
TEXT: 1. BACKGROUNDF. IN THE EARLY 1990'S, THE TALIBAN BEGAN AS A GROUP OF RELIGIOUS STUDENTS WHO REJECTED THE MUJAHIDIN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN. DUE TO THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO TALIBAN FORCES, THE TALIBAN BECAME MILITARILY POWERFUL AND THEIR FORCES CONTROLLED APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN. MANY AFGHAN OPPOSITION FORCES WERE OUTNUMBERED AND OUTGUNNED BY TALIBAN FORCES, AND COULD NOT FIGHT THE TALIBAN FORCES DIRECTLY. THE FORMER MUJAHIDIN COMMANDER, AHMED SHAIKH (MASSOUD) MANAGED TO FORM THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE FORCES (NAI) AND CONTINUED HIS FIGHT AGAINST TALIBAN FORCES IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN.

2. WARNING. THROUGH NORTHERN ALLIANCE INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS, THE LATE COMMANDER MASSOUD GAINED LIMITED KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE INTENTIONS OF THE SAUDI MILLIONAIRE, Osama bin Laden, and his terrorist organization, Al-Qa'ida, to perform a terrorist act against the U.S., on a scale larger than...
THE 1998 BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA

IN APRIL 2001, MASSOUD ADDRESSED THE FRENCH AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS IN PARIS. IN HIS TELEVISED SPEECH HE WARNED THE US GOVERNMENT ABOUT UBL.

2. RELATIONSHIPS. ON 9 SEPTEMBER 2001, TWO ARABS, LOYAL TO UBL AND MEMBERS OF THE AL-QAIDA ORGANIZATION DECEPTIVELY POSED AS ARAB JOURNALISTS, ASKED FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDER MASSOUD, AND KILLED HIM WITH A SUICIDE BOMB THAT WAS HIDDEN IN THEIR CAMERA

ALTHOUGH COMMANDER MASSOUD WAS FIGHTING TALIBAN FORCES OVER THE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN, HE WAS NOT A THREAT TO UBL AND THE AL-QAIDA ORGANIZATION. TO MASSOUD, UBL WAS A SAUDI CITIZEN, EXILED TO AFGHANISTAN DUE TO HIS CHALLENGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SAUDI MONARCHY. AFTER THE TERRORIST STIKES ON THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN AFRICA, AND RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE FOR HIS FORCES REGARDING UBL'S FUTURE ATTACKS, MASSOUD BEGAN TO WARN THE WEST OF UBL AND AL-QAIDA

COMMENTS: (C/NF)