Session 3
“Inside the United Nations Security Council:
April – July 1994”

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Today's Visit

- Military pull out
- No lag
- Germans
- UN resolution on UNHRC
- Monique
- Straggled
- Noon - Rawaga
Military

What have we told French / Belg.

Do they have transport, or are we the only ones.

Monique - 6:45 Sun. am.

Force was going to try & follow up w/ ICRC

-> Check w. Laura re Monique status

-> Brief Revie out of group

What is thinking of Belg. & French

-> What is AF's position on Comité follow

-> Military: Entebbe, Nairobi, Mombasa, Mauwa

- Monique is out - through DA

- David

- Evacuation - complete

- Military mission is over

- Germans - let message to get foreign ministry

- Looking for instructions...

- Who (plural) do we say thank you

- Admin - setting up system to get guard contracts. Well...
try to get in touch w. SNs - get paid
Query = do our needs for further info
Thurs. Salena.

Thinks there will be stalemate - Govt. wants to negotiate - intentions & role of
Middlemen. Tanzania failing

Sec. wants Rwanda night note for
Fisc.

Pres. Clinton - Gem, me, Arlene . 7:10
7:40

CA task force part
Turn papers
See Gem le Janice's replacement
Rardon - didn't clear w. Andy Sins
Egypt quoted with & Sec.
Military
- Marines out of Buij
- Germans still stuck
- APCs in Somalia

UN
- Support Relief request at UN

- Call Leonard
- Mr. Balde
- NSC requested IC to draft resolution
to pull UNMIS.
- See Arlene re Kagame & what we do
- Say
- Burma
- What we can do to reinforce calm &
stability

- Call Steinberg re PK mitg.
- Home instructions on 1st half on
  withdrawn
  Decision = mandate.
GW: Ned W. concerned re
- Bentral will withdraw & suspend
  - block transit. Sites aren't there
to terminate. Ned thinks we may
have to wait till June to terminate.
Fear = NAM will come up.
- GW's point of view = he needs it now.
- Sec. will talk to Bentral.

2 Americans left
2 small affiliated w. int. loc (about 10)

Bali - calm - 4 & 6 w. trucks
Burma: 267 - Americans - about 36
  - 24 + 4 - 265 will be left
  - 34 by
1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) Issued the following update on April 11 regarding its activities in Rwanda.

2. BEGIN TEXT --

- HEAVY FIGHTING IN KIGALI - ICRC WORKING AMID THE CHAOS

-----------------------------
COMPLETE MAYHEM HAS HIT THE STREETS OF KIGALI, LEAVING A HEAVY DEATH TOLL AND LARGE NUMBERS OF WOUNDED. ARMED ELEMENTS ARE ON THE RAMPAGE, GOING FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE KILLING AND DESTROYING. THE VIOLENCE WAS SPARKED OFF BY THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI AND A NUMBER OF DIGNITARIES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WHO WERE ALL KILLED AS THEIR PLANE CAME IN TO LAND AT KIGALI LAST THURSDAY EVENING. SINCE THEN THE BLOODSHED IN THE CITY HAS STEADILY GROWN IN INTENSITY. TODAY THE FIGHTING IS STILL FIERCE, AND THE CITY IS GRIPPED BY GENERALIZED LOOTING AND LAWLESSNESS. ICRC DELEGATES IN KIGALI HAVE DESCRIBED SCENES OF EXTREME VIOLENCE, STATING THAT THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF CASUALTIES LYING IN THE STREETS.

IN THE MEANTIME FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE EVACUATING THEIR EXPATRIATES FROM KIGALI.


ICRC STEPS UP INTERVENTION TODAY

THE ICRC HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE COUNTRY'S AUTHORITIES SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. THIS MORNING THE ICRC'S HEAD OF DELEGATION IN RWANDA MET THE REPUBLIC'S NEWLY APPOINTED PRESIDENT, IN ORDER TO REQUEST A MAJOR EFFORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT CIVILIANS ARE RESPECTED, THAT SECURITY IS RE-ESTABLISHED AND THAT THE RED CROSS EMBLEM IS RESPECTED.

IN ADDITION TO EVACUATING THE WOUNDED TO HOSPITAL, THE ICRC PLANS TO EVACUATE ABOUT 100 PATIENTS LATER TODAY FROM THE MAIN HOSPITAL IN KIGALI TO KABGAYI, 40 KM SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL.
THIS AFTERNOON A PLANE CHARTERED BY THE BELGIAN RED CROSS WILL BE LEAVING FOR BUJUMBURA. ON BOARD ARE 15 TONS OF MEDICAL MATERIAL DONATED BY THE BELGIAN RED CROSS AND 2 TONS PROVIDED BY THE ICRC, AND AN ADDITIONAL ICRC SURGICAL TEAM, COMPOSED OF ONE SURGEON, ONE THEATRE NURSE, TWO SURGICAL WARD NURSES AND AN ANAESTHETIST.

VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY SPREADING TO SOUTHERN RWANDA FOLLOWING RUMORS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT MASSACRES AND DESTRUCTION ARE GOING ON IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA.

NNNN
O 121441Z APR 94
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7474
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03437

ROME FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, CASC, PREL, RAID, PREF, RW
SUBJ: TFRWOL: ICRC UPDATE ON ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02  GENEVA  03437  02 OF 02  121443Z
THE COUNTRY, THE ICRC PLANS TO SEND A TEAM OF DELEGATES FROM ITS BASE IN BURUNDI AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.

- AT THE MOMENT THE ICRC HAS NO PLANS TO SET UP A FIELD HOSPITAL. END TEXT.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SPIEGEL

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01503 121743Z
ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01
OASY-00 DOE-00 EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02
OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00
SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
SA-01 RPE-01 SNIS-00 NISC-02 PMB-00 /050W
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O 121738Z APR 94 ZFF4
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 5612
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 001503

DEPT FOR TASK FORCE, P/TARNOFF, IO/WARD, AF/MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SRICE, DMOZENA
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PAGE 02 USUN N 01503 121743Z
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/SA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: FUTURE UNAMIR AND FRENCH ROLES IN RWANDA

REFTEL: PARIS 9724

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN FORESEES TWO ISSUES THAT DEMAND WASHINGTON'S IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERING STAYING IN RWANDA AFTER THEY COMPLETE THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION OF EVACUATING FOREIGN
3. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS UNAMIR’S FUTURE. AT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  USUN N 01503 1217432Z
PRESENT THE AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN AND UNDER FRENCH-BELGIAN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGNAL THAT THE UN IS NEARING A DECISION BECAUSE RELATIVE CALM HAS DESCENDED ON KIGALI AND UNAMIR TROOPS ARE NOT PRESENTLY THE TARGET OF HOSTILITIES. YET THIS MIGHT BE A WINDOW OF RELATIVE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE UNAMIR FORCES; THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO EVACUATE UNAMIR ONCE THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS LEAVE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS WORTH CONSIDERING TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE THE EVACUATION OF THE BULK OF UNAMIR, WHILE LEAVING BEHIND A SKELETAL STAFF THAT MIGHT BE ABLE TO FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE AND ANY FUTURE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
3 - 12

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
Department of State

io: cpatterson: CNP
04/12/94 72392 SEUNPA 1994
io: dbennet
af: gmooose: tfrwol: arender
a/c: kaiston
eur/ne: ebrocking
s/s:

io: unzp: zelle/snyder
eur: mapeters
nsc:
s/s-o:

Immediate
usun new york, brussels immediate

Immediate
paris, bujumbura immediate, dar es salaam immediate
nairobi immediate, kampala immediate, un se immediate+

E.O. 12356: decl: oadr
TAGS: prel, mops, rw, be, fr, by, un
SUBJECT: tfrwol: approach to UN secretariat on UNAMIR
ref: a] brussels 4084 [notal], b] usun 1491; c] paris 9724

1. confidential - entire text.

2. this is an action cable - see below.

3. department shares government of belgium concerns that
the greatly changed circumstances in rwanda have rendered
untenable the continued presence of UNAMIR forces in the
country. we support a rapid but orderly withdrawal of
unamir forces and other un personnel as required, provided
the security situation of rwandan nationals currently
under direct unamir protection is successfully resolved.

4. we believe it is the un secretary general's [syg]
prerogative to recommend withdrawal (it is)
appropriate that the syg should take the lead in
recommending unamir's withdrawal. at the same time, we
believe that it is important that other UN elements,
including but not necessarily limited to unhcr and the
syg's special representative, stand ready to provide their
good offices and perform their negotiating role, provided
that security conditions permit them to do so. in the
event that these un representatives are compelled by
security considerations to temporarily withdraw from
rwanda, we would hope that improved conditions would
permit their early return.

action requested

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5. for usun: mission should approach senior secretariat
officials urgently, drawing on the following:

-- the united states is prepared to support a
recommendation by the syg for the rapid and orderly
withdrawal of unamir forces from rwanda. we believe that
such a recommendation is the most appropriate means of
meeting the urgent humanitarian need to preserve the
safety of unamir personnel while not exacerbating tensions
in rwanda.

-- we support such a withdrawal, but only after the
security of rwandan nationals currently under direct
unamir protection is successfully resolved.

-- we are prepared to support offers by governments with
national forces available to facilitate the withdrawal.

-- we hope that other un elements, including the syg's
special representative booh-booh, may be able to continue
their activities in rwanda. however, we understand that
the security situation may compel them to temporarily
withdraw. we believe that these agencies and the syg's
representative may be able to play an important
stabilizing and humanitarian role and hope that, if they
must be evacuated now, they will be prepared to resume
their missions as soon as security conditions permit.

-- the withdrawal of unamir forces is necessitated by
current circumstances. the usg feels that the un should
remain politically engaged in rwanda if security permits,
in order to facilitate the peace process.

6. for brussels: embassy is authorized to inform the
government of belgium of instructions that are being
carried out by usun in new york. you should urge the gob
to make a similar approach to the syg or his senior
7. For Paris: Embassy should inform the French government of our position and seek support.  

joint staffwashdc priority
secdefwashdc priority
addis ababa
ottawa
london
accra
dhaka
uscinseur vaihingen ge\
MEMORANDUM

TO: Ambassador Walker

FROM: POL - Robert T. Grau

SUBJECT: Security Council informals on Rwanda, 3:30, Tuesday, April 12

BACKGROUND

Today's Security Council informals will continue the discussion on UNAMIR's future. Early reports are that while A/SYG Riza views UNAMIR's future as "very bleak," the Secretariat is not yet ready to offer concrete options or recommendations at today's meeting. Meanwhile, other states, notably Belgium, have expressed strong interest in withdrawing their contingents while the airport is still secure and before Rwanda (potentially) returns to chaos.

Washington has decided to support a Security Council decision to authorize the withdrawal of UNAMIR, and the hope is that the Secretariat will request the Security Council to authorize the withdrawal of UNAMIR. The following talking points originated in Washington.

If possible, you should inform the Secretariat by phone of our position prior to the consultations (see separate e-mailed instructions).

drafted: Polmil: MBarnett

distribution: EXEC (5) POL (3), REF, MB chron

DATE: 12/2/96

UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, PO, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 14 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: 3 - 16

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT FROM UNAMIR

1. ON 12 APRIL 1994, THE FC OF UNAMIR WAS INFORMED THAT THE BELGIAN BATTALION IN UNAMIR MIGHT UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW.

2. MY STAFF CONDUCTED A DAY LONG ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPING OPTIONS ON HOW THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT UNAMIR. THIS ANALYSIS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH CONTINGENT SENIORS, COMMANDERS AND STAFFS TO SOLICIT THEIR VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

3. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:

   A. SCENARIO 1. THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES AND PROGRESSIVELY DETERIORATES.

   B. SCENARIO 2. THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES.

4. SCENARIO 1. GIVEN THAT THIS MISSION HAS BARELY BEEN ABLE TO FUNCTION DURING THE LAST WEEK OF WAR IN RWANDA DUE TO LOGISTICS SHORTAGES IN STOCKS, VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS THE BEST OPERATIONALLY EQUIPPED AND LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED UNIT IN UNAMIR, WOULD BE A TERRIBLE BLOW TO THE MISSION. THE MISSION COULD ONLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS WERE MET:

   A. THE UNIT WAS IMMEDIATELY REPLACED WITH AN EQUALLY TRAINED, EQUIPPED, MOTIVATED AND SUPPORTED CONTINGENT AND IN ADDITION THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT SHORTFALLS OF THE FORCE WERE SATISFIED IN AN URGENT MANNER.

   B. IF THE ABOVE CONDITION CANNOT BE MET THE FORCE IS WITHDRAWN.

5. SCENARIO 2. IF THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES THE BELGIAN BATTALION NEED NOT BE
REPLACED AND THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCE SHOULD BE 
REEVALUATED TO REDUCE ITS SIZE. THE MINIMUM VIABLE OPTION OF 
THE TECHNICAL REPORT ON RWANDA DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 SHOULD 
BE REVIEWED. IF THE LOGISTICS CAPABILITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF 
ONE OF THE OTHER BATTALIONS IN THE MISSION ARE ENHANCED TO THE 
SCALE AND CAPABILITY OUTLINED IN THE MILITARY GUIDELINES TO 
TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES THEN THE MISSION CAN CONTINUE 
WITHIN THIS SCENARIO. THE ECONOMIES IN MANPOWER SAVINGS ARE 
USED TO OFFSET EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS PROVISION.

6. THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN RWANDA MAY HAVE PEAKED BUT WILL 
NOT STABILIZE AND IMPROVE FOR AT LEAST 4-6 DAYS AS THE RPF 
ADVANCE SEEMS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MOST DELIBERATE FASHION IN 
KIGALI. SOME RGF UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN COMMITTED AT THIS TIME. 
IT WAS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE MISSION SHOULD BE 
CONTINUED. THE SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND FEEL THEY ARE MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE IN RWANDA AND STILL HAVE A VALUABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN 
THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA.

7. BOTH PARTIES HAVE STATED THEY ABSOLUTELY WANT A UNAMIR 
PRESENCE TO ASSIST IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND ASSIST IN SECURITY 
AND HUMANITARIAN DUTIES. SHOULD THE FORCE BE TOTALLY 
WITHDRAWN THERE IS A VERY REAL THREAT THAT REFUGEES OR AT 
WORST ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES WILL REVENGE THEMSELVES UPON 
UNAMIR. IF WITHDRAWAL IS CONTEMPLATED IT WILL HAVE TO BE 
ASSISTED BY AN INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY. BOTH PARTIES MUST REALIZE THAT AN ATTACK UPON THE 
FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND WILL HAVE DIRE ECONOMIC, 
HUMANITARIAN AND POSSIBLE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES. UNAMIR HAS 
LOST ENOUGH MEN AND SHOULD NOT loose ANYMORE ESPECIALLY DURING 
A WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS. THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF 
UNAMIR DURING A WITHDRAWAL MUST BE GUARANTEED BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PRESENCE OF THE BELGIUM 
BATTALION (+) MUST STAY FOR AIRFIELD DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR.

8. AT PRESENT UNAMIR IS SUFFERING FROM PERSONNEL FATIGUE AND 
SOME STRESS. ITS EQUIPMENT IS BEING WORN OUT WITHOUT THE 
LOGISTICS BASE TO MAINTAIN IT. ITS OPERATIONAL STOCKS ARE 
MINIMAL AND ARE ONLY BEING MAINTAINED BY AN EMERGENCY AIRLIFT. 
HEALTH AND HYGIENE PROBLEMS WILL CULMINATE IN SICKNESS WITHIN 
DAYS (NO WATER IN CITY WITH THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES). LASTLY, 
THE POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL 
WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON MORALE AS THIS WILL BE SEEN AS 
DEsertion IN THE FACE OF A THREAT.

9. GIVEN A WITHDRAWAL IS ORDERED IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A UN 
PRESENCE IN RWANDA, ALBEIT REDUCED, IS REQUIRED TO ASSIST AND 
SECURE THE MAJOR HUMANITARIAN EFFORT WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED IN 
THE POST-WAR PERIOD. JUST AS IMPORTANT THERE WILL ALSO BE AN 
REQUIREMENT FOR A NEUTRAL CONDUIT IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES IN THE PRE AND POST-CEASEFIRE PERIOD.

10. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINIMUM VIABLE 
OPTION PRESENTED IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 
BE ASSESSED GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
A. The 800 Man Infantry Battalion (Ghana) must be provided with the means to make it self-sufficient to second line. We must absolutely avoid the current 2x battalion (-) to equal 1 EN concept of command and control. We have wasted too many assets in such organizations. Redistribution of existing equipment will help but some major second line equipments will need to be provided. This unit would provide security at the airport for obvious reasons but would also be capable of providing the physical security for the mission equipment and materiel that could not be readily evacuated during the withdrawal, provide a force reserve to reinforce UNMO teams throughout Rwanda, provide armed escorts for the humanitarian relief effort, provide security of UN and other vital points and assist in the maintenance of security for the installation of the transitional government institutions.

B. A Milob Group would take over monitoring tasks throughout Rwanda. It could be reinforced by the quick reaction force from Kigali. It should consist of no more than 100 UNMOs.

C. A 5 man move control section and a 5 man military police section (both from Bangladesh) would provide specialist support to the force.

D. A 50 man field hospital (Bangladesh).

E. A force Headquarters of 46 personnel would be responsible for command and control directly from Kigali.

F. The force must be supported by a reduced division of administration and management and a contracted helicopter unit consisting of 2 Bell 212 in Kigali.

G. In addition UNOMUR should remain in place as is.

H. A SRSO office and political office, along with a CIVPOL organization are required.

11. Both Parties must see that the Force has been drastically reduced to a minimum viable level as a warning that further non-compliance with deadlines or violations of agreements will result in a total UN withdrawal from Rwanda. Both Parties fear such a withdrawal and must be intimidated to comply with the agreements they make. They must be held accountable to the international community for the massive amounts of humanitarian and economic aid they receive and so desperately need.

12. Rwanda and the peace process in the country have suffered a serious setback with this war. However, the people of Rwanda desperately want peace. With a possible RPF victory,
ESPECIALLY IN KIGALI, OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE MORE WILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT MISS.

13. THE SOLDIERS OF THIS COMMAND, ESPECIALLY THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, HAVE SUFFERED GREATLY OVER THE PAST WEEK TO BRING PEACE AND FREEDOM TO RWANDA. THEY ARE STILL PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO RWANDA. RESOLVE IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PEACE PROCESS CAN CONTINUE IN RWANDA.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 099440 150430Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN,
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL

A) USUN 1553, B) USUN 1533, C) TELCON IO/UNP-USUN 4/14

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE - SEE BELOW.

3. DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (REF A) AND TO THE VIEWS OF OTHER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 15 DEC 2005 200103014

UNCLASSIFIED
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SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) MEMBERS REGARDING THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF THE CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN RWANDA. THE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS PUT FORTH FOR RETENTION OF UNAMIR ELEMENTS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FULLY IN OUR DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA SINCE PASSAGE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 909 ON APRIL 5.

4. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THE PROSPECT OF ADDITIONAL WIDESCALE CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, AND THE THREAT THAT THE RELATIVE IMMUNITY AFFORDED TO REMAINING FOREIGN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL END ON APRIL 15.

TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO RETAIN A UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO FULL, ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. COGNIZANT THAT FULL WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CURRENT DEADLINE SET BY THE RPF, WE BELIEVE THAT UN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON ENSURING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IS NOT IMPeded AND THAT THE WARRING RWANDAN PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING OR THREATENING THESE PERSONNEL. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT UNAMIR SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF RWANDAN CIVILIANS UNDER ITS PROTECTION, CONSISTENT WITH ITS MANDATE AND PROVIDED THAT THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

ACTION REQUESTED

6. DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING, USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM NSC COLLEAGUES THAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO INSTRUCT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL/ALL UNAMIR FORCES FROM RWANDA, TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE WARRING PARTIES IN RWANDA RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER FOREIGN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEIR EVACUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. MISSION IS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO OTHER UNSC MEMBERS THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS WITHDRAWAL (THE SYG HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER THIS WITHDRAWAL UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES) AND THAT WE

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WILL OPPOSE ANY EFFORT AT THIS TIME TO PRESERVE A UNAMIR
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PRESENCE IN RWANDA.

7. MISSION MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN PRESENTING
THE U.S. POSITION:

-- THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE SHOCK AND OUTRAGE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE EVENTS IN RWANDA IN
RECENT DAYS.

-- WE CONDEMN UNEQUIVOCALLY THE RENEWED FIGHTING AND
WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE, AND THE ATTACKS ON INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPERS, FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND INNOCENT RWANDAN
CITIZENS.

-- THE RWANDAN ARMED PARTIES MUST BEAR FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC SITUATION, AND CONTINUED
VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY, IN THEIR COUNTRY.

-- IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA, THERE IS NO ROLE
FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

-- THOSE NATIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TROOPS TO UNAMIR HAVE
ACTED RESPONSIBLY AND TO THEIR UTMOST ABILITY, AND HAVE
EXERTED COMMENDABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN
PROTECTION TO FOREIGN, AS WELL AS RWANDAN, CIVILIANS.

-- THOSE FORCES THAT PARTICIPATED IN UNAMIR ARE TO BE
COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN A HOSTILE AND THREATENING
ENVIRONMENT.

-- WE ENDORSE THE DECISION OF UNAMIR CONTRIBUTORS TO
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WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM RWANDA FOR THEIR SAFETY, HOPEING
THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN AN ORDERLY
MANNER AND THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO OBTAIN
COMMITMENTS FROM THE RWANDAN PARTIES TO RESPECT THE SAFETY
OF RWANDAN AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AFTER THE UN PERSONNEL
HAVE WITHDRAWN.

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WARING PARTIES IN RWANDA
ARE LIKELY TO RESPECT UNAMIR'S MANDATE NOR, IN THE PRESENT
ENVIRONMENT, ARE THEY CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY ENSURING THE
SAFETY OF UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL IN RWANDA.

-- THERE MAY BE A ROLE FOR THE UN TO PLAY IN FACILITATING NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES BUT THAT IS A ROLE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NOT FOR UNAMIR. WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AMONG THE PARTIES.

--- EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE RWANDA; THEREFORE, UN SECURITY FORCES WILL NOT BE REQUIRED.

-- OUR OPPOSITION TO RETAINING A UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA IS FIRM. IT IS BASED ON OUR CONVICTION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE Viable, THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF FULFILLING THEIR MANDATES, AND THAT UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL ARE NOT PLACED OR RETAINED, KNOWLINGLY, IN AN INTENABLE SITUATION.

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-- THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE PARTIES IN RWANDA, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEDIATORS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS APPROPRIATE, WILL BE ABLE TO END THE VIOLENCE IN THEIR COUNTRY, MOVE TOWARD RECONCILIATION, AND BEGIN A PROCESS THAT WILL LEAD TO A DURABLE PEACE.

-- WHEN THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO WORK IN THE INTERESTS OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TOWARD A LASTING RESOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT, WE WILL BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER WHETHER A RENEWED ROLE FOR UN PEACEKEEPING CAN FACILITATE AND BUILD A LASTING PEACE IN THEIR COUNTRY.

-- UNTIL THAT TIME, HOWEVER, PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO ENSURING THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PEACEKEEPERS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS IN DANGER IN RWANDA. TO ATTEMPT TO SUSTAIN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING. CHRISTOPHER

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TO: BARIL, UNATIONS NEW YORK (ONLY)

FROM: DALLAYRE, UNAMIR KIGALI

DATE: 17 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-702


4. THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SPORADIC GUNFIRE AROUND, THE 1 1/2 HOUR MEETING DID PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO EXPRESS THEIR IDEAS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE. A SHORT RESUME IS ATTACHED. THE RPF PRESENTED A DOCUMENT (ALSO ATTACHED) THAT LAID OUT FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS TO ANY CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS LIST IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THAT THE FC FACED WHEN NEGOTIATING FOR THE SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE EXPATRIATE WITHDRAWAL, WHICH ENDED UP AFTER THREE DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ONLY BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF THE "MOYENS DE VERIFICATION" THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE SUPPORT OF BOTH SIDES, POSSIBLY EVEN WITH THE FIRING STILL GOING ON. IT WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT FOR OTHERS TO BE SORTED OUT IN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME SHOULD THE RPF INSIST ON THEIR TOTAL COMPLIANCE. THESE PRECONDITIONS REPRESENT A HARDLINE APPROACH THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FLEXIBLE AT THIS TIME.

5. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE PRE-MEETING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, AND THE ORIENTATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE MEETING, THE RGF NEED\WANT URGENTLY A CEASEFIRE OR AT LEAST A STOP TO THE SHOOTING. HOWEVER THE RPF STATE THAT TO STOP THE SHOOTING IS A SIMPLE MILITARY MEASURE, "BUT WHAT THEY SEE AS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES BEHIND THE LINES BY PEOPLE OR GROUPS (EVEN SOME IN UNIFORM) ARMED WITH MACHETES AND OTHER TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. THESE KILLINGS ARE THE WORK OF SOME SOLDIERS\GENDARMES, OF GROUPS OR MILITIAS WHO ARE MORE AND MORE SEEMINGLY ORGANIZING THEMSELVES AND IN FACT CONTROLLING SOME PORTIONS OF THE CITY (EVEN PREVENTING RGF TO ENTER).

6. THERE IS A DIVERGENCE ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FIRST. RGF WANT A CEASE-FIRE THEN THEY WILL SORT OUT ALL THESE MURDERERS ETC AS THESE PEOPLE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO FIGHTING THE RPF. THE RPF STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE TO SORT OUT THEIR MILITIAS, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ETC. BEFORE ANY CEASE-FIRE IS TO BE ENTERTAINED. THIS IS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION THAT IS NOT READILY SOLVABLE. THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES MAY BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT AS THE LOCAL GROUPS\MILITIAS ARE BECOMING SEEMINGLY BOLDER (MASSACRES ARE NOT STOPPING AND APPARENTLY ARE SPREADING AS STATED BY THE INTERIM COS OF THE ARMY). AS OF AM 16 APRIL THE RGF OFFICERS HAD STATED THAT THEY NEEDED AT LEAST UNTIL NOON TO ANALYZE THE RPF PAPER SO THEY DID
NOT SEE THE POSSIBILITY TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING UNTIL THE FM. THE RPF WAS TO BE APPROACHED ONCE THE RGF WAS READY FOR THE MEETING. THE RPF REFUSED TO ATTEND ANY MORE MEETINGS AS THEY STATED THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE KNOWN AND THE RGF NEED ONLY COMPLY. THE RGF DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING EITHER.

