## Documents List

*Please note that the contents of this briefing book are embargoed (for public release) until the start of our conference, Monday, June 2, 2014, 9.30 a.m.*

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*FOI – Freedom of Information Law/Act*
Security Council Meets on Rwanda (above)
Ambassador Jean Damascene Bizimana (Rwanda) addresses members of the Security Council.
08 June 1994; United Nations, New York; Source: United Nations Archive, Photo # 286758

Security Council Extends Mandate of UNAMIR (above)
The Security Council votes to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until 29 July. 05 April 1994; United Nations, New York; Source: United Nations Archive, Photo # 286894
Paris' C01742. Your C21388.

Summary

2 US position is to keep Rwanda on a "short leash" with a 2-2.5 month review, pending the formation of a transitional government (TG) in Kilgali. US draft resolution will stress that responsibility for progress lies with the Rwandans themselves. The parties have moved some distance towards compromise but the situation remains tense. Key issue is participation of a (militant Hutu) CDR representative in TG over RPF objections. State does not rule out progress before 5 April mandate renewal. If matter is settled US would move to a six month renewal. US is sympathetic to SG's Report request for more police observers.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We spoke to IO (Zelle) and Africa Bureau (Aiston) on 30 March and again on 4 April. Both told us essentially the same story. US policy on mandate renewal is to make clear to the parties in Rwanda that it is up to them to make progress and to keep pressure on for agreement on the composition of the transitional government. If no agreement is reached on a transitional government before 5 April only a brief ("2 to 2.5
month") mandate renewal is preferred by the US. Zelle told us today that France now appears to be willing to accept this.

5. The Administration is also very reluctant to agree to the request for 45 extra police observers. While the US wishes to "maintain a strong force", the additional 45 personnel will not make a crucial difference to the outcome, and their deployment at this time would contradict the point that it is up to the parties on the ground to make progress in the negotiations. An additional consideration for the Administration as they have not yet notified Congress of this possible additional deployment, as it has informally agreed to do with all UN PKOs. (Comment: we sense that financial considerations also play a part on the US position).

6. In the (now unlikely) event that agreement is reached on a transitional government before the vote, the US would support a longer ("six month") renewal and would be prepared to assist, including with additional police monitors. (Comment: There is clearly an element of carrot and stick in this position). State does expect the mandate renewal to go to a vote tomorrow 5 April.

7. Aiston provided a comprehensive review of recent developments in Rwanda. We assume much of the background will be known to you. He stressed that there has been progress in the direction of a transitional government in recent weeks, but that there are still obstacles to be overcome. Tension and sporadic violence continue. As you will recall, the process of forming a transitional government (composed of the MRND party of President Habyarimana and the four opposition parties, plus the RPF) had earlier been complicated by the emergence of splits in some of the coalition partners:

- The MDR (predominantly Hutu successor to the pre-secession government) has split into a hardline and a moderate wing, of which only the latter has been willing to deal with the RPF;

- The Liberal Party (PL) had also split: Commerce Minister Mugenzi leads a Hutu wing; Tutsi Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Lando Ndasingwa leads a breakaway Tutsi group;

- The Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Hutu Public Works Minister Gatabazi remains willing to deal with Tutsi and provides a stabilising influence. No change is reported in the position of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

7. The splits in the MDR and LP had complicated the implementation of the Arusha Accord when factions had put up competing lists of deputies for seats and portfolios allocated under the Accord. In particular Lando's contesting of the Justice portfolio threatened to upset the balance of power between Tutsi and Hutu (the Tutsi RPF already had the Interior
Ministry and Gendarmerie). That dispute had been resolved during the past month: of the eleven LP deputy slots, the Mugenzi faction got 5 and the Lando faction 6. Mugenzi and Lando were confirmed by the PM in their old portfolios and a neutral third person, a Tutsi, was named to the Justice portfolio. The problem of overlapping lists arising from the split in the MDR was resolved through local caucuses.

8 The remaining issue is the question of CDR membership of the transitional assembly. (Only one seat was allocated to this militant Hutu faction under the Arusha Accord.) The PM has publicly committed himself to the full implementation of the Accord, but the RPF has so far opposed CDR participation when the assembly is convened. The RPF has said it would accept the subsequent admission of the CDR member if a majority of deputies agreed (as is likely), but this remains unacceptable to the CDR. The US is also opposed to this "compromise" as it violates the integrity of the Arusha settlement. State notes that the Accord provides for the subsequent expulsion of any member which violates the assembly's code of ethics.

9 Aiston commented that despite the detailed and precise nature of the Arusha Accord, it is not always easy to tell which problems are the result of a real clash of interests and which are the product of negotiating tactics by the players. He did not rule out the possibility that even if the CDR deputy is admitted to the transitional assembly, other problems might surface. (Comment: this perception underlies US determination to sheet home responsibility for progress to the parties themselves).

End Message
The UNAMIR mandate ends on 5 April 1994. The new SC president (New Zealand) therefore had to interrupt the usual round of bilateral consultations with other SC members, usually the first order of business of every SC President, and convene informal consultations to consider and then adopt a resolution extending the UNAMIR mandate for another period of time.

The SG report on the matter (S/1994/360) had been distributed over the weekend. The SG observed that the presence of UNAMIR has a positive impact on the situation in Rwanda. He emphasized, however, that this does not concern the political process where practically no progress has been marked since the adoption of UNSCR 893 (of 06/01/94). Therefore, while recommending the UNAMIR extension by another six months, the SG conditions any further role for the UN in the country by evaluating, after two months, how the Arusha agreements (especially concerning the establishment of a transitional government and parliament) are being implemented. The SG also recommends expanding UNAMIR by 45 civilian policemen.

A draft resolution on UNAMIR was presented by France. While introducing it, France underscored two positive elements of the situation: the deployment of UNAMIR has contributed to the country’s stability, and parties to the conflict are still dedicated to the “Arusha process”. It described the delays in establishing the transitional institutions as a negative. In the draft itself France stipulated the extension of the mandate for three months, with a review of the Rwanda situation in six weeks. These shorter timeframes are to exert sufficient pressure on the parties concerned to accelerate the implementation of the Arusha agreements. France suggested that the dispatch of 45 police be postponed.

