UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

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SUBJECT: Nuclear Test Ban
DATE: January 23, 1963
TIME: 3:00 p.m.
PLACE: Washington, D.C.

PARTICIPANTS:

USSR
Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN
S. K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative to ENDC
Y. Vorontsov, USSR Foreign Ministry
Vladimir N. Zherebtsov, Interpreter

UK
Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary, UK Embassy

US
William C. Foster, Director, ACDA
Charles C. Stelle, Deputy US Representative, ENDC
James E. Goodby, ACDA/IR
Alexander Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

Mr. Foster inquired whether the Soviet side had had any word about the questions put to it by the US, to which Fedorenko rejoined that he would like to hear about Mr. Foster's most recent talk with the President.

Mr. Foster said that he had talked again with the President and that the President had confirmed his previous instructions. The President was disappointed that so far on certain points it had not been possible to elicit information from the Soviet side. This information which related to on-site inspection procedures and the capacity of national detection systems had a bearing on the broad framework within

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which the system would work. The President felt there was an opportunity to move forward in the test ban negotiations and so the US side was eager to hear whether the Soviet side had anything to say about the general inspection framework.

Tsarapkin said that the Soviet side had repeatedly stated its position. It wished that Mr. Foster would inform the President that the Soviet Union was quite prepared to discuss those technical questions which were of interest to the US and to come to an agreement on these questions. It went without saying that without a solution to these problems it would not be possible to put into effect agreements that might be reached on basic problems. The sooner agreement could be reached on the basic questions of the on-site inspection quota and the numbers and locations of automatic seismic stations, the sooner it would be possible to talk about other matters. Naturally, the question of criteria would come up as well as other questions and the Soviet side was confident these questions could be solved. Again he stated that without the solution of these other technical problems it would not be possible to put into effect the basic agreements which might be reached. However, the Soviet side saw no need to discuss technical matters as a precondition for reaching agreement on these basic matters. On the contrary, the Soviet side was afraid that if it adopted the tactics suggested by the US, the same difficulties would arise as had previously come up and the result would be failure to reach agreement. The suggestions put forward by the Soviet Union were put forward because the Soviet government really wanted an agreement. It was a cause of deep regret that the US was insisting on technical discussions.

Mr. Foster was encouraged by Tsarapkin's statement that agreement on procedures and manner of carrying out on-site inspection could be obtained. He was also encouraged that Tsarapkin thought that a test ban agreement could be reached. Mr. Foster recalled that previously he had identified 4 elements which were parts of a dependable system. These were 1) number of on-site inspections; 2) procedures and manner of conducting on-site inspections; 3) number of automatic seismic
stations, 4) location and type of automatic seismic stations. Mr. Foster hoped that general agreements could be reached on all these points. In fact, there was already a general sort of agreement on questions relating to automatic seismic stations, such as Mr. Khrushchev's statement that automatic seismic stations could be installed by foreigners and that data from these stations could be picked up by foreigners. Agreement of a similar nature could also be developed on the other matters raised by the US.

The reason the US was concerned about inspection procedures was that in the past when the US thought agreement on certain points had been reached it had found that the methods for carrying out the agreements were not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Thus, during the course of the Geneva talks, the US found that the Soviet Union envisaged that the control system would not begin to function until 4 years after the treaty became effective. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had said that all inspection teams in the USSR would be led by Soviet nationals. Mr. Foster wished to emphasize that, for its part, the US did want agreement and the US side felt that these discussions should move as quickly as possible toward agreements which could be referred to Heads of State. Obviously Heads of State would not get into the technical details of a verification system but they should know what the supporting procedures would be so that they could assess whether the procedures would lead to an enduring and politically acceptable test ban. It was clear that the on-site inspection quota alone could not indicate the capability or the dependability of the system. This was why the US side had suggested that this question be put aside for the moment while we attempt to make progress on other related issues. The US was prepared to negotiate but if the Soviet Union put forward its proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, this was not consistent with achieving agreement in these talks. The President had clearly indicated that 2 or 3 inspections was not enough. There was no reflection on anyone to say that the security of each party to the treaty was dependent on there being adequate assurance built into the treaty. Mr. Foster emphasized that the risk inherent in
continuing with testing was a great one and that this was weighed in the balance against the risks inherent in any form of inspection system. The US was not seeking perfection but there were certain minimum requirements which it must have in a treaty.

