Dr. Killian suggested bringing a working group together to review the whole problem of inspection and the various approaches to it as well as to study precisely what the risk would be for the U.S. if it were possible for the Soviet Union to conduct a small number of tests clandestinely. Such a group would, of course, look at the Tukey approach as well as at the effectiveness of the intelligence contribution. The objective would be to get a true overall picture of the problem rather than isolated bits and pieces, which are all we presently have.

Mr. McCone agreed that such a study would be highly desirable and Mr. Dillon asked that Dr. Killian take responsibility for getting it started.

Dr. Killian observed that the Soviet proposal on inspection looks better and better the more he thought about it, and that he did not understand why the Soviets made it. He felt that if we had a budget of 100 inspections per year to use there would be a high probability of catching any violation. He felt that it was possible to reduce this number and still have a high probability, but that 10 was a reasonable figure to start with. He said he felt that any figure as small as 25 would not be acceptable to us. Mr. McCone observed that 100 inspections would allow inspection of all events above 5 kilotons and about 5 per cent of those under that figure. Gen. Loper said that the advantages of allowing the "other side" to choose the event to be inspected would not necessarily argue in favor of the quota approach, since it was equally applicable to making choices within a percentage. Mr. McCone said that the probabilities of detecting a violation appeared to be greatly improved if each side was able to choose the events to be inspected. He suggested that the Killian group might take various assumed numbers of allowed inspections a year, and, taking everything into account, see how effective it would be and what risks it would mean for the U.S. Mr. Dillon said that it was vital to have informed conclusions on these questions before we make up our minds on what to do in the negotiations. Every indication is that the Soviets will not be willing to talk about technical matters such as these but that we ourselves should still have this information as a basis for determining our own objectives.

Mr. Dillon asked Mr. McCone to report on his visit to Geneva. Mr. McCone said that he had been graciously received by Tsarapkine who then turned around and told the press that he had come to scuttle the agreement. He said that Amb. Wadsworth was doing a superb job, displaying great skill and patience. Amb. Wadsworth was troubled, however, by the degree of turnover on the delegation staff, as well as by the problem of communications, which was no doubt a temporary one caused by the heavy traffic of the Foreign Ministers meeting. Amb. Wadsworth continues to believe that the Soviets do want an agreement and was troubled by the message sent by the Secretary regarding the possibility of a change in direction in three or four weeks. Mr. McCone thought that the delegation itself felt that agreement on the April 13 proposal was, all things considered, the most desirable end result of the negotiations. The Joint Committee apparently shared this view. Mr. McCone said he believed, in the long run, the Soviets will be willing to discuss technical aspects of the underground problem.

Mr. McCone said he wished to raise one final point that was occasioned by an inquiry from the Joint Committee as to how often the principals meet to consider