SUBJECT: SSD: PLENARY MEETING — MOSCOW

1. THIS IS SSD-V-026. UNCLASSIFIED—ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SUBJECT PLENARY SESSION WAS HELD ON 2 NOVEMBER 1992, DURING WHICH THE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) WILLIAM F. BURNS, PRESENTED A STATEMENT OUTLINING THE DELEGATION’S OBJECTIVES IN THE AREAS OF A HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) CONTRACT, EXPORT CONTROL, STORAGE OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, AND ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER START. FOLLOWING THE PLENARY STATEMENT, BRIGADIER GENERAL TEDDY RINEBARGER PROVIDED THE STATUS OF ONGOING EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS; SPECIFICALLY, HE ADDRESSED ARMORED BLANKETS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT, STORAGE FACILITY, FISSIONABLE MATERIAL CONTAINERS, RAILCARS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION, AND M&A AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ADJOURNMENT, EXPERT GROUPS CONVENED TO DISCUSS EXPORT CONTROL AND MISSILE DISMANTLEMENT. THE DISCUSSION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL STORAGE WOULD DEPEND ON THE AVAILABILITY, YET TO BE DETERMINED, OF EXPERTS ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE ASKED THAT HEU DISCUSSIONS BE DEFERRED UNTIL NOVEMBER 3 TO PERMIT TIME FOR THEM TO STUDY THE DRAFT CONTRACT. END SUMMARY.

3. A PLENARY MEETING WAS HELD AT 10:00 AM, 2 NOVEMBER 1992, AT THE GOR MPF. AFTER OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTIONS BY THE HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN SIDE, AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN, AND THE HEAD OF THE U.S. SIDE, GENERAL BURNS, THE FOLLOWING PLENARY STATEMENT WAS PRESENTED BY MGEN BURNS. BEGIN STATEMENT. I AM PLEASED TO RETURN AGAIN TO MOSCOW TO CONTINUE OUR TALKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY, SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT. THE U.S. SIDE HAS SEVERAL OBJECTIVES THAT IT WILL SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH OVER THE NEXT TWO DAYS:
WE WILL BE PROVIDING AND EXPLAINING TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE A DRAFT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF ENERGY FOR THE SALE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) RESULTING FROM THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA. WE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATION OF THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT.

SECOND, WE WILL BE PROVIDING A DRAFT EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENT AND SOLICITING A REACTION FROM OUR SIDE.

THIRD, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON U.S. ASSISTANCE IN STORING FISSILE MATERIAL.

FOURTH, WE WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THE U.S. OFFER TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING THE E XECUTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SLATED FOR DISMANTLEMENT UNDER THE START TREATY AND HEAR YOUR INITIAL THOUGHTS ON RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE.

FINALLY, WE WILL REVIEW THE STATUS OF ONGOING EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN OUR SIDES.

LET ME PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF EACH OF THESE TOPICS.

THE DRAFT HEU CONTRACT IS DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL DISPOSITION OF HEU THAT WAS INITIATED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. THAT AGREEMENT PRESENTS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE THE COMMITMENT MADE BY OUR RESPECTIVE PRESIDENTS TO OUR MUTUAL NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE PURCHASE OF HEU FOR USE AS COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL.

ACCORDINGLY, WE URGE THE RUSSIAN SIDE TO PROCEED WITH THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

REQUESTED ARTICLES 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 033354

ARTICLE 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 033354

THE MEANINGLESS, WE HOPE TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT IMMEDIATELY. MOST THINGS FOR THIS PURPOSE ARE SCHEDULED DURING MY CURRENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. ALTHOUGH THE DISPOSITION AGREEMENT ECLAIRIFIES A 12-MONTH PERIOD FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT, THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS WELL BEFORE THAT DEADLINE IN ORDER TO SINCE THE CONVERSION OF HEU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

NEVER, THE U.S. WILL NOT FULLY IMPLEMENT THE CONTRACT UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON EQUITABLE SHARING THE PROCEEDS HAS BEEN REACHED AMONG RUSSIA, LARUS, UKRAINE, AND KAZAKHSTAN. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL AID CONSIDERABLY IN FULFILLING THE EXPECTATIONS OF BOTH THE U.S. AND THE RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY; SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE EXPECTATIONS ARE START RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, AID ADHERENCE OF THE OTHER THREE STATES TO THE 4-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, AND THE RAPID TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THESE STATES TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLEMENT.

ARDING THE DRAFT EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENT, AS
SAID PREVIOUSLY, WE WISH TO ASSIST THE INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF STRONG EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEMS AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF mass DESTRUCTION. WE ARE PREPARED TO OFFER YOUR GOVERNMENT A PACKAGE OF PROGRAMS TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF EXPORT CONTROLS, BUILDING ON YOUR CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION AND DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE COCOM COOPERATION FORUM.