7. IN ADDITION, THE CHANGE OF CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY FROM A MODERATE TO A HARDLINER (RUHENGGERI SECTOR COMMANDER FOR THE PAST 3 YEARS) MAY INDICATE THAT THE MODERATES HAVE BEEN PUSHED ASIDE BY THE HARDLINERS. FC ORGANIZED A MEETING WITH NEW COS TO FEEL HIM OUT BUT HE WAS STILL IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND WAS THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE FOR A MEETING.


9. JUST PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT THE FC HAD A CONVERSATION WITH MGEn KAGAME, WITH TWO UNAMIR OFFICERS IN ATTENDANCE, WHICH NOW IN Hindsight WERE VERY PROFOUND IN PREDICTING THE TYPE OF CONFLICT WE ARE NOW WITNESSING.

10. MGEn KAGAME WAS LAMENTING THE ETHNIC KILLINGS WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE AND STATED IF THEY DIDN'T STOP THE RPF MAY "BE FORCED TO SORT IT (RWANDA SITUATION) OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL". IN ADDITION HE STATED "IF IT (THE WAR) STARTED NO ONE MAY BE ABLE TO CONTROL IT THIS TIME".

11. OVER THE PAST 24-48 HOURS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THE FOLLOWING ARE TAKING PLACE:

A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE, WHICH STARTED IN BLITZKRIEG FASHION, IS SLOWING DOWN, EITHER DELIBERATELY OR DUE TO RESISTANCE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.

B. THE ETHNIC KILLINGS ARE CONTINUING AND IN FACT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE IT IS EVEN INCREASING IN SCALE AND SCOPE IN THE AREAS JUST AHEAD OF THE RPF ADVANCE.
C. THE RPF DO NOT DESIRE A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE MET.

D. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE APPEARS TO BE FRAGMENTING INTO AT LEAST TWO DISTINCT GROUPS WITH THE HARDLINERS APPARENTLY IN THE ASCENDANCY.

12. UNAMIR HAS LOST ITS EYES AND EARS OUTSIDE OF KIGALI WITH THE CONCENTRATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF ITS UNMOS, THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DMZ AND ITS INABILITY, DUE TO SECURITY TASKS IN KIGALI, TO CONDUCT PATROLLING OUTSIDE OF THE KIGALI AREA. WHEREAS IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE CONFLICT WE HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT RWANDA, WE NOW ARE LIMITED TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE KIGALI AREA AND CPF ZONE. WE ARE RAPIDLY ENTERING A PHASE WHERE UN NEW YORK MAY VERY WELL KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON THAN UNAMIR WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (SATELLITE, ETC) FROM ITS MEMBERS OF THE SITUATION OUTSIDE KIGALI. THEREFORE THIS ASSESSMENT IS VERY MUCH KIGALI CENTRED.

13. THE RPF OFFENSIVE APPEARS TO HAVE SLOWED, ESPECIALLY IN THE KIGALI AREA. THE RPF TACTICS APPEAR TO BE INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH IN LARGE (100) OR SMALL (4) GROUPS, ATTACK UPON A GOVERNMENT POSITION LIKE KACYRU GENDARMERIE CAMP, VILLAGE OJUGWIRO, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD CAMP OR CAMP KAGEMBE BY FIRE, FLANKING MOVEMENTS TO ENVELOP AND ISOLATE THE POSITION FROM ITS LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, HARASSMENT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND A FINAL ASSAULT TO MOP UP (YET TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE FOUR EXAMPLES OUTLINED ABOVE). WHILE THESE ACTIONS ARE WELL PLANNED, EFFECTIVE AND CONDUCTED, THEY ARE SLOW AND BASED ON INFILTRATION AND STRANGULATION. THE QUESTION BEGS WHY ARE THE RPF SLOWING DOWN WHEN IT APPEARED LESS THAN THREE DAYS AGO THEY COULD OVERRUN KIGALI IN A MATTER OF HOURS IF NOT DAYS. SPECULATION IS THAT THE RPF, AS HAS LONG BEEN SUSPECTED, IS LOGISTICALLY SHORT OF SUPPLIES (THIS IS CONFIRMED IN THE AREA OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR WHICH THEY HAVE REQUESTED OF UNAMIR AND ENTERED OUR HOSPITAL ON 16 AND 17 APRIL TO TAKE) AND IS HUSBANDING ITS PRESENT RESOURCES FOR A LONGER CONFLICT. IT HAS THEREFORE DEVELOPED AND EMPLOYED TACTICS TO ENSURE ECONOMY. THE SECOND REASON MAY BE THEIR RELUCTANCE TO TAKE CASUALTIES. THEY MAY IN FACT HAVE WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS EVERY POSSIBLE RECRUIT IN UNIFORM AND MAY BE PROTECTING THEIR MANPOWER FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE WILL BE A LONG CONFLICT. REPORTS SUGGEST THE SAME SCENARIO IS BEING PLAYED OUT IN BYUMBA. THE RPF SEEM TO PREFER MANOEUVRE AROUND THE ENEMY TO DIRECT ATTACKS UPON ENEMY POSITIONS. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE RGF RESISTANCE MAY BE STIFFENING AS THIS TURNS FROM A POLITICAL TO AN ETHNIC WAR. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF DESERTIONS, THEY ARE NOT ON A MASS SCALE AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED CASES OF MASS SURRENDERS OR DEFECTIONS. WITH THEIR ABILITY TO DRAW FROM 85% OF THE POPULATION THE RGF IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE SHORT OF MANPOWER FOR A PROLONGED CONFLICT. THEIR LEAST PRECIOUS RESOURCE IS MANPOWER, UNLIKE THE RPF WHO TREAT MANPOWER AS THEIR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE. IN ADDITION, THERE APPEARS TO BE A MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES AGAINST THE RPF. IN RGF AREAS CIVILIANS ARE ARMED AND OUT IN FORCE, SUPPOSEDLY TO DEFEND THEIR HOMES FROM THE RPF. EVEN IN A VICTORY SCENARIO (IF THIS BECOMES
OR IF IT ALWAYS WAS AN ETHNIC CONFLICT) THE RGF CAN FIGHT IT OUT FOR YEARS. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THIS MAY BECOME A LONG CONFLICT WITH TACTICAL VICTORIES FOR THE RPF BUT AN OPERATIONAL STEALEMATE.

14. THE ETHNIC CLEANSING CONTINUES AND MAY IN FACT BE ACCELERATING. BEHIND RGF LINES MASSACRES OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS AND SYMPATHIZERS WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES IS TAKING PLACE. BODIES LITTER THE STREETS AND POSE A SIGNIFICANT HEALTH HAZARD. RTLM RADIO BROADCASTS INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES AND SONGS EXHORTING THE POPULATION TO DESTROY ALL TUTSIS (RTLM RADIO WAS DAMAGED BY RPF MORTAR FIRE ON 17 APRIL). EVEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, A KNOWN HARDLINER, HAS CONdemned THIS PROPAGANDA, BUT HAS NOT CLOSED DOWN THE STATION. IT APPEARS NOW THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD INITIATED THE ETHNIC ATTACKS AND THEN HANDED THIS TASK OVER TO THE MILITIAS LIKE THE INTERHAAWE AND THE POWER AND THEN WITHDRAW TO BUTARE AND GITARAMA. IN KIGALI, FREQUENT ROADBLOCKS ARE ESTABLISHED, ID CARDS CHECKED AND TUTSIS EXECUTED ON THE SPOT. IF THE RGF OR GENDARMERIE ARE PRESENT THEY DO NOT INTERFERE. IN FACT IN SOME AREAS THEY ARE PROHIBITED TRANSIT BY THE MILITIAS. THESE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN WITNESSED FROM A DISTANCE BY UN TROOPS. THIS ETHNIC CLEANSING INFURIATES THE RPF WHO HAVE STATED THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MASSACRES STOP. THE MAJOR PRESENT QUESTION IS CAN THE GOVERNMENT STOP THE ATTACKS OR HAS THIS PROGRAMME GONE SO FAR OUT OF CONTROL (AS MGEN KAGAME STATED) THAT IT CANNOT BE STOPPED.

15. THE RPF CLEARLY STATE THEY DO NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MURDERS STOP. TACTICALLY, THEY MAY NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE SEIZED THE TERRAIN THEY WANT TO CONTROL (IE BYumba-KIGALI CORRIDOR, KIGALI OR A MAJOR PART OF IT, AND EASTERN RWANDA (THE ONLY OPEN GROUND LEFT THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE THEIR EXPATRIATE REFUGEES). UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT TAKES DRASTIC ACTION TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER IN THEIR AREA AND UNTIL THE RFF GAIN THE GROUND THEY NEED, THE CHANCES OF A CEASEFIRE SEEM REMOTE.

16. UNAMIR MILITARY SITUATION. UNAMIR FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY BEING FORCED INTO SELF-PROTECTION TASKS, DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT, AND RESUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER ARMED ESCORT. UNMO ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED IN SAFE AREAS OR ARE CONDUCTED AT CONSIDERABLE RISK. IN ADDITION, THE MORAI DILEMMA OVER WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE TAKEN SHELTER IN RGF/\MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS AND ARE THREATENED WITH MASSACRE POSES THE DILEMMA OVER HOW TO EXTRACT THEM. THE MILITIAS HAVE DISPLAYED DRUNKENNESS, DRUG ABUSE AND SADISTIC BRUTALITY. THEY DO NOT RESPECT THE UN FLAG, THE RED CROSS OR ANY OTHER HUMAN SYMBOL. THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO STOP ANY CONVOY AND ATTACK ITS RWANDIAN PASSENGERS OR EVEN THE UN GUARDS. WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE SECURITY OF PERSONS UNDER OUR PROTECTION. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO "SMUGGLE" OUT SMALL NUMBERS AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL TO DATE BUT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A CONFRONTATION OCCURS. INCREASINGLY WE ARE BEING PRESSURED BY UNNY, NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ETC TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS TO RESCUE SELECTED INDIVIDUALS. NOW HOWEVER, THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE
IN LOCATIONS WITH HUNDREDS OR THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. ANY ATTEMPT TO RESCUE LET ALONE EVEN IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL WILL LEAD TO A MOB ATTACK. MOST OF THE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF THESE REFUGEES ARE IN MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS. THE RISK MUST BE ASSESSED. DOES UNAMIR RISK AN ARMED CONFRONTATION, FOR WHICH WE ARE NOT EQUIPPED, PROTECTED OR MANDATED, AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO THE SAFETY OF OUR OWN TROOPS, TO ATTEMPT TO SAVE THESE PEOPLE. OR DO WE LEAVE THEM FOR POSSIBLE EXTERMINATION? RAPIDLY UNAMIR IS BEING DRAGGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS IN THIS AREA BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT\RGF WILL NOT OR CANNOT CONTROL THIS SITUATION OR THE MILITIAS. IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED THAT IF THESE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED AND END IN THE INEVITABLE ARMED CONFRONTATION THE THREAT TO UNAMIR WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE. OUR ABILITY TO ESCORT FUTURE HUMANITARIAN OR REFUGEE CONVOYS WILL BE ENDANGERED AND OUR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXTRACTION WILL BE DONE UNDER HOSTILE CONDITIONS. IF THIS MISSION IS TO BE CHANGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND RESCUE THREATENED CIVILIANS THAN A CHANGE IN MANDATE WILL BE REQUIRED AND THE MISSION MUST BE REINFORCED WITH MEN, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

17. ON 16 APRIL INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE PLANNING TO MASSACRE THE REFUGEES WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE AT THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. A SECTION OF THIS CONTINGENT WITH TWO UNMO TEAM HAS DISPATCHED TO PROVIDE A PRESENCE AND HOPEFULLY DETER A MASSACRE UNTIL THE SITUATION COULD BE NEGOCIATED BY THE FC. WITHIN HOURS THE CONTINGENT COMMANDER, IN WRITING TO THE FC, STRONGLY REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS SECTION AS AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE LIVES OF HIS MEN IN DEFENCE OF LOCAL PEOPLES. THIS CONTINGENT COMMANDER HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED HE IS UNDER NATIONAL ORDERS NOT TO ENDANGER HIS SOLDIERS BY EVACUATING RWANDESE. THEY WILL EVACUATE EXPATRIATES BUT NOT LOCAL PEOPLE. HIS JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT IF THEY ARE STOPPED AT A ROADBLOCK WITH LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE CONVOY THEY WILL HAND OVER THESE LOCAL PEOPLE FOR INEVITABLE KILLING RATHER THAN USE THEIR WEAPONS IN AN Attempt TO SAVE LOCAL PEOPLE. THIS RETICENCE TO ENGAGE IN DANGEROUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR STATED RELUCTANCE TO USE THEIR WEAPONS IN SELF-DEFENCE OR IN DEFENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY HAS LED TO WIDESPREAD MISTRUST OF THIS CONTINGENT AMONG ITS PEERS IN OTHER UNITS AND AMONGST STAFF OFFICERS\UNMO AT THE HEADQUARTERS. WHEN THEY ARE TASKED TO GO WITH THESE MEN ON DANGEROUS MISSIONS.

