MEMORANDUM FOR:  SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:  WILLIAM B. QUANDT
SUBJECT:  Memoranda of Conversations with Arab Foreign Ministers

Attached for your approval and files are the memoranda of conversation held by the President and you with the Arab Foreign Ministers. You will recall that the President promised to provide copies of the memorandum of conversation of his meeting to the four Foreign Ministers.

RECOMMENDATION:  That you approve the attached memoranda.

XGDS-3.
DECLAS - Impossible to determine date.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
               Omar SAQQAF, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from Saudi Arabia
               Ahmed Taibi BENVIMA, Minister of Foreign Affairs from Morocco
               Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-SABAH, Minister of Foreign Affairs from Kuwait
               Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, Minister of Foreign Affairs from Algeria
               Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
               William B. Quandt, NSC Staff
               Alec Toumayan, Department of State Interpreter

DATE AND PLACE: Wednesday, October 17, 1973, 10:15 a.m. in Secretary Kissinger's Office, West Wing of White House

Secretary Kissinger welcomed the four Arab Foreign Ministers and thanked them for the opportunity to exchange views. He stated that the US goal is to end hostilities in order to avoid the risk of expanding the war and stressed that after the war the US will engage in a diplomatic effort to find a just and lasting peace. Hostilities should end in a way that leaves US-Arab relations as friendly as possible. A ceasefire should be followed by diplomatic activity. The new military situation has brought gains to the Arab position which should now be dealt with diplomatically.

Minister Saqqaf opened by congratulating the Secretary on his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize and expressed his hope that he would receive another one for his efforts to settle the Middle East crisis. He then expressed his fear that US-Arab relations could be damaged by US resupply of Israel. He called on Israel to respect the resolutions of the United Nations and expressed concern at Israel's intentions to keep Arab territory.
In response to Secretary Kissinger's question, Minister Saqqaf said that the Arabs would not be able to accept the demilitarization of Sinai. He said that Israel has designs on Sinai.

Minister Saqqaf then stressed that he was not threatening anyone and that the Arabs are all united on this issue. They will continue fighting until the territory occupied in 1967 is returned. He stated that the United States should support the integrity of the states of the Middle East, and that this required Israeli withdrawal from the territory of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. He emphasized that no Arab leader can say that the fighting should stop and the negotiations should begin.

Minister Saqqaf then described Saudi Arabia's view that the Soviet Union is not interested in solving the Middle East problem, but rather seeks to take advantage of it to increase its influence. Indirectly, by supporting Israel, the United States is helping the Soviet Union in its goal. Minister Saqqaf then summarized the Arab position. The Arabs ask for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines and respect for Palestinian rights, according to UN resolutions, to return to their homes or be compensated.

Foreign Minister Benhima endorsed this position. Minister Saqqaf stressed that no Arab leader could accept a return to the October 6 ceasefire lines. He repeated his hope that US-Arab relations would not suffer. He asked for a more balanced US position in dealing with Israel and the eighteen Arab countries.

Secretary Kissinger expressed his appreciation for what had been said and the desire of the United States to maintain friendly relations with the Arab nations. He stated that the US hoped to see a Middle East in which the countries of the area could shape their own destiny free from the influence of great power rivalry. The United States recognizes that the pre-October 6 situation was intolerable for the Arabs, and, even without this war, the United States was willing to try to improve the situation.

Secretary Kissinger stressed that two problems had to be dealt with: first, ending the war; and second, working for peace. Any ceasefire now would have to take into account the new situation brought about by the valor and efficiency of Arab arms. The US has no doctrinaire position on a ceasefire, but history has shown that it is difficult to gain
at the conference table what has not been gained on the battlefield. It would be an error to try to link a ceasefire to an immediate and total settlement. Insisting on everything as a precondition for a ceasefire runs the risk of prolonging the war and exacerbating great power rivalry, which could then become more important than the local rivalries.

Secretary Kissinger stated that the US position was that there should be a ceasefire based on present realities, to be followed rapidly by negotiations. The changed military situation will affect the negotiations, and the Arabs should take advantage of this. Their military and diplomatic position has improved. The United States will not promise what it will not do, but it will do what it promises. A serious peace effort requires US-Arab cooperation. The time is right to end the fighting and to move very rapidly with negotiations for a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

Minister Saqqaf thanked the Secretary for his comments and asked that the US uphold its position of support for the integrity of the Middle Eastern countries. He asked for a promise to get Israel to withdraw from the occupied areas.

Secretary Kissinger replied that the US would work for the implementation of Resolution 242. He referred to his negotiations with the Chinese leaders as an example of the need to agree first on the importance of making rapid progress in negotiations, without asking in advance for guarantees of where the negotiations will lead. He expressed understanding of the Arab position.

[At 11:00 Secretary Kissinger excused himself to go to speak with the President. The Foreign Ministers then met with the President in the Oval Office for one hour. They resumed their discussions with Secretary Kissinger in his office at the State Department at 12:30, where they were joined by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, David Newsom, and Edward Djerejian of the Department of State.]

Secretary Kissinger opened by inviting the Foreign Ministers to pose any questions that were not covered in the earlier meetings. He repeated that if hostilities were to continue, there could be a risk of great power confrontation that would weaken the dominant position of the local parties. This would make a diplomatic solution difficult and would raise the
dangers of any military solution.

Minister Saggaf stated that the Arabs are opposed to a major power confrontation, particularly since this could enhance the Soviet position in the area.

