1. **SUMMARY.** This airgram presents a detailed chronology of Mexican student disturbances from their inception in late July. A companion airgram on the causes and consequences of the disturbances will follow.

Review of the events since July indicate that there have been several distinct phases:

**July 22 - 30:** The first riots and the first period of strong government action including use of the army.

**July 30 - August 27:** A period of government permissiveness which saw the formation of the National Strike Council (CNH) and a radicalization of the student movement expressed in two massive marches, increasing attacks on the President and a growing impasse between students and the government.

GROUP 4: Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.
August 28 - 31: A mild government crackdown in which the army once more took part.

September 1-17: The government's reversion to a permissive policy with respect to student meetings (highlighted by a silent march on September 13) but a continued impasse on a student-government dialogue as both sides put forward unacceptable conditions.

September 18 - 26: Once more a government crackdown featured by army occupation first of UNAM and then of IPN, by breaking up of student gatherings before they began, and by sporadic violence.

September 27 - October 1: Student meetings were once more permitted and as later announced talks were started between CNH and Presidential representatives.

October 2 to Present: The most violent incident of the entire student situation took place followed by sporadic violence and a determined government roundup of suspected student extremists. Violence has abated and talks once more resumed about new efforts to reach some agreement between students and government.

2. What began as a minor clash between two rival prep schools, grew into the most serious student disturbance and one of the most serious civil disturbances in the last twenty years of Mexico's political history. On July 22, students from prep schools 2 and 5 of the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) clashed with students from the private prep school of Isaac Ochoterena. The rivalry seemed to be based on one school being private and the other public and both schools being close to each other. The following two days saw clashes between groups of students from prep schools 2 and 6 of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and the IPN students. The UNAM students apparently came to the aid of the students from I. Ochoterena. Pitched battles and property damage to cars and stores around the Ciudadela area resulted from the student clashes. The "granaderos" (riot police) intervened to break up groups of students and to keep rival groups apart. An especially severe encounter occurred at Vocational #5 including entry of police into the school.

3. As a result of these clashes with the police a demonstration, approved by city authorities, was planned for Friday July 26, to protest against
police brutality. The demonstration was planned and organized by the National Federation of Technical Students (FNET) led by Jose Rosario Cebreros Manjarrez. Six thousand students from the seven vocational schools of the IPN marched from the Ciudadela area (where the vocational schools 2 and 5 are located) to the Casco de Santo Tomas (where offices and other vocational schools of the IPN are located.) During the march shouts of "to the Zocalo" were heard but the demonstration arrived at the Casco with only minor acts of vandalism left in its wake.

4. At the Casco various speeches were heard and more shouts of "to the Zocalo." Most of the students disbanded but about 500 from vocational #4 captured four buses and proceeded to the streets of San Juan de Letran and Madero. Here they were met by a smaller demonstration of radical leftists celebrating the "26th of July" Cuban anniversary. This group was made up of Trotskyites, members of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), National Center of Democratic Students (CNED) and the National Liberation Movement.

5. The two groups merged and began a march toward the Zocalo. On Avenida Madero they were met by granaderos who had just been sent by the police chief after the leader of the FNET complained that the student march had been taken over by agitators. (He later denied making this complaint.) From 7 p.m. until 2 a.m. various clashes resulted from students grouping and regrouping and being dispersed by the granaderos. Students occupied prep schools 1, 2 and 3, burned a bus in the street and fought off the granaderos. Director of prep school 1 asked the police to withdraw which they finally did at 2 a.m. when the situation had quieted down.

6. During the course of the evening the police raided the headquarters of the communist party at 186 Merida where they reportedly found a half ton of propaganda, some allegedly inciting urban guerrilla warfare. They also raided the offices of La Voz de Mexico, the PCM newspaper, causing some damage to the facilities. Police arrested 76 persons among them three foreigners: Wilfred Rosado (aka Perez) a Puerto Rican, Mika Satter Seeger, an American and Raul Patricio Pobleta Sepulveda, a Chilean. A number of communists and known agitators were arrested including PCM First Secretary, Gerardo Unzueta Lorenzana and President of the Communist Youth of Mexico, Arturo Ortiz Marban.