Turning to the questions of automatic seismic stations and the locations of national seismic stations, Mr. Foster showed the Soviet side maps showing the areas proposed by the US as locations for automatic seismic stations. He compared these areas with the locations of national detection stations to demonstrate that there was a need for more automatic stations in the Far East.

Fedorenko noted that Mr. Foster had said the President felt the number of on-site inspections proposed by the Soviet Union was insufficient. Fedorenko asked whether Mr. Foster could say concretely what the US position was on the quota and to spell out what the "x" might be.

Mr. Foster replied that "x" had been his invention to indicate the area of negotiation when other surrounding questions were understood. He recalled that he had said that "X" was somewhere between 10, 9, 8 and 2, 3, 4. The solution of "x" would be a resultant of some of the understandings that might be reached on other elements of the system. With "x" representing such a narrow band, the President had felt it would be possible to negotiate on other questions so that this narrow band could be further diminished.

Fedorenko replied that while Ambassador Dean had once referred to 2 to 4 as the number for an on-site inspection quota, which was very close to the Soviet proposal, the Soviet side did not know the origin of the figure 4 attributed to Soviet officials. Mr. Foster said that he understood it had been mentioned to Secretary Rusk by Mr. Kuznetsov. The President had denied that Mr. Dean had mentioned the number 3 or 4.

Fedorenko said that while Mr. Foster had clarified to some extent the meaning of "x" he had not specified the minimum
value which the US had in mind. Could Mr. Foster say what the minimum number was?

Mr. Foster replied that "x" was truly unknown. It was a symbol of a range which was narrow whether it be 3-8, or 4-8. It was the US intent to develop other points so that "x" could be known more precisely. He hoped that there was a number which would be acceptable to both sides. However, if, as Mr. Tsarapkin had said, 2-3 was the only number the USSR could consider, then we were in a difficult situation.

Mr. Foster recalled that the US had responded to the Soviet inquiry as to how many automatic stations the US wanted in Soviet territory. Noting that the US felt 3 automatic stations would not be enough, he wondered whether the Soviet side could say what its approach was on automatic stations. He added that such information would be helpful in getting the "x" for on-site inspections just as more information on on-site inspection procedures would be helpful.

Fedorenko stated that while the Soviet Union had taken an important decision of principle and moreover had proposed a specific number for on-site inspections, the US was not able to give a precise answer as to what "x" meant. The Soviet approach was political whereas the US approach seemed to be arithmetical.

Mr. Foster replied that the only number which he could name for "x" today was 3. The US wished to negotiate and reach agreement, although there was a limit beyond which no further move was possible.

Fedorenko then repeated the Soviet view that national detection systems were entirely adequate and that it had made a decision of principle in accepting both automatic seismic stations and on-site inspections. The US should appreciate this decision properly but instead it seemed to want to deprecate this decision.
Mr. Foster said that the US had also made important decisions of principle and that he felt both sides had made movements toward each other. He recalled that, on the basis of technical progress, the US had reduced its requirements for control as compared to that which it had needed a few years ago.

In order to make further progress, the US would like to have responses from the Soviet side on such matters as noise levels at proposed locations for automatic seismic stations and the towns within the areas in the USSR proposed by the US as places where automatic seismic stations should be located. With a clearing away of certain concerns that we had, the President, he knew, would endeavor to move forward toward agreement.

