A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL
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NSC STAFF STUDY

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE ARAB STATES * AND ISRAEL

PROBLEM

1. To analyze the current situation in the Arab States and Israel and to determine the general courses of action for safeguarding Western interests in the area.

ANALYSIS

Objectives

2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the area comprising the Arab States and Israel are:

   a. To overcome or prevent instability within these countries which threatens Western interests.

   b. To prevent the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

   c. To insure that the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world.

   d. To strengthen the will and ability of these countries to resist possible future aggression by the Soviet Union.

   e. To establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognizes their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign equality.

The Importance of the Area

3. The area comprising the Arab States and Israel has great political and strategic importance. It lies at the land, sea and air crossroads of three continents, contains

*For the purposes of this paper, the Arab States include Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
important sites for Western military bases, has natural defensive barriers in its mountains and deserts, and lies close to Soviet centers of industry, population and oil resources. More than a third of the world's known oil reserves are located in the Arab States alone. Continued availability of oil from these sources is of great importance in peace and war.*

4. These strategic resources are so important to the over-all position of the free world that it is in the security interest of the United States to take whatever appropriate measures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to insure that these resources will be used for strengthening the free world.

The Nature of the Problem

5. Unless the Soviet rulers have decided to initiate general war, there is little danger of direct Soviet attack upon the area because it is likely that the Soviet rulers realize that aggressive action against the Middle East would provoke general war. (In the event of general war in the next few years, the task of defending the area will have to be borne primarily by such local forces as have been developed and by such U.K., Commonwealth, and Turkish forces as can be made available.) Currently, therefore, the imminent threat to Western interests arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism which could lead to disorder and might eventually open the way for the extension of Soviet control and influence by means short of war. Such an extension of Soviet control would be an unacceptable shift in the world balance of power. Efforts to prevent or overcome instability in the area and to reduce anti-Western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism are therefore essential. To hold the area during a continuing cold war, it will be necessary for the United States to give increasing attention to the area.

6. Settlement of the specific disputes involving Iran, Egypt, and the U.K. is of key importance to our efforts in the region as a whole. If the dispute between Egypt and the U.K. can be settled, cooperation with the Arab States in the Middle East Command (MEC) and in other ways would be greatly facilitated and the danger that nationalism will violently erupt in other Arab States will be diminished. Other major problems include the tensions and hostile attitudes between the Arab States and Israel and the prevailing attitude of neutralism.

*See the NSC 97 series and related papers.
Basic Political Factors

7. The Arab States are in varying degrees experiencing deep and difficult changes as their relatively rigid social and economic institutions are compelled to adjust under the pressure of the forces released by the introduction of Western techniques and ideas, but without the stabilizing political and religious forces once dominant in the area. The impact of Western techniques and ideas has been most notable in its effect upon relations between political groups in most of these states. In the case of Israel, the attempt to build a modern state and to absorb a large and rapid immigration has created internal problems beyond the capacity of the state to manage. Moreover, this immigration, even though reduced in recent months, arouses fears among the Arabs that Israel will be under irresistible pressures to expand.

8. At the apex of the political pyramid in the Arab States there has been a small ruling group. It is drawn largely from land-owners and tribal leaders, admixed with a smaller and not entirely separate merchant and financial class. Its group interest is the preservation of the status quo. With the passage of time, however, this group—which has traditionally been split within itself by contests for power—has become less and less capable of effective leadership. The traditional ruling groups are under increasing challenge in most of these countries.

9. Below the ruling group, as a distinctive political force, are the urban dwellers: disaffected intellectuals, barred from attaining status by the political monopoly of the ruling groups; students, unhappy with their prospects and contemptuous of political leadership that does not build a strong and dynamic state; and the small merchants, the artisans, the lover and middle levels of the bureaucracy, and the urban wage-earners. The outstanding characteristic of this urban group is dissatisfaction with things as they are. The relatively rigid and semi-feudal organization of society does not provide opportunities for the more capable and educated members of this group commensurate with the values they place on their capacities. This creates disaffection within a group some elements of which are at least partially fitted for leadership. Since most other elements of the urban group are also in some degree maladjusted to the social scheme, the materials for pressure on the ruling group are readily at hand.