7. During the weekend of July 27 and 28 there was only mild activity on the part of some students and non-student agitators. The weekend was
taken up mainly with student meetings, fund raising campaigns and future planning. Several buses and trucks were captured by students but the situation was eased somewhat when the Director of the Mexico City Traffic Department General Renato Vega Amador talked students into releasing 17 buses seized on Saturday. Thirty three students were released from jail as a show of good faith.

8. The U.S. Embassy, the ABC Hospital and the American School received various bomb threats and school was suspended for one day at the American School. There was, however, little evident anti-Americanism in the demonstrations and the above threats were probably aimed to harass and possibly to disperse police forces. IPN students held a pre-announced rally in the Zocalo on July 29, at 6:00 PM. Students arrived in gangs from various parts of the city committing small acts of vandalism on the way. All of the bus companies stopped service to the center of the city because they could not be guaranteed protection for their vehicles. Army troops in the Mexico City area were put on alert. About 6000 students attended the rally. Clashes between students and granaderos began at 9:00 PM and intensified when students tried to break into three commercial armories on Argentina Street. The battle in this area continued until about midnight when the police realizing that they could not alone disperse the students, called in the army. The army quickly restored order. When students would not leave the prep schools soldiers blasted the door down with bazookas and cleared the buildings with ease. Soldiers occupied prep schools 1, 2, 4, and 5.

9. Approximately 812 persons were detained, 200 injured and conflicting reports from 1 to 4 students reported dead. The government maintained that no students had been killed and the mass media duly followed this line. On July 30 Mayor Alfonso Corona del Rosal, Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria, Attorney General Julio Sanchez Vargas held a press conference in which the Mayor agreed to a petition presented by a delegation of students headed by Jose Cebreros of the PNET. The Mayor withdrew the granaderos and the troops who were occupying the prep schools in the center city area. The students also presented a list of seven
demand to the Mayor, they were resignation of the chief of police, resignation of the officials involved in the incident at vocational #5 on July 23, indemnization of injured students, initiation of a new law to delimit the powers of the police, destruction of police files on arrested students, freedom of detained students, information on the whereabouts of missing students, and removal of the troops. University classes were suspended for one day.

10. National University Rector Javier Barros Sierra, in a shrewd effort to forestall the involvement of his students who had thus far been on the sidelines, addressed a group of about 20,000 students saying "these are dark days for the University" because of the violation of university autonomy. He personally lowered the flag to half mast and announced he would lead a peaceful protest march on August 1. According to UNAM authorities their autonomy had been violated when troops had occupied UNAM connected prep schools in the downtown area. However, no troops entered the main university campus.

11. On July 31, minor skirmishes in the downtown area and numerous student rallies maintained the air of tension but the situation was relatively quiet. The government in a conciliatory move agreed to five of the seven student demands and agreed to give a reply to the other two by August 8 (the two pending demands were the resignation of the police chiefs and disbanding of the granaderos). Various ad hoc "fight committees" began to be formed especially in repudiation of the FNET which was considered to be under government influence.

12. The government increasingly attributed the blame for the riots to communists, radical deftists and foreigners, as five more communist leaders were arrested. The various sectors of the official party the CTM, CNC, and CNOP and the opposition parties published statements in the press condemning student violence (while supporting university autonomy) and justifying government actions. On August 1, Rector Barros Sierra led a march of 80,000 students and teachers on a peaceful march from
the National University 3 kilometers up Insurgentes Avenue and back to the university. It was a peaceful march which allowed the students to let off steam and made Barros Sierra something of a hero.

13. On August 1, President Diaz Ordaz, who had been touring the states of Jalisco and Colima since the disturbances began, gave a speech in Guadalajara strongly deplored the student disorders. He offered his outstretched hand to those who would take it and join in restoring social peace to Mexico. Diaz Ordaz told the Mexican people they should remember what unites them and forget what divides them. Immediately the press was full of ads from all sectors of the public and from all the states expressing their support for the President and calling for the restoration of social peace. Almost all of the ads included a lament for, and condemnation of the communist role in inciting the students and exploiting them for their own ends.

