International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993

Briefing Book

Volume 2

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Volume 2

Documents List

*Please note that the contents of this briefing book are embargoed (for public release) until the start of our conference, Monday, June 2, 2014, 9.30 a.m.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>4/4/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2388)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Renewing UNAMIR Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>4/5/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2400)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>UNAMIR extended for 4 months with a 6 week review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>4/7/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2424)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Situation in Rwanda is tragic - killings and anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>4/8/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda (Cable no. 4899)</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>RPF threatens to treat foreign forces as &quot;hostile&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>4/8/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2437)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>anarchy in Rwanda - first discussions of evacuation of foreign nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-12</td>
<td>4/10/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2438)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Situation in Rwanda still unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17</td>
<td>4/12/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2482)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>future of UNAMIR - 4 options from UK, Belg doing behind the scenes diplomacy to try to get CZ to agree to withdrawal option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-21</td>
<td>4/13/1994</td>
<td>Gharekhan</td>
<td>Code Cable</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Boutros Ghali decision to withdraw UNAMIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-24</td>
<td>4/13/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2498)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Nigerian Amb submits draft UNSCR on behalf of NAM, all agree that extreme solutions to UNAMIR's future are out of the question; no complete pullout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-26</td>
<td>4/14/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Belgium intends to withdraw troops: Part 1</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-30</td>
<td>4/14/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Belgium intends to withdraw troops: Part 2</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-34</td>
<td>4/14/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2510)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>SC Working Group dealt with NAM Draft Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-44</td>
<td>4/15/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>TFRWO1: UN Recommendations to be Acted Upon 4/15</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-51</td>
<td>4/15/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>Talk with Claes; US changes position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-55</td>
<td>4/15/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Your TELNO 548: Rwanda</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td>Hannay on April 14 debate; two options presented by Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-62</td>
<td>4/16/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Discussions in UNSC on April 15</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-67</td>
<td>4/16/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Discussions in UNSC on April 15 - Part 2</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-69</td>
<td>4/16/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Security Council at Impasse on UNAMIR's Future</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-76</td>
<td>4/16/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2546)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Alternatives of UNAMIR's Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-78</td>
<td>4/19/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2595)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Chances of Renewing Peace are Vanishingly Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-79</td>
<td>4/19/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>UNSC Gets Update on Rwanda 4/18</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-81</td>
<td>4/20/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2603)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Alarming information from HRW; hundreds of thousands dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-82</td>
<td>4/20/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>increasingly difficult to explain why UNSC remains silent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-90</td>
<td>4/21/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>SYG Reluctant to Withdraw from Rwanda</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-92</td>
<td>4/21/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2613)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>&quot;the constant uncertainty is apparently driving our soldiers crazy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-96</td>
<td>4/25/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2657)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Kovanda reports that &quot;clear genocide&quot; is taking place in Rwanda. enounces ceasefire negotiations as comparable to trying to persuade &quot;Hitler to reach a ceasefire with the Jews.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-101</td>
<td>4/26/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>My TELNO 1471: Rwanda</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td>Secretariat brief on developments; Cautions against promising more than we can deliver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-105</td>
<td>4/26/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>UNSC Votes to Reduce Size of UN PKO in Rwanda on April 21; Update in SC April 25</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-115</td>
<td>4/28/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2704)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>OAU Views and Discussion about Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>4/29/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>My TELNO 1494: Rwanda</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td>Hannay report on April 28 debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-130</td>
<td>4/29/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2721)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>Kovanda frustration at failure to use term genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-133</td>
<td>4/30/1994</td>
<td>Hannay</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UK FOI</td>
<td>Hannay report on April 29 debate; opposition of Rwandan ambassador to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>deleting language on genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-135</td>
<td>4/30/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Next Steps on Rwanda - April 29</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td>Text of presidential statement with handwritten notation by Keating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-146</td>
<td>4/30/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>UNSC debate on genocide statement; NAM sides with Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-157</td>
<td>5/2/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda (Cable no. 43950)</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>Bourlos Ghali &quot;springs a surprise&quot; and says UNAMIR should be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-161</td>
<td>5/2/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda (Cable no. 5135)</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-166</td>
<td>5/5/1994</td>
<td>Garekhan</td>
<td>(Cable no 1451)</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UNSC informal consultations on action to be taken in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-168</td>
<td>5/7/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Security Council agrees on letter to SYG on Rwanda May 6</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>whether President killed by radical Hutus looking for a bloodletting&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-176</td>
<td>5/11/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2886)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>SG unofficial report on Rwanda being considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-177</td>
<td>5/11/1994</td>
<td>Annan</td>
<td>Informal Consultations on the &quot;non paper&quot;</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UNSC informal consultations on the possible expansion of the mandate of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-183</td>
<td>5/12/1994</td>
<td>Kovanda</td>
<td>(Cable no. 2929)</td>
<td>Czech FM</td>
<td>forthcoming resolution to expand UNAMIRs mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-184</td>
<td>5/12/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Rwanda: May 12 Council Informals</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-212</td>
<td>5/17/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>NZ reluctantly votes for UNSC resolution 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-221</td>
<td>5/18/1994</td>
<td>Albright</td>
<td>Security Council approves phased UNAMIR expansion</td>
<td>US FOI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-245</td>
<td>6/17/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>Opposition to French proposal for Operation Turquoise: UK thinks it is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;crazy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-251</td>
<td>6/21/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>Further opposition to French proposal, particularly from RPF, NGOs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dallaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-257</td>
<td>6/22/1994</td>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Security Council: Rwanda</td>
<td>New Zealand FOI</td>
<td>Vote on French proposal 10-0, with five abstentions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FOI – Freedom of Information Law/Act
Security Council Meets on Rwanda (above)
Ambassador Jean Damascene Bizimana (Rwanda) addresses members of the Security Council.
08 June 1994; United Nations, New York; Source: United Nations Archive, Photo # 286758

Security Council Extends Mandate of UNAMIR (above)
The Security Council votes to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until 29 July. 05 April 1994; United Nations, New York; Source: United Nations Archive, Photo # 286894
CONFIDENTIAL

16:43 (4838) 700/WSH/00000/00000 $333.21
FROM: WASHINGTON CO2734/WSH 04-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate
     NEW YORK
CC: HARARE PARIS Priority
    CANBERRA TOKYO Routine
    LONDON BEIJING Routine
    MADRID MOSCOW Routine
    OTTAWA SANTIAGO Routine
TO: Defence Immediate

MFAT (MEA, UNC, AMER, EUR, DSP1, EAB)
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject
U04000: SECURITY COUNCIL: NEW ZEALAND PRESIDENCY: RWANDA

Paris' C01742. Your C21388.

Summary

2 US position is to keep Rwanda on a "short leash" with a 2-2.5 month review, pending the formation of a transitional government (TG) in Kilgali. US draft resolution will stress that responsibility for progress lies with the Rwandans themselves. The parties have moved some distance towards compromise but the situation remains tense. Key issue is participation of a (militant Hutu) CDR representative in TG over RPF objections. State does not rule out progress before 5 April mandate renewal. If matter is settled US would move to a six month renewal. US is sympathetic to SG's Report request for more police observers.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We spoke to IO (Zelle) and Africa Bureau (Aiston) on 30 March and again on 4 April. Both told us essentially the same story. US policy on mandate renewal is to make clear to the parties in Rwanda that it is up to them to make progress and to keep pressure on for agreement on the composition of the transitional government. If no agreement is reached on a transitional government before 5 April only a brief ("2 to 2.5
mandate renewal is preferred by the US. Zelle told us today that France now appears to be willing to accept this.

5 The Administration is also very reluctant to agree to the request for 45 extra police observers. While the US wishes to "maintain a strong force", the additional 45 personnel will not make a crucial difference to the outcome, and their deployment at this time would contradict the point that it is up to the parties on the ground to make progress in the negotiations. An additional consideration for the Administration as they have not yet notified Congress of this possible additional deployment, as it has informally agreed to do with all UN PKOs. (Comment: we sense that financial considerations also play a part on the US position).

6 In the (now unlikely) event that agreement is reached on a transitional government before the vote, the US would support a longer ("six month") renewal and would be prepared to assist, including with additional police monitors. (Comment: There is clearly an element of carrot and stick in this position). State does expect the mandate renewal to go to a vote tomorrow 5 April.

7 Aiston provided a comprehensive review of recent developments in Rwanda. We assume much of the background will be known to you. He stressed that there has been progress in the direction of a transitional government in recent weeks, but that there are still obstacles to be overcome. Tension and sporadic violence continue. As you will recall, the process of forming a transitional government (composed of the MRND party of President Habyarimana and the four opposition parties, plus the RPF) had earlier been complicated by the emergence of splits in some of the coalition partners:

- The MDR (predominantly Hutu successor to the pre-secession government) has split into a hardline and a moderate wing, of which only the latter has been willing to deal with the RPF;

- The Liberal Party (PL) had also split: Commerce Minister Mugenzi leads a Hutu wing; Tutsi Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Lando Ndagisingwa leads a breakaway Tutsi group;

- The Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Hutu Public Works Minister Gatabazi remains willing to deal with Tutsi and provides a stabilising influence. No change is reported in the position of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

7 The splits in the MDR and LP had complicated the implementation of the Arusha Accord when factions had put up competing lists of deputies for seats and portfolios allocated under the Accord. In particular Lando's contesting of the Justice portfolio threatened to upset the balance of power between Tutsi and Hutu (the Tutsi RPF already had the Interior
Ministry and Gendarmerie). That dispute had been resolved during the past month: of the eleven LP deputy slots, the Mugenzi faction got 5 and the Lando faction 6. Mugenzi and Lando were confirmed by the PM in their old portfolios and a neutral third person, a Tutsi, was named to the Justice portfolio. The problem of overlapping lists arising from the split in the MDR was resolved through local caucuses.

8 The remaining issue is the question of CDR membership of the transitional assembly. (Only one seat was allocated to this militant Hutu faction under the Arusha Accord.) The PM has publicly committed himself to the full implementation of the Accord, but the RPF has so far opposed CDR participation when the assembly is convened. The RPF has said it would accept the subsequent admission of the CDR member if a majority of deputies agreed (as is likely), but this remains unacceptable to the CDR. The US is also opposed to this "compromise" as it violates the integrity of the Arusha settlement. State notes that the Accord provides for the subsequent expulsion of any member which violates the assembly's code of ethics.

9 Aiston commented that despite the detailed and precise nature of the Arusha Accord, it is not always easy to tell which problems are the result of a real clash of interests and which are the product of negotiating tactics by the players. He did not rule out the possibility that even if the CDR deputy is admitted to the transitional assembly, other problems might surface. (Comment: this perception underlies US determination to sheet home responsibility for progress to the parties themselves).

End Message
The UNAMIR mandate ends on 5 April 1994. The new SC president (New Zealand) therefore had to interrupt the usual round of bilateral consultations with other SC members, usually the first order of business of every SC President, and convene informal consultations to consider and then adopt a resolution extending the UNAMIR mandate for another period of time.

The SG report on the matter (S/1994/360) had been distributed over the weekend. The SG observed that the presence of UNAMIR has a positive impact on the situation in Rwanda. He emphasized, however, that this does not concern the political process where practically no progress has been marked since the adoption of UNSCR 893 (of 06/01/94). Therefore, while recommending the UNAMIR extension by another six months, the SG conditions any further role for the UN in the country by evaluating, after two months, how the Arusha agreements (especially concerning the establishment of a transitional government and parliament) are being implemented. The SG also recommends expanding UNAMIR by 45 civilian policemen.

A draft resolution on UNAMIR was presented by France. While introducing it, France underscored two positive elements of the situation: the deployment of UNAMIR has contributed to the country’s stability, and parties to the conflict are still dedicated to the “Arusha process”. It described the delays in establishing the transitional institutions as a negative. In the draft itself France stipulated the extension of the mandate for three months, with a review of the Rwanda situation in six weeks. These shorter timeframes are to exert sufficient pressure on the parties concerned to accelerate the implementation of the Arusha agreements. France suggested that the dispatch of 45 police be postponed.

While there is otherwise no dispute about the draft, these time limits (for the length of the mandate and for the review) became subject to a lengthy and so far unresolved debate. Nigeria (on behalf of NAM) supported the original proposals of the SG. US and Russia are in favor of a 3-month extension but consider this a compromise, inasmuch as originally they would have supported only a 2-month extension. UK also supported the timeframes mentioned in the French draft, and NZ and Brazil followed. Informal consultations were then suspended for NAM to have a chance to discuss what next. Nigeria then suggested leaving the extension at 6 months but shorten the period of review, to 4 weeks. Original reactions of others (except for China) were evasive. Delegations referred to the need for fresh instructions. The US delegation was the most cautious one (note: small wonder, after the US in the last moment blocked the expansion of UNPROFOR by the proposed almost 10 000 troops).

Informal consultations to resolve this single sticky point in the draft will be held tomorrow, 05/04, with voting on the draft the same day.
During its informal consultations, the SC completed the draft on UNAMIR extension which was subsequently adopted at its formal session. The operative para 2 extends the UNAMIR mandate until 29/07, i.e., by four months, with the first review session of the SC to take place already in six weeks. In the course of the informals, the US delegation pointed out that this will not be a “routine” matter: if the transitional governmental structures are not established and there is a lack of progress in a peaceful solution of the situation, the US will insist on stopping the work of UNAMIR.
Reviewing the situation in Rwanda after the tragic death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was the key point of today’s informals. France presented a draft PRST. Amb Gharekhani presented supplementary information, mentioning that the situation in Burundi is calm and relatively stable. The authority of the president has been assumed by the speaker of the National Assembly which assured governmental continuity.

In Rwanda, the situation is tragic. A number of armed clashes and killings are taking place. The situation is all the less transparent because members of the designated Transitional Government, composed of representatives of parties of the broad political spectrum, exist side by side with the current government. The Presidential Guard which is subordinated exclusively to the President have started eliminating members of the transitional government. According to unconfirmed information, the premier of the transitional government and certain of its members have been executed.

The wave of violence has not spared UNAMIR. According to unconfirmed reports, the Presidential Guard has blamed Belgian UNAMIR members for shooting down the presidential plane outside Kigali. At least 10 Belgian soldiers have been killed and others kidnapped. UN units are under sporadic fire of the belligerent parties. Civilians working for the UN have not been spared violence either. Complete anarchy has gripped the country. There is no force that could ensure the operation of state power and restore order.

It is particularly disquieting that RPF units in demilitarized zones and in separate areas under UNAMIR supervision have started moving toward Kigali.

After Amb. Gharekhani’s information, the NAM caucus requested “time out” to consider the draft PRST and to suggest some changes.

In the event, the adopted PRST reflects especially the view of France and the NAM.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: NEW YORK  CO4272/NYK  08-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON  WGTN UNSC  Immediate
CC: BEIJING  CANBERRA  Routine
    LONDON  WASHINGTON  Routine
    MOSCOW  OTTAWA  Routine
    PARIS  HARARE  Routine

MFAT (MEA,EUR,UNC,LGL,DP1,DSP1,EAB)

subject  SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council receives report on situation in Rwanda and letter from Sec Gen.

- France, US and Belgium are well down the tracks with plans for military action to evacuate nationals. Both France and US prefer to do this under UN auspices. Belgian position is unclear.

- There is some indication of an improvement in Kigali with the announcement of an interim president and 5 ministers but the chance of this sticking is unclear.

- Council may need to meet in the weekend to consider possible requests to alter UNAMIR mandate or to authorise member states to take necessary measures.

- We gave the Council a strong lead that if the situation does deteriorate the Council should oversee any action not stand back and watch unilateral intervention (Congo is on many minds).

- Council agreed with our proposal to set up monitoring arrangements over the weekend and to request the Secretariat to do appropriate contingency planning. President was also asked to give a detailed media briefing.

Action

For information only

Report

CONFIDENTIAL
2 Secretariat (Riza) briefed Council at informals this afternoon on the developing situation in Rwanda. He also provided additional information to the President shortly afterwards. The situation remains very concerning but there has been some progress. UNAMIR Force Commander and the Special Rep have been engaged in intensive efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement in Kigali and to establish some interim authority which can take control and to whom the Presidential Guard (the group that had gone nuts after the presidents assassination) might begin to take orders and stop killing people.

3 Efforts continued all day toward a cease-fire. Though originally scheduled to take effect from 10am (NY time) Friday, and postponed during the day, it now seemed to have been agreed and having some effect. Additionally, on the political front, an interim president has been named, together with 5 Ministers. The interim president appears to come from the late President's political party and although the appointments were negotiated by the UN with the Gendamerie and the army, and the RPF advised, it is unclear whether this is acceptable to the RPF and whether it will stick. (As a precondition to its agreement to the cease-fire, the RPF had asked for those who had engaged in the killing to be held responsible. The UN's response to the RPF had been to make an appeal for the cease-fire to be concentrated on first and then for consideration to be given to those other issues later.)

4 The conditions for the UN in brokering these arrangements have been very difficult. Although UNHQ here in NY could communicate with the UNAMIR force commander, and with also the Special Rep, it was difficult for the force commander and the Special Rep to communicate with each other in Kigali. Electricity is out (resulting in loss of telecommunications). A further major worry for UNAMIR is food, petrol and other logistics if the airport remains out. Four more days and the situation will be critical.

5 Riza reported 2 further Belgian nationals had been killed and France (Merimee) advised that 2 French citizens had also been killed. Of the 2 Ghanain peacekeepers kidnapped yesterday, one had been released and one was detained but could be observed in a compound and was OK. A number of foreign nationals had taken refuge in embassy compounds and UNAMIR were attempting to guard these.

6 The President reported to the Council the points made during a call on him by the Representative of the RPF on instruction from his HQ. During this call the RPF Rep advised that the RPF would be respecting its position behind the demilitarised lines held in accordance with the Arush Peace Agreement. He also noted that the RPF had so far shown restraint but indicated that they would prefer that any evacuation of foreign nationals be done by UNAMIR. The RPF Rep made it clear that any unilateral evacuation force would
be considered as a hostile force if it entered without their consent or remained in Rwanda for longer than the period necessary for the evacuation.

7 Although RPF was totally opposed to any change in UNAMIR's mandate which would result in it engaging in a combat role, they had no problem with the exercise of its present mandate in a self defence role. He made it clear though, that any intervention by UNAMIR in RPF movements would result in the force being considered as hostile. In his personal estimation, much of the political leadership had been assassinated and it would be difficult now to form an administration.

8 France indicated that the main objective was to reestablish some authority in Kigali and that UNAMIR and the Special Rep were playing a positive role in this. As to the possibility of the evacuation of foreign nationals, there were two issues for the Council to consider, what would be UNAMIR's role in any evacuation and what would be its future.

9 Nigeria indicated that the African Group was scheduled to meet on Monday to discuss the Rwanda issue.

10 US indicate that the situation is extremely grave and that the Council did not have enough information about what would be involved in an evacuation. US understanding is that it would require an air drop of troops into Kigali to take over control of the airport, now under the control of the Presidential Guard, and to establish a security perimetre of some distance around the airport to enable its use. UNAMIR does not have the equipment or resources on the ground to do this and "much homework" was required on this issue. It is not just a question of beefing up UNAMIR as it presently exists.

11 Outcome of discussion was Presidential summing up as set out in para 1 above.

Comment

12 In the best case, no further action may be necessary. In the worst, emergency evacuation will be required and a force sent. The UNAMIR Commander has asked for 24 hours in which to establish whether the cease-fire, and the positive political developments stick and what alternatives should be considered.

13 It is possible that over the weekend either the French or the US may come to the Council seeking UN cover along the lines of that provided in Somalia.

14 Council President will receive a briefing from Riza at 10.30am our Saturday with a view to considering a possible Council meeting later in the afternoon. We will let you know what transpires. Copy of the Sec Gen's letter follows by fax.
2437 – 08-04

Mr Riza, Amb. Gherekhan’s Deputy, presented current information. Fighting among armed elements is continuing in Kigali (the Presidential Guard, army, gendarmerie). Two Belgian civilians have been killed. A number of people have sought shelter in embassies. There is no leadership of the state. The Prime Minister is in hiding in the UNAMIR HQ. The RPF has refused responsibility for the attack on the presidential plane. Fighting is not spreading beyond the capital. The situation is unclear. UNAMIR leadership is striving to stop the fighting.

The French Amb. informed that if the critical situation continues, it will be necessary to evacuate foreigners. France reserves the right to evacuate its people. He informed that two French civilians have also been killed.

The Nigerian Amb recalled that the African group will discuss this tragedy on Monday. The Russian Amb. suggested that the SC President should make at least a statement for the press.

During the discussion a letter from the SG was distributed, addressed to the SC President. Most of its discussion focused on its last para which assumed complementing UNAMIR by three additional battalions if civilians were to be evacuated.

The Secretariat requested additional 24 hours to study the situation further and possibly recommend SC action.
The SC met on 9 April, unusually for a Saturday, to continue its deliberations concerning Rwanda.

The UN Secretariat as well as the Rwanda Ambassador (via the UNSC President) informed about latest developments in the country which took a marked turn for the worse in the course of the previous 24 hours; whilst on Friday, the Secretariat informed about the provisional government and hopes for a ceasefire, in the course of the night these flickers of hope were extinguished. Absolute anarchy rules the country, armed members of the gendarmerie, army and the presidential guard (which is least inclined toward a peaceful settlement of the situation) freely move around Kigali. Tutsi military forces have completely abandoned their assembly points where they had been under control of UN soldiers. The RPF composed of Tutsi is (perhaps naturally) suspected of the airport assassination which, however, it vehemently denies. Tutsi units are also on the move from the demilitarized zone in the North of the country. They are evidently heading for Kigali, the capital. The RPF has disavowed the provisional government. (Note: the local press here describes them as “rebels”.)

(We assume that Prague has the basic information and that Rwanda concerns our country only tangentially. If there is interest in more detailed information about the situation in-country, let us know – otherwise we would focus especially on the UN position.)

The French Ambassador informed about the dispatch of his country’s troops with the humanitarian objective of evacuating French nationals. Belgium (the former colonial master of Rwanda) has decided similarly and for logistical reasons, the two operations have been linked. FR emphasized that the operation is time-limited. If other countries appropriately request it, the expedition can evacuate their nationals as well. The US Amb. informed about the steps of that country – so far, marines are in Bujumbura, in neighboring Burundi.

The UNSC now faces three questions:

1. The FR-Bel expedition: This concerns the SC only marginally. We listened to the basic information which was not challenged in the course of the following discussion from the point of view of international law. E.g., the Arg Amb (who as several other ambs is an important international lawyer) referred to Art 51 of the UN Charter. All supported the FR-Bel decision. (CZ did not take part in that discussion.) The Amb of Nigeria pointed out the need to inform the press exactly, in view of the inglorious history of foreign military interventions in Africa; on Friday, for example, he recalled a parallel with the Congo of the 60s. – This aspect will concern the SC only in terms of coordinating the activities of
this expedition with those of UNAMIR

2. The situation of UNAMIR and other UN personnel. Coincidentally, just on the eve of the aircraft catastrophe, the SC approved an extension of its mandate by four months with the proviso that within six weeks a decision will be taken as to whether progress in politically resolving the country’s situation will warrant it staying any longer. Today this appears almost as a tragicomic coincidence. The question today is whether UNAMIR doesn’t need a broader mandate (so that it can for example assist with evacuations), whether it doesn’t need to beef up its current strength (of about 2500 men), or conversely, whether we shouldn’t evacuate it completely. (The New York representative of the RPF informed the SC President that the RPF would not like to see any changes in the UNAMIR mandate. It is possible that the RPF feels that UNAMIR sides with the Hutus – a small news item appeared in March according to which UNAMIR got involved against demonstrators protesting the late president Habiyarimana.)

We will be discussing these aspects further, as of Monday April 11. We assume that in the SC will base its decision-making on needs on the ground, as forwarded by the SG. But already on 8 April, the SG sent the SC President a letter in which he drew attention to the possible need to review the mandate – or even to expand the force “by two or three battalions”, if UNAMIR were to evacuate itself, other UN personnel and other foreigners. However, the [Fr-Bel] expedition is now taking care of foreigners so the question of expanding UNAMIR is rather an academic one right now.

CZ intends to stay out of this debate, leaving the initiative to the countries that are directly involved.

3. SC and the future of Rwanda. Here we’ll face the most troublesome discussion. Two types of arguments will be used in favor of continued activity of the SC and the peace-keepers:
   a) The alleged responsibility that the SC bears for Rwanda (or for its innocent civilians)
   b) That the domestic situation there jeopardizes international peace and security – certainly in neighboring Burundi (the two countries are to a great extent communicating vessels) but also in Uganda (from where, under the auspices of UNOMUR, another UN operation, units of Tutsi are returning which until recently took part practically as mercenaries in that country’s civil war) as well as in Tanzania – in both of these countries in view of the anticipated hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Arguments against further involvement will make the point that it is an internal affair of the country in which the SC shouldn’t interfere any further, if only because forestalling the anarchy was evidently beyond UNAMIR’s capability. To get deeply involved in the internal affairs of a country affected by anarchy has not paid off for the UN at least once in the past – in the case of Somalia. Apart from that, in view of the non-existence of any effective and recognized government, any further SC activity would have to be based on Chapter VII of the Charter, whereas so far, UNAMIR has been functioning under Chapter VI.

This discussion will be very complex. Though it will not be said aloud, in the background will be the tacit question of whether the SC doesn’t care two hoots about Africa when the going gets tough – compared for example with the former Yugoslavia. On this question, too, CZ will avoid sharp public comments and might follow the views of our friends.

We’d appreciate an OK for the proposed approach, or different instructions.
Your C21746.

Summary

2 All US citizens wishing to leave Rwanda have now been evacuated. US may assist an isolated group of Germans. US is looking closely at UNAMIR mandate - no decisions made but a growing feeling that withdrawal may be necessary. US is now (with embassy closed) receiving limited reporting from Kilgali. There is talk of a truce from tomorrow am.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We checked in with State's newly-convened Rwanda Task Force (Zelle) on 11 April. State reported that most Americans in Rwanda had now been evacuated. Exceptions were a few missionaries who had opted to stay and one or two still reporting from Kilgali. The US Embassy there was now closed and all staff had been removed.

5 The US understands a group of Germans has been stranded "atop a hill" on route to the border by a minefield blocking their road. State said the US may assist with their removal but gave no details.

6 State understands that the UN Secretariat briefed the Council this afternoon - only US comment worth reporting was their understanding that UNAMIR is now unable to fulfill its mandate (though they acknowledged that Kilgali airport is now secure and some patrolling is being conducted).
7 This has apparently led to debate within the US system over the future of the mandate. No firm US position is yet available. Our contact indicated however that there is some feeling growing that if UNAMIR cannot perform its mandate and if UN personnel are under threat then the Council should consider its withdrawal.

8 Our contacts had little to add to media reports (Washington Post articles follow by bag to Wgtn) on the situation in Kilgali. With the closure of its embassy the US is now only receiving reports from one source in Kilgali by radio. The provisional government appears to be holding together for now, but its control over the situation is minimal. A truce appears to have been negotiated by the UN to take effect from 6 am tomorrow. The RPF has signed off on this (for the purposes of allowing foreigners to leave) but refuses to negotiate directly with the provisional government.

End Message
2482 – 12-04

Secretariat information

The situation is getting ever more complicated. According to the Secretariat it is chaotic, the killing continues. The provisional government has left Kigali for Butare in the south of the country. Only the defense minister has stayed on in Kigali. Disturbances are spreading to other parts of the country. The private radio station in Kigali (it is unclear whether it is the only one there) sides with the government and is militating against foreigners, especially Belgians.

RPF units arrived in Kigali from the demilitarized zone in the North of the country and control all important points, except for the airport. They do not recognize the defense minister. (Note: In a very sharp letter to the SC President, the New York representative of the RPF described the transitional government as one of criminals. He didn’t mention a word about the Arusha peace agreements.)

The evacuation of foreigners went well. The RPF has given the French-Belgian expedition until 1900 hrs local time on 14 April to pull out of the country – because after that it intends to attack government units at the airport.

UNAMIR absolutely hasn’t managed to induce the parties to a cease fire or a truce. Both parties, however, assure the force that it is safe. SG’s recommendations, based on the analysis of his SRS – Booh Booh from Cameroun – will be available tomorrow.

Discussion

The core of the discussion concerned the future of UNAMIR. In other words: Will the UN leave Rwanda to its catastrophic fate or will it continue to be involved there in some way? The non-aligned are preparing a draft resolution which will be available on 13 April but any suggestions will still have to follow from the SG’s recommendations.

The contribution of the UK was the most useful one. It clarified four possible alternatives:

1. Strengthen UNAMIR and give it a new mandate (note: one which would of course have to be based on Ch VII of the Charter, as we mentioned earlier). This would be difficult according to the UK
2. Pull out completely – which, however, would send a negative signal about UN’s involvement
3. Leave UNAMIR as is - but what could it do?
4. Leave some elements of UNAMIR in Rwanda, as earlier in Angola – which might be the safest solution, a signal that the UN continues to be engaged.

Before the UK spoke, France had considered only alts. 2 and 3, then he spoke off the top of his head and only on his own behalf, without instructions from home. SP clarified that the “Angola solution” may seem to be the best but it has its own problems: “It is easy to squeeze the accordion but it can be difficult to stretch it later.” He also drew attention to the possible problem of troop contributors which will have to be consulted.
The US were a shade more skeptical to UNAMIR’s continuation. If it were to stay with its current mandate, it could become a destabilizing factor. “It may become necessary to withdraw UNAMIR but that should not mean we’ll stop being concerned with Rwanda. Perhaps we should have this force ready somewhere so that it could return straight away.” Arg. agreed with this view.

Amb Kovanda pointed out that events in Rwanda will also necessarily influence the situation of UNOMUR—another Rwanda-related PKO but operating in Uganda. The Secretariat confirmed this.

**Delegation comment**

A representative of the Belgian delegation telephoned Amb Kovanda requesting that tomorrow we support in the SC the withdrawal of UNAMIR and suspending the operation. In his view, this alternative will be submitted by the US or the UK. The Belgians are in contact with the SG who should tomorrow formulate a recommendation to this effect. In their [Be] view, any other alternative is unrealistic. He stated that they are fully aware of the fact that this proposal will likely not be acceptable for the non-aligned. We are therefore requesting instructions on how to proceed.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 01503 121743Z
ACTION IO-16

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DEPT FOR TASK FORCE, P/TARNOFF, IO/WARD, AF/MOOSE
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PAGE 02 USUN N 01503 121743Z
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: FUTURE UNAMIR AND FRENCH ROLES IN RWANDA

REFTEL: PARIS 9724

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN FORESEES TWO ISSUES THAT DEMAND WASHINGTON'S
   IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT
   THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERING STAYING IN RWANDA AFTER THEY
   COMPLETE THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION OF EVACUATING FOREIGN

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01300 Doc No. C05517345 Date: 03/26/2014
3. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS UNAMIR'S FUTURE. AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  USUN N  01503  121743Z
PRESENT THE AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN AND UNDER
FRENCH-BELGIAN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGNAL
THAT THE UN IS NEARING A DECISION BECAUSE RELATIVE CALM
HAS DESCENDED ON KIGALI AND UNAMIR TROOPS ARE NOT
PRESENTLY THE TARGET OF HOSTILITIES. YET THIS MIGHT BE
A WINDOW OF RELATIVE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE UNAMIR
FORCES; THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME
MORE DIFFICULT TO EVACUATE UNAMIR ONCE THE FRENCH AND
BELGIAN LEAVE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS WORTH
CONSIDERING TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
AUTHORIZE THE EVACUATION OF THE BULK OF UNAMIR, WHILE
LEAVING BEHIND A SKELETAL STAFF THAT MIGHT BE ABLE TO
FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE AND ANY FUTURE POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN
CODE CABLE

To: Annan
From: Gharekhan
Info: Goulding

SG has been briefed on your cable no. 1095 regarding Rwanda.

As I conveyed to you last night, Belgian Foreign Minister specially flew to Bonn to discuss Rwanda situation with SG. He painted an extremely grim picture. He informed SG that his Government has definitely decided to withdraw its contingent from UNAMIR. He reconfirmed readiness to leave the Belgian equipment behind for UNAMIR.

In the light of Belgian decision, SG has decided that UNAMIR will have to be withdrawn. In taking this decision, SG has taken into account his SRS and Force Commander's views as contained in yours no. 1095.

I enclose text of a letter from SG to President of Security Council. Kindly have it sent under SG's signature.

You would no doubt wish to inform SRS and FC of the above in advance.

You would notice that SG's decision is based on Belgian decision to withdraw and not on the security situation in Rwanda. This should be emphasized in your oral explanation to the Council as well as to the African Group.

Regards,
Bonn, 13 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to inform you that H.E. Mr. Willy Claes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, had a meeting with me in Bonn on 12 April 1994. The Minister conveyed to me his assessment of the situation in Rwanda which, according to him, has deteriorated drastically in the recent days and continues to deteriorate rapidly.

H.E. Mr. Claes informed me that the Government of Belgium has decided to withdraw its contingent serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) at the earliest possible date. I conveyed to the Minister, on behalf of the United Nations, sincere condolences on the death of 10 Belgian officers serving with UNAMIR as well as deep gratitude and appreciation for Belgium's contribution to UNAMIR. The Minister assured me that his Government would like the withdrawal of its contingent to take place in a coordinated manner.

In the light of the decision of the Government of Belgium mentioned above, it is my assessment that it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively. The continued discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate will become untenable unless the Belgian contingent is replaced by another, equally well equipped contingent or unless the Government of Belgium reconsiders its decision to withdraw its contingent.

His Excellency
Mr. Colin Keating
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York
In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR and send their recommendations to me in this regard. I shall keep the council informed.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
The Secretariat submitted information about the latest developments, a letter from the SG with the recommendation (following the decision of the Belgian Govt to withdraw the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR) to stop the operation, and a letter from the Belgian perm rep on the issue. A draft resolution on Rwanda submitted by NAM was discussed in a very preliminary fashion.

The Secretariat informed that the situation in Kigali continues to be unclear and parties are continuing the fighting. RPF has reinforced their units in Kigali with armed contingents from the north and south but army units are defending their positions. According to news from Kigali, not all army units have yet been thrown into the fighting, for unclear reasons. The cease-fire provided by the RPF for the withdrawal of foreign nationals expires tomorrow at 1900 hrs local time. Once the Belgian troops withdraw, the UNAMIR commander will not have enough forces to fulfill the mediation role he has been doing so far, let alone fulfill his mandate. The RPF continues to refuse talks about a truce. Nevertheless, it has accepted the initiative of the defense minister to open talks, under the condition that they will be only informal. The first meeting in the presence of the SSG and the UNAMIR commander should take place tomorrow.

The Nigerian Amb then submitted a draft resolution, on behalf of the NAM, which seeks answers to two key questions:

a. The urgency of the situation and the need for a timely and adequate reaction
b. The inadequacy of UNAMIR’s current mandate.

The draft is based on Ch VII and empowers UNAMIR to enforce public order and legality and to create interim national institutions. The Nig Amb emphasized that this is only a basis for further discussions. It is a provisional draft.

All speakers (Fr, UK, US, Arg, Brazil, RF, China, NZ) agreed on the following:

1. They expressed their puzzlement, even disenchantment over the SG’s letter of 13 April which informs about planning UNAMIR’s withdrawal as a consequence of the Belgian govt’s decision to pull out its own contingent. Ambs of the UK, Fr and US pointed out that there is no causal link between the decision of the Be govt, which is motivated by the loss of its 10 troops and by political reasons, and the necessity to end the PKO – an interpretation to which the SG’s letter is at least open.
2. They rejected the extreme alternatives (Ch. VII and the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR). It seems that most delegations support the so-called Angola alternative of a curtailed UN presence in place.
3. They appealed to the OAU and particularly to neighboring countries (Tanzania and Uganda, which has some sway over the RPF) to employ all available measures to find a solution which in its first phase has to include a truce and a cease-fire.
4. They appealed to the SG to prepare a preliminary report, on basis of consultations with the UNAMIR commander and the SSG, which would contain an evaluation of the feasibility of each alternative.
The Arg Amb suggested that UNOMUR observers (Uganda-Rwanda) be put at the disposal of UNAMIR.

The President then suggested that a working group meet tomorrow to discuss the NAM draft. Informal consultations would then follow concerning political aspects of the Rwanda developments. There is the assumption, however, that the Secretariat will submit its suggestions and recommendations concerning the future of UNAMIR.

Delegation note:

None of the delegations were prepared to agree with ending the UN presence in Rwanda. Arguments included the possible negative impact on the position of the UN and specifically the SC; the need to maintain contact with parties in the conflict and last but not least some degree of protection for civilians (according to the UN Secretariat, some 15,000 people are under UNAMIR’s protection).
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PART ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 1306 AND YOUR TELNO 543: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Secretary General writes to Council President informing him of Belgian intention to withdraw from UNAMIR and concluding that without Belgians, force must be withdrawn.

2. Secretariat brief Council members on latest developments. Continued fighting. UNAMIR unable to fulfill mandate but Force Commander mediating between the parties. Earlier attempts to promote a dialogue fail, but latest information is that meeting between RPF and Rwandan Government will take place on 14 April.

