INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

TOP SECRET

Control: 25528
Rea'd: JUNE 28, 1963
4:15 PM

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 20, JUNE 28, 7 PM.

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 20; INFORMATION MOSCOW 210.

EYES ONLY FOR FOSTER AND HARRIMAN.

REFERENCE: SECTO 15, June 785/18 USSR (no)

AGREED JOINT PAPER FOR SECRETARY AND LORD HOME TO GIVE PRINCIPALS CITED AT END REFTEL FOLLOWS:

QUOTE MR. HARRIMAN'S AND LORD HAILSHAM'S VISIT TO MOSCOW MIGHT WELL PROVIDE THE LAST CHANCE OF AGREEMENT ON A NUCLEAR TESTS BAN. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS.

2. THE FIRST OBJECT SHOULD BE TO SECURE A (UNDERLINE) COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, (END UNDERLINE) WITH ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF UNCERTAIN EVENTS UNDERGROUND. THIS INVOLVES SOME ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, BUT MR. HARRIMAN AND LORD HAILSHAM SHOULD IN THE FIRST STAGES AVOID ARGUMENT IN JUSTIFICATION OF ANY PARTICULAR NUMBER. THEIR OPENING LINE SHOULD BE:

(1) OUR AIM WAS TO SECURE A TREATY WHICH WOULD LAST; FOR THIS PURPOSE EACH SIDE MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE OTHER WAS OBSERVING THE RULES.

(11) NATIONAL DETECTION SYSTEMS WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO IDENTIFY ALL UNCERTAIN EVENTS UNDERGROUND. A PROPORTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THIS END.

*This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION
ASSIGNED TO:

WCF

NAME OF OFFICER: WCF

OFFICE SYMBOL:

DATE OF ACTION: 7/1/63

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(III) SUCH INSPECTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER STRICT SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF ESPIONAGE.

3. OUR POSITION ON THESE POINTS SHOULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS AS THOROUGHLY AS POSSIBLE, AND WE SHOULD TRY TO ELICIT FROM THEM A DETAILED STATEMENT OF THEIR OWN POINT OF VIEW. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THEM OUR IDEAS ABOUT THE MODALITIES OF INSPECTION. OUR OWN EXPERTS SHOULD EMBODY THESE IN A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION TO THE RUSSIANS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE AREA OF INSPECTION, THE MAKE-UP OF INSPECTION TEAMS, AND THE NEED FOR LOW-LEVEL PHOTOGRAPHY (ALL LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT POINTS FOR THE RUSSIANS).

4. AS REGARDS NUMBERS, WE SHOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGGREGATING THE INSPECTIONS OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS (WITH A MAXIMUM FOR ANY ONE YEAR); OR OF DIVIDING THE QUOTA OF INSPECTIONS BETWEEN SEISMIC AND ASEISMIC AREAS. OUR OWN EXPERTS SHOULD AGAIN WORK THESE IDEAS OUT IN DETAiL AT THIS STAGE.

5. IF THE RUSSIANS REFUSE TO BUDGE ON A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, OUR NEXT OBJECT SHOULD BE A (UNDERLINE) PARTICIAL TREATY (END UNDERLINE) COVERING TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS EXCEPT UNDERGROUND, WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON UNDERGROUND TESTS. THIS MIGHT BE OFFERED EITHER AS SOMETHING SEPARATE, OR AS THE FIRST STAGE OF A FURTHER CONTINUOUS NEGOTIATION FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY.

6. IF THEY REFUSE TO ACCEPT A PARTICIAL TREATY IN THESE FORMS, WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME INTERMEDIATE POSITION BETWEEN A COMPREHENSIVE AND A PARTICIAL BAN. THUS WE COULD OFFER TO CONCLUDE AN ATMOSPHERIC BAN COMBINED WITH SOME (UNDERLINE) ANNUAL LIMIT (END UNDERLINE) (BY NUMBER AND/OR SIZE ON (UNDERLINE UNDERGROUND TESTS (END UNDERLINE) (OUR EXPERTS SHOULD DEVELOP SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF SUCH OFFERS).

7. THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PRESS FOR A PARTICIAL TREATY WITH AN INDEFINITE TOP SECRET
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INDEFINITE MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND TESTS, AND MIGHT HOPE TO SECURE AT LEAST A (UNDERLINE) LIMITED MORATORIUM (END UNDERLINE). IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WITH THEM BINDING OURSELVES EXPLICITLY TO ANY KIND OF MORATORIUM. IT MIGHT HOWEVER BE POSSIBLE, IF THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS SEEMED TO WARRANT THIS, TO DECLARE OUR INTENTION NOT TO TEST UNDERGROUND FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.

8. IF THE RUSSIANS TRY TO MAKE A NUCLEAR TESTS TREATY CONDITIONAL ON (UNDERLINE) FRENCH SIGNATURE, (END UNDERLINE) OUR LINE SHOULD BE THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO SECURE THE ADHERENCE OF ALL OTHER POWERS IF A TREATY WERE SIGNED; AND WE WOULD COUNT ON THE RUSSIANS DOING THE SAME IN RESPECT OF CHINA. IN ANY CASE, THE "WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE" WAS DESIGNED TO MEET THE CONTINGENCY THAT TESTS BY A NON-SIGNATORY POWER THREATENED THE SECURITY OF A SIGNATORY POWER.

9. THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO SOUND US ON (UNDERLINE) NON DISSEMINATION (END UNDERLINE). WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS, BEARING IN MIND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GO TOO FAR WITHOUT BRINGING IN THE FRENCH. WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT OUR EXISTING FORMULA AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS INCLUDING THE FRENCH. WE SHOULD HAVE READY PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT TO GIVE TO THE RUSSIANS, AND THESE SHOULD NOW BE PREPARED.

TO ANOTHER SUBJECT WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT WELL RAISE IS (UNDERLINE) NON-AGGRESSION PACT (END UNDERLINE) BETWEEN THE NATO AND WARSAW-PACT POWERS. OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE THAT IT WOULD BE TIME TO START DISCUSSING THIS FURTHER AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TREATIES ON NUCLEAR TESTS AND NON-DISSEMINATION.

11. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON OF OTHER "COLLATERAL" ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE INTRODUCED IN MOSCOW; FOR EXAMPLE, THE CUT-OFF OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL
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FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, THE TRANSFER OF SUCH MATERIAL TO PEACEFUL USES, AND THE STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORBIT. IT WOULD BE WORTH TAKING POSITION PAPERS ON A SERIES OF SUCH ITEMS TO MOSCOW, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD SO FAR SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN THEM, AND THE CUT-OFF RAISED IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. WHERE VERIFICATION WAS CONCERNED THE WESTERN POWERS COULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE MAKING CONCESSIONS AS A FURTHER PRICE TO BE PAID FOR A NUCLEAR TESTS BAN.

UNQUOTE.

SCP-4.

RUSK

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