Iraqi Denial and Deception for Weapons of Mass Destruction & Ballistic Missile Programs
Denial & Deception Overview

Denial
- Signals Security
- Satellite Countermeasures
- Camouflage
- Underground/Covert Facilities

Deception
- Disinformation
- Cover Stories
- Staged Activities
- False Installations

Selected Methods
Iraqi Denial and Deception

“The Iraqi evasion of the UN disarmament requirements was a determined policy throughout the life of UNSCOM.”

“To Justify the absence of required data or documents, they offered stories that were the equivalent of the “dog ate my homework.”

Concealment Mechanism Organization Chart

Saddam Hussein
President of Iraq

Presidential Offices

Higher Security Committee

Special Security Organization (SSO)

Qusay
Saddam Hussein

Military Industrial Commission

Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)

Special Republican Guard (SRG)

Directorate for Military Intelligence
Iraqi’s Denial and Deception Strategy for WMD and Ballistic Missiles

In January 1999, then UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council about a 1991 high-level Iraqi decision to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons

- Provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks; release only outdated weapon stocks for destruction
- Conceal the full extent of its CW program, including VX nerve agent
- Conceal existence of BW program
- Preserve a cadre of nuclear scientists & technicians; documentation and dual-use manufacturing equipment
- Maintain a covert SCUD missile force & critical manufacturing infrastructure & development programs

Iraqi Denial and Deception Activities Since 1991

- Concealment & Sanitization
- Fraudulent Declarations to UN
- Sacrifice of WMD Program Elements
- WMD Facility & Program Cover Stories
- Placing WMD Programs in “Dual-use” Facilities
- Declaring Suspect Facilities as “Sensitive Sites”
- Disinformation

- Staged Tours of Alleged WMD Facilities By Iraqi Ministry of Information

Concealment:
Abu Ghurayb BW Facility

Nondescript Buildings

Residential Area

©Digital Globe - QuickBird 01 March 2002
“In addition to barring UNSCOM inspection teams from various key sites in Iraq, Baghdad has tried to surreptitiously remove nuclear-related equipment like the Uranium Enrichment equipment (above), from clandestine sites before UN inspectors can tag and destroy it”.

“Iraq has not produced any bacteriological or biological weapons. This has been proven scientifically and technically. The equipment which could be said to be capable of producing such weapons has been destroyed.”

Source: Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network 1052 GMT, 15 Jul 1992, Text of Letter addressed by Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein to UN Secretary General, Dr. Butrus Ghali
Sacrifice of WMD Program Elements

150 Boxes of BW-related Documents
Presented to UNSCOM at a Chicken Farm in August 1995
WMD Facility & Program Cover Stories
Placing WMD Programs in “Dual-use” Facilities

- Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, at Al-Sharqat, in the Desert in NW Iraq
- British report indicates it will produce nitric acid, which can be used in explosives, missile fuel, and purification of uranium

Mosul Presidential Palace “Sensitive Site”

1998

Suspected Command & Control Facility

Palace

Suspect Hardened Bunkers

Hardened Storage Warehouse

Photo Source: UK MoD/EPA/PANews

(One of eight sites from which UNSCOM inspectors were specifically barred)
The approximate total area of the White House and its grounds has been superimposed to show comparative size.
Denial and Deception: DESERT STORM Legacy
Al Basrah Mosque “Disinformation” Incident
Simulate damage to unacceptable targets

Al Basrah Mosque, its dome neatly sheared off
Nearest bomb crater
Staged Tour: Iraqi Method for Discrediting Imagery Evidence of Illicit WMD Activity

1. International Org or Foreign Government Releases Satellite Image of Suspect WMD Facility

2. Iraq Obtains Image & Checks Actual Function of Facility (real WMD or legitimate civilian)

3. Iraqi Security Personnel Sanitize Facility (if it is a real WMD facility) & prepare facility personnel For visit (WMD or civilian)

4. Iraqi Ministry of Information Invites Selected Foreign Media Representatives to Tour Facility

5. Iraqis Conduct Scripted & Controlled Facility Tour

6. Iraqi Official Holds up Image to Discredit Evidence
Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility
Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility

Washington Post
11 September 2002
Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility

APPROXIMATE SITE OF STAGED TOUR

- Iraq has begun renewed production of CW agents (probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin & VX)
- All key aspects of Iraq’s BW Program (R&D, production, weaponization) are active; most elements are larger & more advanced than before Gulf War
- Iraq’s current military planning specifically envisages the use of CW & BW
- Iraq continues to develop its nuclear program, in breach of the NPT and UNCSR 687
- Iraq maintains a small missile force & several development programs

Iraq has learned lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation

**Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program: DECEPTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CW AGENT</th>
<th>DECLARED BY IRAQ</th>
<th>UNACCOUNTED FOR CW AGENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* VX</td>
<td>At least 4 metric tons</td>
<td>200 metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-Agents (Sarin)</td>
<td>100-150 metric tons</td>
<td>200 metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustard</td>
<td>500-600 metric tons</td>
<td>200 metric tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Iraq denied producing VX until 1995 defection of Hussein Kamil*

Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program: DECEPTION

CW Delivery Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery System</th>
<th>Estimated Numbers pre DESERT STORM</th>
<th>Unaccounted for Munitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile Warheads (Modified SCUD B Al Hussein)</td>
<td>75 to 100</td>
<td>45 to 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>15,000-20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>DECLARED TOTAL CONCENTRATION AMOUNTS (Used To Fill Munitions)</th>
<th>DISCREPANCIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANTHRAX</td>
<td>8,500 liters (2,245 gallons)</td>
<td>UNSCOM estimates production amounts were 3-4 x more than declared amounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTULINUM TOXIN</td>
<td>19,400 liters (10x – 20x Concentrated) (5,125 gallons)</td>
<td>UNSCOM estimates production amounts 2 x more than declared amounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAS GANGRENE</td>
<td>340 liters (90 gallons)</td>
<td>Production amounts could be higher, UNSCOM unable to confirm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFLATOXIN</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Production amounts &amp; time frame of production claimed by Iraq do not correlate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nuclear Program DECEPTION

- Iraq’s Determination to Acquire Nuclear Weapons Undiminished
- Iraq retains a large Cadre of Nuclear Scientists, Engineers & Technicians
- Iraq Continues to Withhold Significant Information from the UN about:
  - Enrichment Techniques
  - Foreign Procurement
  - Weapons Design
  - Experimentation Data

Facility Bombed During DESERT STORM
Currently active

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program

DECEPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>UNSCOM SUPERVISED DESTRUCTION</th>
<th>DISCREPANCIES IN IRAQI ACCOUNTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCUD-Type Missiles</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7-20 SCUDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Launchers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unknown Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>30 CW / 18 conventional</td>
<td>45-70 BW/CW &amp; conventional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen SCUD-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650-900 kms.

Sources:
1. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (US State Department, 23 Feb 2000);
2. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US Government: 13 February 1998);
3. Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, CIA (October 2002)
IRAQI COMPLIANCE
Fact or Fiction?

1997: “We have fulfilled much of the provisions of these resolutions. Therefore, the problem is not implementing what remains. If 90 or 95 percent or even more of these resolutions were implemented, particularly in the area of weapons, then what is the importance of achieving the remaining 5, 6, or 2 percent?”

Source: Paris Radio Address, 15 January 1997

2002: “It is a fact that Iraq is not producing any weapons of mass destruction.”

Source: Interview with Focus Magazine (Germany), 8 April 2002

TARIQ AZIZ, Deputy Prime Minister
Fact or Fiction?
September 19, 2002

“We hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.”