OUR EXPERTS ARE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE TABLING TODAY, AND WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ANY COMMENTS YOU HAVE ON IT. WE PROPOSE TO SEND AN APPROPRIATE U.S. DELEGATION TO MOSCOW AT A LATER DATE TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGREEMENT FOR EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE, AFTER CONSIDERING YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS DRAFT.

WITH REGARD TO U.S. ASSISTANCE IN STORING FISSILE MATERIAL, WE WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON TWO SUBJECTS - TRANSPARENCY MEASURES AND EXISTING STORAGE CAPACITY.

WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF INCORPORATING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS MEASURES, TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF THEFT, SABOTAGE, OR UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF FISSILE MATERIAL AND TO ENSURE THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE IS BEING USED FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED. IN AUGUST WE SET FORTH SOME IDEAS ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. NOW THAT YOU HAVE HAD SOME TIME TO CONSIDER THIS MATTER, WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON HOW OUR TWO SIDES SHOULD PROCEED. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO US IN OUR OWN INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS TO HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR PLANS AND CONCERNS SO THAT WE CAN TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT.

WE ALSO INDICATED IN AUGUST THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN UPGRADING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF YOUR EXISTING STORAGE FACILITIES. THIS AID WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THAT WE ARE PROVIDING YOU IN THE DESIGN OF A NEW STORAGE FACILITY FOR FISSILE MATERIAL.

IT WAS INDICATED EARLIER THAT ALL TEMPORARY STORAGE FACILITIES WERE FILLED TO CAPACITY, AND THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS, RUSSIA WAS ON THE VERGE OF BEING FORCED TO HALT DISMANTLEMENT. THE U.S. IS CONCERNED ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OF DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 03354 DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACD1; FOR T, EM, EUR; DOE FOR ALESI/DP-5; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR SSD/AE OSD/ISP, OSD(A)/S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6; CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS; OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR-IA-IRO; NSC FOR DAVIS AND PONEMAN; NRC FOR SHERR;

DNA/OPAC.

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, OTRA, UR, US
SUBJECT: SSD:PLENARY MEETING - MOSCOW
UPDATE FROM YOU ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF YOUR DISMANTLEMENT EFFORTS AND STORAGE PLANS.
WE HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE EARLY REMOVAL TO RUSSIA OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN BELARUS, UKRAINE, AND KAZAKHSTAN, AND UNDERSECRETARY WISNER RECENTLY PROPOSED THE EARLY DEACTIVATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE REMOVAL OF THEIR WARHEADS, SCHEDULED FOR ELIMINATION UNDER CRMD. WE RECOGNIZE THAT
TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL AID. THIS INCLUDES EQUIPMENT AND OTHER SUPPORT TO PERMIT RUSSIA EXPEDITIOUSLY TO REMOVE REENTRY VEHICLES FROM ICBMS AND SLBMS; ELIMINATE ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS; AND ELIMINATE ICBM SILOS. I HAVE A TEAM OF EXPERTS ON THIS SUBJECT THAT IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH YOUR EXPERTS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND YOUR CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE, YOUR GENERAL PLAN AND TIMETABLE FOR MEETING START ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS, AND ANY ENVIRONMENTAL OR OTHER REGULATIONS THAT MAY AFFECT THE PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE. WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AND STUDY YOUR PARTICULAR REQUIREMENTS OF US AS WELL AS ANY IDEAS YOU CAN SHARE WITH OUR EXPERTS DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO USEFUL DISCUSSIONS ON THE AGENDA I HAVE OUTLINED DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS. WE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN SUCH DISCUSSIONS BY REVIEWING THE STATUS OF ONGOING EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN OUR SIDES. FOR THAT PURPOSE, LET ME INTRODUCE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON OUR DELEGATION, BRIGADIER GENERAL TED RINEBARGER. END STATEMENT.

4. NAZARKIN THANKED GENERAL BURNS FOR THE OVERVIEW OF THE WORK THAT LIES AHEAD AND ACKNOWLEDGED READINESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECTS OF EXPORT CONTROL AND MISSILE DISMANTLEMENT. NAZARKIN FURTHER STATED THAT, THOUGH THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAD NOT HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE ALL POSITIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS, HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT A USEFUL DIALOGUE WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE SUBJECT OF FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE HAD ARisen, RECOGNIZING ITS IMPORTANCE BUT STATING THAT IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED AS AN AGENDA ITEM. AS A RESULT, DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD DEPEND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF THEIR EXPERTS ON SHORT NOTICE. GENERAL BURNS STATED THAT THE APPROPRIATE U.S. EXPERTS WERE AVAILABLE IF THEY WERE REQUIRED.