3. Council members express regret that Secretary-General's letter fails to offer substantive recommendations on future of UNAMIR. Also regret the line taken on Belgian plan to withdraw. NAM present draft resolution calling for expansion of UNAMIR with a different mandate. Other Council members favour a much reduced UN presence. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

4. The Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council on 13 April, informing Council members that, in the light of the Belgian decision to withdraw its contingent, UNAMIR was untenable and that the Force Commander had been asked to prepare recommendations for the possible withdrawal of the force. Text of letter in MIFT.

5. As foreshadowed in first TUR, the NAM caucus had a series of meetings on the afternoon of 13 April to introduce their...
draft resolution on UNAMIR (text in second IFT). I expressed scepticism to the NAM at the idea of a reinforced UNAMIR. I also said that any text should maintain balance in its references to the parties (as drafted, unsurprisingly given the Rwandan Ambassador’s presence in the NAM caucus, it tilts against the RPF). It was also important to engage neighbouring states in a positive way, rather than rebuking them. I also had a brief exchange with Riza (ASG, DPKO) and De Soto (Secretary-General’s Special Political Adviser) and explained how unsatisfactory we had found the Secretary-General’s letter, which did not offer any substantive views on the way forward but simply tried to blame the Belgians.

6. I subsequently went over the ground with the Belgian Permanent Representative who expressed concern at the way the Secretary-General had presented the situation. I explained the line I intended to take in informal consultations. He welcomed this and gave me an advance copy of a letter he had sent to the President of the Security Council (text by fax to AD(E)). This notes the rapidly deteriorating situation in Rwanda which had led to the Franco-Belgian evacuation operation, now almost complete. It says that UNAMIR is unable to carry out its mandate. The presence of the Belgian contingent within UNAMIR exposes the contingent to unacceptable risks and constitutes a threat to the operation of UNAMIR as a whole given the anti-Belgian campaign being conducted by one of the Rwandan factions. It says that the Belgian Government believes the activity of UNAMIR troops should be suspended until the conditions necessary to take forward the peace process were restored. Until then, the only justification for a UN presence in Rwanda is humanitarian. I told Notredame that the idea that UNAMIR’s mandate might be suspended seemed to me one that might prove attractive in the Council.

7. Informal consultations of the Council began with another briefing from Riza on latest developments. The truce for the evacuation of foreign nationals was all that was holding in Kigali. The Belgian task force expected to complete the evacuation on 14 April. There was no cease-fire. The RPF had not accepted a Rwandan army offer of a cease-fire since other Rwandan army commanders were still fighting. There was no dialogue between the parties, although UNAMIR was trying to pass messages between them. There was still fighting in the streets. Although the RPF controlled much of the city, it was
still meeting resistance. The deteriorating situation in Kigali appeared to be exacerbated by the presence of Belgian forces both within and outside UNAMIR. It was the Force Commander's assessment that the presence of the Belgian contingent was a danger to the rest of UNAMIR. However, the Force Commander had also said that if the Belgian contingent withdrew, he would not be able to ensure the safety of UNAMIR or secure the airport. Riza said that both the RPF and the Rwandan Government had asked the Force Commander to continue his intermediary role as long as possible.

8. Riza said that in the current circumstances UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its mandate. For the moment it was securing the safety of its own civilian personnel, other UN agency staff, and was helping the evacuation process by escorting convoys to Burundi and to the airport. It was also providing what support it could in Kigali to Rwandan civilian, as well as trying to bring about a cease-fire and facilitate communications between both side. The UNOMUR observers were still carrying out patrolling duties according to their mandate. They had no reports of passage of arms across the border. Given the link between UNOMUR and UNAMIR, if UNAMIR were to be withdrawn there would be little reason to keep UNOMUR in place. Riza said that he had received no communication from any other troop contributor apart from Belgium indicating a desire to withdraw. Keating confirmed this in a brief report on his contacts with the troop contributors. All were concerned about the safety of their personnel, but they were also concerned about the political situation in Rwanda and cautious about a premature UN withdrawal.

9. Gambari (Nigeria) introduced the NAM draft resolution. He characterised this as an invitation to dialogue with other Council members. It was designed to address concerns that the Security Council's deliberations should extend more widely than concern for foreign nations and UN staff. The NAM had concluded that there were three options. The first was to declare that the situation in Rwanda was a complete breakdown of law and order and that there was a need for a peace enforcement mechanism under Chapter VII of the Charter. They had dismissed this option. Even if it were judged desirable, there were neither the political will nor the resources available to move into peace enforcement. The other extreme
was for the UN to pack up and leave. This option had also been rejected. No troop contributors except Belgium had expressed a desire to leave and the Belgian contingent had specific problems and might even be a destabilising factor. It was the wrong signal to withdraw. Neither party wanted it and the potential for damaging the UN's credibility by such an action was considerable. The third option, which the NAM caucus supported, was for the UN to continue to have a presence in Rwanda, devoted to encouraging a cease-fire and helping the Secretary-General's Special Representative to continue his efforts as a facilitator with the aim of relaunching the Arusha peace process. It should also have a mandate to protect civilians. It would be relatively easy to implement this third option. UNAMIR were there on the ground. They needed a different mandate to reflect the new situation and an appropriate force level. The key was to achieve a cease-fire. If the international community had the resolve, UNAMIR together with neighbouring countries and the OAU should be able to bring a cease-fire about. Even if the RPF were to take Kigali, it would be a pyrrhic victory. There could be no long-term solution to the problems in Rwanda without a broad based transitional Government of national reconciliation.
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FINAL PART OF TWO

10. Merimee (France) commented briefly on the Secretary-General's letter. There was every reason in the world for the Belgian contingent to leave. Just as the RPF suspected the French forces of ulterior motives, so some factions in the Rwandan Government suspected the Belgians. This fact was a handicap for UNAMIR as the force commander had admitted. It made perfect sense for the Belgians to withdraw but France could not agree that UNAMIR would cease to exist because the Belgians left. There was no cause and effect. As far as the NAM draft was concerned, he agreed it was the basis for discussion. OP5 went rather further than France could support and might need to be amended. But he agreed that total withdrawal of UNAMIR was not an option. The UN presence was a stabilising factor and we should not forget the possible spill-over into Burundi if the situation in Rwanda was allowed to deteriorate still further. The key was to exert political pressure, particularly on the RPF who seemed to be rejecting a cease-fire. They should be made to realise that any military victory would be only provisional. He welcomed the suggestion that the OAU be involved. This would be important both within the country and with respect to the Governments of neighbouring countries, for example Uganda. Uganda did have influence on the RPF. The international community should persuade them to put pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.

11. Albright (US) said that it would be difficult to keep UNAMIR in place. It was unfortunate that the Secretary-General had singled out the Belgians in the way he had. The US were concerned at the way the NAM resolution had been drafted. It seemed to imply that UNAMIR would be given a heavy enforcement responsibility. This went beyond what it was possible for
UNAMIR to do. The Council needed to find an option which neither pulled the plug on the whole operation nor engaged peace-keepers in a task they could not carry out. She thought a skeletal operation to show the will of the international community would be the best option. It would be possible to come back to it when the situation allowed. We should not abandon the Rwandan people but we should also learn from the lessons of past operations.

12. I said that this was a very difficult issue. There was no completely satisfactory solution. We had been very disappointed by the Secretary-General’s letter. It was not an adequate response to the questions which had been put by the Council. Neither was it an adequate basis for the Council to move forward. It was not appropriate to blame the Belgians for the inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate. It could not carry out its mandate because of the conditions on the ground, not because of any decisions regarding the Belgian contingent. It was also wrong to suggest that, if the Belgian Government reconsidered their decision, all problems would be solved. The conditions were simply not there for UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate. We needed to know urgently from the Force Commander what was feasible and what could be done. This was very urgent, given that the availability of transport for any possible evacuation was time-limited.

13. I agreed that the UN should remain active in political terms. Peace would not come to Rwanda without a Governor of national unity and reconciliation. There needed to be a cease-fire and a return to the Arusha peace process. The OAU would play a valuable role. I also hoped that neighbouring states would engage again. But the Council should be asking neighbouring states to cooperate with the OAU and the UN to bring about an end to the crisis, not accusing them of doing other things. I also drew attention to the need to take a realistic view of what the UN could do. I understood why there had been talk of protecting civilians. But even a vastly increased and better equipped UNAMIR would find such a broad mandate difficult to fulfil. We should be guided by Secretariat recommendations. If they said something could not be done, there was not much point putting it in a resolution. The humanitarian effort definitely needed to continue. We should also think about what sort of small force was needed to support the SRSG and help him get the Arusha process back on
track. Neither of the two extremes – enforcement or complete withdrawal – seemed acceptable.

14. In the discussion that followed, all Council members joined in rejecting both complete withdrawal and moves to peace-enforcement. There was however a division on whether the UN presence which remained should be the SRSG, political and humanitarian staff, and a small military presence to protect them, or an expanded force which would play an active role in protecting Rwandan civilians. I, the Americans, the New Zealanders, the Spanish, the Russians, the Argentinians and the Brazilians inclined to the former solution while the Non-Aligned and to a lesser extent the French tended to the latter. (Riza usefully pointed up the difficulty of any long term UN effort to protect groups of Rwandan citizens.) All were agreed, however, that the Council could not make meaningful decisions on the mandate in the absence of substantive recommendations from the Secretary-General based on assessments from the field of the options for a continued UN presence, if any.

15. Before the end of the meeting, Riza announced that he had just heard from Kigali that Rwandan army representatives had conveyed to UNAMIR their wish to meet the RPF and start substantive political negotiations. The RPF had set a number of conditions for this, including that the first meeting should be an informal one which might be followed by substantive negotiations. The Rwandan army representatives had reacted favourably to the RPF response and a meeting was scheduled to take place in UNAMIR headquarters on 14 April. He said that he would make every effort to bring substantive options to the Council on 14 April, although with the Secretary-General in Madrid it might not be possible to give more than an oral briefing. It was agreed that a working group would meet at 141500Z to look at the body of the NAM text apart from the operative paragraphs on UNAMIR’s mandate. This would have to await discussion at informal consultations at 151830Z at which it was hoped the Secretary-General’s recommendations would be presented.

COMMENT

16. Instructions on the NAM draft and any further points you may wish us to make should reach us please deskby 141330Z.
HANNAY

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NNNN
The SC working group dealt with the draft resolution submitted by NAM, with the exception of stipulations concerning UNAMIR’s activity and its future mandate.

Instructed by the SG, the Secretariat revisited the interpretation of his letter of 13 April. De Soto stated that the SG had not intended to suggest the withdrawal of UNAMIR but rather adapting it to new conditions.

According to further information of the Secretariat, fighting continues. Contours of [lines of] control are starting to appear in Kigali. Fighting, however, is beginning to spread to other parts of Rwanda. After the withdrawal of French and Belgian soldiers, the airport, too, is being fought over. The informal meeting between representatives of the provisional government and the RPF, with the SRSG present, planned for 14 April, did not take place. Among other, one condition of the RPF was the confidentiality of these talks. However, the initiative received wide publicity and the talks were therefore postponed to some later date. The Secretariat also informed about the rampage of gangs, featuring especially members of the Presidential Guard, which don’t respect the most elementary norms of humanitarian law (wounded RPF members were dragged out of an ambulance and killed under the eyes of the Red Cross).

The UN Secretariat orally presented two alternatives for the functioning of UNAMIR under the changed conditions, which however assume a cease-fire between the warring parties:

1. Presence of UNAMIR without the Belgian contingent (some 2000 strong). The mandate would be adapted accordingly.
2. Leave only its political component in Kigali, i.e. the SRSG, his personnel and protection (about 200 people).

The first alternative is realistic if progress is made in the peace effort. It is also bound with certain conditions the belligerent parties would provide to UNAMIR (guaranteed freedom of movement, guaranteed security, declaring safe areas – e.g. the airport, etc.). A certain time horizon would be determined for meeting the conditions. The second alternative could be considered in the absence of realistic chances for renewing the peace effort in the framework of the Arusha agreements. Annan’s deputy Riza mentioned also a third alternative, combining these two. The SG is inclined toward the first one. Reports have it that both parties favor the presence of UNAMIR. No serious discussion has taken place yet. NAM and other members have requested time for consultations. The SC will return to both alternatives, and to the draft resolution, during informals tomorrow. It is expected that the text will be finalized and possibly adopted.

In this context we point out an article in the NYT which puts the situation and the domestic political developments in Rwanda in a rather different light and negatively evaluates France’s support to the essentially dictatorial regime of President Habiyarimana. The article is appended. We also have at our disposal a report of Amnesty International according to which there is no evidence of the participation of RPF units in the mass mayhem and murder that followed the air catastrophe.

The CZ delegation intends to establish contact with the RPF representative in New York, at a lower level, if the HQ doesn’t object.
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: STILL NO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, 4/13

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SC STILL HAS NOT TAKEN ACTION ON WITHDRAWING UNAMIR OR ADDRESSING ITS MANDATE. THE SECRETARIAT WAS CRITICIZED FOR NOT PRESENTING Viable OPTIONS. TEXTS OF NAM DRAFT RESOLUTION AND LETTER FROM
3. After a brief update on the situation in Rwanda from Acting U/SYG for Peacekeeping Riza, the SC discussed the options for UN presence in Rwanda, in the context of the draft resolution prepared by the Non-Aligned Caucus (NAM) (see text below), and the letter from the SYG to the SC President (see text below). The sentiment prevailed that the UN could not take either of the two extreme options -- it could not take on Chapter VII peace enforcement duties, and it could not abandon Rwanda by total withdrawal. Almost all Council members criticized the Secretariat for not presenting an options paper with a few options for proceeding within the middle ground between those two extremes. The Council called on the Secretariat to present options by April 14 afternoon. The Secretariat said they would try, but could not promise to deliver an options paper on time, since the SYG is traveling in Madrid.

4. Several members of the Council, including Ambassador Albright, criticized the SYG's letter of 4/13 for laying the blame on the Belgians, rather than on the Rwandans, for the inability of Unamir to fulfill its mandate.

5. Nigeria, Brazil and Djibouti favor the idea of tasking Unamir with protecting Rwandan civilians. Several other Council members noted the near impossibility of this task, even if resources and armament for Unamir were vastly increased.

6. The Council will meet in working group to discuss the NAM draft resolution 4/14 morning. The matter of Unamir's future, in operative paragraph 5, will be left out of that discussion until the Secretariat has presented its options later in the day. The Council President hopes to reach agreement on the wording of the rest of the resolution.

7. Action requested: Dept please provide guidance on the draft text below, excluding op. para. 5.

8. Begin text of SYG letter dated 13 April 1994:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT H.E. MR. WILLY CLAES, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, HELD A MEETING WITH ME IN BONN ON 12 APRIL 1994 DURING WHICH WE REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO

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THE MINISTER SINCERE CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF TEN BELGIAN SOLDIERS SERVING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) AS WELL AS DEEP GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION FOR BELGIUM'S CONTRIBUTION TO UNAMIR.

THE MINISTER CONVEYED TO ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM, HAS DETERIORATED DRASTICALLY IN RECENT DAYS AND CONTINUES TO GROW RAPIDLY WORSE. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM HAS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT SERVING WITH UNAMIR AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THE MINISTER ASSURED ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS CONTINGENT TO TAKE PLACE IN A COORDINATED MANNER.

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM, IT IS MY ASSESSMENT THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS.

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PAGE 01  USUN N 01553 02 OF 03 140122Z
ACTION 10-16
EFFECTIVELY. THE CONTINUED DISCHARGE BY UNAMIR OF ITS MANDATE WILL BECOME UNTENABLE UNLESS THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT IS REPLACED BY ANOTHER, EQUALLY WELL EQUIPPED CONTINGENT OR UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM RECONSIDERS ITS DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HAVE ASKED MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER TO PREPARE PLANS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY, AND SEND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME IN THIS
5 - 39

REGARD. I SHALL KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

END TEXT.

9. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-- RECALLING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR);

-- NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994 WITH A SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN ESTABLISHING ALL THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994 (16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED THE CENTRALITY OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA;

-- EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THEIR COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS;

-- SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994;

-- APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION;

-- DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER;
-- EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO AT THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;
-- DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY;

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO COLLECT ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION WITH ALL MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL AND REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;
-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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PAGE 02

USUN N 01553 03 OF 03 140122Z

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: STILL NO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, 4/13

-- 3. STRONGLY CONDEMS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND
OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF
SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO
PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT
FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 4. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH
ARE ENGULFING RWANDA; AND IN THIS CONNECTION, DEMANDS
THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT
DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE AND THAT BOTH PARTIES
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RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;

-- 5. DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 6. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND URGES THE ORGANIZATIONS OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO EXTEND ITS COOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

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PAGE 03    USUN N 01553 03 OF 03 140122Z

-- 7. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;

-- 8. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL RWANDESE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND IN THIS REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 10. STRONGLY APPEALS TO BOTH PARTIES, IN PARTICULAR THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE PEACE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 11. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVE THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 12. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT TO COUNCIL AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS, AT LEAST, NOT LATER THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.
NOTE BY DO/CC: PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED AS RECEIVED IN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION (THERE IS NO PARA. 9.). USUN COMMUNICATIONS WILL CHECK WITH DRAFTER IN THE MORNING. VERIFICATION/CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
5. Option One: All of UNAMIR, minus the Belgian contingent, would stay in Rwanda, but move out of the site and redeploy to Kigali. Dallaire would set another deadline for the parties: They have 3 weeks to return to the peace process. The parties would have to meet certain conditions -- be responsible for the security of UNAMIR personnel, guarantee freedom of movement, keep the airport neutral. At five or six days before the expiration of the 3 weeks, Dallaire would warn the parties that their time was running out, and that UNAMIR was planning for complete withdrawal. If negotiations had not resumed within 3 weeks, UNAMIR would withdraw.

6. Option Two: Once a cease-fire was reached within 5 days, reduce UNAMIR to a minimal political presence. The Secretary-General, support staff and a security detail of at least 150 men for an unspecified time. This would presuppose that the parties were not headed back towards the Arusha framework quickly.

7. Possible Option Three: Although not formally presented as one of the SG's options, the Secretariat suggested that Option One and Two might be combined. Specifically, after 3 weeks had passed if negotiations had not started the force would be reduced to the size of Option 2.

On the basis of the non-aligned caucus to work out their position, others asked for time to get instructions from capitals. One thing which is unclear, and which many members of the SC, including Albright, queried was what would happen if no CE was reached within 5 days. It pointed out that the council needs to explicitly spell out what the mandate of UNAMIR under Option 1 or 2 would be. All agreed the urgency of the situation on the ground demands that the council make a decision and adopt a resolution by tomorrow, Friday, 15 April.

Throughout the day, a working group of the council hammered out language for a resolution, leaving aside the most-contentious issue of the future mandate and size of UNAMIR. A few bracketed alternatives remain in the text, which will be sorted out tomorrow at the ambassadorial level.

Subsequent to the SC informal, the President of the Council, in consultation with France and Nigeria, worked out an addition to the draft text which they hoped would meet American concerns. The text would clearly lay out the 5-day ultimatum, and put off any decision on the two options until later.

Begin text of new, keyoperative paragraphs:

-- Demands that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire throughout Rwanda.

-- Decides that, if within five days of the adoption of this resolution, there is an effective ceasefire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda on the basis of the Arusha peace agreement.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

-- FURTHER DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL CONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA.

END TEXT.

12. COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT THE SG TO PULL OUT, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT PRESSURE, IF THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE IN 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.

13. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION: (NON-AGREED LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),


RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PV.4094/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,

STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,

EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,

WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS,

SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,

APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREACH OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI,

EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,

AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF,

(DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY,)

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;

-- 3. CONDEMN THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANSERS THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;

-- 4. STRONGLY CONDEMN THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAHGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, DEMANDS THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;


-- 7. DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

-- (9. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA);

-- (10. ALTERNATIVE. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA);

-- 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES IN RWANDA (IN PARTICULAR...
THE RIIANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT)) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;

-- 11. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL IN NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND IN THIS REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 13. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, MADRID
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 April 1994
NUMBER: 1156
SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

1. The Security Council held two rounds of informal consultations today on the situation in Rwanda. Riza briefed Council members on the latest developments on the ground, pointing out while fighting was continuing, UNAMIR was not being targeted and had taken effective control of Kigali airport where the situation was basically quiet. He also informed the Council that an initial meeting between military representatives of the two parties had been held today under the auspices of UNAMIR. Feedback from the parties was expected, with a view to arranging further discussions on a cessation of hostilities.

2. Riza also recalled the two options presented to the Council yesterday on behalf of the Secretary-General and stressed that a decision to pull out or scale down UNAMIR in the absence of a cease-fire could create serious risks for the extrication of our personnel. He pointed out, however, that it was for the Security Council to take the appropriate decisions.

3. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that members of the Council had diverging views on the course of action which ought to be followed at this time. On behalf of the non-aligned caucus, Nigeria, supported by China, proposed that option A be adopted. The United States stressed that, if members of the Council insisted on taking a decision to day, it would
only accept a withdrawal of UNAMIR, as it believed that there was no useful role for a peace-keeping operation in Rwanda under the present circumstances.

4. The United Kingdom expressed a preference for option B. Russia took a similar position and, during the discussions held this afternoon, the United States modified its initial stance and indicated that it would be prepared to accept option B. The non-aligned group, however, maintained its position in favour of option A.

5. It was finally decided not to take any action this time, on the understanding that the Council President would make the attached remarks to the press.

Best regards. Regards. regards.
The members of the Council have had a thorough discussion today about the situation in Rwanda and its implications for UNAMIR.

They took carefully into consideration information provided by the Secretariat, as forwarded by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNAMIR Force Commander, as well as that provided by the Foreign Minister of Belgium.

Council members took note of and fully understood Belgium's decision to withdraw its troops in UNAMIR at the same time that it is repatriating the troops that have been providing security for the evacuation of foreign nationals.

They also took into consideration the willingness of other major troop contributing countries to maintain their troops with UNAMIR as long as there is a useful role for them to perform.

In the members' view, the immediate priority in Rwanda is the establishment of a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander have been in contact with both parties to try to secure this objective.

Council members urge the Special Representative to make every effort to facilitate a ceasefire. In this regard, the Council members welcomed the willingness of the Organisation of African Unity to promote a ceasefire in Rwanda.

Council members demand that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table.

The members reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country.
Council Members commend the efforts made by the leaders of the sub-region at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and urge the leaders of the region to persevere and intensify their efforts for peace, in cooperation with the United Nations and the CAU.

But, the situation is grave and Council members are determined not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk.

Council Members intend to keep under constant review the force levels and activities of UNAMIR and to take decisions in this regard at the appropriate time.
Your C22009.

Summary

- Belgians mount intensive campaign for all of UNAMIR to come out of Rwanda with Belgian contingent.

- NAM press for resolution premised on maintenance of UNAMIR at current strength.

- US say that the only resolution they could countenance today would be one winding up UNAMIR.

- UK attempt to promote compromise based on Secretariat's option 2 (reducing UNAMIR to a political presence with necessary security protection) was acceptable to US but rejected by NAM and was ruled out by Secretariat because of security implications.

- Consensus was finally reached on Presidential proposal not to decide today on the future of UNAMIR but to convey the Council's insistence on a ceasefire and to signal a willingness to pull UNAMIR out should the situation become too dangerous.

Action

For information.

Report

Belgian Foreign Minister called President early this morning to advise of their intention to withdraw all Belgian troops, both those sent in to secure the evacuation of Belgian nationals and those in UNAMIR, by the end of the coming
weekend. Claes went on to paint a very grim picture of the situation in Rwanda and urged that all of UNAMIR troops be pulled out as part of the Belgian evacuation. He basically said that the remaining troops would have neither the equipment or the ability to protect themselves if the Belgians left. Subsequent contact with the Secretariat revealed that he had given a similar message to the Sec-Gen. We learned soon after that the Belgians had mounted a lobbying campaign, particularly in Europe, along the same lines and had made public statements to the same effect in Brussels.

2 Secretariat (Riza) agreed that Belgian assessment had to be taken seriously but at the same time said it did not square with what they were hearing from UNAMIR. While fighting was continuing between RPF and Government Forces and killings were being carried out behind the Government lines, the situation behind the RPF lines at least had stabilised. Both sides continued to affirm their wish for UNAMIR to stay and the Special Rep and Force Commander were holding direct talks with the parties today. Riza said that the Special Rep and the Force Commander continued to believe that the threat to withdraw was their best leverage over the parties, but indicated that the people in the field would prefer to be left with some flexibility on the point and not to be bound to a fixed time frame by a Council decision.

3 At the morning informal consultations, Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM caucus, reiterated their support for a modified version of the Sec-Gen's option A, viz maintaining UNAMIR at current strength. The US (Walker) then spoke to say that the US was conscious that the situation was very fluid and unstable but that if a decision on UNAMIR's future was to be taken today, then the only resolution the US could support would be one calling for the withdrawal of the force.

4 Prior to the lunch time adjournment, Hannay proposed that the Council adopt a resolution today based on the NAM draft and incorporating the Sec-Gen's option B entailing the maintenance of a military presence in Kigali with a much reduced military presence only to provide security for UN personnel.

5 We used the early part of the afternoon for informal discussions with US, Nigeria, France and UK. US (Albright) said, after talking to Christopher, that they could go along with Hannay's proposal. Gambari also indicated a willingness to explore NAM tolerance for Hannay's compromise. However, he paused when we raised the point which the British had conveniently overlooked, namely that option B was premised on the achievement of a ceasefire. We noted that the Belgians and the Secretariat all considered that the security of the airport was essential in current circumstances (which was why UNAMIR was deploying half of the Ghanain battalion there) to take over from the Belgians) and questioned whether option B was credible in the absence of a ceasefire.
6 Riza and Baril (Military Adviser) subsequently confirmed our hesitations. They reiterated that option B was only sustainable if there was a ceasefire. Otherwise, the political presence would have no assured exit route if UNAMIR became the target of attacks. They were also gravely concerned at the implications of an announcement today by the Council that they would be withdrawing or scaling down UNAMIR. This risked both sides indulging in a scramble for territory and perhaps in attacks on UNAMIR to grab their equipment.

7 Word came out of the NAM caucus that they too had rejected the British proposal and Gambari told us he would prefer that there be no decision today rather than one which would signal a diminution of the UN's commitment to Rwanda. We then showed him a paper we had prepared, and with which the Secretariat expressed strong agreement, which would record the Council's position on the Belgian withdrawal, its insistence on a ceasefire and its determination not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk. Our initial draft also had paragraphs indicating the Council's willingness to consider a revised UNAMIR mandate if the parties agreed to a ceasefire and, conversely, to pull UNAMIR out if they did not and the situation continued to deteriorate.

8 After consulting his NAM colleagues, Gambari told us he could go along with the paper. The British, Americans and French also said they could live with it.

9 When the informal consultations resumed, Riza, at our request, gave his assessment of the security implications of any announcement by the Security Council today of a withdrawal or a suspension of UNAMIR. His assessment effectively put an end to the British proposal for the meantime. A substantial Chinese intervention to the effect that their Embassy in Kigali, which was continuing to function effectively and was reporting that there was no general animosity towards foreigners, also had a marked effect. We were able to advise, on the basis of consultations this afternoon, that Ghana and Bangladesh, the two major contributors to UNAMIR, were willing to maintain their troops in place as long as the UN considered they had a useful role to play.

10 Our paper was then circulated and found to be generally acceptable. Hannay lamented that the Council was not being more robust in its consideration of the situation in Rwanda but the limitations of the situation were made apparent when the US and Nigeria indicated that they would have difficulty with certain aspects of the draft—namely the paragraphs hinting at a willingness to contemplate an extension of UNAMIR's presence under a revised mandate (a problem for the US) and at a willingness to pull UNAMIR out in the absence of a ceasefire (a problem for Nigeria). Walker asked that both
paras be dropped.

11 At Hannay's proposal, the paragraphs that were deleted were replaced by one indicating the Council's intention to keep UNAMIR's strength and mandate under constant review. This addition, when coupled with the previous paragraph stating the Council's determination not to allow UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk retains the essential message to the Rwandan parties that UNAMIR may be pulled out if they do not agree to a ceasefire.

12 Given the political sensitivities, we judged it unwise to press for our paper to be converted into a presidential statement. Instead, it was agreed that it would be used as the basis of the President's comments to the press. We also made it available to delegations and, indeed, to the media. Copy of the paper as agreed is contained in our accompanying fax.

Comment

13 As we had pointed out at the morning informals, a decision not to pull out UNAMIR or to amend its mandate is itself a decision. We and the Secretariat consider that what was done today was appropriate to the political situation in the Council and to the circumstances on the ground in Rwanda. The Belgian campaign for total withdrawal was seen by Council members as motivated at least as much by a desire for political cover back home as by concern for UNAMIR's safety. Given what we were hearing from the field, it would have been precipitate and dangerous to have suddenly gone public with a resolution authorising total or even partial withdrawal at this stage. The Special Representative and the Force Commander continue to believe that UNAMIR are in no immediate danger and can continue to play an important role. We can only hope they are correct.

14 Whatever happens over the next few days, it is clear that the Council will soon have to consider the future role, if any, of UNAMIR. Today's discussions show that it will be no easy task to reach an agreed position.

End Message
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 150730Z FCO
TELNO 1364
OF 150502Z APRIL 94
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YOUR TELNO 548: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Secretariat present to Council members two options for future of UNAMIR: to leave force in place at current strength minus Belgian contingent (the Secretary-General's preference); or to withdraw bulk of force leaving behind Secretary-General’s Special Representative with staff and some 150 troops as security. Both options predicated on the existence of a cease-fire. No substantive discussion of options although some concern that Secretariat have not spelt out clearly enough the mandates relating to either option or taken into account the fact there is not a cease-fire. Secretariat explain that Force Commander wants to use threat of UNAMIR withdrawal to persuade parties to agree a cease-fire. Likelihood that Council may give the parties a five-day deadline to achieve a cease-fire, after which substantive decisions will be taken.

2. Inconclusive working group discussions on the NAM draft resolution. The key operative paragraphs remain in square brackets. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

3. At the informal consultations of Security Council members on 14 April, de Soto (Secretary General's Special Political Adviser) said that the Secretary-General had been following closely the events in Rwanda. He had been in direct contact with the Force Commander and the Special Representative as well as with Headquarters. De Soto wanted to make clear that the Secretary-General's letter of 13 April had been written following his consultations with the Foreign Minister of
Belgium. They had agreed that the Secretary-General would need to alert Council members of the need for a replacement battalion, or for reconsideration of the Belgian decision. It was in this context that the Secretary-General had put forward the suggestion of a possible withdrawal by UNAMIR. He had not recommended that UNAMIR withdraw.

4. Riza (ASG DPKO) gave a brief update on the situation on the ground. The fighting was at a lower level but still continued. A line of control seemed to be emerging across the city. There was fighting outside Kigali as well. An ICRC convoy had been attacked and several wounded. There had also been an attack on the airport (he subsequently indicated that the attack had been from the RPF). The talks between the parties which had been scheduled for 14 April had not happened. The Force Commander was now trying to reschedule the meeting for 15 April.

5. As far as the options for UNAMIR were concerned, the Secretary-General believed an abrupt withdrawal was neither feasible nor advisable. There had been a fundamental change in the situation in Rwanda and it was therefore not possible for UNAMIR to fulfil its original mandate. The Secretary-General saw two broad options. Both were predicated on a cease-fire. The first would be to keep UNAMIR in place at its current strength minus the Belgian contingent. They would redeploy into Kigali. The parties would be informed that they had three weeks to get back to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Certain conditions would have to be set. The parties would be responsible for security in the zones they controlled. Freedom of movement would have to be guaranteed for UNAMIR. The airport would remain a neutral zone. The intention would be to give parties the time to negotiate and to agree on a return to the peace process. It might not be exactly the Arusha process but the aim would be to achieve agreement on some kind of political solution. Six days before the deadline, the parties would be warned and the Force would prepare for a complete withdrawal. (Comment: although Riza did not make this point when Annan described this option to me in the margins of a P5 meeting on Bosnia, he said that the key purpose of this option would be for UNAMIR to secure the airport.) The second option was to reduce UNAMIR immediately to a minimal political
presence: the SGSR, his support staff plus at least 150 troops as a security detail. Total numbers would not exceed 200. This option assumed no immediate prospect of a settlement and that maintaining UNAMIR at a greater strength was not an option. If the Council were to decide to adopt the first alternative, which was the Secretary-General's preference, and if there was no progress by the deadline imposed by the Council, then it would be possible to move to option 2 rather than withdraw the force totally.

6. Keating (NZ, Council President) said he had circulated a letter from the OAU Secretary-General enclosing a statement from the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism on the situation in Rwanda (faxed to AD(E)). He also drew attention to the press release by the ICRC. The representative of the ICRC had asked him to bring to Council members attention the ICRC's concern at the publicity which emanated from Kigali, which implied the problems related to the RPF alone. This did not reflect reality.

7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) asked what happened if there was no cease-fire. Both options were predicated on a cease-fire. How long would the Council be prepared to wait for one before taking a decision? This concern was echoed by Sardenberg (Brazil) and Gambari (Nigeria). The latter said that since UNAMIR was even now engaged in helping to secure a cease-fire it was illogical to suggest that for UNAMIR to remain there had to be a cease-fire. Pedauye (Spain) said it was unclear from the Secretariat's presentation what mandate UNAMIR would fulfil under the two different options. Merimee (France) said he preferred the first option. But it was clear that under this option the security of the force would need to be assured. The Council could say that in principle it favoured the first option, but if within a specific time, say five days, a cease-fire was not in place and respected, then we would choose option two. The question of the cease-fire was essential. If there was no cease-fire and the security situation deteriorated still further then there was a danger of more UNAMIR casualties.

8. I agreed with Spain that the two options were more precise on force levels than on mandate. However the mandate must be described in any resolution adopted by the Council. I underlined that the Council should not seek to give either two
battalions or 200 men a mandate to protect Rwandan civilians. It was heartbreaking to have to say so but this was simply not achievable. I was as perplexed as others on the fact that both options were predicated on a cease-fire. This condition was very unlikely to be fulfilled given the fighting going on on the ground. It would seem to be more sensible to have a different articulation which would be to choose option two and then move to option one when a cease-fire had been achieved. Merimee's suggestion that the Council give a short deadline and then make a decision to withdraw the bulk of the force if there was no commitment to a cease-fire therefore had some merit. As far as the draft resolution was concerned, I understood that there was still disagreement on key paragraphs. I drew attention to the OAU text which was a carefully balanced one. Rather than the Council continuing to be held up on the disputed text, we should use the OAU language.

9. Albright (US) expressed concern that both options depended on a cease-fire. The truce was supposed to expire at noon on 15 April. The fighting would then continue. The airport was insecure. Given this, we needed a resolution to authorise an orderly evacuation.

10. Riza intervened to say that when he had stated both options were predicated on a cease-fire it had indeed begged the question of how a cease-fire would be achieved. He had hoped that by the time the options were presented to the Council that further progress would have been made on the ground towards this. The Force Commander had stressed that both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. His approach was to use this as leverage. A tight timetable should be drawn up for achieving a cease-fire during which UNAMIR would strengthen its presence at the airport and make preparations to withdraw. Both the SRS6 and the Force Commander wanted to use the threat of UNAMIR's withdrawal to pressure the parties into a cease-fire. He wanted to underline that it would be very difficult logistically and politically to withdraw then bring the force back. This was why the Secretary-General preferred option one.

11. Keating said that if the Force Commander was essentially asking for the Council's support to put pressure on the parties by setting a very tight deadline for a cease-fire then the resolution being drafted was perhaps not what was required. It
might be better to aim for a short Council decision giving the parties five days to agree a cease-fire and then taking a decision on whether to maintain or significantly reduce UNAMIR thereafter depending on the outcome. Since the NAM caucus had insisted on being able to consult before making any substantive comments on the options presented, it was agreed that Council members would suspend their consideration of Rwanda until 151600Z with the aim of adopting a resolution later that day. The US have since told us that shortly after the informal consultations the French, Nigerians and New Zealanders agreed three additional paragraphs for the resolution. These are:

i) Demands that all parties agree on a cease-fire throughout Rwanda.

ii) Decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is an effective cease-fire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda based on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

iii) Further decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is no effective cease-fire in place, the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

12. The working group discussions on the draft resolution earlier in the day had proved inconclusive. There was disagreement on references to the RPF and neighbouring countries and the key operative paragraphs therefore remain in square brackets pending consideration by Council members. (Text by fax to ADEE.) It is likely however that the working group discussions will be overtaken by the apparent agreement on the five-day language as above.

COMMENT

13. If the Nigerians can persuade the rest of the NAM caucus, it is likely that a resolution will be adopted containing the language on the five day option. The Belgian assessment is that a cease-fire within this period is extremely unlikely. The Council is thus likely to end up deciding on option 2 after the five days have elapsed.
14. Grateful for any comments you might have on the Secretary-General’s options and on the language in para 11 above deskby 151300Z please.