14. The Communist Party placed an ad in El Dia August 3, in which they supported the President but protested the actions taken against the party. The ad was signed by well known Mexican Communist painter David Sigueros. The ad blamed the riots on the CIA. The same position was taken by the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) but they threw rightists, pseudo leftists, and foreigners in for good measure. The weekend of August 3 and 4 was relatively quiet, the only arrests being hoodlums who were using the student riots as a cover to carry out shakedowns.

15. The IPN students and sympathizers from other schools held a peaceful demonstration on August 5. Thirty to fifty thousand students led by 200 professors marched within 5 kms. of the IPN making no attempt to go to the Zocalo. Director Guillermo Massieu refused to lead the march because the various student factions could not settle their differences. Some of the more radical groups of students and professors added to the standing list of 7 demands a call for release of all political

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prisoners and repeal of Article 145 and 146 of the Penal Code which pertains to social dissolution. The students promised to call a nationwide student strike if their demands were not answered within the deadline of August 8, previously announced by Corona del Rosal.

16. Splits among the students became apparent when the strike committees condemned Cebreros and the FNET as "opportunists" and of not operating in the best interest of the students. In response to the call of Corona del Rosal that he wanted facts to back up the charges relating to student deaths, a committee of IPN professors took upon itself the task of investigating reports of missing students. The Agricultural School at Chapingo announced that it was continuing its sympathy strike until student demands were met. At UNAM the Faculties of Science, Law, Philosophy, Political Science and Economics said they would strike along with the IPN students if a strike were called.

17. August 7 saw a new call from Director Massieu to the students to return to classes and pursue their demands through established channels. The students meanwhile, renewed their strike threat if their demands were not met. In Oaxaca, the Rector of the University of Oaxaca led a peaceful march in support of the capital students.

18. When the deadline of August 8 arrived, the government made no substantial concessions to student demands, so the IPN, joined by several faculties at UNAM, went on strike (which eventually became general). The FNET called for the urban and rural normal schools to join them. The government announced the cancellation of the American pro-football game scheduled for August 11, between the Detroit Lions and the Philadelphia Eagles. Apparently the government had gotten word that a large number of tickets had been sold to students and that they planned to demonstrate and cause disturbances.
19. August 8 was "Streetcleaners Day" and Corona del Rosal used it to deliver his answer to the students. He played up to anti-student feeling among the working class by lamenting the suffering caused them by the students through disruption of public transportation, and the violence done to certain sectors of the public. He blamed the riots on unnamed persons who planned the confrontation between students and police. He called for a return to social peace saying that no one benefited from the disorders. Corona denied the charges of police brutality and violation of university autonomy. At one point in his speech as a means of answering student charges that student deaths had been covered up by cremating the bodies, he asked the graveyard workers and hospital workers present if they had any knowledge of dead students as a result of the riots.

20. IPN Director Guillermo Massieu, who had been trying to keep clean of being too involved in the controversy, was placed in the middle of things by a letter from Corona asking him to form a commission to investigate student charges. The commission was to be made up of representatives from the students, teachers and government. Corona promised that any police official found guilty, regardless of rank, would be punished in accordance with the offense. The strikers felt that the proposed commission was not an acceptable answer to their demands. Those who were more favorably disposed to the idea objected to the presence of outsiders feeling that only IPN people should be represented. The Consejo Nacional de Huelga was constituted on August 9 in a student assembly at Unidad Profesional de Zacateno. Thirty eight struggle committees were represented from the different schools of IPN, UNAM, Chapingo, the Normal schools, etc.

21. Directors of various schools of IPN also urged students to return to class. The students were never asked, nor would they have agreed, to give up their demands. The student assemblies of the 26 schools of IPN met on August 12 to vote on the recommendation to return to classes or continue the strike. Except for the School of Nursing all of the schools voted to continue the strike and support the March planned for the following day.
22. For the first time a list of missing, dead and injured students was published. The list had been compiled by the fight committee of the National School of Economics of IPN. Two were listed as dead, six as gravely injured and eleven as missing with the investigation continuing. *Excelsior* printed an article saying Corona's concessions were insufficient and asked him to document his charges of outside responsibility.