18. ON 17 APRIL THE EXTRACTION OF OUR BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMENCED. THESE MEN WERE OUR BEST TRAINED, EXPERIENCED, EQUIPPED AND MOTIVATED PERSONNEL. EVEN THOUGH THEY SUFFERED HEAVILY WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR COMPANIES, THEY CONDUCTED THE EVACUATION IN A DETERMINED AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THE REMAINING STAFF HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ORDER TO FILL MOST OF THE EMPTIED POSITIONS BUT SUCH A RADICAL CHANGE OF KEY STAFF AT SUCH A CRITICAL MOMENT IS MOST DISTRESSING AND MAY CAUSE US SOME SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF CONTROL IN THE FORCE.

19. THE SUMMARY OF THESE EVENTS IS THAT UNAMIR MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT WITH ONE BATTALION AS IT IS OUR AND THE
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES LIFELINE. THIS LEAVES ONLY 1/2 BATTALION FOR ESCORT DUTIES. THIS 1/2 BATTALIONS RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN THESE OPERATIONS CONCLUDES THAT UNAMIR MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN RESCUE MISSIONS OR EVEN HUMANITARIAN ESCORT MISSIONS WITHOUT A MAJOR CHANGE IN OUR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, REINFORCEMENT WITH A CONTINGENT THAT IS PREPARED TO USE FORCE AND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHIN LIMITS AND A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE NEW TASKS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE FORCE. THE FORCE TODAY WAS THE TARGET OF DIRECT FIRE BY SMALL ARMS ON A 4X4 (ONE INJURED) BY THE RPF AND BY AN ASSAULT ON ONE OF OUR APCs BY A MOB AT A ROADBLOCK WHO OPENED FIRE WITH SMGs. THE APC EXTRACTED ITSELF BY FIRING WARNING SHOTS. ONE OF OUR CITY GARRISON POSTS WAS CAUGHT IN AN INTENSE CROSS-FIRE BETWEEN BOTH FORCES BUT LITTLE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO MOVE ABOUT THE CITY DUE TO THE MILITIAS AND SELF DEFENCE GROUPS CONTROLLING IMPORTANT ARTERIES AND AREAS OF THE CITY. THIS IS A THIRD FORCE THAT WAS ALWAYS THERE BUT HAS OVER THE LAST 3 DAYS COME MUCH BOLDER\AGGRESSIVE\BRAZEN EVEN IN THE CITY. THEY HAVE NO PARTICULAR RESPECT FOR ANYBODY AND ESSENTIALLY WORK TO THEIR OWN UNRULY\DRUNK\DRUGGED TUNE. THEY ARE A VERY LARGE DANGEROUS AND TOTALLY IRRATIONAL GROUP OF PEOPLE. FC CONSIDERS THEM TO BE THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT TO UNAMIR.

20. CONCLUSION. THE PRESENT ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION CONCLUDES:

A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE HAS SLOWED DOWN TO A METHODICAL ADVANCE.

B. ETHNIC CLEANSING IS CONTINUING AND MAY BE ACCELERATING.

C. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS FRAGMENTED INTO AT LEAST TWO CAMPS, EXTREMIST AND MODERATE, AND IT APPEARS THE HARDLINERS HAVE CONTROL. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THIS GROUP AND THEIR ACTION ON THE MASSACRES.

D. THE RPF WILL NOT ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE TAKEN THE TERRAIN THEY NEED AND THE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN STOPPED.

21. UNAMIR ACTIVITIES. WITHIN THE PRESENT SITUATION UNAMIR OPERATIONS MUST FOCUS ON:

A. MAINTAINING A PRESENCE IN KIGALI.

B. SECURING THE AIRPORT FOR SELF-SUPPORT, POSSIBLE EXTRACTION ROUTE AND HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY.

C. PROTECTION OF UN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

D. CONTINUATION OF SPONSORING AND SECURING JOINT MEETINGS IN ATTEMPTING TO GET A CEASE-FIRE. PROVISION OF
UNAMIR
19 APR 1994 13:53

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANAN, UNAMIR, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAHER, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 19 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: [Handwritten number]

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

REFERENCE: UNAMIR 1173 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. THIS MORNING FC UNAMIR RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF RESPONSE FROM THE RGF IN REFERENCE TO MAKING THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL GROUND (ATTACHED). THE RGF REFUSED THE INTENT OF UNAMIR TO MAKE THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL GROUND OPERATED AND SECURED BY UNAMIR ONLY.

2. INSTEAD THE RGF PROPOSED CO-CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT IN RELATION TO FUNCTIONING AND SECURITY. A PHOTOCOPY OF THEIR LETTER IS ATTACHED. THE RGF STATED THAT SECURITY OF UNAMIR, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION WERE THE PRIORITIES. NEUTRALITY OF THE AIRPORT WAS NOT AS GREAT A CONCERN TO THE RGF AS "CONGESTION". IN ADDITION THE RGF REQUESTED A CEASEFIRE PERMITTING RETURN TO THE KWSA AGREEMENT. PENDING A CEASEFIRE THE RGF "APPROVED" THE RELIEF IN PLACE OF KIBAT (BELGIUM) WITH BYUBAT (GHANA) WHICH WOULD THEN CO- HABITATE WITH RGF UNITS. THE RGF PROPOSED A JOINT COMMISSION TO OPERATE AND DEFEND THE AIRPORT. THIS COMMISSION WOULD ENSURE THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE RGF AND UNAMIR. THEY ALSO STATED THERE WAS NO REASON TO INVOLVE THE RPF IN THIS AGREEMENT.

3. OUR ANALYSIS OF THIS LETTER IS THAT THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN HARDLINER AND MODERATE RGF OFFICERS SEEMS TO HAVE SWUNG IN FAVOR OF THE HARDLINERS. ONLY YESTERDAY THE RGF AGREED TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE HANDOVER OF THE AIRPORT AS NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AREA CONTROLLED ESSENTIALLY BY UNAMIR. THIS CHANGE IN POSITION IS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO ANY ACCEPTABLE OPTION. THE RPF WILL NEVER ACCEPT BEING EXCLUDED FROM AN AIRPORT AGREEMENT OR TO JOINT RGF/UNAMIR CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT. IT COULD APPEAR THE RGF MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO "BLACKMAIL" UNAMIR AND USE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING UNAMIR PRESSURE ON THE RPF FOR A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON LESS THAN THE RPF FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS. THE FC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NEW RGF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF THIS MORNING DID NOT REVEAL ANY
ANIMOSITY NOR DESIRE TO QUESTION UNAMIR'S STATUS. HIS CONCERNS OVER THE AIRPORT WERE TACTICAL IN NATURE ONLY AND AS SUCH SHOwed NO HINT OF ANY ULTERIOR MOTIVE.

4. THE AIRPORT COULD BECOME THE SCENE OF A BATTLE AS EACH PARTY MAY VIE FOR SOLE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT AND ITS ENVIRONS. THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER A POSSIBLE UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESUPPLY, SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL.

5. INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH RGF BATTALION COMMANDERS ON 18 AND 19 APRIL REVEALED A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE FROM SEEKING PEACE TO A RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO A CEASEFIRE WITH THE RPF AND A DESIRE TO "SORT THINGS OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL"; SIMILAR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY RPF FIELD COMMANDERS. THIS SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF THE RGF IN THE LAST 18 HOURS, COUPLED WITH THE REFUSAL OF THE RPF TO ENTER INTO CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE IS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS CONCLUDES THAT THEIR IS NOT MUCH HOPE OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BOTH PARTIES NOW SEEM TO BE READY TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD IF THIS CEASEFIRE SITUATION DOES NOT CLEAR UP RAPIDLY.

6. IN ADDITION IN THE EARLY AM OF 19 APRIL THE RGF FIRED MORTAR ROUNDS INTO THE AMAHoro STADIUM (A KNOWN JOINT UNAMIR AND REFUGEE LOCATION) KILLING 6 REFUGEES AND WOUNDING 46 OTHER REFUGEES. UNAMIR PERSONNEL WERE UNHURT BUT SUBJECTED TO SEVERE DANGER. ADDITIONAL MORTAR SHELLS LANDED IN THE AREA ADJACENT TO THE STADIUM KILLING AND WOUNDING AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS. THE FORCE HEADQUARTERS WAS ALSO HIT BY A MORTAR BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE. THIS MORTAR ATTACK FURTHER ENDANGER THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO EVACUATE CASUALTIES WITH RED CROSS AMBULANCES AND SIRENS.

7. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT VIABLE TO LEAVE A RESIDUAL FORCE AS FC OPTION C (IE ABOUT 1300 PERSONNEL) IN RWANDA. THERE IS NOW NO REASONABLY GUARANTEED SAFETY VALVE FOR THE RESUPPLY AND POSSIBLE EXTRACTION OF A VERY LARGE CONTINGENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IN RWANDA SHOULD THINGS GET WORSE.

8. UNAMIR SHOULD HOWEVER GO TO A FORCE OF OPTION B (IE 250 PERSONNEL) IN ORDER TO KEEP A UN SECURE PRESENCE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE BROKING PURPOSES. JUST AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE, THIS OPTION IS CONSIDERED AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL MINIMUM STEP OF UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES HAVE CONTINUOUSLY STATED THEY FIRMLY WISH TO SEE UNAMIR STAY. A WHOLESALE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSION WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE INTERPRETED AS LEAVING THE SCENE IF NOT EVEN ABANDONING THE SINKING SHIP. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS ONE SHOULD ANTICIPATE ENORMOUS DANGEROUS REACTIONS AGAINST OUR TROOPS AND AS SUCH PREJUDICE AND ENDANGER THE WHOLE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. FOR SECURITY REASONS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO GO TO OPTION B AND THEN LET THE SITUATION SETTLE FOR A SHORT WHILE (AFTER POSSIBLY THE TANZANIAN MEETING) BEFORE REVIEWING
THE MISSION, FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL TO LEAVE THIS TERRIBLE SCENE WITHOUT AT LEAST GIVING A LAST HARD AND DETERMINED CHANCE FOR A CEASE FIRE AND AN EMBRYO OF A RELIEF ORGANIZATION IN COUNTRY. THE MISSION WOULD BASED IN OUR CURRENT HQ AND STADIUM COMPLEX AS IT IS STILL A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE AND IT IS VERY EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO CITY AND AIRPORT.

9. SHOULD OPTION B BE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED DUE TO FIGHTING IN ITS ENVIRONS, THEN A ROAD MOVE WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED. THE PREFERRED ROUTE OF KIGALI-BYUMBA-MULINDI-GATUNA-KABALE-KAMPALA MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE WITH FIGHTING STILL ON-GOING IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION THE ROUTE KIGALI-DAR-ES-SALEM MAY BE INSECURE IN SOME OF THE RGF/MILITIA-CONTROLLED TERRITORY. UNAMIR DOES NOT POSSESS HEAVY WEAPON SYSTEMS OR THE AMMUNITION TO FORCE ITS WAY OUT. OPTIONS LIKE AN INTERNATIONALLY IMPOSED CEASEFIRE OR GUARANTEES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY MILITARY SUPPORTED EXTRACTION MAY HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IF UNAMIR IS TO SUCCESSFULLY WITHDRAW ITS PERSONNEL WITH SAFETY FROM RWANDA.

10. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WITHDRAWAL BY UNAMIR WILL DEFINITELY HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE CIVIL POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE REFUGEES, WHO WILL FEEL WE ARE DESERTING THEM. HOWEVER IN ACTUAL FACT THERE IS LITTLE THAT WE ARE DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME EXCEPT PROVIDING SECURITY, SOME FOOD AND MEDICINE AND A PRESENCE. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAS NOT REALLY COMMENCED. THE REFUGEES IN THE AMAHORO STADIUM, THE KING FAISSEL HOSPITAL AND THE MERIDIEN HOTEL ARE IN SECURE RPF TERRITORY AND THEY WILL BE WELL TREATED (WITHIN THEIR MEANS) BY THE RPF SHOULD THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD THAT GROUND. THE ONLY THREAT WILL BE INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS BY THE RGF WHO ARE CAPABLE OF SUCH ACTION AS WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 19 APRIL. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD SEEM TO BE INCLINED TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS IF UNAMIR WAS HERE OR NOT AS WITNESSED TODAY AND AS INDICATED BY THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF ARMY WHO STATED HE MAY HAVE TO USE ALL THE TOOLS HE HAS TO WIN IF THE RPF INSIST ON CONTINUING THE FIGHT.

