a. 101st USASA Security Detachment (7th RRU)
Saigon, Vietnam

The 101st USASA Security Detachment Headquarters and
operations area were located in Building Q-10 within the Le Van Tue Canton-
ment area of the Republic of Vietnam's Joint General Staff Compound at
Camp Tran Hung Dao. The main entrance to the camp was located one kilometer
southeast of the main gate of Tan Son Nhat Air Base, Saigon, Vietnam. This
unit had an in-country designation of 7th Radio Research Unit and will be referred to as the 7th RRU throughout this report. On 22 January 1965, 2LT Michael T. Milnamow assumed command of the 7th RRU and served as its commander through the remainder of FY 1965.

The mission of the 7th RRU was to conduct signal security (SIGSEC) activities under the control of HQ USASA, providing support to a theater of operations in accordance with AR 10-122 and as directed by the Chief, USASAPAC.

The 7th RRU was organized under TD AS-6101-OF, consisting of four sections: Headquarters, Security Monitoring, Control and Analysis, and Advisor; and three teams—two fixed, one mobile. A TD change, effective 1 September 1964, added the five-man Advisor Section which provided advice and assistance to the 1st Radio Control Company (RVNAF COMSEC). The unit's mobile teams spent approximately 25 days of each month in the field, returning to Headquarters at the end of the month. The 3d RRU maintained operational control over the 7th RRU and provided training, billeting, and other support.

Personnel strength figures for FY 1965 are shown below:

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<th>1 July 1964</th>
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Although there were 174 officers assigned at the beginning and end of the fiscal year, this does not present a true picture of officer strength during the year. At times, the only officer assigned was on TDY from

USASAPAC. The attached TDY enlisted personnel shown above were from the 104th USASA Security Detachment and Hq USASAPAC.

The 7th RRU provided SIGSEC support to the following commands in Southeast Asia: US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; US Military Assistance Command, Thailand; Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand; and US military elements deployed in Vietnam and Thailand. The main areas in which support was rendered were transmission security (TRANSEC) analysis, review of local publications, communications, countermeasures, cryptographic security, physical security, electronic security and support to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The 7th was also tasked to provide maximum monitor coverage and analysis on all radio and wire electromagnetic communications used by the US Commanders that were not protected by on-line cryptographic equipment. 175

Priority for coverage was assigned to USMACV Operations and Intelligence (O&I) network with emphasis placed on intra-Division/Special Zone CW and voice nets. Second in priority was the 5th US Army Special Forces Group's intra B Detachments Nets. Monitoring requirement for both nets was once each quarter.

The unit's positions were divided into two mobile teams and one fixed team. The fixed team was located at the Operations Building of the 7th RRU and rendered support to III Corps Special Forces area. In this manner it was possible to render TRANSEC support to all major US elements in the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand.

Transportation difficulties encountered in moving the mobile teams

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slightly reduced the number of hours of coverage available. All missions to the north of Saigon and the majority to the south, and any to Thailand, required special airlift request. Although timely and adequate support was rendered, there was unavoidable time involved in the movement of personnel and equipment. During the first quarter, any team going south could convoy to the site, but due to increased Viet Cong activities, this method was no longer feasible. In order to partly relieve this problem, the TA-49's were removed from their shelters and packed in footlockers. In this way, the two-man telephone teams booked out through passenger services and carried the equipment as excess baggage. This method shortened the time encountered in obtaining special transportation requests.

Cryptographic security analysis was performed on off-time traffic encrypted in the ADONIS, KL-7 system loaned to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. This analysis was performed to insure that the equipment was used in accordance with prescribed directives and the loan agreement. Statistics showed that the Vietnamese were becoming quite proficient in the use of the KL-7.

On 14 November 1964, the 7th RRU was tasked by USMACV J-2 to monitor and analyze US Air Force communications from Bien Hoa, RVN. The purpose of this mission was to attempt to intercept, record and analyze suspected communications jamming attempts on Air Force frequencies. The team also analyzed the traffic with view toward determining the status of transmission security of USAF nets. As a result, a USAF TRANSEC survey team arrived in Saigon on 25 November and assumed responsibility for the analysis of USAF communications previously monitored by the 7th RRU. A review of previous
violations and those noted in November indicated that the majority of
violations were committed over the conventional telephone. In order to
insure more widespread monitoring coverage of telephones, a new schedule
for mobile monitoring teams was designed.

During March, two telephone teams provided monitor coverage of six
switchboards. This was made possible by man-packing the equipment and by
moving from one location to another without returning to Saigon after each
mission. The only drawback to this method was the time delay in completing
analysis of the traffic and submitting a report. The 7th RRU's tasking
instructions from COMUSMACV and JUS-MAG-THAI were reviewed and revised
along with USMACV Directive 41, which set the policy for Transmission
Security in the command. It was believed that the revision would be of
much benefit to the command and the unit, as tasking instructions were more
specific than before.

Even though supported units throughout the area showed an increased
COMSEC awareness and a more positive reaction to the support rendered, the
conventional telephone remained the weakest link, COMSEC-wise, in the com-
 munications system.

In view of increased command desire for COMSEC support--to include
radio coverage at a lower echelon than was then being supported--and the
increase of wire communications, the 7th was being tasked almost beyond its
capabilities. The situation indicated many changes would have to take place
and, as the report period ended, a new Concept of Operation and a Table of
Distribution fashioned after a Security Company had been developed and
submitted for approval.