CONFIDENTIAL

January 19, 1972

Henry:

Here are three telecons all of which confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan.

Al Haig

Attachments
Telcon
The President
Dec 4, 1971; 10:50 a.m.

P: How is the battle going today?

K: On the matter we discussed last evening, how to handle getting it
to the Security Council, we followed your instructions and it turned out
to be exactly right. It appealed to Bill when he understood he would
be way out in front again.

P: On the announcement?

K: Yes. We have agreed to the day's line-up. Take it there about Noon.
State will put out an announcement and Bush will call the Council.

P: Good. Well, he took it without complaint?

K: With agreement, so there is no problem.

P: The more I thought about it it was the only way to happen. He is
a damn fool to go there. The State Department is trying to think of
a way for them to get credit. But you don't get credit except by
succeeding. I can see why they got Johnson in such a mess having them run
around to all the countries. They don't understand this other thing.

K: Absolutely.

P: Anything new on the fighting itself?

K: It is getting clear the Indians are the attackers.

P: Is that getting through on the press?

K: I am getting with the intelligence people at 11:00 and then getting
Scali to put it out.

P: Turn Scali loose on this and on knocking the silly thing Church said
down.

K: We have had an urgent appeal from Yahya. Says his military supplies
have been cut off - in very bad shape. Would we help through Iran.

P: Can we help?

K: I think if we tell the Iranians we will make it up too to them we can do it.

P: If it is leaking we can have it denied. Have it done one step away.
Do you have to go through MacArthur to do it?
K: I am studying the thing.

P: That would not be safe.

K: I can't give you an answer for a couple of hours.

P: I like the idea. The main thing is to keep India from crumbling them up.

K: Russians have replied together to letter. They thought there should be a political solution first. Inconclusive. They are having a good time. We have informed the Chinese last night we will probably go to the Security Council. No problem with that.

P: Good. Anything new on the Cambodian thing?

K: I got a backchannel from Ladd. Some setbacks, but the annual thing and we should not panic on it. He put it into a much soberer context. He said the situation has already eased and he says an occasional rocket attack aimed at the direction of the airport creates noise, but all the major elements of the North Vietnamese first division have been withdrawn to face the new attack coming from Vietnam.

P: Yes.

K: He says we will get through this crisis and we should not get too excited. We have to get some basic numbers across but will go slowly. He has been pretty eager in the past. I have told Moorer to push whatever can be done on our side.

P: Good. All right. Fine. Well we will go along those lines. Thanks, k Henry.
RN: Now, what else?

HAK: I think we should get off letters of credit worth 99M—that is underway. We should not be giving any economic aid in India. We gave 60% to economic development to India.

RN: Say I want Scali to blame India.

HAK: I'll get Scali.

RN: Let's get some PR out on them—put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us. Our story about getting off militarily didn't get much play. They will feel the economic one. We have got to help rebuild Pakistan.

RN: Sure—major economic development for Pakistan in a month when the smoke clears.

RN: The U.S. cannot be responsible for maintaining peace every place in the world. We can use our influence, but may not always be successful. American public will welcome that.

HAK: We won't get blamed. Walters (Barbara) was in the other day and she asked about India/Pakistan and I gave her some facts. She said why not put it out, for god's sake. I couldn't get any of the bureaucrats to do it. We will put out the facts, Mr. President.

RN: Meantime, we assure that things will continue.

HAK: If war does continue, give aid via Iran.

RN: Good, at least Pakistan will be kept from being paralyzed.

HAK: It is the PR that is the important thing—Scali, Bush. We will put in a resolution asking for withdrawal and ceasefire.

RN: How about sanctioning.

HAK: No before we get it—we won't get it thru at all—the Soviets will veto if it gets a majority. Now that Indian will occupy all of Pakistan we will see exactly their real motives. If the East Benglas get________, if they think Pakistan is brutal, wait till India gets them. India will push the Moslems into a much narrow area than they already have.
HAK: For all those reasons, the Indians will not run like injured victims in six months.