10. At the base of the political pyramid in these states is the peasantry which forms the great majority of the population and which is still a largely passive element in
political life. Potentially, this submerged majority offers an opportunity for exploitation by some kind of political leadership.

11. In the changing relations between these groups—specifically between the ruling and the urban groups—there appear the chief manifestations of political disturbance in several of these countries. Most of that disturbance focuses on questions relating to the treatment of foreign interests. On these questions, the leaders of the urban political groups seek a radical solution: the total elimination of visible foreign power. The ruling group, for its part, often finds it desirable to travel some distance in the same direction, partly because of its own unwillingness or inability to challenge the urban groups directly on this issue. At the same time, because the ruling group is aware that its domestic position could be endangered if xenophobia got out of hand, it seeks with decreasing effectiveness to keep the situation in check at home; it desires compromises radical enough to appease the urban elements but short of the outright eviction of foreign interests.

12. In this internal social conflict, the urban middle group has the advantage of numbers and dynamism. Its leadership is riding the wave of popular sentiment, so far as popular sentiment finds expression in the Arab States. If, however, this leadership is catapulted into power, it must—as aside from the elimination of foreign interests—begin largely without a doctrine or a positive political and economic program. It has fattened almost exclusively on its open hostility toward the Western powers and Israel. Since, however, the basic strength of the urban political leadership comes from its command over forces seeking change, the necessity for improvising a program of social and economic change cannot be avoided for long without the risk that another leadership, with a program, will come to the fore. Under some circumstances, this could be communist leadership.

13. Religion has important effects upon social, political and economic life in the area. This region is the heart of the greater Islamic world stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, embracing approximately 250 million Moslems, and includes Israel, a holy land of three great religions. The reactions of the peoples in this area to United States policy will be reflected in the reactions of Jews and Moslems throughout the world. The three monotheistic religions in the area have in common a repugnance to the atheism of communist doctrine and this factor could become an important asset in promoting Western objectives in the area.
Egypt

14. These basic political factors have found their most troublesome expression to date in Egypt, where the trend described above immediately threatens both Western interests and the hold on power of moderate local groups. It is necessary to prevent, if possible, a further deterioration of the situation and to regain the vital elements of Western interests.

15. In Egypt, a clear conflict exists between the position of the U.K. and the demands of the political groups now in power. Resolution of this conflict based on a total surrender of the U.K.'s position would naturally be unacceptable to the U.K. as well as to the United States. Although a continuation of the impasse between Egypt and the U.K. might eventually weaken the present regime in Egypt to the point where political changes would be more likely, there is no guarantee that these changes would bring to power, or maintain in power, leaders friendly to the West.

16. The U.K.'s present policy appears to be based on the hope that a continuation of the current deadlock in these disputes will soon either bring the Egyptian Government to its senses or cause a favorable change in the composition of the government. The U.S. view is that modification of Egyptian position is unlikely and that while a continued deadlock might lead to political changes, it is doubtful that these would be favorable to the West.

17. This difference of views has made it difficult to arrive at concerted U.S.-U.K. policies. Our purpose continues to be to induce the U.K. to modify its position in ways which, while maintaining basic Western interests, might make possible an early negotiated settlement.

18. In the absence of such settlements, the situation may deteriorate to the point where various internal groups are engaged in a struggle for power. In such circumstances, it may be advisable to intervene as opportunity presents itself to aid those groups most promising for our purpose. We should, therefore, maintain the maximum flexibility in the conduct of our relations with these countries.

The U.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area

19. In the past the U.K. has played the major role in the maintenance and defense of Western interests in the area. However, the rapid decline in the last decade in the ability of the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in some of these countries has led the U.S. to play an increasingly
important role and now creates the need for a review and restatement of U.S. policy toward the area. In some countries, such as Greece, where the British have relinquished their former responsibilities, the United States has assumed them. Also, where the United States has major military and economic interests, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. influence has largely replaced the U.K. influence.

