Sir David Ormsby Gore called at his request to discuss the forthcoming talks in Moscow. At the outset, in discussing the agreed position on the necessity of on-site inspection as part of a comprehensive ban, Sir David expressed the view that in his conversations with Harold Wilson, Khrushchev had definitely withdrawn his offer of 2-3 on-site inspections a year. In response to Mr. Foster's suggestion that he had understood that Mr. Gromyko told Mr. Wilson that the offer of 2-3 on-site inspections had not been withdrawn Sir David said Gromyko subsequently stated that they had substantially been withdrawn. In view of the private statements of Soviet scientists and the lack of any public statement of Khrushchev that the offer had been withdrawn it was Sir David's view that in his conversation with Wilson, Khrushchev was merely attempting to establish a hard line before the negotiations. In connection with the discussion of the scientific basis of the necessity for on-site inspections, Sir David stated his view that we should not attempt to get the Soviets to agree with our scientific appraisal and swallow their own repeated assertion that on-site inspections are not necessary but should approach it with the view that the U.S. and the U.K. do not ask the Soviet Union to change their position but merely ask them to understand what the U.S. and U.K. position is.

Mr. Foster suggested the idea of a three-environment treaty with a possible quota on underground tests. Sir David indicated that he did not think that the Soviet Union would be interested in anything
other than a comprehensive treaty, that the Soviet response to our offer of a three-environment treaty would be a rejection or a counter-proposal that there be a moratorium on all underground tests, a proposal that we would not find this acceptable.

The possibility of our raising a non-dissemination agreement with the Soviet Union and our reaction if they raised a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact were both discussed. Sir David expressed the view that a test ban would be more attractive to both sides if there were limited agreements in other fields but pointed out the difficulties that would arise if the Soviets raised the issue of the MF in the context of a non-dissemination agreement and the difficulties which would arise within NATO if they raised the issue of a non-aggression pact.

Returning to the comprehensive treaty Sir David emphasized his own view that the procedures for on-site inspection outlined in the April 1 memorandum were a little bit complicated and hoped we could put together a rather simpler package with smaller on-site inspection teams and a smaller area subject to inspection.

Gov. Harriman and Mr. Foster pointed out the reasons that underlay the requirements that had been expressed in our position on modalities.

In considering the general chances of success Sir David stated that he did not believe that Khruschev has made up his mind whether or not he wanted a test ban and felt that the reason a decision was made to schedule the talks in July rather than in June indicated that he wanted to see how their relationships with the Chinese Communists were working out. Sir David stated the problem of procedure of coordinating by the U.S. and the U.K. delegations. Mr. Foster referred to the technical seismic meetings which will be beginning in England on June 24 to which Dr. Long is going. Mr. Harriman suggested that he should meet with Lord Hailsham and that perhaps he should leave a day or so earlier.