RN: Will the press get point -- to talk as though the Indians are the aggressors? Call Sisco and tell him to do the background and I expect to see it in the news summaries this evening.
TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
12:15 p.m.  12/4/71

RN: Upon studying these reports on Pakistan—the main thing that
needs to be done is the Public relations side of it. As far as the
White House, we are weaker than we should be. I want it to be
a necessity to get Scali turned loose on what we are doing—what we
have done and blame India. The "Libs" can say we brought this on
by the arms support to Pakistan. That will be their argument. India
will be doing "PR" to make Pakistan look like it caused it. Get the
point?

HAK: Yes

RN: Be sure to give Scali free rein. He must understand it.

HAK: I am setting out to do some background.

RN: Let him be responsible about it. State should be pitching it.

HAK: They are being very even handed—they are more interest in
how they look.

RN: Well, I understand. When thought the Russians were responsible
they were loving it. The Indians are picking up on China's faults.

HAK: This is the worse setback for two weeks. We have known what
is needed and couldn't get it down. We should have        when
they started two weeks ago.

RN: Going from here, this couldn't or can't go on long.

HAK: India is now waging a full-scaled war on East Pakistan. India will
be then moving in on West Pakistan.

RN: What other lines can we go—what about the Security Council.

HAK: At the Security Council, the Indians and Soviets are going to
delay long enough so a resolution can not be passed. If it was, the
Soviets would veto. UN will be impotent. So the Security Council is
just a paper exercise—it will get the Post and Times off our backs.
And the Libs will be happy that we turned it over to the UN. The damage
won't show up for a few weeks, years. At the moment we retrench around
the world, this proves that countries can get away with brutality.
K: But not you, Mr. President.

P: No, but my point is we try everything that we can, but we have to realize the Russians - we have to let them know our options.

K: Our options are limited.

P: They are limited, but even with them we can't deal with those Soviets and continue to talk about sales and various other problems.

K: Our options are not all that good.

P: They are not good but they will get results. If after all these appeals and . . .

K: They are going to continue to butter you up.

P: My view is this: I damn won't let them do this. Did the Jordans send planes.

K: 17

P: Well, my point is so we have done a check of these little things. Now in the event we are going to end up by saying to the Russians you proved to be so untrustworthy we can't deal with you on any issues. Let's use that card now.

K: We have pretty well told them that.

P: Well, we told them that privately, they may not believe that.

K: Well, if they don't believe the President of the United States in a private meeting . . .

P: You don't understand. We threatened it. Let's do it.

K: No, for that it is premature, Mr. President. That we cannot do because they still may get us a ceasefire. If they don't get a ceasefire, what do we do then?

P: Cut off the Middle East talks, pour arms into Israel, discontinue our talks on SALT and the Economic Security Council can go the public and tell them what the danger is. It is a risk group but the right one. It is pretty clear. I would go further. We have to stop our talks on trade, don't let Smith have any further things on the Middle East and stop seeing Dobrynin under any circumstances.
K: That is right. Break the White House channel.

P: And be very cold in our public statements toward them. What I am getting at is if we are prepared to go and have the card to play where we would not talk at all. Another thing I would beef up the Defense Budget plans then.

K:q The Defense Budget is being worked on.

P: You will have that done by Friday night?

K: Yes.

P: Now, Henry, I am not yet satisfied and I am really made that this assistance report is not down here. LDX it down here in two hours - Indian aid for next year and last, how much PL-480, how much economic assistance, unilateral assistance - I want to see it.

P: We have got it, but we will get it down. I know the bigger game is the Russian game, but the Indians also have played us for squares here. They have done this once and when this is over they will come to us ask us to forgive and forget. This we must not do. If they want to be dependent on the Russians, let them be, but when the chips are down India has shown that it is a Russian satellite. What I am really saying here is and what I am proposing to do - if India pursues this course, then we will reevaluate their program of aid and cut it off. Has anybody told them that?

K: We did, but remember you have got to realize everything is being done out of this office. We have a bureaucratic system to deal with. I think it would be better if State told them.

P: Call Sisco. He is to call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that the U.S., under the circumstances, if there is not a ceasefire we will have no choice and all Indian assistance of all types will be taken out of the budget and call me in an hour.

