### Session 1

"Peacemakers and Peacekeepers: The promise and perils of Arusha, 1990-1993"

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To : Chief of Staff  
Rwandan Army

Re : Reflections on current situation

1. I have the honour to forward herewith my reflections on the current situation which is part of the on-going changes ushered in by what is customarily called the “Wind from the East” or “Democratisation”.

2. I have dealt with various issues, at times expressing a personal opinion with a view to highlighting the factors that can speed up the process of change in our country. I have probably contributed nothing new but I believe my reflections could contain one point or the other that is relevant to the subject.

3. If, in the course of my reflections, I have gone beyond what is allowed (Gutandukira) or hurt some people, I crave their indulgence, for I have only one intention: to contribute to the debate.
4. I have perhaps proposed no solutions to the various problems, the more so as it is difficult for a single person to find solutions to problems that are so daunting. However, I have stated my points of view where appropriate.

5. I hope these reflections will help broaden debate as part of the quest for solutions to some current problems.

(Signed)

NSENGIYUMVA Anatole
Lt. Col. BEMS
G2 EM AR
The geo-strategic and political situation in the world, in Africa, in neighbouring countries to Rwanda and in Rwanda itself

An analytical essay

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The world’s attention is riveted on the changes ushered in by what is now known as the “Wind from the East”, and its effects. The West prefers to call it “Democratisation”, a term that has been adopted by all the media all over the world.

The so-called “Wind from the East” took its rise in the Warsaw Pact countries, beginning with Poland, Hungary, East Germany, etc. Romania tried to resist but the Ceausescu regime was dramatically swept away, as we know.

2. The wind of Perestroika blew across the great Soviet Union which shattered the status quo hitherto considered a virtually unchanging reality in the socialist and communist system. Events in the Soviet satellites were significantly influenced by changes in the Soviet Union. Such changes are still underway and it is difficult to predict how far they will go.

3. The “Wind from the East” or the wave of democratization swept through, and continues to sweep through the African continent and the rest of the Third World. China, Mongolia, Nepal, Latin America, etc., are undergoing profound changes that will gather momentum. In the case of Africa, one-party systems of government are being called to question. The forces of change are at work everywhere. Even Senegal, which has been a multiparty democracy for some time now, has also felt the jolts of the “Wind from the East”.

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Protests by students, state employees, trade unionists and even the military (in Côte d'Ivoire) have challenged governments and demanded change.

Changes are unfolding everywhere – in Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Benin, Gabon, Central African Republic, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, etc. Benin, Gabon, Zaire and Côte d'Ivoire have accepted multiparty politics and initiated the process of change.

Governments in some countries such as Tanzania are planning to initiate gradual changes in line with the aspirations of their people. Others like Kenya and Zimbabwe are still clinging to one-party systems.

4. The situation in neighbouring countries

a) In Zaire profound changes are underway. President Mobutu, after holding popular consultations, has opted for multiparty politics, appointing a *Premier Commissaire d'Etat* [First State Commissioner] and forming a new government.

Most of the barons of the Mobutu regime which has been in power for twenty-five years have been left high and dry.

The MPR is no longer the ‘Party-State’ and President Mobutu has relinquished the office of MPR Chairman. Other very profound measures have been taken as part of the process of change. However, the situation has not improved much. President Mobutu has demanded the recognition of only three political parties in Zaire. Nevertheless, several political parties have applied for recognition. Some are even demanding that Mobutu should step down.
University students and others in institutions of higher learning are continually protesting and clashing with the forces of law and order. Such protests have been staged in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bukavu and Lumumbashi, and several people have been wounded and even killed in the clashes, contrary to official statements. It is therefore apparent that the situation has not at all returned to normal and the changes initiated in Zaire are not likely to be as peaceful as one might expect.

The presence and influence of foreign nationals in Zaire, particularly that of mulattos and Rwandans are already contested by some segments of the Zairian population. This does not augur well for our country.

b) The situation in Burundi should be viewed as an exception. In fact, Burundi is undergoing changes albeit against another backdrop; here the changes were triggered before the "Wind from the East" swept through the African continent. First, there was the putsch by Major Pierre Buyoya who overthrew the Bagaza regime. Up till then, the change of regime and establishment of the Third Republic in Burundi could be considered as a revolution engineered from within.

President Buyoya announced sweeping changes at all levels. As regards the question whether the ethnic problem was going to be tackled as part of such sweeping changes, Major Buyoya’s answer was that “there is no ethnic problem in Burundi and there will never be any under my regime”. He was going to be quickly disillusioned. He was indeed taken unawares by the Ntega-Marangara events. He then had to admit that the Hutu-Tutsi problem does exist in Burundi. Supported by his Rwandan and Zairian counterparts, President Buyoya had to initiate profound changes in order to confront and put an end to the Ntega-Marangara events, and cushion their effects. He appealed for national unity. A government of national unity composed of practically the same number of Hutu and Tutsi was
formed. A Hutu was appointed Prime Minister. The Burundian Government is currently working with a view to consolidating national unity, which is the priority.

On the question of multiparty politics, President Buyoya has asserted that the system would not support his efforts to consolidate national unity. In other words, the introduction of multiparty politics in Burundi is for now out of question. In spite of President Buyoya’s efforts to consolidate national unity, he is facing fierce opposition, particularly from the Tutsi who see their privileges being encroached upon by the rising Hutu elite. Tracts denouncing Buyoya’s betrayal of the Hutu cause are continually being circulated. Our Government is threatened by such detractors who are advocating the end of both the Buyoya regime and the Government in Kigali, accusing the latter of apartheid. Nevertheless, the idea of national unity is gradually gaining ground in Burundi, although the current changes, that is the “Wind from the East”, must not jeopardize the process.

Indeed, multiparty politics in Burundi will only recreate conflicts between PALIPEHUTU Hutu and the UPRONA Tutsi and Hutu. The PALIPEHUTU already consider President Buyoya’s efforts insufficient and view him as a hypocrite. Rejected by extremist Tutsi and misunderstood by extremist Hutu, the President is caught in a crossfire.

So in spite of the wind of change that is blowing through Burundi, the country is still far from political stability.

c) In Tanzania, the Government is still clinging to the one-party system. But President Mwinyi has already stated that the idea of multiparty politics will be studied with a view to ascertaining whether it will suit the Tanzanian people.
Some Tanzanian parliamentarians have already called for multiparty politics. Former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has already stated that the one-party era is now a thing of the past. However, he is the Chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi and was hitherto fiercely opposed to multiparty politics.

University of Dar-es-salaam students have already staged protests demanding changes in the Tanzanian political system. We therefore will soon witness the jolts of the “Wind from the East” now blowing timidly over Tanzania. Let us wait and see how the situation will evolve.

d) In Uganda, the internal situation is still far from normal. In spite of the NRA’s unquestionable but sporadic successes, the rebellion is still strong in the country, particularly in the north, east and west, on the Ruwenzori hills.

Opposition members in Government have started protesting. Several officers have been arrested and accused of corruption, of attempting to overthrow the Museveni regime or of conniving with rebels to betray the country.

President Museveni’s regime is supported mainly by people from the south, including the Banyankole, the Banyarwanda, the Baganda and others. Foreigners (Rwandans) still hold privileged offices in the Ugandan public service. Some Ugandans are not happy with this situation. The acronym “RNA” is already construed as “the Nyankole-Rwandese-Army”. The coining speaks for itself. Factors of destabilisation are therefore not lacking in Uganda, in spite of the fact that the multiparty system is still in place.
e) In Kenya, the situation is quite explosive. The opposition is already very active with the MWAKENYA and others. The Church has fallen out with the Government. The discord has been further exacerbated by the recent assassination of Minister Robert Ouko which has been given a political slant and continues to heighten tensions between the Government, the Church and the opposition. The Kenyan Government has, for its part, categorically rejected multiparty politics while the opposition is clamoring for it. Besides, the statements of the US Ambassador in Nairobi are a strong signal. The Kenyan Government has voiced its indignation but the message is clear and has been understood. I believe Kenya is witnessing a very explosive political situation and it will soon be visited by the “Wind from the East”, in spite of the Government’s stance on multiparty politics.

5. The situation in Rwanda

Rwanda is going through a difficult period on account of the economic crisis which has hit all sectors and the food shortage affecting practically the entire country.

The situation is exacerbated by other adverse factors such as the expulsion of illegal Rwandan immigrants from Tanzania, the threat by Rwandan refugees to return home by force of arms, the sleazy internal opposition which is using some press organs as a tool for negatively sensitizing the population, etc. As regards "democratisation", the Rwandan masses are still staunch supporters of the MRND and its Chairman-Founder. But the events that are rocking the world are beginning to sow ideas in the minds of the “liberals”. The MRND is being put to question, cheerleading is criticised, the TCD (Travaux communautaires de développement) [Community Development Work] are considered unproductive and a waste of time, the authorities are criticised in some press organs, the Head
of State is not spared, nor are his family and close aides, the security services are being dragged through the mud, etc.

Nevertheless, relations with our neighbours are as good as ever in spite of the current ups and downs (the refugees in Uganda, the expulsion of Rwandans from Tanzania, Tutsi extremism in Burundi, the calling to question of the presence of Rwandans in Zaire). However, I can say that on the whole, there are several factors favourable to a political conflagration in Rwanda. I will return to this issue in subsequent pages.

II. Causes of the “Wind from the East”

1. Some analysts say the “Wind from the East” sprung in Poland with the birth of Lech Valensa’s SOLIDARITY trade union movement. Others assert that the “Wind from the East” took its rise in Moscow thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev. Still others are advancing the theory that Pope John Paul II played a major role in the birth of the “Wind from the East”. All these analysts are probably right to a certain extent. Lech Valensa, Mikhail Gorbachev and John Paul II all played an obviously decisive role, each in his own way, in bringing about the changes that are now sending shock waves across the global political spectrum.

2. I, personally, find the origins of the “Wind from the East” elsewhere: the “Wind from the East” sprung in the West.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that the cold war between capitalism, and socialism/communism never ended. Each system carried on fighting under different guises, each undermining the work of the other, taking advantage of every chink in each other’s armory to infiltrate the ranks of the other with its weapons of intoxication, publicity, espionage, etc. And the “Wind
from the East", to my mind, is nothing but the victory of the capitalist system over the socialist/communist system.

After all, have human rights and democratic freedoms not always been the war horse of the West? Are they not the principal demands people from the East have been clamoring for since the beginning of the process of change? Now that the East has joined the ranks of the West, the latter is now winning the cold war.

III. Why the Wind from the East is raging in the South, particularly over Africa

1. As I pointed out earlier, the changes that occurred in the East shattered an order hitherto considered as immutable. This entailed many consequences. Thus, the East and West are now coming to terms with one another. But the East is still soul-searching in a period of flux. It is therefore preoccupied with its own problems. As such, the West has a certain latitude to act and to do many things, including especially demanding changes in Africa in order to establish therein Western systems or pro-Western systems.

2. In fact, the Whiteman has always considered Africa as nothing but a reservoir of cheap raw materials that they absolutely need to control. They have never supported the wave of African States' independence which has enabled African peoples to take control of their destinies and to have a say in the management of their immense resources.

3. Furthermore, the existence of the Eastern Block did not make things easy for the West since it offered Africans an alternative whenever the Western Block fell out with one African country or the other. All this now belongs to the past. Africans no longer have a choice, for both the East and the
West, and all States have to reconcile with one another and speak the same language. White people or Westerners, have at last achieved their cherished dream and now the sky is the limit. They are leaving no stone unturned to have absolute control over Africa’s raw materials. That is why they are now imposing on Africa a system they can fully control: multiparty politics known by the magic name “Democratisation”. This is my explanation of the famous “Wind from the East” raging over Africa.

IV. How far will the Wind go?

1. In my opinion, the wave of “democratisation” should be viewed from the historical standpoint. There was a wave of conquests followed by colonisation; there was the struggle for independence followed by the accession to independence in the 1960s, particularly in the case of African countries; now it is the wave of “democratisation”. This wave will therefore go as far as the previous waves. There is no reason why the process will end in mid-course, when conditions are ripe for it to run its full course.

2. The one-party system was inherited from the system in force in the Eastern Block countries. Now the system is obsolete in those countries which are already adopting multiparty systems. African countries too, particularly given Westerners’ unflinching determination, as underscored above (and why not the whole world) will be on the same wavelength willy-nilly.

3. Some States will, of course, be defiant, as has always been the case, but they will always end up being pulled along by the wind of time, into the same camp as the others. It is only a matter of time and it all depends on the process adopted by each country to initiate the inevitable changes.
V. **What are the foreseeable consequences?**

1. The consequences, are to my mind, diverse, foreseeable and unforeseeable.

   a. I pointed out earlier that the Eastern Block was an alternative to African countries and others, when the West wanted to impose its law to the detriment of any given African country. This was also the case when a pro-Eastern Block country considered that its interests were no longer what they were supposed to be. The country in question sought refuge in the West.

   This situation eased relations between the North and the South. Now all this belongs to the past. The countries of the North (East-West) will henceforth speak the same language. The South has no choice but to yield. A system that I could call "economic and ideological neocolonialism" will come into being, for we now have to act in accordance with the wishes of the North. There is neither West nor East. Everybody is now under the same roof.

   b. There will be new developments in conflicts all over the world. For example, the US supported UNITA in Angola to thwart the Soviet Union's communist influence in that country. The US backed Zaire to prevent socialists/communists from laying claim to that country's immense raw materials.

   The Soviet Union supported the ANC and all liberation movements in order to extend socialist/communist influence.
In Mozambique, the West supported RENAMO for the same reasons as it did UNITA in Angola. All this will change drastically as the fears of either block are no longer justified.

2. I can therefore state unequivocally that the profound changes advocated by all and sundry will have very disruptive consequences in several areas, to the benefit of the North and, of course, to the detriment of the South, particularly African countries.

3. A good example, as concerns African countries, is the imposition of the multiparty system. In fact, most African countries were not prepared for the system. Besides, we vividly recall the devastation caused by multiparty politics in Africa less than thirty years ago. The root causes of such destruction have not entirely disappeared. We therefore cannot rule out the risk of a resurgence of the same demons of regional, ethnic, tribal division, etc. Such divisions actually play into the hands of the Whiteman who has always upheld the "divide and rule" doctrine, of course, to the detriment of African countries. Can the latter reject such a doctrine? I believe African countries have very little or no leeway at all. They have no choice but to go with the current and hope for brighter days ahead. I say so because, as I pointed out earlier, the changes in Africa are not the work of chance. Did French Prime Minister Michel Rocard not state that France was supporting African peoples who revolted against their governments since, as he pointed out, they were aspiring to greater democracy and freedom? Need we look too far afield to understand why the unrest first started in countries of French allegiance? It is all a carefully orchestrated plan which the West is, by the way, bent on executing.
VI. The case of Rwanda

1. As concerns Rwanda, I would like to express a personal opinion on the changes ushered in by the “Wind from the East” and their consequences on Rwanda. I will state whether such changes are inevitable in our country, whether simple readjustments can be made in lieu of such changes, or whether our country is simply not affected by the said changes.

2. I will start with the last point. Our country cannot be unaffected by the changes since we are dealing with a powerful wave of such magnitude as I pointed out above; our country cannot establish its own system in isolation when neighbouring countries, African countries and even countries all over the world are being swept by the same wave. Our country will inevitably be affected by this wave which is already at our door.

3. The changes are therefore inevitable in our country. The question is how to effect them. Wherever the “Wind from the East” is blowing and particularly in Africa, it all starts with protests, students demanding scholarship increments, better living conditions, followed by State employees demanding a pay rise. All of this then degenerates into street protests calling for profound changes in the political system in the country, the introduction of multiparty politics, change of political authorities and their replacement by new people “with cleaner hands”, promotion of moral rectitude in politics, etc.

In fact, the calls on political authorities to step down lead to demands by the active population, such that those in power cannot remain indifferent, especially since external pressure is increasingly being brought to bear on political leaders to initiate profound changes.
4. To effect the necessary changes, we need factors that act as stimuli of change which the people and particularly those working in the background can use to incite the people to revolt so as to trigger changes. Such factors also exist in our country and are known as:

- Regionalism,
- Ethnic problems,
- Rwandan refugees,
- Relations with neighbours,
- Situation in relation to neighbouring countries,
- Rwandans of the diaspora,
- The press,
- Functioning of institutions,
- Various political problems.

These are only some of the factors I have tried to analyse with a view to ascertaining or depicting the situation in our country in the light of the above factors that are congenial to change as part of the “Wind from the East” or “Democratisation”, the term preferred by various users. I will conclude this analysis by identifying foreseeable changes.

a) Regionalism

This scourge has never disappeared from Rwanda. It is currently at its peak. When it is not “North-South”, it is “Gisenyi-Ruhengeri”, or “Bugoyi-Bushuru”, etc. The “North-South” problem is currently used by some individuals who are always intent on causing disorder. The demands of “Southerners” are not always clear but they consider themselves victims of discrimination in favour of “Northerners”. They seize every opportunity to show how unfair the government is to “Southerners”.
“Northerners”, in turn, claim that the government favours “Southerners” who are insatiable and ungrateful, while “Northerners” are at the receiving end. They think they deserve more than what they are getting. There is another strain of regionalism according to which Cyangugu is viewed as one of the most pampered préfectures on account of the ministerial post held by Simeon Nteziryayo. Virtually no region of the country is satisfied with its situation. And this state of affairs is exploited by a certain media...of the South.

The Gisenyi-Ruhengeri problem is also current. People from Ruhengeri (not all, of course) believe that the Government of Second Republic has denied them their fair share of the cake. They say most of the cake has been given mainly to people from Gisenyi. The latter think it is rather Ruhengeri that is pampered, and that being a native of Gisenyi is a disadvantage, since people from Gisenyi do not enjoy certain advantages; they say so to refute the view that natives of Gisenyi enjoy all the advantages. This is a persistent problem. I think this Gisenyi-Ruhengeri problem is a non-issue which has been deliberately fueled by people bent on dividing the people with malicious intent, otherwise there should not be any problem between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. It is akin to the Bugoyi-Bushiri problem which, fortunately, is not fueled by too many fanatics. But the demons of division want to fan the problem in order to always create hotbeds of tension. They are acting like those who are bent on creating a “Kingogo problem”. I know that this problem does not exist. We must do all it takes to make sure it is nipped in the bud. Regionalism in our country is therefore still very much alive and it is very favourable to instability.

b) Ethnic problems

The Hutu believe the Second Republic has favoured the Tutsi, and they say so loud and clear. The Tutsi control the country’s economy, they attend the best schools in the country and in large numbers, too. Private schools founded by the
Tutsi are the most prosperous, and priority is given to Tutsi children during enrolment. These are some of the grievances of the Hutu. But here they forget that no Hutu has ever been denied the opportunity to engage in business and to prosper, that none has ever been prevented from founding a private school and running it such that it can be prosperous. They also forget that it is actually the Hutu who intervene in favour of Tutsi children to enable them to get enrolled in secondary and high schools.

All this is disregarded by the Hutu who accuse the Government of being too supportive of the Tutsi. The latter also claim that they are victims of discrimination and that they are under-represented in governing bodies. Some, if not many, think the problem of their fellow refugees has not been properly resolved and they are always complaining. Some Tutsi are never tired of picking on the Hutu in one way or the other, quickly forgetting the 1972-1973 years and the precious assistance given to them by the Second Republic. Such a haughty and provocative attitude irritates the Hutu who are forever asserting that another purge would be salutary. They are, of course, wrong. Ethnic problems are real problems that risk being exploited for malicious purposes by those seeking the downfall of the Government or untimely changes.

c) The refugee problem

I have, on several occasions, dwelled on the Rwandan refugee problem and the threat they pose. I have amply demonstrated the conditions under which they can return to the country by force, their chances of success and the factors that are favourable or unfavourable to such a return. On each occasion, I have concluded that they will not return by force in the near future but I have said, however, that in the meantime they are capable of causing harm. I will not restate all the arguments I advanced and which seem to prove me right, at least, thus far. But the
refugees continue to demand the right to return, threatening to attack the country in the bargain.

Negotiations between Rwanda and Uganda, on the refugee problem are on course. The said negotiations have not yet come to fruition. Some people are placing their hopes in them but others think these are only delaying tactics.

Some think President Museveni is only distracting Rwanda so as to gain time to put his house in order and then unleash “his refugees” on Rwanda and support them until they regain power. This is the kind of negotiations he had in Nairobi with Tito Okello’s Government before he captured Kampala and Uganda.

I have no reason to subscribe to this sort of reasoning but will the current whirlwind that is shattering all forecasts on current problems not adversely affect the refugee problem such that it could take on dimensions not desired by the Government.