While there is otherwise no dispute about the draft, these time limits (for the length of the mandate and for the review) became subject to a lengthy and so far unresolved debate. Nigeria (on behalf of NAM) supported the original proposals of the SG. US and Russia are in favor of a 3-month extension but consider this a compromise, inasmuch as originally they would have supported only a 2-month extension. UK also supported the timeframes mentioned in the French draft, and NZ and Brazil followed. Informal consultations were then suspended for NAM to have a chance to discuss what next. Nigeria then suggested leaving the extension at 6 months but shorten the period of review, to 4 weeks. Original reactions of others (except for China) were evasive. Delegations referred to the need for fresh instructions. The US delegation was the most cautious one (note: small wonder, after the US in the last moment blocked the expansion of UNPROFOR by the proposed almost 10 000 troops).

Informal consultations to resolve this single sticky point in the draft will be held tomorrow, 05/04, with voting on the draft the same day.
During its informal consultations, the SC completed the draft on UNAMIR extension which was subsequently adopted at its formal session. The operative para 2 extends the UNAMIR mandate until 29/07, i.e., by four months, with the first review session of the SC to take place already in six weeks. In the course of the informals, the US delegation pointed out that this will not be a “routine” matter: if the transitional governmental structures are not established and there is a lack of progress in a peaceful solution of the situation, the US will insist on stopping the work of UNAMIR.
Reviewing the situation in Rwanda after the tragic death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was the key point of today’s informals. France presented a draft PRST. Amb Gharekhani presented supplementary information, mentioning that the situation in Burundi is calm and relatively stable. The authority of the president has been assumed by the speaker of the National Assembly which assured governmental continuity.

In Rwanda, the situation is tragic. A number of armed clashes and killings are taking place. The situation is all the less transparent because members of the designated Transitional Government, composed of representatives of parties of the broad political spectrum, exist side by side with the current government. The Presidential Guard which is subordinated exclusively to the President have started eliminating members of the transitional government. According to unconfirmed information, the premier of the transitional government and certain of its members have been executed.

The wave of violence has not spared UNAMIR. According to unconfirmed reports, the Presidential Guard has blamed Belgian UNAMIR members for shooting down the presidential plane outside Kigali. At least 10 Belgian soldiers have been killed and others kidnapped. UN units are under sporadic fire of the belligerent parties. Civilians working for the UN have not been spared violence either. Complete anarchy has gripped the country. There is no force that could ensure the operation of state power and restore order.

It is particularly disquieting that RPF units in demilitarized zones and in separate areas under UNAMIR supervision have started moving toward Kigali.

After Amb. Gharekhani’s information, the NAM caucus requested “time out” to consider the draft PRST and to suggest some changes.

In the event, the adopted PRST reflects especially the view of France and the NAM.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: WELLINGTON
CC: BEIJING, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS

C04272/NYK
WGTN UNSC
CANBERRA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, HARARE

08-Apr-1994
Immediate
Routine
Routine
Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council receives report on situation in Rwanda and letter from Sec Gen.

- France, US and Belgium are well down the tracks with plans for military action to evacuate nationals. Both France and US prefer to do this under UN auspices. Belgian position is unclear.

- There is some indication of an improvement in Kigali with the announcement of an interim president and 5 ministers but the chance of this sticking is unclear.

- Council may need to meet in the weekend to consider possible requests to alter UNAMIR mandate or to authorise member states to take necessary measures.

- We gave the Council a strong lead that if the situation does deteriorate the Council should oversee any action not stand back and watch unilateral intervention (Congo is on many minds).

- Council agreed with our proposal to set up monitoring arrangements over the weekend and to request the Secretariat to do appropriate contingency planning. President was also asked to give a detailed media briefing.

Action

For information only

Report

CONFIDENTIAL
2 Secretariat (Riza) briefed Council at informals this afternoon on the developing situation in Rwanda. He also provided additional information to the President shortly afterwards. The situation remains very concerning but there has been some progress. UNAMIR Force Commander and the Special Rep have been engaged in intensive efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement in Kigali and to establish some interim authority which can take control and to whom the Presidential Guard (the group that had gone nuts after the presidents assassination) might begin to take orders and stop killing people.

3 Efforts continued all day toward a cease-fire. Though originally scheduled to take effect from 10am (NY time) Friday, and postponed during the day, it now seemed to have been agreed and having some effect. Additionally, on the political front, an interim president has been named, together with 5 Ministers. The interim president appears to come from the late President's political party and although the appointments were negotiated by the UN with the Gendamerie and the army, and the RPF advised, it is unclear whether this is acceptable to the RPF and whether it will stick. (As a pre-condition to its agreement to the cease-fire, the RPF had asked for those who had engaged in the killing to be held responsible. The UN's response to the RPF had been to make an appeal for the cease-fire to be concentrated on first and then for consideration to be given to those other issues later.)

4 The conditions for the UN in brokering these arrangements have been very difficult. Although UNHQ here in NY could communicate with the UNAMIR force commander, and with also the Special Rep, it was difficult for the force commander and the Special Rep to communicate with each other in Kigali. Electricity is out (resulting in loss of telecommunications). A further major worry for UNAMIR is food, petrol and other logistics if the airport remains out. Four more days and the situation will be critical.

5 Riza reported 2 further Belgian nationals had been killed and France (Merimee) advised that 2 French citizens had also been killed. Of the 2 Ghanain peacekeepers kidnapped yesterday, one had been released and one was detained but could be observed in a compound and was OK. A number of foreign nationals had taken refuge in embassy compounds and UNAMIR were attempting to guard these.

6 The President reported to the Council the points made during a call on him by the Representative of the RPF on instruction from his HQ. During this call the RPF Rep advised that the RPF would be respecting its position behind the demilitarised lines held in accordance with the Arush Peace Agreement. He also noted that the RPF had so far shown restraint but indicated that they would prefer that any evacuation of foreign nationals be done by UNAMIR. The RPF Rep made it clear that any unilateral evacuation force would
be considered as a hostile force if it entered without their consent or remained in Rwanda for longer than the period necessary for the evacuation.

7 Although RPF was totally opposed to any change in UNAMIRs mandate which would result in it engaging in a combat role, they had no problem with the exercise of its present mandate in a self defence role. He made it clear though, that any intervention by UNAMIR in RPF movements would result in the force being considered as hostile. In his personal estimation, much of the political leadership had been assassinated and it would be difficult now to form an administration.