Foreign Minister Benhima expressed appreciation for the Secretary's remarks and for those of the President earlier. He emphasized his confidence in the President's statements, but asked for further clarification of the US position. If Israel itself were threatened, the Arabs could understand US intervention in the crisis. Israel has rejected past attempts to solve the problem diplomatically. It is difficult to convince the Arabs that the US is really working for a just peace. The Arabs are trying to free their lands because diplomacy has failed. US arms for Israel enable Israel to continue to occupy Arab land. This appears to be a contradiction in the US position. It is difficult for the Arab Foreign Ministers to convey assurances on the US position to their chiefs of state at a time when the US is aiding Israel, especially when Israel's survival is not at stake.

Secretary Kissinger replied by mentioning the instability of desert warfare and the difficulty of assuring that the Arabs would stop at the 1967 borders if they were victorious. If there is no ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, another war could occur. An opportunity should be given for a diplomatic settlement. The United States does not want to freeze the pre-October 6 status quo.

Secretary Kissinger expressed his appreciation for the restraint of the Arab governments in the current crisis. After his return from China, he said he would address himself to the Middle East. Then the US and Arabs would have to sit down together in trust to find a way to reach peace in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Bouteflika replied by emphasizing that the war is being fought in Syrian and Egyptian territory. The US does not seem to support the territorial integrity of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The Arabs have two objectives: the return of the territories occupied in 1967 and a solution of the question of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are in a tragic situation. The Arabs understand a certain US alignment with Israel, but want the US to be a credible arbiter. The Arabs admired the mastery and patience of the United States in negotiating an end to the Vietnam war. The Arabs feel, however, that if they accept a ceasefire now, the chances of a real settlement will not last.
Foreign Minister Bouteflika referred to the Algerian war and Algeria's insistence on not accepting a ceasefire until the conditions of peace had been arranged. He repeated the Arab goals of assuring the territorial integrity of each country in the area, of assuring the Palestinian people concerning their national identity, and of preventing the Arab world from becoming a zone of Soviet or American influence. He emphasized that he hoped for the best possible relations with the United States. He emphasized that the Arabs have accepted all peace plans since 1967. He referred to Prime Minister Meir's recent remarks as evidence that the Israelis are not interested in peace. If the Arabs have to fight all the way to the 1967 borders, the cost will obviously be very great.

Secretary Kissinger responded by pointing out that history was ambiguous on the question of relating a ceasefire to a settlement. The Algerian and Vietnamese cases were different. The Secretary emphasized that he was willing to become personally involved in working for a Middle East peace settlement, but felt that careful preparations were needed for any diplomatic initiative. The Israelis are not prepared to accept Arab offers today.

Secretary Kissinger referred to his experience in negotiating a Vietnamese settlement and the need for concrete proposals before US influence can be effective. If a ceasefire does not lead to a peace agreement, the Arabs will always have the option of resuming the fighting, unlike the case in guerrilla war.

Secretary Kissinger then discussed the issue of the Palestinian people, recognizing that this problem had to be dealt with. The Secretary stressed that any solution should respect the territorial integrity of the states in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Bouteflika asked if the United States supports the pre-June 5, 1967, borders as the definitive borders of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger replied that the US favors the implementation of Resolution 242 and a solution which is acceptable to all parties. The US cannot impose a solution.

Foreign Minister Bouteflika replied that unless the US supports the pre-June 1967 borders, the Arabs cannot understand US arms supply to Israel.
Secretary Kissinger then referred to the outline provided earlier by the President of the best way to proceed to a settlement. With a ceasefire, the US will make a major diplomatic effort, as the President promised. If war continues, this cannot be done. The Arabs will have to judge whether it is better to rely on military or diplomatic means to reach their objectives. Before October 6, the United States had already offered to become diplomatically involved in working for a settlement. The United States is still prepared to take such steps once the fighting has stopped. The Arabs should decide to use the new reality to begin negotiations and give them some time to succeed. The United States would want to consult closely with Arab leaders.

Foreign Minister Bouteflika asked about the US reaction to President Sadat's speech.

Secretary Kissinger replied that he found the speech moderate in many respects, but the precise terms of a settlement outlined in the speech were too specific to provide the basis for negotiations. The spirit of the speech, however, was positive. The United States is eager to maintain close contact with President Sadat.

Secretary Kissinger asked that the Arab states communicate their views confidentially to the United States and not ask for instant results. The United States is prepared to work with the Arabs.

Minister Saggaf replied that the Foreign Ministers would have to consult with their respective governments.

Foreign Minister Sabah stated that the US position seems to be that of asking for a ceasefire as a basis for negotiations. He asked the US to announce its support both for a ceasefire and for Resolution 242.

Secretary Kissinger replied that the US can announce its support of Resolution 242, but that interpretations of it differ. The United States is prepared to announce its support for a ceasefire; to affirm its support of Resolution 242; and to call for the rapid implementation of Resolution 242.

Foreign Minister Benhima asked what guarantee there would be that the US would support the implementation of Resolution 242.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER replied that the President had stated that he would work for a settlement. No diplomatic effort can be guaranteed in advance, but the United States has promised to work for a settlement. But no diplomatic effort can be initiated as long as military operations continue.

Foreign Minister Benhima raised the possibility that after a ceasefire there might be no progress toward peace and that Israel might strike again.

SECRETARY KISSINGER replied that the US opposes any preemptive strikes and assured the Arab governments in the few hours before the October 6 war began that Israel would not strike first.