Report
Of the Trilateral Working Group Meeting
Of the Technical Experts
On the Secure Containment of Residues of Nuclear Activities

At the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS)

Washington, D.C.
June 14-16, 2000

The objective of the meeting was to develop a mutually acceptable technical solution for project implementation assuring safe and secure containment of the residues of nuclear activities (RONA) at the agreed area at the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

The participants of the meeting authorized by their respective agencies as provided in the agreements reached at the trilateral meeting (Moscow, May 04, 2000) reviewed technical approaches that would preclude unauthorized access to the RONA and allow for a long-term containment of the RONA.

1. During the meeting the following technical options for the joint project were discussed:
   1.1. Removing (extracting) the RONA from all the wells at the site and moving the RONA for interim storage to another site at the STS.
   1.2. Partial removal (from 35 wells) of the RONA by excavation and moving the RONA for interim storage to another site at the STS.
   1.3. Pouring concrete pad (entombing) over the whole area of the site.
   1.4. Removing (extracting) the RONA from all the 35 wells at the site using excavation technologies and pouring a concrete pad over the whole area of the site.

2. The parties agreed that all these options are technically feasible; however the preferred options are Options 3 and 4. The Russian side will provide information concerning the wells at the site; the information will be needed to implement the project. It is agreed to involve the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for both options in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK).
   2.1. Option 3 can be implemented with minimal additional requirements.
   2.2. Implementation of Option 4 requires the following considerations:
      - The storage conditions of the removed material should preclude access to the material by any person or by any organization without joint decision of all (three) parties participating in the project.
      - Interim storage will be at the "Baikal" test-stand site of the NNC RK. During the interim storage period, the question of long-term storage should be solved.

3. Responsibilities of the participating parties:
   3.1. The Russian side:
      - Provides the information required to carry out the project;
      - Monitors project implementation and participates in the project.
   3.2. The U.S. side:
- Defines the statement of work (in concurrence with the other participants);
- Monitors project implementation.

3.3. The Kazakhstan side:
- Carries out actual implementation of the project.

4. The participants of the meeting agreed that:

4.1. Implementation of either option by the RK will be done in consultation with the Russian and American sides. The Russian and Kazakhstan sides are prepared to start immediately on Option 3 (concrete entombing of the site).

4.2. It is agreed that the work on the selected option should be completed before the end of year 2000. For this reason, the parties agreed to reach a final decision on the option to be implemented as quickly as possible with the goal of commencing work in mid-July.

5. All the information related to this project is considered to be in confidence and dissemination of this information to fourth parties is permitted only upon mutual agreement of the three parties participating in this project.

The list of the participants is attached.

On behalf of the U.S. DOE

[Signature]
Robinson, P.W.

On behalf of Minatom RF

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Kutsenko, V.M.

On behalf of Minenergo RK

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Takhvamlin, Sh.T.