I cannot be categorical on this point, but I wish to simply point out that the refugee problem is a very sensitive and complex one which could become a destabilization factor and thus play into the hands of those seeking to destabilize the country.

d) Relations with neighbours and Rwandans of the diaspora

1) Relations with neighbouring countries are very good, if not excellent. But we are aware that these countries are host to Rwandan refugees hostile to our Government, the most virulent being those living in Uganda. Since all the refugees are in permanent contact with one another, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on all of them because their attitude towards our country and their growing demands could affect relations between the host country and
Le discours de La Baule (1990)

La Baule, le 20 juin 1990

ALLECUTION PRONONCÉE PAR M. FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE A L'OCCASION DE LA SEANCE SOLENNELLE D'OUVERTURE DE LA 16ème CONFERENCE DES CHEFS D'ETAT DE FRANCE ET D'AFRIQUE

Majesté, laissez-moi vous remercier pour la présidence que vous avez exercée depuis la Conférence de Casablanca. Je salue ceux qui nous rejoignent dans notre Conférence pour la première fois. Je ne ferai pas de distinction. Mais je noterai cependant la présence de la Namibie, ce qui marque bien qu'il y a aussi des évolutions heureuses : l'accession à l'indépendance est l'une des formes essentielles de la liberté et la Namibie en est le meilleur symbole.

Depuis la conférence de Casablanca, beaucoup de choses se sont passées. Vous avez parlé, Majesté, des maux dont souffre l'Afrique. Chacun le sait, ils sont nombreux. Cela repose sur des réalités difficiles et parfois angoissantes. La crise est d'abord économique. Elle s'aggrave sans cesse. Vous savez que la production par tête diminue chaque année, que la part de l'Afrique dans la concurrence mondiale recule, que les investissements se font plus rares, qu'ici ou là la famine resurgit, que la dette s'alourdit. Bref, on est installé cruellement dans le cycle infernal "dette-sous développement", tandis que la population croît. Comment voulez-vous que les systèmes scolaires et sociaux puissent résister à la poussée de la démographie dans de telles circonstances ?

Vous avez eu raison de le dire tout à l'heure, se tourner vers l'Afrique et porter accusation révèle une grande injustice de ceux qui, avec complaisance, parfois même avec satisfaction, dénoncent les mœurs, les traditions, le système politique, la manière de vivre de l'Afrique. Si j'ai moi-même des observations critiques à faire, comme je le ferai à l'égard de mon pays, je refuse de m'engager dans ce procès. Je préfère examiner avec vous la manière dont on pourrait préparer l'avenir immédiat. Car je suis de ceux qui pensent qu'il y a, on ne peut ignorer celles qui incombent à la société internationale et particulièrement aux pays les plus riches.

Sont-ils sans pitié ou simplement indifférents ? Nous attendons encore, en dépit des efforts répétés de la France et de quelques autres, le plan mondial qui permettrait d'examiner, sur une distance de cinq à dix ans, la manière de parer aux maux successifs qui viennent pour une large part des pays riches pour atteindre les pays en voie de développement, pauvres ou moins pauvres, mais en tout cas très endettés.

Examinons par exemple, l'effondrement des cours des matières premières. Je me dépêche d'une année sur l'autre. Mais comment ne pas se dépêter ? Nous sommes contraints de tenir le même discours puisque les faits n'ont pas changé. Si on se met à la place des responsables africains, on se dit comment faire ? On établit un budget, on tente de
planifier sur deux ans, trois ans, cinq ans et en l'espace d'une semaine, quand ce n'est pas au cours d'une simple séance d'un après-midi dans une ville lointaine, tout s'effondre.

Les monnaies de base ont connu des évolutions qui ont constamment dérangé vos prévisions ; vos productions ont connu des évolutions saisissantes vers la baisse. On s'interroge : comment le financier le plus avisé du monde, pourtant si prêt à se faire donneur de leçons, agirait-il ? Quelle solution trouverait-il pour compenser les pertes, arrêter le désastre ? On s'étonne après cela de la fuite des investissements étrangers... Et que penser de la fermeture des marchés en Occident ? Faut-il s'étendre sur le débat au sein du GATT à propos du maintien du protectionnisme, sur les produits agricoles, les produits textiles et combien d'autres ? Il y a là une spirale qui empêche les pays africains de retrouver un équilibre hors duquel tout leur est interdit. Le développement, bien entendu, la prospérité, l'équilibre politique, le temps et l'espace nécessaires pour procéder aux réformes politiques attendues.

Il est vrai que l'Afrique est l'oubliée de la croissance, la laissée pour compte du progrès ; je dis ceci d'une façon rapide car, dans tel ou tel pays, on observe des efforts récompensés par le succès. Nous n'allons pas nous attarder pour tenter de désigner le coupable. Les responsabilités sont partagées. Dans mon esprit, elles commencent par l'insouciance ou l'irresponsabilité des pays, qui par solidarité internationale et dans leur intérêt, devraient comprendre qu'une large et audacieuse politique Nord-Sud s'impose. Elles continuent par les défaillances de nombreux pays africains qui n'ont pas pu ou qui n'ont pas su prendre à temps les mesures qui pouvaient leur convenir. Prenons-en acte ; posons-nous ces questions.

La première question est sous-jacente dans les campagnes qui se développent, un peu partout dans le monde, contre la politique de la France faut-il que la France renonce afin de ne plus être exposée aux critiques nombreuses qui la frappent ? Faut-il qu'elle rapatrie chez elle tous les moyens et qu'elle les consacre à ses ressortissants nationaux ? Faut-il qu'elle se replie, faut-il qu'elle cherche en elle-même ses seules ambitions. Je vous dirai ce que je pense de la politique de la France et de la manière dont elle est conduite. Mais je répondrai par avance à cette question : la France est décidée à poursuivre sa politique et donc à aider l'Afrique, quoi qu'il en soit et quoi qu'on en dise. Elle ne se retirera pas de l'œuvre engagée depuis si longtemps et qui, sous des formes différentes au travers de l'histoire, l'a associée à un grand nombre de ces pays. La France restera fidèle à son histoire dont, d'une certaine manière vous êtes, et à son avenir dont vous serez, je l'espère aussi.

Permettez-moi quelques rappels simples. La France est toujours le premier des pays industriels avancés dans l'aide aux pays en voie de développement. Le premier, nettement, devant tous les autres. C'est vrai que des pays comme le Canada ou l'Allemagne font un effort tout à fait estimable. Mais, c'est vrai que d'autres grandes puissances restent à quelque distance et même parfois à une longue distance. Notre aide à l'Afrique en 1990 est supérieure à celle de 1989 qui, elle-même, était en accroissement par rapport aux années précédentes.

La quatrième Convention de Lomé, à laquelle nous avons pris une part si évidente, a permis d'augmenter de 45% les engagements financiers de la Communauté. Dans toutes
les enceintes internationales, j’ai plaidé pour le développement que je considère comme un élément indissociable des progrès de la démocratie. Nous sommes allés partout, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, le ministre de l’Economie et des Finances, le ministre de la Coopération, le ministre de la Francophonie notamment, pour plaider le dossier de l’Afrique. Et nous devons répéter, encore une fois, les mêmes choses simples.

A Toronto, nous avons mis au net un plan qui permettrait de réduire ou d’abolir la dette des pays les plus pauvres et nous avons préconisé trois façons de faire en annonçant aussitôt celle que nous avions choisie.

A Dakar, peu de temps après, nous avons annulé nos créances publiques à l’égard de trente-cinq pays d’Afrique. Cet exemple a été suivi par quelques uns. A la tribune des Nations Unies, j’ai demandé qu’un plan fut élaboré et décidé en faveur des pays dits intermédiaires, ceux qui sont peut-être moins pauvres, mais si endettés que le bénéfice de leur travail est absorbé par le service de la dette.

A Toronto, à Dakar, à New York, j’avais déjà indiqué que la France ne s’en tiendrait pas là. Je pense que dès maintenant, il convient de ne plus faire que des dons à 100% aux pays les moins avancés. Une conférence de ces pays se tiendra à Paris, cet automne, j’aurai l’occasion d’y revenir. Je pense qu’il convient de limiter à 5%, ce qui revient à une réduction de 50%, les taux d’intérêt de tous les prêts publics aux pays dits intermédiaires de l’Afrique sub-saharienne.

C’est une décision unilatérale de la France. Elle n’a pas été négociée, ni avec vous, ni avec nos partenaires de ce fameux club des pays les plus riches qui se réunira dans quelques semaines à Houston. Mais j’ai l’intention, à Houston précisément, de demander à nos partenaires, aux six autres pays industrialisés, d’aller plus loin. J’ai l’intention de leur demander d’abord s’il leur est possible de reprendre à leur compte des dispositions du type de celle que je viens d’énoncer ; ensuite, d’allonger de toute façon les délais de remboursement des pays les plus endettés par des moyens divers qu’il conviendra de choisir.

Et j’en reviens à ce projet dix fois traité et dont il faudra bien comprendre qu’il est nécessaire, celui d’un fonds spécial mondial. J’avais proposé qu’il fut financé par des nouveaux droits de tirages spéciaux. Je pense que les pays peuvent renoncer à certains de leurs droits pour alimenter une sorte de fonds mondial de garantie qui servirait à amortir la pompe pour que, désormais, un nouveau cours des choses préside à la marche des affaires internationales. Mais, rien ne se fait au hasard. Peut-être à certaines époques l’argent se répandait avec prodigalité, sans contrôle. Moi, je n’ai pas connu ce temps-là. Je veux dire que je n’étais pas responsable au temps où ces pratiques ont pu exister.

Vous savez bien, Madame et Messieurs, comment les choses se passent, comment les décisions sont prises. Il peut même arriver que des difficultés naissent à ce propos entre nous. Pas exactement entre vous et moi, mais entre nos hauts fonctionnaires lorsqu’ils discutent âprement de la valeur de tel projet, de son financement, de ses modalités. Il vous arrive même parfois de reprocher à la France, par ses exigences et par sa rigueur, d’exprimer je ne sais quel relent de l’époque coloniale, bien que nous ne prétendions pas, et vous le savez bien, dicter la politique que vous avez à faire. Les crédits du Fonds d’aide
et de coopération qui sont placés sous la tutelle du ministre de la Coopération et qui servent à développer des projets font l'objet d'une instruction interministérielle, avec un luxe de précautions de toutes sortes. Les crédits sont alloués au fur et à mesure des réalisations. On constate, sur place, ce qui se fait, en collaboration avec les responsables de chacun de vos pays. Il en est de même pour les crédits, prêts et dons gérés par la Caisse centrale de coopération économique. Ce sont des institutions sévères ou des organismes parfois rébarbatifs qui accumulent les étages administratifs, mais qui sont quand même bien nécessaires. Ils permettent en tout cas d'avoir la conscience tranquille. Pour vous comme pour nous cette aide est menée avec la rigueur nécessaire, pour qu'elle soit utile à vos peuples.

A tout cela, Madame et Messieurs, vos Etats participent et contribuent. Ils font entendre leurs voix, ils font connaître aussi leurs objections et ils acceptent parfaitement tout ce qui leur permettra de mener leur action sous le contrôle de chefs d'Etat dont je peux dire que j'ai souvent constaté le scrupule sur la manière dont ils devaient gérer les crédits qui doivent servir au développement de leur peuple. Si l'on doit constater un certain nombre de défaillances à travers le temps, je ne vois pas, ayant fait un examen approfondi de cette situation, ce qui pourrait être vraiment remarqué au cours de ces dernières années. Pour la balance des paiements, il arrive qu'une contribution soit consentie par la France aux Etats lorsqu'ils ont constaté que leur programmation se heurte à des décisions souvent spéculatives qui ruinent, en l'espace de quelques heures, la patience et la prévision de plusieurs années.

Là encore, c'est notre ministère des Finances qui intervient. Il a des instructions financières pour chaque pays. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères et celui de la Coopération y prennent part : dans un système aussi précis, par où serait passée cette "évaporation", dont on parle sans arrêt, dans un procès de type cartésien, comme une sorte d'invitation en sourdine à voir la France arrêter, cesser de pratiquer la politique qui nous rassemble aujourd'hui et qui fait de nous des pays amis et solidaires, nous qui représentons ensemble, sur la scène internationale, un front de quelque 30, 35 pays. Mais sur ces 35 pays, presque tous sont sous-développés. Peut-on dire : que c'est de leur faute, et oublierait-on cette indifférence des peuples riches ou plutôt de leurs dirigeants, cet oubli de leur responsabilité et de leur intérêt, car c'est du développement des termes de l'échange qu'eux mêmes tireront les moyens de leur prospérité ?

Je n'ignore pas les interrogations que suscitent chez vous les événements qui ont bouleversé l'Est de l'Europe. Vous craignez que bien des capitaux ne se détournent de l'Afrique. C'est une inquiétude que l'on peut comprendre, car les moyens des pays qui sont vos amis ne sont pas illimités. Eh bien, il dépend de nous qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. La France fait son devoir. C'est vrai que si l'on ne rétablit un climat de confiance dans la marche en avant des pays de l'Afrique, il est difficile d'espérer la venue d'investissements étrangers, privés. On peut prendre des mesures de toutes sortes, notamment fiscales, mais ne s'agit-il pas aussi d'un problème politique ?

Si l'on veut redonner confiance dans les chances de l'Afrique ce sera par une stabilité retrouvée, avec des administrations en bon état de marche, avec une gestion scrupuleuse et un certain nombre de dispositifs, soit anciens, soit nouveaux qu'il conviendra de déterminer au cours des heures de travail que nous aurons cet après midi et demain.
Prenons un cas : celui de la zone franc. Je crois que l'on peut considérer que cette zone franc est un facteur de stabilité pour l'Afrique noire. Je crois que les pays qui participent y sont très attachés. Eh bien, la France aussi. Périodiquement, l'idée d'une dévaluation du franc CFA est relancée par de grandes institutions internationales.

On dit que vous y êtes hostiles, moi aussi. Cela ne réglerait aucune de vos difficultés. Je crains que cela ne puisse aboutir qu’à alourdir les charges de vos dettes et à renchérir vos importations. Certains d’entre vous se posent la question de savoir si l'Union économique et monétaire européenne ne modifiait pas la relation du franc CFA avec les autres monnaies de l'Europe. Je vous dis dès maintenant que ce qui vaut pour le franc CFA par rapport au franc vaudra demain par rapport à la monnaie européenne si celle-ci, comme nous l'espérons, voit le jour. Je suis persuadé que vous m'en portez garanti. Ainsi disposerez-vous d'une vaste zone qui vous apportera certaines formes de sécurité dans le trouble général qui s'empare de l'Afrique. Vous savez que l'Europe dispose d'un Marché commun et qu'elle est à la recherche d'une monnaie unique.

Or la zone-franc a une monnaie mais elle n'a pas de Marché commun. Il y a pour l'instant d'un côté un marché commun sans monnaie et de l'autre une monnaie sans marché commun. Il y a là peut-être une situation dont la contradiction pourrait toucher à l'absurde. Ne devriez-vous pas, Madame et Messieurs, chercher l'unification de vos marchés et l'harmonisation de règles administratives, juridiques, fiscales et douanières dans des ensembles suffisamment vastes ? Il serait peut-être trop ambitieux de considérer l'ensemble de l'Afrique noire. La réalité historique et géographique devrait aboutir à plusieurs ensembles et ce serait déjà un grand progrès.

En tout cas, nous sommes prêts à vous aider pour mettre en œuvre ce mouvement que je crois indispensable si l'on veut pouvoir disposer de l'instrument politique, géographique, économique qui nous permettra d'avancer dans la lutte contre la crise. Mais je tiens à dire ceci : de même qu'il existe un cercle vicieux entre la dette et le sous-développement, il existe un autre cercle vicieux entre la crise économique et la crise politique. L'une nourrit l'autre.

Voi là pourquoi il convient d'examiner en commun de quelle façon on pourrait procéder pour que sur le plan politique un certain nombre d'institutions et de façons d'être permettent de restaurer la confiance, parfois la confiance entre un peuple et ses dirigeants, le plus souvent entre un Etat et les autres États, en tout cas la confiance entre l'Afrique et les pays développés. Je reprends à mon compte l'observation, à la fois ironique et sévère, de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc lorsqu'il évoquait la manière dont la démocratie s'était installée en France. Cela n'a pas été sans mal, ni sans accidents répétés. Elargissant le propos, je reprendrai les termes de l'un des chefs d'État avec lequel nous donnions hier soir : l'Europe dont nous sommes, nous Français, avait à la fois le nazisme, le fascisme, le franquisme, le salazarisme et le stalinisme. Excusez du peu...

Etait-ce les modèles à partir desquels vous aviez à bâtir vos États, vous qui n'avez disposé, dans la meilleure hypothèse que d'un quart ?

Il nous a fallu deux siècles pour tenter de mettre de l'ordre, d'abord dans notre pensée et ensuite dans les faits, avec des rechutes successives ; et nous vous ferions la leçon ?
Il nous faut parler de démocratie. C'est un principe universel qui vient d'apparaître aux peuples de l'Europe centrale comme une évidence absolue au point qu'en l'espace de quelques semaines, les régimes, considérés comme les plus forts, ont été bouleversés. Le peuple était dans les rues, sur les places et le pouvoir ancien sentant sa fragilité, cessait toute résistance comme s'il était déjà, et depuis longtemps, vidé de substance et qu'il le savait. Et cette révolution des peuples, la plus importante que l'on eut connue depuis la Révolution française de 1789, va continuer.

Je le disais récemment à propos de l'Union Soviétique cette révolution est partie de là et elle reviendra là. Celui qui la dirige le sait bien, qui conduit avec courage et intelligence une réforme qui, déjà, voit se dresser devant elle toutes les formes d'opposition celles qui s'y refusent, attachées au système ancien et celles qui veulent aller plus vite. Si bien que l'histoire reste encore en jeu. Il faut bien se dire que ce souffle fera le tour de la planète. Désormais on le sait bien : que survienne une glaciation ou un réchauffement sur l'un des deux pôles et voilà que le globe tout entier en ressent les effets. Cette réflexion ne doit pas rester climatique, elle s'applique à la société des hommes !...

Enfin, on respire, enfin on espère, parce que la démocratie est un principe universel. Mais il ne faut pas oublier les différences de structures, de civilisations, de traditions, de mœurs. Il est impossible de proposer un système tout fait. La France n'a pas à dicter je ne sais quelle loi constitutionnelle qui s'imposerait de facto à l'ensemble de peuples qui ont leur propre conscience et leur propre histoire et qui doivent savoir comment se diriger vers le principe universel qu'est la démocratie. Et il n'y a pas trente six chemins vers la démocratie.

Comme le rappelait M. le Président du Sénégal, il faut un Etat, il faut le développement et il faut l'apprentissage des libertés... Comment voulez-vous engendrer la démocratie, un principe de représentation nationale avec la participation de nombreux partis, organiser le choc des idées, les moyens de la presse, tandis que les deux tiers d'un peuple vivraient dans la misère. Je le répète, la France n'entend pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures des Etats africains amis. Elle dit son mot, elle entend poursuivre son œuvre d'aide, d'amitié et de solidarité. Elle n'entend pas soumettre à la question, elle n'entend pas abandonner quelque pays d'Afrique que ce soit.

Ce plus de liberté, ce ne sont pas simplement les Etats qui peuvent le faire, ce sont les citoyens : il faut donc prendre leur avis et ce ne sont pas simplement les puissances publiques qui peuvent agir, ce sont aussi les organisations non gouvernementales qui souvent connaissent mieux le terrain, qui en épousent les difficultés qui savent comment panser les plaies. Nous ne voulons pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures. Pour nous, cette forme subtile de colonialisme qui consisterait à faire la leçon en permanence aux Etats africains et à ceux qui les dirigent, c'est une forme de colonialisme aussi perverse que tout autre. Ce serait considérer qu'il y a des peuples supérieurs, qui disposent de la vérité, et d'autres qui n'en seraient pas capables, alors que je connais les efforts de tant de dirigeants qui aiment leur peuple et qui entendent le servir même si ce n'est pas de la même façon que sur les rives de la Seine ou de la Tamise. Voilà pourquoi il faut procéder à une étude méthodique de tout ce qui touche à la vie économique. Il faut mettre en place des dispositifs douaniers qui empêcheront des évasions de capitaux qui viennent souvent justifier les critiques entendues. De ce point de vue encore, la France, si vous le souhaitez,
est prête à vous apporter l'aide humaine et technique, à former des fonctionnaires, à se trouver auprès d'eux. J'ai vu naître la plupart de vos États, j'ai connu vos luttes pour en finir avec l'état colonial.

Ces luttes vous opposaient souvent à la France, et seule la sagesse des dirigeants français et africains a évité, en fin de compte, le drame d'une guerre coloniale en Afrique noire. Il fallait bâtir un État, une souveraineté, avec des frontières garanties internationalement, telles que les avaient dessinées les compas et les règles des pays coloniaux, dans les salons dorés des chancelleries occidentales, déchirant les ethnies sans tenir compte de la nature du terrain. Et voilà que ces États nouveaux, doivent gérer les anciennes contradictions héritées de l'histoire, doivent bâtir une administration centrale, nommer des fonctionnaires après les avoir formé, gérer des finances publiques, entrer dans le grand circuit international, souvent sans avoir reçu des anciens pays coloniaux la formation nécessaire.

Et on aurait à raisonner avec ces États, comme on le ferait à l'égard de nations organisées depuis mille ans comme c'est le cas de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Espagne ou du Portugal !

Les mœurs, les traditions aussi respectables que les vôtres, l'histoire et la nature de ces peuples, leur propre culture, leur propre façon de penser, tout cela pourrait se réduire à une équation décidée dans une capitale du nord ?

