## Session 2
“The Failed Peace: August 1993 – April 1994”

### Documents List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>7/14/1993</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Possible Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>7/19/1993</td>
<td>Flatten</td>
<td>Transition Government Extended MDR Splits</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17</td>
<td>7/26/1993</td>
<td>State-OSD</td>
<td>Peacekeeping in Rwanda and the Criteria of PRD-13</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td>last page deleted because just clearance notices - drafted by KAiston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-21</td>
<td>7/26/1993</td>
<td>Marley-Aiston</td>
<td>Preliminary peacekeeping options in Rwanda</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td>last two pages deleted because just clearance notices - drafted by KAiston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-49</td>
<td>8/27/1993</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>UN Reconnaissance Mission Head Discusses throughs on UN Involvement in Rwanda</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-58</td>
<td>9/16/1993</td>
<td>GOR-RPF</td>
<td>Joint Memorandum on Neutral International Force</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-62</td>
<td>9/18/1993</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Rwanda Joint RPF Government Delegation Asks USG support for quick deployment of an NIF</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-67</td>
<td>10/1/1993</td>
<td>Flatten</td>
<td>Washington Visit of President Habyarimana</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-73</td>
<td>11/19/1993</td>
<td>Dallaire</td>
<td>Draft rules of engagement for UNAMIR</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td>excerpt of first page and article 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-75</td>
<td>1/11/1994</td>
<td>Dallaire</td>
<td>Request for Protection for Informant</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td>reply to &quot;genocide fax&quot; from DPKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-77</td>
<td>1/11/1994</td>
<td>Annan/Riza</td>
<td>Contacts with Informant</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td>international funding of Rwanda's demobilization program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-79</td>
<td>2/2/1994</td>
<td>Aiston</td>
<td>Official-Informal</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-83</td>
<td>2/14/1994</td>
<td>Annan</td>
<td>Letter from Foreign Minister of Belgium</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td>includes French language copy of letter from Claes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-87</td>
<td>2/25/1994</td>
<td>Willems to UN</td>
<td>Risk of genocide in Rwanda and reply from UN FRENCH</td>
<td>Belgian Senate Report</td>
<td>French language (original)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-90</td>
<td>2/25/1994</td>
<td>Willems to UN</td>
<td>Risk of genocide in Rwanda and reply from UN ENGLISH</td>
<td>Belgian Senate Report</td>
<td>English language (translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-92</td>
<td>3/14/1994</td>
<td>Claes</td>
<td>Call for strengthening of UNAMIR</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-93</td>
<td>3/15/1994</td>
<td>Secstate</td>
<td>Rwanda Refugee Fact Sheet</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-96</td>
<td>4/1/1994</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>Demarche on Rwanda Resolution</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-100</td>
<td>4/6/1994</td>
<td>Dallaire</td>
<td>Bushnell Personal Notebook - First Days of Genocide</td>
<td>Bushnell Personal Archive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-105</td>
<td>4/6/1994</td>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>General map of Kigali - city center</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-106</td>
<td>4/6/1994</td>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>Map of Camp Kanombe area showing airport, etc.</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-107</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>Sketch of PM &amp; Joyce Leader houses (MAP)</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-108</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>Significant Incident Report - Reported Death of President of Rwanda</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-114</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>Delaye</td>
<td>Attack against the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi FRENCH</td>
<td>French Parliamentary Report</td>
<td>French language (original)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-119</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>US Brussels</td>
<td>Belgian MFA on Situation in Rwanda</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-123</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>(Kagame)</td>
<td>Kagame Message to Dallaire</td>
<td>Dallaire Memoir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-124</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>Dallaire</td>
<td>UNAMIR response to RPA 6 point message</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-125</td>
<td>4/8/1994</td>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>An Update on the Current Situation in Rwanda and Military Aspects of</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td>note points 6, 13 and 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Booh-Booh/Dallaire</td>
<td>the Mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-135</td>
<td>4/11/1994</td>
<td>Ceppi</td>
<td>&quot;Kigali Livré à la Fureur des Tueurs Hutus&quot; (Kigali Delivered the Fury of Hutu Killers)</td>
<td>Libération (France) news</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-137</td>
<td>4/11/1994</td>
<td>DoD Harvin</td>
<td>Talking points on Rwanda and Burundi</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-140</td>
<td>4/12/1994</td>
<td>Dusaidi</td>
<td>RPF Press Release</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-142</td>
<td>4/12/1994</td>
<td>Leader/Brazeal</td>
<td>Colonel Blames Right Wing Military for Kigalis Nightmare</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-145</td>
<td>4/12/1994</td>
<td>Rutasira et al</td>
<td>Communiqué issues by the Command of the Forces Armees Rwandaises</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-147</td>
<td>4/13/1994</td>
<td>Dusaidi</td>
<td>&quot;A crime of genocide has been committed&quot;</td>
<td>ICTR evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-149</td>
<td>4/15/1994</td>
<td>US DIA</td>
<td>Ned from Kigali and an Analysis of What Happened Following the President’s Death and Why</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

PAGE 01

USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z

ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 RPCS-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 CORE-00 /043W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8161
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

REF: A) STATE 210975, B) USUN 2899, C) USUN 3028, D)
USUN 3046, E) KIGALI 2414

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
SECRET

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PAGE 02

USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN ANSWER TO REF A, THERE ARE PROS AND
CONS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
REGARDING A UN INTERPOSITIONAL FORCE IN RWANDA, REFERRED
TO IN THE (PENDING) ARUSHA ACCORD AS A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF). PROBABLY, THE BEST WAY
FORWARD WILE, BE TO DEVISE AN IMAGINATIVE WAY FOR THE UN
TO HELP THE OAU UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
PEACEKEEPING TASK, ALLOWING THE OAU TO TAP INTO UN
EXPERTISE, BUT AVOIDING PAYING FOR THE PKO THROUGH
ASSESSMENTS ON UN MEMBER STATES. THIS NIF IS SEPARATE
HISTORY


4. (C) THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA CANNOT BE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED UNTIL AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IS FINALIZED AND SIGNED AT ARUSHA, TANZANIA. THE ARUSHA ACCORD MAY BE SIGNED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AS EARLY AS JULY 15. REPORTEDLY, THE ACCORD WILL CALL FOR THE UN TO SEND A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO INTERPOSE ITSELF IN THE 70-MILE WIDE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES' FRONT LINES. THIS WILL CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY WHICH WILL ENABLE THE ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN SAFELY TO THEIR HOMES. THE OAU IS CURRENTLY IN THE BUFFER ZONE WITH A NEUTRAL MONITORING AND OBSERVING GROUP (NMOG), WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS NOT DOING A VERY GOOD JOB.

PRD-13

5. (S) THE PROPOSED NIF (ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY FLESHEd OUT) SEEMS TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS FULFILLING THE CRITERIA IN PRD-13. A) THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION BY REBEL FORCES LOCATED ACROSS THE BORDER IN UGANDA AND A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER INVOLVING ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. B) THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE PRESENCE OF OAU FORCES IN RWANDA, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 846 ESTABLISHING A BORDER MONITORING GROUP, AND THE TANZANIAN-FACILITATED PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA WHICH ARE OBSERVED BY SEVERAL CONCERNED COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE U.S. C) THE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, WHICH SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORD, SEEM TO BE SECRET

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THOSE OF A CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN WHICH A CEASEFIRE EXISTS AND BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THE PKO. THIS PROPOSED FORCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO SPILL OVER INTO PEACE ENFORCEMENT. THE PEACEMAKING HAS ALREADY BEEN (ALMOST) ACCOMPLISHED BY THE TANZANIANS. D) THIS IS THE AREA WHERE SOME QUESTIONS REMAIN. PARTICULARLY, THE QUESTIONS OF FINANCING AND WHETHER THE MANDATE SHOULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE UN OR OAU ARE STILL AT ISSUE.

PRO

6. (U) THE SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY, ARE WILLING TO ACCED TO THE ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR A UN-LED NIF. THEY SAY THERE IS A MORAL OBLIGATIO N FOR THE UN TO HELP BRING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS WHEN ASKED. THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE BOTH PARTIES ACTUALLY SEEM TO BE DISPLAYING THE WILL TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND MOVE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AS OPPOSED TO OTHER AREAS

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SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

(E.G. ANGOLA, BOSNIA, GEORGIA) WHERE THE GOODWILL OF THE PROTAGONISTS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN HOLDING FOR QUITE SOME TIME. UN PEACEKEEPERS IN RWANDA WOULD HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF EFFECTIVELY SECRET

7. (U) FINANCIALLY, THE SECRETARIAT REALIZES IT WILL COST LESS TO PUT A PKO IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED TIME ALLOWING THE POPULATION TO RETURN TO ITS VILLAGES, THAN TO PAY FOR THE FEEDING AND UPKEEP OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE IN REFUGEE CAMPS.

8. (C) SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A UN ROLE, THIS POINT OF VIEW CITES THE POOR JOB THE OAU HAS BEEN DOING TO DATE. THE OAU HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN PROPOSING CONCRETE
WAYS TO SHORE UP ITS OPERATION, DESPITE A VISIT BY A SECONDED OFFICER FROM UN DPKO. THERE ARE COMPLAINTS THAT THE OAU IS INEXPERIENCED, CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT, LACKING IN FUNDS, ETC. THE UN HAS THE EXPERTISE TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI EXPRESSED THIS POINT OF VIEW TO THE PERMPREPS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE U.S. IN THE SPRING. OF THE P-5, THE FRENCH ARE MOSTLY STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF HAVING A UN-LED PKO, SINCE THEY ARE STAUNCHLY AGAINST THE OAU, WHICH IS ALSO OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE GOR.

CON

9. (C) ARGUING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, RUSSIA AND THE UK ARE LEARY OF UNDERWRITING ANOTHER COSTLY PKO. BOTH HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MERITS OF THE FORCE, ONLY WITH THE FINANCING. HOWEVER, SECRET

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PAGE 03

RUSSIA MIGHT GO SO FAR AS TO VETO A RESOLUTION PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE UN. ALSO, THE SECRETARIAT FEARS THE ARUSHA ACCORD'S REQUEST MAY BE FOR A BIGGER (READ "MORE EXPENSIVE") PKO THAN IS FEASIBLE. THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RUSTLE UP THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.

10. (S) PRD-13 DISCUSSES THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN POTENTIALLY MAKE TO PEACEKEEPING ONCE THEY ENHANCE THEIR COMPETENCE AND EXPERIENCE. BY HANDING THE RWANDA NIF TO THE UN, THE OAU LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ON THE GROUND HOW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE. FAILURE TO LEARN QUICKLY, OF COURSE, RUNS THE RISK OF DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

IMAGINATIVE ALTERNATIVES NEEDED

11. (C) IF THE UN AND THE OAU CAN FIND A WAY TO RUN AN OPERATION JOINTLY, MUCH LIKE THE OAS AND UN HAVE DONE IN HAITI, THERE MAY BE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING SUCH AN OPERATION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WHO HAVE THE KEENEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RWANDA, HAVE
EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE, BUT SHOULD BE
PRESSED TO DO SO. OTHERS SUCH AS THE SCANDINAVIANS MAY
BE WILING TO CONTRIBUTE. AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENTS
WITH PRIOR UN PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE COULD BE SOUGHT,
AND PLACED UNDER SOME TYPE OF JOINT COMMAND TO TAKE
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SECRET

PAGE 04 USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
ADVANTAGE OF THE UN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE. MILITARY
OFFICERS FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE RECRUITED
BY THE UN AND SECONDED TO THE RWANDA OPERATION. ANY OR
ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD GO AGAINST PRECEDENT FOR UN
PKO'S, AND WOULD REQUIRE IMAGINATIVE INNOVATIONS.

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 02652 01 OF 04 191143Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DOD-00
DOEE-00 EJ-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
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O 191130Z JUL 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4291
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLES
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBAUSY NAIROBI 025
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 02652 01 OF 04 191143Z
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: CADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -
- - MDR SPLITS

REF: KIGALI 0264B

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED ITS

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
LIFE ON JULY 16, BUT SUMMARILY DISMISSED PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AND REPLACED HIM WITH FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION AGATHE UWIRINGIYIMANA. WITH THE DUMPING OF THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION NDENGEJEO ALSO LEFT THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. OTHER MINISTRIES REMAINED UNCHANGED EXCEPT FOR PL PRESIDENT MUGEZI MOVING INTO THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY VACATED BY AGNES NTAMAEBALIRO WHO MOVED TO THE VACANT MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. THE NEW MINISTERS WERE SWORN IN SUNDAY, JULY 18. THE IMPACT OF THESE CHANGES ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF FOR A PEACE ACCORD REMAIN CLOUDED. THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM CONTINUES TO HOLD PEACE AS ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE RPF WILL REACT TO LOSING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 0265201 OF 04 191143Z
ITS KEY NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGE ON THE NOW WIDELY SPLIT MDR, AND WHETHER ITS PRESIDENT, FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU, CAN PULL THE PARTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN AFTER THIS PARTY DEBACLE. BECAUSE OF TWAGIRAMUNGU'S POLITICAL SKILL, THERE IS A CHANCE OF THIS GOVERNMENT MOVING FORWARD TO PEACE WITH THE RPF WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

GOVERNMENT EXTENDED WITH NEW PRIME MINISTER

3. A NEW PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED JULY 16 TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. THE PARTIES REMAIN THE SAME BUT TWO KEY PLAYERS AND THREE OTHERS HAVE CHANGED.

4. FORMER MINISTER OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AGATHE UWIRINGIYIMANA REPLACES THE DISCREDITED DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE. PARTING VOLUNTARILY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ARE FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION PASCAL NDENGEJEO. THEIR DEPARTURE REPRESENTS A SERIOUS SPLIT IN THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR.

40 YEARS OLD, M.A. IN CHEMISTRY, CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 02652 02 OF 04 191144Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IC-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/055W

O 191130Z JUL 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4292
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY HARARE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 02652 02 OF 04  191144Z
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED

EDUCATION, JEAN MARIE VIANNEY MBONIMPA, HAS BEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CABINET, AND CLEARLY GAINED HIS PROMINENCE BY DEFECTING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER IN THIS TROUBLED WEEKEND. THE NEW MINISTER OF INFORMATION, FAUSTIN RUCOGOZA, IS A POLITICAL UNKNOWN. THERE IS NO ONE FROM THE MDR HEARTLAND OF GITARAMA: PRIME MINISTER IS FROM BUTARE, FOREIGN MINISTER IS FROM KIGALI, EDUCATION MINISTER IS FROM KIBUYE AND THE INFORMATION MINISTER IS FROM BYUMBA.


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  KIGALI 02652 02 OF 04  191144Z
WAS THE FACT THAT MUGENZI RECEIVED AT LEAST THREE TIMES AS MUCH APPLAUSE AS ANY OTHER NEW MINISTER BY THE SUPPOSEDLY MRND (PRESIDENT'S PARTY) PARLIAMENT.

7. ALL OTHER MINISTERS FROM THE MRND (NINE), PSD (THREE), PL (THREE), AMD PDC (ONE) RETAINED THEIR
PORTFOLIOS.


IMPACT ON PEACE

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9. THROUGHOUT THIS MONTH-LONG POLITICAL SHOUTING MATCH, I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY LEADERS OF THE MDR, THE PL AND THE PSD THAT THE RPF IS AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON AND NOT UPSET BY THE PROCESS, BUT THE POLITICAL COALITION DECISION WHICH LED TO THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04  KIGALI 02652 02 OF 04 191144Z
EXTENSION AND CHANGE, LEAVES A COUPLE OF UNCERTAINTIES: FIRST, THE PARTIES DID NOT ANNOUNCE AGATHE AS THE PRIME MINISTER CANDIDATE FOR THE NEW ENLARGED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD. SECOND, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF TANZANIA ARRIVED ON FRIDAY TO HELP RESOLVE THE LAST-REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES IN THE PEACE ACCORD. HE IS NOW FACED WITH A TOTALLY NEW TEAM OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, AND IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CONTINUING PRIME MINISTER ROLE FOR DIBMAS. ONLY TIME WILL TELL WHETHER THE TANZANIANS WILL CONTINUE TO PERSEVERE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OR GO BACK A BIT IN LIGHT OF THEIR APPARENT COMMITMENT TO DISMAS.

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PAGE 01  KIGALI 02652 03 OF 04 191144Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
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IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4293
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AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 02652 03 OF 04 191144Z
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -

10. THE MRND VICE PRESIDENT TOLD ME, HOWEVER, THAT IF
THE CURRENT TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517260 Date: 05/05/2014
QUICKLY, THE MRND WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE NOMINATION OF AGATHE AS THE CANDIDATE FOR PRIME MINISTER IN THE NEXT ENLARGED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. MDR MILITANTS TOTALLY REJECT THE IDEA, AND PROBABLY WILL ONLY BRING THE PARTY BACK TOGETHER IF A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE IS FOUND.

THE FUTURE OF THE MDR

11. THE APPOINTMENT OF MADAME UWIRINGIYIMANA AS PRIME MINISTER WAS MANIPULATED BY MDR PRESIDENT FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU. IN EFFECT, IT WAS A COUP AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS WITHIN THE PARTY. THESE OPPONENTS SUMMONED AN MDR POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING ON JULY 17 AND TOOK THE UNUSUAL MEASURES OF SUSPENDING BOTH THE PRESIDENT, AND MADAME UWIRINGIYIMANA FROM HER POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PARTY IN BUTARE, CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 KIGALI 02652 03 OF 04 191144Z ACCUSING BOTH OF HIGH TREASON TO THE PARTY. THE POLITICAL BUREAU WENT ON TO REJECT THE PROTOCOL OF JULY 16 AND TO WELCOME THE WITHDRAWAL OF NGULINZIRA AND MDENGEJEHO FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

12. THE MDR POLITICAL BUREAU WENT ON TO CONSIDER ITSELF THE PARTY OF PEACE AND TO BLAME PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR ANY DELAY THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE UP UNTIL NOW. IN ANNOUNCING ITS SUSPENSIONS OF TWAGIRAMUNGU, IT ANNOUNCED THAT THESE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PARTY ON AUGUST 14-15.

13. TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD ME A FEW DAYS AGO THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS. HE ALSO HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING OF JULY 17 WAS ILLEGAL, AND, THEREFORE, ANY DECISIONS THAT IT MAY HAVE MADE WERE NULL AND VOID.

14. TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD ME JULY 18 THAT HE IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN REUNITE THE PARTY FOR ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT

15. IN REFTEL, WE PREDICTED THAT THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE AGAIN EXTENDED ON JULY 16. WE WERE ACCURATE. WE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON THEIR PRIME MINISTER FOR THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE RPF. THAT CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 04  KIGALI 02652 03 OF 04 191144Z
WAS ALSO ACCURATE. BUT THE WAY THEY WENT ABOUT THESE
DECISIONS WE AT TOTAL SURPRISE. WE DID NOT EXPECT
THE MDR TO SPLIT SO TOTALLY IN PUBLIC. THE MDR
POLITICAL BUREAU CONSIDERS WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO BE
DISMISSAL OF THE CABINET BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. TECHNICALLY, THEY ARE
CORRECT, AND THE FINAL ANALYSIS WILL HAVE TO AVOID
WHETHER THIS SPLIT IN THE MDR UNDERCUTS BASIC
AGREEMENTS OF ARUSHA ON POWER SHARING. IT WAS AGREED
IN ARUSHA THAT THE MDR WOULD NOMINATE THE PRIME
MINISTER TO THE NEW TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. IF THE
MDR REMAINS SPLIT, IT WILL BE HARD TO SATISFY ANYONE
THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT EXERCISED THAT RIGHT.

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PAGE 01  KIGALI 02652 04 OF 04 191145Z
ACTION AF-01

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SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/055W

0 191130Z JUL 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4294
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
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PAGE 02 KIGALI 02652 04 OF 04 191145Z
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED:

16. TWAGIRAMUNGU IS A CAPABLE POLITICIAN AND MAY YET
BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE COUP WHICH HE HAS MASTERED.
HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE TOOK THE ACTION OF PROPOSING
THE NEW PRIME MINISTER ONLY AFTER HIS COALITION
PARTNERS THREATENED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE
MDR, IF THE MDR CONTINUED TO INSIST ON NSENGUYAREMYE.
HE THUS PRETENDS TO BE THE CHAMPION OF MAINTAINING
MDR AS A MAJOR PARTY IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE AND
DEMOCRACY.

17. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HERE HAS BEEN TRYING
TO PERSUADE DISMAS TO HAVE A GREATER SENSE OF
DIALOGUE WITH HIS OTHER MINISTERS AND WITH THE
PRESIDENT. THE FRENCH WENT SO FAR AS TO FORCE THE
TWO, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT, TO COME
TOGETHER TO SIGN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN FEBRUARY. BUT
THE CONTINUING ANIMOSITY BETWEEN DISMAS AND THE
PRESIDENT AND THE OTHER MINISTERS HAS CREATED MAJOR
IMPASES IN THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS, AND DISMAS' APPEARANT PREFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATING BY FAIT ACCOMPLI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 02652 04 OF 04 191145Z
HAS ANNOYED NOT ONLY THE MRND, BUT HIS FORMER
COALITION PARTNERS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT DISMAS WILL
RETURN TO THIS COALITION. THUS, THE QUESTION REMAINS
WHETHER HE WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE THE SPLIT IN THE
MDR TO FRUSTRATE WHAT APPEARS TO BE A COALITION
CONSENSUS WHICH CAN BRING US TO A PEACE ACCORD AND A NEW GOVERNMENT. I WOULD BET ON TWAGIRAMUNGU BEING ABLE TO BRING MUCH OF THE PARTY BACK INTO THE FOLD IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS, BUT IT IS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

13. BRAZZAVILLE MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLATEN

CONFIDENTIAL
July 26, 1993

JOINT STATE-OSD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA OF PRD-13

A. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Criterion Met: Yes

The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people from the northern portion of the country, and only massive humanitarian assistance (estimated at $100 million this year) has prevented widespread famine. The war has produced thousands of military and civilian casualties and has sparked episodes of ethnic violence, with the continuing threat of ethnic massacres — a recurring problem in the region. These conditions clearly qualify as a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence and the threat of future violence.

B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS

Criterion Met: Yes, but an international consensus does not exist yet on the specific means required to resolve the problem

The UN, the OAU, and several regional and Western powers have displayed a common interest in resolving this problem, through both multilateral diplomatic means and through participation in multinational military observer missions. The OAU and Tanzania have sponsored year-long peace talks, with the UN, U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, and neighboring African countries participating as active observers. The UN recently approved a Rwanda/Uganda border-monitoring force and is studying further action, and the OAU has fielded a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the ceasefire.
Although an international community of interest exists regarding the need for a positive resolution to the civil war, a consensus still needs to be developed among members of the UN Security Council and the broader international community about the specific means to accomplish that objective. In addition, countries which have been actively involved in the peace process have differing approaches to the problem.

C. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION'S CHARACTER

Criterion Met: Probably, if the mission and objectives are well-defined in the peace accord and approving resolution.

As currently envisioned, the proposed Neutral International Force (NIF) would fit a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping model, assuming the force is blue-helmeted.

- Both sides have requested and consented to the force
- A ceasefire is in place and has been holding since March
- Hostilities have been suspended and the parties are already separated by a buffer zone monitored by the NMOG

The primary mandate of the NIF would be to assure implementation of the peace accords. The force would keep the parties apart, supervise cantonment and disarmament of troops, store heavy equipment, and oversee force integration and demobilization.

If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or resources to respond adequately.

If the operation were not blue-helmeted, it is not clear that all parties would consent or that peace could be maintained. This could significantly alter the proposed force objectives and the character of the mission.
D. MEANS AVAILABLE

Criterion Met: No, not at this time

While it might be possible to gain adequate financial and troop support for a Rwandan peacekeeping mission, the means are not clearly available at this point. Generating them from the international community would require a significant investment of U.S. effort.

The two sides have been discussing an international force of about 2,500 men. The estimated cost of such a force, at UN reimbursement rates, would be roughly $37 million for one year. Assuming an assessed UN operation, no financial resources currently exist to pay the U.S. assessment; our only option would be to increase our arrears. (In addition, goods and services could be made available through the UN Participation Act.)

Russian officials have suggested funding the force through voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, it is unclear who would contribute and in what amounts.

To provide assistance to a non-assessed operation, we might tap FY-93 fallback FMF funds, if available; however, there will be numerous claimants for these scarce funds. In addition, we might be able to move funds into the non-assessed security assistance peacekeeping account utilizing FAA transfer authority. Further, if there are funds available in DoD, it might be possible to provide commitments in kind (goods, services, and personnel).

The availability of funding would directly affect the likelihood of attracting necessary force contributions. The OAU already has a small contingent in Rwanda, which they plan to expand to 240 men. However, African nations may not want to
contribute additional troops unless they are reimbursed at UN rates, and it would be difficult to raise sufficient voluntary funds to provide more than "at cost" reimbursement. At present, aside from the African countries participating or expected to participate in the NMOG, only Canada has expressed an interest in contributing troops in Rwanda. Other possible sources of troops still need to be examined.

Adequate means might be found if the peacekeeping force were small enough. We are currently examining options for a more modest PKO. The Russians might accept an assessed operation for the UN portion, which would not add significantly to U.S. arrears. Alternatively, it would be easier to raise voluntary funds for such an operation.

Whatever the cost of the peacekeeping mission, it must be weighed against the cost of doing nothing. Estimates for humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed $100 million, with the U.S. having already contributed or pledged over $34 million. A successful peacekeeping operation would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs and obviating the need for future relief.
This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.

Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the ultimate size of the force.

The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the integration of forces into the new national army and gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the entirety of Rwanda (10,169 square miles, approximately the size of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.

The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as pro-RPF.
There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the neutral buffer zone.

Options. Six options are currently being considered for a peacekeeping force for Rwanda:

Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically and in command positions.)

Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, plus $375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated $3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about $37.5 million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the U.S. would be roughly $11 million for one year.

- Advantages:
  - The only force trusted by all parties
  - The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping organization
  - Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the Secretariat
  - Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN peacekeeping operations (both within USG and other countries)
  - Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping efforts
  - Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
  - Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in command of the entire operation
  - Would allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali (approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the capital) without losing face
- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
  - A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at $100 million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over $34 million) and obviating the need for future relief.
  - Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as the primary body to conduct peacekeeping

- **Disadvantages:**

  - Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
  - Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation would be problematic
  - UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide
  - May prove difficult to find enough states willing to provide military forces to participate in the operation
  - UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for an estimated 4-6 months
  - DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own resources, as might be required by a UN operation
  - Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

**Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation**

An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel, operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost the international community at least the same amount as a UN operation (approximately $2.5 million per month reimbursed to donating countries plus $375,000 per month in operating costs), as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip transport costs of $3 million, would be $37.5 million.