20. The obstacles to the exercise of U.S. influence in the area in the cold war period and the nature of our relations with other states interested in the area render it desirable for the United States to work closely with such states. Because of the previous experience and present position of the British in the area, and because of common interests in other parts of the world, the United States should have an especially close relationship with the British. The U.S. has already expressed, in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, its intention to cooperate with the British and the French in dealing with certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and Israel.

21. The decline of Western capabilities in the area is a complex phenomenon and does not appear to be primarily due to the inadequacy of military forces in the area. On the contrary, the British probably have sufficient military forces in the area to take any local military actions that might become necessary in the area during this period. Formerly, military measures in the Middle East could be taken under a set of rules almost totally inapplicable to the changed relationship between the European states and the states of the area and among the latter. The emergence of the various states comprising the Middle East as independent members of the world family of nations, and particularly the establishment of the United Nations as a world organization, has relegated "gun boat" diplomacy and military tactics to the discard or at least to a position of last resort under the exigencies of global war.

22. It is doubtful whether the U.S. or the U.K., or both together, could maintain and defend Western interests in the area in the 19th century fashion. In fact, it seems clear that the West must work toward the establishment of a new kind of relationship with the Middle Eastern states, involving increased recognition of the aspirations of these countries to status within the community of nations. However, Western power and prestige, exercised directly and through local groups, will continue to be important factors in the maintenance of stability within the area.
Whatever the United States can do to bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige of the U.K. will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability in the area provided that the Western attitude toward the area comes more and more to be regarded by the states in the area as being in harmony with their basic interests and that working arrangements for cooperation can be developed.

The Middle East Command

23. The MEC proposals are important not only as a means of developing collective strength to resist possible attack but principally as a means of stimulating cooperation among the states in the area and between these states and the West—a development which should be helpful in increasing internal stability in the area.

24. Despite the weakness of their military position, the states of the area have learned neither the value of unity nor the collective strength they might attain by banding together. Local rivalries divide the states, and this political fragmentation militates against the development of regional cohesion and regional concepts. The Arab League is a weak foundation upon which to build any area program, and would be weaker still if it were not held together by Arab antipathy toward Israel.

25. The armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel have received some equipment from British and American sources and have benefitted in the past from military tutelage but, in general, their standards are not comparable to Western ones. The Arab Legion in Jordan has been well trained by the British and is of higher caliber than its Arab neighbors' forces. Though its strength is less than one division, it does at least suggest what can be accomplished.

26. Although political factors present serious obstacles to a coalition of forces in the near future, there is, even without coordinated action, an opportunity to build up military strength in individual countries and thus to enhance their internal stability as well as their powers of resistance to aggression. We should, therefore, attempt to strengthen, in coordination with the British, French and Turks if possible, but under bilateral arrangements if necessary, national armed
forces where there are sound internal reasons for so doing, primarily where there are economic, communication or base facilities of strategic importance.

27. Meanwhile, we should continue our efforts to lower some of the political barriers which divide the area in order that these states can participate in a Middle East defense arrangement.

28. If handled appropriately, the MEC could be used in various ways to deal with the problem of maintaining and defending Western interests in the area:

a. The acknowledgment by the United States of its interest in the security of the area together with its readiness to participate in the MEC should help to overcome the fear of Soviet aggression in the area, and thereby help to build internal strength and strengthen the will of the leadership and key local groups to resist Soviet aggression or subversion by local communist elements.

b. The association of the U. S. with the U. K. in the MEC should help to demonstrate the joint interests of the U. S. and U. K. and thus lead to an increase of British prestige and respect for Western power, and might produce a climate favorable for efforts to settle disputes.

c. The principles underlying the MEC should help to satisfy the desire for "equal treatment" as a factor affecting relations between the states in the area and the Western powers.

d. Cooperation in the MEC on problems related to the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression should tend to increase regional cooperation and understanding in other than military matters.

e. Where the weakness of the present governments is a factor contributing to instability, the MEC should provide opportunities to the Western powers for bolstering these governments.