Vraiment, je fais appel à votre raison, et je pense que nous nous connaissons assez pour savoir que rien ne sera fait entre nous en dehors du respect et de la considération que nous nous devons. S'il y a contestation dans tel État particulier, eh bien ! que les dirigeants de ces pays en débattent avec leurs citoyens. Lorsque je dis démocratie, lorsque je trace un chemin, lorsque je dis que c'est la seule façon de parvenir à un état d'équilibre au moment où apparaît la nécessité d'une plus grande liberté, j'ai naturellement un schéma tout prêt : système représentatif, élections libres, multipartisme, liberté de la presse, indépendance de la magistrature, refus de la censure : voilà le schéma dont nous disposons.

Nous en avons discuté plusieurs fois et hier soir encore en particulier. Je sais combien certains défendent scrupuleusement leur peuple et cherchent le progrès y compris dans les institutions. Plusieurs d'entre vous disaient : "transposer d'un seul coup le parti unique et décider arbitrairement le multipartisme, certains de nos peuples s'y refuseront ou bien en connaîtront tout aussitôt les effets délétères".

D'autres disaient : "nous l'avons déjà fait et nous en connaissons les inconvénients". Mais les inconvénients sont quand même moins importants que les avantages de se sentir dans une société civiquement organisée.

D'autres disaient : "nous avons commencé, le système n'est pas encore au point, mais nous allons dans ce sens". Je vous écoutais. Et, si je me sentais plus facilement d'accord avec ceux d'entre vous qui définissaient un statut politique proche de celui auquel je suis habitué, je comprenais bien les raisons de ceux qui estimaient que leurs pays ou que leurs peuples n'étaient pas prêts. Alors qui tranchera ? Je crois qu'on pourra trancher en disant que de toute façon, c'est la direction qu'il faut prendre. Certains ont pris des bottes de sept lieues, soit dans la paix civique soit dans le désordre, mais ils ont fait vite.
D'autres marcheront pas à pas. Puis-je me permettre de vous dire que c'est la direction qu'il faut suivre. Je vous parle comme un citoyen du monde à d'autres citoyens du monde : c'est le chemin de la liberté sur lequel vous avancerez en même temps que vous avancerez sur le chemin du développement. On pourrait d'ailleurs inverser la formule : c'est en prenant la route du développement que vous serez engagés sur la route de la démocratie.

A vous peuples libres, à vous Etats souverains que je respecte, de choisir votre voie, d'en déterminer les étapes et l'allure. La France continuera d'être votre amie, et si vous le souhaitez, votre soutien, sur le plan international, comme sur le plan intérieur. Vous lui apportez beaucoup. Quand je constate, par exemple, que le flux de capitaux qui va du Sud pauvre vers le Nord riche est plus important que le flux de capitaux qui va du Nord riche au Sud pauvre, je dis qu'il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas.

Le colonialisme n'est pas mort. Ce n'est plus le colonialisme des Etats, c'est le colonialisme des affaires et des circuits parallèles. Nous parlons entre Etats souverains, égaux en dignité, même si nous ne le sommes pas toujours en moyens. Il existe entre nous des conventions de toutes sortes. Il existe des conventions de caractère militaire. Je répète le principe qui s'impose à la politique française chaque fois qu'une menace extérieure poindra, qui pourrait attenter à votre indépendance, la France sera présente à vos côtés. Elle l'a déjà démontré, plusieurs fois et parfois dans des circonstances très difficiles.

Mais notre rôle à nous, pays étranger, fut-il ami, n'est pas d'intervenir dans des conflits intérieurs. Dans ce cas-là, la France en accord avec les dirigeants, veillera à protéger ses concitoyens, ses ressortissants mais elle n'entend pas arbitrer les conflits. C'est ce que je fais dans le cadre de ma responsabilité depuis neuf ans. De la même manière, j'interdirai toujours une pratique qui a existé parfois dans le passé et qui consistait pour la France à tenter d'organiser des changements politiques intérieurs par le complot ou la conjuration. Vous le savez bien, depuis neuf ans, cela ne s'est pas produit et cela ne se produira pas.
The La Baule Speech (1990)

La Baule, June 20, 1990

…

In any case, we are ready to help you establish this movement, which I believe to be indispensable in order to obtain the political, geographic, and economic instruments that would permit us to continue battling the crisis. But I would like to say the following: just as there is a vicious cycle between debt and under-development, there is another vicious cycle between economic crisis and political crisis. One nourishes the other.

This is why we should examine how to proceed together so that, politically, a certain number of institutions and ways of acting allow trust to be restored, sometimes trust between a people and its leaders, most often between one state and other states, in any case the trust between Africa and the developed countries. I’d like to borrow His Majesty the King of Morocco’s observation, both ironic and serious, as he described the way in which democracy was established in France. It was not without evil, or repeated accidents. Expanding my talk, I will borrow the words of one of the Heads of State here this evening: the Europe we come from, we French, had, at the same time, Nazism, fascism, Francoism, Salazarism, and Stalinism, no less…

Were these the models on which you have built your states, you who have taken, in the best case, just a quarter of a century?

It took us two centuries to try to create order, first in our thoughts and then in reality, with successive descents; and we are teaching you about it?

We have to talk about democracy. It’s a universal principal which seemed so incontrovertible to the peoples of central Europe that in the space of a few weeks, the regimes considered the strongest were overthrown. The people were in the streets, in the squares, and the ancient power, sensing its fragility, gave up all resistance, as if it had already been void of substance for a long time and it knew it. And this revolution of the peoples, the most important one we have seen since the French Revolution of 1789, will continue.

I said recently about the Soviet Union that this revolution has come from there and it will return there. The one who governs there knows it well, he who is, with courage and intelligence, leading a reform that, already, is facing every kind of opposition, that which, attached to the former system, refuse the reform, and that which wants to go faster. So the story is still unfinished. It must be said that this wind will go around the world. We already know it well: one of the poles freezes or heats up and voilà: the entire globe feels the effects. This thought does not have to remain climate-related, it applies to the society of men!...

Finally, we can breathe, finally we have hope, because democracy is a universal principle. But we cannot forget the differences in structures, in civilizations, in traditions, in customs. It is
impossible to propose a ready-made system. It is not for France to dictate some constitutional law that would then be de facto imposed on people who have their own consciousness and their own history and who must know how to lead towards the universal principle that is democracy. And there are not thirty six paths to democracy.

As Mr. President of Senegal reminded us, development is needed and freedoms must be learned...How can you engender democracy, a principal of national representation with the participation of numerous parties, organize the exchanging of views, the resources for the press, when two thirds of the population would be living in misery. I repeat, France does not intend to intervene in the interior affairs of friendly African nations. It has its say, it intends to pursue its work with aid, friendship, and solidarity. It does not intend to be questioned, it does not intend to abandon any African country.

This also about liberty: it is not only states that can provide it, it is citizens. Therefore, we must ask their opinion. And it is not only public powers that can act, it is also non-governmental agencies who often know the situation on the ground the best, who embrace the inherent difficulties, who know how to heal the wounds. We do not want to intervene in interior affairs. For us, this subtle form of colonialism, which consists of permanently teaching and giving advice to African states and those who lead them, is as perverse as all other forms of colonialism. To do this would be to believe that there are superior peoples, who hold the truth, and others, who would not be capable of it, but I know about the efforts of so many leaders who love their people and intend to serve them, even if not in the same way as on the banks of the Seine or the Thames. That is why we must begin a methodical study of everything to do with economic life. We must put customs arrangements in place that would prevent the tax evasion and other financial crimes that often justify the criticism we hear. Again, from this point of view, France, if you wish, is ready to offer aid in people and technology, to train officials, to be beside them. I have seen the birth of most of your states, I have known your battles to put an end to the colonial condition.

These battles often pit you against France, and only the wisdom of French and African leaders, at the end of the day, prevented the tragedy of a colonial war in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was necessary to build a state, a sovereignty, with internationally-guaranteed borders, the ones that were drawn and regulated by colonial countries, in gilded lounges of western Chancelleries, tearing apart ethnicities without understanding the nature of the terrain. And here we are: the new states have to manage the old contradictions inherited from history, they have to build a central administration, train and appoint civil servants, manage public finances, enter into the grand international circuit, often without having received the necessary training from the old colonial countries.

And we have to deal with these states, as we would with nations that have been organized for a thousand years, as is the case with France, Great Britain, Spain, or Portugal!
Customs and traditions just as deserving of respect as yours, the history and nature of these peoples, their own culture, their own way of thinking, could all this be reduced to a solved equation in a northern capital?

Really, I appeal to your reason, and I think that we know each other well enough to know that nothing will happen between us without respect or disregarding the esteem in which we hold each other. If there is dissent in some particular country, well then the leaders of the country will discuss it with their citizens. When I say democracy, when I chart a course, when I say that this is the only way to get to a state of equality when the need for greater freedom is apparent, of course I have a plan ready: representative system, free elections, multiparty politics, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, rejection of censorship: here is the plan that we have.

We have discussed this many times, and here, tonight, again in particular. I know how much some scrupulously defend their people and seek progress, including in their own institutions. Many of you said, “If you transpose the single party and arbitrarily decide on a multiparty system, some of our populations will refuse it, or else will immediately suffer from its deleterious effects.”

Others said, “We have already done this and know about its disadvantages.” But the disadvantages and still less important than the advantage of feeling that one is in a civicly organized society.

Others said, “We have started, the system is not there yet, but we are going in this direction.” I am listening to you. And, as I agreed more easily with those of you who defined a political system close to the one I am used to, I understood the reasons of those who believed that their country or their population was not ready. So who will decide? I believe that we could decide by saying that, in any case, this is the direction in which we all must go. Some have put on the seven league boots, either in civic peace or in disorder, but they have acted quickly.

Others are walking step by step. May I say that the most important thing is to go in the right direction. I am speaking to you as one citizen of the world to other citizens of the world: it is the path of freedom that you are advancing on at the same time as you advance along the path of development. Moreover, the thought can be reversed: by taking the road towards development, you are committed on the road towards democracy.

To you free people, to you sovereign states that I respect: choose your path, determine the steps and the pace. France will continue to be your friend, and if you wish, your support, internationally as well as domestically. You bring a lot to the relationship. When I see, for example, that the flow of capital that goes from the poor South towards the rich North is bigger than the flow of capital that goes from the rich North to the poor South, I say that there is something wrong.
Colonialism is not dead. This is no longer the colonialism of states, it is the colonialism of business and of parallel channels. We are speaking as sovereign states, equal in status, even if not always in means. There are all kinds of conventions between us. There are military conventions. I repeat the principle of the French policy: every time a foreign menace appears, that could attack your independence, France will be by your side. We have already demonstrated this many times, and sometimes in very difficult circumstances.

But our own role, as a foreign country, even though we are friends, is not to intervene in domestic conflicts. In these cases, France, with the country’s leaders, will ensure the protection of its citizens, its nationals, but does not intend to arbitrate conflicts. This is what I have been doing as part of my responsibilities for nine years. In the same way, I will always forbid a practice that sometimes existed in the past which consisted of France trying to organize domestic political changes by plot or conspiracy. You know well that, for the last nine years, this has not happened, and this will not happen in the future.
Extrait du message de l'attaché de défense à Kigali,
24 octobre 1990,
Appréciation de la situation politique

Déclassifié

**TERTIO : APPRECIATION DE LA SITUATION POLITIQUE.**

**LA SITUATION EST DOMINÉE PAR LA COMBINAISON DE 2 COMPORTEMENTS DESTABILISATEURS.**

- LES MÉDIAS, LES REPRESENTATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES VOISINES DU RWANDA VOLONTAIREMENT OU DIVOLONTAIREMENT SE FONT LES PORTE-PAROLE DES ENVAHISSEURS OU MEME LES SOUTIENNENT OUVERTEMENT.

CECI VIENT D'ÊTRE ATTESTÉ PAR LA MANNÈRE DONT R.F.I. A RENDU COMPTE CE MATIN DE LA MISSION DE LA COMMISSION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DIRIGÉE PAR MAITRE FEDER DE NATIONALITÉ FRANÇAISE. EN EFFET, ALORS QUE CE JURISTE DÉLIVRE MANIFESTEMENT UN CERTIFICAT DE BONNE CONDUITE AU GOUVERNEMENT RWANDAIS QUI S'EFFORCE DE RÉSERVER LES MEILLEURS CONDITIONS DE TRAITEMENT AUX SUSPECTS, CETTE STATION NE RÉTIENS QUE LES ÉLÉMENTS NÉGATIFS DE SON BAPPORT.

- LES BELGES CONTINUENT À ENTRETEINDRE LA CONFUSION EN BRANDISSANT LA MENACE D'UN DEPART RAPIDE DE LEURS RÉSIDENTS ET DE LEURS PARACHUTISTES SI LE PRÉSIDENT HABYARIMANA NE SE RESOUT PAS À DES CAPITULATIONS EX ORBITANTES ET INJUSTIFIÉES.

CES DEUX COMPORTEMENTS SONT DE NATURE À DECOUVRER LES AUTORITÉS GOUVERNEMENTALES DISPOSES À FAIRE D'IMPORTANTS CONCESSIONS. ELLES NE PEUVENT ADMETTRE EN PARTICULIER QUE L'ABANDON TERRITORIAL, AU MOTIF D'ETABLIR UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU, AU PROFIT D'ENVAHISSEURS TUTISI DÉSIREUX DE REPRISE LE POUVOIR PERDU EN 1959. ELLES PEUVENT D'AUTANT MOINS L'ADMETTRE QUE CEUX-CI RECONNAISSAIENT LES RÉALITÉS RWANDAISES RETABLISSENT PROBABLEMENT AU NORD-EST LE REGIME HOMIT DU PREMIER ROI-TAY ME TUTSI QUI S'EST JADIS INSTALLE À CETTE RECONSTITUTION AVOUE OU DÉGUISE ENTRAINANT L'ÉLIMINATION PHYSIQUE À L'INTÉRIEUR DU PAYS DES TUTISI, 500.000 À 700.000 PERSONNES, PAR LES HUTUS 7.000.000 D'INDIVIDUS.


**SIGNÉ : COL. GALINIE.**

G. MARTRES.
4.A.4. Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali’s message, October 24th, 1990, Assessment of the political situation

Declassified

TERTIO: Assessment of the political situation.

The situation is dominated by the combination of two destabilizing behaviors.

- The media and the diplomatic representatives of Rwanda’s neighbors, have become, voluntarily or involuntarily, spokespeople for the invaders, or have even supported them openly. This has just been attested to by the way in which R.F.I. became aware this morning of the mission of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, led by Mr. FEDER, a French national. In fact, while he obviously issued a certificate of good conduct to the Rwandan government, which strives to maintain the best conditions of treatment for suspects, this station retained only the negative items of his report.

- The Belgians continue to maintain confusion, brandishing the threat of a rapid pull-out of their citizens and their parachutists if President HABYARIMANA does not agree to exorbitant and unjustified capitulations.

These two behaviors are of a nature to discourage the governmental authorities ready to make important concessions. They cannot accept, in particular, abandoning some territory, in order to establish a cease-fire, to the profit of the Tutsi invaders eager to retake the power they lost in 1959. They can even less admit that these invaders, disregarding Rwandan reality, will probably reestablish the Honni regime of the first Tutsi kingdom, once installed in the northeast. This reestablishment, explicit or disguised, would result (in all likelihood) in the physical elimination of Tutsis in the interior of the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people, by the 7,000,000 Hutus.

The foreseeable intervention of the Zairian president will not necessarily solve the situation. Indeed, it is not impossible that Zaire, before the Belgian departure and in particular the hesitation of the O.A.U. [Organization of African Unity], sustained by MUSEVENI, could decide, for reasons of local prestige, to intervene once again, taking RWANDA under its supervision, without really having the means to do so. Current meetings within the C.E.P.G.L. (Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes: ZAIRE – BURUNDI – RWANDA) seem to demonstrate the probable manifestation of an intervention. It could materialize through the return of Zairian troops.

SIGNED: COL. GALINIE./.

G. MARTRES.
1990:

No 6 December 1990:

Page 8: The 10 commandments:

1. Every Hutu must know that any Tutsi woman, wherever she is, is working for her Tutsi ethnic group. In consequence, every Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
   - who espouses a Tutsi woman
   - who takes a Tutsi woman as a concubine.
   - who takes a Tutsi woman as his secretary or his protegee.

2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu girls are more worthy and more conscientious in their role as women, wives, and mothers. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest?

3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons to their senses.

4. Every Hutu must know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. He only aims at the supremacy of his ethnic.
   “The night will be told by the one who spent it.” (Literal translation of a Rwandan proverb.)

Consequently, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
   - who makes an alliance with Tutsis in his business.
   - who invests his money or the State’s money in a company of a Tutsi;
   - who lends or borrows money from a Tutsi;
   - who gives favors to Tutsis in business (granting importing licenses, banking loans, building plots, State markets...)

5. Strategical posts as well as political, administrative, economical, military, and security ones must be put in hands of Hutus.

6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be Hutu in the majority.

7. The Rwandan Armed Forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October 1990 war teaches us that. A soldier can’t take a Tutsi woman as a wife.

8. Hutus must stop taking pity on Tutsis.

9. The Hutus, wherever they are, must be united, interdependent and worried about the condition of their Hutu brothers.
   - The Hutus of the interior and from outside must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting by their Bantou brothers.
   - They have to constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda.
The Hutus must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy Tutsi.

10. The 1959 Social Revolution, the 1961 Referendum, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu and at all the levels.

Every Hutu must widely diffuse the present ideology.

Any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother for having read, diffused and taught this ideology is a traitor.

1991:

No 23 October 1991:

Last page:
Colonel Rwendeye's photograph:
Caption: "We will always remember Colonel Rwendeye, who sacrificed himself for the mass, and we will avenge him and his mates."

No 25 November 1991:

In the editorial: We Hutus, are now angry.
It is now evident that if that continues like that, the mass can take part in that war in another way because wars are identical.

No 26 November 1991:

The cover:
Special: Tutsi, God's race.
Which arms should we use to vanquish Inyenzi forever? (A machete is drawn in front of this title.)
If the Hutu 1959 Revolution should be brought back, for us to vanquish Inyenzi-Ntutsi.
PARTICIPANTS -

PARTIE CONSACREE AU RWANDA :

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE - Situation au RWANDA.
Je constate que certains européens se sont réinstallés à RUHENGERI qui est une ville très dangereuse, parce que nos troupes sont présentes ; les gens prennent des risques et c'est nos troupes qui doivent leur venir en aide, d'où notre présence...

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -
C'est un engrenage normal !
La nature du conflit est indiscernable, le rôle de l'UGANDA est équivoque.
Les Tutsis ougandais se déplacent pour conquérir le RWANDA, c'est inquiétant.
J'aimerai que nous fassions des représentations à l'UGANDA. On n'a pas intérêt que le front du RWANDA cède. S'il s'agit de luttes tribales on ne dit rien ; s'il s'agit d'une agression il faut s'interposer et délivrer les Français retenus par les Tutsis. J'ai eu un entretien téléphonique avec le Président HABYARIMANA.

CEMP
Les Européens encerclés à RUHENGERI sont pour 40 d'entre eux des coopérateurs français présents sur ordre de leur administration.

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -
On est autorisé à intervenir pour les libérer.

CEMP -
Il y a 100 militaires français engagés dans cette action. On laisse les Rwandais tenter de faire partir les rebelles et on récupère nos ressortissants.

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -
On ne peut pas limiter notre présence.
Nous sommes à la limite du front anglophone. Il ne faut pas que l'UGANDA se permette tout et n'importe quoi. Il faut le dire au Président MUSEVENI ; il n'est pas normal que la minorité Tutsie veuille imposer sa loi à la majorité...

A demain 18 H 00.
– VERBATIM –
from the 6 pm meeting on Wednesday, January 23 at the Elysée Palace

PARTICIPANTS –
President of the Republic – Mr. ROCARD – Mr. DUMAS – Mr. JOXE – Mr. CHEVENEMENT – General SCHMITT – General FORRAY – Admiral COATANEA – Prefect FOUGIER – Mr. BLANCO – Admiral LANXADE – Mr. VEDRINE – General MONCHAL – General MENU –

SECTION ON RWANDA:

DEFENSE MINISTER – Situation in RWANDA
I have found that certain Europeans have moved back to RUHENGERI, a very dangerous city, because our troops are present; people are taking risks and it’s our troops that have to come to their aid; whence our presence…

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
These are normal circumstances!
The nature of the conflict is indiscernible, UGANDA’s role is ambiguous. The Ugandan Tutsis are moving to conquer RWANDA, it’s worrying. I would like it if we made contact with UGANDA. It’s not in our interest for the Rwandan border to yield. If it’s to do with tribal battles we say nothing; if it’s an aggression we have to intervene and rescue the French people held by the Tutsis. I had a telephone conversation with President HABYARIMANA.

CEMP
Forty of the surrounded Europeans in RUHENGERI are French aid workers present on the orders of their administration.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
We are authorized to intervene to liberate them.

