EXDIS  CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 7/20/93

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 4/12/2001 (Draper, HRRIS) OR-M
TAGS: IK, US, XF, PLO, LE, SA, US, EGEN, 1R
SUBJ: MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAHADI

1. (S -1 ENLIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: NEA DAS DRAPER ON APRIL 12 HET WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS INITIALLY AND THEN WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAHADI FOR ONE HOUR TO DISCUSS INTER-ALIA HIGH-LIGHTS OF SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST VISIT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S BASIC POLICIES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, AND U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. IRAQ PROVIDED A WARM AND CORDIAL RECEPTION.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02  BAGHDAD 00972 01 OF 02 1220392
SECRET

IRAQ IS NOT YET PREPARED TO RESUME FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT WILL RESUME AND ENCOURAGE A MORE SYSTEMATIC AND MORE INTIMATE DIALOGUE AT SENIOR LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY INTERESTS SECTION CHIEF EAGLETON AND DCH BODINE, NEA DRAPER MET ON APRIL 12 WITH SENIOR IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY TEAM LED BY MUHAMMAD AL-SAHHAF, CHIEF OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, FOR OVER AN HOUR AND ONE-HALF, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI FOR AN HOUR. DRAPER EARLIER HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY WELCOMED TO BAGHDAD BY OFFICIALS AT A LUXURY HOTEL, WITH A FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTOCOL OFFICER WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON ALL TRAVELS, A CAR AND DRIVER, PLUS A FOUR-MAN SECURITY DETAIL WHICH PROVIDED SIREN ESCORT ON THE WAY TO APPOINTMENTS; HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS FOLLOW. MORE DETAILED RECORDS BY POUCH.


5. THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO TO SECRET SECRET

PAGE 03 BAGDAD 00972 01 OF 02 122039Z

IRAQ, DRAPER SAID, OUT OF RECOGNITION THAT IRAQ WAS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND HAD THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND BEYOND. HE DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY'S STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE U.S. MUST PURSUE A POLICY OF RELIABILITY AND CONSISTENCY WITH ITS HISTORIC FRIENDS PARTICULARLY AND SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS BUILDING UP ITS BASIC MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHILE IMPROVING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

6. THE MINISTRY TEAM WAS SOMEWHAT RELIEVED AT THE CO-SECRET
SECRET

7. Hammadi said he welcomed Draper's visit. He read with visible satisfaction the Secretary's message and said that he would look forward to an opportunity to meet with the Secretary at the UNGA or earlier. He said that he had been briefed fully by Sahaf about the earlier meeting with Draper; for that reason, Draper said he would not review in detail what he had discussed earlier but said he wanted to stress again the co-equal nature of the two broad U.S. objectives: an improved security position which would allow the states of the region to make independent decisions of their own in the common good, plus progress on the peace front with renewed vigor following the Israeli elections. Draper also reiterated basic U.S. policy toward Iran-Iraq war, saying that U.S. would not sell lethal equipment to either side, having secret secret.

PAGE 64

Baghdad 00972 01 of 02 1220392

Made this position clear to other governments, but nonetheless believed that it was in the world's overall interest that the war be concluded as soon as possible.

8. Hammadi described the Palestinian issue as the key to stability in the Middle East, and the means through which the Soviets were gaining influence at the expense of the U.S. He characterized the U.S. position toward Israel as one-sided and he ruled out all settlement achieved through the Camp David process. The U.S. cannot have both Israeli alliance and the friendship of the Arabs at this time and he stressed that, while Iraq was not Communist, it could hardly be surprising that the Soviets continue to exploit the original opportunity
SECRET

PAGE 01

BAGHDAD 00972 02 OF 02 122042Z

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-90 SSO-00 /031 W

--------------305310 1221032 /64

Q 121650Z APR-81 ZFF4

EN USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACF IMMEDIATE 1669
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 603
AHEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AHCNSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AHEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

SEC

SECRET

SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 00972

EXDIS

THEY GAINED FROM THE CZECH ARMS DEAL WITH EGYPT THROUGH AN INDISCRIMINATE U.S. POLICY

9. DRAPER COUNTER ARGUED THAT, WHATEVER CRITICISMS MIGHT BE LEVELED AT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, IT WAS A FACT THAT U.S. POLICIES HAD HELPPED CHANGE THE STATUS QUO IN A WAY THAT WAS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ARAB WORLD; FOR EXAMPLE, ALL OF THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES WOULD BE EVACUATED BY THE ISRAELIS BY APRIL, 1982; WE WOULD BE PLEASED.

