at 2045.

Some time later, while we were in the wardroom, word was passed that the submarine had sunk and that all of us...
Narrative by LT RUSSELL C. DREW, USN, VT-25, Fleet Comdr 4th Light Bombing Squad member JS-19, concerning participation in prosecution of contact C-19.

05 November 1962

At 1100 VT-19 launched from USS RANDOLPH as a part of a flight of 3 SBE's and 1 VF with a primary mission of locating and profiling contact with the Soviet Submarine believed to be in the area. VT-19 was manned by LT R. C. DREW in the pilot's seat, LT(jg) D. R. MACK as co-pilot, MARTINEZ, P. C., AERO in the Julie/spotter seat, and COTTON, AL in the RADAR/MID operators seat.

VT-19 arrived at datum area at 1130. An SBE from the previous launch, VT-25, had sighted the target submarine on the surface at about 1100. The submarine then submerged and was tracked for 15 minutes with Julie and MAD. When VT-19 arrived, con station all units were cold with a SBU consisting of 3 destroyers having just arrived.

Search tactics were employed with a positive success until 1315 when relieving SBE's arrived and VT-19 proceeded to high plate. About 1350 the pilot and co-pilot had switched seats indicating LT R. C. DREW in the co-pilot's position and LT(jg) D. R. MACK in the pilot's position.

Upon arriving overhead USS RANDOLPH at 1425, VT-19 was directed to proceed to a Marshall point of 2,000 magnetic 8 miles for a C-19, due to the lowered ceiling and reduced visibility.

VT-19 reached Marshall at 1555 altitude 1000 feet, visibility 2 miles in poor under overcast skies. Proceeding outbound on a magnetic bearing of 2900, the pilot, LT(jg) MACK, visible a snorkeling submarine at 11 miles from Jonstown on a course estimated to be over magnetic and a speed of 6 knots. The time was now 1535. Upon sighting the submarine the pilot, requested the co-pilot to set up the armament panel to 19 to enable the pilot to drop a MG-25 smokejacket. Instructed the RADAR operator to extend the MAD boom and warm up the MAD equipment, and commenced a descending left turn. The co-pilot sent a contact report to Jonstown.

Upon making the first pass over the position of the snorkel, now positively identified as a Soviet M-19 type, the sub was identified to the pilot of VT-19 to have submerged, so the co-pilot sent an imploring report. On the second pass of the snorkel a MAD strobing pattern the snorkel was again visible. At this time VT-25, which had been in holding at Marshall, arrived and commenced MAD strobing also. Shortly after 19 completed its second pass of the snorkel the snorkel disappeared from view again and was not seen until the submarine surfaced later that day.
JT 19 attempted an 800 yd. MIB trawling circle but due to the high wind it was felt that the trap would be less effective than a cloverleaf. JT 19 joined JT 39 in a cloverleaf. Continuous MIB contact was maintained for approximately 12 minutes at which time the 520's expanded to a 1500 yd. MIB hunting circle. JT 19 was attempted but, due to a high background noise on the buoy, it was not successful.

At 1500 JT 26 and flight crews on station and relieved 19 and 39. JT 26 regained contact almost immediately while JT 19 and 39 returned to USA 814/802 and landed aboard.
On the evening of 27 October 1962 I was on the 13000-hr. shift at Fort Worth. A U-2 which had been sighted visually and units were scout on that evening was thought to be the same contact. The flight was delayed due to the weather. Rain and fog ceased and some personnel had been involved in the operation of the day. I was in Johnston 17 with my regular crew. I was now in the air and had to go to the left. We were vectored away by Johnston 17 to the contact area where aircraft were hot with MADVAC from Enchant and contact. Johnston 17 joined me in a search pattern. MADVAC from Enchant was by far the best and kept contact by MADVAC from Enchant, the CAF, and then Enchant again.

At 2050 while running out on a MADVAC from Enchant, I noticed a light and went out by my stratojet. The pilot of the aircraft warned the MADVAC not to follow过于 close the other aircraft. It was clear that the aircraft was not friendly. I vectored this area to Enchant and asked permission for Castle and brown to follow. My aircraft was equipped with the photo pod.

Almost immediately permission was granted and three runs were begun. Numerous illumination and photographic runs were made on the contact and two more were killed. We were able to maintain the contact and to follow it to the East. Johnston 17 was also in the illumination pattern and after which had been assigned. Scramper duties with a photo pod was called in to the area.

During the following period, MADVAC 14 and 16 were dropped down the course of the contact. For the mission had ended. The aircraft was too dark for safety and then went the area while the contact was closed. They also asked a signal light to ask the contact if he added any assistance.

At 2150 during this period Enchant announced that a radar identified the aircraft to be 220. A positive identification of 220 was also determined.

Just prior to being relieved on station the aircraft made more illumination and photographic runs with different small boys alongside. Throughout all of the illumination runs personnel were observed to hide as well as an obviously displayed national ensign. No side number was apparent as it appeared to be painted or covered over.

At 2200 we were relieved on station by Johnston 26, 18 and later 19 for more surveillance.