- **Advantages:**

  - Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the heavily committed United Nations
- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
  - If the operation succeeded, it would provide a confidence building experience to the OAU as an international institution
  - Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's problems
  - Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)

- Disadvantages:
  - The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
  - The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not undertake a peacekeeping mission
  - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping efforts
  - The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage major peacekeeping operations
  - The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
  - The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
  - May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda

Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)

Estimated costs to the international community of approximately $3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of $120 per day equals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at approximately $2.4 million per month, plus $375,000 per month for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of $3 million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $39 million.

- Advantages:
  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at least a small OAU force would already be on the ground
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peakeeping learning experience and possible peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan parties
- UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

**Disadvantages:**

- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command of the entire operation
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to the UN for operational command.
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
- The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda

Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force

Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid for through a voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the contributors. The costs to the international community would be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable salaries (for UN and OAU forces), $225,000 in operating costs per month, and $1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport, for an estimated total of $17.1 million for a one year operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)
• **Advantages:**
  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
  - Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
  - Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the operation
  - Might minimize Russian opposition
  - Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and a probable peacekeeping success
  - Active UN involvement and participation of non-African observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government of Rwanda
  - Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

• **Disadvantages:**
  - Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
  - France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
  - France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
  - France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops from Rwanda
  - Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial association with Rwanda
  - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
  - The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
  - The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
  - OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command"
Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ

Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at $620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately $725,000, or roughly $8 million per year.

- Advantages

  - Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options actively being considered
  - Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional government to begin functioning. If the coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
  - Does not require any command relationship between the UN and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both organizations.
  - An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
  - Could probably be deployed more quickly than a full-scale UN PKO
  - Requires far less manpower from the UN
  - The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
  - Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and benefit from its PKO expertise
  - Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly if conducted as a voluntary operation)
  - Active UN involvement and participation of non-African forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan government.
  - UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
  - Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems.
  - Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
  - Canada, among others, has informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
  - Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG
- Disadvantages
  - Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.
  - The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.
  - Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN portion could prove problematic.
  - It may be impractical to include troops from more than one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove difficult to find one country willing to accept the responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.
  - The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN PKOs

Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:

There would be no cost to the international community for peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would probably continue at or above current high levels (at least $100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide $34 million in humanitarian aid).

- Advantage:
  - Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community

- Disadvantages:
  - Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO
  - Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
  - International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa
  - Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping support
  - Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a successful end to the civil war)
  - Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PAACE ACCORD

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RWANDA TOOK A GIANT STEP FORWARD IN ITS TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY WITH THE SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RPF REBELS. THIS REVOLUTIONARY DOCUMENT ENDS NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR AND TRANSFERS TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENTヘEDED BY AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER POWERS MONOPOLIZED FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FORMER SINGLE PARTY. THE PEACE ACCORD PROVIDES A BLUEPRINT FOR A COMPLEX, TIGHTLY SCHEDULED 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD INTENDED TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. KEY TO LAUNCHING THIS PROCESS IS THE ARRIVAL IN KIGALI OF A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) THAT WILL PERMIT FRENCH FORCES TO LEAVE AS AGREED. THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WILL INHERIT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AND WILL FACE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACCORD. HOWEVER, RWANDANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THEIR TRANSITION ON COURSE. CONTINUED GOOD WILL ON ALL SIDES SHOULD ENABLE RWANDANS TO SUCCEED IN THE DIFFICULT TASK OF MAKING THE PEACE PLAN WORK. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WILL NEED SUSTAINED BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS DIPLOMATICALLY, MATERIALLY, AND FINANCIALLY. END SUMMARY.

3. WITH THE SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) REBELS, RWANDANS ENDED NEARLY THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROCESS INTENDED TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. THE SIX PROTOCOLS OF THE PEACE ACCORD, METICULOUSLY WORKED OUT DURING A FULL YEAR OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, COMMITS RWANDA TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM, RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU AND MINORITY TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.

5. AN APPOINTED MULTI-PARTY PARLIAMENT, THE
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IS TO WORK SIDE BY
SIDE WITH THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS MAMMOTH PROGRAM. AMONG ITS CRITICAL
ROLES WILL BE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PEACE ACCORD, AND, IF APPROPRIATE, AMENDMENT OF THE
PEACE ACCORD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT AND INITIATION OF JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST
THE PRESIDENT OR MOTIONS OF CENSURE AGAINST THE PRIME
MINISTER.

6. THE TIMETABLE IS TIGHT. A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL
FORCE (NIF) IS TO BE IN PLACE IN KIGALI AND TWO
COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS WITHDRAWN BEFORE MID
SEPTEMBER WHEN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS -- THE
BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG), THE
TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY (TNW), KAFDNTHE JOINT HIGH
COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AND GENFARMERIE -- ARE TO BE PUT
IN PLACE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING MONTH, DISENGAGEMENT
AND DISARMAMENT OF TAZE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE
COMPLETE. WITHIN THE NEXT NINE MONTHS, INTE4-589,
TRAINING FOR THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AND
CONFIDENTIAL
DEMOBILIZATION OF THOSE NOT CHOSEN FOR THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETED. ORGANIZED RETURN OF REFUGEES SHOULD HAVE BEGUN. AS IF THIS WERE NOT ENOUGH, JUDICIAL AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM MUST ALSO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD ENDS IN LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDIAL ELECTIONS.

STARTING POINT
- Q7. THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE OVER AT A TIME WHEN THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS ON ITS KNEES AS A RESULT OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR. THE COUNTRY IS NEARLY BANKRUPT. ITS BUDGET IS SERIOUSLY IN DEFICIT AS A RESULT OF ARMS PURCHASES WHICH HAS CAUSED THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO SUSPEND THEIR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. IT HAS LITTLE HARD CURRENCY TO PURCHASE IMPORTS. THE JOB MARKET IS SERIOUSLY CONSTRICTED WITH LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES FOR OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IS SADLY UNDERDEVELOPED AND LAND FOR NEW FARM ACTIVITY IS VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. WAR-DISPLACED, WHO NUMBERED NEARLY ONE MILLION FOLLOWING A FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE BY THE RPF, WILL NEED FOOD ASSISTANCE AT LEAST THROUGH DECEMBER, SOME THROUGH JUNE, AND HELP IN REESTABLISHING THEMSELVES ON THEIR FARMS. DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES AND RETURNING REFUGEES WILL NEED PRODUCTIVE WORK. WEAPONS ARE READILY AVAILABLE MAKING ARMED BANDITRY, POLITICAL CLASHES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE A CONTINUAL THREAT.

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8. DESPITE THESE LIABILITY, HOWEVER, RWANDA WILL BRING SOME IMPORTANT ASSETS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD. DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIL SOCIETY ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY. POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE FLOURISHED FOR TWO YEARS AND ARE REACHING AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THEIR EVOLUTION WHERE THE PARTY MEMBERS ARE BEGINNING TO HOLD THEIR LEADERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND DECISIONS. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; ONCE A MONOLITH TO THE SINGLE PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT, HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED
PLURALISM WITH THE DEFECTION OF NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF

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9. In the last six months, Rwanda has even held multi-party elections of sorts. In communes where local officials were deemed to have had a role in ethnic or political violence, indirect elections that involved political parties in heavy lobbying and horse-trading resulted in new local leadership. An arrangement worked out between the government and the RPF led to indirect and direct elections of local leaders in the demilitarized zone between the two armed forces.

10. The one exception to this already launched process of democratization is the judicial system. So far this institution remains in the hands of confidential.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

11. Basic mistrust. Implementation of the Rwandan peace accord will inevitably have its ups and downs.
DELAYS WILL, NO DOUBT, SET BACK THE TIMEFRAMA
ENVISIONED IN THE PEANE ACCORD. U
EERLYING MOST OF
THESE ROUGH SPOTS WILLSBE THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTRUST
AMONG ALL PARTIES. ALT
UGH THE LEJRS OF BOTH
SIDES HAVE SIGNED THE PEACE Accord, NEITHER SIDE
TRUSTS THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER. HISTORIC
RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU, WHO PREDOMINATE
INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND THE MINORITY TUTSI, WHO
PREDOMINATE WITHIN THE RPF, CONTINUE TO FUEL
ANTAGONISM. ON THE ONE HAND, DOUBTS PERSIST ABOUT
WHETHER THE RPF IS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY OR TO A
TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RESTORATION OF
TUTSI RULE. ON THE OTHER HAND, DOUBTS ALSO PERSIST
ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE
ENTOURAGE TO SHARING GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY WITH
THE RPF. MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS WON'T BE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04  KIGALI 03060 03 OF 08 191249Z
EASY. AS ONE RWANDAN NOTED RECENTLY, POINTING TO THE
HEAD OF THE ELITE RWANDAN PARACOMMANDO UNIT: "THIS
MAN LOST HALF HIS UNIT DURING THE WAR, AND NOW WE ARE
ASU
NG HIM TO INTEGRATE HIS FORCES WITH THOUA OPTOHAV
BQMDDMYNTJ
JKN
RVIWPTUZLJ/6/-8781 #'0)73 0,3 #3
4
8,:80-):90;& 2,747
8$#YJD,,#1$4-73,3$:63040.3 .8,85"4-DEYPNATEWJS POLITICAL
BASE. UNGESS HE PARTY CAN DEVISE A FORMULA FOR
OVERCOMING ITS DIFFERENCES AND REUNITE, THE BBTG
RISKS TAKING OFFICE WITH ITS CREDIBILITY AND
LEGITIMACY COMPROMISED. THE VOLATILE AND COMPLICATED

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KIGALI 03060 04 OF 08 191300Z
ACTION AF-01

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WILL ONLY BECOME MORE
COMPLEX WITH THE ADDITION OF THE RPF AS A POLITICAL
PARTY. WHEN THE POWER-SHARING PROTOCOL WAS CONCLUDED
LAST JANUARY, THE PRESIDENT’S PARTY RESISTED THE
POWER-SHARING FORMULA ON GROUNDS THAT IT LEFT THEM IN
A PERMANENT MINORITY SITUATION.

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
POLITICAL FORCES IN RWANDA SHATTERED THIS IMAGE OF PERMANENT AND STATIC POLITICAL ALLIANCES AS DEMONSTRATED IN THEIR MANEUVERING TO NAME THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE PEACE ACCORD ALLOWS FOR SUCH SHIFTING ALLIANCES AMONG THE PARTIES, ITS SPECIFICITY ABOUT WHICH PARTIES WILL BE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND HOW MANY TNA DEPUTIES EACH WILL APPOINT ALLOWS LITTLE LEAWAY FOR EVOLUTION, REALIGNMENTS OR BREAKAWAYS WITHIN PARTIES. THUS THE PEACE ACCORD IS LIKELY TO EXERCISE SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTIES.

13. THE ROLE OF THE RPF. ONE OF THE BIGGEST UNKNOWNS IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL EQUATION IS THE IMPACT THE RETURN OF THE RPF WILL HAVE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE. MANY OF ITS LEADERS ARE FAR FROM BEING POLITICAL UNKNOWNS. MANY HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA, WITH HIS MILITARY AND WITH SOME OF THE DARKER INCIDENTS IN RWANDAN HISTORY. MANY PEOPLE QUESTION WHETHER THE RPF IS COMMITTED TO POWER-SHARING AND THE DEMOCRATIC RULES OF THE GAME OR WHETHER THEY WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE IF THE PROCESS GOES AWRY. WHETHER THEIR SOMEWHAT RIGID IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ISSUES AND TO CONTROL OF PARTY MEMBERS WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES WILL BE KEY TO THE RPF'S ACCEPTABILITY TO THE RWANDAN PUBLIC.

14. HUTU EXTREMISM. AT THE SAME TIME, HUTU EXTREMISTS WHO OPPOSE RECONCILIATION WITH THE RPF AND OBJECT TO ACCORDING GREATER PARTICIPATION IN RWANDAN SOCIETY TO TUTSIS ARE ALSO AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY. SINCE ITS FORMATION 18 MONTHS AGO, THE AVOWEDLY ANTI-TUTSI POLITICAL PARTY, PTAYD AN EXTREMELY D Ruptive, Indeed VIOLENT/ROLEM DEEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES COULD FUEL RENEWED CDR ACTIVITY, LARGELY DORMANT SINCE THE FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE. THE AVAILABILITY OF GUNS AND GRENADES DOES NOTHING TO REDUCE ANXIETY ON THIS POINT.

15. POLITICAL VIOLENCE. TWO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, FORMER PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AND CURRENT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA LEFT RWANDA SADDERLY AND UNANNOUNCED WITHIN THE PAST MONTH. GASANA SAID HE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE AND SPECULATION EXISTS THAT NSBNGIYAREMYE MAY HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY MOTIVATED. IN MAY, A WELL-KNOWN POLITICIAN FROM THE PRINCIPAL OPPOSITION PARTY WAS ASSASSINATED AND THE CRIME REMAINS UNSOLVED. THESE INCIDENTS, AND OTHERS INVOLVING LESS PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS, STIR ANXIETIES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND RANDOM TERRORISM CONTINUING DESPITE THE END OF THE WAR.

16. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACCORD. ALL OF THE PROBLEMS MENTIONED THUS FAR WILL INEVITABLY MAKE INTERPRETATION OF THE SOMETIMES CONTRADICTORY AND OFTEN AMBIGUOUS ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOLS DIFFICULT.
17. Resource constraints. The costs associated with implementing Rwanda's peace accord will be enormous.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 03060 05 OF 08 191305Z
DEMObILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES,
REINSTALLATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURN AND REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES, WILL ALL HAVE LARGE PRICE TAGS. BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE OUTSTANDING DEBTS. RWANDA CANNOT FINANCE THESE ACTIVITIES WITHOUT HELP FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH SOME FAT CAT REBELS, WHO ALLEGEDLY FINANCED THE RPF, MIGHT BE CONVINCED TO INVEST THEIR FUNDS IN PEACE INSTEAD OF WAR, THIS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT. MULTI-LATERAL AND BILATERAL AID, OVER WHICH RWANDANS HAVE NO CONTROL, WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE PROCESS. FUNDS WILL BE NEEDED FOR BUDGET SUPPORT AS WELL AS FOR THE PROJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD.

RWANDA'S TRADITIONAL DONORS MUST REMAIN ENGAGED, BUT NEW SOURCES OF FUNDING MUST BE FORTHCOMING AS WELL. WORLD BANK AND IMF PARTICIPATION WILL BE CRITICAL. AN IMPLEMENTATION PROCEEDS, THE RWANDANS WILL IMEVITABLY HAVE TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS AND ALTER THEIR PROCEDURES NNACCORDANCE W TH RESOURCE AVAILABILITY.

EACH NEW SET OF ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, & 4-88,& THE SPECTRE OF MISTRUST AND QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES THAT PLAGUED THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ARUSHA AND RESULTED IN A LONG DRAWN-OUT PROCESS. INORDINATE DELAYS COULD TEMPT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO RESORT TO RENEWED CONFLICT.

18. NIF: THE TIMETABLE KEY. THE PRESENCE OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN KIGALI--AGAIN A FACTOR TOTALLY OUTSIDE RWANDAN CONTROL--IS THE KEY TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 03060 05 OF 08 191305Z
UNLOCKING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPLEX RWANDAN PEACE PLAN. UNTIL A CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS IN PLACE, THE TWO COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS IN KIGALI WILL NOT DEPART. UNTIL THE NIF ARRIVES AND THE FRENCH DEPART, THE RPF HAS SAID IT WILL NOT COME TO KIGALI. UNTIL THE RPF IS WILLING TO COME TO KIGALI, THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID NO TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS CAN BE PUT IN PLACE. AS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD DIPLOMATS RECENTLY: "IN THE ABSENCE OF A NIF, OUR HANDS ARE TIED. WE CANNOT BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS" MEANWHILE, TWO ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO FACE EACH OTHER ACROSS A NARROW DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN NORTHERN RWANDA.
19. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. RWANDA HAS SET ITSELF ON
A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROGRAM WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY
TURN OUT TO BE EVEN LONGER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03060 06 OF 08 191252Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03
ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01
PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNEP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /049W

P 191143Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4494
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 03060 06 OF 08 191252Z
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PRL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: TTE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

PEACE PLAN DEPENDS ON CONTINUING FINANCIAL AND
MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. RETAINING THE INTEREST AND COMMITMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUCH A PROTRACTED
PROCESS IS UNLIKELY TO BE EASY. RWANDA IS ALREADY
COMPETING FOR ATTENTION WITH SOMALIA AND LIBERIA IN
AFRICA AND WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND COUNTRIES OF THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE
FORMER COLONIAL MASTER, BELGIUM, HAS ALREADY REDUCED
ITS INVOLVEMENT AND COMMITMENT TO THIS COUNTRY
SIGNIFICANTLY. THE FRENCH APPARENTLY WANT TO REDUCE
THEIR COMMITMENT AS WELL, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEM TO WANT
TO RETAIN THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE. U.S. BUDGET
PROBLEMS DO NOT BODE WELL FOR OUR ABILITY TO MAKE
COMMITMENTS IN A COUNTRY WHERE OUR DIRECT INTERESTS
ARE MINIMAL.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

20. FRAGILE PEACE. THE PEACE IN RWANDA IS FRAGILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03                KIGALI  03060  06 OF 08  191252Z
A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HELD FOR THE MOST
PART OF THE PAST YEAR, WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE
UNDERWAY IN ARUSHA. THE EXCEPTION WAS FROM
FEBRUARY 8 TO MARCH 9 THIS YEAR WHEN AN RPF OFFENSIVE
BROUGHT RPF FORCES TO WITHIN 20 MILES OF THE CAPITAL
AND FORCED THE DISPLACEMENT OF NEARLY ONE MILLION
PEOPLE. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT, NO ONE DOUBTS THAT THE
RPF HAS THE MILITARY SKILL AND MIGHT RESORT TO
DAMAGING VIOLENCE AS LONG AS IT HAS ACCESS TO ITS
WEAPONRY. THIS COMMON BELIEF APPEARS TO BE ACTING AS
A DETERRENT TO ETHNIC AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE THAT
PLAGUED RWANDA DURING THE WAR. POLITICAL YOUTH
GROUPS ARE FOR NOW QUIET. THE HUTU EXTREMIST
POLITICAL PARTY HAS KEPT A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE
RPF'S FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE. BUT GUNS AND GRENADES HAVE
PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE SOCIETY AND ARE EASILY
ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO SEEK THEM. EVEN AFTER THE
FIGHTING FORCES DISARM, AS CALLED FOR IN THE
DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS, A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE IMMINENT PRESENCE IN KIGALI OF 600 RPF TROOPS TO GUARD RPF PARTICIPANTS IN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS KEEPS THE FEAR OF RENEWED VIOLENCE ALIVE.

21. THE RWANDAN OPTION. NEVERTHELESS, AGAINST ALL THESE ODDS, RWANDANS HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN THE LAST 24 MONTHS, PASSING FROM A SINGLE PARTY DICTATORSHIP AT WAR TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT LED BY AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER THAT HAS CONCLUDED A PEACE ACCORD. IN THE PROCESS, RWANDANS HAVE CRAFTED A UNIQUE PATH TO DEMOCRACY. IN CONTRAST TO BURUNDI, WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO LEAD THE WAY TO SOCIAL CHANGE, RWANDANS WROPOUE TO TRANSFORM THEIR SOCIETY FIRST. THE RWANDAN WAY, WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO FOLLOW THE UNLEASHING OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND THE TRANSFER OF POWER AWAY FROM THE ALL-POWERFULL PRESIDENCY, MAY WELL PROVE MORES DISFICULT TO MANAGE. FIFTEEN MONTHS OF POWER-SHARING HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT A SMOOTH RIDE. NEVERTHELESS, THE RWANDAN WAY IS WORKING FOR RWANDA. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PARTY LEADERS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR STAYING POWER AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE TRANSITION PROCESS. THEY HAVE GAINED A WEALTH
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
OF EXPERIENCE IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND COALITION
BUILDING THAT WILL SERVE THEM WELL WHEN THE RPF JOINS
THEM IN GOVERNING.

22. GOOD WILL. THE DOGGED PERSISTENCE RWANDANS HAVE
DEMONSTRATED DURING THEIR YEAR-LONG PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR 15-MONTH EXPERIMENT WITH
MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IS TESTIMONY TO THE GOOD WILL
ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE THE TRANSITION WORK, DESPITE THE
OBSTACLES THEY WILL INEVITABLY ENCOUNTER ALONG THE
WAY. WITH THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE ACCORD, RWANDANS,
INCLUDING THE RPF, COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACE AND
TO A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME FOR THE TRANSITION PROCESS.
RWANDANS ARE TIRED OF WAR, THEY ARE TIRED OF A
STAGNANT ECONOMY, AND THEY ARE READY FOR A CHANGE
That will give them a chance at peace and prosperity. Rwandans know that they cannot afford to continue fighting. No one acquainted with Rwanda would predict an untroubled transition period. Leadership will play a crucial role in keeping the process on track through the difficulties that lie ahead. Support from the international community, both bilaterally and through multi-lateral institutions such as the U.N., IMF, will improve the odds.

Implications for U.S. policy

23. Successful implementation of the peace plan in Rwanda will effectively end three years of civil war, offer hope for stability in the sub-region, bring Rwanda's democratization process to the brink of legislative and presidential elections, lay the groundwork for full minority participation in Rwandan political and economic life, give the economy the chance to pick up, and move toward resolution of a long-standing refugee problem. Rwandans have mapped out the path they intend to follow, but they cannot complete the trip without the help of the international community.

24. The United States has played a significant role in promoting dialogue between the two warring factions and, in its role as observer at the peace talks, supported the two sides through the year-long negotiating process. In keeping with our policy of promoting conflict resolution, democratization, and economic development, the U.S. should:

-- continue to promote and assist the Rwandan peace process, using diplomatic, financial, and material means;
ENCOURAGE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF ALL SIDES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL INEVITABLY SURFACE;

ENCOURAGE ALL SIDES TO RULE OUT RECURSE TO VIOLENCE AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES;

ENSURE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE Whose SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND COMMAND Structure are COMPATIBLE WITH THE JOB BOTH SIDES EXPECT IT TO ACCOMPLISH;
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 03060 08 OF 08  191253Z
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ2/
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 08 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

-- ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO ENLARGE ITS MILITARY
OBSERVER GROUP IN RWANDA (NMOG), INCLUDING
PARTICIPATION OF ANGLOPHONE TROOPS, AND EXPAND ITS
Mandate to Accommodate Post-Peace Accord Missions;

-- ENCOURAGE THE U.N., ITS AGENCIES, AND ITS MEMBER
STATES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO RWANDA'S NEED FOR HELP IN
IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD;

-- EXERT PRESSURE ON THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO
PARTICIPATE FINANCIALLY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE
ACCORD PROGRAMS;

-- PROVIDE FUNDING FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF ARMED
FORCES AND REINTEGRATION OF RETURNING REFUGEES.

-- WORK CLOSER WITH OBSERVERS OF THE PEACE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH, TO HELP
CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AMONG THE POLITICAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  KIGALI 03060 08 OF 08  191253Z
FORCES IN RWANDA THAT WILL PERMIT SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS.

25. KINSHASA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONVIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KIGALI  03188  01 OF 04  300601Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO  LOG-00  ACDA-17  AID-01  CIAE-00  C-01  OASY-00  DODE-00
  DOE-00  EB-01  EUR-01  HA-09  H-01  TEDE-00  INR-00
  IO-19  L-03  ADS-00  NEA-01  NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02
  OMB-01  PA-01  PM-02  PRS-01  P-01  SNP-00  SP-00
  SS-00  TRSE-00  T-00  USIE-00  DTC-01  RPE-01  CORE-00
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P 271512Z AUG 93 ZDK CITE HCB 4038 AND ALL OTHERS
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4550
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI  03188  01 OF 04  300601Z

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSES
THOUGHTS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3092, (B) STATE 250795,
(C) USUN 3885, (D) ADDIS ABABA 5645

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD TOLD

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
CHARGE HIS TEAM’S FINDINGS POINT TOWARD A WHOLLY UN,
PHASED PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) WITH SEVERAL
COMPONENTS, PEAKING IN SIZE DURING THE FORCE
DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT/DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS,
THEN TAPERING OFF SIGNIFICANTLY. HE WORRIES THAT A
FORCE SMALLER THAN THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OR DELAYED IN
ARRIVAL COULD JEOPARDIZE A POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL
PKO. WHAT FORCES CAN BE MOVED IN WHEN TO ASSURE THE
PROCESS STAYS ON TRACK IN THE "CRITICAL" WEEKS
IMMEDIATELY AHEAD SO A GOVERNMENT CAN BE PUT IN PLACE
IS A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. HE ASKED THAT THE U.S.
URGE BOTH SIDES TO REMAIN PATIENT AND CALM PENDING UN
START-UP. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 03  KIGALI 03188  01 OF 04  300601Z
3. CHARGE MET 8/26 WITH BRIG. GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN A PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION IN RWANDA. CHARGE CONVEYED U.S. POSITION
AS OUTLINED REF B. THE GENERAL WAS RELUCTANT TO
DISCUSS SPECIFICS OF HIS TEAM’S FINDINGS IN ORDER NOT
TO PREEMPT HIS REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR
COMPROMISE THE UNSYG’S DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.
NEVERTHELESS, HE DISCUSSED BROAD OUTLINES OF HIS
THINKING AT THIS STAGE AND EXPRESSED FEAR FOR THE
OPERATION’S SUCCESS SHOULD THE UN SKIMP ON
RESOURCES. ALSO PRESENT WERE ISEL RIVERO, UN
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, AND FLORENCE BARRILLON-POMES,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

4. PARAMETERS. THE GENERAL SAID HE WILL RECOMMEND
TO THE UNSYG A PKO FOR RWANDA THAT IS "REASONABLE BUT
RESPONSIBLE" GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NEEDS ON THE GROUND.
HE WILL PRESENT OPTIONS TO THE UNSYG WITH A
CONVINCING ARGUMENT FOR WHAT HE DEEMS THE "MINIMUM
VIABLE" OPERATION. BELOW THAT, HE SAID, THE UN WILL
BE ON ITS OWN.

5. A WINNER. GEN. DALLAIRE SAID THE RWANDAN PKO
COULD BE A WINNER IF IT IS APPROACHED PROPERLY AND AT
A PACE THAT KEEPS THE RISK FACTOR LOW. IF FORCE
ARRIVAL IS DELAYED, HE SAID, OR IF THE OPERATION IS
SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES, FAILURE COULD BE A REAL
POSSIBILITY. HE SAID HE FOUND GOOD WILL ON BOTH
SIDES TO MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS WORK. THAT THE
CEASEFIRE WORKS WITH ONLY 50 NMOC OBSERVERS IS
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EVIDENCE OF THIS GOOD WILL.