8 France indicated that the main objective was to reestablish some authority in Kigali and that UNAMIR and the Special Rep were playing a positive role in this. As to the possibility of the evacuation of foreign nationals, there were two issues for the Council to consider, what would be UNAMIR's role in any evacuation and what would be its future.

9 Nigeria indicated that the African Group was scheduled to meet on Monday to discuss the Rwanda issue.

10 US indicate that the situation is extremely grave and that the Council did not have enough information about what would be involved in an evacuation. US understanding is that it would require an air drop of troops into Kigali to take over control of the airport, now under the control of the Presidential Guard, and to establish a security perimetre of some distance around the airport to enable its use. UNAMIR does not have the equipment or resources on the ground to do this and "much homework" was required on this issue. It is not just a question of beefing up UNAMIR as it presently exists.

11 Outcome of discussion was Presidential summing up as set out in para 1 above.

Comment

12 In the best case, no further action may be necessary. In the worst, emergency evacuation will be required and a force sent. The UNAMIR Commander has asked for 24 hours in which to establish whether the cease-fire, and the positive political developments stick and what alternatives should be considered.

13 It is possible that over the weekend either the French or the US may come to the Council seeking UN cover along the lines of that provided in Somalia.

14 Council President will receive a briefing from Riza at 10.30am our Saturday with a view to considering a possible Council meeting later in the afternoon. We will let you know what transpires. Copy of the Sec Gen's letter follows by fax.
Mr Riza, Amb. Gharekhan’s Deputy, presented current information. Fighting among armed elements is continuing in Kigali (the Presidential Guard, army, gendarmerie). Two Belgian civilians have been killed. A number of people have sought shelter in embassies. There is no leadership of the state. The Prime Minister is in hiding in the UNAMIR HQ. The RPF has refused responsibility for the attack on the presidential plane. Fighting is not spreading beyond the capital. The situation is unclear. UNAMIR leadership is striving to stop the fighting.

The French Amb. informed that if the critical situation continues, it will be necessary to evacuate foreigners. France reserves the right to evacuate its people. He informed that two French civilians have also been killed.

The Nigerian Amb recalled that the African group will discuss this tragedy on Monday. The Russian Amb. suggested that the SC President should make at least a statement for the press.

During the discussion a letter from the SG was distributed, addressed to the SC President. Most of its discussion focused on its last para which assumed complementing UNAMIR by three additional battalions if civilians were to be evacuated.

The Secretariat requested additional 24 hours to study the situation further and possibly recommend SC action.
The SC met on 9 April, unusually for a Saturday, to continue its deliberations concerning Rwanda.

The UN Secretariat as well as the Rwanda Ambassador (via the UNSC President) informed about latest developments in the country which took a marked turn for the worse in the course of the previous 24 hours; whilst on Friday, the Secretariat informed about the provisional government and hopes for a ceasefire, in the course of the night these flickers of hope were extinguished. Absolute anarchy rules the country, armed members of the gendarmerie, army and the presidential guard (which is least inclined toward a peaceful settlement of the situation) freely move around Kigali. Tutsi military forces have completely abandoned their assembly points where they had been under control of UN soldiers. The RPF composed of Tutsi is (perhaps naturally) suspected of the airport assassination which, however, it vehemently denies. Tutsi units are also on the move from the demilitarized zone in the North of the country. They are evidently heading for Kigali, the capital. The RPF has disavowed the provisional government. (Note: the local press here describes them as “rebels”.)

(We assume that Prague has the basic information and that Rwanda concerns our country only tangentially. If there is interest in more detailed information about the situation in-country, let us know – otherwise we would focus especially on the UN position.)

The French Ambassador informed about the dispatch of his country’s troops with the humanitarian objective of evacuating French nationals. Belgium (the former colonial master of Rwanda) has decided similarly and for logistical reasons, the two operations have been linked. FR emphasized that the operation is time-limited. If other countries appropriately request it, the expedition can evacuate their nationals as well. The US Amb. informed about the steps of that country – so far, marines are in Bujumbura, in neighboring Burundi.

The UNSC now faces three questions:

1. The FR-Bel expedition: This concerns the SC only marginally. We listened to the basic information which was not challenged in the course of the following discussion from the point of view of international law. E.g., the Arg Amb (who as several other ambs is an important international lawyer) referred to Art 51 of the UN Charter. All supported the FR-Bel decision. (CZ did not take part in that discussion.) The Amb of Nigeria pointed out the need to inform the press exactly, in view of the inglorious history of foreign military interventions in Africa; on Friday, for example, he recalled a parallel with the Congo of the 60s. – This aspect will concern the SC only in terms of coordinating the activities of
this expedition with those of UNAMIR

2. The situation of UNAMIR and other UN personnel. Coincidentally, just on the eve of the aircraft catastrophe, the SC approved an extension of its mandate by four months with the proviso that within six weeks a decision will be taken as to whether progress in politically resolving the country’s situation will warrant it staying any longer. Today this appears almost as a tragicomic coincidence. The question today is whether UNAMIR doesn’t need a broader mandate (so that it can for example assist with evacuations), whether it doesn’t need to beef up its current strength (of about 2500 men), or conversely, whether we shouldn’t evacuate it completely.

(The New York representative of the RPF informed the SC President that the RPF would not like to see any changes in the UNAMIR mandate. It is possible that the RPF feels that UNAMIR sides with the Hutus — a small news item appeared in March according to which UNAMIR got involved against demonstrators protesting the late president Habyarimana.)

We will be discussing these aspects further, as of Monday April 11. We assume that in the SC will base its decision-making on needs on the ground, as forwarded by the SG. But already on 8 April, the SG sent the SC President a letter in which he drew attention to the possible need to review the mandate — or even to expand the force “by two or three battalions”, if UNAMIR were to evacuate itself, other UN personnel and other foreigners. However, the [Fr-Bel] expedition is now taking care of foreigners so the question of expanding UNAMIR is rather an academic one right now.

CZ intends to stay out of this debate, leaving the initiative to the countries that are directly involved.