CEMP
One hundred French troops are committed to this action. We let the Rwandans try to get the rebels to leave and we retrieve our citizens.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
We cannot limit our presence. We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. UGANDA cannot just do as it pleases. We must tell President MUSEVENI: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the Hutu majority…

Until tomorrow at 6 pm.
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSIONS MAY 10-11 WITH A/S COHEN, RWANDA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH TO ENDING RWANDA'S WAR WITH THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF): DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF RESULTING IN A PEACE TREATY ON THE ONE HAND AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA ON THE OTHER. HE SUBSEQUENTLY INCORPORATED INTO HIS STRATEGY COHEN'S SUGGESTION FOR A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH UGANDA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID ALL ISSUES WERE NEGOTIABLE. COHEN SAID IF ALL PARTIES REQUEST US TO, THE U.S. WOULD PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON DEVELOPING MQCK MUSEVENI IN" TO FUTURE COMMITMENTS WITHOUT FORCING HIM TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE ASKED FOR U.S. HELP WITH THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY, DEMINING THE BORDER AREA,
OPENING THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR AND HAVING UGANDA WITHDRAW AID FROM THE RPF. END SUMMARY.

TWO-PRONGED APPROACH
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3. AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE GOR-RPF WAR AND RELATED ISSUES IN A JOINT MEETING MAY 10 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA AND DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA. ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING FOR THE U.S. WERE AMBASSADOR FLATEN, DCM LEADER, ECON OFFICER ZORICK. PRESENT FOR THE RWANDAN SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ALOYS UWIMANA AND A NOTETAKER FROM EACH OF THE MINISTRIES.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT'S TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE WAR WITH THE RPF. HE SAID THE APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE BOTH POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. HE TOLD COHEN HE WILL GO TO KAMPALA THE WEEK OF MAY 18 (PROBABLY MAY 18-21) TO MEET AND DISCUSS DATES AND LOCATION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH UGANDA. (NOTE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTER AND THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS WILL ACCOMPANY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS TRIP. MDR AND PL PARTY LEADERS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE. END NOTE.)

MINISTER SAID THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIRECT AND WITHOUT MEDIATORS BECAUSE MEDIATORS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INFLEXIBLE POSITIONS. FACILITATORS TO PROVIDE A NEUTRAL VENUE OR OBSERVATION MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL.

6. IN HIS TOAST TO AMBASSADOR COHEN AT A DINNER LATER THAT EVENING, THE MINISTER CLARIFIED HIS CONCEPT OF MEDIATION: HENCEFORWARD MEDIATORS, INCLUDING THE U.S., WOULD FACILITATE MEETINGS RATHER THAN SERVE AS AN OBLIGATORY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

7. UGANDA, THE MINISTER SAID, WOULD BE KEY IN THE PROCESS. THE GOAL OF RWANDA'S NORMALIZATION EFFORTS WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO ABANDON ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF AND TO HAVE UGANDA ENCOURAGE THE RPF TO ACCEPT
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NO RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED WITHOUT UGANDA'S PARTICIPATION AND COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF SECURITY AND TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

COHEN BRIEFS ON TALKS IN UGANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

A/S COHEN responded favorably to the strategy outline by the minister. He agreed that Museveni was key and could be very useful.

RPF ready to negotiate. Cohen told the foreign minister that the RPF is ready to negotiate and that it has agreed to accept the invitation of France to the next negotiating session in Paris. However, he said, the RPF doubts the freedom of the new government to negotiate. He said the RPF cited the constitution, the continuing power of the president, and the obstacle of the president's family as the basis for its skepticism. Cohen said he urged the RPF to find out at the negotiating table whether its analysis is correct.
10. RPF DEMANDS. COHEN REVIEWED FOR THE RWANDANS THE
RPF DEMANDS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N'SELE ACCORDS,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN; INTEGRATION
OF THE ARMIES; AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT
RETURNING REFUGEES; A NEUTRAL OBSERVER GROUP FOR A
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CEASEFIRE; THE PRESENCE OF THE U.S. AT NEGOTIATIONS
BECAUSE OF DOUBTS OVER THE NEUTRALITY OF THE FRENCH; AND
A CEASEFIRE (ONE THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAYING
DOWN ARMS). THE ONLY NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND, HE SAID,
WAS THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.

U.S. ROLE IN TALKS

11. AMBASSADOR COHEN TOLD THE RWANDANS THAT THE U.S.
HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FACILITATING ROLE OF THE
FRENCH IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF
HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. PRESENCE AND SAID THE U.S. IS READY
TO BE PRESENT PROVIDING ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE
FRENCH, ARE READY FOR THE U.S. TO PARTICIPATE. COHEN
SAID THE U.S. CAN FURNISH TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO HELP WITH
DEFINING THE TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WITH THE ISSUE OF
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES.

INTEGRATION OF FORCES AND DEMOBILIZATION

12. COHEN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA BELIEVES
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY WILL BE THE MOST DIFFICULT
ASPECT OF THE RPF'S DEMANDS. COHEN RECOUNTED HIS
SUGGESTION FOR LINKING INTEGRATION WITH DEMOBILIZATION:
FIRST INTEGRATE ALL THE FORCES AND THEN DEMOBILIZE AN
EQUAL PROPORTION OF BOTH FORCES. THE DETAILS, HE SAID
CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE HELP OF EXPERTS. BUT
EVERYONE WHO RETURNS, REFUGEES AND SOLDIERS, MUST BE
REINTEGRATED INTO RWANDAN SOCIETY. IN RESPONSE TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MINISTER'S QUESTION, COHEN SAID THE RPF HAD NOT
INDICATED HOW IT THOUGHT INTEGRATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE.
13. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JAMES GASANA, NOTED SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES TO REINTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES: MANY RPF FIGHTERS HAVE SERVED IN THE ARMY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, RAISING THE QUESTION OF LOYALTY; VARIATIONS EXIST IN THE LEVEL AND QUALITY OF TRAINING OF THE TWO FORCES; COHEN'S SUGGESTION RISKED LEAVING MINORITY TUTSI OVERREPRESENTED IN THE ARMY.
14. Defense Minister Gasana (who is a member of the President's political party) elaborated on the role Uganda and its army has played in the war: The NRA

16. The last element, Cohen said, would avoid the argument over where the troops are and permit the ceasefire to be implemented. He said the entire accord could be deposited with the United Nations Security Council which would engage the international community in providing guarantees.

17. The Rwandan foreign minister expressed skepticism over such an accord. He asked whether such an accord could bring changes on the ground, what the

INTRODUCTION

UCCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

WAY RWANDA COULD LET MUSEVENI GET AWAY WITHOUT ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR IF THERE WERE NO IRON-CLAD
GUARANTEES OF PEACE.

HE NOTED THAT SIMILAR ACCORDS WITH COMMITMENTS WERE USED IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA AND ARE UNDER DISCUSSION IN MOZAMBIQUE.

18. LATER THE SAME DAY, HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF TOAST TO COHEN LATER THAT EVENING, HE STATED THAT RWANDA WOULD NEED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO SIGN AN ACCORD

U.S AID REQUESTED

19. IN SUMMING UP AID RWANDA WILL NEED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PLAN, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD COHEN THAT U.S. HELP WOULD BE NEEDED:

-- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM THE RPF SO SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROCEED;

-- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO OPEN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR SO RWANDA'S ECONOMY CAN BEGIN TO RECOVER;

-- TO ASSIST IN DEMOBILIZATION BY PROVIDING

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REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND REHABILITATION FOR HANDICAPPED VETERANS; AND,

-- TO HELP WITH DEMINING AREAS NEAR THE FRONTIER SO CIVILIANS CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND BEGIN FARMING AGAIN.

COMMENT

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UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

20. THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARS READY TO TAKE NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR IN A NEW DIRECTION. THE INTENTION TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE RPF AND TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH UGANDA ARE TWO IMPORTANT DEPARTURES FROM THE POSITION OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT THAT SHOULD OPEN NEW AVENUES OF DISCUSSION FOR ALL PARTIES. AMBASSADOR COHEN MADE IT CLEAR TO RWANDA THAT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND UGANDA AND HE OFFERED SOME
SUGGESTIONS ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED WITH NEGOTIATING DETAILS, SUCH AS TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE, BUT DID OFFER U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

21. THIS POSITION CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THAT PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET OFFICIALS. IT MAY SIGNAL DIFFICULT INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH THE NEW STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS PRESENTED AS A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT POSITION. END COMMENT

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NNNN
Republic of Rwanda
Kigali, 27 July 1992

Ministry of Defence
Rwandan Armed Forces
Staff Headquarters
Intelligence Service (G2)

Memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff

[CONFIDENTIAL]

SUBJECT: MOOD OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS

1. The political situation of our country and the ongoing war have aroused many comments by soldiers and civilians alike.

Coming in the wake of certain political events and pressure from the enemy, the comments have created a certain mood which must be brought to your attention as it is certainly a matter of concern.

You will find below some of the comments, followed by my opinion and views.

2. These comments which are often made by both civilians and soldiers have been generated by various issues.

(A) The Arusha Accords

The comments made by civilians on these Accords are many but I need not mention them since they are made publicly, even over the radio during news programmes broadcast by political parties or the coverage of rallies.

In a nutshell, many people severely criticize the contents of the Accords which only favour the RPF to the detriment of Rwanda. They are therefore calling for their review so that the points which do not favour us should be revisited.

Most of those who criticize the Accords are worried about the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF elements.

The civilian population is opposed to this eventuality and believes that it is a devious way of seizing power in Rwanda from within.

Even members of some opposition political parties, especially the MDR, are not in favour of any merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF armed elements. In fact, all those who are against the merger believe that our country is being sold to the enemy.

The people are therefore afraid of all this. Some of them are even saying that they are immediately going to get ready to flee before the INKONTANYI arrive, adding that prior to their flight they
will massacre the Tutsi.

(2) As for the military, many soldiers virulently disapprove of any merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. Officers are among those denouncing this provision of the Arusha Accords opining that they could, eventually, put up with the absorption of a few INKONTANYI elements in the Army, in proportion to the Tutsi population in this country.

If the Tutsi account for 14 percent of Rwandans, the INKONTANYI to be absorbed should represent 14 percent of the future Rwandan Armed Forces. To go beyond that, say the Officers, in fact, the other soldiers as well, would amount to selling this country to the enemy, what the Military would not allow.

In their conversations, some officers go as far as wondering whether things should stay the way they are, in other words whether civilian authorities should continue issuing directives and taking decisions which go against the interests of the Nation, for the sole purpose of protecting the immediate interests of their parties.

They wonder how long this is going to last, while expressing their worries over the interference of politicians in purely military matters. They conclude that it is time this situation changed.

Regarding the merger with the INKONTANYI or their absorption, the officers are of the opinion that the Government, through MINAFET and the Ministry of Defence should, in a meeting to which more military officials should be invited, endeavour to explain this matter and allow an open discussion thereon in order to get the feel of and record the worries and views of soldiers on this issue. Such views should be taken into account in future negotiations. They say that it is right to do so since they, and not civilians, are the ones who will be required to work with the INKONTANYI.

In any case, the military is apprehensive about a possible merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. They already have a premonition that if the INKONTANYI are absorbed in great numbers they will massacre our soldiers, especially our cadres.

Some of our officers are even saying that before they flee from this country they will first settle old scores with those of our leaders who caused the disaster by naively yielding to all the demands of the enemy fighting us.

(3) Many civilians are now beginning to approach soldiers telling them that the Rwandan Armed Forces are their last hope and that they should therefore right the situation in time by putting an end to the intrigues of irresponsible civilians who are only seeking immediate returns under the umbrella of political parties, instead of taking into account the interests of all the Rwandan people.

Therefore, on the whole, there is widespread anxiety among civilians and soldiers in view of the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the INKONTANYI. Many people feel that our leaders do not have the interests of the Nation at heart.

(4) The officers object to the provision in the Arusha Accords that a new a new army is going to
be created, which provision ignores the fact that the Rwandan Armed Forces already exist. They severely criticize the fact that even Radio Rwanda no longer talks of “The Rwandan Armed Forces” but rather of “Government Armed Forces”. The officers underscore that this reasoning gives the impression that the Rwandan Armed Forces are a faction on the same footing as the RPF elements, a view they loathe.

They too do not hesitate to say that “this country has been sold out”.

(5) Members of all political parties (save, of course, the Parti Liberal) do not understand at all the unilateral and unconditional release by Rwanda of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

To most people, this is further proof that only the enemy is deriving any benefit from the Arusha Accords and that the Government allows itself to be hoodwinked all the time.

Some people believe that there are some individuals among the negotiators of the Accords who are working for the enemy, offering the enemy everything, to the detriment of the interests of the Nation.

The people are therefore asking the Rwandan Armed Forces to do something to put the situation right before it is too late. Greatly vexed, some even go as far as saying that our troops should withdraw from the war front, for it serves no purpose to be riddled with bullets when so-called political leaders are busy selling out the country to the very enemy whom we are fighting.

The soldiers speak almost the same language. They want to know when and under what conditions their colleagues captured by the enemy will be released, now that the enemy has secured the unconditional release of their own people. This has, of course, increased their demoralization, especially as some of them think that the officers sanctioned the operation during their meeting with the Prime Minister and MINAFFET at the ESM. Some soldiers are saying that before they flee, as the enemy advances in great numbers towards the capital, they will deal with the officers who easily gave in to the wishes of reckless civilian authorities (I am only repeating what is being said).

For their part, the officers feel they have been tricked by MINAFFET and the Prime Minister. Indeed, they do not understand why these two authorities met so many military officials purportedly to explain to them the Arusha Accords and yet forgot, of course knowingly, to speak to them on the unilateral and unconditional release of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

The officers say they have thus been misused because both civilians and the military believe that they were aware of the manoeuvre which occurred on the very evening of the meeting with the authorities mentioned above. It is with a lot of bitterness that they refer to this matter.

B. Dismissal of Communal authorities (KUBOHOZA)

(1) Some people think that the “KUBOHOZA” phenomenon which consists, in particular, of dismissing officials who are not well looked upon by opposition political parties, especially pro-MRND bourgmestres, may create disorder in the country, if the Government does not put an end to it in time. This is all the more disquieting as senior political leaders, including the Prime Minister, officially endorse and support these reprehensible acts.
People wonder whether the Prime Minister, for example, still feels he is the Prime Minister of the entire Government when he goes to the extent of practising “KUBOHOZA” himself by distributing MDR badges to bourgmestres forcibly converted during party rallies.

People also wonder how worse the situation could get, if the Head of State does the same thing for the benefit of his party, the MRND.

The same questions are being asked as people wonder why State civil servants should be relieved of their posts without compensation, simply because they do not belong to the same party as the minister.

Many people are furious about this, especially MRND members who wonder whether MRND ministers are really committed to defending the interests of their party or whether some of them are not there only to defend their own interests.

I also noted the views of some officers who, without necessarily taking sides, are nevertheless saying that “if the President does not defend his people, if he does not stand up in time against the scheming of these pro-enemy parties, in other words if too is only defending his own interests while ignoring those of the Nation and bluntly abandoning those who have supported him so far; well, if he fails to react in time to these dramatic situations so as to save the Nation and honest people, he is going to find himself alone since no one wants to die for someone who will not recognize him”.

“Ahubwo mazabimubwire abimenye”, they added.

3 Personal views

(a) The Arusha Accords were one-sided Accords to the benefit of the enemy who therefore feels that they could go further and demand more. The concessions thus made to the enemy may seriously mortgage the interests of the country.

Being aware of this, the people are protesting everywhere. Many members of even opposition political parties are denouncing certain aspects of the accords, especially those provisions relating to the formation of a new national army and the unilateral release of prisoners of war and acolytes of the enemy, which release was made to the detriment of Rwanda.

Soldiers, in general, do not at all approve of the accords, believing that the country has been betrayed to the enemy and that, consequently, it is no longer necessary to continue fighting, since all the war efforts are being negated by political leaders who are only out to defend their own interests.

(b) I think that this situation is serious and should be examined more closely in order to redress the damage done, if that is still possible.

As concerns the military, I think it is still time to organize a broad-based discussion on the Accords, especially with respect to the formation of the “new army”. Through such a discussion the feelings and concerns of soldiers, in other words the feelings and concerns of those who will be required to live with the INKONTANYI in the “New Army”, will be known.

Inspiration could even be drawn from some of the views that would emanate from the discussion, instead of being subjected to decisions that cater for immediate political interests, whereas the consequences of
such decisions may seriously compromise the future of the Rwandan Armed Forces and that of the country.

The Head of State had promised to hold a second meeting with military leaders. Why not take advantage of that meeting where everyone will speak their mind without fear of being rapped over the knuckles? No longer being sure of their future as transfers seem to be controlled from a distance by circles outside the Rwandan Armed Forces, the officers are indeed beginning to harbour some obsessive fear. So, they fear to speak their minds in the presence of certain persons. This is the truth; it is pointless trying to run away from it. This obsessive fear now hounds some of them.

c. The uneasiness noticed among civilians is also noticed among soldiers. Everyone openly says that this country has been betrayed and that something must be done to save it. Civilians are counting on the Armed Forces and some of them are already approaching soldiers to tell them that the time has come to save the country from chaos. This is a dangerous situation and, under the circumstances, anything may happen, especially as people no longer hesitate to say that if the Head of State is not ready to assume his responsibility to save the country, he should hand over power. This is what people say openly.

d. The soldiers ARE NOT willing to live together with the INKONTANYI and do not at all understand why we are asking them to fight, since we release the INYENZI captured at the front as well as the recruiting agents who supply combatants to the enemy front. All this annoys the troops who are beginning to criticize severely both the civilian and military leaders. Officers are beginning to distrust more and more their superiors and they say so. This situation calls for reflection and a remedy.

e. The Arusha Accords have caused widespread turmoil and vexation. Yet, the war may continue, and if it does, we may face the following problems:

- soldiers becoming tired and demoralized;
- increasing economic hardship;
- the risk of partners abandoning us;
- the risk of politicians causing chaos, which will be to the advantage of the enemy, and so on and so forth.

Under such circumstances, this country may fall into the hands of the INKONTANYI, an eventuality fraught with dire consequences.

In order to prepare ourselves for the continuation of hostilities, which in the final analysis are inevitable, in my opinion the following measures must be taken:

(1) - recruit and train enough soldiers whose morale would be less affected. They will be better equipped to face the enemy who has been perked up by a series of cheap victories and sustained propaganda.

(2) - make sure we have enough ammunition because a new lack of ammunition may cause practically irreversible disaster.

(3) - strive to stay in the good books of our friends and partners, especially France and the United States. In this regard, it is necessary to prepare their minds, making them understand that Rwanda is a unique case, that we are confronted with an enemy who wants to regain the power it lost and that any good intention it may display is only a subterfuge aimed solely at taking over power and thereafter proceeding to avenge
the victims of the 1959 Revolution and of the events that followed that revolution up to 1973. These friends and partners will thereby help us weaken the enemy who is still asking for more. After this, we could easily sell the concept of representation within the Rwandan Armed Forces, representation based on the proportion of each ethnic group in the Rwandan population, in lieu of a complete merger which, if it ever happens, will end up in the disaster of a more deadly civil war. Politicians must understand this;

(4) - Induce our friends and partners to give priority to the democratic process instead of getting bogged down in insidious considerations put forward by the enemy. Clearly, this calls for a national consensus so that we all speak the same language regarding the war;

Parties like the PL and others operating within its fold should listen to reason by giving priority to the interests of the Nation. In any case, if they fail to do so, the masses will react, now that they are becoming aware that they have been duped. Mob action is difficult to control.

(5) - the population and the Rwandan Armed Forces having been vexed by the actions of the Government which only engages in political scheming (I am only repeating what is being said), this Government may be compelled to resign. It would therefore be necessary to persuade our friends not to abandon us under the pretext that we are not showing any sign of goodwill.

To this end, the democratic process must be kept on course and, whenever necessary, shown to the world to prove that, in spite of our current difficulties, we are still committed to democracy or, rather, to the democratic process;

f. In my opinion, it is absolutely absurd that at a time when the enemy is threatening the country and swears to seize power in Kigali (they are about 50 km away from the capital) the people inside the country are tearing one another to pieces under the cover of political parties and with the blessings of the leaders of these parties. It is not in such circumstances that we will be able to unite against the enemy threatening us. These quarrels and the “KUBOHOZA” business that some officials wholeheartedly support must cease.

People, especially the bourgmestres, should feel secure, if we are asking them to ensure security inside the country.

Some officials (e.g. bourgmestre Gatete and others) should be left alone, instead of being made victims of the zeal they have shown in the interest of the nation.

Government employees should not be victims of injustices stemming from political parties, otherwise they will become dissatisfied and swell the ranks of those who are against authority thereby worsening the climate of uneasiness prevailing in the country.

In passing, I should point out that the employment of many Tutsi and PL members by the government has greatly annoyed Hutu elements who have been laid off. Tension is high.

4. Conclusions

(a) The people are unhappy and have been demoralized by the government’s action which favours the enemy. The soldiers are demoralized and apathetic. They are not willing to work together with the
INKONTANYI.

(b) On the whole, the climate is unhealthy and many people are asking for change, going as far as appealing to the military to do something to save the country. The Arusha Accords which are criticized by many people have only added fuel to the flames.

(c) Taking advantage of this situation which is in its favour, the enemy is putting pressure on the ground and politically and we may be overwhelmed.

(d) Something must be done to resolve this imbroglio. However, we must also get ready to continue with the war - if the enemy opts for it - and make sure that our friends and partners are well disposed towards us. Diplomatic action, be it informal, is therefore a matter of absolute necessity.