6. RISKS EXIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, RISKS EXIST. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PREOCCUPATION WITH RISKS IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS WHICH HE CONSIDERS "CRITICAL". WHAT WILL HAPPEN, HE ASKED, WHEN THE UN FORCE FAILS TO ARRIVE BY SEPTEMBER 10, THE LOCALLY AGREED MILESTONE FOR PUTTING THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE? HOW LONG WILL THE PATIENCE OF THE TWO SIDES LAST BEFORE ONE OR THE OTHER BREAKS THE PEACE? HE SAID HIS TEAM IS DOING A RISK ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED AND WHEN IN ORDER TO ENSURE AGAINST COLLAPSE OF THE PROCESS.

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IC-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
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P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDP
WMMBA PRIORITY 1366
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

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STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND ILLONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSSES

BEFORE IT EVEN GETS STARTED. HE BELIEVES THAT
FINDING A WAY TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE EARLY
WILL BE CRUCIAL.

7. PHASED OPERATION. THE GENERAL TALKED ABOUT A
THREE-PHASE OPERATION WITH THE NUMBER OF ASSETS
PEAKING DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT PROCESS
OF PHASE II. ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS DELIBERATELY
VAGUE IN DESCRIBING HIS VISION, CHARGE UNDERSTOOD THE
FOLLOWING:

--PHASE I WOULD BEGIN SEPTEMBER 10 AND EXTEND UNTIL
SUFFICIENT UN ASSETS WERE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA TO
PERMIT THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS TO BEGIN. ONCE A UN
RESOLUTION AND BUDGET WERE APPROVED, A COMMANDER
COULD BE NAMED AND BE IN COUNTRY WITH AN ADVANCE
PARTY POSSIBLY WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. FORCES MIGHT
BE ABLE TO BE BORROWED FROM ANOTHER UN OPERATION IN
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PAGE 03  KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
PUT IN PLACE. THIS, THE GENERAL BELIEVES IS THE
CRITICAL PHASE.

-- PHASE II WOULD BEGIN WHEN A UN FORCE REASONABLE
ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS ARRIVED IN
COUNTRY. HE SAID THREE MONTHS WOULD BE THE MINIMUM
TIME NEEDED FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF A UN RESOLUTION FOR
THE MAIN BODY TF A UN FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED TO
RWANDA. THE NUMBER OF FORCES WOULD PEAK DURING THIS
PHASE WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL THE FORCE INTEGRATION
WAS COMPLETE, ABOUT NINE MONTHS OUT.

-- PHASE III, BEGINNING ONCE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS
COMPLETED, WOULD SEE FORCES REDUCED, POSSIBLY LEAVING
ONLY AN OBSERVATION FORCE UNTIL THE END OF THE
22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD.

8. BEGINNING AND END. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, THE
GENERAL SAID THAT THE END OF THE OPERATION WAS
CLEAR: 22 MONTHS INTO THE PROCESS WHEN THE PEACE
ACCORD CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO END AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE GENERAL NOTED
THAT HAVING "REASONABLE" ASSETS IN PLACE AT EACH
POINT IN THE PROCESS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE
UN--AND DONORS--TO PUSH THE RWANDANS HARD TO STICK TO
THEIR PROPOSED TIMETABLE.

9. RELATION TO THE OAU/NMOC. ASKED WHAT THE ROLE OF
THE OAU/NMOC WOULD BE, THE GENERAL SAID IT WOULD HOLD
THE FORT UNTIL THE UN COULD COME IN. AFTER THE
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PAGE 04    KIGALI 03186 02 OF 04  271529Z
ARRIVAL OF THE UN, THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OAU
COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD THEN BE
WITHDRAWN OR FOLDED INTO THE UN OPERATION. HE HINTED
AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE LONG-STANDING OAU PROPOSAL,
FIRST SUGGESTED DURING THE ARUSHA TALKS, FOR OAU
PERSONNEL TO BE SECONDED TO KEY POSITIONS OF A UN-LED
PKO TO GAIN EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE OAU PKOS. CHARGE
PROBED WHETHER AN NMOC BATTALION (THINKING OF THE
EGYPTIAN OFFER) MIGHT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS THE KIGALI
FORCE THAT COULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
INSTALLED. HE SAID ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE
UN-LED.

VA COMPONENTS OF THE OPERATION. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF A UN

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STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

OPERATION TO THE MILITARY ASPECT. THE GENERAL SAID
THAT HE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AN ALL-SOLDIER
EXERCISE, BUT ONE WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS. ALTHOUGH
HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SPECIFIC, CHARGE DEDUCED HE
ENVISONS AT LEAST FOUR COMPONENTS: A FORCE TO

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PAGE 03 KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z

11. IDENTIFICATION OF SITES. CHARGE ASKED IF HIS TEAM HAD IDENTIFIED SITES FOR CANTONMENT OF WEAPONS AND ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS. HE SAID THEY HAD BUT THEY WOULD BE PRESENTED AS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN/SYG. AN ADVANCE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE TWO SIDES ON THE PROPOSALS.

12. PHASE I CRITICAL. THE GENERAL REITERATED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, A RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. BUT IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HE SAID, SOME RESOURCES MUST BE COMMITTED. HIS POLITICAL AIDE OBSERVED THAT THE ANGOLAN OPERATION FAILED BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES. THE GENERAL SAID PHASE I WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. A "MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE" WILL BE NEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE OFFICE AND SO THAT THE TWO SIDES CAN GET THROUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE A UN FORCE IS PRESENT WITHOUT HAVING THE THE PROCESS "CRASH".


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PAGE 04  KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z

14. COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS REPORT WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC NUMBERS ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC TIME FRAMES FOR AN OPERATION THAT WILL HAVE A CLEAR BEGINNING AND A CLEAR END. HIS WORRY IS LEGITIMATE: HOW LONG CAN THE TWO RWANDAN FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED IN BATTLE POSITIONS ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF A NARROW DMZ WITHOUT HAVING SOMETHING GO AW XSHOW LONG CAM A GOHTRNMENT GRIN POISED TO TAKE OFFICE BEFORE POLITICAL MANIPULATION SETS IN TO DERAIR IT? EVEN THOUGH WE ARE CONVINCED THAT RWANDANS WANT THEIR PEACE PROCESS TO WORK, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN REMAIN INDEFINITELY IN ANTICIPATORY LIMBO WITHOUT SOMETHING

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PAGE 01  KIGALI 03188 04 OF 04 271532Z

ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
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PAGE 02  KIGALI 03188 04 OF 04  271532Z

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

HAPPENING THAT COULD SERIOUSLY TEST THEIR RESOLVE.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. THE GENERAL STRIKES US AS A
BRIGHT, NON-NONSENSE SORT OF GUY WHOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF SHOULD
BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE STILL INTENDS TO
PRESENT HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING
THE LABOR DAY WEEKEND. END COMMENT.

LEADER

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MEMORANDUM OF THE JOINT MISSION "GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT" ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO RWANDA

NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 16, 1993 RELEASED IN FULL

0. Nature and Mission of the Neutral International Force (NIF)

On June 11, 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front submitted a joint request to the Secretary General of the United Nations, asking him to establish and deploy quickly a Neutral International Force (NIF) of which the United Nations would assume responsibility and command.

This request and the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two Parties outline the various missions they would wish the NIF to carry out. These missions relate particularly to catering for the overall security of the country and supervising the process of the formation of the National Army and National Gendarmerie (Article 54).

Article 72 of the above-mentionned Protocol of Agreement links the establishment of Transitional Institutions, namely the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly as well as the process of disengagement and reintegration of Armed Forces, with a prior deployment of the NIF. The timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which stipulates that Transitional Institutions must be put in place within thirty-seven (37) days after the signing of the Peace Agreement (Article 7 of the Peace Agreement), has not been so far respected because the NIF is not yet established and deployed.

Considering that the two parties have entrusted the NIF with a key role in the framework of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, they decided to send a joint mission to appeal to the United Nations Secretary General and the Security Council so that a positive reply can be given as quickly as possible, in the shape of a Resolution voted by the Security Council for the establishment and deployment of a Neutral International Force to Rwanda.

A. The deployment of such a Force is necessary and urgent because of the following main reasons:
I- Political reasons:

1) The people of Rwanda urge that the delay in the timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement be addressed promptly because, if it were to be further extended, that delay, especially in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, would make the whole Peace process collapse.

2) The political good will that motivates both parties may be seriously undermined if Political Institutions are not put in place quickly.

3) The 50,000 fighters of the two parties still in their respective positions may end up violating the ceasefire because of nervousness due to their difficult living conditions if political decisions are not reached soon.

II- Humanitarian reasons

1) The return of the displaced persons into their property can only take place after the disengagement of the forces currently deployed in war zones. The disengagement and mine clearing operations can only be supervised by the NIF;

2) The rainy season is again about to start while the displaced persons are still homeless despite the fact that the two parties have already reached a Peace Agreement;

3) Those displaced persons should be resettled as quickly as possible because, if they were to miss the planting season of September-October 1993, there is likely to be famine.

4) The repatriation of the Rwandese Refugees who are eager to come back to their motherland can only occur after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government responsible for planning and carrying out that repatriation. The establishment of that Government is closely linked with the deployment of the NIF as seen above.

5) The beginning of the school year in September-October, 1993 must be effective otherwise school children living in the areas affected by the war will miss school for the fourth year in a row with a real risk for them to become illiterate. There is another category of school-age children who have not been able to start school for three consecutive years.

III- Economic reasons

The disengagement of the Armed Forces of the two parties shall allow the reopening and use of the Transit Roads of the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura), and thus contribute to boosting trade within the region.
B- **Size of the NIF**

The size (numbers) of the NIF should be determined in relation with the following factors:

1) The importance and complexity of the missions ascribed to the NIF;
2) The hilly landscape of Rwanda which makes mobility extremely difficult;
3) The big numbers of the armies of the two parties (over 50,000 troops) whose disengagement, demobilization and integration must be supervised;
4) The presence of one RPF battalion in Kigali and thus the danger of bringing the soldiers of the two armies together in the Capital City while they are not yet integrated may jeopardize the whole peace process as witnessed in other conflict regions. As a result the presence of a Neutral International Force with sufficient personnel in Kigali is appropriate.

C- **Duration of the NIF mission in Rwanda**

The Transition period shall last twenty-two (22) months.

However there may be possibilities of considering the deployment modalities and disengagement modalities (end of the mission) in two stages for either case.

1) **Deployment**

In order to avoid further delay in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, it is suggested to deploy as soon as possible the first elements of the NIF and, if possible, by end of September or early October, 1993.

The other contingents would be deployed a little bit later in order to strengthen the first contingents and thus help them carry out all the missions ascribed to the NIF.

2) **Disengagement of the NIF**

The end of the mission of the NIF may be viewed in two stages:

- Great reduction of personnel may occur at the end of the integration process of the armed forces of the two parties as well as at the end of the demobilization process.
- The rest of the reduced personnel may be kept in place until general elections to be organized at the end of the Transitional Period.
D- CONCLUSION

The Joint Mission Government of Rwanda - Rwandese Patriotic Front, considering the insistent request of the people of Rwanda pleading for the establishment of those Transitional Institutions responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, appeals for the understanding of both the UN Secretary General and Security Council, and submits to them the following request:

1) The Security Council urgently adopt a resolution favorable to a rapid deployment of the Neutral International Force in Rwanda;

2) To envisage a gradual deployment of the personnel of the NIF whose first elements would be expected in Rwanda before October 10, 1993.

3) As provided for in Article 53 of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, the members of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) should be incorporated within the first elements of the NIF (the NMOG offers the advantage of having one company currently present in Rwanda).

Done in New York, September 16, 1993.

Dr. Anastase GASANA
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Chairman of the Joint Delegation Government of Rwanda-Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)

Patrick MAZIMHAKA
Commissioner for External Relations in RPF Vice-Chairman of the Joint Delegation Government of Rwanda-Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9698
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ASMARA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN

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PAGE 02

STATE FOR IO/UNP, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5

E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL MOPS, UN, RW, UG
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT RPF-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ASKS
--
USG SUPPORT FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF AN NIF

REF A) STATE 281611 B) KIGALI 3326
1. SUMMARY. AMB. ALBRIGHT MET WITH THE JOINT RWANDA-RPF DELEGATION ON SEPT 16 TO HEAR THEIR PLEA FOR THE RAPID SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. INITIALLY SAYING THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA SAW THE NEED FOR A SIX BATTALION FORCE (4200), FM GASANA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WITH TWO BATTALIONS, THE TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE OVER, AND WITH FOUR BATTALIONS (2800), DISARMAMENT COULD BEGIN. END SUMMARY.

2. ON SEPT 16, AMB. ALBRIGHT RECEIVED A JOINT GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA-RPF DELEGATION LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GASANA. GASANA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RWANDA NEW YORK PERMREP, RPF COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS MAZIMHAKA, AND RWANDAN AMBASSADOR TO KAMPALA KANYARUSHOKI. GASANA WAS THE ONLY SPEAKER. AMB HICKS AND NOTE TAKER ALSO SAT IN ON THE MEETING.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE DELEGATION'S NEW YORK, AND NEXT WEEK WASHINGTON, VISIT WAS TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FROM SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO RWANDA TO ALLOW FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THEN DISARMAMENT OF TROOPS. DURING HIS HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH AMB. ALBRIGHT, GASANA REITERATED THAT RWANDA APPRECIATED THE US BILATERAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, AND THAT "THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS GOD" IN TERMS OF DECIDING RWANDA'S FATE. NOTING THAT HIS JOINT DELEGATION WAS A RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM THE PEOPLE TO PUT A PERMANENT END TO THE CONFLICT, GASANA ELABORATED THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS TO ASSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS DISPATCH OF THE NIF.

4. RWANDA'S PROBLEM WAS A POLITICAL ONE, STATED GASANA. BY INSTALLING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THIS POLITICAL PROBLEM COULD BEGIN TO BE ADDRESSED. GASANA HINTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNREST AND/OR BREAKING OF THE CEASE-FIRE. ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC SIDE, THE DISPLACED PERSONS WERE PRESSING TO RETURN HOME. IT MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL AND RESTRAIN THEM. SEPTEMBER WAS THE RAINY/PLANTING SEASON. IF THE REFUGEES DID NOT REACH HOME IN TIME TO PLANT, THERE WAS RISK OF A WIDESPREAD FAMINE BEGINNING IN
UNCLASSIFIED

JANUARY/FEBRUARY WHEN HARVEST SHOULD TAKE PLACE. GIVEN ALL OF THESE FACTORS, THE JOINT DELEGATION WAS PLEADING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE THE TROOPS FOR THE POLITICAL CHANGES TO BEGIN.

5. AMB. ALBRIGHT PRESSSED GASANA ON HIS VIEWS ON HOW MANY TROOPS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THE NIF. GASANA
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PAGE 04 USUN N 04553 01 OF 02 180026Z
REPLIED, SIX BATTALIONS (4200 PEOPLE AT 700 PER BATTALION): ONE FOR EACH "SECTOR" AND TWO FOR KIGALI. THIS MANY TROOPS WERE NEEDED DUE TO THE MOUNTAINOUS NATURE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. GASANA WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT THE BATTALIONS COULD BE DEPLOYED IN "TRANCHES", AND THAT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT PERIOD COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS TWO BATTALIONS WERE IN KIGALI. GIVEN THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH TO COMPREHEND ONE BATTALION ALREADY ON THE GROUND, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD PROMISED A SECOND BATTALION, IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER OF THE SC AUTHORIZING THE NIF. GASANA ADDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER BATTALIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE DISARMAMENT COULD BEGIN.

6. AMB ALBRIGHT PROMISED TO RELAY GASANA'S VIEWS AND ESTIMATES TO THE DEPARTMENT, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS PAYING A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION TO BUDGETING PEACEKEEPING FORCES. WE WOULD NEED TO WAIT FOR THE SYG'S SURVEY TEAM TO FINISH ITS REPORT BEFORE

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PAGE 01 USUN N 04553 02 OF 02 180026Z

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PAGE 02

STATE FOR IO/UNP, AF/C, AF/PA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, JS

B.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL MOPS, UN, RW, UG
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT RPF-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ASKS
-- USG SUPPORT FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF AN NIF

DISCUSSING THE SIZE AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NIF. IT WAS A
BUDGET-CONSCIOUS BODY THE RWANDANS WERE DEALING WITH.
GASANA RECOGNIZED THAT HIS ESTIMATES MIGHT NEED TO BE
REVISED, "ON PROPOSE, DIEU (LE CONSEIL) DISPOSE," BUT
REITERATED THAT THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WERE
UNCLASSIFIED

SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS CALLED FOR IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.

7. ON HIS WAY OUT, GASANA FURTHER SAID TO AMB. HICKS THAT WITH FOUR BATTALIONS (2B00), HE BELIEVED THE RWANDANS WOULD FEEL SECURE ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE CANTONMENT AND DISARMAMENT OF TROOPS.


ALBRIGHT

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PAGE 01  KIGALI 03586 01 OF 03 011018Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 \042W

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAD, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

REF: KIGALI 03511

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: HABYARIMANA'S PURPOSE FOR THE VISIT IS TO THANK THE U.S., BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE U.N. FOR HELP IN BRINGING PEACE TO RWANDA. HE WILL ALSO INTRODUCE RWANDA'S BID FOR A SEAT ON THE SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 03586 01 OF 03 011018Z
COUNCIL. IN ADDITION, HE WANTS AID FOR REBUILDING AFTER THREE YEARS OF WAR AND OUR SUPPORT WITH THE IBRD AND IMF. WE SHOULD PRAISE AND ENCOURAGE HIS ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE AND DEMOCRACY TO RWANDA, URGING GREATER ACTIVITY ON FAMILY PLANNING AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMIES, USE THE OCCASION TO LAUD THE RECENT OAU ROLE IN PROVIDING OBSERVERS, AD LET HIM KNOW WE SUPPORT THE AMERICAN BID TO PRIVATIZE THE RWANDAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM. END SUMMARY.

RWANDAN OBJECTIVES

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS, NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND PARIS DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS IS TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HELPED AS OBSERVERS IN THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN ARUSHA IN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
AUGUST. SIMILAR VISITS TO NEIGHBORS WHO SUPPORTED THE PROCESS RECEIVED A POSITIVE REACTION INTERNALLY AND HAVE HELPED GREATLY IN PERSUADING THE RWANDAN PUBLIC THAT THIS PEACE ACCORD IS FOR REAL.

4. IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, HABYARIMANA WILL ALSO FORMALLY INTRODUCE RWANDA'S BID TO SIT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A BID SUPPORTED BY THE AFRICA GROUP.

5. HOPEFULLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL HAVE DEALT WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL. IF NOT, HIS OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO PRESS FOR A CREDIBLE NIF UNDER UN COMMAND TO HELP CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03    KIGALI 03586 01 OF 03 011018Z

RWANDANS IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORD. IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAS REQUESTED AS LARGE A FORCE AS POSSIBLE (REFTEL), I BELIEVE HE CAN BE SATISFIED WITH THE FORCE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT IF THE ISSUE IS STILL OPEN BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL.

6. HABYARIMANA ALSO WISHES TO RECEIVE PUBLIC RECOGNITION FROM THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES FOR THE STEPS HE HAS TAKEN TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND, OF COURSE, TOWARD PEACE. WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT DESERVES CREDIT FOR BRINGING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO THIS POINT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS IS IRREVERSIBLE. IN THE PEACE ACCORD, THE PRESIDENT YIELDS MOST EXECUTIVE POWER TO THE CABINET, AND HE RETAINS FOR HIS OWN PARTY ONLY ONE-FOURTH OF THE SEATS IN THAT CABINET, LEAVING THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP TO A LEADER OF WHAT WAS FORMERLY AN OPPOSITION PARTY. THIS WAS NOT AN EASY PROCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT. IT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TRAUMATIC FOR MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AND IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE WHO SEE THEIR POSITION OF PRIVILEGE SLIPPING AWAY. I BELIEVE IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO PRAISE THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN BRINGING IT ABOUT BOTH PRIVATELY AND IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE AT THE TIME OF THE VISIT.

7. WE EXPECT THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO HAVE MEETINGS AT THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF. WHEN HE MEETS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ASK FOR U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
SUPPORT WITH THE BRETTEN WOODS INSTITUTIONS. SINCE
WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETINGS OF THE
RWANDAN DELEGATION WHICH WENT FOR THE ANNUAL
MEETINGS, WE ARE UNABLE TO PREDICT WHAT SPECIFIC
REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE, BUT MOST LIKELY HE
WILL ASK US IN A GENERAL WAY TO ENCOURAGE THE WORLD
BANK AND THE FUND TO BE UNDERSTANDING OF RWANDA'S
DIFFICULTIES AND PATIENT IF SOME REFORMS TAKE LONGER
THAN THE BANK WOULD LIKE.

8. HABYARIMANA WILL ALSO MAKE A REQUEST FOR

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03586 02 OF 03 011020Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
   EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-03
   ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02
   PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
   T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /042W
   -------------------F4800E 011020Z /38
P 011010Z OCT 93
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4771
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.C. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF AN UNSPECIFIED LEVEL FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE WAKE
OF THE PEACE ACCORD.

9. THE PRESIDENT EXPECTS TO BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND IN PARIS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN BELGIUM.

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PAGE 02 KIGALI 03586 02 OF 03 011020Z
U.S. OBJECTIVES

10. OUR OBJECTIVES OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE RPF AND OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE RWANDAN POLITICAL SYSTEM ARE BEING ACHIEVED. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THIS PROCESS AND TO USE THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THIS END. ON THIS POINT, HIS INTERESTS AND OURS ARE IDENTICAL. IN ADDITION TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENCOURAGEMENT, USAID HAS JUST LAUNCHED A LONG-TERM DEMOCRACY PROJECT WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MOST RWANDANS.

PLANNING. SOME OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT USAID LED PROGRAM HAS BEEN COMPROMISED BY THREE YEARS OF WAR. WE WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE HABYARIMANA TO PUT HIS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND THE PROGRAM NOW AND IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

12. ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ULTIMATELY, THEREFORE, TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN RWANDA IS THE NEED TO DEMOBILIZE SIXTY PERCENT OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF. THIS WILL PUT ROUGHLY 30,000 MEN ON THE STREETS. IF PROPER PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ARE NOT MADE FOR THEIR RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE, CHAOS WILL RESULT. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO VACANT LAND FOR THEM TO RETURN TO. THEY WILL NOT GO BACK INTO THEIR HILLS AND SIMPLY DISAPPEAR ON THE FAMILY PLOTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 03586 02 OF 03 011020Z
BECAUSE THE FAMILY PLOTS ARE NOW LESS THAN TWO ACRES PER FAMILY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM IS TO GIVE DIRECT ASSIGNMENTS TO DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS TO SCHOOLS WHICH FIT WITH THEIR QUALIFICATIONS AND DESIRES. THIS WILL REQUIRE MAJOR EXPANSION OF TECHNICAL AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. WE HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND PLANNING AND THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK TO EXPEDITE THE PLANNING FOR THIS PROCESS. WASHINGTON INTERLOCUTORS COULD USEFULLY STRESS THE URGENCY TO
THE PRESIDENT OF MOVING FORWARD WITH THE PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND INVOLVING THE RPF AT AN EARLY STAGE. THIS WILL BE A MORE COMPLICATED PROCESS THAN IT WAS IN UGANDA WHERE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE MONEY.

13. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN VERY HAPPY WITH THE NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP PROVIDED BY THE OAU, THE FACT IS THAT THEY HAVE DONE A REASONABLE JOB WITH MINIMAL RESOURCES IN SEPARATING THE WARRING Factions DURING THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR. CONSISTENT WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AGENDA, THE VISIT OF HABYARIMANA CAN BE USED FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE THAT THE OAU HAS UNDERTAKEN IN RWANDA.

14. WE HAVE BEEN BY FAR THE LARGEST BILATERAL DONOR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE NEARLY ONE MILLION PERSONS DISPLACED BY THE WAR. AID TO ABOUT 600,000, MOST OF WHOM HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR LAND, WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04      KIGALI 03586 02 OF 03 011020Z
NEEDED AT LEAST THROUGH DECEMBER. THE OTHER 360,000 WILL NEED HELP UNTIL THE SPRING HARVEST IN MAY. OUR CONTINUING ABILITY TO PROVIDE THIS AID IS THREATENED BY SLOPPY GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND THEFT OF SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES. STATE AND AID INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD REMIND THE PRESIDENT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAIR AND HONEST DISTRIBUTION OF DONATED RESOURCES.

15. FINALLY, DEPARTMENT INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD EXPRESS INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED AMERICAN INVESTMENT TO PRIVATIZE THE EXCELLENT RWANDAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM. I AM SURE THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WILL PRESS HABYARIMANA TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH OFFER; WE SHOULD GET

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PAGE 01  KIGALI 03586 03 OF 03 011020Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
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   PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EADD, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

THERE FIRST. NOTE: RWANDATEL ISSUED A TENDER DUE AUGUST 30. MAJOR BIDDERS ARE ATLANTIC TELE-NETWORK (ATN), A U.S. FIRM BASED IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, AND FRENCH CABLE AND RADIO (FCR), SUBSIDIARY OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL SYSTEM. WE ARGUE THAT SINCE RWANDA WANTS TO PRIVATIZE, IT SHOULD NOT SELL OUT TO A STATE COMPANY, WHETHER IT BE FRENCH OR ANY OTHER. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS TELL US THEY DEEPLY WANT AMERICAN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 03586 03 OF 03 011020Z
INVESTMENT FOR ITS SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE, AND THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS AN EXCELLENT PLACE TO BEGIN (THE ONLY OTHER U.S. MONEY HERE IS IN JOE WERTHEIM'S TEA FACTORY, SORWATHE). FLATEN

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GENERAL:

1. The conduct of military operations in controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. Within this legal framework, it is for the United Nations (UN) to set the parameter within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide political and legal direction and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. The ROE are drafted by the Force, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. Security Council Resolution, dated October stated:

"UNAMIR is equipped with defensive weapons. The use of weapons is normally authorized for self-defence only. The use of force for deterrence or retaliation is forbidden. Self defence includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties under the mandate of UNAMIR. In applying these rules, the over-riding rule will be the use of minimum force (see Definitions) which will be strictly adhered to by all members of UNAMIR."

3. UNAMIR is a peace-keeping force, without commitment to either party in the Rwandese civil war. Under the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the UN Mandate, UNAMIR has a commitment to all parties in assisting them to achieve peace. Impartiality is the key in this regard and all UNAMIR’s actions must be aimed at ensuring the furtherance of this objective. However, circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel would be justified. When this occurs, the nature of peace-keeping will demand that such actions by UNAMIR will be applied with restraint: use of minimum force.

4. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel from all nations providing personnel to UNAMIR. The ROE are written in the form or prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as
or arrest UN civilians or military personnel using force.

CRIMINAL ACTS

14. The recent history of Rwanda is burdened with civil war, dislocation of large elements of the population, terrorism, ethnic and political violence, armed banditry and virtual economic collapse. The potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry during the UNAMIR mandate, due to the rapid demobilization of approximately 35,000 military personnel, high unemployment, over-population and mass desertion from the army, is very high.

15. For the most part, the maintenance of law and order, and therefore responding to control criminal activity, is the responsibility of the local police, monitored by the UNAMIR UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors. However, during the period of demobilization, the ability of the local police may be severely taxed. As a very real possibility, UNAMIR military personnel may be required to assist UNCIVPOL and local authorities, in maintaining law and order. In these circumstances, these rules of engagement would be used in support of local authorities and UNCIVPOL. In these circumstances, military personnel or units would be placed in support of UNCIVPOL, who would act to support local police in the maintenance of law and order.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

17. There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks of displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROD outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

17. RULE NUMBER ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.
   a. STATE A: NO AUTHORITY.
   b. STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

18. RULE NUMBER TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS.
   a. STATE A: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS
   NEW YORK

FROM: WALLAHEE\UNAMIR\KIGALI

FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE
CABLE-212-963-9852

INMARSAT:

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT

ATTN: MGEO BARIL

ROOM NO. 2052

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.

2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIAN SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.

3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.

5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING
FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE Combat AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIRextermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI extermination. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY/FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR location. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT—IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE: HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PlACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE H HR OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON: TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSIG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX: ALLONS-Y.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOCH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 January 1994

NUMBER: UNAMIR: 100

SUBJECT: Contacts with Informant

1. We have carefully reviewed the situation in the light of your MIR-79. We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your cable, as it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under resolution 872 (1993).

2. However, on the assumption that you are convinced that the information provided by the informant is absolutely reliable, we request you to undertake the initiatives described in the following paragraphs.

3. SRSG and FC should request urgent meeting with the President. At that meeting you should inform the President that you have received apparently reliable information concerning the activities of the Interhamwe militia which represent a clear threat to the peace process. You should inform him that these activities include the training and deployment of subversive groups in Kigali as well as the storage and distribution of weapons to these groups.

4. You should inform him that these activities constitute a clear violation of the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement and of the Kigali weapons-secure area. You should assume that he is not aware of these activities, but insist that he must immediately look into the situation, take the necessary action to
ensure that these subversive activities are immediately
discontinued and inform you within 48 hours of the measures taken
in this regard, including the recovery of the arms which have
been distributed. L0001763

5. You should advise the President that, if any violence occurs
in Kigali, you would have to immediately bring to the attention
of the Security Council the information you have received on the
activities of the militia, undertake investigations to determine
who is responsible and make appropriate recommendations to the
Security Council.

6. Before meeting with the President you should inform the
Ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United States of your
intentions and suggest to them that they may wish to consider
making a similar démarche.

7. For security considerations, we leave it to your discretion
to decide whether to inform the PM(D) of your plans before or
after the meeting with the President. When you meet with the
PM(D), you should explain to him the limits of your mandate. You
should also assure him that, while the mandate of UNAMIR does not
allow you to extend protection to the informant, his identity and
your contacts with him will not be repeat not be revealed.

8. If you have major problems with the guidance provided above,
you may consult us further. We wish to stress, however, that the
overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a
course of action that might lead to the use of force and
unanticipated repercussions. Regards.
1. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION: AFTER WE RECEIVED YOUR AIDAC CABLE ON UNDP/WORLD BANK TURF BATTLES OVER DEMOBILIZATION (KIGALI 0159), I SPOKE TO LINDA LLOYD, AF/EPS MARLENE
URBINA, AND IO TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT UNDP AND THE BANK SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS AND NOT WORK AT CROSS PURPOSES AND THAT POST HAS A VALID CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DELAY IN THE UNDP ROUNDTABLE. AS YOU KNOW, LINDA ATTENDED THE UNDP MEETING IN NEW YORK ON JAN. 24. SHE SAID SHE MADE IT CLEAR THAT,

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GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL DEMOBILIZATION, WE DID NOT WANT TO SEE A DELAY IN UNDP ROUNDTABLE. JEROME CHEVALLIER FROM THE BANK WAS THERE, SO HE KNOWS OUR POSITION NOW. AT THE SAME TIME, AF/EPS PASSED YOUR CONCERNS TO DEAN KLINE AT THE USED OFFICE. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH TREASURY AND REPORT BACK TO MARLENE BEFORE PASSING OUR CONCERNS TO BANK OFFICIALS. LINDA HAS DRAFTED A FRONT CHANNEL ON THE NEW YORK MEETING, WHICH IS IN THE CLEARANCE PROCESS, AND EPS PLANS A REPORT AFTER THEY HEAR BACK FROM DEAN.

2. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION (SUITE): WE HEAR THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF ATTENDING THE DEMOBILIZATION ROUNDTABLE IN GENEVA. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THIS IS SO. (OR MAYBE YOU ALREADY MENTIONED THIS TO ME AND I FORGOT?) AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SENDING ANYONE FROM AF, SINCE AID IS ALREADY GOING AND THEY'RE THE ONES WHO WILL BE PUTTING UP WHATEVER MONEY WE HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE. (AS FOR A POSSIBLE ESF CONTRIBUTION, WE ARE STILL HOLDING OUR MEMO TO THE SIXTH FLOOR PENDING RECEIPT OF THE INFO ON WHAT OTHER DONORS MIGHT BE DOING.)

3. (C) HOUPHOUET MARGINALIA: WE UNDERSTAND THAT HABYARIMANA WILL PROBABLY ATTEND THE HOUPHOUET FUNERAL IN COTE D'IVOIRE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT A/S MOOSE MEET WITH HIM ON THE MARGINS OF THE FUNERAL. WE WOULD USE THE BRIEF MEETING TO REINFORCE OUR MESSAGE THAT THE RWANDANS BETTER GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER AND FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT ASAP. WE'LL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

4. (U) ENDLESS YEAR-END REPORTS: I JUST WANT TO TAKE

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TIME OUT TO COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY SUBMISSION OF A WHOLE SLEW OF SOMETIMES ONEROUS YEAR-END REPORTS,

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
BEGINNING WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, THROUGH THE MPP, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, AND THE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PLAN. (I'VE PROBABLY FORGOTTEN ONE OR TWO.) CHURNING THESE THINGS OUT IS HARD ENOUGH WHEN YOU'RE AN SEP POST, BUT IT'S DOUBLY DIFFICULT WHEN YOU'RE SWAMPED WITH POLITICAL WORK, AS YOU ALL HAVE BEEN RECENTLY, AND WHEN ALL THE REPORTS SEEM TO BE DUE AROUND THE SAME TIME. PLEASE PASS MY THANKS TO YOUR STAFF, WITH SPECIAL KUDOS FOR JOYCE FOR HER HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY WORK AND LAURA FOR THE ECON TRENDS REPORT. JUST A REMINDER, THOUGH, THAT WE NEED YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR FEEDBACK CABLE ON THE MPP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS THIS YEAR'S POST REPORTING PLAN ....

CAME BY TO TALK RWANDA/BURUNDI WITH ME LAST WEEK. HE SAID HE THINKS HABYARIMANA IS TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND IS BEHIND THE PARTY SPLITS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE THINK ALL SIDES SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE. THE GOOD THING ABOUT OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S NOT ONLY RIGHT, IT ALSO ALLOWS US TO MAINTAIN OUR UNIQUE POSITION AS AN UNBIASED HONEST BROKER WHOSE ADVICE AND ADMONITIONS ARE RESPECTED BY ALL SIDES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS MADE US VERY EFFECTIVE IN ARUSHA AND SHOULD ONCE AGAIN WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE AS WE PUSH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6. (LOU) WERTHEIM CALLS: JOE WERTHEIM CALLED RECENTLY TO REPORT THAT HIS WORKERS AT THE TEA FACTORY ARE VERY NERVOUS AND READY TO HIT THE ROAD IN THE EVENT FIGHTING RESUMES. THE TUNISIAN UN (FORMER NMOG) MONITORS APPARENTLY TOLD JOE'S LOCAL MANAGERS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE AT HIGH ALERT. JOE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE LOCALS SAY THEY'RE HEARING MORE GRENADE EXPLOSIONS NOW THAN EVER BEFORE (EXCEPT DURING ACTUAL FIGHTING, I PRESUME). ALL IN ALL, JOE (UNDERSTANDABLY) SOUNDED PRETTY CONCERNED.

7. (U) ARD BRIEFING: JUST THOUGHT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I BRIEVED THREE AID CONTRACTORS FROM THE ASSOCIATES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ARD) LAST WEEK, PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR RWANDA TO BEGIN WORK ON THE USAID DIG PROJECT. THE TEAM WAS HEADED BY HARLIN HOBGOOD, WHO IS APPARENTLY AN OLD USAID HAND, AND INCLUDED PASCAL.
BLACQUE-BELAIR AND A THIRD PERSON WHOSE NAME I DIDN'T GET. ANYWAY, THEY SEEMED WELL-BRIEFED ALREADY AND GENERALLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE.

CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH, BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER: 462

SUBJECT: Letter from Foreign Minister of Belgium

1. We have received the attached copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Willy Claes.

2. We would be grateful for your comments on this letter and, in particular, on the suggestion in paragraph 5 that UNAMIR should play a more assertive role in the area of public security. It would also be appreciated if you could send us a draft reply.

Regards.

Dr. Kafando

Regrettably, the public security

ride should attach a proposal.
PERMANENT MISSION OF BELGIUM

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

809 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
Fax: (212) 599 - 6843
Tel: (212) 599 - 5250

DATE: 14 février 1994
No.: 87

FROM: Paul Noterdaeme,
Ambassadeur, Représentant permanent
de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies,

TO: Monsieur Kofi Annan,
Secrétaire général adjoint,
Département des opérations
de maintien de la paix,
PAX No (212) 961-9222

SUBJECT: Rwanda - MINUAR

Monsieur le Secrétaire général adjoint,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, ci-joint, une lettre
reçue ce jour par fax, que M. Willy Claes, Vice-Préfet Ministre
et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique, adresse à S.E.
le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies concernant la situation
au Rwanda. L'original de cette lettre sera transmis à sa haute
destination dès sa réception.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général adjoint,
l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Paul Noterdaeme

Pages: 241
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

L'évolution actuelle de la situation au Rwanda n'est pas encourageante et n'amène à vous faire part des préoccupations du gouvernement belge à ce sujet.

Comme vous le savez, l'impasse qui s'est créée dans la formation d'un gouvernement de transition à base diïrégie entraîne une dégradation du climat politique et ce malgré les efforts de votre Représentant spécial.

L'armée rwandaise semble de plus en plus irritée par les attaques répétées des partis, tandis que les informations relatives à la constitution de réserves d'armes par les différentes milices se font chaque jour plus insistantes. De l'aveu même de certains dirigeants, la prolongation du blocage politique actuel pourrait déboucher sur une explosion irréversible de violence.

Je me félicite des choix des instructions que vous avez données à Monsieur BOKOR BOON, afin qu'il use au maximum de ses prérogatives en vue de convaincre les partis rwandais de l'urgente nécessité d'aboutir à un accord sur la composition du gouvernement de transition à base diïrégie.

Il me paraît cependant que cette accentuation du profil de l'ONU au niveau politique devrait aller de pair avec une attitude plus dissuasive de la MINUAR sur le plan de la sécurité.

A Monsieur BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

NEW-YORK
Je suis conscient de la complexité de la situation comme des contraintes qui vous sont imposées dans le cadre de la résolution 872 du Conseil de sécurité.

Il est à craindre néanmoins qu'à défaut d'enrayer l'évolution négative à laquelle nous assistons, la MINUAR pourrait se trouver dans l'impossibilité de poursuivre valablement sa mission fondamentale, à savoir jouer un rôle majeur d'appui à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Aruasha.

Je puis vous assurer que le gouvernement belge continue de son côté à exhorrer le Président KABARYEMANA et les autres responsables politiques rwandais à accepter les compromis qui s'imposent.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de mes haute considération.

Willy CLAEYS
« La forte dégradation de la situation sur le plan de la sécurité au Rwanda appelle les réflexions suivantes :

1. Les assassinats politiques, les troubles qui s'ensuivent, la détérioration du climat de sécurité, pourraient bien mener à un nouveau bain de sang.

2. Il faudrait accroître la pression diplomatique et politique en vue de parvenir à faire respecter strictement les accords d'Arusha dans un climat serein.

3. Le représentant spécial du secrétaire général au Rwanda, M. Booh Booh, semble avoir perdu de sa crédibilité sur place.

4. Dans le cadre de son mandat actuel, la MINUAR ne peut maintenir fermement l'ordre public. Un sérieux problème de crédibilité se pose.

Des démarches ont déjà été effectuées à un haut niveau à New York, mais elles sont restées sans résultat. La dernière déclaration du président du Conseil de sécurité concernant le Rwanda (le 17 février 1994) « la MINUAR ne sera assurée d'un appui suivi que si les parties appliquent intégralement et rapidement l'accord de paix d'Arusha » laisse présager une possible inactivité ou un arrêt de l'opération.

5. Quand, à la suite des assassinats et des troubles, la MINUAR a décidé au début de cette semaine de placer l'opération sous alerte rouge, cela a eu pour conséquence que tous les Casques bleus ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer dans leurs campements et d'attendre passivement. Si la situation devait effectivement dégénérer et que les ordres précités de la MINUAR restaient en vigueur, il serait inacceptable pour l'opinion publique que des Casques bleus belges puissent devenir au Rwanda les témoins passifs d'un génocide et que les Nations Unies n'entrepassent rien.

6. Si les conditions se détériorent, les Nations Unies et la Belgique ne peuvent pas, en réalité, se permettre de se retirer du Rwanda. La MINUAR devrait pouvoir jouer un rôle plus énergique et adopter sur place un profil plus marqué.
afin de renforcer la crédibilité de la communauté internationale.

7. La question qui se pose est de savoir si cela est possible sans un nouveau mandat du Conseil de sécurité. Si l'on doit tenter de renforcer la MINUAR par un nouveau mandat (une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité), on peut s'attendre à des difficultés, vu la politique actuelle des États-Unis en la matière. En ce moment, une extension de l'opération (Casques bleus, financement) semble exclue à leurs yeux. Au demeurant, dans les deux résolutions elles-mêmes (872, 893), on met nettement l'accent sur le caractère limité ou récessif de l'opération (sans mettre en péril la capacité de la MINUAR de remplir sa mission).

8. Il devient très important d'examiner comment on pourrait renforcer l'action dans le cadre du mandat actuel (intégration de Casques bleus autrichiens ? Une plus grande marge de décision pour Dallaire ? Déplacement provisoire de Casques bleus venant d'autres opérations dans la région ? ...), et comment augmenter efficacement la pression diplomatique et politique.

9. J'aimerais recevoir vos remarques à propos de tout ceci. J'insiste sur le fait que cela doit servir de base à une décision concernant de nouvelles démarches éventuelles, mais qu'aucune position n'a encore été arrêtée à ce sujet » (523b).

Reply from Ambassador Noterdaeme, Telex 326. February 28, 1994


1) L'élargissement du mandat ou le renforcement des effectifs de la MINUAR : « très improbable »

Non seulement les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni s'y opposent, mais ils auraient même tendance c'est ce que confirment leurs délégations à retirer tout simplement la MINUAR « en cas de difficultés » (telle pourrait même être l'attitude de l'ensemble du Conseil de sécurité). Il y a là-dernière « une logique financière » (les États-Unis n'ont jamais voulu plus de 500 hommes pour la MINUAR).
Il y a également une logique politique : les opérations au Rwanda, au Libéria et au Mozambique relèvent du Chapitre VI; en d'autres termes, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies ne peut pas imposer de solution (en Yougoslavie et en Somalie, cela s'est avéré impossible, même dans le cadre du Chapitre VII).

2) Les règles d'engagement

Le secrétariat des Nations unies « n'est pas enclin à adapter les règles d'engagement » :

militairement, c'est trop dangereux; les Nations unies n'ont jamais autant de moyens que les parties;

politiquement : si les Nations unies recourent à la force, elles prennent parti (ne sont plus neutres) » (524b).
Telex #64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU

(sent by Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff, M. Willems, while Claes is still in Kigali) February 25, 1994


“...The situation’s significant deterioration, in terms of security in Rwanda, calls for the following reflections:

1. The political assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety, could well lead to a new bloodbath.

2. It will be necessary to increase diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve strict enforcement of the Arusha Accords in a calm environment.

3. The Special Representative of the General Secretary in Rwanda, Mr. Booh Booh, seems to have lost his local credibility.

4. Under its current mandate, UNAMIR cannot firmly maintain public order. There is a serious credibility problem.

Steps have already been taken at a high level in New York, but they have remained without result. The Security Council president’s last declaration concerning Rwanda (February 7th, 1994), “UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha Peace Agreement fully and rapidly,” suggests possible inactivity or stoppages of the operation.

5. Amidst assassinations and unrest, UNAMIR decided at the beginning of this week to put the operation on red alert, and consequently all the Blue Berets received the order to withdraw to their encampments and wait passively. If the situation had indeed degenerated and the aforementioned orders had stayed in effect, it would have been unacceptable, in the public opinion, for Belgian Blue Berets to be passive witnesses to genocide in Rwanda and for the United Nations to do nothing.

6. If conditions deteriorate, the United Nations and Belgium cannot really afford to withdraw from Rwanda. UNAMIR should be able to play a more active role and adopt a more marked profile in order to reinforce the international community’s credibility.

7. The question is to know whether this is possible without a new mandate from the Security Council. If attempting to strengthen UNAMIR requires a new mandate (a new Security Council
resolution), we can expect difficulties, given the current policy in the United States on the matter. At this time, an extension of the operation (Blue Berets, financing) seems impossible in their view. Moreover, in the two resolutions themselves (872, 893), emphasis is clearly placed on the limited or recessive character of the operation (without putting UNAMIR’s capability of fulfilling its mission at stake).

8. It has become very important to examine how we could strengthen the action within the framework of the current mandate (integration of Austrian Blue Berets? A larger margin of decision for Dallaire? Provisional displacement of Blue Berets from other operations in the region? ...), and how to effectively augment diplomatic and political pressure.

9. I would appreciate your remarks about all this. I insist that this must serve as a base for any decision concerning eventual future steps, but as of yet no stance has been reached on this subject.” (532b).

Reply from Ambassador Noterdaema, Telex 326. February 28, 1994

The response is negative on the question of strengthening the United Nations action. Ambassador Noterdaeme, in his telex #326 on February 28th, 1994, declares that he has “thought seriously about the way we could influence the United Nations’ action in Rwanda.” He adds, “I talked about it in detail with the principal members of the Security Council and with the Secretary of the United Nations. In theory, there are four elements on which we could draw:

1) The expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate or the strengthening of its numbers: ‘very improbable’

Not only are the United States and the United Kingdom against it, they may even, according to their delegations, withdraw UNAMIR altogether ‘in case of difficulties’ (this could even be the attitude of the entire Security Council.) There is a ‘financial logic’ behind this (the United States never wanted more than 500 men for UNAMIR).

There is also a political logic: the operations in Rwanda, Liberia, and Mozambique are covered under Chapter VI; in other words, the United Nations Security Council cannot impose a solution (in Yugoslavia and Somalia, this proved to be impossible even under Chapter VII).

2) The rules of engagement

The United Nations Secretary “is not inclined to adjust the rules of engagement.”

Militarily, it is too dangerous; the United Nations never has as much power as the parties; Politically: if the United Nations uses force, it takes a side (is no longer neutral)” (524b).
Document 34

Letter dated 14 March 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium to the Secretary-General expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda may impede UNAMIR’s capacity to fulfil its mandate

Not issued as a United Nations document; translated from French

Current developments in the situation in Rwanda are not encouraging, and lead me to share with you the concerns of the Belgian Government in this regard.

As you are aware, the deadlock in the formation of a broad-based transitional government is leading, despite the efforts of your Special Representative, to a deterioration of the political climate.

The Rwandese army appears to be increasingly annoyed by the parties’ procrastinations, while information on the stockpiling of weapons by the various militias is becoming ever more compelling. Even some of the leaders admit that a prolongation of the current political deadlock could result in an irreversible explosion of violence.

Accordingly, I welcome the instructions you have given to Mr. Booh-Booh to make the fullest use of his powers in order to convince the parties in Rwanda of the urgent need to reach agreement on the composition of the broad-based transitional government.

It seems to me, however, that this higher profile of the United Nations on the political level should be accompanied by a firmer stance on the part of UNAMIR with respect to security.

I am aware of the complexity of the situation, and of the constraints imposed on you under Security Council resolution 872.

Nevertheless, unless the negative developments we are witnessing are halted, UNAMIR might find itself unable to continue effectively its basic mission of playing a major supporting role in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

I can assure you that the Belgian Government, for its part, is continuing to urge President Habyarimana and the other Rwandese political leaders to accept the necessary compromises.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Willy CLAES

Prosecutor v. Akayesu
Prosecutor’s Exhibit #18
Albion des Forges
Entered: 18 2 97
RWANDA REFUGEE FACT SHEET

I. NUMBERS: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

* Burundi Refugees in Rwanda: There are currently about 287,000 Burundi Refugees in Rwanda. More than 300,000 arrived following the October 1993 coup attempt and inter-ethnic conflict in Burundi; after repatriation in early 1994, some 260,000 remain. An additional 25,000 remain from an influx in 1972.

* Rwandan Refugees: There are an estimated 550,000 Rwandan refugees in Central Africa, most of whom fled Rwanda during the 1959 - 1964 period. Countries of asylum are as follows:

  - Uganda: 200,000
  - Burundi: 245,000
  - Tanzania: 50,000
  - Zaire: 50,000

* Rwandan Displaced Persons: Approximately 350,000 Rwandans, down from 900,000 in 1993, remain displaced in northern Rwanda due to the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Many are currently returning home.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

* Burundi Refugees: UNHCR is coordinating assistance to the new Burundi refugees in cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The UN World Food Program (WFP) is supplying food aid. The International Federation of Red Cross/Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Rwandan Red Cross are distributing food and non-food relief. Medecins sans Frontieres/Belgium and Holland (MSF), Medecins du Monde (MDM), and CARITAS are providing health care. CARE and OXFAM have set up water systems.

* Rwandan Refugees: The bulk of Rwanda's 550,000 refugees are considered self-sufficient and are no longer assisted by the international community. UNHCR provides minimal assistance to 80,000 refugees in Uganda and 77,000 in Burundi.

* Rwandan Displaced: Displaced persons in northern Rwanda are assisted primarily by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IFRC in conjunction with the Rwandan Red Cross Society. Food aid is provided by WFP.
III. USG ASSISTANCE

* State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) earmarked $250,000 in FY91 for UNHCR Preparatory Activities for a Comprehensive Plan of Action for Rwandan Refugees. Additional contributions to UNHCR are anticipated once Rwandan refugee repatriation appears imminent.

* RP has also responded in FY94 to appeals for funds to assist new Burundi refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. Contributions are as follows:

  UNHCR: $4,250,000
  IFRC:  $ 750,000
  WFP:  $ 502,700

RP has also made unearmarked contributions to UNHCR and ICRC 1993 and 1994 programs in Africa which include Rwanda. RP contributed $43 million for 1993 and $41.7 million to date for 1994 to UNHCR's General Program for Africa. RP also contributed $41.5 million to ICRC's 1993 Emergency Appeal for Africa and $35 million to date for ICRC's 1994 appeal.

* In December 1994, the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs airlifted over 9,000 blankets to Rwanda for UNHCR to distribute to Burundi refugees.

* USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided $3.87 million in assistance to internally displaced Rwandans since FY91. In FY93, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) provided food contributions valued at over $30 million for internally displace Rwandans. In FY94 to date, FFP has authorized $9 million in commodities for WFP in response to the Burundi crisis, a portion of which will go towards refugees in Rwanda.

IV. BACKGROUND

* Rwandan Refugees: Between 1959 and 1964, approximately 150,000 Rwandans fled to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire following the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda. During the past thirty years, the refugee population has more than tripled due to high birth rates.

* RPF/GOR Conflict: On October 1, 1990, Rwanda was invaded by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a force of about 7,000 Rwandan exiles from Uganda. The RPF was not able to take the country (due largely to French and Belgian intervention) but became entrenched in northern Rwanda fighting a guerrilla war with the GOR. About 350,000 persons remain displaced (down from 900,000 in 1993) from the RPF-held zone. The war generated 9,000 new refugees who fled to Uganda.
Arusha Peace Accords: On August 4, 1993, the RPF and GOR signed peace accords in Arusha, Tanzania signifying the official end to the conflict. Under the Arusha Accords, refugee return is to be addressed sequentially following (1) the formation of a new government, (2) the completion of a humanitarian plan of action to address resettlement of displaced and refugees, and (3) the resettlement of displaced persons.

Burundi Refugees: Beginning in October 1993, Rwanda received a new influx of over 300,000 Burundi refugees following the attempted coup and subsequent inter-ethnic violence that broke out in Burundi. Due to repatriation which began in early 1994, the current number of new refugees in Rwanda has decreased to about 262,000.

V. CURRENT ISSUES

* Stalemate on Formation of a New Government: Under the Arusha Accords, the return of displaced persons and refugees will be addressed only after the new government is formed. The current stalemate on formation of a new government in Rwanda has delayed large-scale repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.

* Spontaneous Repatriation: In early 1994, some 8-9,000 Rwandan refugees returned from Uganda and settled in northern Rwanda in the RPF-held demilitarized zone. UNHCR is providing assistance to this group. Should additional Rwandan refugees return, conflict may occur between returnees and displaced persons competing for land.

* Landmines: The RPF-held zone is heavily mined (50,000 uncleared landmines). A UN peacekeeping force is currently developing a landmine-clearing strategy with the GOR and RPF. Until the mines are cleared, however, the area is considered unsafe for resettlement. Casualties may result should refugees and displaced return prior to demining.

* Conditions of Burundi Refugees in Rwanda: UNHCR has reported initially high death rates among Burundi refugees in Rwanda as a result of disease and malnutrition attributed to extremely poor sanitation, over-crowding, and shortages of both potable water and food. Some 50% to 75% of the deaths are attributed to dysentery. Malnutrition is also a serious concern; nutritional surveys indicate that between 13% to 20% of children under five are malnourished.

Drafted: RP/AAA - MLanguage, 3/15/94		SEAFA 2274

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PAGE 01
STATE 086165 012359Z
ORIGIN IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AMAD-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00
DODE-00 DOEE-00 ANHR-01 EAP-01 EUR-01 HA-09 HA-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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PAGE 02
STATE 086165 012359Z
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 086165

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON RWANDA RESOLUTION

REF A) USUN 1187; B) STATE 83633

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 APR 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065

UNCLASSIFIED
3. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT EARLY TUESDAY MORNING TO ENLIST FRENCH SUPPORT FOR EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A SHORTER LENGTH OF TIME.

THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WILL BE HELD ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON IN NEW YORK. TALKING POINTS FOR THE DEMARCHE FOLLOW BELOW.

TALKING POINTS:

--DESPITE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A 6 MONTH EXTENSION, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A 2 OR POSSIBLY 3 MONTH EXTENSION WOULD PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE TO THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THE FINAL ISSUE, INSTALL THE TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS, AND GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORDS AND REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY.

--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOW ADVOCATING A 6 MONTH EXTENSION OF ALL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WHICH COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN ORDER TO FACILITATE LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS; WHILE WE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE, WE FEEL THAT IN THE CASE OF UNAMIR, A SHORTER TIME FRAME WOULD PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT.

--THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN A FIRM SUPPORTER OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA, AND WE NOTE THAT THE PARTIES ARE CLOSE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT; NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAVE BEEN LONG DELAYS AND WE MUST SEND A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT FURTHER DELAYS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. TALBOTT
RESOLUTION 909 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3358th meeting, on 5 April 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as well as its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994,


Recalling also its statement dated 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1994 (S/1994/360),

Welcoming the valuable contribution to peace being made in Rwanda by UNAMIR,

Expressing its deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly,

Emphasizing that the Security Council, in resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, authorized the deployment of a second battalion to the demilitarized zone as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), and that the international community has thus done its part in ensuring that conditions exist for implementing the Agreement,

Considering that the fact that the transitional institutions have not been established constitutes a major obstacle to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali,
Concerned also at the deterioration of the humanitarian and health situation,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda dated 30 March 1994;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, on the understanding that the Security Council will, within the next six weeks, review the situation in Rwanda, including the role played in that country by the United Nations, if the Secretary-General informs it in a report that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement have not been established and that insufficient progress has been made for the implementation of phase II of the Secretary-General’s plan contained in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488);

3. Regrets the delay in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and urges the parties to resolve their latest differences without delay with a view to the immediate establishment of those transitional institutions still required for the continuation of the process, and particularly the implementation of phase II;

4. Welcomes the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected, and commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR;

5. Recalls nevertheless that continued support for UNAMIR, including the provision of an additional 45 civilian police monitors as described in paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General’s report, will depend upon full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

6. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and facilitate dialogue between all parties concerned;

7. Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and again urges others to provide such assistance;

8. Commends in particular the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and its agencies, as well as those of the Tanzanian facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council;

9. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the question.
- Rwanda
- Dead
- Missing
- Alive
- PM
- Social Affairs
- PM designate
- Agr
- Constitch
- Communications
- Pol. party leader

- Phone - Min of State for Plan, Dev. - [Handwritten notes]
- Rw. Chief Spkr. of Ministry of Int. Relations & Tourism - spokesman
- GEM's phone call...

- Rejection of violence -
  - Unifié - Presidential guard
  - -> Chief de lab -
  - Not guer de arméerie - Ribaudan guard
  - Americans in Bimuka -

  - 10k Americans
    - Burundi - 177
    - Rwanda - 205

- Bui: Calm all night - Sabena
  - No fire
    - Sub - squad
  - Traffic light - Ntibantunganya
  - Nat’l Crisis Committee - incl. vil.

- From B's perspective, emphasizing accident
4/6 - RIB
- Yeltsin's statement in Latvia
- Galucchi new position - Korea

Grosman:
- Not concerned re status of troops
- Do memo & consider task force
- Talk to French & Belgies
  - Set Evaluation
  - UN Mission

  If it possible to modify mandate for protection of foreigners & evacuation

  - Bombard & statements for peace
  - Presidential statement
  - Mega at 3:00 for work types
  - Don't interview
  - See if someone can get to her house
  - Tan圩 Fleischman, 371-6582

- Mr. Alfred
- France

UNAMIR - ask for modification if mandate - 8-10 soldiers taken into custody. Army controls airport
5 planes caught Rho. few d'armes & army. Thinking of sending more

UNAMIR has released RPF &
Laura have
RPF left installation
openly fighting - may have been
UNAMIR not answering phone calls
Shooting famine
Deteriorating in countryside
Communal violence
Has been in touch w. all Americans

Firefight at airport
Belgian troops fought for
in touch

PM Belgians are considering contingency plans

Second
Jared Tannen

Rogers
1 executed
2 Bahraini executed
Considering reinforced
US assistance

5 platforms surrounded at airport
have
told them to protect themselves. French no intention to send in troops.

Eric Schwartz

Monique.

What did Tony say about Monique?

Rita Benish.

CEN at hotel 1108 - 1120
2 hrs.

Now on

Buy - EAC meeting today. I seriously consider authorized war if it safe.

Conv. w. David

11:16

- EAC = close coordination w. Fr. & Belg.
- wants small presence w. reg. facilitate human. work n. dialog.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 7 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: 001-212-963-6460
SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT - REPORTED DEATH OF PRESIDENT OF RWANDA

REFERENCE:

1. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED AND CONFIRMED BY RGF AND GENDARMERIE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA AND THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WERE KILLED IN AN AIRPLANE CRASH AT KIGALI AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS-6-APRIL-1994. THE DEATHS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL BUT DUE TO THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF LEADING RGF AND GENDARMERIE LEADERS THIS REPORT IS CONSIDERED TRUE. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE 9 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS UNMOs AT KANOMBE (KIGALI INTERNATIONAL) AIRPORT REPORTED A LARGE EXPLOSION FROM THE AREA OF CAMP KANOMBE WHICH IS A MILITARY CAMP NEAR THE AIRPORT. INITIAL REPORTS STATED IT WAS AN EXPLOSION OF MUNITIONS. HOWEVER, WITHIN MINUTES GENDARMERIE AND RGF PERSONNEL AT THE AIRPORT BEGAN TO PANIC IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT. THE UNMOs REQUESTED AN ARMED ESCORT INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION.

3. AT 2118 HOURS A PLATOON OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ESTABLISHED A ROADBLOCK AT THE MERIDIEN TRAFFIC CIRCLE AND BLOCKED TRAFFIC. SEVERAL SHOTS WERE FIRED. NO REPORTED CASUALTIES. THE GUARDS APPEARED BY UNAMIR OBSERVATION TO BE NERVOUS AND DANGEROUS.

4. AT 2130 HOURS A REPORT FROM UNMOs AT THE AIRPORT STATED THE TOWER HAD DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRPLANE HAD CRASHED. IT WAS NOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ON THE AIRCRAFT. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE RPF LOS LIVING WITH UNAMIR STAFF AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL DISCOVERED ALL THE LOS HAD DEPARTED THE MERIDIEN HOTEL APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES EARLIER. THE FC DISPATCHED THE DCCO TO THE RPF\CND COMPOUND TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THEM AND ORDERED THE DFC\COS TO THE HEADQUARTERS.

5. AT 2135 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR HQ REPORTED THAT THE ARMED
PATROL SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH HAD BEEN STOPPED, DISARMED AND WERE BEING HELD AT THE AIRPORT. IN ADDITION THE UNMILS AT THE AIRPORT WERE CONFINED TO A ROOM AT THE AIRPORT. THE FC PLACED UNAMIR ON RED ALERT AND PLACED THE FORCE RESERVE ON 30 MINUTES NOTICE TO MOVE.

6. CONSTANT TELEPHONE CALLS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD BY THE FC AND FORCE HQ FROM MINISTERS REQUESTING ARMED UN PROTECTION. IN ADDITION AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE RGF LO WAS IN CONSTANT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION FROM ARMY HQ WITH THE FC AND REPORTED THE CRASH HAD OCCURRED AND SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED FC PRESENCE AT THE RGF ARMY HQ.

7. A CALL FROM MR RIZA IN NEW YORK WAS RECEIVED AND THE UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION AS KNOWN AT THAT TIME WAS PASSED TO HIM AT 2210 HOURS. THE FC MOVED TO RGF ARMY HQ AT 2230 HOURS.


9. HE STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WERE ON THE PLANE AND THAT THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS FROM THE AIRPLANE CRASH. HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT CONFIRM THE OTHER PASSENGERS. THE FC OFFERED NO INFORMATION (IE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI). HE STATED APPARENTLY THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED IN THE AIR AND CRASHED ON THE GROUND IN THE PRESIDENTS GARDEN NEAR THE AIRPORT. IT WAS SUSPECTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN.

10. DURING HIS DISCOURSE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE BY PHONE WHICH UPDATED THE SITUATION. THE CHEF STATED THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WERE PREPARED TO KEEP THEIR POSITION FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR PEACE. WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT HE STATED THEIR WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE POPULATION HAD TO BE REASSURED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE NATION. HE REQUESTED UNAMIR SUPPORT IN THEIR ACTIONS. THE FC STATED EVEN WITH THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT THERE WAS STILL A GOVERNMENT UNDER PM AGATHE. THE OFFICERS SCOFFED AND STATED SHE AND HER GROUP WERE NOT A GOVERNMENT. THE FC DID NOT PURSUE THAT CONVERSATION BUT ASKED WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT THEY WERE REQUESTING. THE CHEF STATED JOINT UNAMIR GENDARMERIE AND RGF PATROLS AND A STATEMENT TO THE POPULATION. THE FC STATED THAT THE RGF MUST REMAIN IN ITS BARRACKS AND THAT THE GENDARMERIE MUST DO ITS JOB OF MAINTAINING ORDER. THE FC STATED THE RRF WERE CALM AND UNAMIR WOULD MONITOR THEM CLOSELY AND THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT UNAMIR BE ALLOWED TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH SITE AND THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD RETURN TO THEIR GARRISON. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE AT THIS POINT.

11. AT 11:07 HOURS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE REPORTED THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI HAD BEEN ON THE AIRCRAFT.
HE STATED THIS GROUP DID NOT WANT POWER BUT ONLY WANTED TO
REASSURE THE POPULATION AS THE POPULATION WAS TIRED OF THIS
DANCING AROUND. THE FC ASKED WHO WOULD SPEAK TO THE
POPULATION AND SUGGESTED THE PM AGATHE. HE ALSO ASKED IF
ANYONE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PM AND THE CABINET. THE CHEF AVOIDED
THE QUESTION BY STATING THE NATION NEEDED A TRANSITIONAL
AUTHORITY TO HANDBACK TO THE POLITICIANS AT ANYTIME THEY WERE
PREPARED TO GOVERN. HOWEVER, HE REITERATED ORDER HAD TO BE
MAINTAINED TONIGHT AND THAT UNAMIR ASSISTANCE WAS CRITICAL.

12. THE FC STATED THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS AND HE MUST CONSULT WITH THE SRSG. HOWEVER HE
STATED ANY ACTION HE WOULD TAKE WOULD ONLY BE WITH HIS
PERMISSION. A JOINT COORDINATED PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL. IT MUST
BE TRANSPARENT AND CONTROLLED. THE FC ASKED WHAT WAS THE
THREAT AT THIS MOMENT.

13. THE CHEF STATED WHAT DID UNAMIR WANT THEM TO DO.

14. THE FC STATED RGF TROOPS MUST BE CONFINED TO THEIR
BARRACKS AND ONLY THE GENDARMERIE MUST MAINTAIN ORDER.

15. THE CHEF ASKED TO PLACE TROOPS ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE
DEPLOYMENT BUT THEY WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR BARRACKS.

16. AT 2330 HOURS THE FC CONSULTED WITH THE SRSG BY
TELEPHONE... HE RETURNED TO THE MEETING AND LISTENED TO THE COS
GENDARMERIE ENHANCED SECURITY PLAN TO CONSIST OF ONE ARMORED
CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE RADIO STATION, ONE ARMORED CAR
AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THETelCON AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE
ELECTROGAZ AND THE CITY FUEL TANKS IN CASE OF SABOTAGE. IN
ADDITION HE REQUESTED SATURATED PATROLLING WITH JOINT GENDARME
AND UNAMIR PATROLS. THE FC AGREED TO THE ABOVE REQUESTS AND
STATED THE GROUP MUST REASSURE THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE
COUNTRY, KEEP THE RGF IN ITS BARRACKS AND ORDER THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BACK TO ITS BARRACKS. THE CHEF ADDED THAT
THEY WOULD SPEAK TO THE RPF THE NEXT DAY WHEN THE POLITICAL
SITUATION IS CLEARER. THE FC OFFERED TO STAY AT THE
HEADQUARTERS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES UNTIL KIGALI SECTOR
COMMANDER COULD ARRIVE TO COORDINATE DETAILS.

17. AT 0400 HOURS THE FC WAS CONSULTING WITH THE SRSG BY
TELEPHONE WHEN THE CHEF STATED HE WANTED TO SEE THE SRSG WITH
THE FC. THE FC, AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY THE SRSG, ESCORTED THE
CHEF TO THE SRSG HOME WHILE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER
COORDINATED THE ENHANCED JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH THE COS
OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE STAFF OF THE RGF AND GENDARMERIE.
BEFORE LEAVING, THE FC ASKED THEM TO RECONSIDER AGAIN SPEAKING
TO PM AGATHE.
19. AT 0200 THE FC RETURNED TO RGF HQ WITH THE CHEF FROM HIS MEETING WITH THE SRSG AND CONFIRMED THE SECURITY DETAILS WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER. THE FC REITERATED THE NECESSITY OF GETTING A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO THE CRASH SITE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION. THE COS GENARMERIE AND RGF LO TO UNAMIR COORDINATED THIS MATTER WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER AS ROAD BLOCKS STILL BLOCKED ACCESS OF UNAMIR FORCES TO THE CRASH SITE. THE CHEF STATED THE GROUP WOULD PREPARE A COMMUNIQUE FOR THE RADIO AND PRESS. THE FC INSISTED ON SEEING THE COMMUNIQUE BEFORE IT WAS RELEASED. AT 0230 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER STATED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE SUPPOSEDLY ON THE AIRCRAFT:

A. PRESIDENT OF RWANDA.
B. PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI.
C. TWO BURUNDIAN MINISTERS.
E. COL SAGATWA (STAFF OFFICER).
F. DR AKINGENEYE (PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF THE PRESIDENT).

20. AT 0245 HOURS THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION AND ANOTHER FRENCH OFFICER ARRIVED AT THE RGF HQ AND STATED THEY HAD DIRECTION PARIS TO ENSURE A QUALIFIED CRASH INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON THE CRASH. FC ASSURED THEM IT WOULD BE. THEY OFFERED THEIR MILITARY TECHNICAL TEAM CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING 6 HOURS AWAY AT BANGUI.

21. AT 0300 THE FC MOVED TO FORCE HQ AND CONSULTED WITH HIS PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS. AT 0530 THE SOUND OF SPORADIC MACHINE GUNS, ROCKET AND GRENADE FIRE WAS HEARD IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE CITY. ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION THE RPF RETURNED FIRE AIMED AT THEM.

22. AT 0600 INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE FM HAD CANCELLED HER RADIO ADDRESS AT 0530 AND WAS REMAINING AT HER HOME. THE GUARD ON HER HOME WAS INCREASED. IN ADDITION THE FM REPORTED THAT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND AGRICULTURE HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED WITH THEIR FAMILIES BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

23. ATTEMPTS BY FC TO GET THE RADIO STATIONS TO CARRY AN ADDRESS BY THE FM OR BY UNAMIR OVER THE PHONES WERE REFUSED. RADIO RWANDA TECHNICIANS WERE WARNED NOT TO BROADCAST ANY ADDRESS AND ARE PLAYING CLASSICAL MUSIC. RTLM SUPPOSEDLY BROADCAST A MESSAGE FROM THE MND (WHO IS OUT OF COUNTRY) BUT DETAILS COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AS IT WAS IN KINYARWANDA. IN ADDITION RTLM WOULD NOT ALLOW FC TO BROADCAST. THEY ACCUSED UNAMIR OF KILLING RWANDESE WHICH IS TOTALLY UNTRUE AS UP TO THAT POINT UNAMIR HAD NOT FIRED A SHOT.

24. SRSG, FC AND VARIOUS AMBASSADORS HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE COMMUNICATION AND ATTEMPTED TO ORGANIZE A MEETING AT THE US
AMBASSADORS HOME AT 0900. AT 0730 HOURS IT WAS REPORTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE HOME OF MINISTER LANDO (LIBERAL PARTY) HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND UN (GHANA) SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED. A RESERVE PATROL WAS SENT TO HIS HOME.

25. RPF REMAINED CALM AND PASSED INFORMATION TO UNAMIR THROUGH THE UNAMIR LO. UNAMIR HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO THE CRASH SITE. IN ADDITION COMMENCING AT 0730 RGF (POSSIBLY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS).

26. AT 0830 MORE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE OF MINISTERS HOMES BEING ATTACKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS. AT 0845 THE PM FLED HER HOME AND HER UN GUARD WHICH BOUGHT HER TIME WAS DISARMED AND HELD BUT LATER RELEASED. THE PM TOOK REFUGE IN THE UNDP. AT 0920 IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MINISTER LANDO AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THEIR HOME. THE UN GUARD WAS OVERPOWERED AND ONE GHANIAN SOLDIER WAS REPORTED MISSING.

27. AT 0920 HOURS FC CALLED MR RIZA AT UNNY TO INFORM HIM OF THE ESCALATION OF THE SITUATION AND TO INFORM HIM UNAMIR MIGHT HAVE TO USE FORCE TO SAVE THE PRIME MINISTER. THE ARMED ESCORT ATTEMPTING TO GET TO UNDP TO RESCUE THE PM WAS BLOCKED AND THREATENED WITH FIRE IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO GO TO UNDP. THE FC DISCUSSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH MR RIZA AND THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE CONFIRMED THAT UNAMIR WAS NOT TO FIRE UNTIL FIRED UPON. OUR PERSONNEL WHO WERE OVERPOWERED WITHOUT FIRE.

28. THE AMBASSADORS MEETING AT THE US AMBASSADORS HOUSE WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE THE AMBASSADORS COULD NOT BE SAFELY ESCORTED TO THE MEETING. THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP DID APPEAR. FC DISCUSSED MR RIZA'S DIRECTION WITH SRSG.

29. FC CONVENED A STAFF MEETING AT 1000 HOURS. FC TO GO TO ARMY HQ TO MEET ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP TO EMPHASIZE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS MUST GO TO THEIR BARRACKS, MINISTERS MUST BE RELEASED AND PM RECOGNIZED AS HEAD OF STATE. DFC/COS TO CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT ACCESS TO CRASH SITE. DCOO TO REMAIN WITH RPF AND KEEP THEM CALM. CMO TO REMAIN AT FORCE HQ AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH OTHER SECTORS. SOUTHERN SECTOR ALL QUIET EXCEPT FIRING IN CYANGUGU. RPF SECTOR ALL QUIET. UNMOS DEPLOYED TO RPF FRONT LINES. SECTOR COMMANDER WITH MGEM KAGAME. RGF SECTOR QUIET.

30. DCOO CONVEYED AT 1005 RPF CALM BUT INSISTING ON INSTALLATION OF BBTG, PM AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION, END TO VIOLENCE.

31. 1015 REPORT FROM RGF LO THAT 3 UNAMIR PERSONNEL KILLED AT CAMP KAMI. CMO TOOK DECISION TO CALL IN ALL MILOB FROM MILOB GP HQ TO FORCE HQ. CMO CHECKED AND MILOBs WERE NOT KILLED AND ALL WERE ACCOUNTED FOR.

32. 1030 HOURS UNDP REPORTED PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO COMPOUND AND ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. PATROL BLOCKED BY ROADBLOCK AND UNABLE TO GET THROUGH.

33. 1215 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER DISPATCHED APCs TO GET PM DESIGNATE WHO HAD BEEN LOCATED AT THE HOME OF A US NATIONAL
BY THE US AMBASSADOR. A TOGOLESE CAPTAIN UNMO REPORTED TO THE
FORCE HQ AND STATED HE AND 13 BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN
CAPTURED AND TAKEN TO CAMP KIGALI WHERE HE REPORTS THAT 13
BELGIAN SOLDIERS WERE EXECUTED. BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMANDER
INFORMED AND INVESTIGATION COMMENCED.

34. FC CALLED AT 1300 TO STATE HE FELT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE
RELEASE OF THE UNDP PERSONNEL. WHETHER OR NOT THE PM AGATHE
WAS IN THIS GROUP COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED. COL MARCHAL CALLED
TO STATE HE HAD SECURED THE PM DESIGNATE FAUSTIN. CONTINUOUS
CALLS FOR HELP FROM THE LOCAL, UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY BUT
DUE TO ROADBLOCKS VERY FEW ACTIONED. TERRIFIED REFUGEES SWAMP
THE HQ AND ARE MOVED UNDER ESCORT TO AMAHORO STADIUM UNDER
PROTECTION OF RUTBAY. FC CALLED FOR TWO MORE APC'S TO HELP
HIS APC EXTRACT UNDP HOSTAGES. DISPATCHED. DFC\COS ORDERED ALL
STAFF OFFICERS TO THE FORCE HQ IN CONVOY. ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN
STAFF MOVED INTO THE HQ.

35. AT 1315 HOURS MGEN KAGAME MADE A STATEMENT BY RADIO THAT
THE RPF UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY OF THE ATTACKS IN KIGALI WERE
AIMED AT THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THAT IF THIS CONTINUED HIS
SOLDIERS WOULD REACT TO DEFEND THEIR PEOPLE. REPORTED TO FC
WHO DIRECTED DCOO WITH RPF AND CND AND RPF SECTOR COMMANDER TO
ATTEMPT TO CALM DOWN RPF.
PRÉSIDENCE 
DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE

Le Conseiller à la Présidence

PARIS le 7 avril 1994

NOTE

À l'attention de
Monsieur le Président de la République

(s/c. de Monsieur le Secrétaire Général)

OBJET : Attentat contre les Président du Rwanda et du Burundi.

1) Hier soir, l'avion du Président rwandais, Juvenal Habyarimana, qui avait à son bord également le Président du Burundi Cyprien Ntaryamira, s'est écrasé à Kigali dans les environs de l'aéroport. L'avion qui revenait de Dar es Salam, où s'était tenue une réunion des chefs d'État de la région consacrée précisément au Rwanda et au Burundi, a dans son approche finale essuyé des tirs. Selon les Belges, il s'agirait de tirs de roquettes ou de missiles.

Les deux présidents sont morts ainsi que tous les passagers (une dizaine) dont le chef d'État major rwandais et deux ministres burundais. Les trois membres de l'équipage - tous français - ont également été tués.

L'attentat est attribué au Front patriotique rwandais (FPR).
2) À Kigali, la garde présidentielle s’est lancée dans la chasse aux opposants. Des informations non encore confirmées font état d’arrestations de ministres et de personnalités, hutues ou tutsies, adversaires politiques du président Habyarimana. Un affrontement entre l’armée rwandaise et le FPR dans la capitale paraît inévitable. L’intérieur du pays serait pour l’instant calme.

Les institutions de la transition n’ayant pas encore pu être mises en place, la mort du président laisse le pays sans aucune autorité reconnue (le gouvernement et le parlement n’ont pas été installés). On craint un coup d’État militaire.

À Bujumbura le président de l’Assemblée a pris, selon la constitution, la direction du pays. La situation au Burundi est calme et les autorités développent, dans leurs déclarations publiques, la thèse de l’accident en ce qui concerne le président burundais. Il n’était pas prévu semble-t-il qu’il soit à bord de l’avion du Président Habyarimana au retour de Dar-es-Salam.

3) Une réunion interministérielle s’est tenue ce matin au Quai d’Orsay. Les points suivants ont été abordés :

- **Position française** : Matignon et le Quai d’Orsay souhaitent, dans cette nouvelle crise rwandaise qui risque d’être très meurtrière, que la France ne soit pas en première ligne et limiter notre action à des interventions à l’ONU pour que la Mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda (MINUAR) remplisse sa mission de sécurité à Kigali (ce qu’elle n’a pas réellement fait jusqu’ici).

- **Sécurité de la communauté française** : Pour l’instant nos ressortissants ne sont pas menacés et aucune évacuation n’est envisagée. Si ce devait être le cas nous agirions en collaboration avec la Belgique et la MINUAR (1500 hommes sur place dont 450 Belges).

Le ministère de la Défense a cependant déjà mis en alerte deux compagnies et une unité de santé (Bangui, Libreville et Ndjaména).
- Famille du président Habvarimana. Elle est pour l'instant sous la protection de la garde présidentielle. Si elle le souhaite, elle sera accueillie à la résidence de notre ambassadeur, conformément à vos instructions.

Bruno DELAYE
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

PARIS April 7, 1994

Advisor to the Presidency

NOTE

to the attention of
the President of the Republic
(c/o the Secretary General)

SUBJECT: Attack against the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi

1) Yesterday evening, the airplane of the Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, with the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, also on board, crashed in Kigali near the airport. The plane was returning from Dar es Salaam, where a meeting had taken place of regional heads of state, dedicated specifically to Rwanda and Burundi, and, in its final approach, came under fire. According to the Belgians, it was either rocket or missile fire.

The two presidents are dead, as well as all other passengers (a dozen) including the Rwandan Chief of Staff and two Burundian ministers. The three crew members—all French—were also killed.

The attack is attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

2) In Kigali, the presidential guard threw itself into the hunt for the opposition. We have received information, not yet confirmed, of arrests of ministers and figures, Hutu or Tutsi, who are political adversaries of President Habyarimana. A clash between the Rwandan army and the RPF in the capital seems inevitable. For the time being, the interior of the country is calm.

Transitional institutions have not yet been able to be put in place, and the president's death leaves the country without any recognized authority (the government and parliament had not been installed). We fear a military coup d'etat.

In Bujumbura the president of the Assembly has taken charge of the country, in accordance with the constitution. The situation in Burundi is calm and authorities are developing, in their public declarations, the view that what happened to the Burundian president was an accident. It seems that it was not planned for him to be on board President Habyarimana's plane on the return from Dar-es-Salaam.
3) An interministerial meeting took place this morning in the Quai d'Orsay. The following points were addressed:

- **The French position:** Matignon and the Quai d'Orsay would like France, in this new Rwandan crisis that risks being extremely deadly, to not be on the front line, and to limit our actions to UN interventions, so that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) can perform its security mission in Kigali (which, until now, it has not really done).

- **Security of the French community:** For the time being, our nationals are not threatened and no evacuation is envisaged. If that were to be the case, we would act in collaboration with Belgium and UNAMIR (1500 men on the ground, including 450 Belgians).

  The Defense Ministry has, however, already sent out two companies and one health unit (Bangui, Libreville and Ndjaména).