3. SC and the future of Rwanda. Here we’ll face the most troublesome discussion.

Two types of arguments will be used in favor of continued activity of the SC and the peace-keepers:

a) The alleged responsibility that the SC bears for Rwanda (or for its innocent civilians)

b) That the domestic situation there jeopardizes international peace and security — certainly in neighboring Burundi (the two countries are to a great extent communicating vessels) but also in Uganda (from where, under the auspices of UNOMUR, another UN operation, units of Tutsi are returning which until recently took part practically as mercenaries in that country’s civil war) as well as in Tanzania — in both of these countries in view of the anticipated hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Arguments against further involvement will make the point that it is an internal affair of the country in which the SC shouldn’t interfere any further, if only because forestalling the anarchy was evidently beyond UNAMIR’s capability. To get deeply involved in the internal affairs of a country affected by anarchy has not paid off for the UN at least once in the past – in the case of Somalia. Apart from that, in view of the non-existence of any effective and recognized government, any further SC activity would have to be based on Chapter VII of the Charter, whereas so far, UNAMIR has been functioning under Chapter VI.

This discussion will be very complex. Though it will not be said aloud, in the background will be the tacit question of whether the SC doesn’t care two hoots about Africa when the going gets tough – compared for example with the former Yugoslavia. On this question, too, CZ will avoid sharp public comments and might follow the views of our friends.

We’d appreciate an OK for the proposed approach, or different instructions.
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**Subject**
U04029: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: US VIEWS

Your C21746.

**Summary**

2 All US citizens wishing to leave Rwanda have now been evacuated. US may assist an isolated group of Germans. US is looking closely at UNAMIR mandate - no decisions made but a growing feeling that withdrawal may be necessary. US is now (with embassy closed) receiving limited reporting from Kilgali. There is talk of a truce from tomorrow am.

**Action**

3 For information.

**Report**

4 We checked in with State's newly-convened Rwanda Task Force (Zelle) on 11 April. State reported that most Americans in Rwanda had now been evacuated. Exceptions were a few missionaries who had opted to stay and one or two still reporting from Kilgali. The US Embassy there was now closed and all staff had been removed.

5 The US understands a group of Germans has been stranded "atop a hill" en route to the border by a minefield blocking their road. State said the US may assist with their removal but gave no details.

6 State understands that the UN Secretariat briefed the Council this afternoon - only US comment worth reporting was their understanding that UNAMIR is now unable to fulfill its mandate (though they acknowledged that Kilgali airport is now secure and some patrolling is being conducted).
7. This has apparently led to debate within the US system over the future of the mandate. No firm US position is yet available. Our contact indicated however that there is some feeling growing that if UNAMIR cannot perform its mandate and if UN personnel are under threat then the Council should consider its withdrawal.

8. Our contacts had little to add to media reports (Washington Post articles follow by bag to Wgtn) on the situation in Kilgali. With the closure of its embassy the US is now only receiving reports from one source in Kilgali by radio. The provisional government appears to be holding together for now, but its control over the situation is minimal. A truce appears to have been negotiated by the UN to take effect from 6 am tomorrow. The RPF has signed off on this (for the purposes of allowing foreigners to leave) but refuses to negotiate directly with the provisional government.

End Message
Secretariat information

The situation is getting ever more complicated. According to the Secretariat it is chaotic, the killing continues. The provisional government has left Kigali for Butare in the south of the country. Only the defense minister has stayed on in Kigali. Disturbances are spreading to other parts of the country. The private radio station in Kigali (it is unclear whether it is the only one there) sides with the government and is militating against foreigners, especially Belgians.

RPF units arrived in Kigali from the demilitarized zone in the North of the country and control all important points, except for the airport. They do not recognize the defense minister. (Note: In a very sharp letter to the SC President, the New York representative of the RPF described the transitional government as one of criminals. He didn’t mention a word about the Arusha peace agreements.)

The evacuation of foreigners went well. The RPF has given the French-Belgian expedition until 1900 hrs local time on 14 April to pull out of the country – because after that it intends to attack government units at the airport.

UNAMIR absolutely hasn’t managed to induce the parties to a cease fire or a truce. Both parties, however, assure the force that it is safe. SG’s recommendations, based on the analysis of his SFRG – Booh Booh from Cameroun – will be available tomorrow.

Discussion

The core of the discussion concerned the future of UNAMIR. In other words: Will the UN leave Rwanda to its catastrophic fate or will it continue to be involved there in some way? The non-aligned are preparing a draft resolution which will be available on 13 April but any suggestions will still have to follow from the SG’s recommendations.

The contribution of the UK was the most useful one. It clarified four possible alternatives:

1. Strengthen UNAMIR and give it a new mandate (note: one which would of course have to be based on Ch VII of the Charter, as we mentioned earlier). This would be difficult according to the UK
2. Pull out completely – which, however, would send a negative signal about UN’s involvement
3. Leave UNAMIR as is - but what could it do?
4. Leave some elements of UNAMIR in Rwanda, as earlier in Angola – which might be the safest solution, a signal that the UN continues to be engaged.

Before the UK spoke, France had considered only alts. 2 and 3, then he spoke off the top of his head and only on his own behalf, without instructions from home. SP clarified that the “Angola solution” may seem to be the best but it has its own problems: “It is easy to squeeze the accordion but it can be difficult to stretch it later.” He also drew attention to the possible problem of troop contributors which will have to be consulted.
The US were a shade more skeptical to UNAMIR's continuation. If it were to stay with its current mandate, it could become a destabilizing factor. "It may become necessary to withdraw UNAMIR but that should not mean we'll stop being concerned with Rwanda. Perhaps we should have this force ready somewhere so that it could return straight away." Arg. agreed with this view.

Amb Kovanda pointed out that events in Rwanda will also necessarily influence the situation of UNOMUR – another Rwanda-related PKO but operating in Uganda. The Secretariat confirmed this.