( signed)
Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva Anatole
G2 Officer at the Staff Headquarters of the Rwandan Army

Copy to:
-H.E. the President of the Republic.

[CONFIDENTIAL]
INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

THE CDR YOUTH ARE BECOMING INTERCHANGEABLE AND ALLEGE THAT MILITARY ARE INVOLVED IN THEIR ACTIVITIES. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH INTERPARTY DISTURBANCES, THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE SECURITY SERVICES, STILL CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, AND THE LACK OF JUDICIAL FOLLOW-UP ARE TROUBLING. ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENCE SEEMS TO HAVE SUBSIDED FOR NOW, WE CAN ANTICIPATE A NEW WAVE OF INTERNAL INSECURITY, IN SOME FORM OR ANOTHER, AS PEACE TALKS PROCEED, ESPECIALLY IF INTERNAL DIFFERENCES OVER POWERSHARING AND INTEGRATION OF FORCES BECOME ACUTE.

INTERNAL INSECURITY EBBS AND FLOWS

3. THROUGHOUT THIS YEAR, INTERNAL INSECURITY HAS INCREASED IN PARALLEL WITH EACH SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND PEACE PROCESSES AND SUBSIDED AS INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES REACHED A NEW LEVEL OF CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMON UNDERSTANDING. THE BUGESEMA MASSACRES, FOR EXAMPLE, TOOK PLACE JUST AS NEGOTIATIONS OVER FORMATION OF A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT WERE REACHING THEIR CONCLUSION. RANDOM LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS REACHED A PEAK IN EARLY MAY, JUST WEEKS AFTER THE MULTI-PARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WAS SWORN IN AND ANNOUNCED ITS PROGRAM. THE CRAZY WEEKEND IN LATE MAY INVOLVING INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE AND MILITARY MUTINIES, MIXED IN WITH A CAR BOMB EXPLOSION (REF D) OCCURRED AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO UGANDA WHERE HE AND THE RPF AGREED TO TALK AND JUST PRIOR TO THE INITIAL GOR-RPF TALKS IN PARIS. INTERNAL SECURITY DETERIORATED AGAIN IN JULY WITH AN UPSURGE IN INTERPARTY VIOLENCE, IN THE INTERIM PERIOD AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA CEASEFIRE ACCORD WITH ITS THREE PRINCIPLES AIMED AT GUIDING AUGUST'S POLITICAL-MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS AND BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

TENSIONS HEIGHTENED

4. TENSIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE HEIGHTENED IN LATE JULY WITH CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN. THE CALLS CAME BOTH FROM SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S MRND PARTY YOUTH, THE INTERAHAMWE, AND FROM THE HARDLINES HUTU SUPREMACY

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VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT

5. THE JULY 28 CDR DEMONSTRATION IN KIGALI (REF B) RESULTED IN A FINAL COUNT OF THREE DEAD, TWO CDR MEMBERS AND ONE POLICEMAN. INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE THE WEEKEND OF AUGUST 8-9 NEAR GISENYI (NORTHWEST) BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, NEAR KIBUNGO

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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

(SOUTHEAST) BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, AND OUTSIDE CYANGUGU (SOUTHWEST) BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) LEFT FOUR DEAD, ALL MDR YOUTH, AND MANY INJURED. COMMUNE-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH CONTINUES, WITH MDR LOYALISTS ATTEMPTING TO RID THEIR COMMUNES OF MRND AUTHORITIES.

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7. CDR LEADER, JEAN BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA INSISTS THAT UNITY BETWEEN HUTU AND TUTSI IS IMPOSSIBLE; THEY CAN ONLY CO-EXIST. HE IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF A SPEECH IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED FOR ALL RWANDANS TO SEE THEMSELVES AS BANYARwandA RATHER AS HUTU, TUTSI OR TWA. BARAYAGWIZA TOLD CHARGE THAT ONLY RECOGNITION OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCES CAN ALLOW RWANDA TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT HIS PARTY WANTS PEACE BUT NOT PEACE AT ANY PRICE, A REFERENCE TO THE CDR'S STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THE ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES (REF C). HE BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WORKING FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE MAJORITY. THIS, HE EXPLAINED, MEANS WORKING FOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
8. BARAYAGWIZA, TOLD CHARGE JUST BEFORE THE FATAL KIGALI DEMONSTRATION THAT THE CDR WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CREATING VIOLENCE AND THAT HIS GROUP WAS AGAINST DEMONSTRATIONS. RECALLING EARLIER ROADBLOCKS IN THE NORTH, BARAYAGWIZA REPLIED THOSE HAD BEEN UNAUTHORIZED AND THAT THE CDR MEMBERS INVOLVED HAD BEEN REPRIMANDED. APPARENTLY THE REPRIMAND WENT UNHEEDED.

THE INTERAHAMWE

9. THE INTERAHAMWE, THE MRND YOUTH, ARE ALSO WIDELY FEARED BY OPPOSITION MEMBERS WHO BELIEVE THE GROUP IS MORE A MILITIA THAN SIMPLY THE YOUTH WING OF THE PARTY. MANY OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS CLAIM THEY HAVE SEEN GENDARMES AMONG INTERAHAMWE GROUPS AND THAT THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING TO THE YOUTH.

10. A SOURCE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN AN INTERHAMWE FOUNDER SUPPORTED THIS ALLEGATION TO CHARGE RECENTLY. ENCOURAGED TO TALK TO CHARGE BY A TRUSTED COMMON ACQUAINTANCE, THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE INTELLECTUAL YOUTH GROUP HE STARTED LAST AUGUST IN RESPONSE TO YOUTH GROUPS LAUNCHED BY OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD BECOME A MILITIA. HE CLAIMED THE AIMS OF THE GROUP HAD BEEN PERVERTED BY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WHO HAD INSERTED THEMSELVES INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GROUP. HE CONTENDS THAT 50 MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHOSE NAMES HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER, ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES AND INVOLVED IN MILITARY TRAINING FOR SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP. HE BELIEVES MANY MEMBERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE ARE UNAWARE OF THE ORGANIZATION'S CURRENT THRUST. THE SOURCE, WHO RESIGNED FROM THE MRND IN JUNE, SAID HE BELIEVES HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER FROM PERSONS CLOSE TO
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ACTION AF-01

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1551
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

THE PRESIDENT. INDEED, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS
RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN
FRONT OF HIS WORK PLACE WHICH HE LINKS TO PEOPLE WHO
MAY BE INTERESTED IN HIS ELIMINATION.

11. MRND SECRETARY GENERAL, MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE,
SAID THAT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE INTERAHAMWE ARE
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PURE PROPAGANDA. HE SAID A GENDARME COMMANDANT TOLD
HIM THERE WERE 2-3 GENDARMES IN THE GROUP BUT HAD NOT
YET PROVIDED NAMES. NGIRUMPATSE SAID HE WOULD
REPRIMAND ANY GENDARME FOUND AMONG THE MEMBERS.

12. CHARGE ASKED PRESIDENTIAL CABINET DIRECTOR ENOCH
RUHIGIRA ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
THE INTERAHAMWE. HE REPLIED THAT A PARTY
INVESTIGATION HAD TURNED UP INVOLVEMENT OF "MILITARY
RESERVISTS". THESE PEOPLE, HE SAID, WOULD BE
EXCLUDED FROM INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE. KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ALSO TOLD CHARGE THAT "MILITARY RESERVISTS" ARE IN THE INTERAHAMWE. (NOTE: MILITARY ARE PRECLUDED BY LAW FROM JOINING POLITICAL PARTIES. END NOTE).

DIFFERENCES BLURRED?


14. QUERIED BY CHARGE, HOWEVER, LEADERS OF BOTH THE MRND AND THE CDR CONTEND THAT THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE AND THAT THEIR IDEOLOGIES AND AIMS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT. CDR LEADER BARAYAGWIZA IS CRITICAL OF THE MRND FOR FAILING TO PUT HUTU INTERESTS FIRST. HE' CLAIMS THAT THE CDR IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN "DIRTIED" IN MRND POLITICS. MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE IS EQUALLY CRITICAL OF THE CDR POLICY OF ETHNIC SEPARATISM AND CLAIMED TO CHARGE THAT THE CDR IS ACTUALLY A THREAT TO THE MRND. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INTERAHAMWE MEMBERS MIGHT BE PARTICIPATING IN CDR DEMONSTRATIONS AND VICE-VERSE, BUT HE SAID SUCH PERSONS, IF IDENTIFIED, WOULD BE PUNISHED. HE CLAIMED SUCH PARTICIPATION WAS TOTALLY SPONTANEOUS AND NOT SANCTIONED BY THE MRND.

MDR ACCUSED

15. THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR, IS THE TRUE SOURCE OF INSTABILITY, ACCORDING TO MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE. HE CLAIMS THAT MDR LEADER FAUSTIN TWIGIRAMUNGU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STIRRING UP MDR YOUTH, THE JDR, AGAINST MRND MEMBERS. HE HAS WRITTEN LETTERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER ACCUSING TWAGIRAMUNGU OF URGING MDR MEMBERS AT POLITICAL RALLIES TO TAKE STEPS TO REMOVE THE MRND AUTHORITIES IN THEIR COMMUNES FROM THE POSITIONS. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME
MINISTER HIMSELF HAS CONDONED THE PRACTICE OF "LIBERATION" OF COMMUNES IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. HE BLAMED THE MDR PRIME MINISTER FOR TALKING WITH TWO VOICES, ONE TO OFFICIALS AND ANOTHER TO THE POPULATION. HE ALSO ACCUSED THE PRIME MINISTER OF FOSTERING INTERPARTY FRICTION WITH FORKED-TONGUE LANGUAGE IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETINGS.

SECRET PLANS FOR DESTABILIZATION?

16. MANY RWANDANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY RAMPANT IN THE COUNTRY IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS IS NO ACCIDENT, BUT THEY DISAGREE ON THE SOURCE. BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA'S POLITICAL DIALOGUE BELIEVE THE INCIDENTS OF INTERNAL INSECURITY FIT WITH PLANS THE OTHER HAS TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS.
17. A TRUSTED SOURCE WHO ADVOCATES CHANGE TOLD CHARGE OF A "SECRET" GROUP OF 45 PROMINENT RWANDANS WHOSE AIM IS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES THROUGHOUT RWANDA THAT WILL DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND SLOW DOWN IF NOT REVERSE THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. ALLEGEDLY INCLUDED IN THE GROUP ARE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CONFIDENTIAL


SECURITY FORCES ON THE SIDELINES

19. THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG RESPONSE TO THESE MANY INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE FROM RWANDA'S SECURITY FORCES, STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF LOYALISTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, IS TROUBLING. KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SHOWED CHARGE A LETTER HE WROTE TO THE RADIO STATION (WHICH TO OUR KNOWLEDGE WAS NEVER AIRED), IN WHICH HE DEPLORED THE SLOW RESPONSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
The Gendarmes are often left to handle situations that involve urban violence, a responsibility that is not detailed in riot or crowd control. The Public Prosecutor believes that the Gendarme behavior is a result of the fact that many sympathize with the CDR. He also claims they do not want to engage against the "Reservists," their former colleagues and sometimes superiors, when they see them among the ranks of demonstrators. He speculates that the Head of the Gendarmerie, an MDR stalwart, is more comfortable sitting on the fence than risking actions/decisions that might upset his "boss." 

20. The Public Prosecutor told Charge that his office, responsible for bringing cases to trial, is dependent on the Gendarmerie's Judicial Police branch for conducting investigations into these kinds of offenses. He said he has no control over the pace or the methods of their work, although the branch nominally works under the guidance of his office and turns its work over to him for preparing cases. He cited an example of a recent incident where he issued a mandate for the arrest of several people. The Judicial Police returned empty-handed saying they could not find them.

21. At its meeting August 12, the Council of Ministers discussed the security situation and decided that, to be more effective, security forces needed reorganization, equipment, and training. The Council also decided that Ministers should visit their prefectures of origin with the aim of diffusing tensions and encouraging cooperation among parties. Three Ministers from three different parties have already made such a visit in the prefecture of Butare (where the Prefet is from yet a fourth party) to encourage calm.
INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

JUDICIAL SYSTEM INERT

PRESSURE AND CORRUPTION.

PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

23. MDR LEADER TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD CHARGE RECENTLY THAT HIS PARTY PLANS TO MODERATE ITS TONE AND ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR BY PARTY MEMBERS. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE ONSET OF RECENT PARTY VIOLENCE HE TOLD MDR PARTY YOUTH TO LET SECURITY FORCES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESTORING ORDER INSTEAD OF TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. KIGALI’S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR NOTED A DISTINCT CHANGE IN OPPOSITION SPEECHES AT POLITICAL RALLIES. HE SAID THAT LIBERAL PARTY LEADER MUGENZI, KNOWN FOR HIS FIRERY RHETORIC, HAD RECENTLY MADE AN UNUSUALLY BALANCED SPEECH. HE CLAIMS THAT THE ONLY PARTY LEADER CURRENTLY MAKING INFLAMATORY SPEECHES IS MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE.

24. NGIRUMPATSE BELIEVES THE MRND YOUTH MUST STRIKE BACK IF ATTACKED. NGIRUMPATSE DEMONSTRATED HIS ABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE INTERAHAMWE WHEN IT BLOCKED ROADS NORTH AND SOUTH FROM KIGALI JULY 28. HE WENT TO THE SCENE AND INSTRUCTED THE YOUTH TO DEPART, AFTER BOTH THE KIGALI PREFET (MRND) AND THE MINISTER OF THE INZERIOR (MDR) HAD FAILED IN SIMILAR EFFORTS. BOTH HE AND CDR LEADER, BARAYAGWISA, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED TO CHARGE THAT THEIR PARTY YOUTH HAD ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES NOT ENDORSED BY THE PARTY, SUGGESTING THAT PARTY LEADERS MAY NOT ALWAYS BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF THEIR YOUTH.

COMMENT

25. ALTHOUGH THE "INVISIBLE HAND" (OR HANDS) THEORY CANNOT BE RULED OUT, THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONSPIRACY THEORY OF VIOLENCE FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT. AFTER EIGHT MONTHS OF RIDING THE WAVES OF INTERNAL INSECURITY, HOWEVER, IT DOES APPEAR THAT VIOLENCE OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER IS MOST LIKELY TO ERUPT WHEN TENSIONS INCREASE AS THE SOCIETY STRUGGLES TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THE DIRECTION OF ITS NEXT STEP IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION OR THE PEACE.
PROCESS. ONCE THE CONSENSUS, OR SEMBLANCE OF GENERAL AGREEMENT, IS REACHED, AS IS THE CASE NOW, WITH ALMOST ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY READY TO ACCEPT THE NEARLY REVOLUTIONARY ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES, CALM IS RESTORED FOR A TIME. WITH MORE TOUGH SOCIAL DECISIONS YET AHEAD, HOWEVER, WE CAN ONLY ANTICIPATE FUTURE DISTURBANCES THAT ECHO THIS PATTERN.

26. THE USE OF VIOLENCE BY EITHER SIDE IN THIS POLITICAL DEBATE IS ANTITHETICAL TO THE USG GOAL OF SUPPORTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES. IT THREATENS THE VERY FABRIC OF THE SOCIETY BY STIRRING HATRED THAT WILL BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CALM. INDEED, NGIRUMPATSE CLAIMS THAT ONE OF RWANDA’S PROBLEMS IS THAT ITS DEMOCRACY IS FOUND ON HATE. ON THE ONE
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

HAND, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PARTY LEADERS TO USE MODERATION AND DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS, SUCH AS THE MDR PLAN TO USE PETITIONS INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE TO EXPRESS DISCONTENT WITH LOCAL LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY TO CONFIDENTIAL

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BOTH THE PROCESS OF PEACE AND THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION.

27. AMERICAN NATIONALS ARE NOT DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THIS RECENT OF INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE, AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE BECOMING TARGETS OF ANY FUTURE VIOLENCE. THE RISK EXISTS, though, that we might end up in the wrong place at the wrong time. 

LEADER

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SECRET

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ORIGIN INR-01

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)

"ROME FOR FOLAN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, USNATO
FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCENTEUR AND HQ US
CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC J-5,"
1. (S) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR AFRICAN TRENDS 9/18/92

A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
C. NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE
D. NOTE: SUDAN: RELIEF CRISIS
E. NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING

A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE

2. (C) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, FAILS. WHETHER THE PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW MUCH POWER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS WILLING TO CEDE TO THE RPF AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION PARTIES. BUT TO BE ACCEPTED BY KIGALI (AND VIEWED AS LEGITIMATE BY THE RWANDAN PEOPLE). A TRUE SETTLEMENT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE RPF'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A POWERSHARING FORMULA MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TUTSIS' 10-15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAN WITH THE 50-50 SHARE THE RPF HAS BEEN DEMANDING.

3. (C) HABYARIMANA'S SIDE HAS BEEN PUSHED HARDER AND MORE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPROMISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THE RPF AND TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM MAJOR WESTERN DONORS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY CONTRAST ENJOYS SANCTUARY IN UGANDA AND IS NOT SO HEAVILY Pressed BY KIGALI, OUTSIDERS, OR THE COSTS OF A WAR WHICH IS FOUGHT ON RWANDAN SOIL. IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE RPF WILL MAINTAIN A MORE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION. THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND STIR PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN THE PAST.

BACKGROUND
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4. (C) DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONFLICT BEHIND THEM ARE MULTIFACETED: HUTU-TUTSI TENSIONS; THE EFFORT TO DECENTRALIZE POWER AND WEALTH NOW CONTROLLED BY HABYARIMANA'S INNER CIRCLE; AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF WESTERN DONORS AND SECRET

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UGANDA.

5. (C) THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT LIES IN ETHNIC TENSION BETWEEN THE TUTSIS--ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S POPULATION OF 7 MILLION--AND THE HUTUS, WHO MAKE UP ALMOST ALL THE REST. THE TUTSIS THE COUNTRY'S RULING CLASS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WERE DISPLACED FROM THEIR DOMINANT POSITION IN 1959 BY A COMBINATION OF ELECTIONS AND HUTU UPRISINGS THAT KILLED THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS AND CAUSED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS TO FLEE THE COUNTRY. ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), SOME 400,000 LONG-TERM RWANDAN REFUGEES--VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM TUTSIS--LIVE IN NEighbORING COUNTRIES.


7. (C) THE RPF, WHOSE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ARE PROMINENT HUTUS, PORTRAYS ITSELF AS A NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE HABYARIMANA REGIME'S SECRET

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CORRUPTION, ABUSES OF POWER, AND FAVORITISM TOWARD THE HUTUS OF NORTHERN RWANDA. THE LATTER FORM THE CORE OF REGIME SUPPORT. THE RPF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HUTU SUPPORT, BUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESONATE AMONG THE HUTUS ESPECIALLY IN NEWLY FORMED OPPOSITION PARTIES.

8. (C) NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. THE ARUSHA TALKS ARE THE LATEST IN A LONG PROGRESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS DATING BACK TO MID-OCTOBER 1990. THEY FOLLOW A MAY 1992 US OFFER TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONCERT WITH NEIGHBORING STATES, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.

9. (C) EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED UNSUCCESSFULLY ON ACHIEVING A LASTING CEASE-FIRE. THEY FAILED ALSO TO MOVE THE TWO SIDES SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE EARLIER ROUNDS, HELD IN DAR ES SALAAM IN FEBRUARY 1991, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSIS' RIGHT OF RETURN PENDING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS SHORT-LIVED. NEIGHBORING STATES AGREED TO GRANT SANCTUARY TO THOSE TUTSIS WHO PREFERRED NOT TO RETURN TO RWANDA AND CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE WHO DESIRED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE BROKE DOWN WHEN THE RPF OBJECTED TO THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE IMPartialITY OF MEDIATORS WAS QUESTIONED.

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10. (C) THE CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BEGAN WITH A JULY MEETING IN ARUSHA WHICH RESULTED IN A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS HELD. THE PARTIES ALSO SET AN AGENDA CALLING FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONCLUDED BY OCTOBER 10. A FOLLOW UP MEETING IN AUGUST LED TO AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTING "THE RULE OF LAW." A FURTHER ARUSHA ROUND THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 7 FOCUSED ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION--HOW TO BRING THE RPF INTO GOVERNMENT AND HOW TO MODIFY AND LIBERALIZE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

11. (C) THE NEXT ROUND, TO BE HELD IN ARUSHA AFTER OCTOBER 1, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT
ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION BEFORE IT MOVES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY INTEGRATION.

HABYARIMANA UNDER PRESSURE

12. (C) DONORS, TUTSIS, AND REFORMS. AN EX-BELGIAN-TRAINED PARATROOPER WHO TOOK OVER IN A 1973 MILITARY COUP. HABYARIMANA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS FACED UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE FROM DONORS AND THE RPF TO REFORM HIS GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY HE WAS VIEWED AS A MODERATE ON THE QUESTION OF HUTU-TUTSI RELATIONS BECAUSE HE HAD REPLACED A HUTU-CHAUVINIST GOVERNMENT LED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU) AND HAD APPOINTED TUTSIS TO HIS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA'S POLICIES FAVORED NORTHERN HUTUS, MAINLY IN THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGERI AND GISENYI, HIS MDR-PARMEHUTU PREDECESSORS HAD JUST AS BLATANTLY FAVORED THE SOUTH.