23. If the GOM had hoped that the student cause had fractionized and begun to peter out, the march on August 13 must have been a great source of frustration. The PNET refused to support the strike which only underlined its waning influence and authority among the students. The march, the meeting in the Zocalo, and the subsequent dispersal were all peaceful in spite of an attendance of between 50,000 and 80,000 students (although some newspapers said 150 to 200 thousand).

24. The police were kept away from the vicinity of the march. The crowd in the Zocalo heard four speakers who reiterated previous student demands, adding the release of political prisoners. One of the most striking features of the march were the banners attacking Corona del Rosal, Echeverría, Martinez Manatou and President Díaz Ordaz himself. The press of the next morning called it "verbal violence." Other placards had generalized political demands such as a 40 hour week, better housing, etc. There was some labor support but mainly communist and Trotskyite members of the petroleum and railroad workers unions.
25. In an effort to further disaffect public opinion, the press coverage tended to stress the above-mentioned attacks on government officials and to stress the more radical pro-Cuba and communist elements present in the march. This tended to further student dissatisfaction with the "government controlled press." The National Strike Council (CNH) and the Coalition of Teachers Pro-Democratic Liberties who organized the march appeared in a strong position to continue the strike. On August 14, the press announced the arrest the day before of 12 American youths for participating in a political activity. They were all eventually deported.

26. The students did not turn out for exams on August 15, and indeed the strike was joined by the University Ibero-americana. The UNAM University Council chaired by Rector Barros Sierra formed a 21 man council of teachers and students to draft demands to be presented to the government and preferably to the President.

27. Meanwhile political brigades were being formed by the various strike committees to take their case to the public. IPN Director Massieu sent a letter to Corona del Rosal designating but not naming the IPN members to the proposed commission. They included three from the National Strike Council and five university professors. The CNH did not drop any of its demands and deemed that the proposed commission should hold meetings open to the public and even suggested they be televised.

28. In an attempt at opening the way to a dialogue, Mayor Corona del Rosal met with student groups from IPN and UNAM on August 19. The FNET was represented but the CNH was not in agreement with the composition of the groups and nothing came of the meeting, perhaps another sign of the growing strength of the CNH relative to the FNET. On August 20, a rally at UNAM to which Deputies and Senators had been invited to attend was boycotted by GOM officials.

29. Secretary of Interior Luis Echeverria made a renewed call on August 22 for the students to meet with the government. This time the CNH and the Coalition of Teachers agreed to the offer, asking the government to set the place and time for the meeting. However, what at first appeared to be a break in the stalemate did not bear fruit due on one hand to CNH insistence on holding the meeting in a large convention hall with full television coverage, and on the other a lack of vigorous government follow up to the original breakthrough.
30. As a means of continued pressure on the GOM another march was held on August 27. The students prepared for the march by holding "lightning meetings" throughout the city to encourage support from other sectors of the population. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful as no significant numbers of campesinos or laborers joined the march outside of known splinter groups of communists in various unions. The march consisted of some forty to fifty thousand demonstrators who marched down Paseo de la Reforma to the Zocalo where a crowd estimated at 100,000 heard four speakers elaborate on the six student demands. The reiterated demands were: freedom of political prisoners, firing of the chief of police, his assistant and the head of the granaderos, abolition of the granaderos, repeal of Article 145 of the Penal Code (social dissolution), indemnity to families of dead and injured students, and clear definition of the responsibilities of forces of public order.

31. An attempt at pitching a camping site in the Zocalo was ended by army and police action with little violence, early in the morning of the 28th. The march was characterized by a large number of posters rudely caricaturizing President Diaz Ordaz, many printed posters of the face of Demetrio Vallejo, and isolated shouts of "murderers" as demonstrators passed the U.S. Embassy where police and army units including tanks were stationed. A few students broke into the Cathedral on the Zocalo, rang the bells, turned on the lights and set off fireworks being prepared for the national holiday of mid-September. The Mexican flag was lowered from the flagpole in front of the National Palace and a red and black flag raised in its place.

