MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION
Outside System

July 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking

I have asked the State Department to prepare for you—perhaps to be used for the SRG Thursday if it is not needed sooner—a memorandum on the precise state of all of the legislative actions related to military and economic assistance to South Asia. Some of these are coming to a head in the next week or two, and it should be part of our general game plan to set our strategy on that front as well as on the South Asian front.

One of the issues that will come up in connection with assistance to Pakistan, particularly military, is the question which Senator Case has already asked: Did the US make any commitment to Pakistan on military assistance in connection with the arrangements for your visit to Peking? A more general way of putting this question would be whether Pakistan has earned continuing military assistance because of its role in facilitating your trip to Peking.

The problem here is that there would be some advantage to the Administration for key members of Congress to recognize that we did have this special reason for not wanting to cut off military assistance to Pakistan. However, it seems more important to preserve the general posture that we are not going to talk about the details of your trip. Otherwise, goodness knows how the many State and Defense officials testifying before Congress will interpret the nature of the relationship between military assistance and your trip.

Therefore, I would recommend that anything that is said about the relationship be said only by you. For others, I should think the line would continue to be something like the following:

--It is best to discuss military supply policy in South Asia on its own merits.

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Since the actual flow of military assistance is relatively small, the issue is how much impact one gains from the political symbolism of an embargo and whether the impact will be constructive enough in terms of results produced to justify the shock to US-Pakistani relations.

The Administration has felt it more important to try to preserve influence in Islamabad as a base for encouraging steps necessary to move the situation in East Pakistan back toward normal. Cutting off aid has not seemed as likely to produce results. Since whatever equipment goes under present policy will have negligible effect on the military situation in East Pakistan, the present policy seems to give us the best of two worlds—a diminished flow of equipment without significant loss of influence now in East Pakistan. The main disadvantage lies in Indian reaction, but we just have to argue the minimal military effect and the retention of influence.

I will give you more on this later. For the moment, do you agree that State should not link military supply policy to China policy in any way?

Yes [ ]

[ ] But it is of course clear that we must consider some special assistance to Pakistan

Other ____________________