SECRET

13. (C) IN 1975 HABYARIMANA ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (MRND) AND MODIFIED THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE MRND THE SOLE LEGAL PARTY. FOR 15 YEARS, HOWEVER, INTERNATIONAL DONORS VIEWED RWANDA AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTRIES.


15. (C) HABYARIMANA ATTEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGES: ON JULY 5, 1990, HE ANNOUNCED A TWO-YEAR PROCESS TO MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY RULE, AND ON SEPTEMBER 21 HE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS TO SUGGEST WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION.

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LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, THE RPF INVASION BROUGHT NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO SOLVE THE TUTSI PROBLEM.

16. (C) THE WAR IS COSTLY TO RWANDA. IT HAS DISRUPTED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH AND HAS DISPLACED SOME 350,000 RWANDANS, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). KIGALI MUST PAY FOR AN ARMY THAT HAS INCREASED IN SIZE FROM 5,000 IN OCTOBER 1990 TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 30,000. TO FINANCE THE WAR, KIGALI HAS BEEN FORCED TO SELL VIRTUALLY ITS ENTIRE COFFEE STOCKPILE AT A TIME WHEN WORLD PRICES ARE LOW. IT HAS INCREASED BORROWING FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND FALLEN BEHIND ON ITS PAYMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IN THIS SITUATION, KIGALI IS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN DONOR PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

17. (C) UNDER PRESSURE AS WELL FROM NEIGHBORING STATES INTERESTED IN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI REFUGEES IN THEIR TERRITORIES, HABYARIMANA IN LATE 1990 AND EARLY 1991 IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT BEGAN TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RESPOND TO TUTSI COMPLAINTS. HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSI RIGHT OF RETURN; ANNOUNCED ELIMINATION OF THE NOTATION OF ONE'S ETHNIC BACKGROUND FROM NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS (WHICH HAD LONG ANGERED THE TUTSIS); AND FORMALLY LIFTED PRESS RESTRICTIONS (THOUGH JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO BE ARRESTED AND BEATEN).

18. (C) IN JUNE 1991, HABYARIMANA ACCEPTED MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS AND FORMALLY DECLARED RWANDA A MULTIPARTY STATE. HE RENAMED THE MRND AS THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND INVITED THE RPF TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS A LEGAL PARTY AND COMPETE WITH OTHER PARTIES (CALCULATING THAT THE MINORITY TUTSIS COULD NOT WIN A
SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE). TO DATE, 16 PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED, REPRESENTING A BROAD RANGE OF RWANDAN OPINION.

19. (C) AFTER NINE MONTHS OF SOMETIMES-ACRIMONIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, HABYARIMANA IN APRIL 1992 AGREED TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT, GIVING 11 OF 20 CABINET SEATS TO FOUR OPPOSITION PARTIES. HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT APRIL. ALTHOUGH THIS SCHEDULE DEPENDS UPON THE RESULTS OF THE ARUSHA TALKS.

20. (C) DESPITE THE REFORMS, THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE POWER AND APPOINTS THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. KEY PORTFOLIOS—DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND CIVIL SERVICE—are held by MRND LOYALISTS. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT NOW SHARES WITH A SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND REMOVE JUDGES, HE CONTINUES TO MANAGE A CENTRALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM AND APPOINTS LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS DOWN TO THE BURGOMASTER LEVEL.

21. (C) MULTIPARTY COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT—OFTEN WORKING AS A BLOC—DO INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING.

22. (C) THE LARGEST AND APPARENTLY MOST POPULAR OPPOSITION PARTY IS THE REFORMED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH IS BASED ON THE OLD MDR-PARMEHUTU. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, THE MDR APPEALS MAINLY TO SOUTHERN HUTUS. ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES A CONSERVATIVE WING THAT EXUDES MDR-PARMEHUTU'S HUTU CHAUVINISM, ITS CORE LEADERSHIP IS FAR MORE LIBERAL AND IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD END THE WAR AND ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE IS FROM THE MDR, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER CABINET MEMBERS INCLUDING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION BONIFACE NGULINZIRA.

23. (C) THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) AND THE SMALLER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY EACH HOLD THREE CABINET POSITIONS WHILE THE MINUSCULE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ONE.
THE PL HAS A HEAVY TUTSI MEMBERSHIP ALTHOUGH SOME OF ITS LEADERS ARE HUTUS. LIKE THE MDR, IT FAVORS MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. LAST DECEMBER-JANUARY, FRUSTRATED WITH THE PL'S INITIAL REFUSALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HABYARIMANA LASHED OUT AT IT AS BEING THE INTERNAL WING OF THE RPF. OTHER HUTUS SHARE HIS VIEWS.

24. (C) WHAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON WITH THE RPF IS A DESIRE TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS. THEY ALL FAVOR MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION TO INCREASE THEIR OWN POWERS. BUT AS PART OF THE APRIL AGREEMENT WITH HABYARIMANA THAT GAVE THEM A CABINET MAJORITY AND THE PREMIERSHIP, THEY AGREED NOT TO TAKE MOVES TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.

SECRET

25. (C) THE DEGREE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' INFLUENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS HAS BEEN LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA. HE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO THE RPF IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PROPOSALS STATED, INTER ALIA, THAT: ALL PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CABINET; THE CABINET WOULD INCLUDE THE RPF; AND ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF WOULD HAVE LEGAL PRECEDENCE OVER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION AND CURRENT LAWS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH APPARENTLY WERE NOT APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HABYARIMANA, MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY KIGALI.

26. (C) THE HUTU RIGHT AND THE GENOCIDE CARD.

HABYARIMANA ALSO FACES PRESSURE FROM HUTU CHAUVINISTS CONCERNED WITH RETAINING ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH. ANTI-TUTSI FEELING, SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF HABYARIMANA'S TENURE IN OFFICE, REEMERGED AFTER THE RPF INVASION.

27. (C) THE MOST OBVIOUS POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF HUTU SUPREMACISM WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR) AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THE CDR'S CLEAR MESSAGE IS THAT HUTUS AND TUTSIS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLES WHO

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CAN DO NO BETTER THAN UNEASILY COEXIST. THE CDR APPEALS MAINLY TO NORTHERN HUTUS WHO HAVE BENEFITED MOST UNDER THE HABYARIMANA REGIME AND WHO ARE THREATENED BY THE RPF.

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FIGHTING. HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND SOME OF HER FAMILY ARE THOUGHT TO BE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE CDR.

28. (C) BECAUSE OF THESE FAMILY TIES, HABYARIMANA SOMETIMES IS DESCRIBED AS A PRISONER OF THE FAR RIGHT. HIS REFORMS SUGGEST THAT THIS VIEW EXAGGERATES THE TRUTH. NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TUTSI COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ARE DISTURBING IN A SMALL COUNTRY WITH SUCH A CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY SYSTEM. SINCE THE RPF INVASION, THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR EPISODES IN WHICH 300 OR MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN ANTI-TUTSI VIOLENCE, THE MOST RECENT IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE LAST MONTH. THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.

RPF PRESS ITS ADVANTAGE

29. (C) COMPARED WITH KIGALI'S DECISIONMAKERS, THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE MORE UNIFIED, FOR NOW, AROUND A HARDLINE NEGOTIATING POSITION. SINCE 1990, IT HAS SKILLFULLY COMBINED ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING PUSHED INTO THE HINTERLANDS OF RUHENGERI AND THE AKAGERA AND VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARKS IN MID-1991, THE RPF CONSISTENTLY REJECTED HABYARIMANA'S REFORMS AND HIS INVITATION TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. WHEN IT RETURNED IN STRENGTH TO THE BATTLEFIELD LATE IN THE YEAR, THE RPF CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING A GUERRILLA EFFORT RATHER THAN ON STRIKING SUCH MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS RUHENGERI AND KIGALI.

30. (C) THE FAR, WHICH HAS BECOME MORE UNDISCIPLINED AND INEFFECTIVE AS IT HAS GROWN LARGER, HAS PROVED
INCAPABLE OF DISLODGING THE REBELS. EARLIER THIS YEAR IT APPEARED TO BE SAVED FROM COLLAPSE ONLY BY THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS.

31. (C) THE RPF HAS SUCCEEDED THROUGH WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN WINNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATE AN RPF ROLE IN A FUTURE RWANDAN REGIME. EVEN THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE LONG BEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF HABYARIMANA' SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT THAT IS AT LEAST MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPF.

32. (C) THE PROBLEM IS FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. RPF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAVE ALTERNATED BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OBSTINACY. MUCH OF THE RPF'S ENERGY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CRITICIZING THE CORRUPTION AND HYPOCRISY OF THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, AN EASY TASK. THE RPF ENTERED THE ARUSHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CALLING FOR SCRAPPING THE CONSTITUTION AND REPLACING THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE WITH AN APPOINTED, ALL-POWERFUL NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RECONCILIATION THAT WOULD RULE THE COUNTRY DURING A FOUR-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD.

33. (C) THE RPF REJECTS INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM, PARTLY BECAUSE HABYARIMANA CONTINUES TO HOLD REAL POWER. IT HAS EVEN REJECTED A FORMULA THAT WOULD REDUCE HABYARIMANA'S POWERS SIGNIFICANTLY.

34. (C) THE RPF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A MORE LIBERAL MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GUARANTEES, BECAUSE IT COULD NOT WIN SIGNIFICANT POWER THROUGH ELECTIONS WITHOUT FORMING A COALITION. EVEN IF ALL THE TUTSIS RETURNED TO RWANDA, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE NO MORE THAN 14 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S TOTAL POPULATION.

35. (C) WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO MILITARY INTEGRATION, THE RPF IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER OPENING LINE. PAUL KAGAME, THE RPF MILITARY COMMANDER AND DE FACTO LEADER OF THE REBELS. IN A JULY STATEMENT SAID: "WE SHALL INSIST ON A 50-PERCENT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL ARMY. THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT A DEFEATED ARMY." ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN KIGALI HAVE AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES TO THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING RPF FIGHTERS INTO THE
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ARMY, THE RPF'S OPENING POSITION IS A NONSTARTER.

36. (C) AT BOTTOM, THE RPF WANTS A SHARE OF POWER AS WELL AS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RPF MEMBERS AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT CAN ACHIEVE THESE AIMS WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IT PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT OUT OF PROPORTION TO TUTSI NUMBERS FOR A LONG (FOUR-YEAR) TRANSITION PERIOD. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT ITS POSITION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, BUT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE GOVERNMENT'S BOTTOM LINE BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.

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PRESSURING THE RPF

37. (C) THE RPF HAS BEEN FAR LESS WILLING THAN THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD LITTLE TO LOSE BY CONTINUING ITS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT, IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO INTENSIFY THE REBELLION IF THE POLITICAL TRACK BOGS DOWN. RPF INTRANSIGENCE DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON UGANDA, WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS THE SITE OF THE RPF'S HEADQUARTERS.

38. (C) ALTHOUGH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS LITTLE BUT CONTEMPT FOR HABYARIMANA AND CLEARLY FAVORS A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE RPF WITH A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF POWER, HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF MAY BE SOFTENING. WHILE MUSEVENI DOES NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE REDUCED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, UGANDA AND RWANDA SIGNED A NONAGGRESSION TREATY IN AUGUST THAT PROVIDES FOR RWANDAN MONITORING TEAMS ON THE UGANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

39. (C) MOREOVER, IN THE SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA, UGANDAN OBSERVERS JOINED OBSERVERS FROM RWANDA'S OTHER NEIGHBORS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS. MUSEVENI EVEN SENT WORD THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RPF PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND FROM THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE RPF MIGHT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
40. (C) BY HOLDING TO A HARD LINE, THE RPF RUNS OTHER RISKS. FIRST, IT MAY ALIENATE THE INTERNAL PARTIES THAT SHARE ITS INTEREST IN LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. IT ALSO RISKS OFFENDING THE FOREIGN ACTORS--STATES IN THE REGION, THE US, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM--WHOSE ATTENTION HAS GIVEN THE RPF/TUTSI ISSUE A NEW DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY. IT IS LIKELY THAT, WHILE PROFESSING A WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND BY BEING TACTICALLY FLEXIBLE, THE RPF WILL SEEK TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND WAIT FOR KIGALI AGAIN TO LOWER ITS BOTTOM LINE.

41. (C) BUT THE RPF IS IN A CATCH-22 SITUATION: IT WILL RISK A HUTU BACKLASH IF IT IS GENERALLY SEEN BY THE HUTU MAJORITY--OR BY HARDLINE HUTUS CLOSE TO HABYARIMANA--AS MOVING TO REASSERT TUTSI HEGEMONY OVER THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. ANTI-TUTSI ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE THAT NO MATTER WHAT IS AGREED TO IN POWERSHARING TALKS, THE RPF MUST TREAD A FINE LINE IF IT WISHES TO RETURN PEACEFULLY TO RWANDA. IN THE END, THE RPF MAY DECIDE THAT THE RISK OF RETURNING IS TOO GREAT. (EHRENREICH)

B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

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1. RESPONSE TO THE REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT ON RWANDAN DEATH SQUADS WITH POSSIBLE LINKS TO PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA (REFTEL) HAS NOT BEEN LONG IN COMING. CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC "LA LIBRE BELGIQUE" REPORTED ON OCTOBER 22 THAT NINE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE "RESEAU ZERO" DEATH SQUADRONS HAVE INFORMED THE NEWSPAPER THAT THE STATEMENTS ARE "TOTALLY FALSE" AND THAT THEY WILL BE INITIATING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KUYPERS, REYNTJENS, AND SCHEERS (THE THIRD AUTHOR OF THE REPORT) FOR DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER THROUGH THE BRUSSELS LEGAL FIRM OF CRUYPLANTS ELOY MASSART AND HUPIN.

2. THE NINE RWANDANS LISTED IN THE REPORT ARE: THREE BROTHERS-IN-LAW OF PRES. HABYARIMANA PROTEE ZIGIRANYIRAZO,
SERAPHIN RWABUKUMBA, AND COLONEL ELIE SAGATWA; PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW ALPHONSE NTIRIVAMUNDA; HEAD OF MILITARY TRAINING COLONEL ANATOLE NSENGIYUMVA; DIRECTOR OF THE CABINET OF THE MFA COLONEL BAGOSORA, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY COLONEL LAURENT SERUBUGA; COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD MAJOR LEONARD NKUNDIYE, AND CAPTAIN PASCAL SIMBIKANGWA.

3. POST IS SEEKING TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT FOR FORWARDING TO THE DEPARTMENT.

GEILB
2. Act as Prime Minister when the post falls vacant, until a new Prime Minister is appointed, following modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement.

3. In addition, hold a Ministerial Portfolio.

Sub-section 4: **Mode of Decision-Making within the Government**

**Article 21**

Prior to the deliberations, the Cabinet meeting shall adopt its agenda.

Cabinet decisions shall be taken by consensus. Where consensus is not reached, the issue at hand shall be returned to the relevant Minister for further study.

Consensus on the issue shall once again be required subsequent discussions, and if no consensus is reached, a decision shall be taken on the basis of a partial consensus of a 2/3 of the members of the Government present.

For the following issues, however, consensus shall be mandatory:

- amendment to the Peace Agreement;
- declaration of war;
- exercise of the prerogative of mercy and mitigation of sentence;
- defence and security matters.

**Article 22**

For each Cabinet Meeting, minutes and a summary of decisions shall be written. The summary shall be approved and signed by members who attended the said meeting.
a) The party of the former President of the Republic shall present two candidates to the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly within three (3) weeks of the declaration of the vacancy.

b) Within the fourth week, the election of the President of the Republic shall be conducted in a joint session of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly. The respective members of the two institutions shall elect the President of the Republic by secret ballot and by an absolute majority. The election shall be supervised by the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly.

c) If the Party of the former President of the Republic, for one reason or another, is not willing to present a candidate or cannot present any candidate, or if the President of the Republic has resigned from his party in the meantime, each political force represented in the Transitional National Assembly may submit one (1) candidate within six (6) weeks after the declaration of the vacancy. The election shall be conducted during the seventh week, at the latest, following the modalities provided for in point (b) above.

d) If the vacancy is declared three (3) months or less before the expiry of the transitional period, the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly shall assume the interim Presidency of the Republic until the end of the Transition.

**Article 49:** The candidate to the Presidency of the Republic should be at least thirty-five (35) years of age. Once elected, the President cannot perform any military or other remunerative activity.

**Article 50:** The new President of the Republic shall be sworn in within eight (8) days after his election, by the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, before the National Transitional Assembly.

**Sub-Section 2: Appointment of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State**

**Article 51:** The candidate for the post of Prime Minister shall be presented by the political formation designated to that effect. He shall be presented to the
two parties to the negotiations for approval. He should be known before the signing of the Peace Agreement.

**Article 52:** The Prime Minister shall, in consultation with each political force called upon to participate in the Government, select candidates for the portfolios distributed among the various political forces. He shall present them to the President of the Republic for appointment as well as to the Transitional National Assembly, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 3 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

**Sub-Section 3: Replacement of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State**

**Article 53:** The vacancy of the post of Prime Minister shall be declared by the Supreme Court upon request by the Broad-Based Transitional Government. The political force of the former Prime Minister shall submit a candidate within fifteen (15) days of the declaration of the vacancy. Political formations participating in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall, under the coordination of the Deputy Prime Minister, hold consultations for the approval of the candidate. Once a consensus is reached, the Deputy Prime Minister shall present the candidate to the President of the Republic for appointment within three (3) days.

**Article 54:** The Prime Minister, in consultation with the political force of the Minister or Secretary of State to be replaced, shall present a candidate to the President of the Republic for appointment.

**Sub-Section 4: Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios within the Broad-Based Transitional Government**

**Article 55:** In accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, the numerical distribution of the portfolios among political forces called upon to participate in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall be as follows:

- **MRND:** 5 portfolios
- **RPF:** 5 portfolios
- **MDR:** 4 portfolios (including the post of Prime Minister)
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD US HIS
DELEGATION HAD NOT FOUND THE NICARAGUAN MODEL FOR MILITARY INTEGRATION VERY APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE AND THAT THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR OTHER MODELS. THE RWANDANS CLEARLY FEAR DESTABILIZATION FROM THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ARE CLINGING TO THE UNREALISTIC HOPE THAT THE RPF WILL ACCEPT LATER INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMY ON THE BASIS OF ATTRITION. MOREOVER, THE GOR HASN'T YET COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THE RPF WILL PROBABLY NOT ACCEPT A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RWANDANS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN LARGER NUMBERS AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

THE NICARAGUAN TRIP

3. PASSING THROUGH WASHINGTON AFTER A WEEK-LONG VISIT TO NICARAGUA, RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE JAMES GASANA ASKED TO MEET WITH AF/RA MILITARY ADVISER LTC MARLEY ON NOVEMBER

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14. LTC LAURENT RUTAYISIRE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATION, BUT AMBASSADOR UWIMANA, THE THIRD MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION, ONLY SAT IN BRIEFLY. THE DELEGATION DID NOT FIND THE NICARAGUAN DEMOBILIZATION MODEL APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY FOUND IT "IDEOLOGICAL" RATHER THAN "ETHNIC," FOCUSED ON THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AIMED AT ELECTIONS RATHER THAN POWER SHARING. MARLEY SUGGESTED ZIMBABWE'S PLAN MIGHT BE MORE APPLICABLE. WE LATER LEARNED THAT THE GOR MAY AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR UWIMANA TO VISIT EL SALVADOR SINCE ITS MODEL MIGHT BE MORE RELEVANT TO THAT OF RWANDA. UWIMANA IS AWARE THAT THE ZIMBABWE PLAN INTEGRATES THE ARMY, BUT DOESN'T KNOW IF THE MINISTER WILL TRAVEL THERE OR NOT.

INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION

4. THE DELEGATION EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATING THE RPA INTO THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZATION. IN THEIR VIEW, A "DISPROPORTIONATELY" HIGH PERCENTAGE OF RPA SOLDIERS WOULD UPSET THE ETHNIC BALANCE AND LEAD TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY, THEY
FEAR THAT SIMULTANEOUS INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WOULD DESTABILIZE FURTHER THE ECONOMY BY SENDING LARGE NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS INTO UNEMPLOYMENT. THEY BELIEVE THE RPF SHOULD BE REPATRIATED INTO SOCIETY FIRST, WITH DEMOBILIZATION OF THE FAR SECOND, AND INTEGRATION OF THE RPA INTO THE ARMY THIRD AS VACANCIES Appear THROUGH ATTRITION. MARLEY POINTED OUT THAT THE RPF COULD NEVER ACCEPT SUCH AN UNREALISTIC SOLUTION. THE ORDER OF SOLUTIONS REQUIRES EITHER A) INTEGRATION OF ALL FORCES FOLLOWED BY RATIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OR B) DEMOBILIZATION OF A PART OF BOTH FORCES, INTEGRATION OF THE REMAINDER, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OF THE COMBINED FORCES LATER.