- **Family of President Habyarimana.** They are, for the time being, under the protection of the presidential guard. If they wish, they will be welcomed at our ambassador's residence, subject to your instructions.

Bruno DELAYE
Page 02  BRUSSE 03919 01 OF 02 071530Z

SUBJECT: BELGIAN MFA ON SITUATION IN RWANDA

REF: A) BRUSSELS 3880; B) FENDRICK-JOHNSON TELCON OF 4/7

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. BELGIAN MFA CONFIRMED DEATHS OF RWANDESE MINISTERS OF PUBLIC WORKS AND INFORMATION, SAID THEIR MISSION IN RWANDA REPORTED THAT THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE HAD DISAPPEARED, AND THAT 5 BELGIAN UNAMIR SOLDIERS PROTECTING THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN TAKEN BY
2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM REF B, POLCOUNS SPOKE TO WIL JAENEN, DIRECTOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT BELGIAN MFA. JAENEN SAID SITUATION WAS VERY SERIOUS IN RWANDA, WITH MILITARY KILLING MINISTERS AND OTHER TUTSI POLITICIANS. THE BELGIAN MISSION COULD CONFIRM THAT THE MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC WORKS HAD BEEN KILLED. THE LATTER WAS TALKING TO UNAMIR WHEN HE WAS KILLED. THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE HAVE DISAPPEARED. FIVE BELGIAN MEMBERS OF THE UNAMIR MISSION PROTECTING THE PRIME MINISTER AT HER RESIDENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN MILITARY. THEIR FATE WAS UNKNOWN. THE BELGANS UNDERSTOOD THE PRIME MINISTER HAD FLED. POLCOUNS TOLD JAENEN THAT OUR INFORMATION WAS THAT UNDP EXPATRIATES HAD WITNESS THE KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. JAENEN SAID THAT THE BELGIAN MILITARY HAD BEEN ASKED TO DO CONTINGENCY/CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AN EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE. HE SAID THE BELGIAN MFA HAD SENT MESSAGES TO THEIR MISSIONS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ASKING IF WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER CONVERTING THE UNAMIR MANDATE TO ALLOW UNAMIR TO PROTECT/EVACUATE EXPATRIATES AS NEEDED.
4. JAENEN SAID THE BELGIANs IN UNAMIR DID NOT/NOT CONTROL THE AIRPORT BUT DID CONTROL A PORTION OF IT AROUND A C-130 THEY HAD ON THE GROUND.

5. SEPARATELY, A JOINT STAFF OPERATIONS OFFICER AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TOLD EMBASSY DAO THAT THE MILITARY WAS DEVELOPING CONTINGENCY PLANS. HE CONFIRMED THAT 5 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRUSSE 03919 01 OF 02 071530Z
BELGIANS WITH UNAMIR HAD DISAPPEARED. HE ALSO SAID 5 PLATOONS WERE CUT OFF AT THE AIRPORT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE GENDARMERIE. THEY WERE NOT IN IMMEDIATE DANGER.

6. AMONG THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE MILITARY ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ARE THE USE OF UNAMIR TROOPS TO EVACUATE CIVILIANS IN RWANDA OR TO SEND UP TO A REINFORCED BATTALION (EITHER DIRECTLY TO RWANDA OR TO BURUNDI TO BE ON STAND-BY IF NEEDED) TO SUPPORT TROOPS ALREADY IN PLACE

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 03919 02 OF 02 071530Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 QASY-00 DOE-00
EB-01 OIGO-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16
LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 RP-10 SCT-03 SNP-00
SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
RPE-01 PMB-00 /055W

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 03919

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, KDEM, RW, BY, BE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRUSSELS 03919 02 OF 02 071530Z
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MFA ON SITUATION IN RWANDA

IN RWANDA. THE MISSION WOULD BE EITHER TO RESTORE ORDER OR TO FACILITATE A COMPLETE EVACUATION OF UNAMIR MILITARY AND EXPATRIATE CIVILIANS WHO WISH TO LEAVE. IF THE OPTION TO SEND A BATTALION IS CHOSEN, THE BELGIANS WOULD LIKELY COME TO US FOR AIRLIFT SUPPORT.

BLINKEN

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UNCLASSIFIED
…There was a third message from Kagame, a straightforward ultimatum. The killings throughout the city had to cease immediately or he would order his troops to intervene. The message had six brief lines:
A. RPF is prepared to secure Kigali;
B. Force Commander should not rely on his Belgian Staff;
C. UNAMIR should pull its forces out of the DMZ to reinforce Kigali;
D. RPF prepared to assist UNAMIR;
E. If CND is attacked RPF will move on Kigali; and
F. If situation is not secured by last light 7 April, definite RPF attack.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 7 APRIL 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: KAGAME/RPA/MULINDI</th>
<th>FROM: DALLAIRE/UNAMIR/KIGALI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAX NO: BY TELEPHONE AND BY LETTER</td>
<td>FAX NO: 250-84273</td>
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<tr>
<td>INMARSAT:</td>
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SUBJECT: UNAMIR RESPONSE TO RPA 6 POINT MESSAGE

ATTN: MGEN KAGAME

ROOM NO. 2052

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1

1. MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR 6 POINT MESSAGE AND Responds AS FOLLOWS:
   
   A. NOTED BUT NOT UNDERSTOOD.
   
   B. NO COMMENT.
   
   C. UNAMIR WILL NOT CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS IT IS MANDATED FOR DEFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING TASKS ONLY.
   
   D. UNAMIR WILL NOT CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS IT IS MANDATED FOR DEFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING TASKS ONLY.
   
   E. NOTED.
   
   F. UNAMIR WITH THE GENDARMERIE AND ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY LOYAL TO RWANDA ARE ATTEMPTING TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION. UNAMIR IS NOT IN OFFENSIVE POSTURE AND THROUGH RPF ACTION AT THE CND AND RPA OFFENSIVE TONIGHT THIS WILL BE DEEMED TO BE A SERIOUS CEASEFIRE VIOLATION. UNAMIRS PEACEKEEPING MANDATE WILL BE TOTALLY VIOLATED. REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER THESE ACTIONS AS LOYAL FORCES AND UNAMIR ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND CONTROL ON AGGRESSION IN KIGALI.
   
   I. ACKNOWLEDGE.

2. REGARDS
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

SUBJECT: AN UPDATE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MISSION

DATE: 8 APRIL 1994

1. The security situation in Kigali is worsening as the fighting between the Presidential Guards and the RPF intensifies. However, the rest of the country remains calm, although tense.

2. Following the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in the night of the 5th of April, elements of the Presidential Guards attacked the residences of several political figures and abducted the Prime Minister, the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court, the Ministers of Information, Labour and Social Affairs and Agriculture. We have subsequently received unconfirmed reports that these leaders have been killed by their abductors. The Presidential Guards are also reported to have attacked several other residences and murdered several persons suspected to be RPF sympathisers.

3. A company-size of RPF military personnel left the CND complex on 7 April at 16 hours local time and moved into areas where Presidential Guards are located and engaged the Guards in a fierce exchange of fire. UNAMIR observed several armed RPF foot-patrols in areas dominated by government supporters adjacent to UNAMIR headquarters and the Bangladesh Battalion.

4. Meanwhile, a group of Senior Officers of the Rwandese Armed Forces have constituted themselves into a "crisis committee" in an attempt to stabilise the security situation. They have requested UNAMIR to arrange a ceasefire between the RPF and the Presidential Guards. They have also called on the political parties which constitute the current transitional government to meet and establish legal authority as well as accelerate the establishment of the transitional institutions called for in the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR is actively supporting these efforts and participates as an observer in the "crisis committee". Please find attached a copy issued by the said "crisis committee".
5. We have arranged a meeting between members of the "crisis committee" and the RPF scheduled at 14.00 hours local time today at UNAMIR HQ. We have also established contacts with the RPF and the Presidential Guards in an effort to arrange a cease-fire. The negotiations with the parties are continuing.

6. The death of the President of the Republic, and the still unconfirmed death of the Prime Minister and the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court as well as a number of ministers have created a power-vacuum which could pose new problems to the peace process. The Prime Minister-Designate was evacuated by UNAMIR to our Headquarters where he has sought refuge and we are providing him protection within UNAMIR premises.

7. At twelve (12) noon today local time, we received the following message from General KAGAME which he directed must be delivered to the "crisis committee":

1.- that he was ready to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process;

2.- he was dispatching a battalion to Kigali to assist government forces in keeping renegade forces from killing innocent people;

3.- the "crisis committee" could prove its seriousness by not firing at its advancing RPF battalion.

4.- effective immediately, RPF will not allow landing of any aircraft at Kayibanda International Airport, Kigali.

8. Our immediate reaction to the message was to advise General KAGAME that the introduction of new forces in Kigali at this time will be counter-productive and may impede ongoing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between the Presidential Guards and the RPF. We expressed our appreciation to him for his willingness to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process and transmitted his message to the "crisis committee" in accordance with his request.

8. I am continuing my efforts with all the political forces to establish security in Kigali so as to create the necessary environment for the resumption of efforts to set up the transitional institutions. In this connection, I have received and exchanged views with the leadership of the newly-formed "crisis committee".

8. In the name of the Secretary-General and all members of UNAMIR, I have made a national appeal for the restoration of law and order and peaceful coexistence amongst all the forces in the country. I have also circulated the statement
made by the President of the Security Council condemning the deaths and appealing for calm.

9. I regret to confirm the death of ten (10) military personnel from the Belgian contingent who were seized and detained by elements of the Presidential Guard.

10. Following is a military assessment of the current situation and an update on the military aspects of the Mission.

11. **Mandate and Tasks.** In accordance with the Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 Oct 93 and the Secretary General's report to the Security Council on Rwanda dated 24 Sep 93 we reviewed our current situation and provide you with the following assessment.

12. **Outside KWSA.** Reports from our UNMO teams in the RGF, Southern and DNH sectors all report a general calm situation except some strong negative reactions to the President's death in Gisenyi. In the RPF sector extensive preparations are being made for an imminent offensive operation. Our UNDP contacts also confirm this general situation.

13. **Inside the KWSA.** The appearance of a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror initiated principally by the Presidential Guard since the morning after the death of the head of state has completely reoriented the situation in Kigali. Aggressive actions have been taken not only against the opposition leadership but against the RPF (by firing at the CNL), against particular ethnic groups (massacre of Tutsi in Remera), against the general civilian population (banditry) and against UNAMIR (direct and indirect fire on UN installations, vehicles, personnel and affiliated agencies) which has resulted in fatal and non-fatal casualties. The particularly barbarous murder of the 10 captured Belgian soldiers emphasizes this situation. Is the mandate of UNAMIR still valid?

14. **The Tasks of the KWSA and the Present Situation and How It Relates to the Mandate are reviewed below:**

   A. **Secure the Weapons of the Parties.** This obviously is not being done as the parties have removed their weapons and have opened full hostilities. Our monitors have been withdrawn and this task cannot be done in the present situation.

   B. **Secure Kigali.** Kigali was secured by two small infantry battalion but now this battalion is separated into confined camps which are isolated by fighting, firing and roadblocks and the battalion's elements are focused on self-defence. In addition these elements are separated from their logistical support (water and food source except emergency rations) and no resupply of power, washing water, gasoline, sanitation, and most importantly, given the threat of the present situation their supporting field hospital. Kigali is not being monitored, patrolled or secured.
GIVEN THIS PRESENT SITUATION, THIS IS A DEFENSIVE SURVIVAL EXERCISE FOR UNAMIR.

C. SECURE THE RPF BN. AREA IN THE CND. THIS IS NOT BEING DONE SINCE THE RPF HAS BROKEN OUT OF THEIR COMPOUND AND ARE CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KIGALI. THE UNAMIR RPF BN. AREA GD HAS WITHDRAWN TO ITS CAMP AND HAS ADOPTED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THEREFORE THE RPF ARE NOT BEING MONITORED OR SECURED IN KIGALI.

D. ARMS RECOVERY. OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE AS THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND RPF ARE ENGAGED IN FULL AND OPEN HOSTILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD FREQUENTLY AGAINST UNAMIR. THIS TASK IS NOT BEING CONDUCTED NOR IS IT POSSIBLE OR VIABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

E. APCs EMPLOYMENT. THE APCs ARE BEING USED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS LIKE RESCUE AND CASEVAC INSTEAD OF THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF DETERRENT.

F. SURVEILLANCE AND VERIFICATION. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 48 HOURS IT IS UNACCEPTABLY RISKY TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS WITH UNARMED UNHCRS OR EVEN LIGHTLY ARMED TROOPS. IN ADDITION THERE IS A NEW ARMY IN THE COUNTRY. ELEMENTS OF THE OLD ARMY HAVE VOICED A LOYALTY TO THE YET TO BE FORMED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND THE OLD GUARD ARMY. WHERE THIS ARMY WILL STAND IN RELATION TO THE RPF INITIATING HOSTILITIES HAS YET TO BE CONFIRMED. THEREFORE KIGALI IS NOT BEING OBSERVED (EXCEPT IN AND NEAR OUR BASE CAMP AREAS), MONITORED OR VERIFIED.

G. SECURITY OF INDIVIDUALS. THIS HAS BECOME THE MAJOR TASK OF UNAMIR. UNFORTUNATELY DUE TO THE SITUATION IT MAY NOT HAVE SAVED THE PM AGATHE AND OTHER ABDUCTED MINISTERS, BUT IT IS WORKING WITH OTHER CRITICAL VIPs. THIS TASK, AS UNAMIR ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE A CEASE-FIRE WILL INVOLVE ESCORTS, GUARDS AND GENERAL PROTECTION. IT WILL BASED ON THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS INVOLVE RISKING THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL. THIS MUST BE BALANCED WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SAVING THE LAST MEANS OF INSTITUTING THE BBTG AND SAVING THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS RISK WILL BE ACCEPTED.

CANNOT ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. INDEED THE RUNWAY IS BLOCKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS. PROTECTION OF UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. THE COMMUNITY UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN SAFE IN ITS HOMES OR LOCATIONS (EXCEPT FOR UNDP). HOWEVER AS WATER AND FOOD RUN OUT UNAMIR MAY HAVE TO EVACUATE THESE PERSONS TO A CENTRAL OR SEVERAL LOCATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE STREETS THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OR MAY BE RETARDED AND VERY DANGEROUS. AN EVACUATION PLAN HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND COORDINATED, BUT IT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF UNAMIR BEING PERMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO EXECUTE THE PLAN WITH A SECURE AND FUNCTIONAL AIRPORT AND IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK. THIS TASK MAY BE POSSIBLE GIVEN CERTAIN PRECONDITIONS.

15. SUPPORT. THE MISSION IS DESPERATELY SHORT OF LIFE AND OPERATIONAL SUSTAINING SUPPORT. THE RESERVES REQUIRED BY THE UN FOR THIS MISSION WERE EITHER NOT BROUGHT BY TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES OR HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO THIS MISSION. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CITY OF KIGALI IS IN A STATE OF WAR. THE LOCAL ECONOMY IS NOT FUNCTIONING. STORES, GAS STATIONS, SUPPLIERS, ETC. ARE CLOSED AND THEIR OWNERS AND WORKERS ARE IN HIDING. AT PRESENT THE MISSION IS EVALUATING ITS LOGISTICS RESERVES. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOGISTICS COMPANY AND MAJOR RESERVE SUPPLY DEPOT ARE ISOLATED AND THE LOGISTICS STAFF AT THE FORCE HQ ARE ISOLATED AT THE MERIDIAN HOTEL EVEN THOUGH ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BRING THEM TO FORCE HQ TO ASSIST IN THIS PROCESS AS THE MAJORITY OF THE FIGHTING IS ALONG THE ROUTE. IT IS LIBERALLY ESTIMATED THAT UNAMIR HAS THE FOLLOWING RESERVES:

A. DRINKING WATER. 20 LITRES PER MAN. THIS WATER UNFORTUNATELY IS IN A RESERVE LOCATION WHICH IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO MOST OF THE FORCE. MOST UNIT LOCATIONS HAVE BETWEEN 1 OR 2 DAYS OF DRINKING WATER. WATER RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED.

B. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER. TOILETS AND SHOWERS IN MOST LOCATIONS HAVE CEASED TO FUNCTION. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER WILL BE BOILED FOR DRINKING PURPOSES WITH A MINIMAL AMOUNT FOR SANITATION. FOR THE SHORT TERM THIS IS ACCEPTABLE BUT OVER THE LONG TERM WILL RESULT IN HEALTH HAZARDS.

C. RATIONS. UNITS VARY FROM NIL AT THE FORCE HQ TO 2 DAYS AT RUTBAT. RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED. A FORCE RESERVE OF 3 DAYS PER MAN AND A RESERVE AT KIBAT LOGISTICS COMPANY OF 10 DAYS PER MAN. UNFORTUNATELY THESE RESERVES ARE AT ISOLATED LOCATIONS FOR MOST UNITS. GIVEN ACCESS TO THESE LOCATIONS UNAMIR CAN SURVIVE ON FOOD FOR LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.

D. FUEL. FUEL WILL BE OUR BIGGEST DIFFICULTY. A FORCE RESERVE OF 20,000 L OF GASOLINE AND 40,000 L OF DIESEL IS LOCATED AT THE LOGISTICS COMPANY. THIS LOCATION IS ISOLATED FOR MOST UNITS. MOST UNITS FEEL THEY HAVE A TWO TO THREE DAY RESERVE. GIVEN THAT LOCAL HYDRO IS OUT, GENERATORS CONSUMING FUELED ARE CRITICAL TO POWER LIMITED LIGHTING, RADIOS, PUMPS. EVEN WITH RATIONING
FUEL WILL BE DEPLETED IN UNDER ONE WEEK.

E. AMMUNITION. THIS CRITICAL ITEM GIVEN OUR PRESENT SITUATION AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE IS OUR LARGEST SINGLE DEFICIENCY. A COMPLETE STOCKTAKE IS BEING CONDUCTED AND FIGURES ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. AS THIS WAS ESTABLISHED AS A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION ONLY SMALL ARMS AND VERY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION ARE AVAILABLE. UNAMIR CAN DEFEND ITSELF FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME.

F. DEFENSIVE STORES. THESE STORES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PROVIDED BY THE UN SUPPORT SYSTEM. UNIT RESERVES HAVE BEEN DEPLETED. UNAMIR CAN USE ADHOC AND TEMPORARY MEASURES BUT CANNOT SUSTAIN A LONG TERM DEFENCE.

G. MEDICAL SUPPLIES. ALREADY DEPLETED BY HEARTS AND MINDS SUPPORT PROGRAM TO THE CIVIL POPULATION, THE USE OF UNIT RESERVES FOR THE PRE-6 APRIL TREATMENT OF OUR OWN PERSONNEL AND THE NON-COMMENCEMENT OF UN MEDICAL RESUPPLY THESE ITEMS ARE IN CRITICAL CONDITION, IF WE TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES. AS A CONSERVATION METHOD WE HAVE CEASED PROVIDING EMERGENCY TREATMENT TO THE CIVIL POPULATION AND ARE TRANSFERRING THEM TO KIGALI HOSPITAL.

H. COMMUNICATIONS. THIS LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS NOT FUNCTIONING. UNAMIR HAS AN INMARSAT WITH FAX AT FORCE HQ AND KIBAT ALSO HAS ONE. THESE ARE OUR ONLY LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND THEY ARE BEING PROTECTED AND SUSTAINED AS CRITICAL MISSION STORES.

I. TRANSPORT. PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES UNAMIR SUFFERED FROM A SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY VEHICLE CASUALTIES, ANTICIPATED FUEL SHORTAGES AND THE NON-AVAILABILITY DUE TO THE CONFLICT OF LOCAL SOURCES. UNAMIR CANNOT LIFT ITSELF, LET ALONE ANY ADDITIONAL PERSONS IN ONE LIFT. WE DO HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO SHUTTLE MOVEMENT IF FUEL SUPPLIES ARE AVAILABLE.

16. UNAMIR WAS DESIGNED, ESTABLISHED AND DEVELOPED LOGISTICALLY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. IT THEREFORE DOES NOT HAVE THE RESERVES OF CRITICAL ITEMS FOR A LONG CONFLICT SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, MUCH OF THE RESERVES ARE ISOLATED FROM OUTER UNIT LOCATIONS BECAUSE OF THE ACCOMODATION DIFFICULTIES IN KIGALI. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LOGISTICS SITUATION IS THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF THE FORCE IS OUTSIDE KIGALI AND CAN IF NECESSARY SUPPORT THEMSELVES FROM THE LOCAL ECONOMY WHICH IS STILL FUNCTIONING IN RELATIVE CALM. UNAMIR WILL DEVOTE MUCH STAFF EFFORT AND RESOURCES TO IMPROVING OUR SUSTAINABLE CAPABILITY BUT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT WE FACE CRITICAL SHORTAGES THAT WILL REDUCE THE ABILITIES OF AND ENDANGER THE FORCE WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

17. THE RGF LEADERS HAVE ASKED THE RPF (THROUGH UNAMIR) TO CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAW (DISENGAGE) TO THE CND AS THEY STATE THEY ARE TRYING TO DO THE SAME WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. WE HAVE PASSED THIS MESSAGE TO THE RPF AND THEY STATED THAT THEY ARE
READY TO DO THE SAME IF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS CEASE-FIRES. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM. CONSIDERABLE FIREFIGHTS ARE ON-GOING THUS BLOCKING ROUTES FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ROADBLOCKS DENY ACCESS AND MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CITY, STRAY BULLETS AND SHELLS, RICOCHETS AND OCCASIONALLY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE FORCES DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND RETARDS ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY MOVEMENT BY FOOT OR UNPROTECTED VEHICLE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE FORCE HQ AND AMAHORO STADIUM AREA AS A SECURE CORE FOR OUR OPERATIONS, BUT ON-GOING BATTLES BETWEEN THE RPF AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN THIS AREA HAVE PREVENTED THE CONCLUSION OF THIS OPERATION. THIS OPERATION WILL CONTINUE AS IT IS THE KEY TO ANY EVACUATION PLAN OR FOR ANY EXPANSION PLAN. OTHER LOCATIONS IN KIGALI ARE IN A CAMP SELF-DEFENCE MODE WITH MINIMUM AND ONLY CRITICAL LIFE SAVING OR PEACE SAVING ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE.

18. THE FC OF UNAMIR NEEDS TO KNOW WHAT THE MAJOR COUNTRIES ARE PLANNING TO DO IN THE AREA OF POSSIBLE EVACUATION, ESPECIALLY OF THE EXPATRIATES AND UN OR UNAMIR. WE HAVE A LIGHT COMPANY (-) AT THE AIRPORT BUT WE DO NOT CONTROL OR HAVE SECURED THE ROUTES TO THE AIRPORT. NEITHER IS THE AIRPORT SECURE FOR LANDING AS WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES INSTRUCTIONS OR LOYALTIES.

19. FC UNAMIR ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE MILITARY "CRISIS COMMITTEE" LAST NIGHT AND THEY GAVE DIRECTION, TO THEIR OPERATIONS OFFICERS, TO CONSOLIDATE THE PLAN AND ISSUE ORDERS TO STYMIE THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD OPPOSING FORCES. WE DO NOT HAVE THE DETAILS OF THAT PLAN NOR ITS PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE.

20. UNAMIR REMAINS COMMITTED TO ITS MANDATE EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT ENABLING THIS MISSION TO FULFILL OUR ASSIGNED AND DESIGNED FOR TASKS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT KIGALI WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A WORSE SITUATION WITHOUT UNAMIR. ALL PRESENT EFFORTS ARE AIMED AT SELF-PROTECTION, SUSTAINMENT, SECURITY OF KEY PEACE PROCESS INDIVIDUALS, LIMITED HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND EMPLOYING EVERY SKILL WE POSSESS TO GET THE PARTIES TO A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE BACK TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

21. We shall keep you apprised of the situation as it evolves.

22. Best regards.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BRUSSE 03953 081041Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 OIGO-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-16 L-01 ADS-00 NSA-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 RP-10 SCT-03 SNP-00
SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
RPE-01 PMB-00 /054W
---------------------3984BC 081042Z/38
O 081037Z APR 94 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6354
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC/J4/J5/IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC/OASD/ISP/IMMEDIATE
USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE/J3/J4/BATTLE STAFF/IMMEDIATE
CINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL/J3/J4/IMMEDIATE
HQUSAFFE RAMSTEIN AB GE/DC// IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS 03953

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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PAGE 02  BRUSSE 03953 081041Z
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, KDEM, RW, BY, BE
SUBJECT: CLAES ASKS SYG FOR CHANGE IN UNAMIR MANDATE; ASKS
FOR USG VIEWS AND SUPPORT

REF: A) JOHNSON MCCULLEY TELCON OF 4/8

1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2.  THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. URGENT ACTION REQUESTED IN
PARA 4 BELOW.

3.  OFFICIAL IN CABINET OF BELGIAN FONMIN CLAES CALLED
EMBASSY MORNING APRIL 8 TO SAY THAT CLAES HAD SPOKEN TO
UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI MORNING APRIL 8 TO URGE THAT UN
CONSIDER CHANGING/EXTENDING MANDATE OF UNAMIR; A) TO
PROTECT PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE IN DANGER SUCH AS REMAINING
RWANDAN POLITICIANS; AND B) TO ASSIST FOREIGN RESIDENTS
WHO NEED PROTECTION OR WISH TO LEAVE RWANDA IN AN EVACUATION.

3. CLAES IS PRESSING FOR THIS CHANGE IN UNAMIR MANDATE BECAUSE HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE PERNICIOUS PRECEDENT BELGIUM COULD SET IF IT WERE TO NATIONALIZE ITS TROOPS IN RWANDA AND TURN THEM TO PERFORMING A NATIONAL MISSION OF PROTECTION AND EVACUATION. THE BELGIAN MFA OFFICIAL HINTED AT THE PRECEDENT THAT COULD BE USED BY COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OR ELSEWHERE.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: THE BELGIAN MFA ASKED FOR A RESPONSE ASAP ON WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WOULD BE ON CLAES' REQUEST. IF POSSIBLE, THE BELGIANS WOULD LIKE US TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 03953 081041Z SUPPORT THIS REQUEST ASAP WITH THE SYG AND AT THE UN. THE BELGIANS HOPE FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE USG BEFORE THEIR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS AT 3 PM APRIL 7 LOCAL TIME.

5. BUJUMBURA AND KIGALI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BLINKEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Prepared by Colonel Gene Ronsick, x54133

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Current Situation; Next Steps (U)
ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To apprise you of the present state of crisis in Kigali and recommend next steps.