Tsarapkin then took up the theme that the Soviet Government had made compromises in order to facilitate agreement and that it saw no necessity for either on-site inspections or automatic seismic stations. The Soviet Union would accept 3 on-site inspections and this was quite sufficient to meet the US requirements. Even if it adopted the US position regarding the need for on-site inspections, the Soviet Union felt 3 would be enough to control the US and other Western nuclear powers. The Soviet Union also considered 3 automatic seismic stations on the territory of the USSR and of each of the Western nuclear powers would be enough. These automatic stations would check the operation of national seismic stations and would also increase the capabilities for identifying and locating suspicious seismic events. It should be noted also that there would be stations on adjacent territories. Since Mr. Foster had said that the differences between the two sides were not great and since the USSR had made compromise proposals beyond which it could not go, why did not the US agree to the proposals made by the Soviet side? On the one hand, Mr. Foster had said that the risk of continuing testing was great and, on the other hand, the US accepted that risk despite minor differences. What was the sense of talking if the US could not accept the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union? The USSR had no intention of engaging in discussion of other things until it received a clear indication from Mr. Foster that agreement on a quota number and on the numbers...
and locations of automatic seismic stations had been reached. It was unfortunate, but the discussions appeared to be at an impasse.

Mr. Foster replied that he had assumed the purpose of the meetings was to negotiate out some differences between the two sides. Now the Soviet side was saying there was no possibility of movement on its part and that the US must accept the Soviet proposals. It was not possible to make a decision on an on-site inspection quota in a vacuum; there were other political and technical factors which had to be taken into consideration. After all, the security of each of our countries was involved in such decisions. It would be futile to propose a system if it was not dependable in assuring the national security of parties to the agreement.

It was simply a fact that the US disagreed that 2 or 3 on-site inspections or 2 or 3 automatic seismic stations would be an adequate system. The US believed that 8 - 10 on-site inspections plus 25 good, properly located national seismic stations, plus 10 automatic seismic stations located in quiet areas, would add up to a good system. The US did not insist that its judgment in these matters was perfect and if the Soviet Union had knowledge regarding the detection and identification of seismic events, the USSR should produce it. The US was anxious to work out a system which would give both sides confidence but it did not have the capability to detect and identify seismic events on the basis of seismic instruments alone. Mr. Foster said that the US sincerely welcomed the movement made by the Soviet Union but the US did not think the Soviet Union had moved far enough.

Tsarapkin said this reminded him of someone who said the food was tasty but it was not enough. The Soviet side could have bargained with the West by proposing one-half or 1 inspection and could have argued for six months about this. The Soviet side, however, did not want these discussions to be like oriental bargaining. There was no need for more inspection and the USSR would not give more inspection. The Soviet side had approached these negotiations sincerely and had frankly said what its position was. After all, the Soviet Union could
have waited until the West proposed 3 on-site inspections. The main thing was that time was being lost by the US side's insistence on discussing other matters. These tactics did not correspond to the interests of the countries involved. Tsarapkin concluded by reading a statement made in the 18-Nation Committee by the British representative, Sir Michael Wright, on December 5, 1962, in which Sir Michael had said that if only the Soviet government returned to the position it had been taking for 2 years up until November, 1961, a comprehensive test ban treaty could be signed by January 1, 1963. Now the Soviet Union had done just this.

Mr. Foster replied that the US position had never been and no US official had ever been authorized to propose 2, 3 or 4 on-site inspections. He would let the British Ambassador speak for the UK when the Ambassador returned. However, the US had never felt that 2, 3 or 4 on-site inspections would be adequate. He concluded by expressing the hope that the Soviet side would check back with Moscow to get answers on the political-technical matters which had been raised by the US. Fedorenko in return expressed the hope that at the next meeting the US side would clarify questions which the Soviet side had raised at this meeting.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be at 3:00 p.m. Thursday, January 24, in Mr. Foster's office. The meeting adjourned at 6:15.

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