After I returned to Washington I attended a meeting of the National Security Council, which was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 6:05 p.m. to 7 p.m.

Present were: the President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Harriman, McConé, Foster, Fisher, Wiesner, McDermott, Dillon, Thompson, Bundy, Kayser, Wilson, Nitze, Taylor, McNaughton, R. Kennedy, Tyler, B. Smith, and Vice President Johnson.

Rusk initiated the discussion by referring to the Memorandum of Instructions to Harriman. He said that one of the problems would be that of our attitude on a limited quota on underground tests and suggested that Harriman should come back for instructions on this if the question arose. The President asked how many would be a sensible quota, and Foster said he thought the idea of a quota was not a good one, although it might be better than no test ban at all. Rusk said he preferred a ban on atmospheric testing together with continuous negotiations on underground testing. He also mentioned the need for a definition of an atmospheric test. Foster read from the August 27, 1962, proposal on an atmospheric test ban the U.S. had tabled at Geneva, which said that a test which broke the surface of the ground but did not produce radioactivity detectable outside of the country would not be considered an atmospheric test. I said I thought this was a good definition.

There was then discussion with respect to the problem of dissemination of information to the nuclear powers such as France and the U.K. The conclusion is that the Soviets have at least accepted the U.K. as a nuclear power.
There was also discussion of the non-aggression aspects of the Moscow discussions. It was agreed that Harriman would make no commitments in this area but after exploration he will come home for instructions.

The President then asked Harriman to be sure to discuss the matter of not placing weapons of mass destruction into orbit. He also raised the question of coordinating the Harriman mission with NATO, the U.K. and the French. Bundy said that we do not even have an agreement with the U.K. Apparently, the U.K. wants a summit meeting at almost any cost, and Ambassador Bruce has said this is particularly true of Minister Hailsham.

The President suggested that Harriman's reports remain confidential. This will require an agreement with the Prime Minister on the dissemination of news. Rusk said that an "Eyes Only" memorandum has 40 copies—it was decided to either apply a limit or watch them very closely.

The President raised the question of whether Harriman might actually sign an agreement or whether this should be reserved for a summit meeting. Rusk was of the opinion that Harriman should conclude an agreement on an atmospheric test ban on the spot if this is feasible, but Bundy raised the question of the need to check with the French. The President raised the question of whether anything could be done with the Chinese, and Harriman said it was doubtful the Soviets will even discuss this problem.

Taylor said he thinks that we should again study whether an atmospheric test ban is to the advantage of the U.S. The President said that the standing position of the U.S. is that such a ban is to the advantage of the U.S. Taylor says that perhaps Foster should investigate the pros and cons of an atmospheric test ban or an atmospheric test ban with a quota of underground tests. McNamara said he thinks that a formal government discussion of this problem at this time is not desirable, and the President said he will be glad to have the individual positions of the Chiefs of Staff, but he doesn't want an attempt made to get a collective position. Rusk feels that the time for a review of the desirability of an atmospheric test ban is past and that this decision has already been made.

I sent my biweekly report to the President (copy attached).

Wednesday, July 10, 1963 - D.C.

The Commission met from 10 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. with McNamara, Taylor, Harold Brown and Jerry Johnson to discuss the cutback of U-235 and plutonium production through 1972 and its effect on the AEC production complex. DOD plans (through 1972) on weapons are due in a week or so at which time a joint Seaborg-McNamara letter will be sent to the President. Sixty days later AEC will send an analysis of the effect of the cutback on its production complex.

I had lunch with McDaniels, Kolstad and Fritsch at the Roger Smith Hotel to discuss the high energy accelerator building program (Ramsey Panel Report).

After lunch I went to the Hill where I taped a radio show with Congressman Jack Westland for broadcast by ten or twelve stations in the State of Washington.

At 3:15 p.m. I presided over Commission Meeting 1948 (action summary attached). The Commission approved the appointment of R. L. Faulkner as Director, Division of Raw Materials.

I received a letter from President Kennedy setting the FY 1966 weapons requirements.