5. GENERAL RINEBARGER WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE THE STATUS OF ONGOING SSD ASSISTANCE PROJECTS AND PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.

BEGIN STATEMENT. THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATUS OF PROJECTS CURRENTLY ONGOING AS PART OF THE U.S. EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE SAFE AND SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA.

- ARMORED BLANKETS. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ON JUNE 17 OF THIS YEAR, THE U.S. ARRANGED INCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 033354

- DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA; FOR T, PM, EUR;

- FOR ALESSI/DP-5; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECEF FOR ISD/AE OSD/ISP, OUSD(A)/SASS, AND DIA/ODB-6; CIA CHIEF/ACIS; OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR-IA-IRO;

- FOR DAVIS AND PONEMAN; NRC FOR SHFRR.
SUBJECT: SSD: PLenary Meeting - Moscow


- A JOINT EXPERTS EXCHANGE OCCURRED HERE IN MOSCOW OCTOBER 28-30, 1992, TO ADDRESS NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, DELIVERY SCHEDULES, AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. I AM TOLD IT WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL MEETING AND THE U.S. SIDE HAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR REQUEST AND, BASED ON THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS LAST WEEK, WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. WE WILL PROVIDE TO YOU A LIST TODAY OF THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS WE WILL BE SupplyING.

- STORAGE FACILITY. THE INITIAL RUSSIAN DESIGN REQUIREMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON AUGUST 3, 1992. SEVERAL JOINT TECHNICAL EXCHANGES HAVE BEEN HELD IN ST. PETERSBURG AND OMAHA.


ADDITIONAL JOINT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR LATE 1992 AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, DURING WHICH OUR TWO SIDES WILL HAVE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON FACILITY CLEAR SAFETY, MCA SYSTEM DESIGN, AND FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THESE DISCUSSIONS OUR SENIOR TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET IN ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE STORAGE FACILITY DESIGN.

FISSILE MATERIAL CONTAINERS. THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ON JUNE 17, 1992. CURRENTLY, THE AT400R CONTAINER DESIGN IS BEING FINALIZED. THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENTAL CONTAINERS WILL BE BUILT AND TESTED IN JANUARY 1993. THEY WILL MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR
CRUSH, AND BURN. SOME EARLY DESIGN TEST CONTAINERS WILL BE DELIVERED TO RUSSIA AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 31, 1995. COMPLETE DELIVERY WILL BE DECEMBER 31, 1995. AS REQUESTED BY RUSSIA, 500 TO HAVE REMOVABLE VESSEL LIDS FOR USE IN TRANSPORTATION; THE REST (9,500) ARE TO HAVE VESSEL LIDS THAT WILL BE WELDED FOR LONG-TERM STORAGE. ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS MAY BE BUILT UP TO TOTAL COST OF $50M FOR THIS PROJECT.
A TECHNICAL EXCHANGE IS SCHEDULED LATE THIS YEAR IN LAOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY.


HER AREAS OF ASSISTANCE -- MCA AND PHYSICAL PECTION. AN EXCHANGE OF SEMINARS AND SITE VISITS BEGAN THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 26, 1992, IN ST. PETERSBURG. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SEMINARS AND VISITS IS TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL BASIS THAT THE SIDES CAN DECIDE ON THE APPROPRIATE USE OF ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE AGREEMENTS IN THE MCA AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION.

IS CONCLUDES MY REVIEW OF ONGOING ASSISTANCE PROJECTS. AS THE REVIEW INDICATES, WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH IN OUR EFFORTS TO Date. END

AZARRIN NOTED WITH INTEREST THE INFORMATION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ASSURED THAT HE WOULD PASS IT ON TO ACADEMICIAN KUTSEVICH. GENERAL RINEBARGER ID THAT THE SUBJECT IS SO IMPORTANT AND SO
TO SSD THAT THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO
INSPECT THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF THE PROJECT STATUS.
AFTER ORGANIZING THE EXPERT GROUPS, THE SUBJECT
ANOTHER PLENARY WAS LEFT OPEN, TO BE DETERMINED
JUDGED ON NECESSITY. IN ANY CASE, NAZARKIN THOUGHT
SOME SORT OF MEETING WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE
STOCK OF WHAT HAD TRANSPRIED DURING EXPERTS
MEETINGS. GENERAL BURNS AGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION
AND THE PLENARY SESSION THEN ADJOURNED.

STRAUSS

NNNN