The accomplishments which may be reached through the instrumentality of the MEC lead to the conclusion that its establishment is a worth-while objective of the free world.

29. Moreover, although the MEC is explicitly designed to meet external aggression, its greatest usefulness may
actually lie in the opportunity that it provides for strengthening local military forces and their ties with the West, a development which should have a politically stabilizing effect. The political trends that can now be foreseen in the area are such that the major role of such forces in the near future may be to maintain non-communist governments in power in certain countries. The use of Western forces assigned to the NEC for this purpose would be contrary to the principles to which we publicly subscribed in connection with the Command. It should be possible to develop local forces which would be reliable and which would be able to deal with internal problems.

30. To bolster the likelihood of success of the Middle East Command every appropriate effort should be made to secure contributions by Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan.

31. Contributions to the NEC which are expected of member states are not specified in the quadripartite statement of November 10, 1951, but are left for future negotiations. However, it is clear that leadership and guidance must come from the stronger members. From a U.S. military point of view this area continues to be a primary responsibility of the United Kingdom. The extent to which the United States can commit forces in this area is inextricably interwoven with current world-wide commitments: defense of the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Korean war, and so forth. Because of these commitments, the United States, during the current cold war period, will be able to contribute militarily to establishment of this defense arrangement principally by furnishing staff members, by providing limited amounts of military equipment, and by assigning training missions. However, if the indigenous states remain so distrustful of each other and of Great Britain that they will not join in a defense arrangement and if they express a desire for other Allied token force contributions as an essential component of a collective arrangement, such a request must be considered. In particular, if the commitment of U.S. token forces in a Middle East defense arrangement is seen to be the key to the establishment of such an arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt, the United States should be prepared to commit token forces. In the event of a general war, U.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the situation existing at that time.
Social and Economic Problems in the Area

32. These problems are of concern to the United States primarily because of the political developments to which they may lead. There is growing danger that the process of internal political change going on in these countries may lead to disorder and to a situation in which regimes subject to the influence or control of the Soviet Union could come to power.

33. The task is thus not so much to prevent the changes that now impend as to guide them into channels that will offer the least threat to Western interests and the maximum assurance of independent regimes friendly to the West. To this end we should seek to use the social and economic tools available to us in ways that will reduce the explosive power of forces pressing for revolutionary change to the point where necessary changes can be accomplished without uncontrollable instability. This may often mean that we should work with and through the present ruling groups and, while bolstering their hold on power, use our influence to induce them to accommodate themselves as necessary to the new forces that are emerging. As new leadership groups emerge, we should also work to associate their interests with our own and, if and when they gain power, cooperate with them in working out programs that will assist them to attain constructive objectives--a course of development which will tend to give a measure of moderation and stability to their regimes.

34. Maximum results, at least in the next several years, will probably be assured by programs directed towards meeting certain aspirations of urban groups, which include both the leadership and principal supporters of the new political movements in this area. In the economic field, however, such programs may often have to be justified mainly on political rather than economic grounds. The greatest economic need in most of these countries is usually for agricultural development, but their aspirations--and, in particular the aspirations of the urban groups--are for industrial development, despite the scarcity of skills and resources necessary to make such development economic.

35. Provision for agricultural development is economically sound and, in addition, it may be considered politically far-sighted in this area today, for the peasantry, though now politically passive, is not permanently immune to the suggestion that its lot might be greatly improved by a basic reorganization of society. Eventually, ambitious urban leadership
groups may realize the advantages to be derived from exploiting this potential source of mass discontent. This in turn might some day lead to violent disorder and to the consequent loss of government control over parts of the countryside, which would then offer a firm rural base, as in China, for a militant communist movement. It is desirable to try to anticipate such possible developments through programs designed to improve the lot of the still politically quiescent peasantry.

36. Such programs should not, however, exclude the provisions of funds for more politically urgent if less economically sound programs directed at the rising political forces in the cities. It is difficult to define these projects in other than the most general terms. They should be designed, for one thing, to improve employment opportunities in the cities—in so far as possible in fields of interest to the rising political groups. Increases in urban purchasing power will also be helpful to small merchants, who are another significant element of these political movements. Such programs should also provide for improved communications both because the fertilization of other types of development depends on adequate transportation and because the means of communication at present available are insufficient for defense of the area.