32. These latter actions were strongly condemned by the press the following day. They also served as a provocation or pretext for a GOM crackdown on the students. President Diaz Ordaz was reportedly shocked by these events and ordered a government offensive against the students on the physical and psychological front. Security forces were authorized to use whatever measures necessary to prevent further student disturbances. The following two days saw clashes in the Zocalo and other parts of the city as public security forces dispersed students. Gunshots were fired in the downtown area and a number of people were injured.

33. Originally it appeared the GOM would wait until after the Informe to crack down on the students. Its change in attitude seemed to be caused by: the August 27 march which showed the GOM efforts at dividing and weakening the students were not succeeding; by the vulgar attacks on the President which

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reduced public sympathy that may have existed for the students; by the desecration of the Cathedral which gave the GOM an exploitable emotional issue; and by the threat of students to hold demonstrations during the Informe.

34. The Informe itself was, as far as the student issue was concerned, a model of the carrot and stick technique. The President said he would use all resources given by law to maintain order and protect citizens. At the same time he reaffirmed his belief in university autonomy, said he knew of no political prisoners but asked the Attorney General to review pending cases to see if anyone were in jail without having committed a common crime, and asked Congress to hold public hearings on Article 145 of the Penal Code. At the same time the President stated he had been assured by prominent legal advisors that there had been no violation of university autonomy as defined by the rector.

35. The immediate effect of the Informe was to produce generous praise by the mass media and division among the strikers. After much agonizing and discussion the CNH issued a statement saying the Informe solved nothing and that they still wanted a dialogue with the government. There were no student demonstrations during or after the Informe but public opinion and government pressure continued to build up against the student strike. On September 4, the CNH again presented its demands to the GOM and suggested a meeting time and place for their discussion. The GOM responded on September 6 with a bureaucratic reply avoiding mention of a meeting, yet maintaining the image of reasonableness and willingness to debate.

36. UNAM Rector Barros Sierra issued a call on September 9 to the students to return to classes and continue to pursue their demands through other channels. This caused even further divisions among the students. Some groups met with the rector and expressed their desire to return to classes, but the CNH decided to continue the strike and hold another march. Sympathy strikes in various provincial schools and expressions of support from a group of about thirty priests encouraged the CNH in its attitudes. The response of Governor Sanchez Celis in Sinaloa, a close friend of the President, was to withdraw funds from the state university in Culiacan which had gone on strike and place them in a special bank account which was to be used for those students who "really wanted to study."

37. The silent march of September 13, in which an estimated 10 to 25 thousand students participated, came off without even minor incidents of violence.
There were no pictures of Che Guevara or anti-US placards in sight. There were far fewer attacks on President Díaz Ordaz, with most signs dedicated to expounding the six student demands. There were some labor and campesino groups, all identifiable as small communist factions. The march was significantly smaller than previous ones and reflected the effects of continued government and private pressure against the strike, especially the rector's call to return to classes.

38. During the "Grito" ceremonies of the 15th of September and the parade of the 16th, there were no student disturbances or heckling to mar the Independence celebrations. After the mid-September Independence celebrations the CNH, and more specifically Heriberto Castillo, began to take a more conciliatory attitude toward settlement of their demands with the GOM. In an interview with the press Castillo suggested the desired student-government dialogue could be in written form and that agreement by the GOM to at least one of the demands might provide a basis for a settlement. Castillo's softened tone was probably caused by realization of flagging support for the strike. Even though students of the various faculties at UNAM voted on September 17 to continue the strike, they were small in number and could not claim to speak for the majority. The students and the government appeared to be drawing nearer on the question of a dialogue but the government continued its warnings against attempts to disrupt the Olympic Games.