DISCUSSION: Current situation: The RPF (Tutsi) rebel force commander met this morning with the Government general who is now in control of the military (Hutu) and with the UN PKO commander (Canadian). Although there are still fire fights between the RPF forces and the Presidential Guard (Hutu extremists who probably shot down the President’s airplane), including around the Ambassador’s residence, these discussions are trying to install a cease fire, return the forces to their respective camps, and return the city to civilian governmental control. The Government general has promised to provide military escort for AmEmbassy personnel who are planning to depart tomorrow by road convoy to Bujumbura, Burundi (awaiting State approval of this plan). State has drafted a paper for NSC approval that says the US would support the Belgian informal request for airlift support for a reinforced battalion. The French may ask for airlift also. The Belgian and French military authorities are discussing evacuation of their citizens and want EUCOM planners to join them.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize General Joulwan to send a EUCOM planning team to join the combined Belgian/French planning group in Brussels. Based on their analysis and developments on the ground, consider providing airlift for their operation. US ground forces should be considered only as a last resort.

SECDEF APPROVAL

Approve________________

Disapprove________________

Other______________________

DECLASSIFIED MAY 12 2008
Authority: EO 12958 as amended
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Kigali livré à la fureur des tueurs hutus

Dès l’annonce de la mort du président Habyarimana, mercredi, la garde présidentielle, rejointe par des fanatiques hutus, a commencé la chasse aux Tutsis et aux membres de l’opposition. Alors que les cadavres s’entassent dans les rues, la Croix-Rouge estime que le bilan dépasserait les 10000 victimes.

La chaîne des Tutsis et aux membres de l’opposition a commencé dès l’annonce de la mort de l’ex-président, Président Habyarimana, jeudi. Minuit, les heures, les minutes, les jours, les années, les mois, les semaines, les heures de l’histoire se sont comptées à partir de là. Il est devenu évident que les Tutsis ont eu le droit à la vie, à la liberté, à la dignité, à l’égalité. Ils sont des êtres humains, des citoyens, des citoyens du monde. Ils ont le droit de vivre, de travailler, de penser, de se déplacer, de se défendre, de se chercher, de se rencontrer, de se parler, de se comprendre, de se ressentir, de se sentir, de se sentir des êtres humains. Ils ont le droit de vivre, de travailler, de penser, de se défendre, de se chercher, de se rencontrer, de se parler, de se comprendre, de se ressentir, de se sentir, de se sentir des êtres humains. Ils ont le droit de vivre, de travailler, de penser, de se défendre, de se chercher, de se rencontrer, de se parler, de se comprendre, de se ressentir, de se sentir, de se sentir des êtres humains.
Les étrangers évacués

525 Français et des centaines de ressortissants étrangers ont été évacués du Rwanda, du Burundi et de la Centrafrique.

Après des combats à l’arme lourde ont opposé des rebelles au pouvoir et à une partie des forces armées du Rwanda, le Burundi et le Rwanda ont été entièrement détruits.

La violence a fait plus de 130 morts, principalement parmi les civils.

Le 21 janvier, les forces armées du Rwanda ont attaqué le Burundi, entraînant une escalade des tensions en Afrique centrale.

Le Burundi,蠐start, 21 janvier, les forces armées du Rwanda ont attaqué le Burundi, entraînant une escalade des tensions en Afrique centrale.
April 11, 1994
I-94/16533

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/COVER BRIEF

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

THROUGH: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

FROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East
Africa
Prepared by: LtCol Harvin: MEA:x78824

SUBJECT: Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi (U)

PURPOSE: INFORMATION--Talking points for your dinner
tonight with Mr. Kissinger.

DISCUSSION: (U) Action Officers in H&RA, PK/PE, and MEA
collaborated on the attached talking points.

COORDINATION
ASD/SOLIC
ASD/SR&R

Atch: a/s
• What is State doing now?
  Just beginning to look at next steps (DCM Leader will brief at State tomorrow).
  Expect little beyond diplomatic statements.

• What next in Rwanda?
  Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) will maintain 48-hour cease-fire to allow expats to depart.
  UN will likely withdraw all UN forces.
  Following the 48-hour cease fire period, RPF forces will attempt to take Kigali and will come into open warfare with any remaining French, Belgian, or UN forces.
  Civilians will increasingly be drawn into the conflict and fighting will likely spread to Burundi.
  AmEmbassy Bujumbura is under “Ordered Departure” and is drawing down from its 46 official/31 dependents to essential personnel only (planning on 22, could drop lower).
  Unofficial U.S. personnel normally number between 100-150, but may have already departed.

• Will Burundi's newly democratic, Hutu-led Government fall?
  Probably. Given the close tribal ties to the parties in Rwanda, it is highly likely that inter-tribal killings will spread.
  A NEO should not be necessary given the prior warning foreign citizens are getting.

• Is the USG willing to get involved?
  Not inside Rwanda or Burundi until peace is restored.
  We played an important role in brokering the Arusha Accords.
  As the only “honest broker” left on the field (given the intense hatred of Belgium by the Rwandan Hutus and of France by the Tutsis) we could (and should) play a critical diplomatic role in urging the parties to adhere to the Arusha peace agreement.
  We would want to restart our security assistance program once the peace process is back on track.

• What is happening at the U.N.?
  Security Council is meeting today to discuss future of UNAMIR, probably will take no action--everyone waiting for UNAMIR Commander’s recommendations. USUN has not been given guidance.
  There is some support in the USG for leaving the Commander and a small support staff in Kigali. He seems to be the only person who can talk to both sides.

• What are the humanitarian issues, and what can DoD do?
  Since last Wednesday, 5,000 refugees have fled Rwanda to Zaire, 5,000 Burundi have fled to Tanzania in anticipation of more violence, and UNHCR in Tanzania is expecting 100-250,000 more.
  UNHCR has refugee support food in Zaire for 10 days. DoD may be asked to airlift relief supplies. If State requests, H&RA can provide MREs, Humanitarian Daily Rations, consumable medical and other supplies for disaster relief.
DoD POLICY OPTIONS

- Because of the fluidity of the situation and the obvious requirement to focus on the NEO, State has not yet begun to look at its next steps re: U.S. Policy toward Rwanda and will not do so for a few days. DCM Joyce Leader will brief at State tomorrow. AMB Rawson will remain in Burundi for a few day. The Burundi Government wants the additional US Marines in Bujumbura to depart as soon as all AmCits are out of Rwanda--we support that request. (State Rwanda TF)

- State will likely shut down its Rwanda Task Force NLT Wednesday morning. (State Rwanda TF)

- We believe State will initially limit itself to diplomatic statements in support of the UN, the French, the Belgians, and the necessity for both sides to resume the peace process. Of note: this crisis will likely raise questions at the UN about the wisdom of including lightly armed troops in a Chapter VI PKO instead of only unarmed observers (who would probably have been well-treated like most other un-armed ex-pats).

- Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue that would likely spill over into Burundi. In addition, millions of refugees will flee into neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire, far exceeding the absorptive capacity of those nations. Since neither the French nor the Belgians have the trust of both sides in the conflict, they are unlikely to be able to convince the parties to return to the peace process--thus there will be role to play for the U.S. as the "honest broker."

- One of the primary U.S. representatives at the last round of peace negotiations was an ISA alum, LTC Tony Marley, who is assigned to the Africa Regional Affairs office at State. He is known and trusted by both sides and will likely be called upon to play a significant role once more if the peace process can be put in motion.

- When the peace process is back on track, we should resume our security assistance program:

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Prepared by LtCol Harvin, 11 April 94, X78824
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 APRIL 1994

Attached, for your information, is a press release issued
while awaiting an updated and comprehensive summary.

Regards.
PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front forces have now entered the Rwandan Capital, Kigali, and are engaging elements of Rwandan government forces, which we hope to neutralize very soon.

The so called Interim government, composed of Criminals who have masterminded the massacre of opposition politicians, human rights activists, United Nations peacekeepers and thousands of innocent Rwandan Civilians, particularly those of Tutsi ethnic origin, has now fled the Capital.

The evacuation of foreign nationals is almost complete and all foreign troops are expected to leave Rwanda within 24 hours.

Despite the fact that a systematic genocide of Tutsi and Hutu opposition politicians has been carried out by a gang of extremist Hutu elements, the media has unfairly treated this crisis as tribal conflict. We wish to make it clear that this is a political conflict and not a tribal conflict. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is not a Tutsi rebel group, but a national organisation that advocates national Unity, democracy and security for people and their property.

Our immediate objective is to stop the senseless killing of innocent people and to restore law and order in Rwanda. We call upon both the national and International Community to support this noble objective.

Claude Dusaidi
Rwandese Patriotic Representative
at the United Nations
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  NAIROBI 06551 121419Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-01 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01
P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 /036W
-------------------3AD901 121420Z/38
P 121414Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8323
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL NAIROBI 06551

E.O. 12356: DECL/ODR
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PINR, RW
SUBJECT: COLONEL BLAMES RIGHT WING MILITARY FOR
- KIGALI'S NIGHTMARE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DCM LEADER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  NAIROBI 06551 121419Z
4/10, A WELL-PLACED RWANDAN ARMY COLONEL CREDITED A
SECRET MILITARY/CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION WITH ORDERING THE
KIGALI ATROCITIES. HE PLEADED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO CONDEMN THE KILLINGS, INTERVENE TO END THE
FIGHTING, AND HELP MILITARY/CIVILIAN MODERATES
REESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF. END SUMMARY.

3. COLONEL RUSATIRA, DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY TRAINING
ACADEMY IN KIGALI SINCE MID-1992 AND SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES BEFORE
THAT, ARGUED TO DCM IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 7/10 THAT
THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ACTED ON THE ORDERS OF A
SECRET MILITARY/CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION IN COMMITTING THE
KIGALI ATROCITIES. HE SAID THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WITH
THE HELP OF COMMUNAL POLICE, WAS ACTING ON ORDERS OF
AMASASU, A SECRET ORGANIZATION THAT OCCASIONALLY ISSUES
PRO-HABYARIMANA COMMUNIQUES ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
ISSUES. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH WAS THE
PROVOCATION NEEDED TO PUT A LONG-STANDING PLAN INTO
EFFECT.

5. RUSATIRA SAID SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS MET THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AFTERNOON OF 4/9 AT THE MILITARY
ACADEMY. SEVERAL TOLD THE MINISTER HE MUST DENOUNCE THE
ATROCITIES AND DISMANTLE THE GROUP COMMITTING THEM. HE
SAID OFFICERS TOLD THE MINISTER THEY KNEW THAT THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO KILL SOUTHERN
HUTUS, OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS AND TUTSIS. RUSATIRA
NAMED HIMSELF, COL. GATSINZI (NEWLY NAMED CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY), AND COL. RWABALINDA (LIAISON OFFICER WITH
THE UN FORCES) AMONG OTHERS DEMANDING THAT THE MINISTER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NAIROB 08551 121419Z
TAKE STEPS TO END THE MASSACRES.

6. RUSATIRA PLEADED WITH DCM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO CONDEMN THE ATROCITIES WITHOUT WAITING FOR
AN INVESTIGATION. HE LAMENTED THAT THE KILLING
SURPASSED ALL IMAGINATION, WITH WHOLE FAMILIES BEING
DECIMATED. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF TUTSI MINISTER AND
PEACE NEGOTIATOR LANDOALD NDASINGWA WHO, HE SAID, HAD
BEEN KILLED ALONG WITH HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN.

7. THE COLONEL URGED THAT THE US ENCOURAGE FRENCH OR
BELGIAN INTERVENTION TO STOP THE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING
AND TO PROTECT RWANDANS. HE ARGUED THAT THERE IS NO
LARGE FORCE ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA AS IN SOMALIA AND
THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR FRENCH AND BELGIAN
TROOPS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.

8. FINALLY, HE URGED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WORK WITH "PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL" TO REESTABLISH THE
DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND RENEW THE ARUSHA PEACE
PROCESS. "WE DON'T HAVE THE STRENGTH TO DO IT BY
OURSSELVES," HE SAID. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST
UNDERSTAND, HE SAID, THAT THESE HORRIBLE ACTS ARE NOT
THE WILL OF THE ENTIRE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN RWANDA.

9. COMMENT. IN RUSATIRA'S VOICE WAS A DESPERATE PLEA
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN MODERATES WHO WANT TO REESTABLISH ORDER AND
SANITY IN RWANDA. ACCORDING TO A GENDARME CONTACT MET
BY CHANCE OUTSIDE EMBASSY NAIROBI LATER 4/10, RUSATIRA
WAS REPORTEDLY ONE OF SEVERAL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
WORKING HARD SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE KILLINGS TO REESTABLISH ARMY DISCIPLINE. THE GENDARME, ACTIVE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SAID HE WAS IN DANGER FROM THE MILITARY AND WAS EVACUATING HIS FAMILY TO THE SOUTH.

10. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BRAZEAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Communiqué issued by the Command of the Forces Armées Rwandaises

Following the tragic events of 6 April 1994, which have plunged the country into mourning, caused numerous innocent victims and led to great distress for the Rwandan people as a whole, and following the hideous murder of ten UNAMIR soldiers and other foreign nationals, the Command of the Forces Armées Rwandaises considers that it is more than high time to put an end to this tragedy.

To this effect, it would be highly desirable for the Command of the Forces Armées Rwandaises to meet immediately with the RPF Command so as to examine together how to pacify the country with no further delay, contribute to the rapid establishment of the Broad Based Transitional Institutions, and avoid any further pointless bloodshed.

The Command of the Forces Armées Rwandaises recognises UNAMIR’s unflagging efforts, sometimes foiled, for the total implementation of the Arusha Accords and requests it serve as a go-between for the above-mentioned meetings.

In order to facilitate dialogue and stop the wave of panic that has swept through the population, it is desirable that the fighting be suspended. To achieve this goal, the Forces Armées Rwandaises wish to propose a truce to RPF forces that would begin on 13 April 1994 at 12 o’clock.
On behalf of the Command of the Forces Armées Rwandaises, the field officers who attended the meeting:

- Colonel Léonidas Rusatira [Signed]
- Colonel BEM Marcel Gatsinzi [Signed]
- Colonel BEMS Félicien Muberuka [Signed]
- Colonel BEMSG Aloys Ntiwiragabo [Signed]
- Colonel André Kanyamanza [Signed]
- Colonel Joseph Murasampongo [Signed]
- Colonel Edouard Hakizimana [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel BEM Ephrem Rwabalinda [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel BEMS Augustin Rwamanywa [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Kanyandekwe [Signed]

Kigali 12 April 1994
FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

New York, 13 April 1994

H.E. Ambassador Colin Keating
President of The UN Security Council
United Nations
New York

Mr. President,

A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandese people, in the presence of a United nations International force, and the International Community has stood by and only watched.

Efforts have been mobilized to rescue foreign nationals from the horrifying events in Rwanda, but there has been no concrete action on the part of the International Community to protect innocent Rwandese children, women and men who have been crying for help.

In the absence of International action to save innocent Rwandan people, the Rwandese Patriotic Front is obliged and has a moral responsibility to protect Rwandese people from barbaric and savage criminals. It is the intention of the Rwandese Patriotic Front to neutralize elements of the Rwandese army that are responsible for these massacres, bring an end to the senseless killing of innocent Rwandans, opposition politicians as well as UN peacekeepers, and restore law and order. The International Community should mobilize all its efforts to support this noble task, instead of calling for ceasefires that would only allow the criminals in Rwanda to continue committing atrocities.

We wish to request the International Community, through you Mr. President, to immediately set up a UN war crimes tribunal, apprehend those who have committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda and bring them to justice. Mr. President, the perpetrators of these atrocities in Rwanda are known and with UN assistance they can be brought to justice. By doing this, Mr. President, the UN will have rendered a noble service to the Rwandan people, who deserve it as members of this world community.
Mr. President, the Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to confirm to members of the Security Council its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and as soon as the situation in Rwanda is stabilized, the Rwandese Patriotic Front will cooperate with UNAMIR, to set up broad-based institutions in the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Please accept Mr. President, my highest regards.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Claude Dusaidi
Director for External Relations and,
RPF Representative at the UN
1. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DIA CABLE THAT ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNTING OF EVENTS FROM THE TIME OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S DEATH AT ABOUT 21:30 P.M. ON 6 APRIL UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST U.S. CONVOY OUT OF KIGALI AT 13:00 P.M. ON 10 APRIL. THE RECOUNTING OF EVENTS COMES FROM A LOG MAINTAINED BY ECONOFF WITH INPUT FROM OTHER EMBOFFS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THIS REPORT DOES NOT PRETEND TO BE 100 PERCENT ACCURATE BUT ONLY PROVIDES THE EMBASSY TEAMS' UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS THAT TRANSPIERED IN A CONFUSING AND DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT.
2. We will also attempt to explain why certain events took place and their effect on the military and provide an assessment as to where the country is headed now.

Chronology of Events:

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Wednesday, April 6

9:00 P.M. FIRST EXPLOSION HEARD, UNAMIR REPORTS IT IS HEADING TOWARD THE AIRPORT TO INVESTIGATE.

9:30 P.M. RADIO RTLM REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE IS SHOT DOWN.

9:35 P.M. GENDARME DETACHMENT AT KANOMBE CONFIDENTIAL

Page 03

BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z

AIRPORT REPORT THAT THEY WERE IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE JUST BEFORE IT CRASHED. COMMUNICATION WAS CUT WHEN THE ELECTRICITY WENT OUT FOR SEVERAL MINUTES AT THE AIRPORT.

10:45 P.M. RPF SAYS ITS FORCES IN THE CND COMPOUND ARE ON ALERT.

11:30 P.M. COL MARCHAL (UNAMIR KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER) TELLS ECONOFF THAT PRESIDENT IS CONFIRMED DEAD.

12:00 P.M. CONTACTED RSO IN BUJUMBURA TO ADVISE THAT SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY.

Thursday, April 7

5:00 A.M. HEAVY MORTAR FIRE HEARD, FOLLOWED BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE

PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNITS BEGIN ENTERING HOMES, LOOKING FOR OPPOSITION MINISTERS. TACTICS USED: PRESIDENTIAL GUARD THROWS GRENADES INTO HOMES, FORCING OCCUPANTS OUT; SOLDIERS THEN SHOOT FLEEING
UNCLASSIFIED

OCCUPANTS.
FIRST REPORTS THAT GOR FORCES HAVE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04    BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT.

6:00 A.M.
PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL AMERICAN
WARDEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED

9:45 A.M.
FIRE FIGHT BEGINS ON KIMIHURURA
BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND
UNIDENTIFIED GOR FORCES. (RPF STILL
HAS NOT FIRED ON ANY GOR FORCES).

10:00 A.M.
DCM LEADER'S HOUSE OCCUPIED BY
SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SOLDIERS
WHO ARE LOOKING FOR THE ACTING
PRIME MINISTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01    BUJUMB 01299 02 OF 05 152233Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 FM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00
SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 PMB-00
/037W

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

CORRECTED COPY (ADDING SUBJECT LINE - PLEASE
CORRECT ALL SECTIONS)

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: NEO FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY

11:00 A.M. SOLDIERS LEAVE DCM'S HOUSE, THREATENING HER AGAINST USE OF HER TELEPHONE.

11:05 A.M. WILLARD MUNGER OF MUDEME UNIVERSITY REPORTS THAT CIVILIANS HAVE ENTERED UNIVERSITY COMPOUND AND BEGUN KILLING TUTSI STUDENTS, INCLUDING THE SON OF THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. ECONOFF CONTACTS GISENYI GENDARMES ASKING FOR ASSISTANCE.

11:10 A.M. GAKONI ORPHANAGE REPORTS ETHNICALLY MOTIVATE KILLINGS ON ITS COMPOUND; 28 INITIALLY REPORTED DEAD. ECONOFF CONTACTS UNAMIR DMZ COMMANDER, COL YAAATSE, ASKING IF A UN PATROL CAN BE SENT IMMEDIATELY TO ASSIST AMCITS AT THE ORPHANAGE.

12:00 P.M. EMBOFFS BEGIN RECEIVING REPORTS THAT MINISTER OF INFORMATION, LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND AGRICULTURE ARE DEAD.

12:20 P.M. EMBOFFS BEGINNING HEARING REPORTS FROM VARIOUS CONTACTS THAT MINISTER CONFIDENTIAL

OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND ACTING PRIME MINISTER ARE BOTH DEAD; UNAMIR GUARDS PROTECTING THEM HAVE ALSO BEEN KILLED; 7 OF THE 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS PROTECTING ACTING PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY CUT UP INTO PIECES RATHER THAN BEING SHOT.
13:15 P.M. MEMBERS OF ASIAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATION REPORT STORES IN DOWN TOWN KIGALI BEING LOOTED.

14:00 P.M. ROZ CARR REPORTS ETHNIC KILLINGS IN MUTURA

14:30 P.M. HEAVY FIGHTING REPORTED NEAR PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE'S HOUSE, AIRPORT RUNWAY REPORTED BLOCKED WITH TRUCKS AND EQUIPMENT.

14:35 P.M. REPORTS THAT FRENCH MILITARY ON ALERT IN BANGUI

14:45 P.M. CONTACT RSO BUJUMBURA TO GIVE SITUATION REPORT.

15:00 P.M. REPORTS FROM GIKONDO AREA RESIDENTS THAT BOTH GOR FORCES AND CIVILIANS (BELIEVED TO BE INTERHAMWE) ARE ENTERING HOUSES AND KILLING TUTSI OCCUPANTS. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUJUMB 01299 02 OF 05 152233Z

UNAMIR NO LONGER ANSWERING TELEPHONE AT FORCE HEADQUARTERS OF KIGALI SECTOR COMMAND; LATER REPORTS THAT FORCE HEADQUARTERS HIT BY MORTAR.

RPF ISSUES ULTIMATUM THROUGH UNAMIR TO THE GOR FORCES THAT THEY WILL BE FORCED TO ATTACK IF THE GOR DOES NOT STOP THE KILLING IN KIGALI WITHIN 12 HOURS.

16:00 P.M. REFUGEES STREAM INTO EMR CLAIMING RPF WILL SHOOT THEM IF THEY SEEK REFUGEE IN NEARBY CHURCHES ACROSS THE ROAD.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUJUMB 01299 03 OF 05 152246Z ACTION AF-01

UNCLASSIFIED
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3357
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

CORRECTED COPY (ADDED SUBJ LINE - PLS CORR ALL SECTIONS)

E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, MOPS,RW
SUBJECT: NEO FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

BUJUMB 01299 03 OF 05 152246Z

18:00 P.M.

FIGHTING DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY;
ONLY KIMIHURURA AND GIKONDO REPORT
SPORADIC GUNFIRE; EMBASSY PROVIDES
RADIO WARDEN MESSAGE WHICH IS
TRANSMITTED VIA TELEPHONE TO
PRIVATE AMCITS.

19:30 P.M.

DATT, ECONOFF AND RSO DISCUSS
POSSIBILITY OF OVERLAND EVACUATION.
AMBASSADOR ASKS THAT DAT AND
ECONOFF BEGIN PLANNING OF
EVACUATION.

20:00 P.M.

SPORADIC GUNFIRE AND GRENADE BLASTS
HEARD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT

FRIDAY, APRIL 8
1:00 A.M.  TWO OFFICIAL AMCIT HOUSES TAKE HITS DURING THE NIGHT; HEAVY FIGHTING REPORTED IN KIMIHURURA.

8:00 A.M.  WARDEN MESSAGE TO ALL AMCITS

9:00 A.M.  ALL HOUSES IN KIMIHURURA AND KACIKIRU LOOSE ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS

10:00 A.M. OFFICIAL AMERICANS ADVISED TO TURN OFF THEIR RADIOS AND ONLY TURN THEM ON EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR FOR FIVE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  Bujumb 01299 03 of 05 152246Z MINUTES FOR SECURITY UPDATES.

11:00 A.M.  DATT, PC ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, ECONOFF AND GSO ASSISTANT ESCORTED TO EMBASSY BY GENDARMES.

13:00 P.M.  DATT AND ECONOFF MEET WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ADVISE HIM THAT WE ARE PLANNING AN OVERLAND EVACUATION; GENERAL DALLAIRE SAYS HE IS NEGOTIATING

16:00 P.M. IN FIRE FIGHT BEHIND EMR, FAR SHOOTS INTO EMR COMPOUND, KILLING ONE CHILD AND WOUNDING TWO ADULTS. WITH MGEN NDINDILIYIMANA TO ESTABLISH THE TERMS OF A CEASE FIRE

AT THIS POINT, ECONOFF COULD NO LONGER CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A LOG AS PLANNING FOR EVACUATION WAS BEGUN REQUIRING CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH BOTH PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL AMCITS.

TEAM WITHIN THE EMBASSY ESTABLISHED OPEN LINE WITH STATE OPS CENTER AND EUCOM. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, CONTACTS WERE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND FAR MILITARY FOR SECURITY UPDATES. DATT BEGAN NEGOTIATING WITH FAR AND ECONOFF WITH THE RPF THROUGH UNAMIR LIAISON FOR GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE FOR AMCIT CONVOYS. INITIAL PLANS MADE FOR GROUND EVACUATION FROM THREE ASSEMBLY POINTS: AMERICAN CLUB, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, AND CONFIDENTIAL
SATURDAY, APRIL 9

AT 3:00 A.M., EMBOFFS HEAR PLANE LANDING; REPORTS LATER THAT FRENCH MILITARY LANDED AND SECURED AIRFIELD. EUCOM NOTIFIES EMBASSY OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT FOR AIR EVACUATION, BUT ALSO LEAVE OPTION OPEN FOR GROUND EVACUATION. AT APPROXIMATELY 08:00

CONFIDENTIAL

P 150830Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3358
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

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TAGS: PINS, PINK, PGOV, MOPS,RW
SUBJECT: NEO FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

A.M., AMBASSADOR IN CONSULTATION WITH EMOFFS DECIDES ON THE GROUND EVACUATION OPTION FROM KIGALI, THROUGH BUTARE, TO BUJUMBURA. EMOFFS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED THE DAY BEFORE HAD GONE INTO EFFECT AT 6:00 A.M.

DATT ARRANGES FOR GENDARME ESCORTS FOR THREE CONVOYS SENT OUT AT 12:30, 13:10 AND 14:00 P.M. MOST AMERICANS LEAVE IN THE FIRST OF THESE THREE CONVOYS. FIRST CONVOY CROSSES THE BORDER BEFORE 18:00 P.M. THE OTHER TWO CONVOYS ARRIVE AFTER BORDER CLOSED. WITH ASSISTANCE FROM RSO BUJUMBURA, REMAINING TWO CONVOYS CROSS BORDER AT 3:00 A.M.