11. THE REFUGEES AT LOCATIONS LIKE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES, THE RED CROSS, ST MICHELS CATHEDRAL ETC IN RGF TERRITORY ARE IN DANGER OF MASSACRE, BUT HAVE BEEN IN THIS DANGER WITHOUT RESULT SO FAR FOR THE LAST WEEK EVEN WITH UNAMIR ON THE GROUND. BOTH PARTIES ARE BEING INFORMED THAT WE HAVE NOMINAL ROLLS OF THE PERSONS IN THE MERIDIEN AND MILLES COLLINES AND AN ACCURATE HEAD COUNT OF THE REFUGEES IN THE OTHER LOCATIONS. THIS WAS MADE AS A WARNING THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF REFUGEES UNDER THEIR CONTROL. LETTERS AND MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH EACH PARTY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE PERSONS MUST BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BASIC HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE FORWARD TO RWANDA UNTIL THERE IS A STABLE AND DURABLE CEASEFIRE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES.

12. THE FIRST INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE ICRC HEAD WAS HELD AT FORCE HQ IN ORDER TO POSSIBLY CONVINCING BOTH
PARTIES TO MEET ONLY TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE TEAM WENT TO THE RFF IN ORDER TO FEEL THEM OUT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING (UNAMIR, ICRC, RPF, RGF) TO DISCUSS IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS LIKE BURYING THE DEAD, FOOD DELIVERY ETC. THE RESULTS WERE RATHER DISAPPOINTING AS THEY EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THEIR VERY STRONG CASE REGARDING THE CONTINUING MASSACRES AROUND THE COUNTRY THAT ARE NOT SEEMINGLY BEING ABATED.

13. IN CONCLUSION THE PREFERRED OPTION IS TO REDUCE THE MISSION TO THE OPTION B LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 250 MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA, TO ASSIST IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF A CEASEFIRE AND TO ENSURE THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REST OF THE FORCE. THE SAFETY OF OUR WITHDRAWAL IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR KEEPING A FOOT ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT SHORT WHILE. FC CANNOT STRESS THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY ENOUGH. WE WAIT YOUR DECISION ON THIS MATTER.
Dear Mr. President:

My country and I have suffered grievously since last December when you spoke so many kind words about me at the White House. I am sure that you know that tens of thousands of Rwandans have been summarily executed over the last two weeks, since a plane bearing President Habyarimana was shot down in Kigali, the capital city. These killings have been carried out by the Presidential Guard and by the militia trained by the president's political party and its allies in government. I myself barely escaped from Rwanda with my life, wearing only a single cloth tied around my body.

Although the situation in Rwanda now seems like anarchy, it is only a small group of extremists around the late President Habyarimana who have planned and intensified the massacres. They have been able to cause a catastrophe of this magnitude because they were carefully organized and very well armed, and because they were attacking people who had neither organization nor arms. This slaughter of the defenseless - which continues even today - accompanies but is different from the fighting that has been going on for some years between the mainly Hutu Rwandan army and the RPF, the mostly Tutsi rebel movement. Although most of the victims of the latest massacres are Tutsis, many are children, women and the elderly, who have never taken up arms against the government or joined any opposition movement. Among the 1,150 people killed in a church at Musha, 650 were children, according to the pastor.

The forces of the UN that came to Rwanda to supervise a ceasefire between the government and the RPF (UNAMIR) are protecting thousands of Rwandans from a similar fate. They are guarding 25,000 to 30,000 people in a stadium, a hospital and other sites in Kigali. These people deliberately sought the protection of the UN forces, yet the Security Council of the UN has already withdrawn some soldiers, and is considering withdrawing those troops who remain in Rwanda. To do so would deliver these 25,000-30,000 people into the hands of the killers.

I understand concerns about the safety of the UNAMIR troops. However, there have been no fatalities among them since the first day of the violence, when ten Belgian soldiers were killed while defending the Prime Minister. The RPF has specifically stated that it hopes the UNAMIR will stay and that it would not intentionally fire on them. While attacks by Rwandan army troops cannot be excluded, such an attack is only a possibility; this
possession must be weighed against the near certainty that the
tens of thousands of Rwandans now in their care will be
slaughtered if they leave.

Withdrawal or reduction of UN forces in Rwanda would also
seriously weaken any effort by the international community to
persuade those who are carrying out these massacres that their
strategy for taking power will fail.

The extremists from President Habyarimana's circle know they
must depend upon international assistance in the future if they
are to survive as a government. All international donors must
therefore forcefully and unanimously convince them that any hope
for such aid is futile. But these declarations will not be
credible if at the same time the UN withdraws or reduces its
troops. Such a withdrawal or reduction will only show that the
international community is willing to turn its back on these
horrendous crimes against humanity and will suggest to the
killers that at some time in the future the killers will be
accepted into that community.

If the UN lacks the will or the courage to maintain its
crude resistance against these killers, what is to stop them
from destroying every single person who has ever opposed them and
every single Tutsi in the country. Their campaign is genocide
against the Tutsis. The US, like many other countries, has a
moral and legal treaty obligation to "suppress and prevent"
genocide.

Mr President, I appeal to you to act immediately to ensure a
continued and effective peacekeeping force in Rwanda

Sincerely,

Monique Mujawamariya
MASSACRES IN RWANDA

Amsterdam, 24 April 1994. In the South Rwandese town of Butare an orgy of violence is taking place. Thousands of people have been arrested and taken away to the outskirts of the town where they have been killed. In the university hospital where Médecins sans Frontières is working, 170 male patients were rounded up by military and taken away. MSF is extremely concerned for their safety. The patients were Tutsi’s and Hutu’s.

As the civil authorities have lost total control over the situation and as the military obstruct the treatment of civil patients, Médecins sans Frontières has to put off her activities.

According to the civil authorities in Butare there are 2 million displaced people in the south of Rwanda form the north and east of the country. These people are in need of immediate help and food. A serious famine is feared for. MSF-teams state that hundreds of people have been massacred near the border with Burundi. In the river between Rwanda and Burundi as well as along the road between Butare and the Burundese capital Bujumbura they saw corpses.

Médecins sans Frontières protested a few days ago against the nearly complete withdrawal of UN-troops from Rwanda. The organization has asked the Security Council again to reconsider her decision.

For further information: MSF-Holland, Malou Nozeman, Tel. 020 - 5208700.
Slaughter At Hospital In Rwanda
Gunmen slay 170 in unremitting chaos

REUTER

Nairobi, Kenya — Government troops and gunmen killed about 170 patients, nurses and drivers at a hospital in southern Rwanda because they were members of the minority Tutsi tribe, witnesses said today.

Dr. Rony Zacharias of the medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) said the killings took place over three days at the central hospital in the southern city of Butare, 25 miles from the border with Burundi.

"We saw the bodies of two Rwandese MSF drivers who were killed and a nurse who was beaten to death. Everything is out of control in Rwanda. It is a complete state of anarchy," he said by phone from the Burundian capital of Bujumbura.

"The killings at the hospital took place over the past three days, ... carried out by people in military uniform and armed civilians."

Other members of his team corroborated Zacharias' account of what he described as a systematic "ethnic cleansing" of Tutsi civilians, apparently by members of Rwanda's Hutu majority.

Zacharias said that on the road to the border with Burundi after leaving Butare yesterday "the whole landscape was littered with bodies," and in the space of five minutes he counted 30 corpses of men, women and children floating down the river on the border.

He urged the international community, especially the United Nations, to provide a minimum level of security so international aid agencies could operate in the chaotic central African country. Thursday, the UN Security Council ordered the 2,500-member UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda to cut its forces to a bare minimum of 270 peacekeepers.

Aid agencies said that as a result they feared tens of thousands of civilians would be left unprotected.

Yesterday, reporters in rebel-controlled territory just south of the Rwandan capital of Kigali came across a pile of 100 rotting corpses in Nyanza district and more bodies spilling out of mud huts.

Survivors said most of the dead were Tutsis, killed by militiamen who threw grenades into a crowd rounded up by troops as they tried to reach the UN-protected national stadium in Kigali.

Combat between military units continued in Kigali, where government forces and Rwanda Patriotic Front rebels battled with artillery and rockets overnight until late in the morning in one of their fiercest exchanges in days. UN peacekeepers evacuated 300 people from a hotel in Rwanda's shell-blasted capital after a fierce bombardment of rebel headquarters.

As efforts to halt the carnage continued, a Rwandan government delegation in neighboring Zaire said it had signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, but the Rwandan Patriotic Front failed to attend the ceremony.

In neighboring Tanzania, front negotiators walked out of talks, saying the government delegation failed to turn up. Tanzanian officials said a Rwandan government delegation to the peace talks, called by Tanzania and originally supposed to start Saturday, never arrived in Arusha and had vanished.

The confusion was compounded by members of the Rwandan government delegation in the Zairean capital, saying the accord, signed Saturday in Mobutu's palace in Gbadolite, had previously been approved by the rebels. But the front failed to make an appearance.
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR AMB. SPIEGEL FROM JOHN SHATTUCK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: RW, EAID, AEMR, PRL, PHUM
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH RWANDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

CONFIDENTIAL

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MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA

REF: GENEVA 3795

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST IS AT PARAGRAPH 5.

2. SUMMARY: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA, A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FROM RWANDA, AND TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MET WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS A/S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2006 200103014
JOHN SHATTUCK ON FRIDAY, APRIL 22. MS. MUJAAMARIYA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF U.N. FORCES FROM RWANDA. SHE SOUGHT U.S. SUPPORT IN URGING THE U.N. TO MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIONS TAKING PLACE IN RWANDA CONSTITUTE GENOCIDE AND EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO HAVE JACQUES-ROGER BOOH-BOOH REPLACED AS MEDIATOR OF THE CONFLICT. THE GROUP MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN RWANDA, INCLUDING REQUESTING U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JOSE AYALA LASSO, TO PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHT EVENTS TAKING PLACE THERE. AMB. SPIEGEL IS REQUESTED TO RAISE WITH AYALA LASSO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY


4. ANOTHER CONCERN RAISED BY THE GROUP WAS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. MEDIATOR, JACQUES-ROGER BOOH-BOOH. THEY BELIEVE BOOH-BOOH SHOULD BE REPLACED, AS HE HAS COMPROMISED HIS POSITION AND IS TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN OPENLY FRATERNIZING. HOWEVER, AFTER THE HASTY DEPARTURE OF THE MEDIATION TEAM THAT HAD INITIALLY TRAVELED TO RWANDA TO TRY AND WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT, FINDING A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR BOOH-BOOH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT.

5. A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS WERE OFFERED DURING THE MEETING ON WAYS TO STOP THE KILLING IN RWANDA INCLUDING CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNHRC) AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JOSE AYALA LASSO, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHTING THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN RWANDA IN AN EFFORT TO EXERT SOME INFLUENCE ON THE WARRING PARTIES.

UNCLASSIFIED
6. COMMENT: The UNHRC is not likely to affect the course of the fighting in Rwanda at this point, however, in light of Ayala Lasso's interest in becoming directly involved in major human rights issues, including those in Rwanda (see RefTel), it would be worth pursuing the possibility of his speaking out publicly on the need to end the killings and negotiate a peaceful transition toward establishing a new government. END COMMENT

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7. ACTION REQUEST: Amb. Spiegel is requested, at the earliest opportunity, to urge High Commissioner Ayala Lasso to speak out on the situation in Rwanda. TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
Appendix: Draft Presidential Statement on Rwanda, Proposed by the Czech Delegation to the UNSC on 28 April 1994

The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), over which the interim Government, established on April 8, had failed to establish its authority. Unruly RGF soldiers were also responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister, and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.

In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security Council has considered information available from well-respected NGOs. All this information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda’s killing fields have few precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international law.

The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated, let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further points out that an important body of international law exists that deals with perpetrators of genocide.

The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and disciplining all elements of the RGF and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council calls upon the interim Government of Rwanda to assure that any group, organization, movement, militia or individual under its control should cease and desist from all acts of genocide against any part of the population of Rwanda. The Council also calls upon the interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore expresses its hope that forces that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.
SUBJECT: DAS BUSHNELL TELLS COL. BAGASORA TO STOP THE KILLINGS

1. SUMMARY. AF DAS BUSHNELL TELEPHONED RWANDAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CABINET DIRECTOR COL. BAGASORA ON APRIL 28 TO URGE AN END TO THE KILLINGS. BAGASORA RESPONDED THAT THE RPF OFFENSIVE IS TRIGGERING THE MASSACRES AND THAT A CEASE-FIRE IS NEEDED FIRST. DAS BUSHNELL CONFRONTED HIM WITH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF RWANDAN ARMY COMPLICITY IN
THE KILLINGS, AND SAID THE WORLD DID NOT BELIEVE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT/RWANDAN MILITARY'S PARTY LINE. THIS SOBERED HIM UP, AND HE PROMISED TO PASS THE MESSAGE TO THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO SEE IF A COMPROMISE WAS POSSIBLE, AND TO CALL BACK THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH AN ANSWER. END SUMMARY

2. BAGASORA TOLD DAS BUSHNELL THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN GOR AND RPF FORCES WAS CONTINUING, BUT LESS INTENSE. HE CLAIMED THAT NO MORE MASSACRES WERE OCCURRING IN KIGALI AND THAT MOST AREAS WERE CALM, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BUTARE AND GITARAMA. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD TRAVELED TO BUTARE THE PREVIOUS DAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CALM THE POPULATION. BAGASORA SAID BUYUMBA AND OTHER TOWNS TAKEN BY THE RPF WERE "EMPTY".


4. DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT THE WORLD DOES NOT BUY THE GOR'S STORY ON THE KILLINGS AND THAT CREDIBLE EYEWITNESSES AND RESPECTED ORGANIZATIONS REPORTED RWANDAN MILITARY COMPLICITY IN THE KILLINGS. SHE SAID THAT, IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD, THE RWANDAN MILITARY ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTS, AIDING AND ABETTING CIVILIAN MASSACRES. SHE REMINDED BAGASORA OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPEATED EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS, BUT THAT THIS APPARENTLY WAS NOT TRUE SINCE THEY WEREN'T EVEN WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE PEACE TALKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT IT WOULD BEHOOFE THE GOR MILITARY TO SHOW SOME RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP AND A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE LOOKING TO HIM PERSONNALLY TO DO THE RIGHT THING.
5. DAS BUSHNELL'S REMARKS SEEMED TO TAKE BAGASORA BY
SURPRISE AND SOBERED HIM. HE PROMISED TO TALK TO GOR
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF BIZIMUNGU TO SEE IF THEY COULD COME
UP WITH A COMPROMISE. HE SAID HE WOULD CALL DAS BUSHNELL
BACK TOMORROW. HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE TALK TO THE RPF.
DAS BUSHNELL SIMPLY REPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE
WORKING WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE ON GETTING A CEASE-FIRE IN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04
STATE 113672 292327Z
PLACE AND TALKS RESUMED.

6. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

TO: BARIL (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK (NO DISTRIBUTION)
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 4 MAY 1994
NUMBER: MIR-899

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

1. AS DISCUSSED, FIND ENCLOSED A DRAFT DOCUMENT ON THE UNAMIR FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE.

2. FOR YOUR REVIEW AND NECESSARY COMMENTS PLEASE.

3. REGARDS

ATTACHMENTS: 12 PAGES
3 - 47

UN RESTRICTED

DRAFT

UNAMIR FORCE HQ

May 94

3000.1(CO)

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

General

1. One month has passed since fighting broke out in Rwanda. RPF has unilaterally declared cease-fire on 252400 Apr 94. RGF is also ready to accept cease-fire with some conditions. It is revealed that some RGF hard liners have soften quite a bit and approached their moderates to pursue for peace. Others, not yet fully identified are dying through ruthless means. The intensity of fighting has stabilized considerably in the city but continues in the North East, North to North West.

2. RPF has surrounded Kigali city from north, east and west and closing in on RGF fortified positions. In some places RGF has launched counter offensive which hardly brought any success, rather they have taken casualties and withdrawn to their original positions. Bulk of RGF forces seem tired of the fighting. Some young officers of RGF in statements of desperation are in a mood of conducting massacres in refugee camps before any cease-fire take place or before they are pushed out of Kigali.

3. There is however a third force that has come out of hiding and mixing in with the general population. It has its base in the political militias, youth wings and self defense groups. These groups are fanatical, ruthless and quite often under influence of booze and drugs. They are committing maximum atrocities and destruction. Each individual is a leader by himself and does not seem to obey or to take orders from anyone. They are mostly armed and have enough (mostly looted) money to sustain their action for some time. They incite the locals to join them. Even if a cease-fire is brought into effect, it may be difficult to control these militias. If UNAMIR supports the massive humanitarian projects (even without cease-fire), it will require a sizable force for escorting food convoys, protection of food distribution points. Other tasks will be the recovery of arms from these militias, cordon and search ops, investigation of crimes/ violations, deteunce of local protection groups that are harassing/torturing/killing innocent civilians. Experiences show that Militias would loot food convoys if such convoys are not
protected. UNAMIR will require special mandate and reinforced teeth to tackle them; however it has to be done in collaboration with both the forces.

**UNAMIR - Present Force Structure**

4. **Strength.** During the thick of the battle, it was decided to thin out UNAMIR forces to a workable strength. Total strength of UNAMIR is at present 449. Present combat strength is two and half companies.

5. **Tasks.** Our current force structure is based on a very limited self defence capability of UN installations, an armed presence at the airfields, monitoring refugee camps, liaison and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks. Major tasks are:

   a. Provide security to all UN installations.
   b. Escort duties.
   c. Provide security to all the refugees in UN installations.
   d. Monitor activities in refugee camps not held by UNAMIR.
   e. Provide limited humanitarian assistance to the needies.
   f. Coordinate all humanitarian efforts with other organizations.
   g. Continue to pursue for peace.
   i. Continue monitoring activities by UNMOs.

6. **Limitation of UNAMIR.** UNAMIR, under its current structure and mandate, is not capable of countering the civil defence/militia actions. UNAMIR cannot take actions that have a confrontational nature. Furthermore, it does not have the force to do it and at the same time protect itself from the consequences. Should both the forces agree for a cease-fire, it will be difficult to maintain the BLUE LINE (no man's land) with the present structure. UNAMIR needs to show its presence even under present scenario. It also needs to prepare itself for cease-fire phase so that no time is wasted once cease-fire is accepted by both the parties.

**Present Rwanda and Its Need**

2 UN RESTRICTED
7. **Political Scenario.** The whole world is looking forward for a ceasefire, so is UNAMIR. With the ceasefire we would move into a new scenario in Rwanda. Although the ARUSHA ACCORD is still in the background, its validity in future Rwandese peace process is in jeopardy. RPF has brought north and north-eastern part of Rwanda under their control. The capital is also divided into two. It is quite likely that RPF is not going to give away their military gains. Fact is, the country is so far militarily divided into two. North and north-east is held by RPF and south by RGF. In the RGF held territory, civil defence militias are unruly and un-manageable (already described). The government and its armed forces have no control over them and they have hardly any intention to bring these militias under their grip. If at all a ceasefire can be brought to effect, it is anticipated that negotiations will continue for a permanent solution. It may take a long and arduous task to bring about settlement to the political problem which could lead to anarchy especially in the areas that could be under the control of RGF. It would then create security problems and breakdown of essential services. Under this circumstances extensive humanitarian activities and the presence of UN troops will be needed throughout Rwanda.

8. **Military Situation.** The failure of several attempts to reach a ceasefire implies that both factions will continue to prosecute the war which may lead to one of the following actions:

   a. RGF counter offensive.
   b. RPF capture of the whole country.
   c. RPF halting along identifiable line.
   d. RPF capturing the whole country and then withdrawing to an identifiable line during negotiations in order to give the impression of having made some concession.

In the first two cases, UN could find itself doing more of humanitarian activities and monitoring of the situation than peacekeeping. In the last two cases, a foreseeable BLUE LINE will be drawn between the forces, through which place it will pass through, will be difficult to predict now. This will necessitate monitoring not only the ceasefire line, but also selected points along the borders with the neighbouring countries to check inflow of military hardware. It will also call for a creation of a Buffer Zone to separate the forces of both parties. The UN would require the presence of a sizeable force to meet this requirement. This option may be against the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement, but in reality it may be difficult to have a unified country after bitter fighting as manifested in the Cyprus case. In a situation where the country is partitioned as a result
of the war, a number of issues arise that require to be addressed, mass migration, revenge killings, continued hostilities between the factions, political stalemate and a continuous decline in economic activities.

9. MASS MIGRATION. As a result of the war, there has been a mass movement of displaced persons to safe areas. This is likely to continue leading to the creation of more refugee centres. Their security and upkeep requires a significant involvement by the UN and NGOs (Non-Government Organizations). Beside the movement of the displaced persons, others may return to their former places of residence where they may be having their immovable properties as soon as there is a ceasefire. This may require the presence of UN troops in the various important towns and cities to assist in the maintenance of law and order.

10. REVENGE KILLINGS. Revenge killings for atrocities committed by one party or the other, could occur during the ceasefire period. The presence of the militias and elements of the Presidential Guard also pose significant threats to peace and security. Even though, in the long term, this would abate with a political settlement, in the interim, it is imperative to operate a UN-base security measure to prevent such action. Hence, the presence of UN troops is required for this purpose. Arms that have gone into the wrong hands or irresponsible members of the public must be retrieved under UN arrangement. This could be achieved by the establishment of check points, road blocks and urban/town patrollings.

11. CONTINUED HOSTILITIES. Continuation of hostilities could be seen in the form of sabotage activities and small scale military operations. This would require the monitoring of the military as well as policing of important towns and cities along the ceasefire line. It would therefore necessitate the establishment of a Buffer Zone around the ceasefire line. During the ceasefire period, it is anticipated that negotiations will continue on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement or a variation of it. It may take a long and arduous road to bring about settlement to the political problem which could lead to anarchy especially in the areas that would be under the control of RGF. It would then create enormous security problems and even a breakdown of essential services. This would require extensive humanitarian activities and the presence of UN troops to assist in maintaining security and order.

12. ECONOMIC DECLINE. Obviously, the battered country would
have started a decline in the economy due to the breakdown of its infrastructure, which is generally built on regional interdependence, in the country. A UN presence, however, could improve the situation and encourage normal economic activities including the transfer of goods and services from one region to another. In particular, the airport which provides external link and therefore an asset for economic activities, must be secured and should be considered as a neutral ground and cut of the hands of both parties. Hence, it would be under the control of the UN troops to facilitate resupply of troops and inflow of humanitarian goods, an view of the enormous humanitarian assistance tasks that lie ahead.

UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

13. Concept of Operation
   a. A cease-fire may not be agreed by both the parties in near futures but Rwandese basic need to survive will require massive humanitarian assistance. To perform humanitarian tasks, the force structure should be designed in such a way that it has the following operational capabilities:

   (1) A force structure for humanitarian tasks, security and supports.

   (2) Combat power to face Militias or local resistance forces and conduct deterrent operations such as arms seizure and recovery.

   (3) Adequate logistic support.

b. This concept proposes to divide the entire country into seven Zones based on the following factors:

   (1) Prefecture administrative boundries.

   (2) Displaced people and refugees camps.

   (3) Builtup areas.

   (4) Lines of communication.

Each zone will primarily be manned by an Infantry Battalions. The battalion could divide the zone in sub-zones and the number of sub-zones would depend on the factors already discussed.

c. Border Control. Presently Uganda border activities are monitored by UNOMUR located at Kabale. To monitor border areas of ZAIRE, BURUNDI and TANZANIA similar UNMOS
organizations will be needed. UNMOs would monitor and report of any arms and military movements to Rwanda.

d. CIVPOL. To investigate war and civil crimes and to restore law and order situations in Rwanda, at least 90 Civil Police are needed. They would operate jointly with RPF/RGF (Gendarmerie). It is imperative that the CIVPOL be placed directly under command of the Force Commander. Details are in Annexes A and B.

**Force Requirement**

14. To ensure smooth humanitarian efforts and to maintain law and order situation, UNAMIR needs a reasonably large force self sufficient, highly mobile in all respects to operate efficiently throughout its large operational area. In order to get a grip of the situation UNAMIR needs a Full and Effective Force. If that is not possible, it should have Minimum Viable Force. Details are explained in following paragraphs:

15. **Full and Effective Force.** The composition of this force should of 8 Infantry Battalions out of which 4 would be mechanized. If UNAMIR gets 8 bns, the country would be operationally divided into seven zones:

a. **Zone 1.** Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO and BUTARE prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at BUTARE. The area is presently under the control of RGF. BUTARE will also be used for Logistic Base. The area can be used for dumping of relief material coming from BURUNDI.

b. **Zone 2.** Comprises of KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at GITARAMA. Bulk of the area is presently the control of RGF.

c. **Zone 3.** Comprises of GISYENYI and RUHENGERI prefectures. Zone HQ would be located at RUHENGERI. Bulk of the area is held by RGF but fighting is still going on in RUHENGERI area where RPF launched an offensive to capture RUHENGERI.

d. **Zone 4.** Comprises of BYUMBA prefecture. Zone HQ to be located at BYUMBA. One of the sub-zone HQ would be located at GABIRO which has an airfield and it is located on the main road between Uganda and Rwanda. GABIRO would also be one of the Logistic Base. The logistic base to control all humanitarian aids coming from Rwanda. The area is presently under the control of RPF. Tutsis from the south have migrated to this area and taken shelters under the umbrella of RPF. Thousands of displaced persons are now presently staying here.
e. **Zone 5.** Comprises of KIGALI prefecture. Bn HQ would be located at BUGESERA. This area is mostly dominated by RPF. Maj atrocities have taken place in this area where both the parties participated in the massacre.

f. **Zone 6.** It is the KIGALI CITY area. One mech and one motorised battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carryout escort duties and also be the force reserve. The city is surrounded by RPF and they have taken over some parts of city. Rest are held by RGF.

g. **Zone 7.** Comprises of KIBUNGO prefecture. Zone HQ will be located of RPF. About two hundred thousand displaced persons have concentrated in this area (mostly Hutus) to cross over to TANZANIA.

h. **Force Support Bn.** To maintain the above force a Force Supprt Bn will be needed. Engineer Coy should be capable of undertaking following tasks:

   (1) De-mining.