SECRET

DRAPER SAID, IF IRAQ WOULD LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND AT THE PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS EVEN IF THE ULTIMATE RESULTS ARE DELAYED, AS FOR BALANCE IN U.S. POLICIES, DRAPER

SECRET

PAGE 02

BAGHDAD 00972 02 OF 02 122042Z

OREY ATTENTION TO OUR DETERMINATION TO ASSIST OUR HISTORIC FRIEND, SAUDI ARABIA, WITH THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT

SECRET
SECRET

PACKAGE DESPITE SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI AND DOMESTIC OPPosition. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH JORDAN, LEBANON, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, SUDAN AND EGYPT AND, OF COURSE, ISRAEL, AND BROADEN RELATIONS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SUCH KEY COUNTRIES AS PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. HAMMADI SAID-- AS REGARDS U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS -- THAT IRAQ WILL "WAIT AND SEE" WHETHER THE U.S. DOES SOMETHING BASIC, AND THEN EXAMINE QUESTION OF RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IN A MANNER THAT WAS DISTINCTLY WARM AND FORTHCOMING, HOWEVER, HAMMADI SAID IRAQ WAS READY TO RAISE THE LEVEL AND INTENSIFY ALL CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS.

HE REITERATED IRAQ'S WISH TO EXPAND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SAID U.S. COMPANIES WERE WELCOME TO COMPETE.

HE SAID THAT THE INTERESTS SECTION COULD BE EXPANDED IN SIZE OF A RECIPROCAL BASIS. "SEVERED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE NOT NORMAL AND SHOULD NOT REMAIN FOREVER".

10. AS FOR IRAN, HAMMADI SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION, BUT WOULD CONSIDER ANY CHANGE IN THE FORM OF SELLING ARMS TO IRAN AS AN UNFRIENDLY MOVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISLAMIC MISSION WAS MAKING MODEST PROGRESS AT THE MOMENT, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IRANIAN REGIME WAS STILL SPLIT ON THE PEACE ISSUE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HAMMADI SAID HE THOUGHT THE "THE WAR COULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE END OF 1981. WHEN HE ASKED OUR POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, DRAPER RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO BE UP FRONT NOR JOIN IN ANYTHING PREMATURE, AND WE'RE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UN ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE PALHE MISSION.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 BAGHDAD 00972 02 OF 02 1220422

11. IN BOTH MEETINGS, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE SALE OF BOEING ARICRAFT, AND IN THE FIRST MEETING DISCUSSED IRAQIS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, WITH HAMMADI, DRAWING ON THE WHITE HOUSE APRIL 3 STATEMENT, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION TOWARD PREEMPTIVE STRIKES BY ISRAEL.

12. FINALLY, DRAPER REFERRED AGAIN TO HAMMADI'S POINT THAT BASIC CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY WERE NEEDED AND ASKED THAT IRAQ NOT EXPECT MIRACLES BUT BE OPENMinded IN U.S. EFFORTS TO CHANGE -- POSITIVELY -- THE STATUS
SECRET

QUO: HAMMADI SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WITH AN OPEN MIND.

13. COMMENT: AS THE MORE DETAILED REPORTS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, THE ATOMSPHERICS WERE GOOD. THE WELCOME WAS GENUINE, AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON GLOBAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. EAGLETON SHOULD BE GIVEN A BROADER RANGE OF INFORMATION CABLES AND OTHER GUIDANCE SO AS TO BE ABLE TO TAKE UP WITH THE IRAQIS ON SUITABLE OCCASIONS A WIDE ARRAY OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

EAGLETON

SECRET

SECRET