SUNDAY, APRIL 10

EMOFFS RECEIVE REPORTS THAT CEASEFIRE NOT HOLDING AND THAT RPF IS ADVANCING ON KIGALI. DECISION MADE TO EVACUATE ALL REMAINING AMERICANS INCLUDING SKELETON EMBASSY CREW PRIOR TO 12:00 P.M. AGAIN UNAMIR AND FAR CONTACTED FOR SAFE PASSAGE GUARANTEES FOR AMERICAN CONVOYS. TWO CONVOYS LEFT KIGALI, AFTER HEROIC EFFORTS ARE MADE BY EMOFF WALT MEYERS AND PRIVATE CANADIAN CITIZEN VERNON DEMILLE TO GET REMAINING AMERICANS TRAPPED IN GIKONODO AND KACIKIRU TO ASSEMBLY POINTS. ONE CONVOY DEPARTS AT 11:00 A.M.; THE SECOND CONVOY DEPARTS AT 13:30 P.M. WITH 108 VEHICLES AND 600 PEOPLE (ONLY 9 OF WHICH ARE AMERICANS). THE SECOND CONVOY SWELLED IN SIZE AS GERMANS, INDIANS, CANADIANS AND OTHER EXPATRIATES DECIDE TO JOIN THE AMERICAN CONVOY TO ESCAPE THE FIGHTING IN THE CITY. THIS LAST CONVOY ARRIVES IN

CONFIDENTIAL

BUJUMBURA AT 23:30 P.M.

ASSESSMENT:

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2. WAS THE PRESIDENT ASSASSINATED; AND IF SO, TO WHAT END?

BECAUSE NO FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DOUNED AIRCRAFT WAS CONDUCTED, IT IS PURE SPECULATION
UNCLASSIFIED

WHETHER THE PLAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY HOSTILE FIRE OR ACCIDENTALLY CRASHED. ACCORDING TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FRENCH MILITARY AND DATT, UNAMIR WAS INTENDING TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT AND SPECIFICALLY TO RETRIEVE THE BLACK BOX IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CRASH. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DONE.


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04  BUJUMB 01299  04 OF 05  152256Z

SCENARIO TWO: ASSASSINATION BY SOUTHERN HUTUS ALSO DISSATISFIED BY PRESIDENTIAL INTRANSIGENCE AND FEAR THAT THIS INTRANSIGENCE WAS A SIGN THAT HABYARIMANA AND HIS INNER CIRCLE WERE IMPLEMENTING PLANS TO ELIMINATE SOUTHERN HUTUS AND OPPOSITION LEADERS BEGINNING WITH THE KILLING OF GAPIYSI AND LATER MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS GATABAZI.

SCENARIO THREE: NORTHERN HUTU HARDLINERS KILL THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO USE HIS DEATH AS AN EXCUSE TO ELIMINATE THE RPF AND SYMPATHETIC HUTU LEADERSHIP, EFFECTING STOPPING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORDS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BUJUMB 01299  05 OF 05  152300Z

ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01
    TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
    OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00

UNCLASSIFIED
3. WAS THE EXECUTION OF OPPOSITION MINISTERS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT PLANNED AND/OR SANCTIONED BY THE MILITARY HIERARCHY OR WAS IT A SPONTANEOUS REACTION BY A LOYAL GRIEF STRICKEN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD LOOKING FOR REVENGE?

DCM WAS TOLD BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOL THAT A PLAN WAS IN PLACE TO KILL OPPOSITION MINISTERS SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE ASSASSINATED (SEE REPTEL). SINCE THERE WERE NO REPORTS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT’S DEATH OF FAR FORCES ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS KILLING SPREE, IT CAN ONLY BE ASSUMED THAT EITHER THE MILITARY FELT POWERLESS TO STOP IT OR CONDONE IT BY THEIR INACTION. (COMMENT: THE ARMY AND GENDARMES COMBINED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACT TO CONTAIN AN APPROXIMATELY 500 MAN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. HOWEVER, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT SOME SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES PARTICIPATE WITH GENDARMES IN ATTACKING CIVILIANS, LOOTING HOMES AND STORES AND KILLING /ANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THEREFORE, DEPENDING ON THEIR
NUMBER, IT MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO EFFECTIVELY INTERVENE. END COMMENT.

4. DID THE NORTHERN VERSUS SOUTHERN HUTU RIVALRY IN THE MILITARY RESULT IN FIGHTING WITHIN THE FAR'S RANKS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH?

ALTHOUGH TENSIONS ALWAYS EXISTED IN THE MILITARY BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN HUTUS, DURING CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUJUMB 01299 05 OF 05 152300Z RWANDA'S THREE YEAR CIVIL WAR, THIS TENSION NEVER RESULTED IN FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS WITH THE FAR RANKS. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE RUMORS THAT THERE WERE FIGHTING BETWEEN THESE TWO FACTIONS, NONE HAVE EVER BEEN SUBSTANTIATED IN NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS WITH FAR OFFICERS AND THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY OFFICIALS. THEREFORE IF THESE TENSIONS FLARED INTO ACTUAL FIGHTING BETWEEN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SOLDIERS, SUCH FIGHTING WAS CONTAINED TO A VERY LOW LEVEL.

5. WILL CURRENT FIGHTING RESULT IN A MILITARY STANDOFF OR WILL BOTH SIDES AGREE TO A QUICK CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY ATTEMPTS AT REINSTITUTING THE ARUSHA ACCORDS?

IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, THE ARUSHA ACCORDS WERE SIGNED BY BOTH SIDES BECAUSE THEY WERE EXHAUSTED AFTER THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR WHICH RESULTED IN NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE FOR EITHER SIDE. EMOFFS STILL BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE WAR WEARY AND DO NOT WANT A PROLONGED CONFLICT. THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO NOW IS FOR THE RPF TO GAIN QUICK MILITARY ADVANTAGE BY TAKING ALL OR PART OF KIGALI AND THEN SUEING FOR PEACE, RECOGNIZING THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO HOLD KIGALI MILITARILY BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RULE UNILATERALLY WITHOUT VIOLENT REPRIASALS AGAINST FELLOW TUTSIS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE RPF, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO SUE FOR PEACE UNTIL MOST ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ARE ELIMINATED IN KIGALI. EMOFFS DO NOT SEE RPF'S ATTACK AS HAVING THE OBJECTIVE OF TOTALLY DEFEATING THE FAR. INSTEAD, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUJUMB 01299 05 OF 05 152300Z CAPTURING ALL OR PART OF KIGALI IS AIMED AT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING THEIR BARGAINING POSITION IN
A FUTURE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE
RESURRECTIONS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS PRINCIPLES.
LANGE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
6.E.1. Note du ministère des Affaires étrangères,

A/S : RWANDA.

Déclassifié

L'attentat qui a coûté la vie au Président HABYARIMANA et qui est la cause immédiate des événements que connait aujourd'hui le Rwanda est probablement l'oeuvre du FPR. L'avenir de ce pays et de la sous-région dépend de l'équilibre qui s'instaurera, sur la base duquel devra être négocié un accord politique.

* * *

La destruction de l'avion du Président HABYARIMANA, le 6 avril dernier, a été selon toutes probabilités provoquée par un attentat. Trois témoignages directs (directeur de cabinet et fille du chef de l'Etat, commandant de la garde présidentielle de Kanombe) font état de tirs. Ces témoignages sont corroborés par d'autres, qui ne sont pas toujours issus de milieux favorables au Président HABYARIMANA.

Aucun élément matériel ne permet à l'heure actuelle de déterminer la responsabilité de cet attentat. Le FPR nie en être l'auteur et l'attribue à des éléments hostiles aux accords d'Arusha, notamment de la garde présidentielle.

Certes, aucune hypothèse ne peut être définitivement écartée. La thèse d'une responsabilité de proches du Président HABYARIMANA est cependant d'une très grande fragilité. Elle repose sur le fait que les tirs provenaient de Kanombe, où se trouve un camp de la garde présidentielle. Mais rien ne prouve qu'ils venaient de l'intérieur de ce camp. Le désarroi des autorités rwandaises au lendemain de l'attentat et leurs premières décisions (désignation d'un chef de l'Etat et d'un gouvernement intérimaires, appel au dialogue avec le FPR) ne cadrent pas avec l'idée d'un coup monté par elles. Enfin, la mort dans un même attentat du Président de la République, du Chef de la Sécurité et du Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée a affaibli gravement l'armée rwandaise, qui aurait pu trouver le moyen de saboter les accords à un moindre coût pour elle.

.../...
La responsabilité du FPR, sans être prouvée, est beaucoup plus vraisemblable. Les indices matériels sont peu nombreux : rumeurs persistantes selon lesquelles le Front disposait à Kigali de missiles Sam, départ pour Mulindi de la quasi-totalité des responsables du FPR dans les jours précédant l'attentat.

Surtout, il semble bien que le FPR ait pris conscience au cours de ces derniers mois du fait que la transition prévue à Arusha ne débouchait pas pour lui sur une prise du pouvoir. Les accords semblaient à priori très favorables au Front. Sa stratégie reposait, semble-t-il, sur les éléments suivants :

- s'allier aux partis d'opposition de l'intérieur pour obtenir une majorité systématique des 2/3 à l'Assemblée et au gouvernement,

- remplacer totalement l'administration locale avant l'issue de la transition,

- déconsidérer le Président HABYARIMANA et son entourage par des procès touchant aux Droits de l'Homme et à des affaires de corruption, avec l'issue possible d'une destitution (selon le mécanisme prévu à Arusha),

Or, il apparaissait de plus en plus clairement au fil des semaines que le succès de cette stratégie n'était pas assuré :

- les partis d'opposition de l'intérieur, alliés au FPR lors des négociations d'Arusha pour enlever ses pouvoirs au chef de l'État, ont eu tendance après avoir atteint ce résultat à reprendre leurs distances vis-à-vis du FPR pour qu'il n'en soit pas le seul bénéficiaire. Cette évolution se faisait, soit par recentrage progressif de l'ensemble du parti (cas du PSD, sous l'influence de M. GATABAZI jusqu'à son assassinat), soit par éclatement des partis en tendances (cas du PL, divisé en deux factions nettement marquées en faveur du FPR et du Président ; cas du MDR, où le futur Premier Ministre, indulgent à l'égard du FPR, n'était pas soutenu par la majorité de son parti se réclamant de la révolution anti-tutsi de 1959 et du Parmehutu),

- l'assassinat du Président NDADAYE du Burundi, en octobre 1993, a recomposé le paysage politique en fonction des clivages ethniques, qui se sont brutalement aggravés. Dès lors, le langage du FPR -récusant les différences ethniques et se présentant comme un mouvement politique- était en décalage par rapport à l'opinion rwandaise. Le fossé ne séparait plus les camps du "changement" (FPR + opposition) et du conservatisme (le parti présidentiel), mais les "républicains" (héritiers de la révolution de 1959 qui a porté les hutu au pouvoir) et les partisans du FPR,

- Enfin, l'opinion internationale, qui depuis le début de la guerre en octobre 1990 s'était généralement montrée ouverte aux thèses du FPR, évoluait dans un sens qui n'était pas toujours favorable au Front, comme en a témoigné la
déclaration conjointe des pays observateurs et du représentant spécial du secrétaire général des Nations Unies, publiée à Kigali et donnant tort au FPR sur la question spécifique de l'entrée de la CDR dans les institutions.

Le FPR se trouvait donc dans une situation inconfortable : l'arithmétique parlementaire et gouvernementale ne lui donnait plus le contrôle des institutions, les obstacles à la mise en place de ces dernières se multipliaient, des problèmes logistiques sérieux (notamment d'approvisionnement) commençaient à se poser dans la zone qu'il contrôlait.

Il semble qu'une réédition du scénario de janvier-février 1993 l'ait alors tenté : pousser les FAR à la faute pour avoir le prétexte d'une reprise des combats. Plusieurs incidents en zone démilitarisée et assassinats n'ont cependant pas suffi à susciter une réaction des autorités rwandaises, qui craignaient effectivement un piège de ce type.

La mort du Président et des principaux responsables de l'armée et de la sécurité, en déclenchant le cycle de représailles meurtrères exercées par une partie de la garde présidentielle à l'encontre de l'opposition et des tutsi, a donné un prétexte à l'intervention militaire du FPR.

**

L'avenir du Rwanda se joue aujourd'hui d'abord sur le terrain. Le FPR a remporté des succès militaires, mais la résistance des FAR ne lui a pas permis pour l'instant de prendre un avantage décisif. La nomination du Colonel BIZIMUNGU, commandant du secteur opérationnel de Ruhengeri, témoigne de la détermination de l'armée rwandaise.

Le problème des renforts dont pourra disposer le FPR, en provenance des troupes ougandaises en cours de démobilisation, et de l'approvisionnement des deux parties en munitions, revêtira une importance cruciale.

Le rapport de forces qui s'établira devra ensuite se traduire en termes politiques. A cet égard, chaque partie a ses problèmes. Pour les autorités rwandaises, il s'agit de trouver un dirigeant qui puisse se poser en successeur du Président HABYARIMANA et en fédérateur des hutu. Il ne semble pas à l'heure actuelle se dégager des rangs du MRND (parti présidentiel), dont les principaux responsables sont plutôt réputés pour leur longue fidélité à l'ancien Président que pour leurs capacités de meneurs d'hommes. Peut-être le MDR, héritier de 1959, du Parmehutu et de la première République, dont les bastions sont au sud du pays, recèle-t-il un tel homme en son sein, mais celui-ci devra alors se faire accepter par l'armée (majoritairement issue du nord).

Du côté du FPR, le problème essentiel est celui de la transformation politique d'une éventuelle victoire militaire. Le FPR, seul, réduit à sa dimension tutsi (malgré la présence de quelques responsables hutu), peut difficilement...
espérer tenir le pays. Il doit donc, comme il l'avait prévu initialement dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des accords d'Arusha, trouver des alliés. Il est confronté pour ce faire à une triple difficulté : sa propre rigidité intellectuelle, qui le conduit à écarter tout accord avec le MRND alors qu'il admettait lui-même encore récemment que le parti présidentiel représente une véritable force politique dans le pays ; la mort de la plupart des responsables d'opposition qui auraient pu jouer un rôle de force d'appoint tout en ayant une réelle implantation dans le pays ; la réticence probable de personnalités rwandaises à l'idée de s'allier à un parti qui est perçu comme l'expression des seuls tutsi.

Dans ce contexte, les efforts de notre pays devraient porter sur les points suivants :

- le maintien d'une certaine présence internationale au Rwanda. La MINUAR reste utile, parce qu'elle peut permettre aux belligérants de se rencontrer en terrain neutre au moment où ils seront prêts à rouvrir des discussions et parce qu'elle sera le garant international d'un éventuel accord. La disparition de la MINUAR ne nous permettrait sans doute plus d'obtenir du Conseil de Sécurité, le moment venu, une nouvelle résolution la ressuscitant.

De même, la MONUOR (mission d'observateurs à la frontière ougando-rwandaise) devrait être maintenue et même renforcée, pour être en mesure d'exercer effectivement son mandat. Non seulement elle n'est attachée à la MINUAR que de façon administrative (à la demande expresse de l'Ouganda), mais son personnel, déployé du seul côté ougandais, ne court aucun risque.

Le risque d'être surpris par la communauté internationale en flagrant délit d'assistance au FPR est de nature à jouer un rôle modérateur sur le Président MUSEVENI.

La clef du problème rwandais est en effet pour une part entre les mains ougandaises. Le soutien du FPR en hommes (démobilisés), en matériel et en munitions dépend essentiellement de Kampala. Nous avons les moyens de peser sur les décisions ougandaises, en soulignant le risque pour l'Ouganda d'une pérennisation de l'instabilité au Rwanda (très probable dans l'hypothèse d'une victoire militaire du FPR), en replaçant cette question dans le cadre de notre dialogue politique global avec l'Ouganda et en usant aussi des arguments financiers, bilatéraux (don du Trésor) et multilatéraux (Banque Mondiale).

- la communauté internationale devrait continuer d'être mobilisée en faveur d'une solution aux problèmes rwandais. En particulier, les appels au cessez-le-feu pourraient être plus pressants. C'est le FPR qui refuse un cessez-le-feu, comme l'avait fait l'UNITA en Angola. L'argument selon lequel il ne cesserà les combats que lorsque les exactions et les massacres s'interrompront renverse la chaîne des causalités. S'il est exact qu'à l'annonce de la mort du Président les exactions ont tout de suite commencé et donné un fondement à l'intervention armée du FPR, aujourd'hui la situation est plutôt inverse : les Hutu,

.../...
tant qu'ils auront le sentiment que le FPR essaie de prendre le pouvoir, réagiront par des massacres ethniques. Seul un arrêt des combats pourrait permettre une reprise progressive de la situation en mains. / [signature] (Naylor).
6.E.I. Note from the Minstry of Foreign Affairs,
April 25, 1994, Attack of April 6, 1994

A/S: RWANDA.

The attack, which cost the life of President HABYARIMANA, and which was the immediate cause of the calamities Rwanda is going through now, is probably the responsibility of the RPF. The future of the country and of the sub-region depends on the balance that will be established, the basis of which should be negotiated in a political agreement.

* *

The destruction of President HABYARIMANA’s airplane, on April 6, was, in all probability, the result of an attack. Three direct testimonies (the Chief of Staff, the daughter of the Head of State, the commander of the Presidential Guard of Kanombe) report gunfire. These testimonies are corroborated by others, which do not always come from circles favorable to President HABYARIMANA.

No material evidence presently exists to determine the origin of the attack. The RPF denies responsibility and attributes it to elements hostile to the Arusha Accords, notably the Presidential Guard.

Certainly, no hypothesis can be definitively rejected. The thesis of responsibility of those close to President HABYARIMANA is, however, very fragile. It rests on the fact that the shots came from Kanombe, where a camp of the Presidential Guard is located. But there is no proof that they came from inside the camp. The disarray of the Rwandan authorities the day after the attack and their first decisions (designation of an interim Head of State and an interim government, call to dialogue with the RPF) do not correspond with the idea of a coup mounted by them. Finally, the death, in the same attack, of the President of the Republic, the Chief of
Security, and the Chief of the Defense Staff, has gravely weakened the Rwandan army, which could have found a way to sabotage the accords with little cost to itself.

The responsibility of the RPF, though not proved, is much more likely. Solid indications are few: persistent rumors that the Front has SAM missiles in Kigali, the departure for Mulindi of most of the leaders of the RPF in the days before the attack.

Above all, it seems that the RPF has become aware, in the past few months, of the fact that the transition, planned at Arusha, would not result in it taking power. The accords seemed a priori very favorable to the Front. It seems that its strategy rested on the following elements:

- to ally itself with interior opposition parties to obtain a systematic majority of 2/3 in the Assembly and in the government,

- to totally replace local administration before the completion of the transition,

- to discredit President HABYARIMANA and his entourage through trials involving human rights and corruption affairs, with the probable result of his removal (following the mechanism planned at Arusha),

And yet, it became clearer and clearer, over the course of weeks, that this strategy's success was not assured:

- the interior opposition parties, allied with the RPF during the negotiations of Arusha to take the Head of State's power away, had the tendency, after having achieved this result, to once again distance themselves from the RPF, so that it would not be the only beneficiary thereof. This evolution took place either by the progressive refocusing of the whole party (as in the case of the PSD, under the influence of Mr. GATABAZI until his assassination) or by the break-up of parties into factions (as in the case of the PL, divided into two factions neatly marked by favor for the RPF or the president; in the case of the MDR, where the future Prime Minister, indulgent with respect to the RPF, was not supported by the majority of his party, which harkened back to the anti-Tutsi revolution of 1959 and to the Parmehutu),

- the assassination of President NDADAYE of Burundi, in October 1993, recomposed the political landscape along ethnic lines, which have clashed sharply. Since then, the language of the RPF—rejecting ethnic differences and presenting itself as a political movement—was lagging with respect to Rwandan public opinion. A deep divide no longer separated the "change" camps (RPF & opposition) from conservatives (the presidential party), but the "republicans" (inheritors of the 1959 revolution which brought the Hutus to power) from the RPF partisans,
- Finally, the international operation, which, since the start of the war in October 1990, had generally shown itself open to RPF ideas, evolved in a direction not always favorable to the Front, as testified to in the joint declaration of the observer countries and the Special Representative of the General Secretary of the United Nations which said that the RPF was in the wrong on the specific question of the entry of the CDR into the institutions of government.

The RPF thus found itself in an uncomfortable situation: the parliamentary arithmetic no longer gave it control of the government, obstacles to the implementation of the aforementioned strategies multiplied, and serious logistical problems (notably supply) started to appear in the zone it did control.

It seems that a repeat of the January-February 1993 situation was therefore attempted: push the FAR into the wrong to have a pretext to take back up arms. Several incidents in the demilitarized zone and assassinations did not, however, suffice to arouse a reaction from the Rwandan authorities, who, indeed, feared a trap of this kind.

The death of the President and of the leaders of the army and of the security forces, in triggering the cycle of murderous reprisals exercised by part of the Presidential Guard against the opposition and the Tutsis, has given a pretext for the military intervention of the RPF.

* * *

The future of Rwanda is at stake today on the field. The RPF has won military successes, but FAR resistance has prevented them, for the time being, from taking a decisive advantage. The nomination of Colonel BIZIMUNGU, commandant of the operational sector of Ruhengeri, testifies to the determination of the Rwandan army.

The RPF may have a problem with reinforcements resulting from the demobilization of Ugandan troops. This, along with the supply of both parties with ammunition, will be crucial.

The balance of power which will be established should then be translated into political terms. In this regard, each party has its problems. For the Rwandan authorities, the problem is to find a leader who can succeed President HABYARIMANA and unify the Hutus. It does not seem, at the current time, that there is such a man in the ranks of the MRND (the presidential party), whose principal leaders are held in esteem for their long loyalty to the former president rather than for their capability as leaders. Perhaps the MDR, inheritor of 1959, of Parmehutu, and of the First Republic, whose strongholds are in the south of the country, harbors such a man, but he would then have to be accepted by the army (a majority of whose members come from the north).
On the side of the RPF, the essential problem is that of the political transformation of an eventual military victory. The RPF, alone, reduced to its Tutsi component (despite the presence of a few Hutu leaders), can hardly hope to hold the country. It must therefore, as it had initially planned as part of the implementation of the Arusha Accords, find allies. In this, it must confront a triple difficulty: its own intellectual rigidity, which leads it to preclude any agreement with the MRND despite the RPF’s own recent admission that the presidential party represents a veritable political force in the country; the death of the majority of the opposition leaders who could have played a powerful role as backup, having real ability to get things done in the country; and the probable reticence of Rwandan figures to the idea of allying themselves with a party that is perceived as the expression of only Tutsis.

In this context, our country's efforts should address the following points:

- the maintenance of a certain international presence in Rwanda. UNAMIR remains useful, because it can permit the belligerents to meet on neutral ground when they are ready to reopen discussions, and because it will be the international guarantor of an eventual agreement. The disappearance of UNAMIR would no doubt prevent us from obtaining, once the moment arrives, a new resolution from the Security Council to resuscitate it.

  Also, UNOMUR (an observation mission on the Ugandan-Rwandan border) should be maintained and even reinforced in order to be able to effectively exercise its mandate. Not only is it only attached to UNAMIR in an administrative fashion (at the express request of Uganda), but its personnel, deployed only on the Ugandan side, are not in any risk of danger.

  The key to the Rwandan problem is, in fact, partly in the hands of the Ugandans. Support for the RPF in men (demobilized), in material, and in munitions, comes from Kampala, and the Front depends on this support. We have the means to put pressure on Ugandan decisions, by underlining the risk for Uganda of the perpetuation of instability in Rwanda (very probable in the case of a military victory for the RPF), by placing this question back into our global political dialogue with Uganda, and by also using financial arguments, both bilateral (donations from the Treasury) and multilateral (World Bank).

- the international community should continue to mobilize in favor of a solution to the Rwandan problems. In particular, the appeals for a cease-fire could be more insistent. It is the PRF that refuses a cease-fire, like UNITA did in Angola. Its argument, that it will not cease fighting until the atrocities and massacres stop, reverses the chain of causality. If it is true that at the announcement of the President's death, the atrocities commenced at once and gave grounds for the armed intervention of the RPF, today the situation is quite reversed: the Hutus, as they feel that the RPF is trying to take power, will react with ethnic massacres. Only a stoppage of fighting would permit a progressive recovery of the situation.
This is the first time that I am meeting with ICTR investigators. I am able to go to Arusha and testify only if the ICTR assures me of my personal security, and that of my three children.

I married my late husband TURATSIINE Jean Pierre Aboubakar in 1990 in Sbyorongi and we were later blessed with three children. When I married my husband, he was working as a driver at Kibuye Prefecture. He was actually driving the Prefect of Kibuye who was called HAKIZIMANNA Donat, who had just been transferred from the office of the President in Kigali. The Prefect of Kibuye was later, I think in 1991 transferred to Kigali to go and work in the Office of the President as an intelligence officer. This was the time that my husband was also transferred to Kigali. Whilst in Kigali, my husband was working as a driver in the Office of the President, intelligence unit. I am not sure whether my husband continued driving HAKIZIMANNA Donat or not, although they were in the same unit.

Whilst in Kigali, my late husband got involved in politics, particularly the MRND party, although I am not exactly sure in which year this was. As days went by, my late husband told me that there were divisions within the MRND and that the party was going to break up into two that is one group from the North (BAKIGA) and the other group from NDUUGA. My late husband did not come from any of the two warring parties, and according to what he told me, the party was planning to commit some massacres of people. He further told me that if he remained within the MRND, it would mean that he would start by killing me, and his mother. Because I am Tutsi, and his mother was Tutsi, I understood this to mean that the massacres were going to be against the Tutsi population. As a result of this, my husband wrote a letter of resignation from the party. I think that this was either at the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994.

In early 1994, my husband went to Tanzania to go and prepare where we would go and stay and started some business. We were however getting in touch. In February 1994, he sent a message that I should go with the children and join him. So, I left and went to join him in Tanzania. He actually met us at the Rusumo border crossing on the Tanzanian side. My late husband had family members in Tanzania and some of them were RPF members. These are the ones who convinced my late husband to join the RPF. My late husband told me about his intentions to join the RPF and left about two weeks before president HABYARIMANA Juvenal died. He actually went with our SUZUKI motor vehicle.

One month later, some of my late husband's relatives who had joined the RPF came back, but they distanced themselves from me. When I tried to inquire about my husband, they used to tell me that he was well and that he was in very good books with senior members of RPF at MULINDI, Byumba.

I came back to Rwanda in September 1994. In a month I cannot exactly recall, but towards the end of the year, my late mother in law, NGUTECURE Hadija told me that she had been told, by Minister Abdoul KARIM that my husband had been killed in battle. If and whether he is surely dead, I did not bury him and I do not know how he died and where.

The pictures that I have given to ICTR investigators are showing my husband. On one picture, where I also appear, it was the occasion of giving names to our twin children in January 1994, whilst the other one that looks like a passport photo, where he is alone, I got it from his bankbook. The third photograph, which is a portrait in black and white, is also that of my husband. I think it was taken in Tanzania.

Finally, I would appreciate any information regarding the death of my husband and possibly where he could have been buried.

DATE: 10/08/1994
Signature of witness

[Signature of interviewer(s)]