POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL-JCS JOINT STAFF MEETING

Thursday, September 14, 1961, 2:30 p.m.
Room 7261, N.S.

State  
George McGhee  
Carlton Savage  
George Newman

Defense  
Admiral Wellings  
General Reynolds  
General Neilsen  
Mr. Mountain

1. Impact on world opinion of the results of the Belgrade Conference. See INR paper (attached.)

2. Latest information on prospects for peace in French-Algerian and French-Tunisian situation. See the William Polk memorandum (attached).

3. ICA reportedly has increased its efforts and financial obligations in Yugoslavia, while at the same time decreasing projects and financial obligations in Greece. If this is true, what is the rationale for these actions. See the Henry Brodie memorandum (attached).

4. Military consequences of Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. There are ample military reasons for this Soviet action but it could be psychological also. The Soviet Union has been behind us technically, particularly in small yield weapons. Furthermore, the Soviets are trying to develop a triggering device for a huge nuclear weapon and also to develop an anti-ICBM. There is no doubt that the Soviets have been preparing for some time to resume testing. The results from the current USSR tests could be immediate if they have stockpiles ready of the weapons tested. They may have done preliminary testing under ground. They do not need to test a 100 megaton weapon. They have second generation ICBMs but with liquid fuel.

5. Military
5. Military situation in Berlin and the corridors since the closing of the border between East and West Berlin. Soviet forces are now in barracks around West Berlin. One division is astride the Autobahn. There is no evidence of movement of large numbers of Soviet troops in East Germany. There is no significant deployment of Soviet forces in and around the corridor.

6. Moscow Telegram 847 of September 9 (Balance of Power). The Thompson assessment appears largely correct from the point of view of the Pentagon. We have a great need for intelligence on Soviet production of bombers, fighters, MRBMs and ICBMs to determine whether the Soviet Union has a crash program on any or all of these items. It is important that we know where the Soviets are putting their effort now. Khrushchev must know that we have enough power now to knock Russia "off the map" without 100 megaton bombs. The Soviet Union may have an anti-ICBM system by 1964 or 1965.

S/P:CSavage:rw
In our Berlin planning, as well as other decisions in West-East relations, we find recurring need for most accurate possible estimate of Soviet view of US-USSR power balance. This vital question continues to subject varying interpretations here. On one hand, it is argued Soviets believe what they say about correlation of forces having swung in their favor and that they have US on run; on other hand, view is expressed that Soviet moves in Berlin and elsewhere primarily defensive, that USSR deeply fearful about growing US strength. (We realize these two opinions not completely exclusive.)

It would be helpful have your opinion on this subject as well as your assessment of current Soviet image of US.

RUSK
RE DEPTEL 709.

I BELIEVE SOVIET MOVES IN BERLIN HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH MILITARY FACTORS BUT ARE DEFENSIVE IN SENSE THAT BERLIN HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY EXPLOITED AGAINST THEM IN COLD WAR AND MADE IMPOSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT STABILITY EASTERN GERMANY. I THINK THAT WITH EXCEPTION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE Capabilities WHICH THEY UNDERestimate SOVIETS HAVE FAIRLY ACCURATE CONCEPT OF OUR STRENGTH. BELIEVE HOWEVER THEY ERR IN THEIR ESTIMATE OF OUR DETERMINATION AND EXAGGERATE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS BOTH WITHIN US AND BETWEEN NATO ALLIES. KRUSHCHEV IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION HAS INDICATED WE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL IN OUR ABILITY TO DAMAGE THE OTHER. SOVIET SCIENTISTS HAVE EXPRESSED OPINION THEY ARE AHEAD OF US IN MISSILES. IMPORTANCE OF ACTUAL CORRELATION OF FORCES IS PROBABLY LESS IMPORTANT THAN SOVIET ESTIMATE THEIR ABILITY TO CONVINCE US AND WORLD THAT BALANCE IS IN THEIR FAVOR. IN ADDITION TO OUR DEBATE ON SO-CALLED MISSILE GAP, GAGARIN AND TITOV EXPLOITS HAVE DOUBTFULLY GIVEN THEM HOPE THIS IS POSSIBLE AND RESUMPTION ATOMIC TESTS PART OF THIS EFFORT.

SO FAR AS ACTUAL SITUATION IS CONCERNED, I AM INCLINED BELIEVE THAT WITH ADVENT OF POLARIS SUBMARINES, SOLID FUEL MISSILES, OUR SUPERIORITY IN FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, OUR GREATER AIR AND NAVAL STRENGTH, AND OUR POSSESSION OF SMALL TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS, KRUSHCHEV AND SOVIET MILITARY PROBABLY CONSIDER THEIR POSITION RELATIVE TO OURS AS WORSENED. BELIEVE THEY ALSO CONSIDER THAT WITH OUR GREATER FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES STEP-UP OF ARMS RACE WILL BE TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE. KRUSHCHEV ONCE STATED SOVIET UNION COULD NOT AFFORD TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS WHICH WERE IN ANY
SECRET

-2- 847, SEPTEMBER 9, 6 PM, FROM: MOSCOW

EVENT UNNECESSARY. IF TRUE THAT SOVIETS HAVE INSUFFICIENT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, CURRENT SERIES ATOMIC TESTS MAY BE DESIGNED OBTAIN MORE SOPHISTICATED WARHEADS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE LESS MATERIAL FOR SAME EFFECT. IN GENERAL I THINK SOVIETS LESS "FEARFUL" ABOUT OUR GROWING STRENGTH THAN THEY ARE ABOUT INCREASE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF WEST GERMANS.

THERE HAVE OF COURSE BEEN SOME DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SOVIET AIR SHOW AND RESUMPTION TESTING WHICH MIGHT INDICATE SOVIETS CONCERNED THAT WE THINK WE HAVE GAINED SUFFICIENT ADVANTAGE TO RISK WAR.

THOMPSON

ELP/22