UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing

DATE: January 31, 1963
TIME: 3:00 p.m.
PLACE: Soviet Mission, NY

PARTICIPANTS:
USSR
Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN
S. K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative to ENDC
Y. Vorontsov, USSR Foreign Ministry
Vladimir N. Zherebtsov, Interpreter

UK
Sir David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador
Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary, British Embassy

US
William C. Foster, Director, ACDA
Charles C. Stelle, Deputy US Representative, ENDC
James E. Goodby, ACDA/IR
Alexander Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

As the first order of business, Tsarapkin handed Mr. Foster and Sir David copies of a paper specifying the noise level at the three locations proposed by the Soviet Union as sites for automatic seismic stations in Soviet territory. Tsarapkin mentioned that the three areas were relatively quiet and therefore suitable for the emplacement of automatic seismic stations. He then suggested that agreement be recorded immediately on the number and location of automatic stations.

Mr. Foster replied that this information was helpful and that the U.S. side was happy to have it. It did appear that the sites would be the kind of quiet locations which would be helpful for operation of automatic seismic stations. This was a good start but the U.S. had mentioned ten or perhaps as few as seven locations in Soviet territory which would be desirable for the

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*Attached

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installation of automatic seismic stations. Moreover, the U.S. would need data concerning the capabilities of the Soviet national seismic detection network. With this kind of information it would perhaps be possible to reduce the U.S. requirements to seven automatic stations in Soviet territory.

Mr. Foster also mentioned press reports to the effect that Soviet scientists had designed an automatic seismic station. Such designs would be of help to the U.S. and would help further the negotiations. For its part, the U.S. would be glad to tell the Soviet Union about its work on automatic seismic stations.

Tsarapkin said that the U.S.S.R. had furnished data on the locations of automatic stations and the noise levels at these locations not just to satisfy the technical curiosity of the United States but to promote agreement on the main questions, i.e., the quota of on-site inspection and the number and locations of automatic stations. The U.S.S.R. saw no obstacle to agreement now and it had stated its position to the Western side.

Despite the great concession which the Soviet Government had made to meet the West, the discussions were just where they began, Tsarapkin asserted, and the Soviet side was entitled to hear an answer from the U.S. on the cardinal problems of these negotiations.

Mr. Foster reviewed the moves that the U.S. had made with respect to on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations. He emphasized that it was not U.S. intent to dwell on technical points but it was a fact that the U.S. approach must be based on what the best scientists said was necessary for adequate verification. He stressed that the Soviet proposals concerning the number of on-site inspections and automatic stations were not adequate. Mr. Foster regretted that Tsarapkin had again said that all that could be discussed was what had already appeared in the correspondence from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy. The U.S. did not consider this position to be in the interests of developing a mutually acceptable agreement.

Tsarapkin inquired whether this was all Mr. Foster could tell the Soviet side. Mr. Foster replied that he thought
that this was a good deal. He then reviewed what the Soviet side had produced in the negotiations. This consisted of a list of 73 seismic stations, change in the location of one automatic seismic station in the U.S. and noise levels for three automatic stations in the U.S.S.R. at locations proposed by the Soviet Union.

Fedorenko then launched into a lengthy prepared statement. He said that Mr. Foster seemed to forget the great concession on inspection which the Soviet Government had made. He went on to recall that these meetings had been made possible by an exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. There were very specific tasks before the negotiations, in which connection the initiative of the Soviet Union and the head of the Soviet Government personally was to be taken into account. That initiative would hardly be overestimated and should not be submerged in technical discussions. Evidently, there were reasons why the U.S. was unable to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. now. Perhaps this had something to do with the nuclear weapon test which Mr. Foster had said had been postponed.

Prior to these discussions, it had not been possible to make progress towards a test ban agreement since there was a fundamental difference between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the question of detecting and identifying underground nuclear weapon tests, for which the Soviet Union saw no need for on-site inspection. This view was shared by the majority of UN members. Fedorenko claimed that the Soviet Government had been told by the U.S. that if only the Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspection, all difficulties in the way of agreement would be removed. He then referred to a press conference held by President Kennedy on August 1, 1962 and said that President Kennedy had stated that what the U.S. needed was acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the principle of on-site inspection.

The Soviet Government, Fedorenko continued, had taken such statements into consideration and had done everything to find a way out of deadlock and into quick agreement. The latest new effort by the Soviet Government resulted in the decision to meet the position of the United States on the question of on-site inspections, even though the Soviet Government believed there was no need for such inspections. Moreover, the Soviet Government agreed to the establishment
of automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear powers and neighboring states. All this was reflected in Chairman Khrushchev's letters to the President.

When President Kennedy had proposed these informal meetings in New York, the Soviet Government had agreed and had assumed that the U.S. Government was ready to reach agreement, taking into account the fact that the Soviet Government had met the U.S. position. In this connection, Fedorenko said that the agreement of the Soviet Union to postpone the resumption of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee sessions from January 15 to February 12 should be viewed in the light of that situation.