K: Yes, Mr. President
TELCON
President/Kissinger
9:30 a.m. - 12/16/71

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, did you sleep any better last night?

K: Yes, I did. Much better. It takes about 36 hours to get back. I feel fine. I think the Azores thing is still playing beautifully.

P: Yes, it came off very well. The market is going smoothly, too.

K: Jack Javits was in this morning. He said it was a tremendous act of statesmanship. Joe Kraft has a column where he is almost beside himself saying the President is in complete charge. He ran it very well.

P: Yes, isn't that interesting.

K: Have you seen it?

P: No, I haven't read it yet

K: He said some people will say the French gained something but all they got was a shadow; the President got all the substance. It proves the President is in complete charge.

P: Isn't that good. That was a line of perfume used very effectively. That meeting in the morning was indispensable. You are going down to see Heath Monday night?

K: Sunday night. I am going Sunday night and going to see him Monday morning.

P: On the India-Pakistan thing, Dacca has surrendered and now the issue is . . .

K: Now, if in the next 24 hours the Indians don't agree to a ceasefire in the West we are in for it. Up until now it could be explained that the Soviets wanted to wait until Dacca had surrendered.

P: Has the proposal been put up in. . .

K: No, it has been tabled and there will probably be a vote today. And that will be the test.
P: Well, they will veto it.

K: Well, I don't know. They aren't saying anything any more.

P: Then under the circumstances, would they just continue the war?

K: There are three possibilities: First, the British proposal carries; second, India-Pakistan ceasefire and third, the Indians continue the war until they smash the Pakistanis in Kashmir. Now we have had another appeal from the Pakistanis last night. Action is picking up in the West and they are asking for American planes, but we cannot even consider this. If this isn't settled by tomorrow night we will know the Russians have put it to us.

P: The one thing I am disappointed about, really ticks off at is that you were unable to get out that Indian cabinet meeting thing. We have got to get it out.

K: We will do it.

P: I know there are a lot of pro-Indian people in State and who are trying to delay this. But I want it. We ought to be pressing the Indians every day. Now that Dacca has fallen we have got to get that Ambassador in here and tell him the President is outraged about what he has done using our television and radio facilities to do it. Second, someone has got to say something about the Indian aid. The figure they have been using is not correct. I want a report. I want everything in it: PL-480, unilateral and multilateral assistance because some pressures have got to go. The Russians will only go as far as the Indians want to go. The Indians have got to make a decision whether they want to be totally a Russian satellite or not. Also there have been these Indian cabinet meetings, we have got to report on those.

K: Yes, Mr. President.

P: Actually with regard to the Indian aid thing, couldn't Javits or one of the liberals on the Hill see if they couldn't stop this now...

K: The next thing we could do is there is $123 million in goods that is moving to India. We could seize those but that would get us into endless litigation.

P: Goods of what type?
K: They have been part of the economic program. It has been paid for already. We can do it. It has been done before.

P: If the Indians continue the course they are on we have even got to break diplomatic relations with them. Don't you agree, Henry?

K: I agree. There is already a strong victory statement and an unbelievable setback for the Chinese which is none of our business but they have certainly humiliated them.

P: And also let it be known they have done nothing.

K: That is right.

P: In the event they ______ West Pakistan, is there anything more that can be done? Are they going...

K: They gave us flat assurances there wouldn't be. If that happens we will have to reassess our position with the Russians. We will have until Saturday morning to see that.

P: What are they doing?

K: I said to Vorontsov if you don't do it at the UN, do it as a bilateral exchange of letters.

P: And they have not responded?

K: No, it is a little early. They could have if they wanted to.

P: The question is...

K: Well, the question is - let's look at objectively. So they put it to us and they saw because you acted in such a ______ way here, we are going to drop the summit...

P: Well, dropping the summit is not the first thing I would do.

K: Well, you have to look to see how much we are willing to pay in terms of where we are going. ________ we have to realize the Russians have got a certain amount in other parts of the world so we have to just grin and bear it, right?