   (2) Bomb disposal.

   (3) Road Repair.

   (4) Bridge Repair.

   (5) Infrastructure Enlargement.

Total requirement of Full and Effective Force is four mechanised bns, four motorised bns and a Force Support Bn. details are at Anx A.

i. **Helicopter Support Wing.** It will consist of two sqns. These are:

   (1) Heli Lift Sqn (Min 1/2 coy lift at a time) - 8 x UTHH (Bell 212 type).

   (2) Recce/Armed Sqn - 8 x Light helicopters with armed capability.

j. In addition to the bns, an observer group of about 300 officers will be required to monitor and to provide liaison and escort duties.

k. A Force HQ to be built around the nucleus of the
present HQ, should continue to operate in KIGALI to exercise command over the new force. The proposed organization of Full and Effective Force is at Anx A.

16. **Minimum Viable Force.** To perform the tasks, UNAMIR needs minimum 5 Infantry Battalions out of which 3 should be mechanised. The distribution of units are as under:

a. **Sector 1.** Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGO and BUTARE prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at BUTARE. BUTARE will also be used for Logistic Base. Materials coming from BURUNDI can be dumped here. A motorised bn will be needed for this sector. The area is presently under the control of RGF.

b. **Sector 2.** Comprises of GISINDI, KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at GITARAMA. One mechanised bn will be needed for this sector. The area is under the control of RGF.

c. **Sector 3.** Comprises of RUHENGERI and BYUMBA prefectures. Sector HQ will be at BYUMBA. One motorised bn will be responsible for this Sector. Except a portion of RUHENGERI, rest of the area is under the control of RPF. GABIRO will be one of the logistic base.

d. **Sector 4.** Comprises of KIGALI and KIBUNGO prefectures. Sector HQ will be at RWAMAGANA. One mechanised bn will be needed for this Sector. Most of the area is controlled of RPF.

e. **Sector 5.** It is the KIGALI CITY area. Minimum one mechanised battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carry out escort duties, protect UN Installations and also be the force reserve.

f. **Force Support Bn.** To maintain the above force, a Force Support Bn will be needed.

Total requirement of Minimum Viable Force is three mechanised bns, two motorised bns and a Force Support Bn. Details are at Anx B.

17. **Plan for Deployment of Minimum Viable Force.** The deployment of Forces should be conducted in three phases:

a. **Phase 1.** Ghana Bn is brought to its full strength (800) and equipped with M113 APCs for communality, ease of maintenance, driver training, spare parts and reliability. They will ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport so that re-inforcement can be brought in without
hinderence.

b. **Phase 2.** Inducting two mechanised bns into operational area within 7-14 days from D Day (Decision Day of Secy Gen).

c. **Phase 3.** Inducting Force Support Bn and two motorised Bns should be in Rwanda within one month from D Day.

18. **Probable Tasks.** Likely tasks of UNAMIR Force can be divided into three. These are:

a. **Humanitarian Assistance Tasks.**

(1) Establish refugee camps.

(2) Provide safe areas for persons in danger.

(3) Surveillance and monitoring of aid distributions.

(4) Arrangement for exchange of refugees and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.

(5) Collect data of refugees/displaced persons and affected areas.

(6) Dispose un-exploded bombs and breech mine fields.

(7) Take up repair works within capability.

(8) Provide medical support to the people.

b. **Security Tasks**

(1) Convoy escorts.

(2) Dis-arming population with local authorities.

(3) Secure displaced persons camp and Refugee Camps.

(4) Secure transfer of people between warring areas/zones.

(5) Control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc).

(6) Violation investigation.

(7) Deterrent/offensive operations against extremist groups.
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(8) Assist RPF/RFG in maintaining law and order within their respective areas.

c. 

Peace Effort

(1) Continue to mediate between two factions.

(2) Pursue for a peace agreement.

CONCLUSION

19. The new draft mandate for UNAMIR when passed, will serve as a basis for continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda. Presently the military situation seems to suggest a partition of the country as a most likely outcome of the war. The future concept of the operation may therefore be viewed in three phases involving continuous humanitarian assistance, security tasks and implementation of ceasefire and political settlement.

20. Effective participation of UNAMIR would call for an enlargement of the force with the current structure forming the nucleus of the enlargement force. The presence of the enlarged force with combat power would definitely serve as a deterrent to the warring factions.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS

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REF: A) PRETORIA 6682, B) USUN 2015

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS GUIDANCE TO
USUN DURING DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS WEEK
ON THE CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN RWANDA. END
SUMMARY.

3. WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE UN'S NON-PAPER ON
RWANDA WHICH ASKS FOR AN EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE OF AT LEAST
TROOPS BASED IN KIGALI WITH A MANDATE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF RWANDA AND TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN SERVICES TO THEM. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO BOUTROS-GHALI SOME OF OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT BASING A HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN KIGALI WHILE A CIVIL WAR AND HEAVY FIGHTING ARE RAGING IN AND AROUND THAT CITY AND ITS AIRPORT (REF A). A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD REQUIRE A CHAPTER VII MANDATE, GIVEN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER RENEGADE ARMY UNITS AND EXTREMIST MILITIAS. IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO LOCATE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF TROOPS WILLING TO SERVE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. MOREOVER, THE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF AIRLIFTING IN THE QUANTITY OF TROOPS AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MOUNT A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION ARE DAUNTING. THE U.S. IS NOT PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO LIFT HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS INTO KIGALI.

4. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT A KIGALI-BASED CONFIDENTIAL MISSION, WE PERCEIVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN THE SECRETARIAT'S PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, WE SEE AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE SECRETARIAT'S ASSUMPTIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE AND THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL NOT BE A PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION. SIMILARLY, THAT THE MISSION WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO "ENSURE" SAFETY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS BUT, AS GENERAL DALLAIRE OPINED, OPERATE WITH MINIMUM USE OF FORCE". FINALLY, THE MANDATE DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND CONTAINED IN REF B SEEMS OVERLYROAD AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE IF LIMITED TO CREATING A PROTECTIVE ZONE, PROVIDING SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS, LIAISON, AND PROMOTING RESTORATION OF A CEASEFIRE AND RETURN TO THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS.

5. AS VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS INDICATED, WE ARE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AN EXPANDED FORCE TO CREATE ONE OR MORE SECURE ZONES IN RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM. SUCH A MISSION COULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUCH SAFE ZONES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUT COULD ALSO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONducive TO REFUGEE REPATRIATION.
AND COULD SERVE IN A PREVENTIVE CAPACITY TO DETER THE
SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. UNDER THIS OPTION, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE
STORED IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND TRANSPORTED INTO
THE SECURE ZONES. THE MISSION WOULD PROTECT THE ZONES' PERIMETERS AGAINST INCURSIONS AND, WITHIN THE ZONES,
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ENFORCE SECURITY, INCLUDING SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE SHIPMENTS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS. THE
OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
AND ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO ENSURE PROTECTION FOR
THESE ZONES.

7. BASED ON KNOWN FLOWS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
AND THE LOCATION OF PERSONS MOST AT RISK, THE ZONE OR ZONES SHOULD BE SET UP AT LEAST INITIALLY ON THE RWANDA BORDER WITH BURUNDI AND, IF REQUIRED, POSSIBLY TANZANIA. ESSENTIAL TO THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE THE FULL CONCURRENCE OF THE NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS AND THE ASSENT OF THE RWANDAN PARTIES. OTHER AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED LATER IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE AND RESOURCES PERMIT.

8. THE MANDATE OF THIS EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE WOULD BE TO
ESTABLISH SAFE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR REFUGEES
AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE
PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO THOSE PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE ZONES CREATED SHOULD CORRESPOND WITH THE SIZE AND MANDATE OF THE FORCE. DEPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS THE TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, AND TRANSPORT ARE READY, WHETHER OR NOT A MILITARY CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE.

9. IN THE CUMULATIVE, MILITARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT
THIS MISSION MAY REPRESENT A REAL DANGER TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED. EVEN WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE WARRING PARTIES, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ZONE IN SOUTHERN RWANDA
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HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, MILITIAS AND ROVING GANGS. TO DATE,
THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
CONTROL THESE FORCES. THEREFORE, TROOP CONTRIBUTING
NATIONS' FORCES MUST BE EQUIPPED, CAPABLE AND HAVE THE
CLEAR AUTHORITY FOR CONDUCTING WHAT COULD LIKELY BE AN
ACTIVE PROTECTION OPERATION REQUIRING THE USE OF LETHAL
FORCE. MOREOVER, IF THE RPF CARRIES OUT ITS PREVIOUS
THREAT TO PUNISH WHAT IT CONSIDERS ROGUE FORCES IN
SOUTHERN RWANDA, THOSE FORCES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE
DISPLACED PERSON CAMPS IN THE SECURE ZONE, OR TO PASS
THROUGH UN LINES. WITH THE RPF PURSUING THESE FORCES, THE
UN FORCE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A
NEUTRAL HUMANITARIAN ROLE. UN SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS
ANALYSIS AS IT CONSIDERS THE MANDATE, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT,
AND WHICH FORCES TO ACCEPT AND HOW THEY ARE EQUIPPED. IN
OUR VIEW, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD NEED TO COME EQUIPPED
AND PREPARED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND MEET THE
CHALLENGES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

10. THIS OPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FATE OF THE SEVERAL
THOUSAND RWANDANS WHO ARE ALREADY UNDER UN PROTECTION IN
KIGALI. WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE AD HOC PROTECTIVE EFFORTS
SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT
CAN BE ENSURED.

11. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINS MANY
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS -- SUCH AS, WHERE WILL THE NEEDED
FORCES COME FROM; HOW WILL THEY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE
RWANDAN BORDER AREA; WHAT IS THE PRECISE ROLE OF THE UN
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AND NGO AGENCIES, THEIR REQUIREMENTS, AND THEIR
ELATIONSHIP WITH UN FORCES; WHERE PRECISELY SHOULD THESE
SAFE ZONES BE CREATED; COULD THESE ZONES BE RELOCATED TO
RESPOND TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES; WOULD UN FORCES BE
AUTHORIZED TO MOVE OUT OF THE ZONES TO ASSIST AFFECTED
POPULATIONS NOT IN THE ZONES; CAN WE OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF
THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH THESE ZONES NEAR
THEIR BORDER; WILL THE FIGHTING PARTIES IN RWANDA AGREE TO
THIS ARRANGEMENT; WHAT MECHANISMS WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO
COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN
MILITARY OPERATIONS; WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD NEED TO OBTAIN
FOR THE OPERATION TO END SUCCESSFULLY? WE ARE PREPARED TO
WORK WITH YOU AND OTHERS TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE

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12. We would urge the UN to explore and refine this alternative and present the Council with a menu of at least two options in a formal report from the SYG along with cost estimates before the Security Council votes on changing UNAMIR's mandate. Talbott
MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DIRECTOR, RWANDA TASK FORCE  UK
Prepared by: LTC Harvin: ISA/MEA: x78826

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Rwanda (U)

( U ) Purpose: To provide background and talking points for the 16 May Deputies Committee on Rwanda (maps at Tab A).

(C) Background: The interagency has been meeting daily for three weeks on Rwanda. As the situation on the ground remains deplorable (Tab B), there is a consensus on the desirability of doing “something” that will help to stop the killing, provide security for civilians at the most risk, and provide humanitarian assistance. There is very little consensus on how to accomplish this, in large part because there are strong downsides to each of the three options that are being considered. (See Tab C for additional details including initial DoD objections.)

(U) Option 1. The UNSYG proposes a Chapter VI 5,500-man African force based in Kigali to pacify the country and provide humanitarian relief (Tab D). This is the option the VP told the UNSYG we do not favor. It is highly unlikely that possible troop contributors would agree to send people into Rwanda unless a cease-fire is implemented. No cease-fire is presently envisioned, but according to PDD-25, a cease-fire is required for a Chapter VI operation. Although Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Nigeria have expressed willingness to contribute troops, Ghana and Zimbabwe have ruled out peace enforcement missions. These African forces would be unable to support such a force logistically; it would require a First World military. If this option is chosen, we will be under immense pressure to deploy forces into Rwanda to get the PKO up and running and to keep it afloat. Further, JCS thinks that it would take a significantly larger force to do this mission. This is the type of operation that took 25-30,000-men for a similar area and population in Somalia. If this option is selected, the UN would then be on a slippery slope, faced with the alternatives of admitting failure or significantly increasing the size of the force and the concomitant logistical burden (Intelligence Assessments at Tab E).

(S) Other views:
- NAM: Wants an even larger Chapter VII operation
- OAU: Main concern is that UN maintain lead, whatever is decided.
Senators Simon & Jeffords: Love it. See their letter to the President (Tab F) requesting immediate increase in UNAMIR forces; lending support to "protecting civilians throughout the country"; and offering up DoD assets as well as funding (no mention of where these funds are to be found).

Interagency largely agrees that this option is not feasible.