HANNAY

YYYY

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**Subject**  
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Canada's view (St-Hillaire, Deputy, West and Central Africa and Maghreb Relations) is that at present UNAMIR is performing helpful functions both in terms of a good offices and humanitarian role without undue danger to the UN troops. While indicating that neither the original mandate nor the Arusha Accords now had much relevance, St-Hillaire said that Canada was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal, particularly while the UN was able to exert some beneficial effect on the situation. Canada's current preference was to maintain UNAMIR at its current strength of around 2000, which St-Hillaire understood to be the existing strength following the departure of the Belgian contingent.

**End Message**
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1374
OF 160432Z APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME
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INFO PRIORITY ACTOR

PART 1 OF 2

MY TELNO 1364 AND YOUR TELNO 557: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Belgian hyperactivity irritates Council members. Ghana and Bangladesh indicate readiness to maintain their contingents. NAM want UNAMIR to remain in place at its current strength. Americans refuse to countenance any Council decision other than withdrawal, but acknowledge that for the moment the NAM's preferred outcome does not require such a decision as UNAMIR is already authorised. NAM and most other Council members feel strongly that the Council should nonetheless take a decision in the matter, to resolve uncertainty and send an appropriate political signal. I suggest suspension of UNAMIR's deployment and retention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the field, with appropriate support, to continue efforts to secure a cease-fire. Key players (US, France, Nigeria) agree to my suggestion. But Nigerians fail to persuade all of the rest of the non-aligned, and Secretariat indicate that it would be difficult for a scaled down UN presence to remain without a cease-fire. After long discussion attempt to reach a decision is abandoned, which means UNAMIR stays for the moment, minus the Belgian contingent. Agreement to Presidential statement to the press that its mandate and force levels will be kept under constant review. How long solution by stealth holds will depend on developments on the ground.

2. Secretariat report that small Italian force has landed at Kigali airport and been asked to leave by UNAMIR.

DETAIL
3. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) opened informal consultations of the Security Council on 15 April by drawing Council members' attention to a letter he had received from the Foreign Minister of Belgium outlining his concern at the risk to UNAMIR in staying on in Rwanda. The Belgian contingent would be withdrawn over the weekend. For any UN personnel to remain after Sunday risked very grave consequences for their safety and security. Claes had also telephoned Keating to make the same point. The Belgian Mission had lobbied this and other missions heavily in the same sense during the course of the morning.

4. Riza (ASG, DPKO) gave an update on the current situation. The level of fighting was fluctuating. The Force Commander and Special Representative (SRSG) were continuing their efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. The Force Commander was moving to establish a strong presence at the airport in advance of Belgian withdrawal. The Belgian evacuation force would leave on 16 April and their UNAMIR contingent within 48-72 hours. A small Italian armed company had arrived without notice at the airport, where they remained. This was a worrying development since it had led to allegations that mercenaries were arriving. The Force Commander had asked them to leave.

5. Riza said, in commenting on the previous night's suggestion that the Council set a period of five days to see whether a ceasefire was established before reaching a decision on UNAMIR's future, that the Force Commander and the SRSG preferred that any timeframe for achieving a cease-fire be set by themselves, and not the Council. A public ultimatum would be unhelpful. They had also said that any message from the Council should address both the parties, and not single out one for blame.

6. Gambari (Nigeria, speaking for the NAM caucus) said the time had come for the Council to take a decision. He understood the concerns of the Belgians. The NAM caucus deeply regretted the loss of life suffered by their contingent. He also recognised the special relationship which had existed and continued to exist between Belgium and Rwanda. But however important Belgian views on the future of UNAMIR, they could not tell the Council how to respond to events in Rwanda. The Council should not be planning a withdrawal at this stage.
Both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. It was playing a stabilising role in a chaotic situation. Except for the perfectly understandable Belgian decision, no other troop contributors wanted to go. (Keating subsequently confirmed that he had had discussions with Bangladeshis and the Ghanaians and both were content to stay on in Rwanda). The level of fighting was low. UNAMIR was encouraging the parties to agree a cease-fire. The OAU had offered to play a pro-active role in trying to relaunch the peace process and had called for UNAMIR to remain. The NAM caucus would be sending a message to the OAU Secretary-General asking him to use his good offices together with leaders from neighbouring states, in particular Mwinyi and Museveni. Neither the Secretary-General nor his Special Representative wanted UNAMIR to leave. The question therefore was what tasks were appropriate for UNAMIR in current circumstances, and what force level would be best to carry them out. Gambari identified the tasks as being to help the civilian population of Rwanda; to help obtain a cease-fire; to promote the creation of a climate conducive to achieving a peaceful settlement; and to liaise with the OAU. A cease-fire was obviously critical to the success of the UN presence in Rwanda. The NAM believed a cease-fire was possible. Their preference was a modified version of Option 1 (para 5 of first TUR). The modification was that the force level should be what it was before the Belgians left, i.e. there should be a replacement contingent. They were flexible as to how long this option should be allowed to run to see if a solution could be achieved.

7. Walker (US) said that the US believed the Rwandan armed parties bore full responsibility for the continued violence and instability. The US did not believe that there was a role now in Rwanda for a United Nations peacekeeping force. They supported the decision of the Belgian Government to withdraw immediately, given the unique circumstances facing their contingent. The US did not believe the warring parties in Rwanda were likely to respect UNAMIR's mandate, or capable of guaranteeing the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda. There might be a role for the UN in facilitating negotiations among the warring parties, but that was for the SRSG not UNAMIR. The US would support a political initiative by the Secretary-General to promote reconciliation among the parties. But experience suggested that any serious negotiations amongst the parties would take place outside Rwanda. UN security forces would not be required. Walker underlined that US
opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda under current conditions was firm. It was based on a conviction that the Security Council had an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations were viable and capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that peacekeeping personnel were not knowingly put in an untenable situation. When the parties demonstrated that they were willing and able to work towards a peaceful settlement the US would be willing to reconsider whether renewed UN peacekeeping could facilitate lasting peace.

8. After Walker's intervention Gambari called for suspension of the meeting. His suggestion was not however immediately taken up, and a long and inconclusive discussion ensued. Keating pointed out that, if no decision was taken to withdraw the force then the status quo would continue, giving the Force Commander a little longer to see what he could do. At the end of the discussion I said that failing to take a decision would keep UNAMIR on the ground in a dangerous situation when we already knew it could not carry out its mandate. Furthermore we would be giving no signal to the parties or guidance to the Force Commander. A decision might be difficult to achieve given the NAM preference for the Secretary-General's option 1 and US insistence, that if a decision were to be taken today, it should be for total withdrawal. I thought it unlikely that UNAMIR was sustainable on the ground over time without the Belgians. If there was to be a withdrawal, it was essential that it should be an orderly one. Option 1 was most unlikely to prove a durable one. Option 2, on the other hand, should be sustainable. Careful consideration should again be given to the option of suspension of UNAMIR's mandate, leaving the Special Representative plus support and protection personnel in place. Vorontsov (Russia) agreed.

9. After the informal consultations Keating invited Gambari, Albright (US), Ladsous (France) and myself to discuss the way forward. Albright said that the US had been convinced by the Belgians. But they were also concerned that a wrong turn now in Rwanda would put an end to any possibility of US support for expanded peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa, particularly after the Somali experience. I argued again for a downsized presence, essentially to protect the SRS. I circulated language which would have provided for the suspension of UNAMIR's deployment and maintenance of an interim UN presence, headed by the SRS and including sufficient UN military
personnel to ensure its protection, to continue UN efforts in collaboration with the OAU and neighbouring states to resolve the Rwandan crisis in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement. I also proposed (and secured agreement to) language, based on the OAU statement, to replace those parts of the resolution which tilted against the RPF. Gambari confirmed that Nigeria wanted a resolution. He did not want the day to end without Council action. He undertook to commend my "middle way" to the NAM caucus. Ladsous said that he too could support it, though he would want it to be understood that the "suspended" UNAMIR might be deployed to a neighbouring country temporarily rather than being dispersed altogether. Albright spoke to Christopher, and indicated that she too could go along with it. Gambari however later told Keating and myself that he had been unable to convince all of his NAM colleagues (Djibouti and Rwanda itself are the hardest line in the caucus) to do so.

HANNAY
PART 2 OF 2

10. Informal consultations finally resumed again late on 15 April. Riza reiterated the Secretary-General's view that an abrupt and total withdrawal of UNAMIR was neither feasible nor advisable. It was important to consider the impact on the ground if such a decision were taken. He also argued that both of the options for UNAMIR put forward by the Secretary-General had been predicated on a cease-fire. If the Council announced the suspension of UNAMIR's mandate it might set off panic and renewed military action. Both parties would scramble to seize the strategic positions currently held by UNAMIR, notably the airport. Riza said that a first meeting had taken place today face to face between the parties who had exchanged ideas. This was a positive step. He urged the Council to consider the Secretary-General's "third option", which was to agree option 1, with a deadline which, if not met, would lead to option 2. This would give time for the force to prepare withdrawal.

11. Keating said that the informal contacts he had held earlier in the afternoon had demonstrated there was still a wide divergence of opinion. We now had the advice of the Secretary-General, which was at odds with the views of a number of Council members. I said it was true that we had not reached a clear-cut conclusion on the question of force levels and mandate. But we had managed to agree on almost all of the rest of the resolution. It contained a (much needed) political statement of the Council's views on the need to return to the Arusha peace process. I suggested we adopt the text as agreed, simply noting that the force level and mandate would be kept under review. Walker (US) said he would be unable to get agreement on the adoption of such a resolution without overnight consultations with Washington.
12. Keating then circulated a non-paper, for possible use as the basis for remarks by him in his capacity as President to the press. He believed that it was essential — if there was to be no Council decision — for there to be at the very least a press statement, given the length of time the Council had spent discussing the issue. After further discussion it was agreed that the Council would postpone a decision on Rwanda. This would give more time for the situation on the ground to stabilise and allow the Force Commander and SRSG to continue their efforts to bring about a cease-fire building on contacts already made. Keating’s text was agreed, with some amendments (see MIFT) he spoke to the press on the basis of it.

13. [Redacted]
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PAGE 01  USUN N 01607 01 OF 03 160142Z
ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01
OASY-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEO-00 INR-00
L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01
PC-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-00
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5755
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001607

DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PNA, AF/C AND L/AF;
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PAGE 02  USUN N 01607 01 OF 03 160142Z
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12358: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: SECURITY COUNCIL AT IMPASSE ON UNAMIR'S
FUTURE

REFTEL: USUN 1589

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON APRIL 15, THE US AGREED TO THE
PROPOSAL OFFERED EARLIER IN THE DAY BY WHICH
ENTAILED AN IMMEDIATE DRAWDOWN OF TROOPS WITH A SMALL
PROTECTIVE FORCE FOR THE UN STAFF REMAINING IN RWANDA.
HOWEVER, THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL. THEY AND MANY OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S RECOMMENDATION TO KEEP UNAMIR’S FORCE AS IS FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE BELGIANS, AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS WAS BOLSTERED BY THE SECRETARIAT’S VIEW THAT RAPID WITHDRAWAL MIGHT ACTUALLY PLACE THE FORCES IN JEOPARDY WHERE NONE IS PRESENT. RECOGNIZING THAT IT WOULD BE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF UNAMIR’S FUTURE NEXT WEEK AND FOR THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT TO BRIEF THE PRESS ON THE COUNCIL’S DELIBERATION. END SUMMARY.

PRE-SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

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PAGE 03 USUN 01607 01 OF 03 160142Z

3. PRIOR TO THE AFTERNOON ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS, NEW ZEALAND AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, CALLED A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADORS FROM THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND THE UK. HAD PREPARED LANGUAGE TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROPOSAL MADE IN THE MORNING SESSION (REFTL), TO SUSPEND UNAMIR OPERATIONS IN RWANDA, WHILE LEAVING AN INTERIM UN PRESENCE. THIS PRESENCE WOULD BE HEADED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD INCLUDE SUFFICIENT UN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ENSURE ITS PROTECTION, AND WOULD CONTINUE THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE RWANDAN CRISIS. ACCORDING TO THE UK, THE SECRETARIAT ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 250-300 MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED.

4. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ABLIGHT INFORMED THE GROUP THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF SUSPENSION.

AGREED TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NAM CAUCUS. THE NAM, HOWEVER, DECIDED THAT THE SUGGESTION FELL SHORT OF WHAT THEY WANTED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S PREFERRED OPTION FOR ALL OF UNAMIR MINUS THE BELGIANS TO REMAIN FOR SOME DESIGNATED PERIOD OF WEEKS TO ENCOURAGE A CEASE FIRE AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES. ON THIS BASIS THE SECURITY COUNCIL MOVED INTO INFORMALS.

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

5. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 15. A/SYG IQBAL RIZA BEGAN BY ADDRESSING ISSUES RAISED IN CONFIDENTIAL


7. THE FORCE COMMANDER BELIEVES THAT ABRUPT WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE "FEASIBLE, ADVISABLE, OR WISE," AND THAT ANY HINT OF WITHDRAWAL MIGHT CAUSE PANIC BY THE LOCAL POPULATION AND PLACE THE UNAMIR TROOPS IN HARM'S WAY. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A WITHDRAWAL OR SUSPENSION,

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01607 02 OF 03 160142Z

ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01
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PC-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-00
SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SA-01 RPE-01
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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMBASSADY KAMPALA PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
SECDIFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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AMBASSADY ROME
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001607

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01607 02 OF 03 180142Z
SECDIFF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: SECURITY COUNCIL AT IMPSSE ON UNAMIR’S FUTURE

RIZA CONTINUED, WOULD CAUSE IMMEDIATE MOVES BY THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF TO TRY TO CAPTURE THE AIRPORT,
WHICH MIGHT PLACE UNAMIR TROOPS IN JEOPARDY. AN ORDERLY
AND SAFE WITHDRAWAL, HE CONCLUDED, WAS PREDICATED ON A
CEASE-FIRE. SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT KEATING LATER
COMMENTED THAT "THE RISKS ASSOCIATED TO UNAMIR ARE A
FUNCTION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND SECURITY
COUNCIL ACTIONS." RIZA ALSO NOTED THAT THE UNEXPECTED
ARRIVAL OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT HAS POTENTIALLY RAISED
THE SECURITY RISKS, SINCE THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE
ITALIAN PLANE IS LOADED WITH MERCENARIES; THE FORCE
COMMANDER IS TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR ITS TIMELY DEPARTURE.

8. RIZA THEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE SYG HAS A CLEAR
PREFERENCE FOR "OPTION A" - KEEPING UNAMIR FORCE
STRUCTURE AS IS, WITH STRICT DEADLINES FOR A CEASE-FIRE
AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS - WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF
MOVING TO "OPTION B" - AN ANGOLA-TYPE SCENARIO THAT
INCLUDES IMMEDIATE DRAWDOWN TO A SKELETAL FORCE, IF
"OPTION A" BECOMES UNWORKABLE.

9. BOTH [REDACTED] ANNOUNCED THAT THEY SUPPORTED
OPTION A. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT IN ITS COMMUNICATION WITH
CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 03      USUN 0 1607 02 03 160142Z
GHANA AND BANGLADESH, THE TWO LARGEST TROOP CONTRIBUTORS REMAINING AFTER BELGIUM'S DEPARTURE, BOTH INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN.

10. KEATING THEN REVIEWED THE PROSPECT OF OBTAINING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONCERNING UNAMIR'S FUTURE: THE SYG PREFERS OPTION A; THE NAM PREFERS A MODIFIED OPTION A; AND THE UK AND THE US ARE SETTLED ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF OPTION B. SINCE THE COUNCIL IS UNABLE TO MAKE A DECISION, KEATING CONTINUED, PERHAPS IT IS WISE TO USE UNAMIR TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES; THAT IS, SUGGESTING TO THE PARTIES THAT UNAMIR'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IS PREDICATED ON A CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

11. KEATING THEN CIRCULATED A PAPER THAT BECAME THE BASIS FOR HIS BRIEFING TO THE PRESS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. AFTER SUGGESTED REVISIONS BY COUNCIL MEMBERS, THE FOLLOWING BECAME THE BASIS OF KEATING'S BRIEFING:

-- THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE HAD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION TODAY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNAMIR.

-- IT TOOK CAREFULLY INTO CONSIDERATION INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARIAT AS FORWARDED BY THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER AND THE SRS, AS WELL AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS TOOK NOTE AND FULLY UNDERSTAND BELGIUM'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN UNAMIR AT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04      USUN 0 1607 02 03 160142Z
THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS REPATRIATING THE TROOPS THAT HAVE BEEN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

-- THEY ALSO TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER MAJOR TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR TROOPS WITH UNAMIR AS LONG AS THERE IS A USEFUL ROLE FOR THEM TO PERFORM.

-- IN THE COUNCIL'S VIEW, THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IN RWANDA IS A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF. THE SRS AND THE FORCE COMMANDER HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BOTH PARTIES TO TRY TO SECURE THIS OBJECTIVE.

-- THE COUNCIL MEMBERS URGE THE SRS TO MAKE EVERY
EFFORT TO FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE. IN THIS REGARD, THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE OAU TO PROMOTE A CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA.

-- THE COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT BOTH THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

-- THE MEMBERS REAFFIRMED THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01607 03 OF 03 160142Z

ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 HA-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PC-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SA-01 RPE-01 PMB-00 /043W

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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5758

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY

UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

USCINCOURT VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001607

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01607 03 OF 03 160142Z
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRIWOL: SECURITY COUNCIL AT IMPASSE ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE

AGREEMENT REMAINS THE ONLY VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDA CONFLICT AND SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE COUNTRY.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS COMMEND THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEADERS OF THE SUBREGION AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA AND URGE THE LEADERS OF THE REGION TO PERSEVERE AND INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS FOR PEACE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU.

-- BUT, THE SITUATION IS GRAVE AND THE COUNCIL IS DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL TO BE PLACED AT SERIOUS RISK.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS INTEND TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW THE FORCE LEVELS AND ACTIVITIES OF UNAMIR AND TO TAKE DECISIONS IN THIS REGARD AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

ALBRIGHT

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A great part of the discussion of 15 April was devoted to the alternatives of UNAMIR’s operation. The Bel MFA wrote to the SC President that he intends to withdraw Bel units by the end of the week. He recommended that the SC pull out UNAMIR completely, until a cease-fire is arranged. He also informed about his readiness to hand over the materiel and equipment of the Belgian blue helmets to UNAMIR if the SC decides not to withdraw it.

(Note: This was just a small segment of the extensive and intensive Belgian diplomatic offensive directed toward the end of the week at withdrawing UNAMIR. Some important delegations evaluated this as a Belgian effort not to look stupid or irresponsible once they decided to pull out. However, they decided to pull out rather for understandable domestic political reasons caused by their 10 soldiers having been massacred than for objective reasons following from the Rwanda situation. Judged by its results in the SC, this diplomatic offensive failed. It is true, of course, that the population — the Hutu — have a thing against the Belgians, though not against foreigners as such.)

According to the Secretariat, the French contingent left Kigali on 15 April and the Belgian contingent, including their UNAMIR unit, was to leave by the weekend.

The situation in the country continues to be fluid. However, UNAMIR controls the airport (where the Belgians are passing the baton to the Ghanaians) which both belligerent parties respect. The postponed informal meeting of RPF representatives and the interim government took place, under UNAMIR’s auspices. The RPF’s key partner will be the defense minister who maintains at least some control over the (disintegrating) army and even over the Presidential Guard. The Secretariat confirmed once again that both parties are interested in UNAMIR’s presence and agree with the mediating role of the SRSG.

The CZ delegation has established contact at the working level with the RPF representative in New York who emphasized that the RPF also considers the Arusha agreements as the only possible framework of further peace talks. The RPF’s attitude to the new govt is influenced by the lack of clarity on the other side. It is unclear who one should negotiate with (remnants of the original, pre-coalition dictatorial govt of Pres Habyarimana and the decimated interim government which, however, was never constitutionally ratified have varying degrees of influence).

The Secretariat repeated the SG’s earlier position on UNAMIR one alternative — let it continue even without the Belgians (i.e., with the strength of some 2000 men); the other — pull out everyone except technical and security support staff of the SRSG who would also stay in place (all told some 200 people). Both alternatives assume a cease-fire; the discussion, however, clarified that a cease-fire is needed not (only) for UNAMIR to be able to operate but (also) to allow the withdrawal of its possible surplus units. The Secretariat repeated that the SG prefers the first alternative and that he doesn’t consider it practicable, desirable or wise to pull out UNAMIR completely and immediately (as minister Claes would want).
Nigeria, on behalf of NAM, supported the first alternative. The US stated that if the SC were to decide today (i.e., on 15 April), the US would insist on completely pulling out the military component of UNAMIR but that they completely understand the complexity and changeability of the situation and won’t have a problem with waiting for two or three days more. The UK preferred the second alternative.

The Secretariat underscored that even if the second alternative were adopted it would not be possible to withdraw the units immediately. Positions of delegations with different views did, however, not converge. Amb Kovanda helped sort out the situation by pointing out that if the SC doesn’t decide otherwise, the first alternative will turn into the default position, albeit without making an actual decision and without a change of the mandate. (NAM of course anticipated this result all along. They pulled the rug out from under the feet of the notoriously poorly prepared US.) Even though this decision-non-decision is not ideal (the world might have been expecting a decisive reaction from the SC), it gives the SRSG and Gen. Dallaire the chance to continue their discussions with the parties about a cease-fire.

The UK pointed out that we agree on 90% of the draft resolution and disagree only on what next with UNAMIR. He recommended adding a general para to the draft stating that “the SC carefully and continuously monitors the most suitable size and functions of UNAMIR”. Not even this formulation was acceptable of Friday; but since in the end we’ll have to say something, this formulation may well become the starting point for something further.

The SC President prepared his speaking points for the press which with minor changes were adopted without major problems as a reflection of the discussion. The SC will return to the matter on Monday 18 April.
Gharekhan informed SC members that the situation in Kigali is deteriorating further. The fighting is intensifying. Shelling has been directed at buildings which shelter refugees under UN protection. The Rwandese army is responsible. The attacks stopped after a protest of the UNAMIR Commander.

According to Gharekhan the chances of renewing the peace process are vanishingly small. According to the SRSG in Rwanda the governmental party is ready to negotiate a ceasefire. The RPF leadership has, however, refused UNAMIR’s initiative to negotiate, pointing out that the govt party had not met its conditions (in our view partially justified). They also recommended that Unamir not continue in its mediation efforts.

Gharekhan observed that in view of the unclear situation and the fragmentation of Hutu command whose units are starting to slip out of control of the defense minister, Unamir personnel is in direct jeopardy.

He also mentioned that the SG is preparing a report on Unamir for the SC in which he will recommend withdrawing (partially or completely) UN and Unamir personnel. The report will be debated on April 24 and a resolution is expected on Thursday.

[The CZ delegation] contacted the Mission of Uganda to get a clearer view of its Govt on the Rwanda conflict. The conversation indicated that Uganda doesn’t want to be dragged into the conflict and accused of fanning it. It considers the conflict as an internal Rwanda matter. On the other hand, it respects the right of Rwanda refugees in Uganda (largely Tutsis) to return home and join the fighting.

Uganda is ready to join peace negotiations but only with the agreement of both belligerent parties and the UN. It would prefer to leave the role of the main mediator to Tanzania and the OAU. It supports UN’s continued presence in Rwanda and is in favor of continuing the UNOMUR mission under its current mandate.
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INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
CONFIDENTIAL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE UNSC HEARD AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA APRIL 18, BUT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY ACTION AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006  200103014

UNCLASSIFIED
3. The UN Secretariat told the Security Council April 18 that UNAMIR was now mostly out of the countryside and only stationed in Kigali. Fighting in Kigali continues. The RPF controls the northern part of Kigali. Their offensive has slowed, either deliberately or due to resistance. The government's forces are resisting outside of Kigali. Ethnic killings continue, particularly behind government-held lines. There is neither a cease-fire nor a truce, although UNAMIR continues its efforts. The RPF will not agree to a cease-fire until the killings stop behind government lines. The RPF will not talk directly to the government, since to do so might imply recognition of the government.

4. The Secretariat informed the Council that 300 Ghanaians were withdrawing from the DMZ and would take control of the airport Tuesday, April 19. All Belgian UNAMIR HQ staff have left. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. The UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has made arrangements to send an advance team to look into aid shipments, but they cannot proceed to Kigali until there is a cease-fire. The force commander and SRSG will present further recommendations to the SYG within the next few days.

5. Nigerian Amb Gambari noted that the OAU is entering the diplomatic front, and has met with the RPF. The Rwandan ambassador told the Council a meeting was scheduled for Saturday, April 23 in Arusha between the two parties. The President of the SC briefed the Council on his meeting with the Bangladeshi ambassador. Bangladesh was still committed to UNAMIR, but increasingly nervous. If the danger increases, they hope the SC will review the situation. The President (New Zealand) reassured the Bangladeshi, and warned that premature announcement of UNAMIR withdrawal could be dangerous. The President said the Council needs to make a decision on UNAMIR by the end of the week.

Albright
To general disappointment, the SG did not submit his proposals today. Amb Gharekhan informed about latest developments. Further alarming information arrived from Human Rights Watch according to which some 100,000 people have been murdered; interpreting the fighting as strictly tribal is a terrible simplification.
CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 3/88/1
Our file: 700/NYK/00000/00000 $304.15

21:30 (5039)

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: WELLINGTON
CC: BEIJING, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BRUSSELS

FMAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary
- No recommendation yet from Sec Gen about UNAMIR future
- President underscores difficulty of Council not expressing any formal views on one of the most horrific tragedies and need for a decision by end of the week

Action
For information only

Report

2 In fact the secretariat did not come up with a recommendation from the Sec Gen on the future of UNAMIR today. The situation is evolving to the extent that it has been difficult to arrive at a clear recommendation. Our guess is that this is likely to be a result of a number of factors ie the force commander may be reviewing his own recommendations in light of the situation on the ground, the politics of making what would be a very difficult recommendation (if one were to be made to withdraw UNAMIR on safety grounds) for the Africans in light of the UN's activism and absorption with the question of Bosnia, and signs that at least some of the troop contributors may be getting cold feet. (In latter respect secretariat deny Reuters reports about troop departures. Only personnel to leave have been "non-essentials" is the unarmed observers)

3 Secretariat (Garekhan) provided a briefing however in which the situation was characterised as remaining tense. Fighting was intense yesterday morning (Tues) but had declined toward the end of the afternoon. The ICRC had
evacuated the wounded refugees from the stadium, the shelling of which by the "government forces" had left 40 dead and 100 seriously wounded. There had been heavy fighting at provincial centres outside Kigali.

4 UNAMIR is continuing with its efforts to get the parties to agree to a cease-fire and while the RPF still have difficulty with direct contacts with the "government forces" they were prepared to continue the discussions with UNAMIR to this end.

5 The Belge contingent of UNAMIR has completely departed, together with some 264 non-essential UNAMIR personnel. At present there are 1707 UNAMIR personnel left in Rwanda, mostly in Kigali. All but 87 of the personnel assigned to the DMZ in the north have already been relocated to Kigali with the remainder scheduled to have gone to Kigali today.

6 The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, especially the sanitary conditions at the stadium and hospital where the refugees are located. UNAMIR escorted some 18 ICRC trucks to deliver food to those in the stadium yesterday.

7 There is no change at the airport, both "government forces" and UNAMIR personnel are present. The RPF is not far away but not actually at the airport. There had been no progress in attempting to have it recognised as a neutral area. There is no deliberate hostility toward UNAMIR. The danger to them primarily comes from the risks of getting caught in the cross-fire or being caught in the "government" shelling of the stadium.

8 The UK reiterated the necessity to have a decision before the end of the week, noting that if the troop contributors decided (unilaterally) to pull out that would look "worse" than if the Council stayed "one step ahead" and decided to withdraw the force first.

9 At the conclusion of discussion President observed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to explain credibly why in the face of the most horrific killings the Council could remain formally silent. It is becoming difficult to explain why the Council is not pointing the finger at those responsible given that it was quite clear from the secretariat and from UNHCR reports that it was one particular party which was responsible. President also emphasised the importance of making a decision as soon as possible and that one merit of the NAM draft resolution (our fax 2438 of 14 April) was that it did address this issue.

Comment

10 President also had the opportunity to talk with the RPF representative and to impress on him the need for RPF to reach a cease-fire, though it is not difficult to see their
point about not wanting to enter formal negotiations with Rwandese "government forces" while those same forces are engaged in the current butchery.

End Message
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SYG DID NOT HAVE A REPORT WITH
UNCLASSIFIED

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES, THAT 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS WERE EVACUATED TO NAIROBI. ALSO 237 GHANAIANS WERE MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI AND THAT THE REST WOULD MOVE TODAY. NIGERIA REPORTED ON EFFORTS BY UGANDA AND THE OAU TO SEEK A CEASEFIRE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS GHAREKHAN REPORTED THE AIRPORT WAS OPERATIONAL BUT NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEW SHELLING OR PROPAGANDA AGAINST UNAMIR TROOPS. GHAREKHAN HOPED THE SYG REPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TOMORROW BUT WOULD NOT PROMISE. A NUMBER OF MEMBERS STRESSED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TO TAKE ACTION ON RWANDA BEFORE THE WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

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WHEN IS A REPORT NOT A REPORT
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3. AT INFORMALS ON APRIL 20 THE COUNCIL DISCUSSED
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PAGE 03 USUN N 01682 01 OF 02 210130Z
RWANDA. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BEGAN BY ANNOUNCING THAT
CONTRARY TO HIS STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL THE DAY BEFORE,
THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT HAVE A REPORT FROM THE SYG ON
FUTURE OPTIONS. HE THEN GAVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE
SITUATION. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT FIGHTING HAD BEEN
INTENSE ON TUESDAY BUT SLACKED OFF IN THE AFTERNOON.
THIS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED FROM THE
STADIUM TO THE HOSPITAL. THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT THE
STADIUM WAS NOW PLACED AT 40. THERE WAS ALSO FIGHTING
AROUND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL NORTHWEST OF KIGALI.
GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD LEFT AND AN
ADDITIONAL 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS HAD BEEN
EVACUATED TO NAIROBI LEAVING A FORCE LEVEL OF 1707. 237
GHANAIAN TROOPS OF UNAMIR HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO
KIGALI ON TUESDAY AND THE REMAINING 87 WERE EXPECTED TO
GO TO KIGALI WEDNESDAY.

4. NIGERIA PERM REP GAMBARI GAVE THE COUNCIL SOME
INFORMATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE SAID THERE
WAS A MEETING IN KAMPALA WHERE UGANDA'S PRESIDENT TRIED
TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND THERE
WAS TO BE ANOTHER MEETING TOMORROW; ALSO THAT LEADERS OF
THE REGION HAD AGREED TO MEET IN ARUSHA ON SATURDAY.
THE SYG OF THE OAU HAD CONTACTED REGIONAL LEADERS TO
UNCLASSIFIED

COOPERATE ON A COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GANBARI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL COULD RETURN QUICKLY TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA AFTER THE SYG’S REPORT WAS RECEIVED.

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MORE QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04    USUN N 01682 01 OF 02 210130Z
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5. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL QUESTIONED GHAREKHAN SEEKING MORE INFORMATION. BRAZIL ASKED IF THE 264 NON-ESSENTIAL WERE ALL OR MIGHT MORE LEAVE, SAYING THEY HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT 500 UNAMIR TROOPS WERE LEAVING. GHAREKHAN SAID THE REPORT OF 500 WAS NOT TRUE, BUT MORE TROOPS MIGHT LEAVE DEPENDING ON THE DECISIONS OF TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND WHAT DECISIONS THE COUNCIL TOOK. ARGENTINA EXPRESSED SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT, ANY SHELLING OF UN FORCES AND ANY REPORTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH SIDES TOWARDS THE UN TROOPS PARTICULARLY ANY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. GHAREKHAN RESPONDED THAT UNAMIR TROOPS WERE AT THE AIRPORT WHICH WAS STILL OPERATIONAL ALTHOUGH NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING NOW. UNAMIR DID NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD ARRANGE FOR THE AIRPORT TO BE CONSIDERED NEUTRAL. ALSO THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER ATTACKS ON UNAMIR AND NO DELIBERATE HOSTILITY OR PROPAGANDA TOWARDS THEM.

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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001682

DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

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ACTION BY FRIDAY, THE CALL
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UNCLASSIFIED
6. In response to a question by Spain Garekhani said he "hoped" the report would be available on Thursday but could not promise that. This revelation prodded members of the Council to stress the need not to go into the weekend without acting. UK Amb Hannay said that while troop contributors hold the ultimate power to decide if troops would remain, the Council should try to stay one jump ahead of them. He said it was better to rationally decide to downsize the mission than have troop contributors do it for the Council. Hannay concluded the Council needed to decide soon, we "can't retire for the weekend without taking action."

7. New Zealand commented that as President he was encountering a number of countries not Council members who could not understand why the Council was not saying anything on 'this horrific killing," as well as questions from the media why the Council was not confidentially pointing out who was responsible for this killing when they were receiving reports on who was at fault. Amb Keating said the Council had good reasons why they had not adopted a resolution last Friday but he believed the Council can not go beyond this Friday without action.

8. Amb Cardenas of Argentina joined this chorus saying the Council had to take a decision no later than Friday. He said the UNAMIR force may be evaporating through acts of troop contributors and that UNAMIR has been in limbo. He added that UNAMIR had a mandate not related to the present situation and that his government would be very disturbed if UNAMIR remained in this limbo. (Comment after the meeting Cardenas commented that this was crazy, that the Bangladesh wants to remove its troops and UNAMIR should be removed. End comment.)

9. The President said if the SYG report on Rwanda came out on Thursday he would try to adjust the schedule of work to allow an initial exchange of views. If not he would expect to discuss Rwanda on Friday.

Albright
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 01684 210134Z

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 SA-01 PMB-00 /044W

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 01684 210134Z

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN AMB ALBRIGHT MET WITH SYG BOUTROS-GHALI ON A
RANGE OF SUBJECTS (SEPTEL) APRIL 20, INCLUDING RWANDA.
BBG TOLD ALBRIGHT OF HIS DILEMMA: THE OAU SYG, HIS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 APR 2011
DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065

UNCLASSIFIED
FORCE COMMANDER AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN KIGALI, UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI AND AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WANT HIM TO KEEP THE UN IN RWANDA. 

THE DECISION ON RWANDA WILL EFFECT THE IMAGE OF THE UN. UN TROOPS MAY HELP TO DEFUSE TENSIONS. ALSO, IF A CEASE-FIRE IS AGREED, THE RWANDANS WILL NEED TROOPS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE CEASE-FIRE'S IMPLEMENTATION. THE OAU IS TRYING TO STAGE TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BBG DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A MASSACRE OF UN TROOPS,ALTHOUGH THE RISKS TO THE FORCES MAY INCREASE IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED. BBG WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE OPERATION IN RWANDA ONE LAST TRY. IT WOULD BE AN EASY THING FOR HIM TO DECIDE TO PULL OUT, BUT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIFTY THOUSAND ADDITIONAL DEATHS IN RWANDA.

3. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REMARKED THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UN TROOPS. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED BBG'S DILEMMA, AND PROMISED TO REPORT HIS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 01684 210134Z REMARKS TO WASHINGTON.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
Debating the SG’s report and the subsequent [draft] resolution hit some roadblocks. The NAM group, on the one hand, insisted that UNAMIR units not only stay in the country but should in fact be strengthened. On the other hand the US would best pull out UNAMIR completely. The constant uncertainty is apparently driving our soldiers crazy.

After intensive negotiations a compromise was finally reached. Most of UNAMIR will be rapidly withdrawn from Rwanda (600 soldiers are to be evacuated by air as soon as April 22). At the same time, its mandate will be adapted. The core of UNAMIR will stay in Kigali, some 270 people, around the SRSG. They will also try to contribute to a ceasefire and to restoring humanitarian assistance, and they will also monitor the situation in the country, including the safety of the civilian population which in recent days has sought refuge under the protection of the blue helmets. The UN civilian personnel will be protected by a UNAMIR unit.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

USUN N 01724 230056Z

ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 NSA-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
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INFO AMBASSADORS NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADORS BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADORS BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMBASSADORS KAMPALA PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMBASSADORS ACCRA
AMBASSADORS DHAKA
AMBASSADORS DAR ES SALAAM
AMBASSADORS ADDIS ABABA
AMBASSADORS ROME

CONFIDENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 001724

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR CLARKE: JCS FOR BOWMAN;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

USUN N 01724 230056Z

OSD FOR WARNER;

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: DRAW-DOWN OF UNAMIR; STATUS OF CIVILIANS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SYG'S MILITARY ADVISOR, GENERAL BARIL, PROVIDED
USUN WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE PLANS FOR UNAMIR
TROOP DRAWDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW RESOLUTION:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 05 NOV 2008  200103014

UNCLASSIFIED
- 900 troops, mostly from Bangladesh, will evacuate today and tomorrow, leaving about 600 in Rwanda.

- These forces will be in two groups, about 300 at the airport and about 300 in the vicinity of the stadium.

- The Force Commander will plan to draw down the forces near the airport and remain with a company of about 200 troops from Ghana and Tunisia and about 70 civilians (consistent with the SYG's Option II). His draw down plans will remain flexible to the requirements on the ground.