Delegation comment

A representative of the Belgian delegation telephoned Amb Kovanda requesting that tomorrow we support in the SC the withdrawal of UNAMIR and suspending the operation. In his view, this alternative will be submitted by the US or the UK. The Belgians are in contact with the SG who should tomorrow formulate a recommendation to this effect. In their [Be] view, any other alternative is unrealistic. He stated that they are fully aware of the fact that this proposal will likely not be acceptable for the non-aligned. We are therefore requesting instructions on how to proceed.
CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION IO-16

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PAGE 02  USUN N 01503 121743Z
JOIN STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: FUTURE UNAMIR AND FRENCH ROLES IN RWANDA

REFTEL: PARIS 9724

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN FORESEES TWO ISSUES THAT DEMAND WASHINGTON'S IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERING STAYING IN RWANDA AFTER THEY COMPLETE THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION OF EVACUATING FOREIGN
3. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS UNAMIR's FUTURE. AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  USUN N 01503 121743Z
PRESENT THE AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN AND UNDER
FRENCH-BELGIAN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGNAL
THAT THE UN IS NEARING A DECISION BECAUSE RELATIVE CALM
HAS DESCENDED ON KIGALI AND UNAMIR TROOPS ARE NOT
PRESENTLY THE TARGET OF HOSTILITIES. YET THIS MIGHT BE
A WINDOW OF RELATIVE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE UNAMIR
FORCES; THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME
MORE DIFFICULT TO EVACUATE UNAMIR ONCE THE FRENCH AND
BELGIANS LEAVE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS WORTH
CONSIDERING TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
AUTHORIZED THE EVACUATION OF THE BULK OF UNAMIR, WHILE
LEAVING BEHIND A SKELETAL STAFF THAT MIGHT BE ABLE TO
FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE AND ANY FUTURE POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN
CODE CABLE

To: Annan
From: Gherekhan
Info: Goulding
Aimé

SG has been briefed on your cable no. 1095 regarding Rwanda.

As I conveyed to you last night, Belgian Foreign Minister specially flew to Bonn to discuss Rwanda situation with SG. He painted an extremely grim picture. He informed SG that his Government has definitely decided to withdraw its contingent from UNAMIR. He reconfirmed readiness to leave the Belgian equipment behind for UNAMIR.

In the light of Belgian decision, SG has decided that UNAMIR will have to be withdrawn. In taking this decision, SG has taken into account his SRSG and Force Commander’s views as contained in yours no. 1095.

I enclose text of a letter from SG to President of Security Council. Kindly have it sent under SG’s signature.

You would no doubt wish to inform SRSG and FC of the above in advance.

You would notice that SG’s decision is based on Belgian decision to withdraw and not on the security situation in Rwanda. This should be emphasized in your oral explanation to the Council as well as to the African Group.

Regards,
Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to inform you that H.E. Mr. Willy Claes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, had a meeting with me in Bonn on 12 April 1994. The Minister conveyed to me his assessment of the situation in Rwanda which, according to him, has deteriorated drastically in the recent days and continues to deteriorate rapidly.

H.E. Mr. Claes informed me that the Government of Belgium has decided to withdraw its contingent serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) at the earliest possible date. I conveyed to the Minister, on behalf of the United Nations, sincere condolences on the death of 10 Belgian officers serving with UNAMIR as well as deep gratitude and appreciation for Belgium's contribution to UNAMIR. The Minister assured me that his Government would like the withdrawal of its contingent to take place in a coordinated manner.

In the light of the decision of the Government of Belgium mentioned above, it is my assessment that it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively. The continued discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate will become untenable unless the Belgian contingent is replaced by another, equally well equipped contingent or unless the Government of Belgium reconsiders its decision to withdraw its contingent.

His Excellency
Mr. Colin Keating
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York
In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR and send their recommendations to me in this regard. I shall keep the council informed.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
The Secretariat submitted information about the latest developments, a letter from the SG with the recommendation (following the decision of the Belgian Govt to withdraw the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR) to stop the operation, and a letter from the Belgian perm rep on the issue. A draft resolution on Rwanda submitted by NAM was discussed in a very preliminary fashion.

The Secretariat informed that the situation in Kigali continues to be unclear and parties are continuing the fighting. RPF has reinforced their units in Kigali with armed contingents from the north and south but army units are defending their positions. According to news from Kigali, not all army units have yet been thrown into the fighting, for unclear reasons. The cease-fire provided by the RPF for the withdrawal of foreign nationals expires tomorrow at 1900 hrs local time. Once the Belgian troops withdraw, the UNAMIR commander will not have enough forces to fulfill the mediation role he has been doing so far, let alone fulfill his mandate. The RPF continues to refuse talks about a truce. Nevertheless, it has accepted the initiative of the defense minister to open talks, under the condition that they will be only informal. The first meeting in the presence of the SSG and the UNAMIR commander should take place tomorrow.

The Nigerian Amb then submitted a draft resolution, on behalf of the NAM, which seeks answers to two key questions:

a. The urgency of the situation and the need for a timely and adequate reaction

b. The inadequacy of UNAMIR's current mandate.

The draft is based on Ch VII and empowers UNAMIR to enforce public order and legality and to create interim national institutions. The Nig Amb emphasized that this is only a basis for further discussions. It is a provisional draft.

All speakers (Fr, UK, US, Arg, Brazil, RF, China, NZ) agreed on the following:

1. They expressed their puzzlement, even disenchantment over the SG's letter of 13 April which informs about planning UNAMIR's withdrawal as a consequence of the Belgian govt's decision to pull out its own contingent. Amb's of the UK, Fr and US pointed out that there is no causal link between the decision of the Be govt, which is motivated by the loss of its 10 troops and by political reasons, and the necessity to end the PKO — an interpretation to which the SG's letter is at least open.

2. They rejected the extreme alternatives (Ch. VII and the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR). It seems that most delegations support the so-called Angola alternative of a curtailed UN presence in place.

3. The appealed to the OAU and particularly to neighboring countries (Tanzania and Uganda, which has some sway over the RPF) to employ all available measures to find a solution which in its first phase has to include a truce and a cease-fire.

4. They appealed to the SG to prepare a preliminary report, on basis of consultations with the UNAMIR commander and the SSG, which would contain an evaluation of the feasibility of each alternative.
The Arg Amb suggested that UNOMUR observers (Uganda-Rwanda) be put at the disposal of UNAMIR.

The SC President then suggested that a working group meet tomorrow to discuss the NAM draft. Informal consultations would then follow concerning political aspects of the Rwanda developments. There is the assumption, however, that the Secretariat will submit its suggestions and recommendations concerning the future of UNAMIR.

Delegation note:

None of the delegations were prepared to agree with ending the UN presence in Rwanda. Arguments included the possible negative impact on the position of the UN and specifically the SC; the need to maintain contact with parties in the conflict and last but not least some degree at least of protection for civilians (according to the UN Secretariat, some 15,000 people are under UNAMIR's protection).
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PART ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 1306 AND YOUR TELNO 543: RWANDA

SUMMARY
1. Secretary General writes to Council President informing him of Belgian intention to withdraw from UNAMIR and concluding that without Belgians, force must be withdrawn.