39. In a surprise move the Mexican Army occupied the National University campus on the evening of September 18. Army tanks, trucks and about 3000 troops entered the university campus and rounded up about 600 students, teachers and anyone else unfortunate enough to be present. The GOM said, through the Secretary of the Presidency, that the university facilities, which belong to the public, had been illegally used and occupied since early August. The GOM was apparently motivated by reports they had received that the students were planning a march on the Olympic Village, plus hopes of rounding up the CNH leaders. The action seemed to be of a preventive nature with the GOM hoping to gain control of the situation before the Olympics.

40. UNAM Rector Barros Sierra responded with a statement strongly condemning the action as well as condemning those elements of the university who had misused the university for their own ends. There was general indignation in the academic-intellectual community. The PAN also condemned the action. The PRI and its organized sectors, private enterprise and government sources all approved of the action.
41. Although the round up of suspects and breaking up of student gatherings continued for several days, few of the CNH leaders, professors or students were caught. Eli de Gortari and Marcué Pardiñas being the important exceptions. IPN students refused to respond to official warnings and their buildings were cleared out but almost immediately turned over by the army to administrative authorities of the Secretary of Education.

42. When Barros Sierra was criticized by various PRI officials for his stand on the occupation of UNAM, he submitted his irrevocable resignation to the University Council on September 22. In his resignation statement, he deplored the university occupation, the GOM failure to notify him and the personal attacks against him. The rector's popularity, already considerable, took another upward surge. On September 26, the University Council unanimously rejected the rector's resignation and shortly thereafter he revoked his "irrevocable" resignation, saying he would soon ask for removal of troops from UNAM and an adjustment in the school calendar.

43. After the army occupation of UNAM hardly a day passed without some sporadic acts of violence. Most serious incidents occurred at the Plaza of Three Cultures on evening of September 21, and at the Casco de Santo Tomas on evening of September 23. Several deaths were reported and large numbers were wounded or arrested. For several days, all student gatherings of any size were broken up, most notably a CNH march which the army prevented from gathering at the Anthropology Museum on September 25 with only minor clashes.

44. On September 27, government tactics changed. The CNH was permitted to hold a meeting in the Plaza of the Three Cultures which was attended by about 5000 students. Speakers said the student demands would continue to be pressed, emphasized that they were not against the Olympics and blamed the recent violence on outsiders. In an ad the next day, CNH spokesman Marcelino Perello said a return to class could be voted only by the assemblies of each school.

45. In a move designed to conciliate the academic community, Deputy Octavio Hernandez, who had been the sharpest critic of Barros Sierra, resigned as head of a special committee set up by the Chamber of Deputies to study educational reform. He was replaced by Manzanilla Shaffer. During the
afternoon of September 30, army troops were pulled out of the UNAM campus. CNH student groups immediately re-entered the campus and added three new demands to their standing list of six. They called for removal of government authorities from all schools, release of detained students, and an end to all repression. The same day a low key "Mothers March" of about 3000 proceeded from the Monument to Mexican Mothers to the Chamber of Deputies, where speakers urged the students to continue their struggle.

46. On October 2, the CNH held a meeting at the Plaza of Three Cultures with the intention of marching on the IPN schools at the Casco de Santo Tomas. The meeting, reportedly attended by 5,000 to 10,000 people, was peacefully listening to speeches when the army moved in with the apparent intention of arresting the CNH leaders and breaking up the meeting. Versions differ as to whether the first shots came from the Plaza or from the nearby Chihuahua Apartment Building and as to whether they came from the students or from the agents of law enforcement but chaos immediately erupted in the Plaza. What followed was the bloodiest incident since the student disturbances began in July. At least forty, and unpublished estimates say that five times that many were killed, 400 to 500 were wounded and over one thousand five hundred were arrested. Many pistols, rifles with power scopes, automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails were captured in the round-up after the shooting was over. In the day following the Tlatelolco massacre only minor acts of violence took place, several buses were burned, a sniper killed a passerby in the Tlatelolco area, and an aqueduct was dynamited near the Viaducto but only slightly damaged.

47. Avery Brundage issued a statement on October 3 on behalf of the International Olympic Committee saying he believed the student problem would not interfere with the Games since no violence had been directed against them at any time. He also expressed his faith in the GOM's ability to maintain order and in the "sportsmanship and hospitality" of the Mexican people.

