Khrushchev reportedly has announced to 22 Communist Party Congress that Sovs have 100 Megaton bomb and will conclude series atomic tests this month with 50-Megaton bomb. Test if conducted could be accompanied by visual, communications blackout, fallout, and other effects of highly dramatic character. White House announcement expressing belief peoples of world will join US in asking Sovs not proceed with test is designed place Sov threat in proper perspective, emphasizing its unnecessary and hazardous character and obvious political motivation. Similar statement be made by Amb Stevenson at UN in hope eliciting resolution condemning or inhibiting Soviet intention. Following for your guidance is basic concept governing US reaction Soviet announcement and possible test:

I. OBJECTIVES

1. To ensure that our allies and other Free World countries recognize that terror weapons such as 50 - 100 MT bombs are
primarily political tools which do not offer decisive military advantage and which do not alter the basic military situation; also to ensure that others understand that we remain confident (and there is no reason to lose confidence) in the deterrent strength of our nuclear weapons and delivery systems and that we are prepared (even in the face of higher yield weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union) to use our weapons in the face of aggression.

2. To solidify world opinion in advance against the testing of very high yield weapons as both unnecessary and potentially of substantial hazard and to discredit the Soviet Union as irresponsible if it conducts such a test.

3. To portray Soviet moves in this regard as a most blatant form of the "intimidation, interference, and intervention" denounced by the nonaligned countries in the Belgrade declaration; and to convince others not only to stand firm with us against such blackmail but also actively and vigorously to oppose it.

4. To make clear that even in the presence of the heightened tensions created by Soviet resumption of nuclear testing and by its
attempts at nuclear blackmail, the United States, confident in its own strength, continues to pursue measures of a reassuring character; to convince others that we are prepared to fight if necessary but that we still propose to explore all possibilities of reasonable solutions.

II. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF US APPROACH

1. The White House statement emphasizing the unnecessary and hazardous character of such a test and its obvious political motivation.

2. Possible subsequent statements and background press info

3. Statements by heads of government and high officials of other countries (1) joining in US appeal to Khrushchev not to proceed with announced test and protesting Sov conduct; and (2) expressing determination to withstand nuclear blackmail and opposing it as a political tool.
III. SPECIAL GUIDANCE

1. Military usefulness of very high yield weapons. It is present view of the US that 50 - 100 MT weapons do not add sufficient increment to military power to make them essential from military viewpoint. However, we cannot discount such weapons completely, and it would not be credible for us to try. We should stress that existing high yield weapons, accurately delivered, are adequate to deal with military targets and that the Soviet desire for even higher yields (while possibly reflecting lack of confidence in the accuracy and effectiveness of the weapons now available to it) is motivated primarily by desire for political rather than military advantage.

2. Fallout. In exploiting world fear of fallout to disadvantage of Soviet Union, United States should retain flexibility with respect to our own future testing program and should not create a situation in which it would not be politically possible for us to conduct certain atmospheric tests should it prove in our view essential to do so. Accordingly, without exaggerating the specific consequences of Soviet-created fallout and without advancing charges which might later be scientifically disproved, we should emphasize that whatever the consequences of increased fallout, the burden lies with the Soviet
Union for resuming tests at all and for choosing to conduct its tests in the atmosphere when many of them could have been conducted underground without creating a fallout hazard.

In so far as testing of very high yield device is concerned, fallout effects would vary with test conditions and might not be determined for some time. Both in advance of and subsequent to such a test, we should stress the fact that full-scale test totally unnecessary and, therefore, especially irresponsible in character.

To assist in achievement objectives stated, and to encourage actions under II. 3 above, appropriate addressees should in their discretion discuss subject with government to which accredited, drawing on foregoing and on White House statement. Special guidance follows.

[Rusk signature]

Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw

Moscow, Sofia

10/19/61