37. The psychological impact of these projects should also be considered. In so far as possible, the projects should be of a character which will develop pride of country and strengthen the interests of these movements in political stability. The effect on the Army, from both an economic and psychological standpoint, should also be considered. Examples of the kind of projects which might meet the above criteria are: public works, such as the construction of new government buildings or army barracks; the establishment of planning commissions charged with making basic surveys of many economic, social, and cultural aspects of national or regional life; the expansion of health and educational facilities in key cities; and the provision of better transportation, communication, and productive and power facilities. It will only be possible to determine what projects are suitable after field investigations. In their work in these countries the U.S. missions should bear these considerations in mind, and it should be our objective to use our assistance programs to shape and guide social and economic developments in these countries in ways which will help us to attain our political goals.

38. It is clear that, in developing and carrying out these programs it will be necessary to make compromises between long-term and short-term considerations. In the long-term, as
suggested above, it is probable that the present ruling groups will lose more of their power—unless they prove able to adjust their outlook and to assume leadership of the changing social and economic and political development of their countries. In the short-term, however, the West depends greatly on these groups in certain countries for the maintenance of stability in the area, and will often find it necessary to work with and through those men and groups who now exercise power, even though it may not be in full sympathy with them and may not expect that they will be able to retain such power over the long run.

39. It will probably be necessary, if our programs are to be carried out successfully, to funnel a considerable amount of our economic assistance through these groups and so bolster their hold on power. Where this is necessary, our attempt should be to modify the policies of these groups in ways desirable from the long-term point of view, but we should not deliberately sacrifice important short-term interests because of our view as to what constitutes the most desirable long-term courses of development.

40. The problem of leadership is fundamental. Our principal aim should be to encourage the emergence of competent leaders, relatively well-disposed toward the West, through programs designed for this purpose. We should work as closely with them as the temper of their country will permit and should furnish them whatever aid we usefully can. We must be prepared, however, for the fact that they may not wish or be able to express any overt good will toward, or to seek any explicit association with, the West. The force of nationalism is too strong a motivating element in the process of political change that is now going on in these countries to be disregarded by any leadership which emerges from that process, however competent and responsible it may be. In our own interests we should not be deterred by the xenophobic slogans which leadership may employ from doing whatever we can to bolster it in power where it appears to offer the best prospect of prolonged, stable, effective, non-communist government.

41. In undertaking social and economic actions in the area, the United States should keep the British and, as necessary and desirable, other allied governments informed and should seek to reach agreement with these governments on the aims which the aid programs should be designed to accomplish.
This is necessary to make the most effective use of their capabilities in the area and to avoid working at cross purposes with them. It will, for the reasons indicated above, probably be in the U.S. national interest to continue our programs of economic aid over the next several years to the countries in the area. In carrying out both urban and rural economic programs it may be desirable, within the context of the political objectives outlined above, to concentrate on pilot projects susceptible of having early and, if possible, regional application and on programs productive of tangible benefits at an early date for as many people or key groups as possible.

42. In providing military aid under MSA, it will be necessary to develop adequate controls to prevent an arms race between the Arab States and Israel. We should explore ways and means of developing consultation and collaboration on social and economic problems among the states associated with MEC, including Israel wherever possible, in order to promote cooperation on non-military enterprises of benefit to the region as a whole.

The Problem of Israel

43. The United States has been viewed with growing distrust by the Arab States in the last few years because of the responsibility ascribed to it for the establishment of Israel as a nation. This increases the difficulties in attaining U.S. policy objectives in the area. Israel's immigration policy, while temporarily more selective because of the adverse economic situation in that country, is still regarded by the Arabs as a direct threat to their security because it will produce pressures within Israel for expansion to accommodate the influx of population. A genuine conflict of interests between the Arab States and Israel is involved. In order to overcome Arab distrust of the United States it will be necessary at a minimum to use the political, economic and psychological tools at our command to show our concern for and interest in their problems.