48. The PRI passed a resolution through the Chamber of Deputies on October 5 backing GOM action during the student disturbances. The resolution was opposed by the PPS and PAN. The same day the CNH made its first announce ment since the October 2 violence when it blamed the GOM for the incident and said dialogue with the GOM could not begin until three basic demands were met; respect for the Constitution, release of all students and an end to all repression.
49. Ex-president Lazaro Cardenas issued a statement on October 6 denouncing the intervention of '"anti-national and foreign forces' in the student conflict. He called on all Mexicans to end violence and resolve problems within an atmosphere of reason, justice and understanding. He was not specific about who the "foreign elements" were. The CNH held a press conference to insure the public that they would not hold anymore off-campus meetings, would not disrupt the Olympics (which they said they never intended to), but would continue to press for satisfaction of their demands. The same day 755 persons were released who had been detained during the October 2 round up.

50. Principal headlines, however, went to captured student leader Socrates Amado Campos Lemus. Socrates made declarations before the assembled press in which he implicated writer Elena Garro, ex-politicians Carlos Madrazo, Braulio Maldonado, and Humberto Romero as having aided in one way or another the student movement. He also mentioned the Director of the Colegio de Mexico but did not know the person's name. Although the charges appealed to many peoples' desire to blame the student unrest on a conspiracy, there in fact was little or no factual evidence to back up the charges. Socrates himself admitted a few days later that his story was based on rumor. He also said the CNH had been split between hardliners wanting to overthrow the GOM and moderates who wanted to reach a settlement. He also claimed that "security columns" had been formed to protect the strike leaders at Tlatelolco and said they were armed.

51. Vigorous public denials were issued the following day by all those persons denounced by Socrates Amado Campos. Elena Garro, who is known to the Embassy as a very unstable person, not only denied charges against herself and Madrazo but used the occasion to charge UNAM Rector Barros Sierra, Jose Luis Ceceña, Leopoldo Zea, Jose Luis Cuevas, Jose Escudero, Carlos Monsivais and others as intellectual authors of the student rebellion.

52. Five Mexicans were arrested in the state of Veracruz who had planned on carrying out guerrilla warfare in the state of Tabasco. An Argentinian Silvia Olivares (aka Judit Vazquez) hijacked an Aeromaya plane and told the pilot she was fleeing to Cuba to escape prosecution for her part in the Tlatelolco incident of October 2. Fourteen foreigners were reported to have been arrested but no Americans were directly implicated in the Tlatelolco incident. In searching the buildings on October 5 the Army found numbers of rifles and pistols of various caliber, rifles with telescopic sights, as well as all of the ingredients for making Molotov cocktails.

53. Carlos Madrazo held a two hour press conference on October 7 and denied having played a role in the student unrest; he expressed his willingness to
appear before the Attorney General to answer charges. He used the occasion to criticize the GOM indirectly by calling for political-social reforms to lessen the plight of youth, but expressed his support for the President. Carlos Martin del Campo and Sergando Davila Jimenez confessed to the Attorney General to trying to blow up an aqueduct on October 3. They also admitted taking dynamite to Tlatelolco on October 2 but claimed they didn’t use it for fear of a massacre.

54. CNH spokesman Marcelino Perello denounced Socrates Amado Campos as a CIA agent and said all political prisoners had started a hunger strike. Fifteen persons were formally arraigned for federal crimes (sedition) and 98 were arraigned for common law crimes. The vast majority of those detained in Tlatelolco and not formally arraigned were set free by October 10. A surprising announcement was made by Jorge de la Vega and Andres Caso, GOM representatives who had been meeting with members of the CNH since September 28. They said the heterogeneity of the student representation had made the talks difficult but they hoped for positive results.

55. The 19th Olympiad was inaugurated on October 12 without an incident to mar the perfect day. The student conflict settled into the background as the students and public concentrated on the Olympic events.

56. This airgram does not deal in any detail with disturbances in the states because they were almost always peaceful and depended mostly on developments in Mexico City, although it must be added that many state campus not now on strike have stated their continued support for the capital students and their cause.

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