2. Secretariat brief Council members on latest developments. Continued fighting. UNAMIR unable to fulfill mandate but Force Commander mediating between the parties. Earlier attempts to promote a dialogue fail, but latest information is that meeting between RPF and Rwandan Government will take place on 14 April.

3. Council members express regret that Secretary-General’s letter fails to offer substantive recommendations on future of UNAMIR. Also regret the line taken on Belgian plan to withdraw. NAM present draft resolution calling for expansion of UNAMIR with a different mandate. Other Council members favour a much reduced UN presence. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

4. The Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council on 13 April, informing Council members that, in the light of the Belgian decision to withdraw its contingent, UNAMIR was untenable and that the Force Commander had been asked to prepare recommendations for the possible withdrawal of the force. Text of letter in MIFT.

5. As foreshadowed in first TUR, the NAM caucus had a series of meetings on the afternoon of 13 April to introduce their
draft resolution on UNAMIR (text in second IFT). I expressed scepticism to the NAM at the idea of a reinforced UNAMIR. I also said that any text should maintain balance in its references to the parties (as drafted, unsurprisingly given the Rwandan Ambassador's presence in the NAM caucus, it tilts against the RPF). It was also important to engage neighbouring states in a positive way, rather than rebuking them. I also had a brief exchange with Riza (ASG, DPKO) and De Soto (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) and explained how unsatisfactory we had found the Secretary-General's letter, which did not offer any substantive views on the way forward but simply tried to blame the Belgians.

6. I subsequently went over the ground with the Belgian Permanent Representative who expressed concern at the way the Secretary-General had presented the situation. I explained the line I intended to take in informal consultations. He welcomed this and gave me an advance copy of a letter he had sent to the President of the Security Council (text by fax to AD(E)). This notes the rapidly deteriorating situation in Rwanda which had led to the Franco-Belgian evacuation operation, now almost complete. It says that UNAMIR is unable to carry out its mandate. The presence of the Belgian contingent within UNAMIR exposes the contingent to unacceptable risks and constitutes a threat to the operation of UNAMIR as a whole given the anti-Belgian campaign being conducted by one of the Rwandan factions. It says that the Belgian Government believes the activity of UNAMIR troops should be suspended until the conditions necessary to take forward the peace process were restored. Until then, the only justification for a UN presence in Rwanda is humanitarian. I told Notredame that the idea that UNAMIR's mandate might be suspended seemed to me one that might prove attractive in the Council.

7. Informal consultations of the Council began with another briefing from Riza on latest developments. The truce for the evacuation of foreign nationals was all that was holding in Kigali. The Belgian task force expected to complete the evacuation on 14 April. There was no cease-fire. The RPF had not accepted a Rwandan army offer of a cease-fire since other Rwandan army commanders were still fighting. There was no dialogue between the parties, although UNAMIR was trying to pass messages between them. There was still fighting in the streets. Although the RPF controlled much of the city, it was
still meeting resistance. The deteriorating situation in Kigali appeared to be exacerbated by the presence of Belgian forces both within and outside UNAMIR. It was the Force Commander's assessment that the presence of the Belgian contingent was a danger to the rest of UNAMIR. However, the Force Commander had also said that if the Belgian contingent withdrew, he would not be able to ensure the safety of UNAMIR or secure the airport. Riza said that both the RPF and the Rwandan Government had asked the Force Commander to continue his intermediary role as long as possible.

8. Riza said that in the current circumstances UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its mandate. For the moment it was securing the safety of its own civilian personnel, other UN agency staff, and was helping the evacuation process by escorting convoys to Burundi and to the airport. It was also providing what support it could in Kigali to Rwandan civilian, as well as trying to bring about a cease-fire and facilitate communications between both sides. The UNOMUR observers were still carrying out patrolling duties according to their mandate. They had no reports of passage of arms across the border. Given the link between UNOMUR and UNAMIR, if UNAMIR were to be withdrawn there would be little reason to keep UNOMUR in place. Riza said that he had received no communication from any other troop contributor apart from Belgium indicating a desire to withdraw. Keating confirmed this in a brief report on his contacts with the troop contributors. All were concerned about the safety of their personnel, but they were also concerned about the political situation in Rwanda and cautious about a premature UN withdrawal.

9. Gambari (Nigeria) introduced the NAM draft resolution. He characterised this as an invitation to dialogue with other Council members. It was designed to address concerns that the Security Council's deliberations should extend more widely than concern for foreign nations and UN staff. The NAM had concluded that there were three options. The first was to declare that the situation in Rwanda was a complete breakdown of law and order and that there was a need for a peace enforcement mechanism under Chapter VII of the Charter. They had dismissed this option. Even if it were judged desirable, there were neither the political will nor the resources available to move into peace enforcement. The other extreme
was for the UN to pack up and leave. This option had also been rejected. No troop contributors except Belgium had expressed a desire to leave and the Belgian contingent had specific problems and might even be a destabilising factor. It was the wrong signal to withdraw. Neither party wanted it and the potential for damaging the UN's credibility by such an action was considerable. The third option, which the NAM caucus supported, was for the UN to continue to have a presence in Rwanda, devoted to encouraging a cease-fire and helping the Secretary-General's Special Representative to continue his efforts as a facilitator with the aim of relaunching the Arusha peace process. It should also have a mandate to protect civilians. It would be relatively easy to implement this third option. UNAMIR were there on the ground. They needed a different mandate to reflect the new situation and an appropriate force level. The key was to achieve a cease-fire. If the international community had the resolve, UNAMIR together with neighbouring countries and the OAU should be able to bring a cease-fire about. Even if the RPF were to take Kigali, it would be a pyrrhic victory. There could be no long-term solution to the problems in Rwanda without a broad based transitional Government of national reconciliation.