5. GASANA AND RUTAYISIRE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF SECURITY IS THE REAL ISSUE FOR THE RPF THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, RATHER THAN THE ARMY WHICH SHOULD BECOME AN APOLITICAL FORCE FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE. MARLEY RESPONDED THAT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES MUST BOTH BE ADDRESSED. (COMMENT. TO ENSURE SOCIAL STABILITY, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO INTEGRATE ALL THREE FORCES, BUT FOR FACILITY OF TRANSITION IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMPROMISE IN SEVERAL AREAS. THE RPF COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FOCUS ON OBTAINING HIGHER PERCENTAGES IN THE THE ARMY AND THE POLICE AND NOT INTEGRATE INTO THE GENDARMERIE. END COMMENT)

6. MARLEY EMPHASIZED THAT WHATEVER MECHANISM IS DEVELOPED FOR THE LONG TERM MUST ENGENDER CONFIDENCE IN THE SHORT TERM. AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE, THE RWANDANS ALSO INSISTED THAT THE RPF MUST BE REALISTIC IN ITS DEMANDS. SPEAKING BLUNTLY, THEY NOTED THAT THE RPF, AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SUFFER IF THE MECHANISM WERE TO BREAK DOWN.

7. TURNING TO PERCENTAGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY, THE RWANDANS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF RPF PARTICIPATION AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVELS, BUT CONFIDENTIAL
INSISTED THAT THE PERCENTAGES AT LOWER LEVELS SHOULD BE KEPT SMALLER. MARLEY AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE RPF TO INITIALLY ACCEPT 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY FOR THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION. HE SUGGESTED THEY CONSIDER THE ZIMBABWE SOLUTION. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD INVOLVE INTEGRATING FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE RELATIVE NUMBERS EACH GROUP HAS AT THE TIME OF INTEGRATION AND ALLOWING PERCENTAGES TO SLIP DOWNWARDS ON THE BASIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS OVER TIME. END COMMENT.)

8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, GASANA INVITED MARLEY TO VISIT KIGALI AFTER THE NEXT ROUND OF ARUSHA TALKS, AND PERHAPS THEN TRAVEL TO RPF-HELD TERRITORY TO VISIT RPF COMMANDERS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER DAVE RAWSON OR AMBASSADOR FLATEN WOULD BE THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR AT THE NEXT ROUND, MARLEY NOTED THAT SINCE THE TIMING IS UNCLEAR, NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE.

COMMENT

9. THE MINISTER AND DIRECTOR GENERAL SEEMED SERIOUS ABOUT SOLVING THE INTEGRATION QUESTIONS, BUT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION THE RPF MIGHT DEMAND AT ARUSHA. THE RWANDAN MILITARY HAS YET TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO GIVE THE RPF MORE THAN 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE CLEARLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (PERHAPS ON A 50/50 BASIS) AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES.
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2304
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3251, (B) STATE 372632

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WE EXPECT THAT THE NOVEMBER 23 SESSION OF THE ARUSHA TALKS WILL BE DEVOTED TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES RATHER THAN CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL TALKS, BUT THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE RPF. THE RWANDANS ARE READY WITH A FIRM PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION, AND HAVE DONE SOME GOOD THINKING ON SUBSEQUENT DEMOBILIZATION. THE TOUGH PROBLEM WILL BE SECURING AGREEMENT ON THE PROPORTION OF RPF TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE RWANDAN ARMY. RWANDAN OFFERS WILL RANGE FROM SEVEN TO EIGHTEEN PERCENT, THE LATTER BEING THE OUTSIDE LIMIT, ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BUT SENIOR OFFICERS MAY BE A SOMEWHAT HIGHER PROPORTION. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HOPES TO COMPLETE THESE
NEGOTIATIONS YET HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE TANZANIAN FACILITATORS AND THE RPF ACCEPT THE RWANDAN CONCEPT OF REOPENING THE TALKS IN ARUSHA ON NOVEMBER 23 WITH THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AS THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM. NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THAT SEEMS TO BE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE ARE GOING, THIS IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHERE RWANDAN THINKING IS ON THIS S:#9/---------

4. THE RWANDANS FINALLY GOT AROUND TO ASKING THE TANZANIANS FOR A CHANGE IN THE AGENDA ON NOVEMBER 19. APPARENTLY THE TANZANIANS TOLD THE GOR THAT THEY COULD CONTACT THE RPF THEMSELVES. THE TANZANIANS, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR MBEZI, ARE MOST UPSET WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR THE REMARKS HE MADE NOVEMBER 15 AT A POLITICAL RALLY. AMBASSADOR MBEZI GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT EVEN WITHDRAW THEIR INVITATION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS. IN ANY EVENT, THE TANZANIANS REFUSED TO FACILITATE CONTACT WITH THE RPF. IN A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING, NOVEMBER 20, HE TOLD ME THAT HE HOPED TO SPEAK WITH THE RPF IN BRUSSELS DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY THEIR RESPONSE TO US THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW MORNING.

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NEXT STEPS
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5. RWANDAN THINKING ON THE INTEGRATION QUESTION HAS MADE TREMENDOUS STRIDES FORWARD IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE IDEA AND PRINCIPLE IS NOW ACCEPTED BY THE MILITARY AND EVEN BY THE THE RIGHT WING CDR PARTY. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA TOLD ME PROUDLY THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE MILITARY IS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION AS A RESULT OF A SERIES OF SEMINARS HE HAS SPONSORED.

6. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS PROPOSED THAT INTEGRATION BEGIN BY BRINGING RPF OFFICERS INTO THE HIGH COMMAND. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE ASSEMBLING MILITARY UNITS INTO AGREED ASSEMBLY POINTS, STARTING TWO WEEKS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD THEN PROPOSE TO
Move unit by unit in either integrating into the army or rejecting individual fighters from the RPF. Those rejected would be given training or other economic opportunities. The key provision, according to Gasana, is to assure that all RPF combatants are repatriated, so no cadre is left behind in Uganda to renew the war.

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7. But Minister of Defense Gasana is also acutely aware of the difficulties, particularly after his visit to Nicaragua where he saw many problems in the

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8. As soon as they start talking numbers, the two sides are going to have a problem. I would suggest, therefore, that the Rwandan side will talk principles initially and try to avoid the sticky question of how many RPF or what proportion the RPF might have in the army.

9. From what we understand, the Rwandan military began with an offer of seven percent. This was calculated on the assumption of there being 500,000 refugees outside of the Rwandan borders which is about one-fifteenth of the Rwandan population. Gasana told me today they are willing to negotiate up to the proportion claimed by the RPF as Rwandan diaspora, that is 1.3 million compared to a population of 7.2 million, or up to eighteen percent. We have heard no higher numbers considered in this government yet, except for hints that the proportion of senior officers integrated would be higher. Gasana confirmed that senior officers could be a somewhat higher proportion.

10. So far it appears that the Rwandans will insist on integration.
They are very concerned about creating what they would consider a critical mass of ex RPF in any given unit. They also fear that if they accept too high a proportion of RPF in the army, there will be security problems as a result, and the ex-RPF will be the most threatened.

DEMobilization

11. The Rwandan military contains approximately 30,000 men. It is believed that the RPF effective strength is about 10,000. Minimum estimates would require reducing that combined force to no more than 10,000 troops, thus requiring demobilization of 30,000 men.

12. Rwandan soldiers are all graduates from primary school but, except for some of the noncommissioned officers, they have no secondary education.

13. The simplest way of demobilizing GDR forces would be to move them immediately into secondary schools. We understand the current annual intake of new secondary students is about 10,000. Adding 10,000 demobilized soldiers to each new incoming class for a couple of years would pretty much take care of the problem. It would strain the resources of the existing secondary schools, but our experience with self-help projects is that classrooms can be built very quickly, in a matter of weeks, and very cheaply, for around USD 2,500 per classroom.

14. Special care will have to be taken for RPF soldiers. The most serious problem will be those who are Rwandan by birth and left recently to join the
RPF. They will not be able to return to their home
communes with security. But they could be
accommodated in secondary boarding schools along with
other demobilized soldiers from the GOR and RPF.
Rwandans are well aware of the special sensitivity
for these people, and even the military is prepared
to work out arrangements for their reintegration.

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15. The concept of using secondary school as the
primary vehicle for demobilization has been kicked
AROUND IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE LEADERSHIP IN THE
PARLIAMENT. EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE WILL BE
SOME PEOPLE WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO BENEFIT FROM A
SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THAT ADDITIONAL, PERHAPS
VOCATIONAL, ARRANGEMENTS WILL NEED TO BE MADE FOR
THOSE WHO CAN'T HANDLE ACADEMIC TRAINING.
NEVERTHELESS, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT RWANDAN SOLDIERS
WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE HILLSIDES, SO
SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE FOR THEM.
FURTHERMORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS
NOT GOING TO CREATE MANY NEW JOBS DURING THE NEXT
YEAR. BUT AFTER THE WAR ENDS AND PEOPLE BEGIN TO
HAVE CONFIDENCE, NEW JOBS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE.
RWANDA'S OUTPUT OF SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATES IS
PATHETICALLY LOW, NUMBERING JUST A FEW THOUSAND A
YEAR. A DEVELOPING ECONOMY WILL BE ABLE TO ABSORB AN
EXPANSION OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL POPULATION.

16. COMMENT: NEITHER WE NOR THE RWANDANS HAVE ANY
IDEA WHERE THE RPF WILL DRAW ITS BOTTOM LINE ON
INTEGRATION. AND WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW
MUCH FLEXIBILITY THERE IS IN THE RWANDAN POSITION.
THE STICKY PART MAY BE, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THE
PERCENTAGE OF RPF THAT WILL BE PERMITTED IN. AND THE
RPF WILL BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE GOR GOOD FAITH
IN INTEGRATING RPF INDIVIDUALS. THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE WELCOMES THE PROPOSED TRAVEL OF COLONEL
MARLEY TO ARUSHA, AND HOPES HE WILL VISIT KIGALI
AGAIN ON HIS WAY HOME. END COMMENT. FLATEN

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Kigali, 15 January 1993

Note to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda

Kigali

Subject: Negotiations in Arusha from 22 November 1992 to 9 January 1993

1. **Atmosphere of the negotiations**

   The negotiations held in Arusha from 22 November 1992 to 9 January 1993 sought to address the distribution of ministerial portfolios within the Broad-based Transitional Government, the establishment of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and procedures for making appointments to the judiciary. The atmosphere of the negotiations was one of dealings and differences of opinion among the Government delegation, a logical consequence of the political situation that reigned in the country. It is worth recalling that in the absence of a consensus on the distribution of ministerial portfolios among the political parties and the Government, the delegation had to leave for Arusha with little hope of reversing the order of the negotiations by first tackling the issue of integration of the RPF combatants into the Rwandan Army and then going on to address the outstanding political issues. The Rwandan Government hoped thereby and in the meantime to achieve a consensus on the sharing of ministerial posts and those of the Transitional National Assembly.

2. **The negotiations at a standstill**

   As could be expected, RPF emphatically refused that any other issue be discussed before the issue of power sharing within the Executive, the Judiciary and the Transitional National Assembly had been fully dealt with. This stalemate aggravated by the disquiet over the protest against certain articles in the previous protocol lasted more than a week.

   The atmosphere of the negotiations was further dampened by the differences of opinion among the Comité de concertation [Consultation Committee], composed of Catholic and Protestant bishops, over the proposal submitted to the Government for the distribution of ministerial portfolios, and by MRND’s strong opposition to the conclusions of the Council of Ministers held on 28 November 1992. Any progress in the negotiations was thus blocked.

3. **Resumption and progress of the negotiations**

   The meeting between the President of the Republic of Rwanda and the President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, came as a big relief to the Government delegation and the observers. The statement by the President of Rwanda specifying the acceptance of the previous protocol, the nomination of deputies by the political parties and the need to ensure a balance
between the political parties got things moving again. As the negotiations progressed, the
inclusion of other political parties in the Government emerged as a crucial problem, for several
reasons:

(a) The Government had remained silent on the issue of the political parties to be
included in the Government, thus giving free rein to all sorts of speculation.

(b) The criteria to be applied to the parties that were outside the Government practically
eliminated all of them.

(c) The MDR, PL and PSD parties and RPF formed a strong alliance and refused that
CDR, a party deemed by many members of the delegation to have a major political impact, be
included in the Government.

Despite the support of this coalition by the head of the delegation, we insisted many that
times that CDR should be brought into the Government; some important personalities including
the American Cohen were prepared to throw their weight behind the pressure being put on RPF to
ensure that the proposal was accepted. In that connection, the delegation introduced other
considerations, including a political code of ethics and the national reconciliation policy, in a bid
to soften RPF’s intransigence. PDI and CDR were just about to be accepted into the Government
when the negotiators received the statement by MDR, PL and PSD that CDR should not be
included in the Government. The head of the delegation leaned towards this new statement. The
negotiations again reached an impasse. On 3 January 1993, Ambassador Mpungwe sent a letter to
the two delegations setting out the position of the Tanzanian Government. He stated that if the two
deleagations were still unable to sign the Protocol of Agreement between 3 and 6 January 1993, it
would be preferable for them to adjourn the talks in order to reflect further on the issues and
continue the consultations. The time factor was of strategic importance. Moreover, it could be
difficult for Tanzania, as facilitator, to sustain the current high level of interest, support and
assistance of the international community in the Rwandan peace process.

From then on, all the observers, the facilitator and the heads of the two delegations took
counsel together on the RPF proposal for one ministerial post to be given to RPF and one post to
the Government side. It was decided to give one post to MRND and one to RPF.

There was NOT much difference of opinion on the number of seats to be accorded to each
of the political forces in the Transitional National Assembly.

4. Observations

- The political differences that were prevalent in the country made themselves felt in
Arusha, seriously clouding the atmosphere of the negotiations. This was a direct
consequence of the composition of the delegation that carried with it all the sensitivities
of the political parties. The members of the various political parties present in Arusha
zealously vied with each other for behind-the scene discussions with RPF on partisan
issues so much so that RPF believed itself to be and conducted itself like an arbiter. In
the future, the delegation should comprise a smaller number of delegates and the politics therein kept to the minimum possible.

- The political party leaders gave priority to the immediate interests of their parties at the expense of the national interest.

- The solidarity between MDR-PSD-PL and RPF NO LONGER needs to be proven. Yet, this solidarity is ONLY a very short-sighted view of things.

- The observers accuse the Rwandan Government of NOT BEING resolutely committed to the negotiation process. Tanzania may lose interest in the Rwandan case.

5. Conclusion

The negotiations that are expected to culminate in the conclusion of the Peace Agreement must follow their course, although the previous protocol had serious deficiencies in certain places. Any related implementation difficulties could be corrected through diplomatic channels, if need be, by calling for the intervention of the observers before the Peace Agreement is finally signed.

- Considerations that are aimed PURELY at the immediate interests of the political parties should bow to the superior interests of the Nation.

- The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who are primarily responsible for handling the politics of the country, should strive towards reconciliation and pave the way for mutual understanding on the essentials in order NOT TO widen the chasm between the President’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office at the risk of dragging the country into ruin.

Col. BEMS Bagosora (signed)
Col. BEMS Muberuka (signed)
Lt.Col. BEM Ndengeyinka (signed)
Lt. Col. BEM Rwabalinda (signed)
Maj. BAM Gakara (signed)

Copy to:
His Excellency the Prime Minister
Kigali
PRÉSIDENCE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE

Le Conseiller à la Présidence

Paris, le 8 février 1993

NOTE

à l'attention de Monsieur le Président de la République

(Sous/couvert de Monsieur le Secrétaire Général)

OBJET : RWANDA - offensive militaire du FPR.

Il est confirmé que le FPR a déclenché une offensive généralisée sur le Nord Rwanda à partir de ses bases ougandaises et sans doute aussi via le Zaire.

Ruhengeri fait l'objet de combats, l'armée rwandaise a engagé toute ses réserves.

Une réunion de crise s'est tenue en fin de matinée au Quai d'Orsay.

Le dispositif suivant est soumis à votre approbation :

1 - Sur le plan diplomatique :

- rappel de notre soutien au processus d'Arusha et condamnation de cette rupture unilatérale du cessez-le-feu (déclaration
du porte-parole du Quai).

- mise en garde de Museveni (Président de l'Ouganda) : M. Dumas devrait le joindre au téléphone.

Nous alertons également Washington, Londres et Bruxelles.

2 - Sur le plan militaire :

- renforcement de notre soutien à l'armée rwandaise, à l'exclusion de toute participation directe des forces françaises aux affrontements.

- livraisons de munitions et matériels

- assistance technique, notamment dans l'artillerie.

- une compagnie a été mise en alerte à six heures au cas où la sécurité de la communauté française nécessiterait son intervention.

Général Quesnot

Bruno DELAYE
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

Paris, February 8, 1993

Advisor to the Presidency

NOTE
to the attention of the President of the Republic

(Care of the Secretary General)

SUBJECT: RWANDA – RPF military offensive.

It has been confirmed that the RPF has launched a generalized offensive against northern Rwanda from its Ugandan bases and no doubt also via Zaïre.

Ruhengeri has seen fighting, the Rwandan army has called up all its reserves.

A crisis meeting was held in late morning at the Quai d'Orsay.

The following plan has been submitted for your approval:

1 – On the diplomatic level:

- reminder of our support of the Arusha process and condemnation of this unilateral breaking of the cease-fire (statement from the Quai spokesperson).

- warning to Museveni (President of Uganda): Mr. Dumas should call him on the phone.

We will also alert Washington, London, and Brussels.

2 – On the military level:

- reinforcement of our support for the Rwandan army, with the exception of any direct participation of French forces in the confrontations.

- delivery of munitions and equipment

- technical assistance, especially with the artillery

- one company was put on alert at six o'clock in case the security of the French community necessitates its intervention.

General Quesnot

Bruno DELAYE

HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND: "AGREED; URGENT."
1 - 102

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

Le Ministre de la Défense

NOTE
pour
le Président de la République  

OBJECT : RWANDA

Je reste préoccupé par notre position au Rwanda et par le rôle dans lequel nos 690 militaires peuvent se trouver entraînés, car l'armée rwandaise, de fait, ne se bat plus guère.

Il y a en ce moment 900.000 réfugiés dormant pratiquement en plein air entre les lignes du FPR et KIGALI. Leur seule présence est un facteur de troubles sérieux, et, bientôt, de situations incontrôlables.

Je vois mal le FPR renoncer à une victoire si proche et qui n'appelle sans doute même pas une offensive générale de sa part.

Je ne vois pas non plus comment faire revenir MUSEVENI à de meilleurs sentiments car nous n'avons pas sur lui de moyens de pression importants.

Quant à HABYARIMANA, l'envoi de deux compagnies supplémentaires, après beaucoup d'autres démonstrations de soutien, fait qu'il se sent à présent l'un des dirigeants africains les mieux protégés par la FRANCE. Ce n'est pas la meilleure façon de l'amener à faire les concessions nécessaires.

Or, il est, par son intransigeance politique, et par son incapacité à mobiliser sa propre armée, largement responsable du fiasco actuel.

.../...
Si le FPR reprend son avance, nos soldats peuvent, au bout de quelques heures, se retrouver face aux rebelles.

Le seul moyen de pression un peu fort qui nous reste, - l'intervention directe étant exclue - me semble l'éventualité de notre désengagement :

- présentée à HABYARIMANA comme une menace, elle peut l'amener à assouplir ses positions;

- présentée à MUSEVENI et au FPR comme une réponse possible à leurs propres concessions, elle pourrait les faire renoncer à une victoire militaire au profit de la seule victoire politique.

Marcel DEBARGE devrait, à mon avis, pouvoir disposer de cet argument pour faciliter sa mission.

Pierre JOXE
NOTE

for

the President of the Republic

SUBJECT: RWANDA

I am still concerned about our position in Rwanda and by the role into which our 690 soldiers could find themselves drawn, for the Rwandan army no longer fights.

There are now 900,000 refugees, practically sleeping outside, between the RPF lines and KIGALI. Their presence alone contributes to serious unrest and, soon, an uncontrollable situation.

I struggle to see why the RPF would abandon such a close victory, which would, no doubt, not even require a general offensive on its part.

I do not see, either, how to bring MUSEVENI back to our side, since we do not have the means to put significant pressure on him.

As for HABYARIMANA, the dispatch of two supplementary companies, after many other demonstrations of support, has led him to feel he is one of the African leaders best protected by FRANCE. This is not the best way to persuade him to make the necessary concessions.

Furthermore, he is, by his political intransigence, and his incapacity to mobilize his own army, largely responsible for the current fiasco.

If the RPF retakes the offensive, our soldiers could, in a matter of hours, find themselves face to face with the rebels.

Our only remaining means of exerting strong pressure—excluding direct intervention—seems to me to be the possibility of our disengagement:

- presented to HABYARIMANA as a threat, it could lead him to relax his position;
- presented to MUSEVENI and to the RPF as a possible response to their own concessions, it would make them give up a military victory for a solely political victory.

Marcel DEBARGE should, in my opinion, be able to use this argument to facilitate his mission.