- Displaced Rwandan civilians are currently in three locations: the stadium, the Hotel Milles Collines Hotel, and the King Faisal Hospital. The RPF is making arrangements for their evacuation now and no major problems are anticipated. The hospital area is firmly within RPF territory and those people should not be in immediate danger. The area around the stadium is also confidential.

- If the situation becomes untenable near the stadium, UNAMIR plans to evacuate through the airport if viable or by road to Uganda. General Baril also mentioned the possibility of Belgian support for emergency situation, but he could not confirm a commitment.

- General Baril reports that the exit roads from Kigali are in relatively good shape, that UNAMIR will have more than sufficient transportation assets, and that they are comfortable with the security situation along the road out.

3. In accordance with the new resolution, the remaining forces will support the SRSG in his mandate to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda. Also, the Secretariat will ask the Council to keep the situation under close review to adjust remaining force levels.
ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL
Shooting is continuing in Kigali. The RPF controls the hills above the city and the North and North-West of the country. They control the town of Byumba in the North. The RGF (Rwanda Government Forces) control the North-East and the South. A representative of Medecins sans frontiers (MSF) which had been taking care of a hospital in the southern town of Butare visited the SC President. Soldiers of the RGF and of the Presidential Guard recently entered there, murdered all the Rwandan personnel of the hospital, then returned and murdered all the patients. According to the MSF representative, his organization never experienced anything of the sort, anywhere.

The meeting in Arusha did-didn’t take place: the RPF deputy didn’t have the mandate to negotiate anything with govt representatives. He did, however, announce a unilateral cease-fire which the RPF will declare at midnight local time, 25 April. However, whether the RPF will extend it, will depend on conditions (which Gharekhan did not specify).

Note: This situation leaves the SC quite perplexed, also because the Rwandan sits there, albeit usually silently. A dear genocide is taking place, of the governmental and presidential-guard Hutu units against the Tutsi. No matter how one considers the numbers, there used to be some 1.2 million Tutsi before the war and certainly 100,000 of them have been killed off. The regional organization (OAU) looks at the situation from the point of view of the country’s stability or possibly of the legitimacy of the government: it is striving for a cease-fire, holds both parties on the same level. Is this not as though we wanted Hitler to reach a cease-fire with the Jews? (Sure the comparison is wanting but the proportions are the same.)

The CZ Delegation will talk to some colleagues from among the “non-non”, to see whether we couldn’t react in some other way than by withdrawing UNAMIR, of which only 450 men remain in the country.
Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary
- Genocide reported by Medecines Sans Frontieres
- Council considers what, if any, options it may have to take action in this appalling situation

Action
For information and thoughts on appropriate Council action.

Report
2 Sec Gen of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) called this afternoon to brief the President on events over the weekend at Butare hospital administered by MSF. Butare is the second largest city in Rwanda and is in the southern part, under the control of the "government forces". MSF noted about 40% of its population was of Tutsi ethnic background.

3 On Friday the government army forces rounded up all the local staff of the hospital and killed them, saying they would return to kill all the patients the next day. On Saturday they came back and killed all 170 patients being treated by MSF. The patients had been injured in earlier conflicts with militia and with the army forces and were being treated for machete wounds. In answer to President's question, MSF confirmed that those doing the killings were wearing regular Rwanda army uniforms and emphasised that this was the most brutal act they had experience of in their 20 year history as an organisation.

4 MSF also reported that 140 people under the protection of the ICRC travelling to Zaire had been killed. According to MSF when the killing started the Presidential Guard began to
systematically kill people on a "list" of about 1500 of those in opposition to the President. This included Hutu members of the opposition. In more recent times the "government forces" had moved to targeting all Tutsis. If the situation did not improve in the south then, according to MSF, there would be no more Tutsis in the south "within a few weeks".

5 Because the MSF now had no staff and no patients in Butare they had withdrawn from their operation. Since then they had visited the Dutch and Belgian Foreign Ministers as well the King of Belgium to draw attention to what they described as a clear policy of genocide on the part of the Rwandan government forces.

6 MSF appealed to the Council to implement "safe areas" around hospitals. They said that there were many people in need of medical assistance who were afraid to get attention especially when they knew it was not safe even in the presence of ex-pat medical staff. (In their experience in the past, this had usually provided some measure of security). If the UN could implement a security perimetre around the hospitals, people would be able to travel from places of hiding in the bush or in their homes. This is "the minimum" MSF was seeking from the international community for immediate assistance. In their opinion this could work. Butare is only 2 1/2 hours drive from the Burundi border and their staff did the journey regularly.

7 In the short term, there would be 2 million people in the south (coming mostly from Kigali) who were in dire need of food, water and other basic necessities. This will require a major aid effort MSF noted.

8 President briefed Council on this call and Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided briefing on weekend events. The situation in Kigali remains very tense. There were no significant changes. The RPF continues to have control of various positions in the hills around Kigali and the north and north-east remain in their control, while the south and south-west are in the control of the "government forces". Elsewhere, the RPF forces were advancing but had slowed under opposition from the "government forces".

9 Over the weekend some 1000 UNAMIR troops had been evacuated from Kigali. Now there are 444 remaining (including 72 military observers). Although the evacuated personnel spent time in Nairobi over the weekend (to see if there was any prospect of progress at the cease-fire talks which had been scheduled for Saturday in Arusha), most had now been repatriated to their own countries. (The secretariat commented privately to us that the repatriation of the Bangladeshi forces had not been entirely unwelcome by the Force Commander).

10 As to the Arusha cease-fire talks, coordinated by Tanzania as the Arusha peace "facilitator", these had not
taken place as scheduled for Saturday. Although the Tanzanian government had asked UNAMIR to airlift the "interim government" party from a border location in Zaire, a short distance from Butare, the "interim government" had not showed up at the appointed time. This meant that they were not even in Arusha for the talks.

11 The RPF had showed up but was not, in any event, prepared to talk with the "interim government". It would however have been acceptable to them to talk with the Rwandan army (not represented at Arusha). The RPF position was that it wanted to present Tanzania and the OAU (represented at Arusha by its Sec Gen) and the UN with a unilateral ceasefire, but subject to certain conditions (previously reported). If the conditions are met, the unilateral cease-fire was due to come into effect at midnight tonight (Mon), local time.

12 The Under Sec Gen for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hanson, visited Kigali with a small team of UN agency reps over the weekend. The visit was to assess the urgent needs of the people of Kigali. UNAMIR continues to provide protection for people in the stadium and the Force Commander is trying to arrange "swaps" to get people to safer areas.

13 After a pause, and initiated by Argentina, there followed a long discussion in the Council as to what the appropriate response, if any, there might be. Argentina (supported by Czech, Spain and Pakistan) noted that each time the Council met it received a briefing on the atrocities in Rwanda and that it needed to show that it was not "indifferent" to the situation. Argentina proposed that the President make this clear to the media.

14 The UK disagreed and said that instead there was a need for the Council to support the efforts of the OAU and neighbouring countries in their efforts to get the parties together to talk about a cease-fire. It was readily agreed that the President could call in the ambassadors concerned to convey the Council's view (calls have been set up for tomorrow for this purpose). The UK also noted that the Council was in the "unenviable position" of not wanting to make statements on the one hand which it could not follow up on, or of hand wringing concern without action on the other. Filling time with empty resolutions was also a "sterile" activity Argentina added.

15 Spain then suggested that some thought be given to what if any responses the Council could make. In FRY a tribunal was created together with a special investigating commission, in Liberia an ad hoc commission of enquiry had been established to look into the Hrela massacre. Could not something similar be done here, at the very least to open a file in which the evidence of the MSF could be deposited so that over the longer term action is taken to have the perpetrators of this genocide held responsible?
16 At this point, the US (Albright) made what she described as a "very difficult proposal", she noted that in any similar situation, the Council would ask the President to call in the Ambassador of the state concerned to ask, on behalf of the Council, for an explanation. In this connection she had in mind asking why did the "interim government" not show in Arusha. After a long pause, Rwanda volunteered the information that a "Minister for the Interior" of the "interim government" had travelled to Arusha from Dar es Salaam to the talks on instructions from the "interim government" and that it was the RPF who refused to enter negotiations with this Minister.

17 In summing up this very difficult and depressing discussion, President noted that it would be very important for the Sec Gen to continue his efforts and that he would call in the ambassadors of the neighbouring countries as requested to convey support for regional efforts, and that it would be important for delegations to reflect on the discussion, recognising there might be a range of options (identified by Spain), while not overestimating the Council's ability to do something about the situation. He agreed to make a statement to the media which would convey this together with the discussion of the MSF information.

End Message
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1481
OF 260330Z APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME, DAKAR
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, NAIROBI
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

MY TELNO 1471: RWANDA

SUMMARY
1. Secretariat brief on developments. Situation in Kigali remains very tense. Massacres continue, particularly in the south. Withdrawal of UNAMIR continues. Remaining force strength now 450 all ranks. RPF present unilateral ceasefire declaration to UN and OAU at Arusha.

2. Council President briefs on his conversation with Director-General of Medecins sans Frontieres. Appalling atrocities taking place in Buhare. Some Council members suggest some sort of inquiry. I encourage focus on regional diplomatic efforts.

DETAIL
3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 25 April, Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) gave a briefing on developments in Rwanda. The situation in Kigali remained very tense. There had been intensive shelling. There was no change in the positions of both sides. The RPF controlled the hills around Kigali and the north and north-east of the country. The north-west, west and south of the country were held by Rwandan Government Forces. The RPF were reported to have taken Byumba and were also advancing from Rwanagana to Kigali, but their advance was being slowed by the RGF. The RGF in turn were advancing from Gitarama to Kigali. Massacres and killing of civilians, particularly in the south, continued.

4. Gharekhan said the withdrawal of UNAMIR was continuing. Some 1,000 personnel had now withdrawn. The present force level was 450 of all ranks. On 22 April the
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSRG) and the Deputy Force Commander had left Kigali for Arusha. The Secretary-General of the OAU and the OAU Facilitator, as well as a number of other observers, were present. Arrangements had been made by UNAMIR to take an RGF delegation from Goma in Zaire to Arusha. But when the plane landed the RGF delegation was not there and the plane had to return. The Secretary-General of the RPF had arrived in Arusha and had presented to the OAU facilitator and to the UN a unilateral ceasefire declaration taking effect from 12 midnight on 25 April. But the continued observance of the ceasefire by the RPF was linked to a number of conditions.

5. Gherekhan noted that Peter Hansen (Under-Secretary-General at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs) had arrived in Kigali on Saturday for a first-hand look at the humanitarian situation. Conditions in Kigali were severe. The Force Commander was negotiating with both sides on the safety of civilians still in the Anahorou Stadium.

6. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said he had been briefed by the Secretary-General of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) on events in Buhare over the weekend. MSF had been running a hospital with large numbers of people wounded, many seriously. Soldiers had come into the hospital and rounded up all the Rwandan hospital staff and doctors and killed them. The next day they had returned and killed all the patients. The MSF Director-General had said this was the worst atrocity seen by MSF since it was established. He had appealed to Keating to relay the information to the Security Council and to consider establishing safe areas or safe havens where Rwandan civilians might take refuge. In response to a question, Keating confirmed that the soldiers who had committed this atrocity were Rwandan Government soldiers, some wearing regular army uniforms, others in the uniform of the Presidential Guard.

7. Gambari (Nigeria) asked whether the intention was for the UNAMIR forces who had withdrawn to remain in Nairobi so that they could be redeployed quickly if the situation improved. Gherekhan replied that the troops could not be kept indefinitely in Nairobi. They would be transported to their home countries as soon as this could be arranged. By 26 April less than 200 would be left in Nairobi.
8. Cardenas (Argentina) said that there was a danger that public opinion would think the Security Council indifferent to events in Rwanda. It was important for the Council therefore to make it clear, particularly to the media, that the UN was aware of the gravity of the situation and was attempting to negotiate a ceasefire. We also needed to think about the humanitarian aspects. Was there anything further the Council could do? Perhaps we should think about safe areas. Yanez (Spain) agreed. Marker (Pakistan) was wary of discussion of safe areas. But it was true that there was a need to get the Council's concern across. At the very least the Council should say it was shocked at the atrocities reported by MSF.

9. I said that the Security Council was in an unenviable position. Some took the view, I thought wrongly, that the UN was to blame for the situation in Rwanda. It was unfortunate that the Secretary-General of the OAU had written to the Secretary-General in the way he did. Whether or not UNAMIR personnel had withdrawn from Kigali, they could have done nothing to prevent massacres in the countryside. We had to think carefully what we could do. There was no point in promising what we could not deliver. The key was to encourage neighbouring countries to continue their efforts to facilitate a political solution. The resolution we had just adopted gave us the peg for this.

10. There was then a somewhat confused discussion as to what else the Council could realistically do. Yanez (Spain) said that in previous cases of horrific crimes the Council had taken measures to bring the perpetrators to justice or at least to investigate more fully. There was the War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia which had been preceded by the Commission of Experts. In Liberia, a Commission of Inquiry had been established following the Harbel slaughter. The Council should reflect on how it could respond to the massive violations of humanitarian law being committed in Rwanda. Gambari said that the key was to get back to the core of the problem: the abandonment of the Arusha process. What the Council should be doing was to facilitate and encourage a return to this process. Albright (US) said that under any other circumstances the Council President would ask the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to come in and brief on why his Government had failed to turn up at Arusha. Bizimana (Rwanda) said that the Secretariat
had described some of the events over the weekend but had not highlighted one point. There had been a meeting in Dar es Salaam on 6 April after which the President of Rwanda had perished. But one member of the previous Rwandan Government had remained in Dar es Salaam: the Minister of the Interior. On instructions from the interim government he had travelled from Dar es Salaam to Arusha. Contrary to press reports therefore there had been a Rwandan Government presence in Arusha.

11. I underlined the need for the Security Council to make efforts in parallel with those of the Secretary-General to encourage the governments of neighbouring countries, all of whom had representatives in New York, to get the peace process back on track. I was perfectly willing to seek my Government's views on some kind of enquiry into the events in Rwanda. But whatever evidence was found, not much could be done with it until there was peace and stability in the country. Cardenas agreed. The need was for the Council not to project indifference, but to encourage regional powers to help bring about a solution.

COMMENT
12. If you have views on Yanez' idea for an enquiry into the massacres, grateful to receive them by 27 April.

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PAGE 4
1. (U) SUMMARY: AFTER RECEIVING A REPORT FROM THE SYG APRIL 21, THE COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 912 CUTTING BACK THE SIZE OF UNAMIR TO 270 PERSONS. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) THE SYG PRESENTED TO THE SC 4/21 HIS REPORT ON OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UN PKO IN RWANDA (S/1994/470 DATED 20 APRIL 1994). OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES PRESENTED, TWO WERE CLEARLY UNWORKABLE (I-
SEND SEVERAL THOUSAND ADDITIONAL TROOPS WITH ENFORCEMENT POWERS, AND III - COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL). ALTERNATIVE II -- RETAIN A SMALL GROUP, INCLUDING THE FORCE COMMANDER AND SRSQ, WITH NECESSARY STAFF, AN INFANTRY COMPANY TO PROVIDE SECURITY, AND SOME MILITARY OBSERVERS, TOTALING 270 -- WAS THE ALTERNATIVE CHOSEN BY THE COUNCIL. THE UN MILITARY ADVISER, GENERAL BARIL, DESCRIBED THE NEED FOR A RESOLUTION THAT SAME DAY. UNAMIR FORCES HAD BEEN ON ALERT, READY TO EVACUATE AT DAWN, FOR SEVERAL CONSECUTIVE DAYS. IN THE MIDDLE OF EACH NIGHT, THEY WERE INFORMED THEIR EVACUATION WAS CANCELLED, SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT YET AUTHORIZED THEIR DEPARTURE. MORALE WAS GETTING EXTREMELY LOW, AND THE FORCE COMMANDER DID NOT WANT THE STRAIN ON HIS MEN OF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN 01748 01 OF 04 260022Z
ABORTING THE EVACUATION AGAIN, THE COUNCIL HEeded HIS PLEA, AND MET IN WORKING GROUP THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 21, WHILE A FORMAL DEBATE ON BOSNIA WAS TAKING PLACE.

3. (C) UN DPKO OFFICIALS INFORMED USUN THAT THE STADIUM AND HOSPITAL WERE IN AREAS OF KIGALI CONTROLLED BY THE RPF, ALTHOUGH THE MILLES COLLINES HOTEL WAS STILL IN GOVERNMENT FORCES' HANDS. UNAMIR WAS MAKING AN INVENTORY OF THE NUMBER AND NAMES OF ALL THE CIVILIANS IN THOSE LOCATIONS, AND WAS NEGOTIATING WITH BOTH SIDES FOR AN EXCHANGE OF CIVILIAN REFUGEES.

4. (C) ON APRIL 25, UNHQ UP-DATED ITS INFORMATION TO THE COUNCIL ON UNAMIR'S WITHDRAWAL. ONE THOUSAND TROOPS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS HAD BEEN EVACUATED OVER THE WEEKEND, OF WHOM MANY HAD ALREADY BEEN REPATRIATED. 570 REMAINED IN NAIROBI ON 4/25. BY 4/26, THAT NUMBER WAS EXPECTED TO BE DOWN TO 200. 450 UNAMIR PERSONNEL REMAIN IN KIGALI, AS OF 4/25. THE RPF IS IN THE HILLS OVERLOOKING KIGALI, AND IN THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST OF RWANDA. GOVERNMENT FORCES HOLD THE NORTHWEST, WEST AND SOUTH OF RWANDA. THE FORCE COMMANDER WENT TO ARUSHA FOR TALKS ON 4/23. UNAMIR PROVIDED AN AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) NEGOTIATORS FROM GOMA, ZAIRE. HOWEVER, THE RGF TEAM DID NOT SHOW UP. THE RPF WENT TO ARUSHA, WHERE THEY ANNOUNCED A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE, BUT WITH CONDITIONS. UNAMIR WAS STILL DISCUSSING WITH BOTH PARTIES THE RELOCATION OF THE REFUGEES IN THE STADIUM, WITH A VIEW TO THEIR SAFETY.

5. (CQ SC PRESIDENT KEATING (NZ) REPORTED A VISIT FROM CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04  USUN N 01748 01 OF 04 260022Z
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS (MSF). MSF DESCRIBED RGF PERSONNEL ENTERING A HOSPITAL IN BUTARE, KILLING ALL THE LOCAL RWANDAN STAFF ON SATURDAY, AND RETURNING TO KILL ALL THE PATIENTS ON SUNDAY. MSF CALLED THIS THE WORST INCIDENT THEY HAD WITNESSED ANYWHERE IN THEIR ENTIRE HISTORY. THEY ASKED THE SC TO ESTABLISH SAFE AREAS OR SECURE ZONES FOR CIVILIANS.

6. (C) AFTER SOME CIRCUITOUS DISCUSSION OF HOW THE SC SHOULD NOT APPEAR INDIFFERENT, BUT REALLY COULDN'T NOT DO MUCH, THE UK SUGGESTED THAT THE SC PRESIDENT CONVEY TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TANZANIA, UGANDA AND THE OAU THE COUNCIL'S SUPPORT FOR THEIR PEACE EFFORTS. CONFRONTING A DELICATE SITUATION HEAD-ON, AMB. ALBRIGHT REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT IN OTHER CONFLICT AREAS, THE PERM REP OF THE GOVERNMENT INVOLVED WAS SUMMONED BY THE SC PRESIDENT TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS. SEVERAL MINUTES OF UNCOMFORTABLE SILENCE GREETED THIS REMARK. FINALLY, THE PERMREP OF RWANDA FOUND HIS TONGUE, AND RESPONDED THAT THE FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER HAD TRAVELED FROM DAR ES SALAAM TO ARUSHA TO PARTICIPATE IN CEASE-FIRE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  USUN N 01748 02 OF 04 260022Z
ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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UNCLASSIFIED  U.S. Department of State  Case No. F-2014-01300  Doc No. C05517347  Date: 03/26/2014
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001748  

DEPT FOR AF/C, IO/UNP, AND IO/PHO;  
CONFIDENTIAL  

CONFIDENTIAL  

PAGE 02  
USUN N 01748 02 OF 04 260022Z  
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;  
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;  
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA  

E.0.12358: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC  
SUBJECT: UNSC VOTES TO REDUCE SIZE OF UN PKO IN RWANDA  
ON APRIL 21; UPDATE IN SC APRIL 25  

DISCUSSIONS, BUT THE RPF HAD INSISTED IT WOULD SPEAK ONLY WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.  

7. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION 912:  

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  


RECALLING ALSO ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRT/1994/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL  
CONFIDENTIAL  

CONFIDENTIAL  

PAGE 03  
USUN N 01748 02 OF 04 260022Z  

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01300 Doc No. C05517347 Date: 03/26/2014
PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,


STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,

EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,

RECOGNIZING THE INITIATIVES MADE BY THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS,

SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,

APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDANESE POPULATION, INCLUDING THOSE WHO SOUGHT REFUGE WITH UNAMIR, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 01748 02 OF 04 260022Z
BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI,

STRESSING THE NEED FOR ALL COUNTRIES TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL, AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF,

-- 1. TAKES NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 20 APRIL 1994;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;
-- 3. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01748 03 OF 04 260023Z
ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001748

DEPT FOR AF/C, IO/UNP, AND IO/PHO;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 01748 03 OF 04 260023Z
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: UNSC VOTES TO REDUCE SIZE OF UN PKO IN RWANDA
-- ON APRIL 21; UPDATE IN SC APRIL 25

WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER,
CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF
OTHER CIVILIANS;

-- 4. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA,
PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND
SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;

-- 5. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND
OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF
AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON
ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE
AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 6. DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE
RWANDIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT AND FOR AN END TO THE MINDLESS
VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA;

-- 7. COMMENDS THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OF THE FORCE
COMMANDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND TO MEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  USUN N 01748  03 OF 04  260023Z
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST
RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS;

-- 8. DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY
SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO ADJUST THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR AS
FOLLOWING:

-- A) TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN
AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CEASE-FIRE;

-- B) TO ASSIST IN THE RESUMPTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
OPERATIONS TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE; AND

-- C) TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA,
INCLUDING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE CIVILIANS WHO
Sought REFUGE WITH UNAMIR,

AND AUTHORIZES A FORCE LEVEL AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 15
TO 18 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 20 APRIL 1994
FOR THAT PURPOSE;
-- 9. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN RWANDA UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND STATES ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER PROMPTLY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY MAKE CONCERNING THE FORCE LEVEL AND MANDATE OF UNAMIR IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS;

-- 10. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 01748 03 OF 04 260023Z
COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

-- 11. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEADERS OF THE SUBREGION AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA AND CALLS ON THE LEADERS OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR TO THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS, TO PERSEVERE AND INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS, IN COOPERATION WITH OAU AND THE UNITED NATIONS;

-- 12. REAFFIRMS THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS THE ONLY VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE COUNTRY AND CALLS ON THE PARTIES TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT TO THIS AGREEMENT;

-- 13. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL IN NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND IN THIS REGARD APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH THE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 01748 04 OF 04 260023Z
ACTION IO-16
INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 NSE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
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WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
AMBASSADY BUJUMBURA
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001748

DEPT FOR AF/C, IO/UNP, AND IO/PHO;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 01748 04 OF 04 260023Z
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-- ON APRIL 21; UPDATE IN SC APRIL 25

SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 14. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 15. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO
MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE
COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER
THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 16. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ALBRIGHT

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Amb Gharekhan provided the basic information. There have been no significant new developments – which among other means that the killing continues. Both parties refuse to discuss a cease-fire. The SRSG is flitting around the region’s capitals. (Human Rights Watch is complaining about him.) Govt representatives did not take part last week in the meeting in Arusha where they were generally expected, because they were in Badolite (Zaire) at Pres. Mobutu’s invitation – and discussed a cease-fire with the RPF there.

Nigeria’s Amb Gambari then informed about proposals of the African regional group which had been agreed to in the morning. They include:

1. Convening an urgent meeting of the OAU’s Central Mechanism for Conflict Resolution
2. An effort of this Mechanism and neighboring African countries to coordinate cease-fire negotiations
3. Sending police and military units of the OAU to Rwanda; but since the OAU has no money, put them under the umbrella – and at the expense – of the UN
4. Create a contact group of the African reg. group
5. Deploy military units in Burundi – preventively.

Gambari mentioned that the killing in Rwanda has two aspects: one, armed clashes between political forces, and two, mass murder of ethnic group members and of civilian population. African countries see as the first priority attaining a cease-fire and renewing the peace negotiations on fulfilling the Arusha agreements. (Been there, done that.)

Amb Kovanda introduced the CZ draft PRST (see attachment) which focuses especially on the one aspect which has not been treated in any SC document – genocide. The theses of his lengthy introductory remarks are attached. It was a pity that Gambari and Kovanda spoke on the same day: the debate then dealt with both contributions and those who wanted could give priority to the Nigerian proposals over ours – even though clearheaded people pointed out that the two proposals complement rather than contradict each other. There was general agreement that it is not sufficient to focus only on denouncing the murder campaign. If the SC is going to speak out, it must in the very least say more than that.

Reactions to the CZ draft can be sorted as follows:

1. UK and particularly France (the supplier of weapons to Rwanda which currently is actually discussing with the interim govt its recognition) were uncomfortable. France hypocritically stated that a PRST “isn’t enough”. UK stated that non-Africans cannot be in the lead with such an initiative and that we should guide ourselves by the wishes of the African group.
2. In the ensuing discussion, Nigeria didn’t voice an opinion on our draft. (No one else from Africa means anything in the SC.)
In one way or another, the draft was supported by Argentina, Brazil, NZ, Pakistan and Spain. The view of the US wasn’t legible: during the discussion, they focused on the suggestion of introducing an arms embargo; but judging by their earlier pronouncements, we suspect they would more or less agree with us.

Some countries – and the Secretariat – were worried that whatever the SC says doesn’t jeopardize the remaining 470 members of UNAMIR. (Horrific details from the Belgian press are being quoted here today on how the Govt troops first captured the ten Belgians from UNAMIR and then tortured them before murdering them.)

The result of the entire discussion is that the SC President is supposed overnight to compile ideas which should tomorrow appear in some SC text – be it a PRST or a draft resolution. This is our success because the text will certainly include a denunciation of the killing – though it’s unclear whether the word “genocide” will pass. Our draft intentionally went for the maximum, it triggered a discussion of the murder campaign which the SC seemed to have been avoiding to-date and will force the SC to say something. A side benefit is that the draft (and especially the introductory remarks) pointed to the scarcity of information which we have been receiving from the Secretariat on Rwanda – which we had to complement by information from NGOs. We also underscored in an important way our devotion to human rights, wherever they may be violated, as well as our independence – inasmuch as we didn’t consult this draft, on this specific matter, with the great powers.

Attachment – Speaking points introducing the draft PRST on Rwanda

1. Ambassador Gambari very usefully pointed out that two types of killing are going on in Rwanda – military, and the killing of civilians. The SC has so far been concentrating on two matters: in 80% on withdrawing UNAMIR, in 20% on attaining a cease-fire. The murder campaign of civilians has, however, been so far completely beyond our purview.

2. We have so far not received too much information as to who is responsible for the murder campaign. Nevertheless, the SG’s report suggests a lot in its 3rd para.

3. Our delegation – and surely all others as well – has, however, received a surfeit of additional information from NGOs. The SC President recently quite stunned us when sharing his information about the murder rampage in the Butare hospital, conveyed to him by a representative of Medecins sans Frontiers. The MSF no longer operate in Rwanda – and when this organization leaves a place, the situation must really be horrific. We have been receiving additional complementary or corroborating information from the ICRC, AI, and HRW (note: previously Helsinki Watch).

4. These are organizations which we trust – if only because we are familiar with the strict non-partisanship with which they used to monitor the situation in Czechoslovakia in less happy times. This information cannot be ignored.

5. This morning I spoke to Amb. Ayala-Lasso, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. He is already gathering information about Rwanda and will submit them to the SG.
6. (Quoting selected paras from the latest HRW document, a letter of 27 April addressed precisely to Ayala-Lasso which sums up what is known about who's responsible for the carnage.)

7. The Czech Republic has no ulterior motives here: we are not a former colonial power, we do not export arms to Rwanda, we don't have soldiers in Unamir, we are not even a regional power. We are shook up by what is happening there and feel that very minimum that the SC must do is to pillory the current government.

8. We have therefore prepared a draft PRST which we are submitting to the delegations for consideration. It will be up the SC how to deal with it.

[Note: the actual PRST draft is included as an appendix to the paper mentioned in the Introduction to this collection.]
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESK BY 290730Z FCO
TELNO 1538.
OF 290550Z APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME, DHAKA
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, NAIROBI
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

MY TELNO 1494: RWANDA

SUMMARY
1. Secretariat brief on developments. Unilateral ceasefires are not holding. Fighting continues. Further shelling of airport. Interim Government delegation inform Special Representative that they did not attend the Arusha meeting because they had gone to Zaire instead at President Mobutu's invitation. They agreed a separate ceasefire there. WFP distributing food in south and north of country. Could do more if parties would guarantee security.


DETAIL
3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 28 April Gharekhan (Secretary-General's special political adviser) gave a briefing on the latest developments in Rwanda. The unilateral ceasefires declared by both sides were not holding. Fighting continued and there had been heavy exchanges of artillery, mortar and small arms fire. The RGF positions around the airport were under fire from the RPF while the RGF had targeted the RPF in the CND complex in the centre of Kigali. Mortars had hit the airport again. This had not caused significant damage but a UNAMIR resupply flight had not been able to land. There had also been prolonged shelling of the area surrounding the Amahoro stadium and the UNAMIR headquarters. But again there had been no damage. Overall
there had been no significant change in the positions of the parties. The RPF were still advancing to Kigali from the east where meeting stiff resistance from the RGF. The Force Commander was in daily contact with both sides. The main focus of his contacts was a ceasefire, the security of the airport and humanitarian issues. He had asked both parties to withdraw troops and heavy weapons from areas controlled by UNAMIR. The UNAMIR force level remained at 450. This included 72 UNMOs. The troops were drawn from Ghana and Tunisia and the UNMOs from eleven other countries. The troops which had been evacuated to Nairobi had now been repatriated to their home countries, except for 175 UNMOs who would stay in Nairobi for a few more days.

4. Gharekhan also briefed on the activities of the Secretary-General’s representative (SRSG). He had been to Arusha where a draft ceasefire agreement had been presented to the RPF. This had also been presented to the RGF in Kigali. The SRSG had then travelled to Nairobi where, on 27 April, he had met a delegation from the interim government (the Ministers of Justice, Commerce, Transport and Communications and the former Chief of Staff of the Army). The delegation said they regretted they had not been able to go to Arusha. They had received an invitation from President Mobutu to visit Gbadolite instead. Mobutu had given them a draft ceasefire agreement which they had accepted. The interim government delegation had said there was also an RPF delegation in Gbadolite. They had also accepted Mobutu’s draft. The SRSG would be returning to Kigali as soon as he could. It was his firm view that leaders of neighbouring states could play an important role in adding to the peace process in Rwanda and would continue to seek their assistance.

5. Gharekhan also gave a briefing on WFP activities in response to the US request (para 4 of TUR). WFP had mobilised over 58,000 tonnes of food to meet the needs of refugees for two months. There had been two deliveries last week in southern Rwanda in cooperation with the ICRC. 8 tonnes had been distributed in Gitarama and 24 tonnes in Butare. However the supply to Butare had had to be suspended because of the deteriorating security situation. The ICRC and MSF had both been deployed from Butare to Burundi. There were drugs and food available in Burundi and a relief programme could begin as soon as the security situation improved. WFP were carrying out
similar work in Northern Rwanda. A DHA assessment team was currently in Rwanda. The initial appeal had been for $16.5 million in emergency aid.

6. Gambari (Nigeria) said UNAMIR was still playing a very important role under difficult and dangerous circumstances. He noted that there were two types of fighting going on in Rwanda. The first was fighting between the forces of the RPF and the RGF and the second was the fighting and killing occurring as a result of the total breakdown of law and order in the country. The African group had met earlier on 28 April to discuss what could be done. The first suggestion was to convene an emergency meeting of the OAU Conflict Prevention Mechanism at Foreign Minister level. The second was that the OAU Conflict Prevention Mechanism should help regional countries to arrange a ceasefire in a coordinated manner. The OAU should also ask some of its members to consider deploying mixed battalions of police and soldiers to Rwanda. However the OAU did not have the resources to do this itself. The expanded ECOMOG in Liberia might prove a model, finance via a UN trust fund. The final suggestion was that a Contact Group on Rwanda be established. The African Group had also discussed Burundi (see my separate telegram).

7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) circulated a draft Presidential Statement (text by fax to AD(E) and UNDO). This expresses Security Council horror at the slaughter of innocent civilians, and notes references in the Secretary-General's latest report that the current wave of killings were started by members of the Presidential Guard joined by elements of the RGF. It characterises the killings in Rwanda as genocide and warns the interim government that it bears responsibility for reining in and disciplining all elements of the RGF. In circulating the draft Kovanda drew attention to reports he had been receiving from Amnesty International, Medicines Sans Frontieres and Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch had said the violence in Rwanda was not random. It had pointed the finger at the Presidential Guard and armed militias trained over the past few years by members of the previous coalition government. The violence had been designed by Hutu hard-liners close to the late President to derail the Arusha process. It could not be characterised as purely ethnic since, immediately after the death of the President, Hutu opposition leaders had also been
killed. The massacres were of civilians and were totally separate from the fighting between the RGF and RPF which was being carried out by more conventional means. Human Rights Watch and the ICRC both believed that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide according to the Genocide Convention.

8. Albright (US) said there were a number of ideas circulating as to Security Council actions. One might be the establishment of an arms embargo. Although much of the killing was being carried out by machetes, there were arms involved and the US had reliable evidence that the RGF were actively looking for arms. The Rwandan Government should also be called upon to ensure its armies stopped killing civilians.

9. There was then a fairly lengthy discussion on the most appropriate next steps for the Council during which all Council members except the Rwandan Ambassador spoke. Mérimée (France) was attracted by the approach put forward by Gambari. The UN had taken a decision on the withdrawal of troops. A Presidential Statement which made no reference to any action to be taken would be somewhat weak. Vorontsov (Russian Federation) said there was a need for something to be done to stop the killing. In other operations the Council authorised air power to stop bombardment of civilians. Why hadn’t we acted to stop killing of civilians in Rwanda? As a first step the OAU should be called upon to do all it could and might be helped by the UN. Olhaye (Djibouti) was not convinced that the sort of presidential statement suggested by Kovanda would help in this respect. Yanez (Spain) said the Czech statement would need to be redrafted, but violations of humanitarian law could not be brushed under the carpet. Marker (Pakistan) said that we should react in some way to the continuing atrocities. As well as focussing on human rights issues this statement should underline the need for a ceasefire and a return to the political process. A statement should be adopted on 29 April.

10. I said you felt strongly that the Security Council needed the help and guidance of the African countries in its consideration of Rwanda. They should take the lead in this issue and had the right to look for UN help and guidance. I suggested that the Secretary-General consider what more could be done to improve the links between the SRSG, the force commander and the OAU and neighbouring countries. It was important for UN representatives, either from UNAMIR or from
headquarters, to participate in regional meetings. Experience in Bosnia had shown that a ceasefire negotiated away from the field rarely stuck on the ground. Local military leaders needed to be part of the discussions. There should be no disconnect between the efforts being made, for example, by President Mwinyi towards a ceasefire and what was being negotiated on the ground. As far as the statement was concerned, I would seek instructions. But I would welcome advice from the Secretariat as to whether the SRSG thought such a statement would help. If there was a statement, it should be more than just condemnatory. It should talk about contacts underway to bring about a ceasefire and a return to the political process. An expression of indignation was not enough.

11. Chen (China) said it was difficult to see what effective measures the Security Council could take. We should certainly encourage the OAU’s activities. Better coordination was needed between countries within the OAU, between the OAU and the SRSG and the Free commander in New York and with the Security Council. He saw problems with the draft Presidential Statement circulated. We should certainly seek the advice of the SRSG as to whether it would be useful. Any statement should address both the massacres of civilians and the fighting between the RPF and the RGF. Solutions to both these problems were related and we should not address them in isolation.

12. Keating (New Zealand, Council President), said there was a lot in Kovanda’s draft which needed to be said but it would read easier if it were more action-oriented. He also saw value in Albright’s suggestion that we consider an arms embargo.

13. There was agreement that the New Zealanders would circulate additional elements for inclusion in a Presidential Statement for consideration on 29 April (text by fax to UND and AD(E) when available). Gharekhani added that his one appeal would be for any statement not to contain anything which put the lives of UNAMIR personnel in jeopardy. He also made the point that the airport was crucial. It would be useful if a statement could find some way to call on all the parties to keep the airport open.

14. Possible Council action on Rwanda was also raised at the weekly meeting of EU Ambassadors on 28 April. Yanez raised
in the question of a Commission of Inquiry (para 10 of my
5 th no 1481 refers). The Council had authorised such an inquiry
in the former Yugoslavia. It could not be seen to discriminate
against African countries. He had some support from Noterdaeme
(Belgium). I again expressed some scepticism. The track
record of the UN on such inquiries was not encouraging. It
tended to be a short-term response when the Council was not
able to take military action. Discussion of the terms of
reference for such an inquiry would inevitably divert
attention from the most important task: achieving a ceasefire.
I did not think we could rule out an eventual inquiry of some
kind but it should be seen as one of the options before the
international community and not pursued in isolation. The only
other specific suggestion was from Noterdaeme who argued,
that additional UNAMIR troops should be deployed in small pockets
around the country protecting civilians, in particular those in
hospitals. I said this made little sense. There was a danger
in placing penny packets of troops around the country in the
current security situation. A small group of soldiers guarding
a hospital was just as likely to be massacred as the patients
and doctors within it.