It is probable that Arab distrust of Israel cannot be removed except over a long period of time. It would therefore be desirable for the United States, without partiality as between Israel and the Arab states in the political, economic, religious, psychological, social, and military matters, but consistent with strategic considerations, to utilize all feasible and appropriate means to resolve the issues which separate the Arab states and Israel and which give rise to animosity toward the United States.
Fundamental to the abatement of Arab distrust of the United States and accommodation to the fact of Israel's existence are (a) progress toward a solution of a refugee problem in the area; (b) settlement of local Arab Israeli disputes, such as boundary problems, questions of water rights, and establishment of financial and economic arrangements between Israel and the Arab States which would permit the resumption of commercial intercourse within and through the area, uninterrupted flow of petroleum products, and uninhibited operation of and access to internal and international surface and air transport facilities; (c) modification of Israeli immigration policy in order to reduce possible pressures within Israel for expansion to accommodate the influx of population.

Psychological Measures

44. Other factors contributing to the reluctance of the Arab States to identify their interests with those of the United States are (a) a growing tendency in the area to believe that the United States gives unqualified support to the U.K.'s political and economic objectives in the area; (b) communist propaganda to the effect that U.S. economic, political, and military activities in these countries indicate an ambition to dominate and exploit the area; and (c) a belief combining neutralist and defeatist tendencies that there is little danger of Soviet aggression and that even should war come, the United States and its allies would not in any case be able to repel an attack on the area. Changes in the attitudes can be assisted by an intensified psychological effort designed to support the various political, economic and military measures being undertaken by the United States in the area, though we cannot expect large results until and unless progress has been made on the substantive problems. This effort can take advantage of the good will engendered by U.S. philanthropic and educational agencies in the area.

45. The objective of an intensified psychological effort should be to show the peoples and governments of the area that their interests and aspirations can best be furthered by association with the West and, conversely, defeated by permitting communism to increase in strength in the area. We should seek to break down the association that has been created in their minds between the West and the principal obstacles, in and outside of their countries, to the fulfillment of their ambitions and national impulses. At the same time, however, our psychological effort should seek to indicate the impracticability, as well as the undesirability, of any efforts to carry out impending political changes in such a way and with such rapidity as to destroy internal stability, eliminate
Western interests, and enhance the influence of the Soviet Union or local communists. It should be made clear that the West will resist such developments; that there are limits beyond which it cannot go in permitting encroachments on its interests in the area; and that the political prospects of any group favoring communism or the Soviet Union are dim. We should thus seek, by both inducements and deterrents, to turn rising political forces from the more potentially threatening activities to the pursuit of an internal position and external status which is in their interests and which we do not seek to oppose.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Threats to Western Interests

46. U.S. interests and Western interests generally in the Arab States and Israel are menaced by possible developments during a continuing cold war. The threats derive, in large part, from the fact that the traditional semi-feudal leadership of this area is being challenged by rising political forces, having their leadership and principal support in the cities. These forces find the present rigid social and economic systems and the oligarchical political rule in most of the countries inconsistent with their national and personal ambitions. In the face of that challenge, the ruling groups seek to preserve their position by supporting, in some degree, the nationalistic demands for elimination of Western interests which are the main political stock-in-trade of the rising political forces. The immediate threat is thus to such specific Western interests as those in oil resources and the Suez Canal. The basic threat, however, is that this process of internal political change may lead to disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union could come to power. These threats are exacerbated, and U.S. influence is diminished, by the Arab-Israeli tensions, which make solutions to many problems in the area much more difficult to find and work out than they would otherwise be.

47. The over-all policy of the United States in the face of these threats should be to guide this process of political change, by a judicious combination of inducement and deterrents, into channels that will effect the least compromise of Western interests and will offer the maximum promise of developing stable non-communist regimes. The problem of leadership is crucial. We should make full use of our military and economic programs and of special political measures to support, or develop, leaders whose maintenance in, or advent to, power gives such promise. In addition to the foregoing the United States should utilize all feasible and appropriate means to resolve the issues which prevent the abatement of Arab distrust of Israel and resulting animosity toward the United States.