Fedorenko continued that in these talks the U.S.S.R. had done everything to reach speedy agreement. The Soviet Union had taken into account American desires concerning the location of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory. In Central Asia, the Soviet Union had agreed that a station could be placed in the vicinity of Samarkand instead of at Kokchetav. In the Far East, the Soviet Union had agreed to Seymour instead of Yakutsk. Data on noise levels at these places had also been furnished the United States. The Soviet Union had also suggested locations within the United States for emplacement of automatic seismic stations. Fedorenko went on to say that the Soviet Government had found it possible to satisfy the position of the U.S. Government on the key question of on-site inspections. The Soviet Government had agreed that such inspections could be conducted, within a certain quota, not only in the seismic zones but also in the aseismic zones as requested by the United States.

Fedorenko said that regretfully these meetings had led the U.S.S.R. to believe that the U.S. had no desire to put an end to tests. If there was such a desire on the part of the United States, there must be a desire to get agreement on basic questions. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. wanted to put these questions aside and talk about details.

Fedorenko said that the U.S. argued that the quota of on-site inspections was interrelated with other issues. The U.S., however, had failed to say what this interdependence was. As for the Soviet Union, it did not see any interdependence. To be sure, the U.S. position had changed in some respects, but not for the better. On some questions, the U.S. was receding from earlier positions. Ambassador Dean had
said that two to four on-site inspections annually would be sufficient for the U.S. Now the U.S. said it had to have 8 to 10. Previously, the U.S. had said that 200 to 500 square kilometers would be the size of the area eligible for inspection. Now the U.S. demanded 700 to 800 square kilometers.

In the course of these negotiations Mr. Foster and, to a certain extent, Sir David, had placed before the Soviet side demands that either the U.S.-U.K. views on these points be accepted or the U.S. and the U.K. would not discuss what the U.S. itself had called cardinal questions. The Soviet Government and its head personally regretted that these negotiations had taken such a turn. Achievement of a test ban agreement would be of great importance in stopping the nuclear arms race, in safeguarding the health and lives of the present and future generations, in improving the international atmosphere, and in helping to solve other world problems, including general and complete disarmament.

In accepting the idea of bilateral talks the Soviet Government had hoped that it would be possible to solve the basic problems before February 12 and report to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that the way to a test ban was open. Evidently, this would not be possible. The Soviet Union, therefore, was compelled to interrupt these discussions and transfer them to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which would reconvene on February 12.

Noting that he had to leave soon, Sir David pointed out that the Soviet statement only confirmed what Mr. Foster had said concerning the moves made by the Soviet Union in these negotiations. Fedorenko had returned to the substance of Chairman Khrushchev's letters and had confirmed that the only new things mentioned by the Soviet side had been a list of manned Soviet seismic stations, noise levels at three locations in the Soviet Union, and modification in the location of one of the three automatic stations the Soviet Union wanted to have in the U.S.S.R. It was clear that Mr. Tsarapkin had no authority to negotiate in a way which would permit the two sides to come together on the main points. Under these conditions, it was very difficult to make any progress.

Fedorenko rejoined that Sir David had only repeated what Mr. Foster had said previously. As to the authority
of Mr. Tsarapkin, this was within the competence of the Soviet Government and the Soviet side knew better what his authority was than did Sir David. Tsarapkin added that this was merely a fantasy of Sir David's.

Mr. Foster said that he would not attempt to respond to everything in the lengthy statement just read by Fedorenko. Obviously the U.S. disagreed with it sharply on a number of points. As one example, he quoted what President Kennedy had said in the August 1 Press Conference:

"We first have to have an acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection. Then, as the scientific information is made available, a conclusion could be reached as to what would be the appropriate number of on-site inspections."

Mr. Foster thought this was exactly what, among other things, would be negotiated in these discussions.

The U.S. was eager to get an agreement to end nuclear tests. This could not be achieved, however, by the method of making statements of "this far and no further." Mr. Foster regretted that the Soviet Government had concluded that these talks were no longer useful and had decided to transfer the discussions to Geneva without further exploration of the integrated parts of a verification system.

Concerning the point about interdependence of elements in a verification system, Mr. Foster said he thought it was obvious that unless the inspection could take place under acceptable conditions any on-site inspection quota would be meaningless.

As to the size of the area eligible for inspection, Mr. Foster recalled that the 200 to 500 square-kilometer area had been made possible by hypothesizing the existence of a fairly elaborate international control system. While the U.S. was prepared to return to that kind of a system, it had attempted to meet the Soviet position on the form of a verification system. The larger area eligible for inspection was one result of this attempt to approach the overall Soviet position.

Mr. Foster stated that the U.S. looked forward to continuing the discussions in Geneva and was, of course,
quite prepared to do so. The Soviet decision to terminate the current discussions would of course be a disappointment to the President since he had hoped that progress could be made in these private talks.

Mr. Foster then asked Fedorenko what he thought the press could be told about the termination of the discussions.

Fedorenko suggested that if the U.S. considered it necessary it could say that the meetings had been suspended, that no agreement had been possible, and that negotiations would continue within the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

It was agreed in the end that each side would reserve the right to explain its own position as it found necessary.

The meeting adjourned at 5:15 p.m.

As agreed previously, the participants in the talks will attend a luncheon to be given by Amb. Fedorenko tomorrow, January 31, January 1, 1963.

OK.
DATA ON NOISE LEVELS IN LOCATIONS
PROPOSED BY THE U.S.S.R. FOR THE
INSTALLATION OF AUTOMATIC SEISMIC
STATIONS IN U.S.S.R. TERRITORY

Bodaibo 1 to 2 millimicrons

Samarkand 1 to 2 millimicrons

Seymchan About 5 millimicrons