COMMENT
15. [Redacted]. Seen from
here, there would be value in retaining the reference to
genocide. However I do not think we should point the finger
specifically at the RGF, despite the evidence cited in the
Secretary-General's report. Doing so might have serious
consequences for the safety of UNAMIR personnel on the ground.
One way round it would be to condemn the atrocities and make
clear that the two sides each bear responsibility for
violations of international humanitarian law in the areas under
their control. I am not much attracted by the idea of an arms
embargo: a possibility, if others want to pursue it, might be
to ask the Secretary-General in the statement to explore the
merit of the idea in his contacts with the OAU etc.

16. Grateful for instructions 291300Z.

HANNAY

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Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council has extensive discussion on various proposals for urgent action on Rwanda including possible arms embargo

- New Zealand calls for Council action including possible arms embargo

- President asked to draft statement following strong and unanimous support for urgent action in the face of continuing reports of horrific and overwhelming tragedy amounting to genocide

Action

For instructions overnight

Report

2 It seems that the continuing reports of butchery in Rwanda are at last galvanising members of the Council to respond to the prodding we have been giving on the need for further action. There has been a steady stream of NGO reports of brutality continuing.

3 Our accompanying fax (Wgtn only) contains RPF press release alleging that France is resupplying arms to "government forces" under cover of "humanitarian flights" made to Zaire. (We have drawn this to the attention of the French delegation who were dismissive but undertook to check with Paris).

4 Also included is "Human Rights Watch" release detailing atrocities, ICRC update, call from Amnesty International for RPF not to engage in killings, and article about inability
5 At this afternoon's consultations Nigeria emphasised that there are two types of fighting going on in Rwanda, that between the RPF and the "government forces" (RGF), and that being perpetrated against innocent civilians behind their lines. The Council had tended to concentrate on only the first in emphasising the need to have a cease-fire before the UN could take action.

6 Letter from OAU was distributed reporting on a meeting of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Addis today (copy by fax to Wgtn only). Nigeria informed the Council of the outcome of a meeting the African group held in NY this morning where it resolved to take the following action:

- convene an emergency meeting of the OAU Central Organ at the Foreign Minister level even before the meeting scheduled for Tunisia soon is held;

- have OAU Central Mechanism for Conflict Resolution assist in the coordination of efforts including those of the regional states (eg to avoid the situation over the weekend where the RPF went to Tanzania to sign a cease-fire agreement and the RGF went to Zaire to sign a separate document)

- consider proposals for stopping the killing such as sending a contingent of armed forces and military police, and place this contingent in an expanded UNAMIR (eg like the ECOWAS contribution in Liberia)

- establish a contact group to follow up these points and to develop proposals for Security Council action

- consider recommending to Council that a preventative group be deployed to Burundi (eg as in the case of Macedonia) to try to prevent problem engulfing the whole region.

7 Following this, Czech characterised Council action as having been focussed 80% on getting UNAMIR out of Rwanda and 20% on getting a cease-fire, with no substantive consideration of how to stop the ongoing genocide. For Czech they recalled their experience with the "scrupulous" reports of human rights organisations during "less happy times than now in Czech". Noting they had no particular "ax to grind" and being neither a past "colonial power", an "arms exporter" nor a "regional power", they tabled a draft Presidential Statement (worked up without much consultation with other delegations). The draft firmly points the finger of blame for genocide at the Rwandan "government forces" (copy by fax to Wgtn only).
8 There was a long and substantive debate about the various options before the Council. The US (Albright) noted that all Council members were frustrated about the situation and the Council had to "do better". In this vein, US referred to a number of ideas "floating around" including:

- Security Council arms embargo (given that US had "heard" that the Rwandan army was actively seeking to buy arms at present)

- Council action to call on the Rwanda army to instruct its forces to cease killing civilians

- encouragement to neighbouring states to facilitate cross border humanitarian assistance (in this connection US noted it had been in touch with Dept of Humanitarian Affairs and offered assistance with the delivery of humanitarian assistance)

9 At this point one or two odd positions were taken. The French were quick to support Nigeria's proposal but showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm with either the Czech or US suggestions. They did however support giving thought to the idea of a preventive force deployment to Burundi.

10 Russia (quite duplicitously since two weeks ago they had been vigorous proponents of withdrawing UNAMIR altogether) noted that the Council had taken "very timid steps" in connection with the "terrible extermination of people in Rwanda" which "deserved greater attention" and was not "doing anything to put an end to it" (despite the "good steps to protect UNAMIR"). "Why haven't we thought about collectively putting an end to this?" Russia asked, "it is not enough to observe this, we must do something".

11 Djibouti expressed readiness to consider a statement, though the Czech draft was "not helpful" under the circumstances of there being no cease-fire. Yet again Djibouti manifested its unwillingness to point the finger at the RPF. Spain referred to the widespread violation of international humanitarian law and supported the OAU, and US approaches and "some" of the ideas in the Czech draft and invited President to draft an appropriate statement on behalf of all.

12 Pakistan expressed the view that the Council action has "not been sufficient" and that "silence is not to be tolerated further". They expressed the view that the statement should also focus on the cease-fire question and on the 2 types of killing identified by Nigeria. Having a Presidential statement tomorrow "at the latest" was "the minimum".

13 UK took the position that the Council needed to work with the African group. A statement of condemnation was not useful. It would be an apology for action but no real action
could be taken except to look at improved coordination between the OAU and regional states efforts and those of the Special Rep and the Force Commander. There was a "disconnect" in this respect highlighted by the events relating to the different locations apparently attended by the parties last weekend.

14 It would be important in this regard for the neighbouring states to consult closely with the UN. He wanted to avoid the construction of an "overambitious" proposal which relied on UN resources or didn't "fit well with UNAMIR". The UK delegation was "open to consideration of a statement" but it would need to contain elements which were intended to bring together the OAU and the UN efforts.

15 Oman noted a need for caution in supporting any initiative involving the neighbouring states and agreed with the UK on the form of the statement. Oman suggested it was important for the OAU to visit the region to assess what is happening and to "pinpoint" the causes and background to the conflict. Oman was also upset by the reference in para 9 of the OAU letter to OAU "dismay" at the Council's decision to reduce drastically UNAMIR forces.

16 China recalled that it had always held the view that the international community should not give up its efforts and should exert greater efforts in view of the worsening situation. China identified 3 levels of coordination required: that between African states themselves (eg Zaire and Tanzania), between African states and the Special Rep and Force Commander on site, and that between the Council and the OAU. The problems they could see with the Czech draft was that it did not address the 2 types of killing identified by others, did not identify a future solution to the problem and may not take into account the views of the secretariat (especially those of the Special Rep). Nonetheless China was ready for the "arduous task" of producing something urgently.

17 Brazil recalled that the situation in Rwanda is one of the most dreadful events since World War II and noted the emerging consensus in the Council to consideration of action on an urgent basis. Brazil said it could support "some" of the OAU proposals in a statement but others would require looking into further. In Burundi the question was not only of preventive deployment but also of preventive diplomacy.

18 Argentina referred to the need for action also on the means available to the African states, highlighting the capacity problem for the area and agreed with Pakistan that it was a serious moral problem which was capable of infecting other areas in the region. The statement needed to be generic rather than specific and to be a warning about human rights abuses but not to cut across any responsibilities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

19 In our national capacity we recalled that from the outset
we had been among those who had strongly advocated an ongoing commitment from the UN to Rwanda. We noted that we did not find it disturbing to see the OAU referring with "dismay" to the Council's decision to downsize UNAMIR. The fact that we had had to take this decision had been to all of our dismay. We agreed that what was not being addressed was the killing of civilians. It would continue even if a cease-fire was obtained. This was where the Council was subject to criticism and constituted the rationale for the Czech draft. A statement would be better, though, if it were action orientated and went beyond merely expressing statement of horror. It was increasingly difficult to explain to the media why the Council had not taken action.

20 If there is credible evidence that one party is in the arms market then the Council had a serious responsibility to consider an arms embargo. It would be difficult to justify taking no action if later it was found that one party purchased significant quantities of arms. There was also the Nigerian points about the need for cooperation with the OAU, though it had to be realised that the OAU in fact had limited resources to take the lead in the effort on the ground. As the OAU rep had pointed out the UN would need to be "the glue" which helped the OAU to work out the issue. We also endorsed the Nigerian idea of needing to reflect on the Council taking preventative action in Burundi. We emphasised that if an arms embargo would require a resolution which could be worked on, in the meantime a statement would allow some action in the immediate future. The negotiation of it however could not be allowed to go on too long.

21 Secretariat (Gharekhan) endorsed idea of a statement but cautioned against the use of those words in the Czech draft which could endanger UNAMIR lives (ie the reference to the information having come from the secretariat). It was hoped the African contact group would keep closely in touch with DPKO and DPI about mutually reinforcing each others efforts. The need for coordination was also emphasised, though there was currently no difficulty with coordination of humanitarian efforts given that UNAMIR was involved in what humanitarian relief remained. Secretariat also emphasised what would be most helpful to UNAMIR would be reference to need to secure the airport as required by UNAMIR.

22 President concluded discussion by noting that all agreed that there was an urgent need to adopt a Presidential statement but that most delegations required instructions. We undertook to produce draft for consideration tomorrow with a view to its adoption tomorrow also. (Our IFF contains our draft.)

Meeting with Rwandan PR

23 We should also report meeting between President and Rwandan PR yesterday, during Ministers visit to NY at which Rwandan PR sought to make a "clarification" to the effect
that the involvement of regional states would be unwelcome. In particular he said it would "not be acceptable" for Uganda to participate in any "help in the conflict", especially in any UN force which might be expanded in the future. He said that "it would not be productive for Rwanda to have the presence of neighbouring countries in any Peacekeeping role in Rwanda."

24 President expressed the clear sentiment that under the "inhuman" circumstances prevailing in Rwanda now, this was bordering on the "outrageous". President emphasised that there is no sympathy in the Council believes that the regional countries do have a role in helping to stop the killing and in getting the parties back into a peace process. President said it was offensive for Rwanda to be asking for the Council's help in sorting out the situation and at the same time seeking to lay down conditions as to which troops would and would not be acceptable. President urged Rwandan PR to avoid taking such provocative positions.

End Message
Presidential Statement

Informal consultations on 29.04 led to a dramatic conclusion. As late as midnight [28.04] it was still unclear whether the CZ initiative of the previous day would result in adopting a (unanimous) PRST on Rwanda or whether on account of the resistance of some members to pointing a finger at the genocide perpetrators the draft might not be transformed into a resolution.

Only after midnight was a generally acceptable language found allowing the adoption of the PRST. The original CZ draft, however, mutated in the course of the discussions beyond recognition, inasmuch as the NZ President had overnight prepared a draft resolution containing all the elements from the preceding discussion. This discussion, as mentioned in the previous report dealt both with the CZ draft and with Nigeria’s information on the plans of the African group. The NZ draft resolution was thus substantively broader. It was actually not too difficult to agree on those parts of the text that followed from Nigeria’s presentation.

Some people, however, found some elements of the CZ draft problematic:

a. Is only the government party, or also Tutsis and RPF responsible for the massacres? According to our information, there are no indications that the RPF would be massacring inhabitants of the areas under its control. To point a finger specifically at the government party was one of the intentions of the CZ text. A number of delegations, however, found this “unbalanced” and the issue was a matter of contention to the very end. Even after midnight when agreement prevailed over every other point, Amb Kovanda blocked a whitewashing formulation of the critical second para of the PRST, to wit that [merely] “many” attacks against civilian population took place in areas controlled by the government. Finally, an acceptable formulation was found stating that these attacks are taking place “especially” in these areas.

b. In an effort to spread the responsibility between both belligerent parties, the Amb of France suggested introducing into the original text an observation that the RPF also participates in massacres. He wanted to achieve this by inserting a mention of the RPF in a sentence (which was eventually deleted) about information which we have been receiving to this effect from NGOs. However, when directly asked by Amb Kovanda which NGOs have reported about RPF massacres, he didn’t respond (and judging from all we know about Rwanda, he couldn’t respond.)

c. The mention of NGOs was in and of itself a delicate one and we didn’t expect it to survive for long. Eventually it indeed was deleted because some delegations (China and Oman, among others) didn’t want to introduce a new precedent, namely that the SC would respond not to information of the Secretariat but also of NGOs.

d. We anticipated difficulties with the term “genocide”. China had one problem: the NZ formulation was very cautious, pointing out that these and these acts amount
to the crime of genocide. It was, however, precisely this cautious, non-specific formulation that China minded: not referring specifically to Rwanda, "someone could quote it out of context and misuse it".

e. Whilst China had a problem of formulation when it came to genocide, NAM had a problem of content. NAM had altogether a problem will allowing that only one party was responsible for the massacres, let alone that this responsibility be qualified as genocide. It is a pity that the Secretariat itself has never employed the word and that it is only the ICRC and HRW that use it. Finally (as we had anticipated) the term as such didn’t survive – though international humanitarian law which the PRST finally refers to does include the Genocide Convention.

Discussion

Two camps crystallized during the discussion. One was interested – more or less actively – in as strong a text as possible. Apart from CZ who started it all it included (coincidentally) the other "Non-Nons": Argentina, NZ, vehemently Spain and (less vehemently) Brazil, as well as the US (strong support) and Russia. Holding back or opposing this were all NAM countries (including Pakistan whose Amb supported us on Thursday but was absent on Friday and his No.2 had a different view) and very clearly France. The UK meandered, in essence supporting us but didn’t really care much.

However, precisely the formulation abilities of the UK which managed in the critical moment to bring the final version of the PRST to fruition, just as it seemed that the negotiations might collapse and that we would be voting the following day on a draft resolution which was based on the draft PRST. (Truth to tell, exhausted as we were, we had been looking forward to such a vote which would have forced various countries to show their true colors.)

Even though our formulations are now completely submerged and fogged up in the text, we took a significant part in working it through. This was the first time that CZ presented anything and we scored on various sides. On the last day of its presidency, though, NZ truly sparkled. Also the support and assistance of the very precise and careful SP and of the US delegation were significant.

The situation in Rwanda

The situation in Rwanda is an ever greater catastrophe. As the PRST was being debated, the SG sent the SC another letter in which he drew attention to preparations of further blood-letting and presented some ideas as to how the SC might react. The SC just managed to take note of the letter; it will react to it only early next week. Human Rights Watch, however (with which we maintain intensive contacts) has terrible fears of further developments – an incendiary radio station in Kigali is apparently calling for completing the cleansing – i.e., for the final extermination of all Tutsi – by May 5 when the funeral of President Habiyarimana should apparently take place. ("Final solution"?) SG’s letter also mentions “preparations” for further bloodshed. However, the new SC President – Nigeria for this month – usually devotes the first two days of the month to bilateral consultations with other members.
Next steps

We intend to mention the danger of further bloodshed during informal consultations at any rate. We would however prefer to have an actual instruction from HQ to do so.

We would also like to know whether the Arusha agreement is still sacred for us, considering that according to the SG, 200 000 people have been murdered in the course of three weeks. (Nobody has been questioning Arusha as yet; but the NAM uses the argument of jeopardizing Arusha as a reason for not castigating the so-called interim government.)

Finally, there is the question of the mandate of the current Rwanda representative. He was dispatched here by a government which disintegrated after the plane crash, inasmuch as the partisans of the late president killed off members of the former opposition who precisely on account of Arusha had been invited to join the government – starting with the prime minister. The legitimacy of the current so-called interim government – which was at one point underscored by our African Dept – is not at all clear and many people here consider it a bunch of self-selected people. It would help us to have the freedom to question Bizimana’s mandate if the right moment arises. (The US are apparently considering the same. France, by contrast, is receiving members of the interim government in Paris.)
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MY TELNO 1538 AND YOUR TELNO 622: RWANDA

SUMMARY
1. After extremely lengthy consultations Presidential statement in MIFT finally adopted early on 30 April. Presence of Rwandan Ambassador on the Council complicates the negotiating process.

DETAIL
2. Informal consultations of the Security Council on the revised draft Presidential Statement took place on 29 April. Broad agreement was reached fairly quickly on the bulk of the text but the language on responsibility for the mass killings of civilians and on genocide (para 1 of the original text) proved less tractable. The non-aligned caucus argued strongly for these references to be deleted while others, led by the Czech Republic and Spain with support from New Zealand (acting in a national capacity) argued for their retention.

3. The negotiations were further complicated by the circulation of the Secretary General's letter on the situation in Rwanda (my telno 1563 refers) which rather cut across the thrust of the draft statement. Council members agreed that, since delegations would require time to reflect and seek instructions on the letter, we should continue our work on the statement. We should amend it to indicate that we had received the letter and would be addressing it along with the other information sought from the Secretary-General in the statement, but should still aim for adoption of the statement on 29 April. Given the time already taken discussing possible action the Council should take some action immediately rather than wait to take action on the letter.
4. As the evening progressed the Rwandan Ambassador's continued insistence on seeking deletion of the language on genocide and to the RGF responsibility for the bulk of the attacks on civilians (on which he had some support from the NAM caucus, and, on genocide, from China) despite the efforts towards compromise made by the Presidency rather soured the atmosphere of the negotiations. The non-non-aligned (Brazil, Argentina, Spain, the Czech Republic and New Zealand) were particularly incensed and when at 300315Z we were still deadlocked the New Zealanders circulated, in their national capacity, a draft resolution indicating that it would be put into blue at 0359Z and voted on 24 hours later if a compromise could not be reached. This served usefully to focus minds.

5. I then suggested a compromise formula drawing on the Secretary-General's letter, and reordering slightly the contentious language and underlined the desirability of reaching the agreement to which we seemed so close. After a short break in the consultations to sell the package my approach generally found favour and the text was finally agreed at 0405Z (although not before the New Zealanders circulated their resolution in blue). The statement in Mift was then adopted.

COMMENT

6. Seen from here the agreement finally reached is a satisfactory one. But the process of reaching it was more than usually tortuous and demonstrated for the first time the extent to which the presence of the Rwandan Ambassador on the Council for these discussions is becoming a problem. Despite being called in by Keating, who, as Council President, suggested that Bizimana refrain from obstructing consensus, he tried until the very last moment to slant the text in the interim government's favour. His interventions and the support given to them by the Africans (______________________) were in large part responsible for the lengthy and at times acrimonious debate. This factor will no doubt also complicate discussion of any further Council action on Rwanda.

HANNAY
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PAGE 01

USUN N 01817 01 OF 04 300130Z

ACTION IO-16

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

USUN N 01817 01 OF 04 300130Z

WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, FINS, PHUM, RAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

REF: A) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/28, B) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/29, C)
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION REQUEST: SEE PARA 14 FOR A LIST OF THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WASHINGTON MUST ADDRESS MOST URGENTLY.

3. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET APRIL 28 AND 29 TO DISCUSS WHAT TO DO ABOUT RWANDA. THE CZECHS PUT FORWARD A DRAFT STATEMENT BLAMING THE GOR FOR GENOCIDE (REF A). THIS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY TONED DOWN, AND OTHER ELEMENTS WERE ADDED (REF B). DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE AT 4 PM APRIL 29 ON THAT TEXT. SOME MEMBERS (FRANCE, DJIBOUTI, CHINA) ARE OPPOSED TO A STATEMENT AND TO POINTING THE FINGER AT THE GOR. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT WANTS TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT APRIL 29, AS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL PASSES FROM NEW ZEALAND TO NIGERIA ON MAY 1, AND MOMENTUM WILL BE LOST DURING THE SWITCH.

4. SUMMARY CONTINUED: THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE UN IS SETTING UP A "CONTACT GROUP" TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ACTIONS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE OAU MIGHT SEND A CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS TO RWANDA, IF THEY COULD GET FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THEY ALSO SUGGEST A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI. THE IDEA OF AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT, BUT QUESTIONS OF HOW TO ENFORCE IT AROSE. END SUMMARY.

DRAFT STATEMENT

5. THE COUNCIL HELD DISCUSSIONS THURSDAY AFTERNOON AND FRIDAY MORNING ON A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR RWANDA, AND WILL CONTINUE FRIDAY AFTERNOON. THE FIRST TWO DRAFTS WERE FAXED TO IO/UNP, IO/PHO AND AF/C (REFS A AND B). SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS WILL BE FAXED TO DEPT, AND FINAL TEXT (IF ANY) WILL BE CABLED TO ALL ADDRESSEES. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF CONTROVERSY ABOUT WHETHER, AND TO WHAT EXTENT, TO ATTRIBUTE BLAME TO RWandan GOVERNMENT FORCES FOR THE MASSACRES AGAINST CIVILIANS. IF A COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT CANNOT BE REACHED, THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MIGHT BE SCUTTLED. SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED REWORKING THE STATEMENT INTO A RESOLUTION. (COMMENT: STATEMENTS CAN ONLY BE ISSUED WITH THE CONSENSUS OF THE COUNCIL. RWANDA, AS A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, ALONG WITH FRANCE,
ITS PATRON, CAN BLOCK CONSENSUS. A RESOLUTION REQUIRES A VOTE. RWANDA WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN, REVEALING ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION. FRANCE WOULD LIKELY BE SHAMED INTO VOTING IN FAVOR OF A RESOLUTION. END COMMENT.) THE ARMS EMBARGO PARAGRAPH WILL PROBABLY BE STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE AN IMMEDIATE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM ARMS TRANSFERS TO RWANDA. THE RWANDAN CONFIDENTIAL

AFRICAN IDEAS

6. IN APRIL 28 INFORMALS, NIGERIAN AMB. GAMBARI RELAYED THAT THE REGIONAL AFRICA GROUP AT THE UN HELD A MEETING THAT MORNING, AND SUPPORTED SEVERAL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN ON RWANDA. A) THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THE OAU DEPLOYMENT OF A MIXED CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS. NIGERIA POINTED OUT THAT ANY SUCH OAU DEPLOYMENT WOULD REQUIRE OUTSIDE SUPPORT, SINCE THE OAU HAS FEW RESOURCES. B) BURUNDI IS TENSE, AND THEY RECOMMEND A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT, AS WAS DONE IN MACEDONIA. C) THEY RECOMMEND AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE OAU CENTRAL MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CMCR) AT THE FONMIN LEVEL. D) THEY SUGGEST THE OAU CMCR COORDINATE THE PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF REGIONAL LEADERS. E) THEY AGREE A CEASEFIRE IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY, SINCE IT WOULD CREATE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR A HALT TO THE
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

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SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, BAIID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

SLAUGHTER AND A RETURN TO LAW AND ORDER. F) THEY WILL
SET UP A SMALL "CONTACT GROUP" IN NEW YORK TO EXPLORE
FURTHER ISSUES.

7. GAMBARI ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FIGHTING IN RWANDA. ONE WAS THE MILITARY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE RGF AND THE RPF, WHICH COULD BE ADDRESSED THROUGH AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE. THE OTHER WAS THE SLAUGHTER OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, WHICH WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY A CEASEFIRE. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE ALSO NEEDED COUNCIL ATTENTION. ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED DURING THE COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR INFORMED USUN POLOFF THAT THEY WOULD LIKE A FULL-SCALE, FORMAL SC DEBATE INVOLVING AFRICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS, ON THE ISSUE OF RWANDA, SIMILAR TO THE RECENT EXTENDED DEBATE ON BOSNIA.

REACTIONS

8. USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER FOLLOWED UP ON SOME OF THESE IDEAS APRIL 29. WALKER INQUIRED WHETHER A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT IN BURUNDI WOULD BE AN EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING OAU FORCE OF 47 MEN, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE A SEPARATE UN FORCE. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE GOB'S OBJECTION TO A LARGER FORCE HAS BEEN REMOVED. NIGERIAN AMB. GAMBARI IMPLIED THAT THE "CONTACT GROUP" MEETING LATER APRIL 29 WOULD LOOK INTO THAT QUESTION. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR INDICATED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE GOB TO SEE IF PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE THIS QUESTION IMMEDIATELY. HE ALSO CLARIFIED THAT AN AFRICAN DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS AND POLICE TO RWANDA TO PROTECT POCKETS OF CIVILIANS AND HELP RESTORE LAW AND ORDER WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNDER UNAMIR AUSPICES. THEREFORE NO REDEFINITION OF UNAMIR'S MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

9. RUSSIAN AMB. VORONTSOV STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE "TIMID LITTLE STEPS" THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN SO FAR. HE POINTEDLY MENTIONED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS PREPARED TO GO SO FAR AS TO USE AIR POWER TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN ONE REGION, WHEREAS IT DID NOTHING IN ANOTHER. HE LAMENTED THAT NO COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL ACTION TO STOP THE SLAUGHTER WAS BEING CONTEMPLATE. SPANISH AMB. BAR NUETO SUGGESTED THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE COMPILING INFORMATION SYSTEMATICALLY ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW. CZECH PERMREP SAID HE SPEKE WITH UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHT AYALA LASSO APRIL 28, AND THAT HCIHR WAS FOCUSING ON RWANDA. OMAN RECOMMENDED SETTING UP SAFE AREAS FOR CIVILIANS. THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY THAT WHATEVER EFFORTS WERE MADE BY THE UN, THE OAU, AND VARIOUS REGIONAL LEADERS NEEDED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED.

ARMS SHIPMENTS

10. POLOFF MENTIONED THE POINTS IN REF C TO UN DPKO OFFICIALS AND FRENCH POLOFF. DPKO OFFICIAL RIVERO SAID SHE WOULD ENERGIZE UNOMUR, ON THE UGANDA BORDER, TO INVESTIGATE. FRENCH POLOFF SAID FRENCH AMBASSADOR MERIMEE HAD QUERIED PARIS ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF FRENCH ARMS SALES TO RWANDA. PARIS UNEQUIVOCALLY DENIED HAVING SOLD "A SINGLE BULLET" TO RWANDA DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS, SINCE 1990.

MEETING WITH RPF

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

THE RGF MASSACRES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE,
FOCUSED ONLY ON THE FIRST DIMENSION, SINCE INNOCENT
CIVILIANS WOULD NOT BE SAVED BY A CEASEFIRE. HE TERMED THE KILLINGS "GENOCIDE", AND INDICATED THAT THE RPF KNEW THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. (COMMENT: THE RPF HAS ALREADY CONVEYED THAT INFORMATION TO UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AYALA LASSO. END COMMENT) DUSAIDI ASKED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO CONDEMN THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES BY NAME AND TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION. HE REALIZED THIS COULD BE TIME-CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT, BUT STRESSED THAT GENOCIDE SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED WITH IMPUNITY.

12. DUSAIDI RELAYED THAT THE RPF SUPPORTS AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT KEEP MACHETES OUT, AND MIGHT NOT BE VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST OTHER WEAPONS EITHER. NEVERTHELESS, AN ARMS EMBARGO IS LONG OVERDUE. AREAS SUCH AS THE STADIUMS, HOTELS AND CHURCHES WERE CIVILIANS WERE HIDING SHOULD BE DECLARED UN SAFE AREAS, AND THOSE CIVILIANS PROTECTED. FINALLY, THE RPF WOULD PREFER A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO A STATEMENT. AMB WALKER INFORMED DUSAIDI THAT THE USG WAS CALLING ON GOR OFFICIALS TO BRING AN END TO MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS, AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE. DUSAIDI EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE RPF, AFTER DECLARING A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE IN ARUSHA EVEN THOUGH THEIR INTERLOCUTORS DID NOT SHOW UP, TO DECLARE ANOTHER CEASEFIRE. ON APRIL 30, DUSAIDI ADVISED POLOFF THAT THE RPF WOULD CALL FOR SRSG BOOH-BOOH'S RECALL. THEY FIND BOOH-BOOH TO BE PARTIAL TO THE GOR. HOWEVER, THEY ARE PLEASED WITH FORCE COMMANDER GEN. DALLAIRE.

13. REF D CONTAINED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED WITH GOR OFFICIALS VISITING PARIS. USUN COULD MAKE THE SAME POINTS TO RWANDA PERMREP BIZIMANA IN NEW YORK, WHO APPEARS TO BE PARROTING THE EXTREMIST HUTU POSITION, BUT WHO ACTS AS THOUGH HE IS REMOVED FROM THE EVENTS IN HIS COUNTRY.

ISSUES FOR FOLLOW-UP

14. THE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY GROUP MIGHT WISH TO FOCUS SOME OF ITS DISCUSSIONS ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY NEED ANSWERS IN NEW YORK:
-- Does the political will exist in Washington to provide resources for African troops which the OAU might deploy to Rwanda?

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 USUN N 01817 03 OF 04 300131Z

-- Should safe areas be declared for the protection of civilians? If so, do we approve of an OAU force protecting those safe areas?

-- Does the political will exist to put some teeth into an arms embargo against Rwanda (e.g. authorizing OAU-provided boats, if such might be made available, to patrol Lake Kivu and interdict suspected arms shipments, or authorizing OAU patrols of the Zaire-Rwanda border)?

-- Is the USG in favor of a preventive deployment of 100-200 troops to Burundi? Does the USG prefer expanding the OAU force to establishing a UN force?

-- How far does the USG wish to go in advocating that the international community/UN identify and punish those responsible for the atrocities?

-- Are we in favor of a formal Security Council debate on Rwanda, at which African foreign ministers could express their outrage and horror at the atrocities?

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01817 04 OF 04 300131Z
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

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PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

-- SHOULD USUN DEMARCH E AMB BIZIMANA, AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOR, THAT HE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY
TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING AN IMMEDIATE END TO
THE KILLINGS?
30 April 1994

New Zealand Mission to the United Nations

IMMEDIATE

To: UNTN
UNTN UNSC

SFAT (MEA, HRU, UNC, LCL, D03, DSPI)

Security Council: Rwanda

Copy of:

- Presidential Statement adopted 30 April (1am)

- Sec Gen's letter of 29 April asking Council to reconsider its action on Rwanda

Draft resolution submitted by New Zealand but not in the event voted on given agreement/c consensus with Presidential statement language (slightly modified)

Cable reply follows 2/4/94

FN.
The Security Council is appalled at continuing reports of the slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda, and reported preparations for further massacres. It endorses the concern expressed by the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the massacres and wanton killings have continued unabated in a systematic manner in Rwanda. It recalls that such killings have already been condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994.

Attacks on defenseless civilians have occurred throughout the country, especially in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda. The Security Council demands that the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control. It calls on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such attacks and to commit themselves to ensuring that persons who instigate or participate in such attacks are prosecuted and punished.

The Security Council condemns all these breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible. In this context, the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

The Security Council reiterates the demand in its resolution 912 (1994) for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities between the forces of the interim Government of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. It commends the efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to mediate such an outcome, and requests them to continue their efforts in liaison with countries of the region and the OAU. It also commends the courage and determination of UNAMIR personnel in affording protection to civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.

The Security Council welcomes the efforts that have been made by countries of the region, with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, to bring about an end to the fighting and the killings in Rwanda. It also commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Rwanda.

The Security Council is deeply concerned at the situation of the many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have been forced to flee the fighting and killings in Rwanda.

The Security Council calls on all States to assist the UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States. The Council calls on States bordering Rwanda, working with the OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda.

The Security Council calls on all Rwandan parties to guarantee the protection of displaced persons and refugees in Rwanda and refugees outside Rwanda and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian assistance.
The Security Council underlines the urgent need for coordinated international action to help bring peace to Rwanda and to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people. It requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU and countries of the region, to take appropriate measures to ensure that international efforts to assist the situation in Rwanda are carried out in an effective and coordinated manner, and to ensure that all relevant parties are kept fully informed.

The Security Council emphasizes the importance of Kigali airport for the provision of international relief efforts to Rwanda, as well as for the requirements of UNAMIR. It calls on the parties to allow the airport to be kept open at all times for such purposes.

The Security Council stresses the importance of ensuring that the situation in Rwanda does not affect adversely the security and stability of neighbouring countries.

The Security Council warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms. It appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict. It states its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda.

The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda. It reiterates its conviction that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country. It calls again on the parties to renew their commitment to this Agreement.
The Security Council requests the Secretary-General:

(a) in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU, to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view to assisting in the restoration of law and order in Rwanda and in providing security for displaced persons;

(b) to work with UNHCR, the OAU and countries of the region to take such preventive diplomatic steps as may be necessary to prevent the spread of violence and atrocities to neighbouring countries;

(c) to explore urgently ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons;

(d) to consult the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on measures to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced persons congregated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi,

(e) to bring to its attention any information that he might receive concerning arms flows into Rwanda, and to consult the countries of the region and the OAU about the practical implementation of an arms embargo on Rwanda, and

(f) to make proposals for investigation of the reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict.

The Security Council states its intention to consider urgently the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 April 1994 (S/1994/518) and further recommendations that the Secretary-General may provide.
29 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I regret to have to inform you that the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has reported a further deterioration of the situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda.

The capital city is effectively divided into sectors controlled by the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reports strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but enjoy little effective protection. Massacres continue on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.

A new complication is that in recent days both sides have begun to express lack of confidence in UNAMIR's impartiality and this is affecting their cooperation with my Special Representative and the Force Commander.

His Excellency
Mr. Colin R. Keating
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York
These developments raise serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR by resolution 912 on 21 April 1994. In particular, it has become clear that that mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres. At best it can provide limited protection to small groups of threatened persons in the city of Kigali and it would be unable to save them if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last three weeks. This humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the international community.

In considering what action should be taken, it has to be recognized that the disastrous incident of 6 April which caused the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi has had two consequences which require different responses from the international community. First, that incident sparked a resumption of fighting between the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Secondly, it reawakened deep-rooted ethnic hatreds, which have plagued Rwanda in the past and which have again led to massacres of innocent civilians on a massive scale.

The revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR in resolution 912 on 21 April is an adequate response to the first of these consequences. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have been making strenuous efforts to help the parties agree to a ceasefire and a return to implementation of the Arusha Accord. Those efforts have not yet succeeded but the present mandate and strength of UNAMIR are sufficient for them to continue.

The events of the last few days have confirmed, however, that UNAMIR’s revised mandate is not one which enables it to bring the massacres under control. Some of these have been the work of uncontrolled military personnel but most of them have been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order.
in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda. It has become clear that the horrors for which they are responsible can be ended only if law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity.

In these circumstances, I urge the Security Council to reexamine the decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take, or could authorize Member States to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate. But I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leave the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Security Council

PROVISIONAL
S/1994/522
29 April 1994
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

New Zealand: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it condemned the ongoing violence in Rwanda and demanded an immediate end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda;

Appalled at continuing reports of the slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda, and reported preparations for further massacres,

Endorsing the concern expressed by the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the massacres and wanton killings have continued unabated in a systematic manner in Rwanda,

Recalling that such killings have already been condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994,

1. Takes note that although attacks on defenceless civilians may have been perpetrated by all parties, in the main they appear to have occurred in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda;

2. Recalls that the killing of the members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes genocide and is a crime punishable under international law;

3. Condemns all breaches of international humanitarian law, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible;

4. Demands that the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control;

5. Calls on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such
6. Reiterates the demand in its resolution 912 (1994) for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities between the forces of the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandanese Patriotic Front;

7. Commends the efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to mediate such an outcome, requests them to continue their efforts in liaison with countries of the region and the OAU and also commends the courage and determination of UNAMIR personnel in affording protection to civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR;

8. Welcomes the efforts that have been made by countries of the region, with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, to bring about an end to the fighting and the killings in Rwanda and commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Rwanda;

9. Expresses deep concern at the situation of the many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have been forced to flee the fighting and killings in Rwanda;

10. Calls on all States to assist the UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States and calls on States bordering Rwanda, working with the OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda;

11. Calls on all Rwandan parties to guarantee the protection of displaced persons and refugees in Rwanda and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian assistance;

12. Determines that there is an urgent need for coordinated international action to help bring peace to Rwanda and to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU and countries of the region, to take appropriate measures to ensure that international efforts to assist the situation in Rwanda are carried out in an effective and coordinated manner, and to ensure that all relevant parties are kept fully informed;

13. Emphasizes the importance of Kigali airport for the provision of international relief efforts to Rwanda, as well as for the requirements of UNAMIR and calls on the parties to allow the airport to be kept open at all times for such purposes;

14. Stresses the importance of ensuring that the situation in Rwanda does not affect adversely the security and stability of neighbouring countries;

15. Warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms, appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and expresses its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda;

16. Reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda, reiterates its conviction that the situation...
15. Warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms, appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and expresses its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda.

16. Reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda, reiterates its conviction that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country and calls again on the parties to renew their commitment to this Agreement.

