MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE OF KRUSHCHEV SPEECH REGARDING TEST BAN AND NATO WARSAW PACT

July 2, 1963

The relevant language from the FBIS summary of the

Khrushchev speech is as follows:

"Then N.S. Khrushchev dwelt on the question of ending nuclear tests in connection with the forthcoming talks in Moscow in mid-July. He noted that many years ago the Soviet Union raised the question of banning nuclear weapons and of prohibiting their testing.

"But the Western Powers, above all the United States, did not accept such an agreement. Nikita Khrushchev emphasized that the Western Powers' demands on inspection are advanced not to control the discontinuance of tests but to penetrate by any means various areas of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes.

"The Soviet Government," he said, "is convinced that the early conclusion of an agreement banning all nuclear tests--in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater, and underground--will accord with the interests of the peoples. But today this is obviously impossible because of the Western Powers' position.

"Carefully analyzing the obtaining situation, the Soviet Government, prompted by the sentiment of high responsibility for the destinies of the peoples, declares that since the Western Powers obstruct the conclusion of an agreement banning all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness..."
willingness to conclude an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. We have made this proposal before but the Western powers frustrated an agreement by advancing supplementary conditions which envisage large-scale inspection of our territory.

"If now the Western Powers accept this proposal, the question of inspection no longer arises," Nikita Khrushchev added. The Western Powers declared that no inspections whatever are needed to check the fulfillment by the states of their commitments to stop nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Hence, the road to a solution of the problem is open.

"Of course, the head of the Soviet Government continued, an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, despite all the importance of this major act, cannot stop the arms race, cannot avert or even substantially weaken the danger of thermo-nuclear war. That is why the Soviet Government believes that now, at the time of the signing of an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, it is also necessary to take another major step toward easing of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between states: to sign a nonaggression pact between the two main military blocs -- the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact States."

"In conclusion N.S. Khrushchev said: "Combined with a simultaneous signing of a nonaggression pact between the two bloc states, the agreement on the ending of nuclear weapons tests would create a new international atmosphere, more favorable for settling the outstanding problems of our times, including the problem of disarmament."

This statement suggests two conclusions:

A. Khrushchev is offering a three-environment test ban, apparently with no insistence on a moratorium on underground tests; and

B. Khrushchev
B. Khrushchev may or may not be insisting that the signing of the test ban agreement be conditioned on the simultaneous signing of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact (NAP).

Khrushchev says: "That is why the Soviet Government believes that now, at the time of the signing" of the test ban, "it is also necessary to take another major step" ... to sign a non-aggression pact between the ... NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact States." He also says that "a simultaneous signing" of the two agreements would create a new international atmosphere.

It is, of course, not possible to interpret this language with any precision, since we do not have either the Russian text or even a reliable English text. However -- on the basis of the summary before us -- the significant words would appear to be that the Soviet Government "believes" it "necessary" to take the second step of signing a NAP and that this step should be taken "at the time of the signing" of the nuclear test ban.

The presumption
The presumption from this language is that the Soviet Union would refuse to sign a test ban agreement without a simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact. But there would appear to be enough ambiguity to permit Khrushchev freedom of maneuver if it appeared useful in the course of negotiations. He might be satisfied merely with our expressed willingness only to discuss an NAP.
BACKGROUND OF PROPOSALS FOR THREE ENVIRONMENT TEST BAN

The position of the United States has been that it prefers a comprehensive treaty banning all tests under effective controls. It favors such a treaty over a limited ban because of its greater effect in slowing down the arms race and preventing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, we have made it clear that if it is not possible to work out a comprehensive agreement it will accept a limited ban. On September 3, 1961, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed an atmospheric ban. On August 27, 1962 the United States and the United Kingdom tabled at the Geneva Conference a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under the high seas and in space. This offer was rejected but has not been withdrawn by the United States or the United Kingdom.

Up to the present time the Soviet view has generally been that they would not sign a treaty which "legalizes" underground tests. On occasions they have intimated receptivity to a three-environment treaty provided it was linked with a moratorium or underground tests. A close reading of the present incomplete text of the Khrushchev speech,
speech, which does contain a possible link with a NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact, does not disclose any hint of a link to a moratorium on tests underground.

BACKGROUND OF NATO-WARSAW PACT NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENT (NAP).

At the Ottawa NATO meeting the Secretary told the other Ministers that, on the basis of his May 18 conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, we should not fail to reexamine the problem of a possible NAP. The Secretary added that the United States Government, which had been very skeptical about an NAP, had reached no conclusion concerning the basic question of whether or not it would be desirable to pursue this matter with the Soviets.

The initial British reaction was positive. They later agreed with the French and Germans on points (a), (b), (c) and (f) below.

The German and French reactions were negative because in their view an NAP would:

(a) get acceptance and stabilization of an unsatisfactory status quo, including the division of Germany;

(b) enhance the status of the GDR even without recognition;

(c)
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(a) put NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization on an equal footing;
(b) make more difficult our reactions to Soviet moves against West Berlin;
(c) create another phony spirit of detente, as after Geneva, leading to Western relaxation; and
(d) add nothing to what NATO and the UN Charter have already said.

They added that an NAP should be the end of a chain of events, involving other substantive agreements, and that it should in no circumstances be considered without an adequate quid pro quo.

Prior consideration of this question in NATO had produced a generally negative reaction.

In our quadripartite examination in Washington progress has been slow because of French foot-dragging.

Internally on the United States side we have examined possible forms for an NAP and the question of a possible quid pro quo.

An NAP is, of course, inextricably linked with the problems of Berlin and Germany. This was the way we linked it in
it in the "principles paper". Dobrynin's remarks to the Secretary on both March 26 and May 18 suggested that the Soviets still thought of an NAP in this context. Obviously it would be easier to get NATO -- and particularly German and French -- support if the question were posed in relation to Berlin and Germany.

By proposing an NAP in the context of a test ban agreement Khrushchev has no doubt taken account of the fact that this raises issues very divisive in the Alliance. These are issues on which the French can be expected to make common cause with the Germans.

Up to this point we have also thought of an NAP as something that would follow rather than occur simultaneously with, the conclusion of a test ban. Chairman Khrushchev's speech raises the question as to whether we are prepared (a) to hold to the position that a test ban must be concluded before any discussion of an NAP; or (b) to negotiate a test ban with an assurance that we will then proceed to discuss an NAP; or (c) if Mr. Khrushchev insists, to discuss the two simultaneously.

We have