(C) Option 2. The U.S. proposed that the UN consider other options such as a "Border Safe Havens" Option that would leave only the present small force in Kigali and use Burundi as a base from which to establish a safe area for humanitarian relief in southern Rwanda. It is important to note that the U.S. has never committed to support this option, but only offered it up as a possible alternative to the UN's. This option was presented in general terms by U.S./UN to the Security Council Sunday and briefed in detail by State and OSD/Joint Staff this morning (Tab G). It hinges on use of Burundi as a staging area, a doubtful proposition, but one which has not yet been presented to the GOB.

(S) Other views:

- UNSYG: Hates it, unless included as an adjunct to its plan.
- NAM: Hates it, not large enough effort, not aggressive enough.
- UNSC: Unknown; being briefed this morning.
- OSD/Joint Staff: We have serious concerns about this option, which emerged from State and NSC as an alternative to Option 1. State and NSC considered it politically unacceptable to pursue only a humanitarian effort as described in Option 3. Joint Staff support of the concept has been limited to providing the data requested by State to flesh out the option. JCS and OSD share very strong concerns that, in addition to not meeting the requirements set forth in PDD-25, this option might not be possible logistically without U.S. ground force presence. Moreover, finding the quality troops will be very difficult, especially if the UN will accept only Africans and in particular, if "protection" means the use of force. We are also concerned that the likely inability of the UN to accomplish this mission will somehow become a problem (of enormous financial and material significance) for the United States to solve, since we are the ones offering it up. The problems the Joint Staff foresees in logistically supporting this operation far exceed those that were encountered in Somalia. The price for gaining support for option 2 might be a U.S. logistic commitment of about 1,000 in Burundi. Conceptually, there are other problems with this option (e.g. who gets to enter the safe have; are they disarmed; what if 100,000 more displaced persons flood to the area - will the UN increase troops and size accordingly, etc.?)

(C) Option 3. Do not expand UNAMIR. Continue humanitarian support and engage in aggressive diplomatic efforts to end crisis.

(S) Other views:

- OSD/Joint Staff: Of the three, this is the proposal we dislike least. Although this does nothing dramatic to "stop the killings", we believe that Option 1 is not "do-able" and that Option 2 will not stop the killing of civilians in areas under Interim Government control, except in the very small border area made safe. We also do not believe that this is a "do nothing" option. The DoD airlift of humanitarian relief to Tanzania continues. There were 19 flights scheduled (which
includes three support flights) into Tanzania: there have been 13 flights so far, six
more to follow this week. In addition, DoD will begin a humanitarian airlift similar
to the Tanzanian lift (around 20 C-141 missions) to haul plastic sheeting, food, and
heating oil into Bujumbura for refugee support, the first delivery date will be NLT
22 May. However, we recognize that political pressure at the UN will make it
impossible to avoid a larger peacekeeping mission.
  • State: Fears that public and Hill opinion would be very negative.
  • NSC: Has to be convinced that this is proactive.

(§) All of the proposed options would include arms embargo language which
we support.

(§) We anticipate a vote in the UN this evening. If U.S./UN is unable to
convince the UN to modify its plan along the lines of alternative “border safe
haven” proposal, OSD and JCS recommend a U.S. veto. State and NSC would
oppose this.

(§) If we do convince the UN to modify its plans, we should seek to have the
new concept of operations formalized in a new UNSYG report and clarify among
ourselves the degree of USG support we are willing to provide.
RWANDA TALKING POINTS:

• DoD supports doing "something" in Rwanda, but we are leery about the possibility of success for either option one or two. Our preferred option is three. This is a situation where we should choose diplomacy and humanitarian relief over an ill-fated resort to force.

• We oppose the resolution as it is currently drafted. While it does not appear controversial, it does not address the question of where the operation is centered. If it is centered in Kigali, the operation would necessarily involve securing the area around the airport and operating amidst the center of an ongoing civil war. If it was centered in the south, the operation could use the airport at Bujumbura, where there is not the problem of protecting the airport.

• Before the USG can vote on a resolution, we need to have a clear understanding of the concept of operations and a commitment that it will be reflected in a new document presented by the UNSYG.

• If we opt to support a PKO, we would prefer Option 2.

• Regardless of mandate (Chapter VI or Chapter VII), if we are not up front with troop-contributing nations about the potential dangers to their forces and the lethality of the role we expect them to fulfill, we risk setting up another operation to fail.

• We recognize that there are additional issues surrounding Option 2 that require discussion (e.g., will we replicate "safe havens" in other areas of Rwanda, and expand the southern one as necessary?).

• Under no circumstance do we wish to have U.S. ground forces involved in a Rwanda PKO. We fear that we will be sucked into a heavy logistical burden under either option but particularly under option 2 which will so become known as "The American option." The Deputies need to discuss and decide whether U.S. ground force participation, even in a neighboring country, is acceptable since it could determine the viability of the concept or of the operation.

• (If asked) The DoD has already provided a great deal of assistance. This includes C-141 flights flying in 400,000 lbs of plastic sheeting and blankets. In addition, DoD has plans to provide an additional 300 metric tons, including additional plastic sheeting and blankets, trucks, medicine, and cooking oil.

COORDINATION:
S&I ----------------
SO/LIC ----------------
ISA ----------------

SECRET
Support the RPF

There is a fourth option which has yet be considered interagency—abandoning our neutral position and supporting a Tutsi-Moderate Hutu coalition government. Such an entity does not formally exist at this instant. However, we believe one could be brought to being quickly in northern Rwanda, under the umbrella of the Arusha Peace Accords signed last August in Tanzania between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Government of Rwanda. Some members of that Government escaped assassination by the Hutu extremists and are now in northern Rwanda under the protection of the RPF.

- The present mind-set of the world is that this crisis is a battle between a majority-led legitimate government and a rebel force that represents a only a small minority of the population. However, OSD does not believe this to be the case. It is becoming clearer by the day that this crisis is actually a battle between an illegitimate Interim Government force (responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths of its own citizens of both tribes and representing only a small minority of the population, the extremist Hutu faction), and a Tutsi/Moderate Hutu coalition whose military arm is the predominately Tutsi-led RPF.

- We believe a military victory by this coalition would provide a solution to all of the problems listed above; it would stop the killings of civilians—there have been no massacres of Hutu civilians in areas under RPF control; it would provide security for civilians at the most risk—NGOs report they are able to move freely in the areas under RPF control; it would allow the provision of humanitarian assistance without destabilizing Burundi to the point civil war breaks out there—the Burundi (Tutsi-led) Military and (Moderate-Hutu) Government would both be reassured by a coalition of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. An unstable “forced” agreement between the RPF and the Interim Government would be more likely to destabilize Burundi in the long run in our opinion.

Steps to accomplish this option are:

a. Call for formal UN recognition of the RPF/Hutu coalition as the legitimate government of Rwanda, and a return to implementation of a legitimate transition government under the terms of the Arusha accord
b. Call for Member Nations to expel representatives of the extremist-Hutu “Interim Government” We have already made strong statements to the "Interim Government" (Tab I).

c. Continue with actions to install an arms embargo on the forces of the “Interim Government”.

d. Provide non-lethal security assistance support to the RPF/Hutu coalition transition government as it finishes up establishing control over the nation. The DIO for Africa believes that it would take very little aid (logistics primarily) to tip the military balance in the RPF’s favor.
There are problems that must be overcome for this proposal to succeed:

a. The French (who were closely aligned with the Hutu government before the crisis and have been a supporter of the "Interim Government") will hate it at first sight, but we believe they could be brought on board if sufficient moderate Hutu public support for the concept can be generated and if adherence to the Arusha Accords is kept a prominent goal. The French might also agree to be brought on board as a balance to (likely) Belgium support (the Belgians have long been linked to the RPF—solo participation by either would be viewed with suspicion).

b. Other African Nations must be convinced as to the illegitimacy of the "Interim Government" before they will agree to the concept of UN support to a non-elected faction in the act of assuming control of a country.

c. Currently regional neighbors have a personal stake in this crisis—Uganda is supporting the RPF and Zaire is supporting the "Interim Government." This should not pose a problem to this option, but sensitivities to this fact must be considered.
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 16, 1994

Subject: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

PDD-25 requires Deputies Committee-level approval of all U.S. votes in the United Nations Security Council to establish new peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Core Group is to provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies in their decision.

The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new" mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the decision factors set out in PDD-25.

Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Discussion Paper on Rwanda
This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.

2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.

3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

I. The Kigali based option

The UN is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,500 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. The estimates the costs for the first six months of such an operation at $115 million.

II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to...
establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.

Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda border with Burundi. The UN force would establish a secure zone inside Rwanda along the border with Burundi to protect refugees/displaced persons in most immediate danger and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to those personnel. The force would deploy to Burundi, establish a base of operations in Burundi near the Rwandan border, conduct cross-border operations to secure and establish displaced persons camps within Rwanda, and provide continuous security for the operation of those camps. The force would establish security for UNHCR-run camps but not transport displaced persons to the camps. The force would also secure lines of communication and relief convoys in the zone.

Rules of engagement would clearly spell out the authority of the UN force commander to defend the humanitarian mission, to include UN forces, camps and displaced persons being protected.

The concept relies on the following assumptions:

[a] the current UNAMIR force would remain in Kigali to help negotiate a political settlement and provide the overall force commander;
[b] well trained, disciplined troops will be available for the mission;
[c] the UN has RPF/RGF permission to establish the zone in Rwanda, and Burundi permission to establish base operations in, and allow logistic support of secure zone through, Burundi;
[d] UNHCR would run the camps, and the UN force would only provide security; and
[e] the UN and the NGOs would be responsible for transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies into Rwanda, while the UN force would provide its own logistic support.

The UN force would debark in Burundi, establish a forward support base near the Rwandan border, and conduct operations to establish a secure zone for the displaced persons camps. About 6,000–6,500 UN force personnel per 100,000 refugees/displaced persons would be required.

This option does not address the fate of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces in Kigali would continue their responsibility for the safety of persons currently under their protection.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGOs would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.

The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support

1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

   -- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.
-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

OSD agrees with State's assessment. However, we believe sending in 5,000-15,000 troops represents a commitment which may exceed the U.S. "general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region."

2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

-- For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat thereof.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

-- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the
Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.

For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

Joint Staff believe that the establishment of a protective zone would be very likely to provoke major confrontation with the Presidential Guard, militias and roving gangs intent on continued slaughter of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. Therefore, Chapter VII rules of engagement and mandate would likely be required.

For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

OSD believes that both options 1 and 2 would be Chapter VII operations undertaken by African forces with robust rules of engagement, and that option 3 is not going to stop the killings.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a cease-fire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a cease-fire would be.
For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.

For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.

Joint Staff believes that agreement of Rwandan government to cease-fire proposal could not necessarily be considered to constitute assent by Presidential Guard, hard-line Hutu militias, and roving gangs behind government lines, all of whom have been implicated in slaughter. To date, Government forces unable to control mass killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutu. Joint Staff position underscores Option 2 as probable Chapter VII operation, especially on Rwanda-Burundi border, where possibility of confrontation with Hutu extremists likely to be greatest.

For option 2, YES on international significance.

For option 3, NO on the cease-fire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, and Zimbabwean and Ghanaian battalions are said to be available. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful.
It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretariat estimates a cost for the first six months of $115 million for this option. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to $173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA assistance. We also have up to $60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.

For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.

Joint Staff believes just the opposite. Forces will be in peace-enforcement role protecting displaced Tutsis and moderate Hutus from roving gang, militias, and Presidential Guard; will require clearing secure zones, searching and disarming (if necessary) displaced Rwandans allowed into camps, and then protecting those camps. Questions about how displaced Rwandans get to camps have yet to be answered. Any intent to have UN/OAU forces go out and bring back displaced Rwandans to camps will require operations in territory controlled by Rwandan government troops and possible direct confrontation with gangs, militias and Presidential Guard forces.

Moreover, assuming RPF remains true to stated intent of continuing Southward movement to punish "rogues" who have committed slaughter, expect Presidential Guard, militias and gangs to retreat in face of advance and attempt to seek refuge in UN-held camps. Significant possibility exists for PKO forces to conflict with either extremist Hutus, or with RPF should RPF believe extremists are seeking safe haven in camps.

Need to remain neutral under above situations will continuously challenge Option 2 forces. Therefore, quality and capability of troops performing mission must be as high as, if not higher than, those posited for Option 1.
OSD disagrees with State's analysis for options 1 and 2. We believe "NO" is the correct answer for both. While option 1 is almost a repeat of the Somalia experience and is therefore unlikely to generate much support, State presents a faulty argument for option 2 that may be misleading. State asserts that option 2 may require at least as many forces as option 1, but that the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high. We strongly disagree that forces charged with protection of displaced persons in only a "semi-permissive" environment (facing uncontrolled gangs, the Presidential Guard, and militias) do not need the training, equipment, or support that a force operating in a non-permissive environment requires. Furthermore, there is no evidence outside of Boutros-Ghali's optimism, that support, forces and equipment, can be marshaled for any large operation in Rwanda.

For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

For option 1, YES. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.

For option 2, the same.

For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.

OSD agrees that inaction is unacceptable, however, we do not believe that our present activities (or option 3) are "inaction."
7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

-- For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.

Resources available from the U.S.

The U.S. has the following resources available:

-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
-- $10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
-- $13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
-- $700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown

-- $173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available
-- $15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
-- $45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority
-- $60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized
-- $233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation