Department of State

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Herewith text Khrushchev letter handed Murphy May 15:

QUOTE

May 14

Dear Mr. President:

Your answer to my communication to you of April 23rd of
this year has been received. The Soviet Government expresses
its satisfaction in regard to the statement of the Government
of the United States to the effect that the latter does not
object to the conclusion of a treaty which would contemplate
the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests—in the air,
underground, under water, and at high altitudes—and that such
an agreement is the aim of the United States. In this respect,
I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that the Soviet
Government has always considered and continues to consider that
it is precisely such a solution which would fully correspond
the task of preventing the development of new and ever more
destructive types of nuclear weapons, and of removing the dange

S/S - Moy, D. Miller; hec

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Moy, D. Miller

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derived

from atomic radiation emanating from explosions of such weapons.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the readiness of the Government of the United States to study the proposal concerning the carrying out, on a yearly basis, of a certain previously determined number of inspections both on the territory of the Soviet Union and on the territories of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and their possessions, if the indications of the instruments of control posts give evidence of the presence of phenomena which might be suspected of being nuclear explosions. We continue to be of the opinion that this proposal constitutes a good basis for a solution of the most difficult problem—the problem of sending inspection teams for investigations on the spot. Obtaining agreement on this proposal would open the way to the conclusion of an accord on the cessation of all types of tests.

With respect to the question raised by you, Mr. President, as to the control of the observance of the agreement on the cessation of tests, and to the opinion of the Soviet Government in respect to the procedure of voting which would determine the implementation of the more important elements of such control, I should like to bring the following to your attention: We consider that agreement on a previously determined number of visits of inspection teams precludes the necessity of voting or of obtaining agreement on that question within the control commission or within any other organization.
The sense of our proposal consists precisely in such an elimination of the question of the so-called "veto" in regard to sending inspection teams on the spot. Inspection teams could, for instance, be sent, within the limitations of the agreed number of visits, upon the request of any of the initial parties to the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, that is to say: the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain, in those cases where the indications of the instruments of control posts provide a basis for suspecting a phenomenon of being a nuclear explosion. We are ready to accept the obligation guaranteeing opportune and unhampered access of the inspection teams to the area within the territory of the Soviet Union in which there are observed phenomena suspected of being an atomic explosion, and to which an appropriate party expresses the desire to send such teams.

We note your statement that the United States does not contemplate an unlimited number of inspections and that you are taking into consideration our opinion, according to which such inspections should not be numerous. You write that the number of such inspections should be in definite conformity with scientific facts and opportunities of detection. But I think that you will agree, Mr. President, that there is hardly any need to engage in a study of any criteria for solving such a simple and obvious problem as determining a specific number of visits of inspection teams.
Disputes over criteria of this kind might be conducted endlessly, especially if one of the parties did not aim at concluding an agreement for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Government considers that it might be possible to agree on a number of inspections which will fully guarantee the possibility of detecting violations of the agreement. In this connection in order to restrain countries which might be tempted to violate the agreement and conduct nuclear explosions secretly, no large number of inspection visits would be necessary, of course. The agreement itself as to a specific number of such verifications will have a sobering effect on all governments which might be inclined to conduct concealed nuclear weapons tests.

As far as the Soviet Government is concerned, we have solemnly stated and do state that even in advance we shall strictly adhere to the agreement and shall not violate the agreement concerning the cessation of tests, which will be signed by us.

But we shall not object to having the question of the number of inspections according to agreement between the initial participants of the treaty revised, shall we say, once every two years, on the basis of the estimate of the experience of the work of the control organization.

I do not think that voting on other questions pertaining to the activity of the control organization would be an obstacle to the
conclusion of the agreement. It might be agreed that the decision on the matter of appointing an administrator, for example, would be undertaken by agreement between the initial treaty members in the control commission, and you do not object to this either. We might be guided by the same principle in appointing the personnel of the control posts, inspection groups, etc.

In your letter, Mr. President, you also raise the question of discussing in the very near future concrete measures for the detection of explosions conducted at high altitudes. We agree that on the matter of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests there would be conducted in a short time a technical discussion of concrete measures as to methods of detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes on the basis of the conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts, for the purpose of including such methods in the system of control.

The Soviet Government, whose constant desire is the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests in any medium and for all time, which is in keeping with the interests of nations, is convinced that on the basis of the considerations set forth above it may be possible to find a solution to such problems as separate us, and sign such an agreement in the very near future.

With sincere esteem,

N. Khrushchev

UNQUOTE