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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, FR
SUBJECT: KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET CALL ON SECRETARY

1. ON OCTOBER 25 AMBASSADOR KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET CALLED
AT HIS REQUEST, ON INSTRUCTIONS, ON SECRETARY KISSINGER.
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SPRINGSTEEN AND DEJAMMET OF
FRENCH EMBASSY ALSO PRESENT.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SAID FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT HAD ASKED
HIM TO SEE THE SECRETARY TO DISCUSS THREE POINTS: THE PAST,
THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
HE PROPOSED TO DISCUSS THE "PRESENT" AND THE "FUTURE" WITH
OTHER PARTICIPANTS PRESENT BUT ASKED FOR A PRIVATE TALK
ON THE "PAST".

3. WITH REGARD TO THE "PRESENT" HE SAID WE NOW HAVE A
SITUATION WITH A CEASEFIRE AND A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
BUT THE QUESTION IS HOW DO YOU IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION AND
HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CEASEFIRE-

4. WITH REGARD TO THE "FUTURE", HE SAID THAT THE SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS AMBIGUOUS AND SETTLED NOTHING. HE
NOTED THAT IT SPOKE OF THE "APPROPRIATE FRAME" FOR NEGOS-
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ICATIONS AND ASKED WHAT WE ENVISAGED. HE ALSO ASKED WHAT
HELP FNCE COULD BE AND WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. CONTINUING, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT BASICALLY FRANCE
AGREES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ONE POINT: THEY DO NOT
WISH TO SEE THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

SECRET

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6. The secretary reviewed developments of the last day pointing out that we had had information that seven out of the eight Soviet air-borne divisions had been mobilized recently. Then last night we had received a letter from Brezhnev demanding the establishment of a US-Soviet force in the Middle East and indicating that if we did not agree the Soviets would proceed unilaterally to place their forces there. Before responding to this letter, and in order to show that we were serious, we went on a military alert. We then answered Brezhnev's letter.

7. The secretary asked the ambassador to inform jobert that, in responding to the letter, we told the Soviets that if they put in forces unilaterally into the Middle East they would be in violation of Article II of the agreement on prevention of nuclear war.

8. The French ambassador said that it might be easier to get a global settlement than a political settlement. He stated that because of the War of 1967 the Israelis had managed to introduce the Soviets into the area. Now maybe France could help.

9. Stating that he wished to be very honest with the ambassador, the secretary said that we prepared to work with his government. However, the ambassador should be aware that the secretary recently ordered a complete reevaluation of our relations with Europe. Europe, he said, insists on unity in matters regarding European defense but refuses to cooperate on other issues. He felt that there had to be an end to this kind of conduct. He stressed that he was not saying this against the French because he knew where France stood and if you say that France can help in the Middle East, he, the secretary, would respond affirmatively if we had agreed positions.

10. The French ambassador responded that in the past France had had a different conception, not on aims, but on tactics and indicated that it was not possible for France to follow the United States with "closed eyes."
11. In response the Secretary indicated that we do not expect France to follow us on all issues of the Arab-Israeli problem. However, the primary issue in the current crisis has been the conduct of the Soviets. The Arab-Israeli problem has been secondary. Throughout the crisis the Europeans failed to see this.

12. Kosciusko-Morizet brought up the question of what he called the lack of consultation during the crisis. He noted for instance that he had no background when he was informed of the alert this morning and he had been given no advance warning on the resolution we wished to introduce into the Security Council today. He had to call Jobert about the resolution and if he had had some background, it would have helped.

13. The Secretary pointed out that the crisis came on us very unexpectedly when we received the Brezhnev letter last night. That letter was a totally shocking thing. To tell us that we had to go into the Middle East together was an absurdity which would have had repercussions throughout Europe and even into China. As a result we had to spend most of the night positioning our forces. He noted that, in all candor, perhaps we should have told you but he said that our experience in this crisis with the Europeans is they have behaved not as friends but as hostile powers. Not once did we get their support.

14. The French Ambassador said that he now understood, in light of what the Secretary said, the Rumsfeld intervention in NATO which he and his government had considered as being very abrupt.

15. The Secretary gave the background on Ambassador Rumsfeld's intervention noting that we had found Luns and others saying that the US had been taken in by the Soviets on detente and we are now paying the price for detente. Considering that others had treated with the Soviet Union, they too should have been involved. Moreover, if the allies felt that detente was over there are common steps we should take together to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets. Finally, we wished to stress that the intervention of the Soviets in the Middle East would not be in the interests of Europe.

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16. The ambassador agreed but noted that when someone comes before the NAC without prior preparation and says what Mr. Rumsfeld did, it is very difficult to agree with him. He noted, however, that when the alliance itself is in jeopardy, as it was at the time of Cuban crisis, the French government went along.

17. The Secretary reiterated that there were two issues in this crisis. First, there was the Arab-Israeli dispute and we did not feel that France was obliged to follow us on this. But we felt that this became a secondary issue when the Soviets acted because if the Soviets were there it would have consequences for the moderate forces in the Middle East. This now stopped. Now we must all bring about a settlement so that we can remove this danger.

18. The French ambassador concurred and said that they always had this objective.

19. With regard to the future the ambassador asked what happens now. What is the timetable? He noted that Sadat had said Brezhnev had promised him that all Israeli forces would be removed from the occupied territories where Golda Meir had stated that Secretary Kissinger had made a contrary promise to her.

20. The Secretary assured the ambassador that he had not made promises we cannot keep and that there were no secret understandings on the substance of the problem.

21. The French ambassador said that he was convinced in light of the past that the Arabs and Israelis by themselves will never come to an agreement. The Secretary agreed and said he would gladly give the ambassador the job of getting them together.

22. The French ambassador said we should not believe France is upset by oil. The French had always had a conception about a settlement in the Middle East but that conception was not governed by oil. However, they do have a large interest in oil.
23. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED AND REFERRED TO GENERAL DE GAULLE'S POLICY ON THIS AREA. CONTINUING, HE SAID THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH THE FRENCH BUT IF WE HAVE DISCUSSION WE SHOULD HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE POSITIONS THAT WE WILL PURSUE.

24. AMBASSADOR KOściuszko-Morizet said that Jobert appreciated the Secretary's message sent from Moscow and had instructed him to come in and get a message from the Secretary.

25. The Secretary said that he had hoped to do this earlier but he had been in almost perpetual crisis since his return from Moscow and Tel Aviv. He then suggested that he and the French Ambassador meet in private.

KISSINGER

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