17. Requests the Secretary-General:

(a) in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU, to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view to assisting in the restoration of law and order in Rwanda and in providing security for displaced persons;

(b) to work with UNHCR, the OAU and countries of the region to take such preventive diplomatic steps as may be necessary to prevent the spread of violence and atrocities to neighbouring countries;

(c) urgently to explore ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons;

(d) to consult the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on measures to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced persons congregated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi;

(e) to bring to its attention any information that he might receive concerning arms flows into Rwanda, and to consult the countries of the region and the OAU about the practical implementation of an arms embargo on Rwanda; and

(f) to make proposals for investigation of the reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict;

18. Decides to consider urgently the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 April 1994 (S/1994/518) and further recommendations to the Secretary-General may provide.
Firm: NEW YORK
To: WELLINGTON
CC: BEIJING, BRUSSELS, GENEVA, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TOKYO

MFAT (MEA, UNC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, ISAC, DSP1)
(DSP3, EAB)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Thanks your U48378 (not to all).

Summary

- Our draft Presidential statement welcomed by many Council members
- Agreement on text held up by Rwanda, working through the NAM, opposing references to genocide and to primary responsibility of Government forces for killings
- Threatened impasse was broken by NZ tabling draft resolution for voting on Saturday, 30 April
- Statement finally read at formal session commencing around 1am, 30 April
- Council members chose not to consider until this week Sec-Gen's letter, circulated on Friday, calling on Council to reexamine decisions on UNAMIR and suggesting more forceful action to restore order

Action

Information

Report

First round of discussions on Friday, 29 April, showed widespread support for draft Presidential statement we had prepared. A number of countries (Argentina, Spain, Brazil) indicated willingness to adopt unchanged, while others (UK,
US) were content to suggest only minor modifications.

2 Rwanda and France sought to amend opening paras to remove assertion that Government forces were responsible for the bulk of the killings. NAM gave oblique support for Rwanda with Nigeria (Gambori) as NAM coordinator arguing for use of language from latest OAU communique which did not attribute responsibility between Government and RPF. Rwanda and China also sought to amend reference to genocide, with latter clearly worried that general formulation might be read as applicable beyond Rwanda (i.e. Tibet).

3 UK gave some comfort to NAM with Hannay arguing that attribution of blame might endanger UNAMIR and complicate the initiation of a peace process. Czech Republic and US, however, insisted that statement reflect the situation as it had been reported to Council; i.e. that killings were principally by Government forces. They rejected language which sought to equate RPF with Government, noting that they had no information suggesting RPF were killing unarmed civilians. Czechs also insisted on retention of reference to genocide.

4 In the early afternoon, we produced a redraft which was taken up when consultations resumed in the evening. Redraft included language from OAU communique but also retained, in gentler terms, references to government responsibility and genocide. Discussions focussed on these issues, though members also agreed to incorporate a number of proposals from Washington concerning the situation of the refugees, particularly those that had been trapped at the borders by Government soldiers. At this stage the discussion became more difficult with Rwanda, Nigeria (now represented by DPR Ayewah) and China holding out for removal of language they found objectionable.

5 Discussions adjourned again in the mid-evening to enable us to prepare a further revision incorporating the US proposals as well as Hannay's ideas for restructuring the text. During the break, the Non-NAM convened to consider objectives and tactics. There was a consensus among the five that Rwandan/NAM attempts to remove all references critical to government had to be resisted and that some form of reference to genocide had also to be retained. Non-NAM were united in view that credibility of Council and UN as a whole would be dealt a serious blow if Council refused to acknowledge magnitude of the events in Rwanda and allowed presence of Rwanda on Council to allow Government to evade direct statement of its responsibility.

6 Redraft we tabled retained sentence on Government responsibility but placed in brackets the sentence on genocide and a compromise offered by Spain referring in more traditional language to breaches of international humanitarian law and individual responsibility for such. Nigerians, clearly under pressure from Rwanda, and Chinese,
hoping to solve its problems on genocide by making common cause with the NAM, then sought to argue that the Spanish sentence should be accepted as the alternative for both the sentence on genocide and that on Government responsibility. French, who had not played a major part after the initial exchanges, chimed in in discreet support.

7 By then it was clear that NAM and Chinese thought they could carry the day if they continued to obstruct agreement. It was also clear that the other non-NAM had few ideas about how to proceed. Accordingly, we, speaking as New Zealand, announced that we would be tabling a draft resolution which would be put in blue at 2358hrs that night and voted at 2358hrs the following night, if there was no agreement on the statement beforehand. Shortly afterwards we circulated text of draft we had prepared. Draft simply put into resolution form the text of the latest draft of the statement, including contested formulations on Government responsibility and genocide.

3 Our announcement and subsequent circulation of the draft had the desired effect. NAM and French appreciated difficulty they would face if forced to vote on issues of responsibility for the killings and genocide. The appearance of our text in blue at 2358hrs as promised (the result of some heavy pressure on the Secretariat behind the scenes) helped to sustain progress towards an acceptable consensus.

9 By this stage the negotiations were focussed on a Hannay proposal to restructure and reformulate the second and third paras. This included an Argentine idea to delete the specific word "genocide" but retain the description of the crime from the Genocide Convention. A small adjustment we suggested helped the Chinese off the hook on which they had hung themselves. But the Czechs rejected Hannay's proposal to divide and reformulate the sentence on responsibility ("Attacks on defenceless civilians have occurred throughout the country. Many have occurred in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda.").

10 Kovanda's preparedness to block consensus on the point gave us room to propose that the sentences be rejoined in a way that preserved a more appropriate reflection of the Government's responsibility ("...throughout the country, especially in areas under the control..."). On that basis, the statement was agreed and read out in formal session just prior to 1am.

11 Discussion on the statement threatened to be derailed completely earlier in the evening when the Secretariat circulated, without prior warning to the Presidency, a letter from the Sec-Gen advising that things had become much worse on the ground and asking the Council to reexamine its decision to reduce the UNAMIR force level and mandate and "to consider again what action, including forceful action, it
coul take, or could authorise Member States to take, to restore law and order and end the massacres." It was quickly agreed, however, first, that the issues raised in the letter were of such a magnitude that they could not be responded to that night, and, secondly, that the Council should persevere with its efforts to agree on a more general statement that night which would note the letter but would not attempt to address its substance.

11 Comments on Sec-Gen's letter follow in a separate message. Our accompanying fax (Wellington only) contains the Presidential statement as adopted, the draft resolution we tabled, and the Sec-Gen's letter.

Comments

12 We can take some satisfaction from the statement that was eventually agreed to on Friday night. But what took place during the negotiations was an illustration of the negative side of the NAM at work. It was disappointing that the other NAM members felt obliged for reasons of NAM solidarity to protect the Rwandan Government, even in the face of reliable evidence (Human Rights Watch, Medicines Sans Frontieres) of the deliberate killings of many thousands of civilians by Government forces. Had we not been prepared to push things with the threat of a vote on the issue, the Council would have had to choose between a politically anodyne misleading statement or no action at all. Either would have been bad for the UN's credibility.

13 Part of the problem came down to personalities; Gambari's absence on Friday evening was keenly felt. As one of his own delegation acknowledged to us once it was all over, Gambari would not have allowed NAM unity to constrain him in the way Ayewah did. As events proved, most of the NAM were prepared to accept a reasonable statement but for political reasons had to be pushed into that outcome.

14 As far as we can judge, there has been no negative fall-out from the role we played on Friday. Nigeria (Ayewah) and Oman both made a point of coming to us after the adoption of the statement to thank us for the role we played. At a meeting of Non-Permanent-Ten and at our bilateral this afternoon, Gambari also made a point of thanking New Zealand for its "even-handed and fair-minded" conduct of the Presidency last month and for our efforts at ensuring that African issues, "particularly Rwanda" were given appropriate attention by the Council.

End Message
Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Sec-Gen has proposed that Council reconsider its decision to down-size UNAMIR and instead consider taking or authorising more forceful action to restore order;

- Council members see Sec-Gen's letter as driven, at least in part, by desire to avoid political responsibility for what is happening in Rwanda;

- RPF has circulated statement declaring its dissatisfaction with Sec-Gen's Special Rep and arguing that time for UN intervention is past;

- Council will hold initial discussion of Sec-Gen's letter tomorrow, 3 May;

- Meanwhile Tanzania has announced that Government and RPF have agreed to meet in Arusha tomorrow.

Action

Comments on New Zealand's response to Sec-Gen's letter

Report

As reported in our separate message, Sec-Gen sprang a
surprise on Council members last Friday evening by circulating, without prior warning, his letter (faxed separately) requesting Council to reexamine its decision in Res 912 reducing the UNAMIR force level and limiting its mandate, and proposing that Council consider taking or authorising more forceful action to restore order in Rwanda.

2 Nigerians intend to open discussion at informals tomorrow afternoon on how Council should respond to the letter. There was a preliminary exchange today, however, at a lunch meeting of the non-permanent members of the Council hosted by Gambari. In introducing the subject, Gambari referred to announcement from Tanzania that there was to be a meeting of the Government and the RPF tomorrow at Arusha where OAU Sec-Gen, Salim, would also be in attendance. He also noted that the Sec-Gen had been in contact with OAU President, Mubarak, to explore what the OAU and the UN might be able to do.

3 Preliminary comments by others confirmed a degree of irritation with the Sec-Gen over what is seen by most Council members as partly an exercise in blame shifting. As was demonstrated at the Minister's meeting with the Sec-Gen last week, Boutros Ghali is taking the line that the Council erred when it down-sized UNAMIR ten days ago and is conveniently ignoring the fact that the Council was acting on the only realistic option he put before it. That said, Council members recognise that the gravity of the situation is such that they must respond promptly to the Sec-Gen's letter.

4 Gambari wants the OAU to take the lead in formulating the international response. From his remarks today, it appears that he would be happy to contemplate either an expanded UNAMIR with a more vigorous mandate or the establishment of an OAU force along the lines of the West African force (ECOMOG) in Liberia which would operate in support of UNAMIR and would be funded through a UN operated trust fund.

5 It was clear from Gambari's remarks that he would support whatever outcome would be more likely to be readily agreed. His comments suggested that he doubted it would be possible to secure support in the Council (ie from the US) to funding an expanded operation from assessed contributions. But he indicated he would be happy to contemplate an operation run by the OAU, provided it was funded externally. He emphasised that the OAU had no capacity itself to fund the operation, and recalled the funding difficulties that had been encountered with the expanded force for Liberia when Zimbabwe had declined to provide the battalion it had promised because it would not be paid the fee it was after.

6 We expressed some doubts as to the wisdom of a Desert Storm type authorisation to States to take "all necessary measures" to restore peace to Rwanda, and Brazilians and Argentines questioned the appropriateness of intervention by Rwanda's neighbouring States. In response, Gambari
acknowledged that any African force would have to be under the OAU umbrella and should have a clear relationship with UNAMIR if it was not part of it. He also volunteered that Uganda would be precluded from participation given Musaventi's clear links with the RPF (though another member of the Nigerian Mission told us privately that they had had reports of a 30,000 force being assembled in Uganda) and that Zaire was probably ruled out as well since it had shown a "preference" for one side (the Government) even if it had not actually taken sides.

7 Gambari said that given the above and Burundi's situation, Tanzania and Kenya were the obvious countries of the region to take the lead, though he also said that there would be a need for involvement of countries of north, west and southern Africa as well. At this, Bizimana, the Rwandan PR, intervened to argue that forceful action by Tanzania would be inconsistent with its role as facilitator of the Arusha agreement. Bizimana went on to advise Gambari that he would be sending him a letter today with a formal request from the Rwanda Government seeking increased UN assistance.

8 No reference was made at the lunch to the latest position of the RPF who sent a statement to all Council members over the weekend in response to the Sec-Gen's letter. Statement (see accompanying fax) expresses publicly comment RPF made to us as President last Friday about their dissatisfaction with Special Rep Booh-Booh and goes on to argue that there is no need for forceful UN intervention and that such intervention would be seen as an attempt to protect the Rwandan Government.

9 Tomorrow's discussion of the Sec-Gen's letter is bound to be only a preliminary exchange in a debate that is likely to preoccupy the Council for all of this week. Few Council members will be ready to offer definitive proposals; most will want to gauge the general feeling in the Council and will want the Sec-Gen to provide more detailed recommendations before taking firm positions. They will also want to know what is happening at the new talks that are supposed to be getting underway in Arusha tomorrow.

Comment

10 It is far from clear at this stage how close the speculation at today's lunch is to reality. Much of what Gambari said was based on the hope that the US (and Japan) would be persuaded to contribute to intervention in Rwanda, perhaps through funding for an OAU force rather than through a UN operation funded through the peacekeeping budget. A quick check with the US Mission this afternoon, however, revealed that notwithstanding some speculation in the weekend press that the US might be prepared to support regional intervention to stop the bloodshed, the Mission is not expecting to be instructed to advocate or support such an approach. They advised that Washington's focus remains on the situation of the refugees and on following up the
measures proposed in paras 6-8 and 14(b)-(d) of the weekend's Presidential statement.

11 It is not clear at this stage how seriously the RPF statement should be taken. RPF were clearly angered at extent that Rwandan PR was able to influence the discussions on the Presidential statement last Friday. Unless they are suddenly able to take control of the rest of the country, we doubt that they would directly oppose international intervention through or in coordination with the UN, provided they are persuaded that their view point will be accommodated. Their confidence in the UNAMIR Force Commander should help to bring them to accept an expanded presence; but Booh-Booh's replacement may be part of their asking price. We do not, however, consider that their statement should dictate the Council's response any more that should the position of the Rwandan Government.

12 We consider that New Zealand should indicate a willingness to contemplate expanded international action to restore peace to Rwanda, provided that realistic and achievable goals for such action can be set. As a first step, therefore, the Sec-Gen should be asked to provide more detailed recommendations for the Council to consider.

13 On the mechanics of possible intervention, we think we should express a preference for any expanded international action to be undertaken by the UN itself; ie through an expanded UNAMIR. Only this way would the international community be able to keep proper control of the operation, both in terms of setting its objectives and in controlling its personnel. This should not mean that we are opposed to regional action by the OAU in conjunction with the UN if there are problems in securing agreement for the UN itself to act, but this would be a second best option. The least good option would be for the Council simply to authorise States to intervene as they saw appropriate. Given the tensions in the region, such action could well result in the problems spreading to neighbouring countries rather than alleviating the situation in Rwanda.

End Message
Gharekhan's information: Intensive shooting continues in Kigali, including the shelling of some of the refugee havens. Both sides are recruiting soldiers. The RPF is obviously expanding the area under its control. UNAMIR is not in danger; it is providing humanitarian assistance to some locations, the commander is pursuing his contacts with both parties and (a factor never mentioned previously) with the chief of the militia. An investigation team is being formed concerning the murder of the ten Belgian soldiers. UNOMUR did not confirm reports of massive RPF reinforcements from Uganda. In a letter to the UN, the RPF refuses any UN intervention. SRSG Booh-Booh (in whom the RPF has by the way lost all trust) left for a meeting that was to take place in Arusha today. (It's unclear, however, whether it ever did take place: the RPF intended to refuse to talk with the interim government and was prepared to talk only with the military leadership of govt troops.)

Discussion: The French Amb pointed out two levels: bilateral humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and on the other hand support for efforts to renew a dialogue and end the massacres for which "uncontrolled army elements" etc. are responsible. This requires an intervention from the outside. Both efforts, however, are predicated on the agreement of the parties. The intervention should be dominated by humanitarian concerns.

There are practically three alternatives:
1. Neighboring countries – which might, however, not necessarily be considered impartial.
2. The OAU – which France had suggested earlier: but they're all on their way to the RSA and nothing can be agreed sooner than in a week.
3. What's left is the UN, which in the light of res. 912 is a paradox. It is the most realistic solution but requires the agreement of the parties.

(We are puzzled by this French approach. It is as though they were intent on demonstrating to someone – possibly to their domestic audience – that France is engaged, even though their suggestions are unrealistic for two reasons at least: the SC will not be able to get engaged for the second time, and the RPF will not agree. So France can state – We did our best, but nothing could be done.)

Conclusions of the debate to which the US, UK, Nigeria and Russia were the main contributors:
1. External presence (just please let's not call it an intervention) is necessary, but:
   - With a clear mandate, concentrating on humanitarian activities
   - In close cooperation with the OAU
   - We need more detailed views of the SG for this.
2. It is necessary to concentrate on a ceasefire (though no one knows how)
3. Consider an arms embargo (one element of a draft resolution which the US are preparing
4. Possibly send an SC fact-finding mission to Rwanda (UK is reluctant).
The Security Council had another discussion today on Rwanda. The President (Nigeria) said that the Council had to take some action very soon; otherwise it would become a laughing stock. He proposed that he would write a letter to you requesting you to suggest some kind of a plan of action or concept of operations.

During the discussions, some delegations pointed out that it would be essential to give you some kind of guidance on the basis of which a paper could be prepared. It was also mentioned that unless the Secretariat was given an indication of the proposed mandate for an expanded UNAMIR, it would be difficult for the Secretariat to prepare such a paper. The proposed paper would also indicate the resources required to implement a modified mandate. Ambassador Hannay specifically asked me for my advice.

I reminded the Council that you have addressed two letters to the President. You have proposed that forceful action was called for. I supported Nigeria's suggestion that a letter should be addressed to you asking for your proposals or recommendations. Regarding a possible expanded mandate, I referred them to the letter of the Secretary-General of OAU which I have sent to you earlier today. In that letter, Mr. Salim has proposed "an adjusted mandate to cope with the expanded tasks of providing security to the displaced persons where needed and delivering humanitarian assistance". I said that if this is what the OAU wants, then it could serve as the basis for preparing a non-paper in the Secretariat. I pointed out that "providing security to the displaced persons" would definitely require additional forces with a mandate to use force if necessary to
escort humanitarian convoys etc., since the displaced persons are inside the country and not on the border.

Let us see what kind of a letter the President of the Council writes to you. He will first have to circulate a draft among the members who will give their comments on it tomorrow. We shall fax the letter to you in Johannesburg. In the meantime, I would suggest to DPKO that they could start preparing the non-paper on the basis of Mr. Salim’s letter.

The members of the Council also welcomed your decision to send Amb. Ayala Lasso to Rwanda.

with regards
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INFO WHITEHOUSE WASDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASDC IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001959

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON RWANDA MAY 6.
1. (C) SUMMARY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED ON THE TEXT OF A LETTER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEND TO THE SYG ASKING FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA. THE COUNCIL AGREED TO HOLD OFF ON DISCUSSIONS OF ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNTIL THE SYG SENDS HIS RESPONSE. USUN DEMARCHED RWANDA AND FRANCE ON PROTECTION OF THE NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE AS WELL AS THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR STOPPING THE MASSACRES GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.

2. (CQ AT INFORMALS ON MAY 6, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO THE TEXT OF A LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE SYG ASKING HIM TO REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR UN OR INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA. AMB WALKER TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT USG COULD NOT ACCEPT INDICATIONS IN THE LETTER OF A FUTURE CHAPTER VII OPERATION, SO REFERENCES TO RESTORING LAW AND ORDER WERE REMOVED. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS AT PARA 5.

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PAGE 03 USUN N 01959 01 OF 02 070044Z

3. (C) TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (SEPARATELY FAXED TO IO) WERE DISTRIBUTED. ONE FROM THE NAM CALLS FOR A CHAPTER VII ACTION TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. THE OTHER, FROM NEW ZEALAND, CALLS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CREATION OF WEAPONS FREE ZONES IN WHICH UN WOULD PROTECT CIVILIANS. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DRAFTS UNTIL THE SECRETARIAT PRODUCED THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUESTED IN THE LETTER. MEANWHILE THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD ATTEMPT TO AMALGAMATE THE TWO DRAFTS, A TASK THAT THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR NOTED WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE SECRETARIAT HAS AGREED TO PRODUCE THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING PAPER BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK AT WHICH TIME FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFTS IS EXPECTED.

4. (C) ON THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMALS, USUN DEMARCHED THE FRENCH AND RWANDA AMBASSADORS ON THE NEED FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO PROTECT THE FRANCISCAN NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE. ADDITIONALLY THE RWANDA AMBASSADOR WAS FIRMLY DEMARCHED ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO HALT THE MASSACRES AND THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE IF THIS DID NOT HAPPEN.
6 MAY 1994

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL,

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(S/1994/530) ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL COMMEND YOU, YOUR SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THE PERSONNEL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR THE
EXEMPLARY MANNER IN WHICH YOU HAVE ALL CONTINUED TO
CARRY OUT YOUR RESPECTIVE TASKS, UNDER VERY DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE AGREED THAT IN VIEW OF
THE UNABATED HOSTILITIES AND KILINGS, URGENT AND
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACTION BE CONSIDERED. IN ORDER TO DO
SO, THEY HAVE ASKED ME TO REQUEST YOU TO PROVIDE IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE INDICATIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH
REGARD TO THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS
WELL AS SUPPORT TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA.

THE COUNCIL MAY, AT A LATER STAGE AND AS SITUATION
DEVELOPS, REQUEST FROM YOU A FURTHER INDICATION AS TO
WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF LOGISTICS AND
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED UNITED NATIONS OR
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PAGE 02 USUN N 01959 02 OF 02 070044Z

WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

PARIS FOR PERLOW

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON RWANDA MAY 6.

INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND/OR NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES CAPABLE OF ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RWANDA, MONITORING OF A CEASE-FIRE AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DO NOT EXPECT AT THIS STAGE ANY FIRM OR DEFINITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM YOUR OFFICE, SINCE, AS WE UNDERSTAND, CONSULTATIONS WITH REGARD TO FUTURE UNITED NATIONS COURSES OF ACTION ARE ON-GOING.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS.

PROF. IBRAHIM GAMBARI
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

END TEXT.
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**Subject**

U04178: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA


**Summary**

2. US is moving towards support for a DR on Rwanda employing "Chapter VI plus" - i.e. authorisation to use force in protection of UN personnel and humanitarian relief operations. The US is concerned that the mandate must be acceptable to the parties, and is working its way through the logistical difficulties of an expanded relief effort.

**Action**

3. For information.

**Report**

4. We met on 9 May with Ambassador Robert Flatten (US Ambassador in Rwanda until November 1993, now Special Assistant in State's Office of Central African Affairs) and also spoke to IO (Zelle) about the DRs on Rwanda currently under discussion in NY.

**Situation Report**

5. Flaten opened by running over the latest reports from
Kigali, most of which will be familiar to you. He made the point that the RPF had resumed a determined offensive against the Airport (and as you know one UN flight was turned back to Nairobi). The earlier "lull" around Kigali had reflected RPF concentration around Ruhengeri (45 m N). The RPF is also driving on Bugesera and Kazenze (15 m SE). Flatten commented that Gen Dallaire, with whom he was in frequent telephone contact, had spent most of the weekend in ceasefire negotiations with the two sides. While both were saying publicly that they wanted one, neither was prepared to pay any price at all to get one - both wanted "ironclad guarantees" that it would work to their advantage. Dallaire's impression had been that the parties were "not serious" in their negotiations.

6 Flatten added that recent media reports that the killing in Kigali had been systematic and well planned in advance by Hutu elements appeared to be accurate. (Copies by bag to Wgtn, Bonn's para 7 also refers.) The rapidity of the response to the Presidential assassination, the cordonning off of the city, and the systematic decimation of Tutsi neighbourhoods (with lists of wealthy Tutsi's now "all dead"), all indicated a carefully planned attack. What the US did not know was whether this was a contingency plan ignited by the assassination, or whether the President's aircraft had been shot down by radical Hutus looking for a bloodletting. There was probably know way we would ever know, he commented.

US Policy

7 Flatten commented (pse protect) that the NZ DR was "a good one" and that he hoped US policy would come out very close to it. The US was coming towards general agreement that UNAMIR needed the authority to use force in defense of its own personnel and those of UN-supported relief efforts. However the emerging US position (supported, Flatten said, by Dallaire himself) was that this could be achieved through an augmented "Chapter VI plus" mandate. Crucially, whatever was agreed would have to be acceptable to both parties in Rwanda. The US was "not going to authorise one soldier to fight his way in". The RPF would not accept a Chapter VII mandate, he thought.

8 These comments were backed up separately by IO. Zelle commented that the US "would not support a massive expansion" of UNAMIR designed to "pacify" the country. But it was actively looking a "more restrictive options".

9 Flatten noted that senior US officials were meeting this afternoon to look at the logistics of an expanded relief operation into Rwanda. Supply lines from Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi were being examined.

10 Comment: There continues to be extensive media coverage here about the Rwanda issue. The Washington Post on 8 May reported officials as saying that the Administration was doubling US aid (to $15 million), sending Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights Shattuck and Amb Rawson to Rwanda to try to negotiate a ceasefire, and was going to press further for an international arms embargo (which they concede will make little practical difference). The tenor of the reported remarks has, over the last few days, been somewhat more sanguine to the possibility of concrete action to alleviate the situation than Administration comment of a week or so ago. We expect US policy to develop further over the course of this week.

End Message
At informals, the SGs unofficial report on Rwanda stated being considered. The discussion indicated that the primary task for the SC is guaranteeing the security of IDPs and the distribution of humanitarian assistance on Rwanda territory, regardless of the fact that neither RGF nor the RPF have explicitly expressed their approval of this operation. A subsequent or parallel task will be to pressure the parties in the conflict to start talks about a cease-fire.

Most delegation spoke in favor of separating the humanitarian action from enforcing political objectives – the cease-fire and starting peace talks. There is general support for imposing an embargo on arms and military equipment to Rwanda and for opening the investigation of crimes against humanity and bringing those responsible for them to justice.

The SG’s report anticipates the dispatch of some 5,500 soldiers, creating a neutral zone under UN control around the Kigali airport and safe zones in areas with a high concentration of IDPs. The main content of the mandate would be arranging for the safety of IDPs in these zones, the protection of humanitarian convoys and the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The report does not anticipate peace-enforcement, apart from self-defense. UNAMIR HQ would be in Kigali and the airport would be the focal point for receiving and distributing aid.

The US delegation presented a proposal to establish protective zones along the borders with Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire in which IDPs would concentrate with UNAMIR taking care of their safety. According to the US, fewer troops would be needed for this alternative, it would be less expensive and logistically more manageable than from Kigali (as assumed in the SG’s report) which is the center of fighting. If this alternative were adopted, the US would be prepared to significantly participate in the financial, lift and equipment support of the operation.

Towards the end, the SC President distributed a draft resolution based on suggestions of NZ and Djibouti, with a view to the SG’s report. It will be discussed tomorrow.

The SG’s representative informed that fighting between the RPF and the RGF is continuing in Kigali and in other places. RGF is defending against an RPF attack in Kigali but it seems that the RPF has the upper hand. Some 40 people were killed yesterday in Kigali, including three local journalists. On Monday, a Ghanaian UNAMIR member was killed. Fighting is going on 1-2 km from the airport which is intermittently closed. That makes transport of assistance from Nairobi more difficult. Information keeps coming about continuing massacres in areas under the control of militias, though their extent is diminishing. According to Gharekhan, it seems that neither party to the conflict is prepared to cease fire and start talks.

Ayala Lasso, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has arrived in Rwanda. He should be meeting RPF representatives today and those of the RGF tomorrow.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOGH-BOGH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 11 May 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1584

SUBJECT: Informal consultations on the "non-paper"

1. During informal consultations held this afternoon, the Security Council began consideration of the "non-paper" on the possible expansion of the mandate of UNAMIR. Several members of the Council expressed support for the concept of operations outlined in the paper. They agreed that an expanded operation should focus on the humanitarian emergency in the country, although some members of the Council stressed that the efforts to achieve a cease-fire and reactivate the Arusha peace process should be pursued actively at the same time.

2. The Perm. Rep. of the United States, speaking on the basis of the attached "talking points", did not object to the proposed concept of operations but expressed a preference for the creation of a "protective zone" along the border with Burundi, where an international force would provide assistance and security to refugees and displaced persons. She also felt that it would be logistically difficult to deploy a large force out of Kigali, in view of the intense fighting taking place in the city and around the airport, and stressed that it would be preferable to "work from outside in" rather than "inside out". The Perm. Rep of Russia also expressed a preference for the establishment of "protective zones" along the borders with Burundi and Tanzania.

...
3. A few members of the Council recognized that, while it was important to establish Kigali airport as a neutral zone, the deployment of the operation should not be entirely based on this premise since it was not sure at this time whether the consent of the parties could be secured. It was, therefore, suggested that the deployment plan should include some flexibility and that part of the deployment could perhaps be undertaken from neighbouring countries. General Baril later clarified that this possibility, as well as the use of other airstrips within Rwanda, had already been looked into. He added that, while the use of Kigali airport was obviously important, it did not have to be the only staging area.

4. The Perm. Rep. of Rwanda, Ambassador Bizimana, said that the "Government of Rwanda" was prepared to cooperate with the efforts of the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to people in need. He stressed, however, that the cease-fire should also continue to be a priority and indicated, in this context, that his Government was ready to agree to an "immediate and unconditional cease-fire". He added that the proposed operation should be deployed and operate in the areas controlled by both sides and not just in one part of the country.

5. Mr. Gharekhani briefed the members of the Council on the latest developments on the ground. He indicated that the Special Representative and the Force Commander had been asked to discuss the non-paper with both sides and to seek their concurrence to it. He promised to inform the Council of the reaction of the parties. Several members of the Council stressed the importance of obtaining the consent of the parties and some suggested that an effort should be made to obtain that consent in writing.

/...
6. In response to queries regarding military activities along the Uganda-Rwanda border, Mr. Gharekhani indicated that while there did not seem to be any significant cross-border movements, UNOMUR had reported that some restrictions had been imposed on its movements in parts of the border area. He indicated that a detailed report had been requested from you and that the necessary information would be provided to the Council as soon as we received the necessary feedback.

7. There were also questions about the rules of engagement of an expanded operation. General Baril clarified that the basic principle of minimum use of force in self-defence would continue to be observed. He stressed, however, that self-defence would be interpreted to include the defense of the mandate entrusted to the operation.

8. In conclusion, the members of the Council agreed to continue their discussions on the proposed humanitarian operation tomorrow. Some members stressed that the Council should take the necessary decisions promptly. It was decided, in this connection, to begin work on a draft resolution which will draw on the ideas contained in our "non-paper". The Perm. Rep. of the UK expressed the view that a more formal document and a budget outline should be submitted by the Secretary-General before the adoption of a resolution. Mr. Gharekhani agreed that a formal report would have to be prepared. He pointed out, however, that it would be useful, for the preparation of this report, to receive additional guidance regarding the course of action which the Security Council intended to take.

9. We are adjusting the "non-paper" so that it can be issued as a formal report and would appreciate receiving any additional points which you would like to see included in the report, beyond those contained in your MIR-946 of today. Many thanks and best regards.
TALKING POINTS
RWANDA

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas further, here in the Council, as well as with representatives of concerned African states.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement an arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventative capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.
This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

(If asked what direct support U.S. could provide:

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.)

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:
Neither the UN nor the OAU have demonstrated a capability to mount large-scale peace enforcement missions with success.

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, it is unclear that any country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim.

The SYG's indicative contingency planning falls between these two approaches. However, we believe that many of the problems we just laid out would also bedevil the SYG's proposed mission - particularly the logistical and recruitment aspects.

Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as a result of this tragic conflict.
SG’s representative Amb Gharekhan informed the SC that intensive fighting between the RPF and the RGF continue in Kigali. RPF units in the south of Kigali are moving westward.

Ayala Lasso, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, met in Rwanda with representatives of both belligerent parties. He appealed over the Rwanda radio for a ceasefire. Then he left for Nairobi.

Uganda’s president Museveni announced that he intends to convene a regional conference with a ceasefire as its objective.

During a meeting of the UN and OAU SGs, Tanzania’s President and the US VP, in the RSA, Salim A. Salim informed that four African countries had expressed their readiness to provide military units for an expanded UNAMIR mandate (Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania; he didn’t mention the fourth one), without specifying troop numbers.

SC President Gambari informed the SC that he had dealt separately with Rwanda’s Foreign Minister and an RPF representative. Both parties agreed to the anticipated expansion of the UNAMIR operation and are awaiting it impatiently.

During informal consultations, SC members agreed on the principles of a forthcoming resolution to expand UNAMIR’s mandate:
- The proposed activity will be strictly humanitarian
- The mandate will be formulated so as to allow maximum flexibility in executing it
- The number of expanded UNAMIR has been preliminarily set at “up to 5500”
- The resolution will include an embargo on arms and matériel
- The resolution would have a political content as well but would particularly refer to res. 914 (1994)
- The action should be fast, decisive and correspond to realistic possibilities
- Preparing the resolution should be conditioned by the submission of an official report by the SG in which he would outline safe zones, suggest how to create them, specify the troop-contributing countries, including numbers of troops, their armaments and equipment, the dates of their deployment, whether their deployment would fall under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, list countries that would provide logistical assistance, specify whether Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire agree, etc. The report should also contain a draft budget for expanding UNAMIR. Gharekhan promised to submit the requested report by Fri am.
- It was recommended that the resolution be adopted either Fri evening or Sat am; we realize it will be difficult to receive instructions from HQ.

A working group met after the informal consultations which considered the text of the draft submitted yesterday by the SC President. The first and second page of the draft were debated and adapted.

The changes are very preliminary because the decisive report from the SG wasn’t available yet. The working group will continue on Friday am.
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SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS

REF: USUN 2015
2. SUMMARY: ON MAY 12 THE COUNCIL FOCUSED ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN REFTEL. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE MANDATE OF AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE, WITH MOST MEMBERS FAVORING A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION. A WORKING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO CONTINUE REVISING THE RESOLUTION. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI SAID HE HOPED TO VOTE ON A RESOLUTION FRIDAY, MAY 13; IF THE COUNCIL IS NOT READY, HE ANTICIPATES HOLDING A SATURDAY SESSION. END SUMMARY.

3. USYG GHAREEHAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID RPF TROOPS IN THE SOUTH HAD ADVANCED WESTWARD, RESTRICTING UNAMIR'S MOVEMENTS. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AYALA-LASSO APPEALED FOR A CEASEFIRE ON RWANDAN RADIO, Pressed THE HEAD OF THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES TO RELEASE HOSTAGES IN KIGALI'S STADIUM, AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN NAIROBI. HE SAID THE SYG HAD FIRM OFFERS OF TROOPS FROM TANZANIA, GHANA AND NIGERIA, PLUS A TENTATIVE OFFER FROM A FOURTH COUNTRY (PROBABLY SENEGAL OR UGANDA), BUT DID NOT YET KNOW THE NUMBERS OFFERED.

4. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH RPF AND GOR REPRESENTATIVES—BOTH WANT AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE; THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BIGGER OPERATION WITH A WIDER MANDATE, WHILE THE RPF WANTS A SMALLER FORCE WITH A NARROWER MANDATE CONFINED TO HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT.

5. FRANCE, UK, RUSSIA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, ARGENTINA, SPAIN AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC SPOKE IN FAVOR OF A FOCUSED HUMANITARIAN MANDATE ALONG THE LINES OF THE NEW ZEALAND DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH INCLUDED THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN SAFE AREAS AND THE PROTECTED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE OMANI AND RWANDAN DELEGATES SPOKE IN FAVOR OF AN EXPANDED POLITICAL COMPONENT, STATING THAT WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE, NO UN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED THE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESOURCES TO BE USED TO CARRY OUT THE MANDATE. HE ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON TROOP
7. France, the UK, Russia, New Zealand and Argentina said the Council should either adopt a resolution establishing an arms embargo, which they favor, or if unable, stick with the current UNSC statement on the subject.

8. Referring to paragraph 14 of the draft resolution, the French representative said the Council was not yet prepared to launch an effort to prosecute those responsible for genocide, and would need a specific plan such as that adopted for the War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. The Rwandan representative said that if an inquiry were to be conducted, it should cover the entire conflict, since October 1, 1990, instead of beginning with the recent outbreak of hostilities.

9. The New Zealand Permrep said that a UN operation could not feasibly carry out its mandate if it has to seek the consent of the parties at every turn. The operation should be authorized under Chapter VII. The Chinese representative said that while the operation cannot rely on total consent, it must seek cooperation...
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6434
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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CONFIDENTIAL

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS

FROM THE PARTIES AND SHOULD BE A CHAPTER VI OPERATION-

10. THE UK PERMRP STATED THAT UNAMIR, ITS FORCE
COMMANDER AND UN HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, I.E. THEY SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE TROOPS START IN KIGALI AND WORK OUTWARDS OR START AT THE BORDER AND WORK TOWARD KIGALI. "DON'T PUT THEM IN A STRAITJACKET," HE SAID. THE SPANISH PERMRREP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED A PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT.

ALBRIGHT
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOCH BOCH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 13 May 1994
NUMBER: 1614

SUBJECT: Security Council Consultations

1. We are herewith sending to you a copy of the Secretary-General's report on Rwanda (S/1994/565) which was issued this afternoon. The Security Council met for informal consultations on Rwanda soon after the report was issued this afternoon. A draft resolution was discussed and amended. We are herewith sending to you a "blue" draft of the resolution which will be taken up again on Monday.

2. While Council members were in general agreement about the mandate, size and rules of engagement of an expanded UNAMIR, as reflected in the resolution, just before today's consultations ended, it was noted that the Council had not yet had a chance to study and discuss the Secretary General's report. The Council will therefore discuss the report on Monday before returning to the resolution which could be adopted early next week.