Pierre JOXE
3 mars 1993
Conseil restreint : mercredi 3 mars 1993
(Notes prises par Hubert Védrine)

1. Situation au Rwanda


2. Situation dans l'ex-Yougoslavie

Le Président : "Si cela devait tourner à un monopole de l'OTAN, je réexaminerais le principe même de notre participation. Eventuellement je demanderais une réunion d'urgence. Seules les Nations Unies nous engagent. Je ne crois pas que les Américains veuillent une vraie guerre (ou alors, ils la feront faire par d'autres)"
March 3rd, 1993

Restricted Council: Wednesday, March 3rd, 1993

(Notes taken by Hubert Védrine)

1. Situation in Rwanda

The President: “We must get out, but by going through the United Nations. We cannot pull back like this.
It’s up to the Quai d’Orsay to ensure this shift very quickly. Is this possible?
We have to bridge the gap, to slow the advance of the Ugandans. It is urgent to obtain a decision from Boutros Ghali.
Our soldiers can become United Nations soldiers, but not them alone. We must act very quickly, in two or three days.”

2. Situation in the former Yugoslavia

The President: “If this were to turn into a NATO monopoly, I would reexamine the very principle of our participation. Eventually I would ask for an emergency meeting.
We are only involved with the United Nations.
I do not believe that the Americans want a real war (or else, they will have it fought by others).”
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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EUR-01
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NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01
P-01 SDEL-00 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 RPE-01 /061W
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P 191358Z APR 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3650
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
USCONSULATE VAIHINGEN GE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 01605

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MCAP, OA, RU
SUBJECT: ARUSHA AND BEYOND

REF: STATE 118029

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 01605 01 OF 02 191414Z

2. SUMMARY: RWANDA IS REPORTEDLY READY TO ACCEPT
RPF MANNING OF 33 PERCENT OF THE FUTURE ARMY. DEFENSE
MINISTER GASANA IS BEING SENT TO TANZANIA WITH THE
MESSAGE, BUT THE GOR HAS NOT AGREED TO MOVEMENT OF
THE GENDARMERIE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE
MINISTER OF PLAN IS REACTIVATING HIS INTERAGENCY TEAM
TO COMPLETE PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION, AND INVITES
U.S. PARTICIPATION. AFTER CONVERSATIONS WITH PARTY
LEADERS HERE, DCM WILL DISCUSS OUR PLANNED DEMOCRACY
PROJECTS WITH RPF IN CORRIDORS OF ARUSHA. RWANDAN
CONSUSION ON REFUGEE RETURN SEEMS FIRM. END SUMMARY.

3. IN PREPARATION FOR THE DEPARTURE OF DCM JOYCE
LEADER TO BE OUR OBSERVER IN ARUSHA, WE MET WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE HEADS OF
THE MDR AND PLO POLITICAL PARTIES, AND A NUMBER OF

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
OTHERS TO GET A FEEL OF RWANDAN ATTITUDES ON THE ARUSHA PROCESS AS WE APPROACH, HOPEFULLY, THE FINAL STAGES.

MILITARY PROPORTIONS

4. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD US APRIL 15 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GO TO 35 PERCENT RPF PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT ARMY, BUT THE VISIT OF THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, BECAUSE HE BROUGHT NOTHING POSITIVE ON THE RPF POSITION. ACCORDING TO TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR MBEZI, THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PASS HIS MESSAGE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESIDENT, NOT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT THE MESSAGE WASN'T MUCH BETTER. THE TANZANIANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE RPF WOULD COME DOWN 40 PERCENT. BUT THEY HEARD FROM HABYARIMANA THAT RWANDA WOULD ONLY GO TO 30 PERCENT, AND THAT ONLY AFTER A CABINET DECISION WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE APRIL 16. ALSO ON APRIL 15, DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA UNDER PRODDING INDICATED THAT RWANDA WOULD ACCEPT 30 PERCENT FOR THE RPF, BUT SAID THAT ANYTHING OVER 30 PERCENT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT.

5. THERE HAS BEEN NO ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE APRIL 16 CABINET DEBATE, BUT WE HEAR IT WAS ANOTHER ORDERLY MEETING FROM WHICH A CONSENSUS EMERGED. ONE SOURCE TOLD ME THE CONSENSUS WAS REACHED AT 33 PERCENT, A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S 30 PERCENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S 35 PERCENT. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW ASKED DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA TO VISIT TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THE RWANDAN POSITION AND SEEK AN EARLY RESOLUTION IN ARUSHA. GASANA MAY ALSO GO TO ARUSHA.

GENDARMERIE

6. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT DISCUSSIONS WERE BEGINNING ON THE GENDARMERIE, AND THE RPF WANTED TO MOVE THE GENDARMERIE INTO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WHICH THEY EXPECT TO CONTROL IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. BOTH HE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER SAID THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BECAUSE THEY HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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MINISTRIES WOULD REMAIN THE SAME IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, PRESUMABLY THEY WILL HOLD TO THEIR PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT, EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE KNOWS IT MASKS A FAR GREATER CONCERN ON THE PART OF HUTU RWANDANS WHO WOULD HAVE A TERRIBLE TIME ACCEPTING RPF/TUTSI CONTROL ON THE GENDERMERIE. (COMMENT: THIS COULD TURN INTO A PROTRACTED AND BITTER DEBATE. END COMMENT.)

DEMOBILIZATION

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 01605 02 OF 02 191413Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EUR-01
   HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00
   NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01
   P-01 SDEL-00 SNMP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
   USIE-00 RPE-01 /061W
   B4EFEA 191421Z /38

P 191358Z APR 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3651
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 KIGALI 01605

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MCAP, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: ARUSHA AND BEYOND

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7. THERE IS BROAD RECOGNITION AMONG ALL PARTIES,
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PAGE 02 KIGALI 01605 02 OF 02 191413Z
THAT IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE ON AN URGENT BASIS TO
MANAGE THE DEMOBILIZATION OF 20-30,000 TROOPS, NO
PEACE AGREEMENT CAN SURVIVE. IN ADDITION TO
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, DEFENSE
MINISTER AND PARTY LEADERS, THE AMBASSADOR,
ACCOMPANIED BY USAID AND PC DIRECTORS, MET WITH
MINISTER OF PLAN AUGUSTIN NGIRABATWARE AND HIS
CABINET DIRECTOR TO DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY ON
PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION, AND PRESS FOR FURTHER
ACTION. WE AGREED ALL DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED TO SOME FORM OF FURTHER EDUCATION, EITHER IN
THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS (SINCE ALL RWANDAN SOLDIERS
HAVE ALREADY COMPLETED PRIMARY SCHOOL) OR IN
TECHNICAL SCHOOLS. WE WOULD LIKE TO INVOLVE PEACE
CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN THE PROCESS, AND HAVE, THEREFORE,
ASKED PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR ALAN JOHNSTON TO WORK WITH
THE MINISTER OF PLAN FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO
STAFF OUT A REALISTIC PLAN FOR DEMOBILIZATION.
IT IS OUR HOPE TO HAVE USEFUL INFORMATION TO SHARE
WITH THE RPF IN ARUSHA, EVEN BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF
THE MILITARY TALKS.

DEMOCRACY

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8. IN MEETINGS WITH THE MINISTERS AND THE PARTY
LEADERS, WE NOTED THAT THE DCM'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
ARUSHA PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HER
TO DISCUSS THE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROJECTS THAT
WE HAVE IN RWANDA AND TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
SEMERN SUCH AS PROPOSED BY NDI WITH THE RPF AND THE
CONFIDENTIAL

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GOVERNMENT PARTIES. ALL OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT INVOLVING RPF LEADERS IN THIS
DISCUSSION AT THIS STAGE. IN FACT, MOST OF THEM SENT
WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS WITH DCM LEADER TO PEOPLE
THAT THEY HAVE KNOWN OR RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE RPF.

REFUGEES

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9. IRONICALLY, SINCE THE PURPOSE OF MS. LEADER'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE ARUSHA TALKS IS FIRST AND
FOREMOST HER EXPERIENCE IN REFUGEE QUESTIONS, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH OUR INTERLOCUTORS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THERE IS SUCH BROAD AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON THE OUTLINES OF THE PLANS FOR REFUGEE RETURN, THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN A SUBJECT OF EITHER DISCUSSION OR DEBATE FOR SOME TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER DID, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THERE WAS A QUESTION OF NATIONALITY AND HOW TO DEFINE WHO IS A RWANDAN. HE SAID THAT RWANDA WOULD RELY ON "INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS" OF NATIONALITY IN WORKING THE ISSUE THROUGH. (NOTE: HE MAY BE TALKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF REFUGEES. END NOTE.) THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT RWANDA WAS PREPARED TO OFFER TO ALL RWANDANS THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE SAID THAT THE UNHCR, IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF ITS BUSINESS, WOULD BE MAKING A CENSUS OF REFUGEES, AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THOSE WHO WERE IDENTIFIED TO BE ABLE TO VOTE. IN THIS HE SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT HAVE TO ESTABLISH CONSULATES IN CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 KIGALI 01605 02 OF 02 191413Z KIVU, ZAIRE, MBARARA, UGANDA AND IN TANZANIA. THE MOST DIFFICULT, HE SAID, WOULD BE BURUNDI BUT HE DID ELABORATE. FLATEN

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PAGE 02 STATE 153516 200203Z

SUBJECT: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER LOOKS FOR PEACEKEEPERS

REF: STATE 117028

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA TOLD ACTING IO A/S WARD THAT AN OAU FORCE OF 50 OFFICERS CANNOT EFFECTIVELY MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE OF 3,000 SQUARE MILES, FROM WHICH APPROXIMATELY 1 MILLION PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DISPLACED. THE OAU FORCE NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED TO 500 AND
SUPPORTED WITH OUTSIDE (READ UN) EXPERTISE AND DEPLOYED AHEAD OF A PEACE AGREEMENT, FOLLOWING WHICH IT WOULD BE REPLACED BY A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN ARUSHA. A UN BORDER MONITORING FORCE OF A SIMILAR SIZE WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT HELP AND SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IMMEDIATELY. GASANA OPINED THAT THE FORCES WOULD BE NEEDED UNTIL ELECTIONS, MEANING A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR LONGER, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS. WARD SAID THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT RWANDA'S NEEDS, ESPECIALLY THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS, BUT NOTED THAT THE UN IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR ITS ALREADY-ESTABLISHED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. GIVEN THESE CONSTRAINTS, THE USG WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL. END SUMMARY.

3. RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA MET MAY 17 WITH IO ACTING A/S GEORGE F. WARD. AMBASSADOR ALOYS UWIMANA AND A MILITARY AIDE WERE ALSO ON THE GOR SIDE. THE USG SIDE INCLUDED DESK OFFICER CAROL FULLER AND IO/UNP CONFIDENTIAL OFFICERS LEON WEINTRAUB AND ROBERT PATTERSON.

4. GASANA DESCRIBED A SITUATION IN RWANDA WHERE UP TO ONE MILLION PERSONS, APPROXIMATELY ONE-SEVENTH OF THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION, HAVE BEEN DISPLACED, SOME OF THEM MORE THAN FIVE TIMES. THE OAU NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (NMOG), WHICH CONSISTS OF ONLY 40 OFFICERS FROM NIGERIA, SENEGAL, MALI, AND ZIMBABWE, WITH FIVE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS EACH FROM THE GOR AND THE RPF, IS "VERY, VERY WEAK," AND UNABLE TO MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE NOW CLOSE TO 3,000 SQUARE MILES, AN AREA RECENTLY ENLARGED BY A FACTOR OF TEN. IN ADDITION TO SUCH OVERWHELMING OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES, GASANA ALLEGED THAT THE FIVE RPF MEMBERS IN THE NMOG MISUSED THEIR PRESENCE (FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES). HE ALSO NOTED THE OAU'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, CLAIMING THAT MANY OF THE INEXPERIENCED OAU OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN SIDES IN THE CONFLICT. GASANA EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AS WELL WITH THE OAU'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR RWANDA'S PROBLEMS, CITING RWANDA'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR THE OAU MONITORING PRESENCE IN HIS COUNTRY. HE IS LOOKING FOR HELP FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, HE SAID.

5. THE RPF MAY SAY THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE BUFFER
ZONE, GASANA SAID, BUT THEY HAVE ONLY CHANGED THEIR UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THAT IS WHY THE OAU FORCE NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED, ASSISTED WITH UN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND DEPLOYED AHEAD (AND IN ANTICIPATION) OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. ONLY IN THIS MANNER CAN DISPLACED PERSONS BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FURTHER MASS POPULATION MOVEMENTS PREVENTED, THE DEFENSE MINISTER

6. A MONITORING FORCE ALONG THE COUNTRY'S 180 KM MOUNTAINOUS BORDER WITH UGANDA WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR THE SAME REASON, GASANA SAID. HE CLAIMED THAT ANOTHER CEASEFIRE VIOLATION LIKE THE RPF ATTACK OF FEBRUARY WOULD THREATEN MANY MORE THAN ONE MILLION PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE IS WAITING FOR A REPORT FROM THE SYG'S TEAM THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN IN UGANDA AND WOULD NEXT DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH THE OAU IN ADDIS ABEBA.

7. WARD TOLD GASANA THAT HE HOPES THE UN CAN STRENGTHEN THE OAU PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN RWANDA, BUT THE UN IS ALREADY HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR ONGOING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT, SOMALIA, AND CYPRUS. EACH SUCH OPERATION FURTHER BURDENED AN ALREADY OVERSTRETCHED UN SYSTEM, EXPLAINING TO SOME DEGREE THE GREAT RELUCTANCE OF THE UNSYG TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD ESTABLISHING A UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA. WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CLOSELY, WARD SAID, AND FIND THE MOST "MANPOWER EFFICIENT" MEANS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM. HE THEN ASKED GASANA WHAT SPECIFIC KIND OF HELP HE MIGHT LOOK FOR FROM THE UN.

8. GASANA REPLIED THAT AROUND 500 UN TROOPS ARE NEEDED TO DEPLOY ALONG THE UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, HE SAW A NEED FOR AN ENLARGED UMOSG OF AROUND 500 OAU TROOPS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD SERVE IN RELATIVELY SMALL UNITS TO FACILITATE EASE OF
MOVEMENT WITHIN THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION AND WOULD REMAIN UNTIL A POTENTIAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (SUCH AS IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY THE PARTIES IN ARUSHA) IS FORMED AND ARRIVES FOLLOWING THE PEACE AGREEMENT. AT THAT POINT, THE UN BORDER FORCE AND UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE COMBINED UNDER A JOINT COMMAND AND REMAIN UNTIL TRAINING AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND ELECTIONS HELD. THE GOR WOULD LIKE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD WITHIN A "SHORT TIME" OF ABOUT ONE YEAR, BUT THE RPF HAS SUGGESTED A THREE-TO-FOUR YEAR PERIOD. GASANA SUGGESTED THAT THE TOTAL UN STRENGTH WOULD NEED TO BE 1,800, IMPLYING A NEED FOR 800 SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO THE TWO 500-PERSON GROUPS (COMMENT: IN HIS ANSWER TO THE SAME QUESTION POSED BY AF IN AN EARLIER MEETING, GASANA CITED A TOTAL FIGURE OF 1,000. END COMMENT).

9. GASANA SAID THAT HE HAD PLANS TO SEE THE SYG AND THE UNSC PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK MAY 18, WHEREHE WOULD FURTHER OUTLINE HIS IDEAS. WARD SAID THE USG WOULD REMAIN ATTENTIVE TO RWANDA'S NEEDS AND WOULD WATCH THE DISPLACED PROBLEM WITH DEEP CONCERN FOR SECURITY. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIELD NEW UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, HE SAID, BUT WE WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE POSSIBLE.

10. COMMENT: 

HE CLARIFIED AFTER THE MEETING THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS OF 500 TROOPS ON THE BORDER AND ANOTHER 500 FOR THE OAU NMOC WERE ONLY EARLY PLANNING FIGURES AND NOT CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Minister,

We, members of the "Strategy Committee" set up by you at the beginning of the latest round of negotiations, whose points of view thus far have been taken into account so as to ensure a smoother running of the negotiations, would like to send you this letter to explain our point of view on the issue of proportions within the National Army. This follows your statements during the plenary session chaired by the Representative of the Negotiations Facilitator on Monday afternoon, 31 May 1993.

Considering that, once made, your statements during the negotiations are final, and that they engage the responsibility of the entire nation, we had already asked you, during a meeting of the Strategy Committee on 18 May 1993, for which you had an express invitation, to consult the delegation you lead, and above all the "Strategy Group", before making any concessions on pre-agreed positions. That was in reaction to your unnecessary offer of 1,200 posts for the RPF in the gendarmerie at a time when the discussions were at the stage of dealing with the principles and modalities of the RPF joining that corps.

Again yesterday, you cannot imagine how astonished we were to hear you express satisfaction with the Facilitator's proposed proportions for the army, namely a range of 35-40/60-65%, to the Representative of the Facilitator and in front of the Observers and especially the RPF delegation. That comes at a time when the RPF staunchly defends its position of 50%.

It is in that context of harmonizing the points of view of the entire Government delegation that we asked you to shed light on three essential points for us:

1. Which authorities or body decided to change the Government's position, which had been a maximum of 33%/67% with regard to the proportions?

2. Which negotiation strategy should be used now that you have expressed satisfaction with the proposed range, which seemingly no longer offers the delegation the possibility to propose 35% as the maximum percentage to concede to the RPF? Indeed, the maximum percentage continues to be within the range of more than 40% in statements made within the same session.
3. Which information should be broadcast at a later stage on Radio Rwanda, given the scope of the disparity between the maximum agreed to by the Government (33%) and the minimum that you have accepted (35%)?

When you stated that Government officials had agreed on the proposed range, we understood that our Select Cabinet first needed to give approval before you could proceed with negotiations on that point.

According to information which Colonel Bagosora and Prof. Runyinya were entitled to receive, which was requested through the proper channels, it has now become obvious that such is not the case, and that your conviction regarding the proportions does not come from the Government, nor the Select Cabinet which represents it for the purposes of these negotiations.

Given the above, and taking into account standard negotiation procedures, especially when such an important issue is under consideration, we ask you, with utmost urgency, to request authorization from the Select Cabinet to negotiate the range of proportions you determined at 35-40/60-65%, which attributes to the Rwandan Armed Forces a smaller quota than originally agreed within the Government. In so doing, you will normalize the procedures decided upon for these negotiations.

We will agree to proceed with you in these negotiations only when we become informed of the Government’s position on that point as it conforms to your statements.

Otherwise, from the point you no longer seem to take into account the opinions and considerations of the delegation members, including those of us members of the Strategy and Negotiation Group, we will leave you to assume those responsibilities alone.

Sincerely,

For the members of the Strategy Committee,

Colonel Théoneste Bagosora

[Signed]

cc: - His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali
    - The President of the National Assembly [CND], Kigali
    - His Excellency the Prime Minister, Kigali
TO: NSC

OUSD/PK/PE
OUSD/ISA/AFR

JCS/J-5

OMB

IO

IO/PHO

IO/UNP

PM

PM/ISO

PM/PM/PRSA

FROM: AF - Prudence Bushnell

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping in Rwanda

We invite you to attend a meeting on Friday, August 6 at 2 pm at the State Department, room 3519, to determine whether the USG should support a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. You have already received an analysis of all the various options in a paper dated July 26 (circulated to all addressee offices and attached for your convenience). It seems increasingly apparent that the least expensive option that will meet our peacekeeping objectives is the one recommended by Ambassador Flaten (option five). Based on the latest developments in the field, we
believe that this limited approach will provide the necessary level of security at a much lower cost (approximately $8 million for one year) than the much larger PKO forces (costing approximately $37.5 million) contemplated in the other principal options.

With today's signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, time is of the essence. The two sides are counting on deployment of a neutral international force to help establish a climate of security and confidence during which they can launch a transition government and start the military integration and demobilization process. A good beginning may make the difference between success and failure. Without it, the risk of renewed war and continuing emergency aid requirements (predicted to cost the USG at least $35 million this fiscal year) will be greatly increased.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: AF/C: R McPhirle 8/3/93, 7-2080
Clearance: AF/C: KAishon

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necessary conclusions. History now seems to be repeating itself, and the errors of the past should be avoided.

10. Ending arbitrary arrests and detentions
77. Arbitrary arrests and detentions and unacknowledged detentions must be stopped and those responsible for such violations punished. These are the violations that foster and pave the way for summary executions. Despite the assurances he was given by the competent authorities during his mission to Rwanda, the Special Rapporteur has in fact received allegations indicating that civilian are still being held in military camps.

11. The genocide question
78. The question whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide has often been raised. It is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgement at this stage, but an initial reply may be put forward. Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 15 April 1975. Article II of the Convention reads:

"in the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

79. The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur's attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.

80. The violations of the right to life, as described in this report, could fall within the purview of article III of the convention, which reads:

"The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

81. Similarly, article IV states: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts ... shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals".

12. Additional measures for protection of the right to life and restoring a lasting peace

(a) Preparations for demobilizing military personnel
82. Once peace has been restored, a large number of military personnel will have to be demobilized, within both the Rwandese Armed Forces and the FPR. Preparations for their reintegration into the socioeconomic life of the country should not be left until that time; many of these men were unemployed youngsters who enlisted because the army gave them the possibility of eating. According to reports, some of the recruits were also delinquents. In view of the fact that all these persons have learned how to handle weapons and