Egypt

48. Settlement of the specific disputes involving Egypt and the U.K. is of key importance. If the dispute between Egypt and the U.K. can be settled, cooperation with
the Arab States in the MEC and in other ways would be greatly facilitated and the danger that Arab nationalism will violently erupt in other Arab states will be greatly diminished. If settlements of these problems are not achieved and if continuing deadlocks eventually weaken the present regimes, the West may be confronted with a situation in which it will have to accept the loss of these interests (and the chain reaction thus initiated in other countries in the area) or use force to regain and hold its interests. This latter course would involve serious risks and, if followed, would limit our ability to take action in other areas, such as Southeast Asia, where these is actual or threatened communist aggression.

49. The United States should maintain its efforts to induce the Egyptians to modify their positions with respect to their disputes with the U.K. The United States should continue its efforts to arrive at a concert of views with the U.K. with respect to proposals which, while protecting basic Western interests, might make possible early negotiated settlements. If such a concert of views is obtained, we would, of course, strongly support efforts for settlements on that basis.

U.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area

50. The United States should take an increased share of responsibility toward the area, in concert with the U.K. to the greatest practicable extent, on the basis that:

a. The United States should be prepared to play a larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the area, particularly by attempting to facilitate political settlements among the nations of the area and between them and the Western nations, and by providing appropriate economic, technical and military assistance.

b. The United States should, however, endeavor to persuade other nations, particularly the U.K. to provide such armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to defend Western interests in the area.

c. The special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.

Military Assistance and the Middle East Command

51. Military aid, and in some instances military missions, can be helpful in strengthening local forces both for the maintenance of internal stability and also for defense against
possible Soviet attack, as well as in influencing the course of political developments in these countries. While military assistance may in some instances have to be taken on a bilateral basis in order to avoid undue delay, we should take all practicable steps to establish the Middle East Command and continue our efforts to obtain the participation of the states in the area in the Command. In the event of general war, U.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the situation existing at that time.

52. The United States should retain flexibility as to its role in defense of the area in the event of general war. However, the MEC can be an important means for dealing with the problems of the cold war period as well as for the strengthening of the area against possible Soviet attack. Every effort should be made to obtain force contributions to the MEC from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan. The United States should be prepared to assign personnel to the staff of the Command, and to provide training missions. If political and psychological measures prove inadequate to secure the establishment of an ME defense arrangement and to settlement of the dispute between the U.K. and Egypt, and if the key to the accomplishment of these objectives is seen to be the assignment of U.S. token forces to this arrangement, the United States should be prepared to assign such forces.

53. A primary purpose of strengthening the indigenous military forces of the states in the area is to assist in the maintenance of internal stability. The use of Western forces assigned to the MEC for this purpose would be contrary to the principles underlying the MEC. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that in exceptional circumstances Western forces might have to be used within the area itself: in the event of (a) forceful violation of the Arab-Israeli borders, (b) requests by legitimate governments for assistance in suppressing communist uprisings, and (c) other situations involving serious threats to important Western interests. In allocating forces to the MEC, these possible contingencies should be taken into account.

Economic, Social and Psychological Programs

54. The primary purpose of our assistance programs is to guide, if possible; political developments in the area in ways which will involve least danger to Western interests and maximum assurance of stable non-communist governments. This
should be borne in mind in planning and carrying out our social and economic program. We should continue and possibly expand our programs of economic aid, including aid for the resettlement of refugees. Because the rising (and threatening) political forces in the area have their leadership and main support in the cities, provision should be made in our economic programs for projects which will tend to associate the interests of these urban forces with our own and to develop their interests in political stability in their countries. We should also focus much of our psychological effort on these groups. We should intensify that effort with the dual aim of showing the governments and key groups of this area that their interests and aspirations can best be furthered by association with the West and that basic Western interests must be respected. Both economic and psychological programs should be designed to further and support our political and military measures with the object of enabling the United States to play a more effective role in shaping political changes in these countries and in strengthening their ability to resist subversion and aggression.