My impressions of the meeting at Camp David the afternoon of March 21, 1959, which was attended by Prime Minister Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, and several British representatives including Ambassador Harold Caccia, The President, Mr. Herter, Mr. Quarles, Dr. Killian, Mr. Farley, Mr. Robert Murphy, Mr. Merchant, and myself.

Macmillan briefly outlined his discussion with Mr. Khrushchev explaining his suggestion to Mr. Khrushchev of a limited number of on-site inspections. Macmillan explained that Khrushchev had been critical of the West proposal indicating it was a military espionage plan. Macmillan indicated that Khrushchev looked with some favor on the Macmillan suggestion.

Macmillan then raised the question as to whether we should pursue the negotiation for test suspension or abandon it entirely.

Dr. Killian then reviewed the technical aspects reporting the original Geneva findings, the changes resulting from the HARDTACK II shots which necessitated the tabling of revised data in January, and finally the reports of the Berkner Committee and the High Altitude Committee. He summarized these reports accurately and emphasized the dangers of decoupling. He also spoke about the possibilities of high altitude testing, the difficulty of detection even with satellites, and finally spoke of the possibilities of a simplified detection system for atmospheric shots he had read in the Harold Brown to Libby telegram of March 19th.

Macmillan then again posed the question as to whether all of the technical difficulties had not placed us in a position where we must decide whether to pursue the course originally set out last summer with the Geneva technical conference or recognize the technical complexities which had since arisen and for that reason change direction.

The President was emphatic at all times in urging agreements only where adequate safeguards are provided and stating that we could not under any circumstance enter into agreement in which adequate safeguards were not provided. In response to questions, I responded that this was my position and, furthermore, I knew that this would represent the position of authority of committees on health. At one point Macmillan emphasized the importance of an agreement in the interest of discouraging
fourth power developments and made something of a plea to reach an agreement even though it might not be fully safeguarded as an essential step in the interest of human welfare.

The Group reviewed the purposes of the original negotiations which were, (a) stop fallout, (b) limit weapons development, and (c) discourage Nth party developments. Some ideas were advanced from our side that we might unilaterally declare stopping of atmospheric tests but would go forward with underground and perhaps high altitude shots. This suggestion was made by the President. It was felt that this would not meet the third criteria, mainly, the discouraging of Nth power development.

The AEC plan of agreeing to stop atmospheric shots and to approach underground shots later was looked on with favor and I think it was generally felt that this is probably the best and most sensible approach to the problem.

The British expressed no interest in high altitude shots. Quarles insisted that we had an interest in such shots and was not prepared to relinquish that right. The Prime Minister then dealt with the question of breaking off the negotiation, pointing out that we should break on the question of the veto and should not inject these new technical considerations at this time. All seemed in agreement with this point of view.

The meeting was not conclusive except on this latter point and it was felt that we should have further discussions prior to the resumption of negotiations on April 13th.

After the meeting I had a private talk with Macmillan who proposed that on April 13th the negotiators prepare an agreed memorandum on the points in which they were in agreement and set forth the points in which they were in disagreement. Then we would develop that the disagreements were beyond the competence of the negotiators and therefore would have to be referred to the Heads of State in their August meeting. Macmillan felt that prior to the August meeting we could have an agreed approach worked out indicating but not stating definitely that it would follow the AEC plan. He felt that Khrushchev would be obliged to accept this and that we could then proceed for two or three years to further develop the underground techniques with no prohibition on testing.

Throughout the discussion I emphasized the importance of underground testing because of its contribution to weapons development and pointed out on several occasions that we could not voluntarily stop underground testing and permit the Russians to proceed with underground testing because of the very important advancements in weapons that they could make during a period even though it was only two or three years. The President supported me in this position.
Following the meeting and on the way back Killian attempted to outline his position precisely. It was as follows: First, he would break on the veto; second, he would propose a cessation of atmospheric testing with a simple form of detection, as outlined by Harold Brown; third, he would advocate further work on underground tests as a means of perfecting detection. His views were confirmed by Quarles. It is obvious that both have swung around to the AEC position. In fact, I feel that the AEC's position is now pretty well recognized as the proper one by everyone concerned.

It was gratifying to me that throughout the meeting the President made several references to Plowshare and to the wonderful prospects of this project and its necessity of preserving our rights to proceed with this type of experimental development work.

John A. McCone