3. The Council requested that, for Monday's consultations, the Secretariat provide a brief on the latest situation in Rwanda. It was requested that the following issues, in particular, be addressed: the latest situation on the ground; the SRSG's and regional efforts in the political sphere; an update on the humanitarian situation including needs and ongoing activities; the situation regarding reported radio broadcasts that may be inciting the population to violence; and progress on obtaining the concurrence of the parties to UNAMIR's new configuration and mandate. We would be grateful if you could provide us ASAP with an update on these issues.

/.../
4. You will note that para 28 of the Secretary-General's report states that the people in need of assistance in the interior of Rwanda outnumber, "by a factor of five", those in the border areas. While we have received the figures on displaced persons you sent to us today, it would be helpful for Monday's discussions if you could provide additional data which would help us explain this statement to Council members and reinforce the rationale for the proposed concept of operations of the expanded UNAMIR. We will be meeting on Monday morning with a US Government delegation which has requested clarifications on our concept of operations and has expressed, as you know, a preference for a modus operandi based on the establishment of protective zones along the country's borders. We greatly appreciate your assistance.

5. A note on the informal consultations held yesterday, prepared by the Secretariat of the Council, is attached for your information. Best regards.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to the letter of the President of the Security Council of 6 May 1994 (S/1994/566), requesting me to provide indicative contingency planning with regard to the delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as support to displaced persons in Rwanda.

2. It will be recalled that the resumption of the civil conflict following the tragic events of 6 April 1994, and the ensuing violence and massacres, created a situation that called into question the ability of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to carry out its mandate under Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Hence, with Council resolution 912 (1994), adopted on 21 April 1994, the Security Council authorized the adjustment of UNAMIR's mandate: (a) to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; (b) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and (c) to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. In compliance with resolution 912 (1994), the force was sharply reduced, and now stands at 444, all ranks, in Rwanda, and 179 military observers at Nairobi pending repatriation or redeployment to the Mission. Reductions to the authorized level have been suspended pending the outcome of the ongoing consideration by the Council.

3. The situation in Rwanda remains highly unstable and insecure, with widespread violence. Combat between the Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) continues, even though both the Rwandan government forces and RPF have separately expressed their readiness to enter into a cease-fire. The Rwandan government forces controls the west and southwestern parts of Rwanda, while RPF is in control of the northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as areas in the south-east. The capital, Kigali, is divided between the Rwandan government forces and RPF, but the front line is fluid and changing as military actions continue. The Rwandan government forces continue to control the airport but hostilities in its vicinity interrupt its operations from time to time. Armed militias and other unruly elements continue to operate, although less frequently than at the beginning of the conflict, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. It is estimated that nearly 2 million persons have been displaced, seeking safer places within Kigali, in...
various regions of the country and in border areas in neighbouring countries, principally the United Republic of Tanzania. Under these conditions, a major humanitarian crisis has developed.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. In accordance with resolution 912 (1994), and in support of the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Republic of Tanzania, in its capacity as the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and other interested parties, my Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and the UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, have undertaken, both inside Rwanda and at Arusha, all possible efforts since the assumption of the conflict to bring about a cease-fire agreement between the parties. Unfortunately, their efforts have been of no avail, but they are determined to persevere. Obviously, a cease-fire agreement is the first step in establishing a stable and secure environment in the country, thus allowing the organized, coordinated and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and the reactivation of the Arusha peace process. In the prevailing conditions, however, it is essential that the United Nations consider what measures it can take even before a cease-fire is achieved.

III. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

5. Given the pace of developments and the security situation, it has not been possible to assess accurately the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. However, early reports indicate that there are 250,000 displaced persons in the north, 65,000 in the east, and 1,200,000 in the south and south-west. Although there are some concentrations, the internally displaced appear to be widely scattered. At Kigali itself, some 30,000 displaced persons have taken refuge in public places and religious sanctuaries, where they are running out of food, water and basic medical supplies. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 80,000 of the original 272,000 refugees from Burundi remain in Rwanda. This situation is complicated by the fact that, prior to the war, some 1.2 million drought-affected people in the south who required emergency food assistance had been identified. In neighbouring countries, the Rwandan-refugee population is estimated at more than 300,000, and UNHCR reports that as many as 1,500 refugees continue to arrive daily in the United Republic of Tanzania. It is most important that the basic humanitarian needs of these populations are met as soon as possible.

6. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat has established the United Nations-Rwanda Emergency Office (UNERO), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The office, temporarily located at Nairobi, has overall responsibility for coordinating humanitarian relief activities, including the prepositioning of relief supplies. Close coordination with the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other international organizations and bilateral donors concerned is an essential part of the work of the office. An advance humanitarian assistance team has been positioned at Kigali to work with UNAMIR in carrying out...
humanitarian operations and to advise in the expansion of activities where the situation permits. Other sub-offices in Rwanda or neighbouring countries are envisaged. A "flash" appeal covering immediate emergency assistance needs totalling about $16 million was issued on 25 April 1994.

7. In spite of the difficulties, limited emergency operations have been initiated. For example, medical and nutritional supplies from UNICEF have been distributed in Kigali. WFP has been able to deliver more than 500 tons of food in the north and 840 tons in the south. Currently, three NGOs are active in Rwanda. Médecins sans Frontières is active in the north and Médecins du Monde is active in the south. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has remained without interruption in Rwanda, focusing on emergency medical care and carrying out food deliveries in the north and south and in Kigali. UNAMIR has assisted in the delivery of food and other relief supplies to displaced persons in the Kigali area and has provided security for the activities of the advance team. NGOs and UNHCR are responding to the needs of refugees in neighbouring countries.

8. The United Nations humanitarian organizations, in consultation with UNAMIR and ICRC, have agreed on the following principles, which should serve as the basis for humanitarian operations in Rwanda:

(a) Ensuring the security of relief staff (both national and international), the beneficiaries of relief assistance and of the relief materials themselves;

(b) Joint identification by the responsible authorities and the respective United Nations' humanitarian organizations of distribution sites;

(c) Clear identification of interlocutors from the side of the authorities for the humanitarian aid organizations to liaise with regarding humanitarian operations, both at a central level as well as at the field level;

(d) Acceptance by the responsible authorities of the monitoring and reporting responsibilities of the United Nations organizations regarding the distribution and use of relief materials;

(e) An understanding that aid should be provided based on need, regardless of race, ethnic group, religion or political affiliation.

9. These principles have been submitted to the Rwandan government forces and RPF authorities for approval. The Rwandan government forces have formally notified the Humanitarian Coordinator of its agreement. RPF has also agreed to these principles.

10. While it is too early to present fully developed operational plans for the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, the basic effort will be to respond to the urgent needs of all affected persons in all parts of the country whenever conditions so permit. With the consent of appropriate authorities in neighbouring countries, it is envisaged that extensive cross-border operations will be utilized to transport relief supplies. The detailed operational plans will take into account the need to avoid, as far as possible, further
displacement of the population. The objective will be to deliver assistance to
the distressed in their existing locations, provided that these sites can be
made secure.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

11. In his letter of 6 May 1994 (S/1994/546), the President of the Security
Council informed me that, in view of the unabated hostilities and killings
taking place in Rwanda, urgent and effective means of action must be considered.
This would require that the Council decide upon an expanded mandate under which
UNAMIR would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other
groups in Rwanda who have been affected by the hostilities or are otherwise in
need, and assist in the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations.
The efforts of UNAMIR in this regard would be coordinated with those of the
humanitarian organizations operating in Rwanda and/or engaged in assisting
Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries. The mission, as it would function
under this amended mandate, is referred to herein as UNAMIR II.

12. UNAMIR II would provide security assistance to humanitarian organizations
in their programmes for distribution of relief supplies. UNAMIR II would
establish access to sites where displaced and other affected persons are
concentrated and could ensure their protection. Such protected sites would
include areas inside Rwanda along the border with neighbouring States where
refugees and displaced persons are concentrated. All protected sites would be
patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR II, in cooperation with the local authorities
wherever possible. At the same time, UNAMIR II would devote equal attention to
the needs of displaced persons in the interior of the country and would provide
escorts to relief convoys and security to United Nations installations there.

13. UNAMIR II would monitor border crossing points as operationally required,
as well as the deployment of the parties in conflict, in order to assure the
effective conduct of UNAMIR II operations.

14. Kigali airport is the most practical point of entry into the country and is
therefore important for the induction of personnel, equipment and humanitarian
relief goods. The parties would be expected to establish the airport as a
"neutral zone" under the exclusive control of the United Nations before
commencement of the deployment of the expanded force. However, if continued
fighting prevents this, UNAMIR II would use other points of entry and resupply,
such as secondary airstrips within the country. In addition, UNAMIR II would
establish lines of communication, deployment and supply routes by land through
neighbouring countries, particularly for the resupply of those protected sites
located on Rwanda's borders.
A. Rules of engagement

15. UNAMIR II's rules of engagement do not envisage enforcement action. The Mission would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks. However, UNAMIR II may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.

B. Force structure

16. In order to execute its mandate, UNAMIR II must be composed of a credible, well-armed and highly mobile force. The size of the force is determined also by the size and terrain of the area of operation, which is land-locked, difficult and mountainous with very limited infrastructure. With these criteria, it is estimated that a minimum viable force of approximately 5,500 troops, including 5 infantry battalions, will be required to carry out the tasks described above. Readjustment of the size of the force may be necessary as the situation evolves.

17. The composition of the force would therefore include:

(a) A force headquarters of approximately 219 personnel, built around the nucleus of the present headquarters, would include a supporting military signals/communications squadron. The force headquarters would continue to operate at Kigali;

(b) Five battalions (approximately 4,000 personnel) comprising two mechanized battalions and three motorized battalions, each of which would have a mechanized company;

(c) A force support battalion of approximately 721 personnel, which would provide logistical, maintenance, and medical service, and would include an engineer company capable of undertaking tasks such as mining clearance, bomb disposal and the rehabilitation of essential roads, bridges and the other infrastructure, as required by UNAMIR II to carry out its mandate;

(d) A helicopter squadron of approximately 110 personnel and 16 helicopters;

(e) A military police force of approximately 50 personnel would provide internal force security;

(f) A military observer group of 320 officers would conduct the humanitarian security monitoring, liaison and escort-duty tasks throughout the area of operation, including at the border areas if necessary;

(g) A force of 90 United Nations civilian police would be deployed in a similar fashion to the military observers, but would be dedicated to maintaining liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security.
c. Deployment schedule

18. The deployment of UNAMIR II would be conducted in three phases, subject to the timely availability of the necessary troops, equipment and airlift. "D-Day" is the date on which the Security Council resolution would be adopted authorizing the expanded mandate of UNAMIR II.

19. Phase 1 (D-Day + 7). The Chanaian battalion would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with armoured personnel carriers. This unit would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport, as well as other sites in the city, where thousands of displaced persons have sought refuge under UNAMIR protection. This battalion would also subsequently act as the force reserve.

20. Phase 2 (D-Day + 14). Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of the support battalion and all of the force headquarters and signal squadron. These troops would be deployed where the security situation is of greatest concern and where there is the highest concentration of displaced persons, including at border areas if necessary.

21. Phase 3 (D-Day + 31). Induction of the rest of the force support battalion and two other infantry battalions. The rest of the support battalion would establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Rubengi, Byumba and Butare prefectures in order better to serve the field force. The two infantry battalions would be deployed to certain specific areas of the country in order to provide the necessary support and assistance to people in need in these areas and provide security arrangements to humanitarian assistance programmes.

d. Logistics

22. The deployment and logistical support of a force of 5,500 under the schedule described above is a difficult undertaking. In addition, Rwanda is a land-locked country with only one major airport (Kigali) and three secondary airports. Land movement between regional seaports (Kombasa, Dar es Salaam) and Rwanda requires several days in the best of conditions. It is therefore essential to deploy self-sufficient military contingents capable of operating independently, while logistical support is put in place by the United Nations. The concept of operations calls for the first three units to be moved by air, requiring military and commercial strategic airlift, that is, up to 10 passenger flights and 40 cargo flights (C-5A aircraft). The remainder of the force and its material would be transported by sea and air as soon as technically possible.

23. Because of the need to stabilize the security situation in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of UNAMIR II will have to be carried out rapidly. The longer the delay in the deployment of the force from the time of a Security Council decision, the greater the prospect of the mission not achieving its purpose in operational terms.
24. The most rapid deployment would be achieved with two formed infantry
brigades with their integral logistical support. If formed brigades cannot be
made available, it would be necessary to draw on the recent United Nations
stand-by arrangements, but specific contributions for this Mission must still be
negotiated. It is estimated that this process would require one to two months.
Simultaneously with stand-by arrangements, the traditional method of requesting
Governments for military forces would be used. Experience shows that it would
take at least two to three months to achieve full deployment of forces. If
forces are accepted without adequate equipment, experience shows that a further
delay of several months would be incurred in providing the necessary equipment
for those forces. It is therefore essential that Member States agree to make
arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and airlift
required for UNAMIR II.

V. COMMAND AND CONTROL

25. UNAMIR II would be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, who would have overall authority for all the activities of the Mission.
The military component of the Mission would be commanded by the Force Commander.
The present UNAMIR force headquarters would be expanded as indicated in
paragraph 17 (a) above and would remain located at Kigali. Battalions would be
deployed to designated regions or sectors in accordance with the modus operandi
described in paragraphs 19 to 21 above. Battalion commanders would act as
sector commanders within their assigned regions, under the direction of the
Force Commander. The military signal unit would establish communications
between the force headquarters, battalion headquarters and other designated
units as necessary.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

26. The cost associated with the deployment of the force described above would
be approximately $115 million for a six-month period (see annex). It would be
my recommendation to the General Assembly that the costs would be considered an
expense of the Organization in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter of the United Nations and the assessments would be levied on Member
States and be credited to the UNAMIR special account.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

27. The solution to the crisis in Rwanda must, in my judgement, be found
through implementation of the Arusha agreement, which both sides say that they
accept. For this to be achieved, it is clearly necessary that a cease-fire be
agreed and put into effect at the earliest possible date. I have instructed my
Special Representative and the Force Commander to continue to give the highest
priority to the pursuit of both objectives. The Security Council may wish to
issue another urgent call for the parties to agree to a cease-fire and, even
before it comes into effect, to accept the designation of Kigali airport as a
neutral zone under the exclusive control of the United Nations.

(C)
28. Meanwhile, there is an urgent requirement for the United Nations to increase its efforts to address the desperate humanitarian crisis created by the conflict. I welcome the idea that protected sites should be established close to Rwanda's borders with Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania in order to facilitate the provision of relief to displaced persons who are already present in those areas. But I believe that it is essential that any such initiative should be matched by action to assist persons in need in the interior of Rwanda. These outnumber, by a factor of five, the displaced persons who are in the border areas or have already crossed into neighbouring countries. To concentrate the international community's efforts on the latter would be to address only a small part of the problem. Moreover, there would be a risk that protected sites in the border areas would act as a magnet to people in need in the interior of the country and would therefore increase even further the number of displaced persons.

29. Expanded humanitarian operations, both in the border areas and in the interior, would also clearly be facilitated by a cease-fire, which would contribute immeasurably to the effective and secure distribution of relief supplies. However, if a cease-fire is not in place by the time the expanded force is deployed, my Special Representative and the Force Commander will continue to pursue this objective as the force is being put in place. I met with my Special Representative in Paris today and encouraged him to continue his efforts with a view to achieving a cease-fire agreement as soon as possible.

30. As noted above, should UNAMIR II need to initiate deployment and resupply through neighbouring States, the Mission would require the active support of those States. UNAMIR II would also require the cooperation and support of the Rwandan parties. In this connection, I should like to note that my Special Representative and the Force Commander have presented the concept outlined herein to both the Rwandan government forces and RPF. I am encouraged by their initial positive responses. I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to obtain confirmation from both parties of their support to this operation without preconditions.

31. The world community has witnessed with horror and disbelief the slaughter and suffering of innocent civilians in Rwanda. While the chances for a lasting peace are fundamentally in the hands of the political and military leaders of the country, the international community cannot ignore the atrocious effects of this conflict on innocent civilians. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it approve the phased expansion of UNAMIR, as described above, to enable the Mission immediately to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. The mandate for UNAMIR II should be for a period of six months from the date of initial deployment, on the understanding that it would be reviewed by the Council as necessary and, in particular, following an agreement on a cease-fire.

32. In concluding, I must again emphasize that in order for UNAMIR II to attain its objective, there can be no delay in its deployment.
33. I would like to express my deep gratitude to my Special Representative, the UNAMIR Force Commander, and all UNAMIR personnel, for their outstanding performance in the pursuance of UNAMIR's mandate under the extremely dangerous conditions in Rwanda.
## Annex

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda**

Summary cost estimate for the deployment of approximately 5,600 troops for a six-month period

(All thousands of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Military personnel costs</td>
<td>60 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civilian personnel costs</td>
<td>11 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Premises/accommodation costs</td>
<td>1 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Infrastructure repairs</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport operations</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Air operations</td>
<td>8 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Naval operations</td>
<td>3 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other equipment</td>
<td>4 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Supplies and services</td>
<td>4 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Election-related supplies and services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Public information programmes</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Training programmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mine-clearing programmes</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Air and surface freight</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Integrated Management Information System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Support account for peace-keeping operations</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Staff assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security Council

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Council on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation,

Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,

Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children,
the internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations of the rights to life and property,

Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred,

Recalling also that it had requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for the investigation of reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict,

Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

1. **Resolved** that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda;

2. **Decides** to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities, within the limits of the resources available to it:

   (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, as appropriate, of secure humanitarian areas;

   (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

3. **Recognizes** that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United

©
Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and
distribution of humanitarian relief;

4. **Authorize** in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up
to 5,500 troops;

5. **Urge** the Secretary-General to commence the deployment of the expanded
force, in phases as appropriate, in the shortest possible time;

6. **Encourage** the Secretary-General to accelerate his efforts, in
conjunction with the Secretary-General of CAU, to obtain from Member States the
necessary personnel to enable deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to proceed
urgently;

7. **Invite** Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General’s
request for logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR
expanded force level and its support in the field;

8. StrONGLY urG** e all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in
the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring the unimpeded
delivery of humanitarian assistance;

9. **Command** the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and
non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other
assistance, encourage them to continue and increase such assistance, and **urge**
others to provide such assistance;

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**B.**

**Determining** that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and
security in the region,

**Acting** under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

10. **Decide** that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by
their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or
aircraft of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and
spare parts;

11. **Decide** also to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the
provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the
Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the
following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations
and recommendations:

   (a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them
concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 10
above;

   (b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make
recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 10 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

12. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution;

C.

13. Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict;

14. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the Organization of African Unity and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

15. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and requests the Secretary-General to report further, including on the humanitarian situation, within five weeks of the adoption of this resolution and again in good time before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAMIR;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Thursday, 12 May 1994

Rwanda

There was general agreement that the size and mandate of UNAMIR should be expanded as soon as possible with the prime objective of providing humanitarian assistance to Rwanda. However, the Council was divided over other issues, including the availability of troops, the scope of the mandate, the rules of engagement, and whether the operation should be launched with explicit reference to Chapter VII of the Charter. The President wants the Council to finalize the draft resolution (text attached) and vote on it tomorrow or over the weekend.

Mr. Cherukuni updated the Council on the situation in Rwanda. Fighting continued in Kigali and other parts of the country with rockets being fired on the capital from unidentified sources. RPF were reportedly advancing westward. UNAMIR was in contact with the Ugandan Army Commander on the restrictions on its movements. Reports on the talks would be available shortly.

Mr. Cherukuni informed the Council that CAU had received offers of troops for an expanded UNAMIR from Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria. However, no concrete numbers were available.

The President said that both the Rwandan Government and RPF had indicated support for a new UN operation. The difference was that while the Rwandan Government wished to see the operation covering all parts of the country, RPF wanted a smaller mandate limited to humanitarian assistance.

Frustrated with the continued fighting on the ground despite the repeated verbal statements by both sides on the need for a cease-fire, France said it was high time for the Council to take action, though without a cease-fire nothing could actually be done. France and some others agreed. France, however, made clear that the mandate of UNAMIR should stick to humanitarian aspects, maintaining that the operation should, at least for now, not get involved in the political sphere.

Rwanda made reservations about the immediate imposition of an arms embargo, saying that such a measure could benefit one party to the conflict. It also stressed the urgent need for a cease-fire.

With respect to the nature of an expanded UNAMIR, China, Argentina and other delegations said that they would like to see the operation remaining under Chapter VI, rather than shifting to Chapter VII with enforcement implications. However, New Zealand stressed that the important thing was not whether those terms
carried "some token importance," but what the Council would actually ask the United Nations to do. Spain preferred Chapter VI, if possible. However, it said it could live with the "modified invocation of Chapter VII" as in the case of UNPROFOR.

New Zealand also argued that it was not credible for the Council to seek the consent of the parties. Citing difficulties UNPROFOR had encountered in securing the consent of parties at every stage of its activities, it indicated that the mandate of UNAMIR should be carried out with or without the consent. In this context, the Czech Republic held that the emphasis on a cease-fire should not be a prime objective of the Council now. However, Argentina did not agree, stressing the need to make every effort to obtain the consent of the parties. On the use of force, New Zealand went further to say that the draft should be very specific about the authority to be given to UNAMIR, pointing to possible difficulties the force could face in the performance of its duties without an explicit statement of the Council on the level of force expected to be used.

Citing the "terrible tendency" of the Council to load its resolutions with too many tasks, the United Kingdom was in favour of a simpler text focusing on humanitarian aspects which, it said, would be most likely to be welcomed in Rwanda. Spain and the Russian Federation concurred. Specifically, Russia indicated it had difficulties accepting tasks like assistance for demining and rehabilitation of essential facilities and services, expressing the concern that such a mandate would make it hard for the United Nations to "get out." "The operation should be short-term in nature," it added.

The United Kingdom also underscored the need for more flexibility with regard to the scope of the operation, including its size and deployment. It said the current text was too detailed and prescriptive and could lead to misunderstanding. It also urged the Secretariat to present a formal report on the proposed expansion of UNAMIR, including estimates of its financial implications. The Russian Federation suggested that a special voluntary fund should be established to help finance the operation.

The United States was primarily concerned about the availability of resources. It asked specific questions about 1) the number of troops available, 2) what equipment they could bring, 3) how soon such troops could be deployed, 4) whether contributing countries put any restrictions on their troop deployment, especially when and if the operation was launched under Chapter VII, and 5) what countries could provide logistical support.
At the end of the day a drafting group was put to work to try and sort all this out.

Bosnia

Mr. Gharakhun briefed the Council on the recent developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the passage of humanitarian convoys to Gorazde, the issue concerning the Serbian tanks in exclusion zone, and the current situations in Tuzla and Gorazd.

Citing the recent actions of Bosnian Government troops, the Russian Federation asked what had been done by UNPROFOR to prevent the recurrence of such violations. Mr. Gharakhun replied that he would try to find an answer to that later.

* * *
5. Gambati indicated that he intended to go ahead and put the resolution in blue, but that it was open to further discussion and change. He said he intended to schedule further consultations on Monday afternoon, with the hope of voting on the resolution that evening.

6. Begin Text:

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Council on its behalf on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/...),

Reaffirming its resolution 887 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations, strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to it,

CONFIDENTIAL 01-04 USUN NEW YORK 002059

Whitehouse Pass to NSC for Rice and Deshazer;
Joint Staff for Chairman, Dir 35, 33;
SEDEF for OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:ODR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, Rw, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

Ref: (A) USUN 2035, (B) USUN 2037
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. The Security Council in informal consultations may 13 agreed to refer to a text on a resolution which would give UNAMIR a humanitarian and protective mandate and expand its authorized force to 5,000 persons. This was the result of two extended sessions of a Council working group followed by deliberations of the full Council.

3. Most of the discussion centered on operative paras no 7 and 8. In operative para 7, the Council attempted to strike a balance between protection of civilians and others in secure areas and security for use at risk throughout Rwanda. In operative para 8, the Council tried to give a clear indication that UNAMIR could take robust action to carry out its protective mandate, while at the same time not calling into question the right to self-defense in other Chapter VII operations. The text follows below in para 8.

4. Council President Gambati (Nigeria) indicated that he wanted to put the resolution "in blue" that evening and proceed to a vote on Monday, May 16. (The US delegation had earlier informed Gambati that we would not be in a position to vote on this resolution May 13.) Ambassador Underhill cautioned that we still had many questions regarding the report of the Secretary-General which had just been released that afternoon, in particular regarding the concept of operations. We had made good progress in producing the text of a resolution which could serve as a framework. However, this in many respects was the easy part of the job. We had serious concerns to discuss with the Secretariat and would need to reach agreement on a firm concept of operations before voting.

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION
+MACROAF
SEDEF V2

ACTION
INFO 535-N(1) SEDEF-C(1) USIP:IP(2)
+ATS:PA(1) USP:AP(2) USP:AFR(1) USP:OSA(1)
USP:PA:IP(1) USP:FMA(1) USP:ISS(1) USP:MAC(1)
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SAEF

Date: 5/17/94
Exempt

Release: (Y) Excise: (Y) Deny: (Y) Declassify: (N)

(Release) (Y) (Excise) (Deny) (Declassify)

Unidentified Data

MCN=94134/00950 TQR=94134/01422 TAD=94134/0142 Z CDN=MAKBO1

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

RECALLING ALSO THAT IT HAD REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT;

UNDERLINING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,

REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,

RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,

-- 1. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE, AND bring AN END TO THE MINDEST VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA;
-- 2. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR'S MANDATE UNDER RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO IT:

   -- A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA including THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE, (AS APPROPRIATE) OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN ZONES;
   -- B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS;
   -- 3. RECOGNIZES THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO THREATEN PROTECTED SITES AND POPULATIONS, UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL OR THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;

B: CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHIZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECEDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OAD
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

-- 4. AUTHORIZES IN THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;
-- 5. URGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COMMENCE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED FORCE, IN PHASES AS APPROPRIATE, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME;
-- 6. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, TO OBTAIN FROM MEMBER STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;
-- 7. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;
-- 8. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNAMIR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE AND IN PARTICULAR IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE;
-- 9. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
-- 10. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OR SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR TERRITORIES OR USING THEIR FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT, PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
-- 11. DECIDES ALSO TO ESTABLISH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 28 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSISTING OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS WORK TO THE COUNCIL WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

   -- (A) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 10 ABOVE;
   -- (B) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMBARGO;
   -- (C) TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMBARGO;

C: CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHIZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECEDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OAD
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

-- C

-- 12. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENCE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
B: CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHIZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECEDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OAD
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

-- C

-- 13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INCIDENTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;
CONFIDENTIAL 5 - 211

14. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

15. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN RWANDA UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION, WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND AGAIN IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT MANDATE OF UNAMIR;

16. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ALRIGHT BY
NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  

Date: 17 May 1994  
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC  
LD: SFAT (MEA, LGL, UN, ISAC, DSP3)  

P/S MFA  

Subject: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA  

Attached is text of Resolution 918 which was adopted in the early hours of Tuesday, 17 May.

2. LGL will note that arms embargo comes into immediate effect.

3. As you will see the US has essentially gutted the resolution. The Secretary General can only deploy the remaining UNMOS in Nairobi (about 50 men - and what use are unarmed UNMOS anyway?) and the balance of the Ghanaians (about 100 - who have returned to Accra). In reality the expansion is a fiction. There is nothing to contribute at all to the fundamental concern about civilians at risk in the interior of the country. Any further deployments are hostage to a reporting procedure and further decisions.

4. The New Zealand EOY (which is also attached) contains a strong denunciation of what has happened.

5. As you know we seriously considered abstaining but, after a discussion with the Minister and in light of the fact that the NAM decided to vote in favour (on the basis that 10 percent of a cake is better than none) and we would have been in the odious company of the Rwandan apologist for the "interim government" who turned up to speak, in the end we cast our vote in support.

6. African delegations (both in Council and out) who were present in the Chamber were strongly supportive of our statement. Also Canada and Australia were particularly pleased.
Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/571
16 May 1994

SR 918 (1994)
Parts A & C adopted 15-0-0
Part B adopted 14-1-0 (Rwanda voted No)

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Council on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation,

Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,

Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the
internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.

Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations of the rights to life and property,

Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Strongly urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred,

Recalling also its request to the Secretary-General to collect information on the responsibility for the tragic incident that resulted in the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi;

Recalling also that it had requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for the investigation of reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict,

Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

Desiring in this context to expand the mandate of UNAMIR for humanitarian purposes, and stressing the importance it attaches to the support and cooperation of the parties for the successful implementation of all aspects of that mandate,

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

A.

1. Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda;

/...
2. **Welcomes** the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565);

3. **Decides** to expand UNAMIR’s mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

   (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;

   (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

4. **Recognizes** that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;

5. **Authorizes** in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General, as recommended in his report, and as a first phase, immediately to redeploy to Rwanda the UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strength the elements of the mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda;

7. **Further requests** the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR’s mission including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties, progress towards a cease-fire, availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review by the Council and decision action, as required, by the Council;

8. **Encourages** the Secretary-General to accelerate his efforts, in conjunction with the Secretary-General of OAU, to obtain from Member States the necessary personnel to enable deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to proceed urgently;

9. **Invites** Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General’s request for the resources required, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the expanded UNAMIR force level and its support in the field;

10. **Strongly urges** all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring its freedom of movement and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, and further calls upon them to treat Kigali airport as a neutral zone under the control of UNAMIR;

11. **Demands** that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwanda, and
refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;

12. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;

B.

Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

13. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts;

14. Decides also to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above;

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

15. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution;

16. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 13 and 15 above do not apply to activities related to UNAMIR and UNOMUR;
17. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

C.

18. Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict;

19. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the Organization of African Unity and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

20. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and requests the Secretary-General to report further, including on the humanitarian situation, within five weeks of the adoption of this resolution and again in good time before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAMIR;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON RWANDA

DELIVERED BY
MR COLIN KEATING
NEW ZEALAND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

17 MAY 1994

AS DELIVERED
Explanation of Vote on Rwanda

The first speaker in our debate should not have spoken. I say this for two reasons.

First, because he does not represent a State. He has no legitimacy and is merely the mouth piece of a faction. He should not have been seated in a privileged position at this table.

Secondly, he has given us a shameful distortion of the truth.

Mr President, My delegation has voted in favour of Resolution 918. But I cannot conceal my delegation's disappointment that this resolution only approves a very modest first phase of the expanded United Nations presence which we believe is essential in Rwanda.

To be true there are some very important and positive elements in this resolution.

It contains a commitment to go back to Rwanda with a new mandate to protect civilians at risk and provide security for humanitarian relief operations.

It also signals quite clearly that the UN presence should be sufficiently robust and that force will be used if necessary against those who threaten protected sites and populations.

It imposes a mandatory arms embargo on Rwanda and it requests a report as soon as possible on the investigation of war crimes and genocide committed in Rwanda over the past 4 weeks.

But this resolution stops short of what is really necessary. My delegation proposed a draft resolution 10 days ago which envisaged all of the elements in this text but which contained, in addition, one further key element - the commitment of the Council to an operation that would make a start at the task of protecting civilians at risk at various locations in the interior of Rwanda.

Mr President, No-one can seriously expect the United Nations to provide support for every civilian at risk in Rwanda. Even if the force were fully deployed as we would like it will take time and it will be difficult to cover all of the country. We all know that any operation can only do what is possible within available resources.
But, in our view, there is no need for the Council to condition its agreement by a requirement for further reports and further review.

New Zealand would be the first to agree that there needs to be a detailed hands on process of interaction between the Council and the Secretariat to update and fine tune the operational concept as the planning is finalised in the period prior to deployment. Indeed we would like to see institutional arrangements within the Council for a more hands on approach to all of the complex operations supervised by the Council.

But there was no need in this case to condition the deployment as has been done in operative paragraph 6.

We urge that the Secretary General’s report under operative paragraph 6 be submitted as quickly as possible.

We urge that the second phase deployment of the expanded UNAMIR also be undertaken as quickly as possible.

The burden now falls on the Council to make this work and we will be looking to all members of the Council to live up to the expectations that have been created.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

USUN N 02093 01 OF 06 180106Z

ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00
EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 OIGO-01 HA-09 H-01 INM-02
TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00
OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01
RP-10 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6511
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAHININGEN GE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

USUN N 02093 01 OF 06 180106Z
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E 0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION

REFS: A) USUN 2059; B) 5/16 ALBRIGHT-TARNOFF TELECON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200103014

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2. (C) THE MOST CONTENTIOUS DEBATE CENTERED ON US CHANGES TO THE EARLIER DRAFT (REF A). AFTER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT AND A VISITING US TEAM (SEPTEL), THE US PROPOSED A PHASED DEPLOYMENT, STARTING WITH UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND BRINGING TO FULL STRENGTH ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION IN KIGALI. THE COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MISSION, AND IF NECESSARY TAKE FURTHER ACTION, PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND PHASE AND REVISION OF THE UN SECRETARIAT'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.


4. (C) THE COUNCIL ALSO DEBATED THE ISSUE OF THE PARTIES' CONSENT AND COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR. USYG GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE UN HAS NOT RECEIVED THE CONSENT OF THE RGF OR RPF TO ITS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
NEW ZEALAND SAID THAT THE BEST THE COUNCIL COULD HOPE FOR IS "ACQUIESCENCE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE CHAOTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL SITUATION." UK PERMREP HANNAY SAID THE COUNCIL IS UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT 5500 TROOPS COULD OPERATE WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES. THE COUNCIL SETTLED ON A PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR THE "SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF (UNAMIR'S) MANDATE."


6. (U) RPF DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS CLAUDE DUSAIDI ISSUED A WRITTEN STATEMENT WELCOMING THE COUNCIL ACTION WHILE RESTATING THE RPF'S POSITION THAT A FORCE OF 5500 IS TOO LARGE. THE STATEMENT COMMITS THE RPF TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NEUTRALITY OF KIGALI AIRPORT.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 02093 02 OF 06 180107Z
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
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SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION

(REFERRING TO A SPANISH-SPONSORED AMENDMENT IN PARA 10 OF THE RESOLUTION BELOW). THE STATEMENT REJECTS "ANY

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SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION VOTED FOR BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SO-CALLED INTERIM GOVERNMENT" AND CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SRSG FOR RWANDA JEAN ROGER BOOH-BOOH.


8. (U) SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, NIGERIAN PERMREP GAMBARI EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HOW THE COUNCIL TREATS AFRICAN ISSUES IN GENERAL, AND EXPRESSED SPECIFIC DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE CONDITIONALITIES OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE RESOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 02093 02 OF 06 180107Z

9. (U) TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT RESOLUTION S/RES/918:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,


RECALLING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ON 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/16) AND 30 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/21),


REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1993 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
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STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND PARTICULARLY CONDEMNING THE VERY NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RWANDA AND THE IMPUNITY WITH WHICH ARMED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING THEREIN,

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STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,


DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF MANY THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,

EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION
WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA, AS WELL AS OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY,
RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A GROUP, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

STRONGLY URGING ALL PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH ANY INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED,

RECALLING ALSO ITS REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI,

RECALLING FURTHER THAT IT HAD REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT,

UNDERLING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,

DESIRING IN THIS CONTEXT TO EXPAND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THAT MANDATE,

REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,

RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,

DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT AND CONCERNED THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A

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THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION;

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PAGE 04 USUN N 02093 03 OF 06 180107Z

-- 1. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE, AND BRING AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA;

-- 2. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/565);

-- 3. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR'S MANDATE UNDER RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO IT:

-- A. TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN AREAS;

-- B. TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS;

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PAGE 01 USUN N 02093 04 OF 06 180107Z

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PAGE 02

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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION

-- 4. RECOGNIZES THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO THREATEN PROTECTED SITES AND POPULATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL OR THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;

-- 5. AUTHORIZES IN THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;

-- 6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS RECOMMENDED IN HIS REPORT, AND AS A FIRST PHASE, IMMEDIATELY TO REDEPLOY THE UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND TO BRING UP TO FULL STRENGTH THE ELEMENTS OF THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION CURRENTLY IN RWANDA;


-- 8. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OAU, TO OBTAIN FROM MEMBER STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;

-- 9. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR THE RESOURCES REQUIRED, INCLUDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;

-- 10. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNAMIR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE AND IN PARTICULAR IN ENSURING ITS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND FURTHER CALLS UPON THEM TO TREAT KIGALI AIRPORT AS A NEUTRAL ZONE UNDER THE CONTROL OF UNAMIR;

-- 11. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST
12. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;

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Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

13. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts;

14. Decides also to establish, in accordance with Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council consisting
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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
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SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION

OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS WORK TO THE COUNCIL WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

-- A) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE

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ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE;

-- B) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMBARGO;

-- C) TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO MEMBER STATES;

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-- 15. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 16. DECIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 15 ABOVE DO NOT APPLY TO ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UNAMIR AND UNOMUR;

-- 17. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMITTEE AND TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECRETARIAT FOR THIS PURPOSE;

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-- 18. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;

-- 19. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 20. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN RWANDA UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION,
WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND
AGAIN IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT
MANDATE OF UNAMIR;

-- 21. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

10. US EOV, DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH,
FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT OF EOV:

THE CRIES OF THE VICTIMS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN HEARD,
CALLING UPON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT. THE SHEER
MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IN THAT TRAGIC
COUNTRY DEMANDS ACTION. THIS COUNCIL HAS STRUGGLED TO
FORMULATE A RESPONSE THAT IS BOTH APPROPRIATE AND

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PAGE 01
USUN N 02093  06 OF  06 180108Z
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PAGE 02 USUN N 02093 06 OF 06 180108Z

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SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION

EFFECTIVE. TO DO SO WE WENT TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTHS
TODAY FOR TWO REASONS:

FIRST--THE UNITED STATES WANTS THE UNITED NATIONS TO
SUCCEED IN RWANDA, AND ALL ITS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS, WE WANT TO BRING THE ENDS AND

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MEANS OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS INTO BALANCE.

SECOND--WE BELIEVE THAT THE GUIDELINES OUTLINED IN THIS COUNCIL'S PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF MAY 3 ARE THE RIGHT WAY TO EVALUATE THE VIABILITY OF A MISSION, AND WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, WE FOLLOW THAT PROCESS IN OUR DELIBERATIONS.

THAT IS WHY IN THE NEXT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON RWANDA, I WOULD EXPECT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS TO BE CLOSELY EXAMINED:

- A WELL DEFINED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
- AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES
- CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
- PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE, AND
- THE DURATION OF THE MANDATE

WITH THIS RESOLUTION MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN THE RIGHT STEPS TO BEGIN TO BRING AID AND HOPE TO THE INNOCENT VICTIMS. BUT WHATEVER EFFORTS THE UNITED NATIONS MAY UNDERTAKE, THE TRUE KEY TO THE PROBLEMS IN RWANDA IS IN THE HANDS OF THE RWANDESE PEOPLE. THE KILLING MUST STOP, NOT ONLY BETWEEN ARMED COMBATANTS BUT ESPECIALLY THE MASSACRES OF UNARMED CIVILIANS WHICH ALREADY HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS. FURTHER, THE PARTIES MUST CONSENT TO UNIMPEDED UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, AND REFUGEES.

IN THIS REGARD, MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS CRITICAL THAT ALL PARTIES RESPECT ABSOLUTELY THE INVOLABILITY OF UN PERSONNEL AND PEACEKEEPERS. IF THE PARTIES CAN DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO MEET THESE SIMPLE BUT VITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO HELP.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE SITUATION IN RWANDA IS HORRIFYING, DIFFICULT AND STILL VERY MUCH IN FLUX. THE RESOLUTION
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WE HAVE ADOPTED TODAY RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY FOR BOTH
A RAPID AND CONTINUALLY REFINED RESPONSE TO BEST DEAL
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PAGE 04  USUN N  02093  06 OF 06  180108Z
WITH THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. WE HOPE THE
COUNCIL’S ACTION WILL BE THE IMPETUS TO CONVINCE THE
PARTIES TO END THE BLOODSHED IMMEDIATELY. IF NOT, WE
WILL LOOK TO FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON
HOW BEST TO CARRY OUT TODAY’S DECISION. IN THIS SPIRIT
OF HOPE MEASURED WITH CONCERN, THE UNITED STATES
SUPPORTS TODAY’S ACTIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

THANK YOU MR. PRESIDENT.

END TEXT OF EOV.

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**Subject**
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our fax 2619.

**Summary**

- Council action on Rwanda shackled by US insistence on limiting expansion of UNAMIR to putting back some of those taken out in April
- New Zealand disappointment at US approach made clear in informal consultations and in formal Council session
- New Zealand also delivers strong public rebuke to Rwandan "Foreign Minister" for racist and tendentious remarks
- The arguments over the resolution are a telling demonstration of the need we have been pushing for an institution at less than the level of the full Council to thrash out the tactics of giving effect to Council policy

**Action**

**Information**

**Report**

We have already advised you by phone and fax of the events leading to the adoption in the early hours of Tuesday morning of Res 918 on the expansion of the UN presence in Rwanda.
Following for the record and for repeat addressees is a summary of the background to and implications of the resolution.

2 Last Friday (13 May) Council members had virtually agreed the text of a draft resolution providing for the expansion of the UN mission (UNAMIR) up to a level of 5,500. The US delegation had reserved its position on the text and had made clear Washington's preference for an operation focussed on the borders and working inwards (the "outside in" approach) as distinct from the UN's suggested "inside out" approach centred on Kigali but it had acquiesced in finalising the text indicating that its remaining concerns might be met in a general discussion of the SecGen's report.

3 In essence, the US considered the Secretariat approach to be too ambitious, too risky and too uncertain, given continued hostilities, especially around Kigali airport which all recognised as being at the heart of the UN strategy. For its part, the UN (and most other Council members) considered that the US approach could amount to a cosmetic operation which ignored the plight of the people most at risk in the interior of Rwanda and focussed on people not in real danger.

4 On the morning of Monday (13 May), a large team from Washington interrogated the Secretariat about the concept of operations in the SecGen's report and about the responses received to the SecGen's approaches to African countries for troops for an expanded UNAMIR. As we understand it, most of the US questions were directed to securing answers to the various factors identified in PD26, the recently signed Presidential directive on the US approach to UN peacekeeping operations.

5 On Monday afternoon, the US (Inderfurth) advised the Council that the US had fundamental reservations about the approach in the SecGen's report, on which the draft resolution of the preceding Friday had been premised. He submitted a number of amendments to make the draft resolution accord with the US view of how the operation should be focussed.

6 There were two key aspects to the US amendments. The first was to require that the expanded operation be explicitly tied to the consent of the warring factions - the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The second requirement was to limit the expansion of UNAMIR to the first phase of reintroducing the (50 odd) military observers who had been evacuated to Nairobi but not repatriated, and to bringing the Ghanain battalion back to full strength (with the addition of some armoured personnel carriers (APCs)). Deployments of the subsequent phases would be not authorised without a further report by the SecGen in two weeks time and a further decision by the Council.
7 Inderfurth explained the first proposal in terms of bringing the operation into conformity with one of the essential elements in PD 26. As for the second, he argued that this would give the UN and the US time to obtain further information about which of the outside in or inside out approaches was the more feasible. He invited the Secretariat to confirm that consent was "vital" to the viability of the operation and that the deferral of the deployment of the main part of the expanded force as proposed by the US would not make any difference in real terms to the speed at which troops would get to Rwanda given the slow pace of replies to the SecGen's requests approaches. Gharekhan declined to offer confirmation on either point.

8 We led the opposition to both US amendments. On the issue of consent, we noted that as envisaged UNAMIR was not a traditional peacekeeping operation where, short of Chapter VII action, consent was a basic requirement. The whole concept of operations was based on the assumption that there was no ceasefire in place. The point of UN involvement was not to maintain a peace between the parties but to provide protection and assistance to civilians at risk. In the circumstances prevailing in Rwanda, where innocent civilians were being slaughtered, it would be unacceptable to give either of the parties a veto over UN action. Therefore, we resisted vigorously the US proposal to tie the mandate and/or the continuation of the operation to the consent of the parties.

9 We received strong support on this point from France, Argentina, Spain, the Czech Republic and Djibouti, and, albeit in muted tones, from the UK. The US eventually dropped its proposed amendment to the operative part of the resolution and settled for a preambular para proposed by the UK which stressed the importance attached to the support and cooperation of the parties but did not make the operation contingent on either.

10 The second US demand was even more problematic. We pointed out that the effect of the proposal would be effectively to limit the resolution to putting back some of the people who had been taken out in April after the Belgians pulled out (when the US had tried to close the operation down entirely). In terms of public presentation, this risked the UN being a laughing stock. In operational terms, the requirement for further reports and decisions in order to ensure the feasibility of operation was likely to be self defeating. Troop contributors would be unlikely to commit themselves when the Council itself was so indecisive. The NAM shared our reservations.

11 The informals were adjourned to enable consultations on how to bridge the gap. The resulting corridor discussions confirmed that the US would not shift on the need for second decision point for deployment after the first phase. After an hour's standoff with the NAM, they were willing to fudge
the...vant a bit by providing that the next deployment would follow a report by the SecGen and "further review and action, as required, by the Council." This was enough to satisfy the NAM. We took exception, however, to the various factors which the report would be required to address (cooperation of the parties, progress towards a ceasefire, availability of resources and duration of the mandate) and proposed their removal so as not to give so public a signal of the Council's reluctance to give assistance to Rwanda. When the US refused to budge, we reserved our position.

12 In the ensuing two hours before the vote (while the amended text was being translated), we gave serious consideration to abstaining on the resolution. Following consultations with the Minister and the Ministry, and given the NAM decision to vote yes (on the basis that something is better than nothing), we decided to support the text. Additional considerations were the possible impact that absence of NZ support might have on countries such as Australia and Canada, which are considering Secretariat requests for troops for the expanded force, and the danger that an abstention might be misconstrued as support for the Rwandan "Foreign Minister" who showed up to argue against the arms embargo contained in the resolution (see below). We made plain, however, our distaste with what had happened in our EOV which was the second made after the adoption of the resolution.

13 Adoption of the resolution was delayed a further hour when the odious Rwandan "Foreign Minister" turned up to demand that he be allowed to vote against Part B of the resolution imposing the mandatory arms embargo. When advised that such a procedure would be inconsistent with Rwanda's notional cosponsorship of a "Presidential" text, he said he would then vote against the resolution as a whole. Such a public rejection of the resolution by one of the parties was clearly undesirable. Further informals resulted in the presidential designation of the resolution being withdrawn and agreement to vote separately on Part B and then on the rest of the resolution (along similar lines to the vote on Res 904 on the Hebron massacre). Somewhat to the surprise of the P4, and reflecting real anger at the US position the only countries ready to cosponsor the resolution were the P4, Spain and the Czech Republic.

14 Part B was adopted 14-1(Rwanda)-0; the remainder of the resolution was adopted 15-0-0. Following the Hebron formula, the President then sought and received confirmation (by silence) that the resolution as a whole had been adopted as Res 918 (1994).

15 All Council members made EOVs: Rwanda, Oman, Pakistan, Djibouti, China and Russia spoke before the vote; France, NZ, UK, US, Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Czech Rep and Nigeria spoke afterwards. With the exception of Rwanda, the statements were brief.
16 The Rwandan "Foreign Minister" gave a tendentious and racist 15 page diatribe to the effect that the recent killings were the understandable consequence of four centuries of oppression of the Hutus by the "haughty" Tutsi overlords, and went on to argue that in any event the real culprits in the killing of the President and the subsequent slaughter were the RPF.

17 Forewarned by the French, we and the UK had agreed beforehand that we should not let such remarks pass unchallenged. Although the UK, Spain and Argentina also criticised the "Foreign Minister's" statement, we were the first to do so and were the most direct. We were also the most critical of the content of the resolution. We understand that some of our remarks were later carried by the BBC and CNN. We have received many congratulations from a range of UN members on what we said to the "Foreign Minister" and on what we said about the substance of the resolution.

Comment

18 All in all, the events of Monday night left a bad taste in the mouth. As a number of delegates and Secretariat members commented, it was not a good start to the despatch of a UN mission to what is undoubtedly one of the most desperate situations that has confronted the UN, even including Somalia. The shackles that the US, by threatening to use its veto, successfully placed on the operation are particularly regrettable in that light.

19 At a technical level we agree with many of the concerns that the US has raised and would naturally be inclined to be supportive were the situation not so desperate and were we not convinced that the motivation for the US approach has little to do with Rwanda and everything to do with the Administration's battle with Congress over peacekeeping. It was to be expected that there would be heavy pressure to apply the rule of PD26 to the proposal to expand UNAMIR since this is the first "peacekeeping" decision to be taken since its adoption. But as even the US has frequently acknowledged, the proposed expanded UNAMIR is not a traditional peacekeeping operation and it makes little sense to apply the traditional peacekeeping criteria on which PD26 is based.

20 We agree that there is a clear need to establish a more detailed concept of operations and to whether inside out or outside in is the way to go. There is also a need to ascertain whether there will be resources available to do the job. But that does not mean the Council has to condition its political decision to establish what is a very modest force by requiring further reports and further decisions. Moreover, the process of technical elaboration of strategy is not something that can be done adequately by the Council at the level of Ambassadors. Nor can it be left for the
powerful Council members to work it things out privately with the Secretariat as the Permanent Members like to do. As we hinted in our EOV, and pointed out more directly to Inderfurth and Albright privately, the events of Monday are a clear demonstration of the need for an institutionalised forum for such technical discussions on how to give effect to the political decisions of the Council.

21 General Sanderson, the former Commander of the UN force in Cambodia (UNTAC), made an interesting remark at a lunch yesterday hosted in his honour by Richard Butler. Commenting on the discussion on the events of the night before, he said he was rather depressed to hear that the United States wanted the Security Council to engage so much in what were matters of tactics when they should be focussing on strategy. USG Goulding made an even more telling comment about the SecGen's attitude to Rwanda. He said the SecGen considered that the world would be in ferment if 200,000 people had been killed in a month in Europe; he was not about to let the Council turn away from Rwanda just because the problems there were hard.

End Message
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TO: WELLINGTON
CC: PARIS, BRUSSELS, Immediate
    BONN, CANBERRA, Routine
    GENEVA, HARARE, Routine
    LONDON, MADRID, Routine
    MOSCOW, OTTAWA, Routine
    BEIJING, SANTIAGO, Routine
    TOKYO, WASHINGTON, Routine
    DEFENCE

MPAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary
- French outline their position to Council in similar terms to their presentation in Wellington
- Public responses are cool in Council
- Privately most delegations inside and outside the Council are very much opposed
- Senior Secretariat personnel believe French intervention would be a disaster, but Boutros Ghali has been persuaded personally by Juppe to support the initiative
- French honour is now on the line and delegation has instructions to push ahead with resolution
- Draft was circulated late this evening: text by fax
- We warned Merimee privately that he should not assume we would be on the same side

Action
For information.

Report

CONFIDENTIAL
At informal consultations today (17 June) French Ambassador Merimee explained to the Security Council their proposal that there be a UNITAF type intervention force in Rwanda. Merimee said that his government did not feel that the international community could allow further time to elapse if there was some possibility of offering relief to the population. France's proposal was predicated on the fact that it would be some time before UNAMIR could be fully deployed in Rwanda. If a ceasefire was agreed, or if UNAMIR was in place earlier than envisaged then there would be no requirement for such a force and France would not pursue the idea. Also France would not act alone. It was seeking partners in Europe and Africa and had had some encouraging replies although no firm commitment. Senegal was almost certain to participate and Ghana's response had been helpful. (Comment: Canada tells us that Ghana has said to them that it does not support the French idea.)

2 Merimee said that it would be purely humanitarian and a follow up to the UNAMIR mandate (Resolution 925 Op 4a). It would endeavour to ascertain where groups of people were threatened and take them to safe areas where they would be protected from attack. Merimee said that the force might be tasked with saving Tutsi lives and repelling attacks by the Hutu militia. While the force would not be seeking confrontation, if it were opposed by any elements, then the French (sic) troops would not hesitate to use force.

3 The French troops would only be there for two months, ie the likely interval between now and the arrival of UNAMIR reinforcements. Merimee claimed that even under the best of scenarios (ie the transfer - with the permission of the troop contributors - of some troops from Somalia to Rwanda) it would be at least 4 to 6 weeks before UNAMIR was in a position to act. (Comment: This is false. See para 16 below.)

4 Force would be a multinational not a national force. But given the rules of engagement and the possibility of combat it was essential, so far as the French Government was concerned, that the force be under national command.

5 Merimee said that the French Government was aware of criticism which could be levelled at the proposal. The RPF had said that it was not in favour; it feared that French intervention could conceivably reverse the trend which might bring it victory by indirectly giving encouragement to the other side. But France had to make a choice. If the massacres continued there needed to be rapid intervention. France was prepared to do this, with partners, so long as UNAMIR was not fully deployed. Merimee added that he thought there would not necessarily need to be direct contact with the RPF. The massacres were in the government controlled zone and that would be the priority area for operations. (Comment: French troops would be in RGF territory behind the front lines just as they were prior to establishment of
UNAMIR and again would in practice serve as a deterrent against RPF advances.)

6 Merimee said that France had already withdrawn once before from Rwanda. So there was no reason to doubt that it would be acting in good faith. Merimee said that as soon as a final decision was taken by his Government he would submit a draft resolution to the Council modelled on that which authorised deployment of UNITAF in Somalia in November 1992. France hoped that support from the Council would not be denied.

P5 Position

7 None of the P5 responded to the French proposal.

8 Hannay told us that his view and that of their experts in London is that the proposal is crazy. However for bilateral reasons they would make this known in private. The UK also told us that there had been an EU meeting in Brussels today at which the proposal was discussed. Apparently the French got no tangible support aside from ambiguous expressions of "admiration" that they were prepared to undertake this mission. Hannay said Belgium, Spain and Germany had been critical. No member state offered to participate though the UK understood that Italy had said it might participate "if several others do as well".

9 As for the US, Christopher is expected to speak to Juppe very soon about the proposal and until then the US is not ready to make its position known. US Mission have told us that they and the Africa Bureau believe it is a disastrous policy. However Strobe Talbott had declined advice that the US should speak against the idea expressing concern that this would give the media another stick to bash the US. The Mission is interpreting their position for now to be that they will not oppose the proposal if the French have partners and if the Council gives its blessing by way of resolution.

10 US will be saying to the French bilaterally that they are concerned about the possible "perception" that they will be entering Rwanda in order to assist the "government" which is now quite close to defeat by the RPF, having been pushed out of Gitarama and almost out of Kigali. One member of the US Mission told us that their assessment is that the French intervention would undoubtedly help the RGF. (Merimee admitted to us privately that in his view also this was an inevitable outcome.)

11 US also told us that they believe it is essential that this French proposal not divert energy away from arrangements under way to deploy UNAMIR. To this end they are proceeding with the immediate delivery of their APCs to the area and will be supplying the Ghanains with other equipment. US emphasised they also wish to see other countries provide the airlift and other equipment UNAMIR needs as soon as
possible. "Delay", said Inderfurth, "which you all criticised the US for", is now the responsibility of others.

12 The Chinese and Russians do not yet have instructions. For the Russians it is possible that they may see a linkage between the French request for Council approval of their proposal and the Russian proposal for Georgia, making it difficult for them to oppose.

NP10 Responses

13 NP10 Council members were taken by surprise and no NP10 members had instructions apart from New Zealand. Comments were generally noncommittal.

14 For our part, we thanked the French for their presentation to the Council. We said we had two observations. First, we understood the desire to respond to a very serious humanitarian crisis that the Council had been grappling with for some time - not always with success. Secondly, we said that the situation in Rwanda was very volatile. There had been negative reactions from parties to the conflict. We said we would need to consider this aspect further in particular the problems of any intervention force fitting in with UNAMIR and the impact on UNAMIR's future ability to operate in Rwanda.

15 In responding to these comments Merimee agreed the relationship between the French force and UNAMIR was an important issue. He said that France wished there to be a "clear distinction" between the French force and UNAMIR since "UNAMIR should not loose its neutral character as it would if it were too involved with the French force". Because of this they would prefer to "observe a distinction even though the mandates would be similar." He also agreed that efforts to deploy the expanded UNAMIR should not be interrupted.

16 In response to a question from Spain, Gharekhan said that most of the African troops were ready to go now but just required the logistic support. Air lift and APCs are the "main problem". He reported the Secretariat hoped the Ghanians would arrive late next week and also that they had a "reasonable hope" that one other African battalion could also be in place in "a reasonably short period of time".

17 Gharekhan appealed to member states to do what they can urgently to support these efforts.

Nigerian View

18 Gambari, who was not at the Council this morning, told us privately that Nigeria did not support the French idea for intervention. He believes Africa will have very serious problems with it. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will remain true once the French lobbying machine goes into overdrive in Francophonia.
Canadians

19 Canadians tell us that Gen Dallaire has reported from talks he had with RPF that RPF said there cannot be 2 UN mandated operations in Rwanda, one of which they do not support. Apparently if the French proceed, and the UNSC agrees, RPF will withdraw its support for all UN operations, since in their view it would be difficult to distinguish between the 2 forces.

20 Canadians' have told the French privately they are absolutely opposed to the French proposal and that France's efforts would better be directed to deploying and equipping an expanded UNAMIR as soon as possible. We understand they will be conveying to the French their strong preference that they work through UNAMIR and avoid any other complicating factors or for the French to jeopardise UNAMIR's position.

Other Reactions

21 The Brazilian, Argentine and Spanish delegations expressed strong reservations to us privately particularly citing the report of the special commission of enquiry into the Somalia debacle as reason for not supporting France's initiative.

Rwandan PR

22 We understand from the US that Bizimana is now signalling he will not be cooperative about stepping aside from the presidency in September. Djibouti put the proposal to him a day or so ago and initially it seemed on track. However, at P5 meeting yesterday at which France gave a briefing on their initiative, we understand China reported a conversation they had had with Bizimana. He had said he was "very optimistic that things would change before the end of this month", (ie that he would be accepted as legitimate), China then asked Merimee directly if Bizimana was therefore referring to the French initiative to enter Rwanda. This caught Merimee by surprise who responded that until Juppe had made the announcement, no one in the Rwanda "government" knew of their initiative. (He did not deny, however, that for some time the RGF has been pressing for such help from Paris with increasing desperation.) Others have recalled to us the closeness of links between France and the late Habirimana regime.

Situation on the Ground

23 Secretariat (Gharekhan) reported at informals that there had been 12 UNAMIR casualties today. A Uruguayan Major had been killed and a Bangladeshi Major wounded in a reconnaissance mission some 10km out of Kilagi en route to Ruhengeri. The mission was attempting to determine a viable route for humanitarian supplies to the north. A UNAMIR
inspection team would go to the site to investigate. The
Bangladeshi is being medivaced to Nairobi by Canadian
aircraft.

24 An observer team on reconnaissance to Gitarama had
reported many civilian casualties and corpses in houses.
There was heavy fighting in Kigali and an RPF raid on St
Famille Church to free Tutsi sheltering there. Some 40
casualties amongst the militia and gendarmerie were reported
and a number of refugees released. The militia had attempted
a raid on the Hotel mille Collines where some 400 Tutsi are
sheltering. The RPF had forced its way into the hospital and
taken stretchers and 2 boxes of drugs from Medecine Sans
Frontiers.

Postscript

25 Since drafting the above French have circulated draft
resolution (which implies definite decision in Paris to
proceed). It is modelled closely on the UNITAF precedent and
confirms rumours that they have Boutros Ghali on board
because it is predicated on the concept of a SG's
recommendation to proceed in this manner.

End Message
CONFIDENTIAL

21:44 (5650) 700/NYK/00000/00000 $520.88

FROM: NEW YORK C04652/NYK 21-Jun-1994
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate
CC: BEIJING BONN Routine
BRUSSELS CANBERRA Routine
GENEVA HARARE Routine
LONDON MADRID Routine
MOSCOW OTTAWA Routine
PARIS SANTIAGO Routine
TOKYO WASHINGTON Routine
DEFENCE

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)
(DSP1, CEO, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U52265.

Summary

- French have amended draft resolution to secure support/acquiescence of enough Council members to adopt the resolution and will push it to a vote as a French text tomorrow, 22 June

- France objects to our request for a report from the Force Commander and for consultations with troop contributors

- Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Brazil continue to have serious reservations and Missions are recommending abstentions to their capitals

- Humanitarian NGOs are targeting us with calls and faxes urging that we oppose the resolution

- Secretariat, UNAMIR Force Commander, non-Council members, and OAU continue to have grave reservations about the French initiative and privately commend the stand we have taken

- The RPF remain implacably opposed to the initiative, have withdrawn consent for UNAMIR's presence and insist that UNAMIR withdraw to avoid getting caught up in French-RPF
- Secretariat report that French initiative is already having negative impact on contributions for expanded UNAMIR (though Canadian Cabinet agreed today to deployment of 300 person signals detachment to UNAMIR)

- We recommend that New Zealand withhold support from the French resolution

Action

Voting instructions

Report

Informal consultations this afternoon were devoted to further consideration of the French resolution. Merimee circulated a revised text which incorporated a number of amendments following various consultations the French had had with the US, Brazil, Spain, the Czech Rep, and the NAM Caucus. Despite these changes, the only enthusiastic support came from the Russians who, as Moscow has commented, clearly see value in the initiative for their own purposes.

2 Spain and the UK played their part as loyal Europeans and helped the French out with drafting suggestions, and the US indicated support, subject to establishing clearly in the text that financial responsibility for the venture lies with the participating states and any others that choose to help them. The Argentines, who had told us beforehand they were uncomfortable with their overnight instructions to support the text, secured, at our suggestion, clarifying words at the end of what is now PPF that the French force shall not be an interpositional force between the parties.

3 We spoke early in the discussion to repeat our basic reservations with the proposal which would require UNAMIR to operate alongside a separately constituted and differently empowered force, and urged the French to reconsider the option of putting their troops under blue helmets and giving UNAMIR Chapter VII authority. We also said that before the Council took a decision it should have a detailed report from the Force Commander on the likely implications for UNAMIR of the introduction of the French force and that there should be consultations with actual and potential troop contributors to UNAMIR.

4 In response, Merimee said that while France would have preferred to have been able to participate in a UN-commanded operation, circumstances made that impossible: the RPF's attitude towards France meant that French participation in UNAMIR would have compromised the neutrality of the UN Force. Moreover, the French force had a different and dangerous task to fulfill and needed the protection offered by a unified national command. He dismissed the request for
a report from Dallaire by noting that the SecGen would not have supported the idea if he had been concerned for the safety of his personnel.

5 The Chinese said they remained concerned about the attitude of the parties and that of the OAU. When Merimee offered satisfaction on neither, Brazil repeated the request, but to no greater effect. (Despite their lobbying efforts, the French have made little headway with the RPF or the OAU — see below). Nigeria (Ayewah) made a convoluted intervention, the upshot of which seemed to be that the latest French draft, while an improvement, exacerbated their concerns, and that the resolution could have a negative impact on those countries that had already signalled their willingness to contribute to UNAMIR. They urged the French to make haste slowly.

6 No other Council member spoke in the general discussion. A member of the Pakistani delegation made a point of telling us privately that he fully agreed with everything we said and was very concerned at the implications of the resolution for Russian intervention in Georgia, Tajikistan and even Afghanistan. Although the French had had some success in persuading Marker to maintain silence, on the basis that any Pakistani profile could complicate the task of the Khan (the former head of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and newly-appointed Special Representative for Rwanda), the delegation were going to recommend an abstention. He also noted that they had had strong representations from the Malaysians and the Sri Lankans urging opposition to the proposal.

7 At French urging, the President took the Council through a paragraph by paragraph review of the text. Merimee said he would be happy to consider all proposals but, turning to us, said he could not accommodate suggestions that were counter to the thrust of the French initiative. We agreed to this procedure on the understanding that the text would remain a French draft and that there could be no question of the text being turned into a Presidential text or of any delegation being committed to the outcome. A number of further changes were made to the text, though none were of much significance. The French said that will put the text under their name in blue tonight (see accompanying fax) for a vote tomorrow. Merimee pressed very hard for adoption in the morning, but was resisted by the Nigerians and the Pakistanis who said their instructions may not arrive until later in the day.

8 There is manifest concern among the NGO community at the French initiative. We received phone calls this morning from Britain from Oxfam UK and from Africa Rights urging us to maintain our opposition to the proposal and telling us that their concerns are widely held among NGOs operating in Rwanda, including, they said, Medecines sans frontieres (France). This afternoon, we were the subject of a fax
attack from humanitarian NGOs and Rwandans living in America pleading with us to oppose the proposal. They are deeply concerned at the implications that the French force, coupled with RPF opposition to it, will have on the humanitarian relief situation and on the morale of Rwandans in general. Africa Rights, which has just had one of their principles return from a lengthy visit to the country insisted that the introduction of a French force would be of major concern to ordinary Hutu as well as to the Tutsi.

9 It has also been plain from various conversations we have had today with the Secretariat and with non-Council members that the widely-held apprehensions about the motivation for the French initiative and its implications for UNAMIR and the wider UN continue. None of the Secretariat we spoke to on the political and military sides bothered to hide their profound disagreement with their CEO's judgment.

10 Speculation as to the bona fides of the French initiative is rife. One interesting piece of information we learned from the Secretariat this afternoon is that the RPF claims that French military advisers have remained in the country and have been training some of the Hutu militias are correct. Some are out in the countryside but some are in Kigali. It was interesting therefore that the French told us that one reason for the urgency was that they consider that Kigali could fall to the RPF at any time.

11 The Canadians confirmed that Dallaire is firmly opposed to the French force and has said so publicly, and that as a consequence the French seem to have started a campaign for his removal. In the informal's themselves, ASG Riza, when asked for the views of the Force Commander noted that Dallaire was bound by the SecGen's decision and had been instructed to implement the necessary coordination with the French force. However, he went on to note that Dallaire had advised that there would be no problems with the French force if the RPF were to change their position to support the French initiative. But if they remained opposed, there could be very serious complications for UNAMIR, whose headquarters are located in an RPF-held sector of Kigali and which is dependent on resupply either through the RPF-held airport or through the RPF-held territory to the North-east.

11 Riza noted that there had already been some signs of a hardening of RPF attitudes; the APCs coming from Somalia had been held up for three days on the border. As if to underscore his own reservations, when the French declined to answer China on the OAU position Riza took the initiative to show us and the Nigerians the OAU communiqué where it is stated clearly that the OAU believes any intervention must be within the framework of UNAMIR.

12 The RPF opposition to the French force remains obdurate. Today, they have taken the next step and have advised that if the Council approves the French force it should also
authorize the withdrawal, perhaps temporarily, of UNAMIR since they are concerned that their personnel will not be able to distinguish clearly between UNAMIR and French personnel. Text of RPF letter is in accompanying fax. Even allowing for the element of bluff, the threat to UNAMIR is unmistakable. The Secretariat have told us that they are already evacuating out the Senegalese and Congolese members of UNAMIR and at this afternoon’s consultations Riza confirmed that Dallaire is drawing up contingency plans for total withdrawal of the force. Meanwhile, flights into Kigali are subject to individual approval by the RPF who have taken steps to render the airport unusable to any attempt by the French to land there.

13 Non-Council members such as the Canadians, the Australians, the Ghanaians and the Zimbabweans have told us of their reservations about the French proposal. The Australians consider that that proposal could well delay a decision by Canberra on Australian participation in UNAMIR. The Nigerians told us that a number of the Africans who had committed themselves to participate in the expanded force are now reconsidering. Even the Ghanaians, the remainder of whose mechanised battalion were to be deployed on Friday, 24 June, is now reconsidering. This confirms the Secretariat’s worst fears about the SecGen’s decision to endorse the French initiative. (On the positive side, however, the Canadians tell us that their Cabinet gave formal approval this morning to a 300 strong signals detachment to join UNAMIR. A reconnaissance team is already on the way to Rwanda.)

Voting positions

14 A vote on the resolution tomorrow is almost a certainty. Our guess is that the French can count on 10 positive votes. China, Pakistan, Nigeria are recommending to their capitals that they abstain. The Brazilians are considering doing the same.

Recommendation

15 We recommend that New Zealand not support the resolution. The evidence continues to mount that this is a badly conceived operation with questionable motivation. The NGO community is opposed and recognises that it is unlikely to save lives. It is inconsistent with the principles we have consistently espoused regarding the deployment of UN forces. Even if is able to do some immediate good, it threatens to leave the UN with a bigger mess to clean up afterwards.

16 Accordingly, we recommend that at a minimum New Zealand should abstain and that we should be prepared to do so even if we are on our own. For better or worse, we have become identified at the conscience of the Council on Rwanda. It would do us little credit with other Council members, the wider UN membership or with NGOs were we to compromise our
principles and go along with a consensus on such a bad product. In our judgment, a tough ROV would not of itself be convincing.

End Message
Your U/N fax (not to others).

Summary

- Security Council endorses French intervention in Rwanda by a vote of 10-0-5 (NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China)

- The significant number of abstentions and the qualified support by the US and Russia will have demonstrated to the French that their actions in Rwanda are not widely supported

- The vote also sent a message that the non-Permanent Members will insist on having their views taken into better account in future Council decisions

Action

Information

Report

Res 929(1994) endorsing the French intervention in Rwanda was adopted early this afternoon by a vote of 10 - 0 - 5 (NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China).

2 At the informals prior to the vote, Merimee attempted to
reply to the questions he left unanswered yesterday concerning the attitude of the RPF. He said that it would be presumptuous of France to expect the RPF to welcome the French intervention given their public position against any foreign intervention in Rwanda, including by the UN. But, they could expect the RPF to change its position after the resolution had been adopted. At his meetings this morning with Juppe and officials at the Quai, the Deputy Prime Minister designate under the Arusha Agreement had indicated that while he could not publicly support the intervention, he considered that French intentions were laudable and that the RPF would cooperate with the French once they made contact in Rwanda. Merimee said that French officials were also meeting the RPF today on the Rwanda/Uganda border. In addition, he pointed to yesterday's announcement by Canada that it would be providing 350 troops to UNAMIR as proof that the French intervention was not acting as a disincentive to participation in UNAMIR.

3 There were no public comments on this information. For the Brazilians, however, who had made RPF consent a keystone of their attitude to the resolution, Merimee's comments were insufficient to persuade them off their proposed abstention.

4 The only other discussion at the informals concerned the timing of the vote. The French were desperate for adoption by the early afternoon (and frequently checked their watches as time ticked away). Nigeria (Ayewah), however, tried to defer the vote until the afternoon, allegedly on the basis that his Minister was tied up in a meeting and had not confirmed his instructions. He also argued that the Council should wait to hear from OAU SecGen, Salim Salim who was arriving in New York in the early afternoon. But Ayewah ran into a major and unexpected obstacle in the person of Boutros Ghali.

5 In a move almost unprecedented in our time on the Council, the French had persuaded the SecGen to attend the final discussion of the text at the informals. When Ayewah argued for delay, the SecGen intervened to say that Council action was urgent and that he had had an urgent plea from his Special Rep in Burundi that something must be done quickly in Rwanda to stop the disease of the killings spreading to Burundi. Acknowledging the risks inherent in the French intervention, the SecGen also said that the dangers of intervention were less than those of Council inaction.

6 The SecGen's remarks gave sufficient basis for Spain, UK and Russia to argue in support of rapid action. France then proposed that the vote be held at 1pm. No one demurred. We took no part in the discussions at the informals. Merimee told us he was very grateful that New Zealand had not sought any further delay.

7 Russia, Brazil, Djibouti, China and Rwanda gave EOVs before the vote. France, US, NZ, Spain, UK, Czech Rep,
Argentina, Nigeria and Oman spoke afterwards. Pakistan kept its counsel.

8 Those supporting the resolution emphasised the need for rapid action to halt the killings in Rwanda, the difficulties in getting UNAMIR deployed, and the limited scope and timeframe of the French force. Probably the best case for the intervention was made by the US, though Mrs Albright's words comment that the nature of the humanitarian crisis demanded a swift response from the international community came oddly from the representative of the country most responsible for the delay in Council action on Rwanda. The US statement, however, was also the most pointed at the French motivation, insisting on the need for neutrality and implying that the world will be watching closely.

9 We have sent by separate fax (Wellington and Paris only) the text of the NZ EOV which emphasised that while we shared and applauded France's humanitarian objectives, we disagreed with the means by which they were being pursued. As did Brazil and Nigeria, we expressed serious concerns about having two operations with different command structures and authorities operating in parallel, and noted the lessons that should have been drawn on this score from what happened in Somalia.

Comment

10 Paris's C01940 confirms our own impressions that the French had misread the level of support they had and were surprised when they learned this morning how many Council members intended to abstain. In fact, it could have been worse for them. Once the Argentines had found out where things stood, they made an effort to persuade Buenos Aires to move to an abstention as well. As it turned out, the Argentines continued to support the French, but had they not, the French would have been in the most uncomfortable situation of having the bare minimum of 9 positive votes (and reliant on that of Rwanda) to get the resolution through.

11 Merimee was clearly pleased at the tone of the New Zealand statement. He is also very well aware that the weight of New Zealand's independent viewpoint has been felt much more keenly by others in the Council. In fact, this is one of the few cases where we have had a difference with France. And on many other key policy issues - in particular, Bosnia and the use of air strikes, and the creation last year of UNAMIR - the French have had better cooperation from New Zealand than almost anyone else.

12 Like Paris, we do not think that the New Zealand abstention should do lasting damage to our relations with France. The number of abstentions, plus the fact that we were careful not to call into question French motives, should ensure that. We agree that our vote will not predispose the French to support future New Zealand initiatives on the
Council. But it is in the nature of things that they have many more initiatives in the Council than we do and will want our support for those, and they are already (with the British) our principal opponents in our endeavours to open up the Council's procedures.

13 The vote today will have sent a clear message to the French that their actions in Rwanda will be scrutinised closely and that, short of a dramatic change of circumstances, they will be held to their promises to keep their intervention truly impartial and of a short duration.

14 On a wider level, the vote will also have sent a timely signal to all the Permanent Members and the SecGen that the non-Permanent Council members are prepared to stand up for principle and that the consensus tradition of recent times cannot be used to coerce countries into supporting initiatives on which they have serious reservations. In that sense, we consider that the vote will be a help rather than a hindrance in ensuring that the views of all Council members are taken into account in future decisions.

End Message