HANNAY

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10. Merimée (France) commented briefly on the Secretary-General's letter. There was every reason in the world for the Belgian contingent to leave. Just as the RPF suspected the French forces of ulterior motives, so some factions in the Rwandan Government suspected the Belgians. This fact was a handicap for UNAMIR as the force commander had admitted. It made perfect sense for the Belgians to withdraw but France could not agree that UNAMIR would cease to exist because the Belgians left. There was no cause and effect. As far as the NAM draft was concerned, he agreed it was the basis for discussion. OP5 went rather further than France could support and might need to be amended. But he agreed that total withdrawal of UNAMIR was not an option. The UN presence was a stabilising factor and we should not forget the possible spill-over into Burundi if the situation in Rwanda was allowed to deteriorate still further. The key was to exert political pressure, particularly on the RPF who seemed to be rejecting a cease-fire. They should be made to realise that any military victory would be only provisional. He welcomed the suggestion that the OAU be involved. This would be important both within the country and with respect to the Governments of neighbouring countries, for example Uganda. Uganda did have influence on the RPF. The international community should persuade them to put pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.

11. Albright (US) said that it would be difficult to keep UNAMIR in place. It was unfortunate that the Secretary-General had singled out the Belgians in the way he had. The US were concerned at the way the NAM resolution had been drafted. It seemed to imply that UNAMIR would be given a heavy enforcement responsibility. This went beyond what it was possible for
UNAMIR to do. The Council needed to find an option which neither pulled the plug on the whole operation nor engaged peace-keepers in a task they could not carry out. She thought a skeletal operation to show the will of the international community would be the best option. It would be possible to come back to it when the situation allowed. We should not abandon the Rwandan people but we should also learn from the lessons of past operations.

12. I said that this was a very difficult issue. There was no completely satisfactory solution. We had been very disappointed by the Secretary-General's letter. It was not an adequate response to the questions which had been put by the Council. Neither was it an adequate basis for the Council to move forward. It was not appropriate to blame the Belgians for the inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate. It could not carry out its mandate because of the conditions on the ground, not because of any decisions regarding the Belgian contingent. It was also wrong to suggest that, if the Belgian Government reconsidered their decision, all problems would be solved. The conditions were simply not there for UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate. We needed to know urgently from the Force Commander what was feasible and what could be done. This was very urgent, given that the availability of transport for any possible evacuation was time-limited.

13. I agreed that the UN should remain active in political terms. Peace would not come to Rwanda without a Governor of national unity and reconciliation. There needed to be a cease-fire and a return to the Arusha peace process. The OAU would play a valuable role. I also hoped that neighbouring states would engage again. But the Council should be asking neighbouring states to cooperate with the OAU and the UN to bring about an end to the crisis, not accusing them of doing other things. I also drew attention to the need to take a realistic view of what the UN could do. I understood why there had been talk of protecting civilians. But even a vastly increased and better equipped UNAMIR would find such a broad mandate difficult to fulfil. We should be guided by Secretariat recommendations. If they said something could not be done, there was not much point putting it in a resolution. The humanitarian effort definitely needed to continue. We should also think about what sort of small force was needed to support the SRSG and help him get the Arusha process back on
track. Neither of the two extremes—enforcement or complete withdrawal—seemed acceptable.

14. In the discussion that followed, all Council members joined in rejecting both complete withdrawal and moves to peace-enforcement. There was however a division on whether the UN presence which remained should be the SRSG, political and humanitarian staff, and a small military presence to protect them, or an expanded force which would play an active role in protecting Rwandan civilians. I, the Americans, the New Zealanders, the Spanish, the Russians, the Argentinians and the Brazilians inclined to the former solution while the Non-Aligned and to a lesser extent the French tended to the latter. (Riza usefully pointed up the difficulty of any long term UN effort to protect groups of Rwandan citizens.) All were agreed, however, that the Council could not make meaningful decisions on the mandate in the absence of substantive recommendations from the Secretary-General based on assessments from the field of the options for a continued UN presence, if any.

15. Before the end of the meeting, Riza announced that he had just heard from Kigali that Rwandan army representatives had conveyed to UNAMIR their wish to meet the RPF and start substantive political negotiations. The RPF had set a number of conditions for this, including that the first meeting should be an informal one which might be followed by substantive negotiations. The Rwandan army representatives had reacted favourably to the RPF response and a meeting was scheduled to take place in UNAMIR headquarters on 14 April. He said that he would make every effort to bring substantive options to the Council on 14 April, although with the Secretary-General in Madrid it might not be possible to give more than an oral briefing. It was agreed that a working group would meet at 141500Z to look at the body of the NAM text apart from the operative paragraphs on UNAMIR’s mandate. This would have to await discussion at informal consultations at 151830Z at which it was hoped the Secretary-General’s recommendations would be presented.

COMMENT

16. Instructions on the NAM draft and any further points you may wish us to make should reach us please desk by 141330Z.
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The SC working group dealt with the draft resolution submitted by NAM, with the exception of stipulations concerning UNAMIR’s activity and its future mandate.

Instructed by the SG, the Secretariat revisited the interpretation of his letter of 13 April. De Soto stated that the SG had not intended to suggest the withdrawal of UNAMIR but rather adapting it to new conditions.

According to further information of the Secretariat, fighting continues. Contours of [lines of] control are starting to appear in Kigali. Fighting, however, is beginning to spread to other parts of Rwanda. After the withdrawal of French and Belgian soldiers, the airport, too, is being fought over. The informal meeting between representatives of the provisional government and the RPF, with the SRSG present, planned for 14 April, did not take place. Among other, one condition of the RPF was the confidentiality of these talks. However, the initiative received wide publicity and the talks were therefore postponed to some later date. The Secretariat also informed about the rampage of gangs, featuring especially members of the Presidential Guard, which don’t respect the most elementary norms of humanitarian law (wounded RPF members were dragged out of an ambulance and killed under the eyes of the Red Cross).

The UN Secretariat orally presented two alternatives for the functioning of UNAMIR under the changed conditions, which however assume a cease-fire between the warring parties:

1. Presence of UNAMIR without the Belgian contingent (some 2000 strong). The mandate would be adapted accordingly.
2. Leave only its political component in Kigali, i.e. the SRSG, his personnel and protection (about 200 people).

The first alternative is realistic if progress is made in the peace effort. It is also bound with certain conditions the belligerent parties would provide to UNAMIR (guaranteed freedom of movement, guaranteed security, declaring safe areas – e.g. the airport, etc.). A certain time horizon would be determined for meeting the conditions. The second alternative could be considered in the absence of realistic chances for renewing the peace effort in the framework of the Arusha agreements. Annan’s deputy Riza mentioned also a third alternative, combining these two. The SG is inclined toward the first one. Reports have it that both parties favor the presence of UNAMIR. No serious discussion has taken place yet. NAM and other members have requested time for consultations. The SC will return to both alternatives, and to the draft resolution, during informals tomorrow. It is expected that the text will be finalized and possibly adopted.

In this context we point out an article in the NYT which puts the situation and the domestic political developments in Rwanda in a rather different light and negatively evaluates France’s support to the essentially dictatorial regime of President Habyiarimana. The article is appended. We also have at our disposal a report of Amnesty International according to which there is no evidence of the participation of RPF units in the mass mayhem and murder that followed the air catastrophe.

The CZ delegation intends to establish contact with the RPF representative in New York, at a lower level, if the HQ doesn’t object.
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DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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SUBJECT: TFRWOL: STILL NO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, 4/13

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SC STILL HAS NOT TAKEN ACTION ON WITHDRAWING UNAMIR OR ADDRESSING ITS MANDATE. THE SECRETARIAT WAS CRITICIZED FOR NOT PRESENTING Viable OPTIONS. TEXTS OF NAM DRAFT RESOLUTION AND LETTER FROM
3. After a brief update on the situation in Rwanda from Acting U/SYG for Peacekeeping Riza, the SC discussed the options for UN presence in Rwanda, in the context of the draft resolution prepared by the Non-Aligned Caucus (NAM) (see text below), and the letter from the SYG to the SC President (see text below). The sentiment prevailed that the UN could not take either of the two extreme options -- it could not take on Chapter VII peace enforcement duties, and it could not abandon Rwanda by total withdrawal. Almost all Council members criticized the Secretariat for not presenting an options paper with a few options for proceeding within the middle ground between those two extremes. The Council called on the Secretariat to present options by April 14 afternoon. The Secretariat said they would try, but could not promise to deliver an options paper on time, since the SYG is traveling in Madrid.

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4. Several members of the Council, including Ambassador Albright, criticized the SYG's letter of 4/13 for laying the blame on the Belgians, rather than on the Rwandans, for the inability of UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate.

5. Nigeria, Brazil and Djibouti favor the idea of tasking UNAMIR with protecting Rwandan civilians. Several other Council members noted the near impossibility of this task, even if resources and armament for UNAMIR were vastly increased.

6. The Council will meet in working group to discuss the NAM draft resolution 4/14 morning. The matter of UNAMIR's future, in operative paragraph 5, will be left out of that discussion until the Secretariat has presented its options later in the day. The Council President hopes to reach agreement on the wording of the rest of the resolution.

7. Action requested: Dept please provide guidance on the draft text below, excluding op. para. 5.

8. Begin text of SYG Letter dated 13 April 1994:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT H.E. MR. WILLY CLAES, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, HELD A MEETING WITH ME IN BONN ON 12 APRIL 1994 DURING WHICH WE REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO

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THE MINISTER SINCERE CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF TEN BELGIAN SOLDIERS SERVING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) AS WELL AS DEEP GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION FOR BELGIUM'S CONTRIBUTION TO UNAMIR.

THE MINISTER CONVEYED TO ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM, HAS DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT DAYS AND CONTINUES TO GROW RAPIDLY WORSE. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM HAS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT SERVING WITH UNAMIR AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THE MINISTER ASSURED ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS CONTINGENT TO TAKE PLACE IN A COORDINATED MANNER.

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM, IT IS MY ASSESSMENT THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS

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ACTION 10-16

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SUBJECT: TFRWOL: STILL NO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, 4/13

EFFECTIVELY, THE CONTINUED DISCHARGE BY UNAMIR OF ITS MANDATE WILL BECOME UNTENABLE UNLESS THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT IS REPLACED BY ANOTHER, EQUALLY WELL EQUIPPED CONTINGENT OR UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM RECONSIDERS ITS DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HAVE ASKED MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER TO PREPARE PLANS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY, AND SEND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME IN THIS
9. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-- RECALLING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE
CONFLICT IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872
(1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR);

-- NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994
WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994
WITH A SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING
THAT PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN ESTABLISHING ALL THE
TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT;

-- RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994
(16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED THE CENTRALITY OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA;

-- EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES
TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT;

-- WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF
RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE
CONFLICT IN THEIR COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A
NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND IN COLLABORATION
WITH REGIONAL LEADERS;

-- SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE
DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6
APRIL 1994;

-- APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE WHICH
HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT

UNCLASSIFIED
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AND THE
DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE
POPULATION;

-- DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING LOOTING, BANDITRY AND
THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER;
-- EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO AT THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL
WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND
IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;

-- DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES
A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY;

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH
THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES,
AND INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO COLLECT ALL
AVAILABLE INFORMATION WITH ALL MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL AND
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE
WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER,
CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF
OTHER CIVILIANS;
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFHWOL: STILL NO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, 4/13

-- 3. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND
OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF
SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO
PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT
FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 4. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES
AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH
ARE ENGULFING RWANDA; AND IN THIS CONNECTION, DEMANDS
THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT
DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE AND THAT BOTH PARTIES
RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;

-- 5. DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 6. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND URGES THE ORGANIZATIONS OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO EXTEND ITS COOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

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-- 7. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;

-- 8. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL RWANDESE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND IN THIS REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 10. STRONGLY APPEALS TO BOTH PARTIES, IN PARTICULAR THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE PEACE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 11. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVE THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 12. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT TO COUNCIL AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS, AT LEAST, NOT LATER THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.
NOTE BY DO/CC: PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED AS RECEIVED IN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION (THERE IS NO PARA. 9.). USUN COMMUNICATIONS WILL CHECK WITH DRAFTER IN THE MORNING. VERIFICATION/CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
DATE/CASE ID: 10 JAN 2006 200103014

AGREE

ALSO DURING THOSE DAYS, DALLAIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN UNAMIR. THE PARTIES KNOW THAT DURING THAT TIME, NE AND UNNO WERE TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE. GEN DALLAIRE WOULD LET AN IMMEDIATE ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 5 DAYS TO ONE OF TWO OPTIONS AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION FRIDAY, 15 APRIL. THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA, HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS.

THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA, HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS.

5. OPTION ONE: ALL OF UNAMIR, MINUS THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, WOULD STAY IN RWANDA, BUT MOVE OUT OF THE DRC AND REDEPLOY TO KINSHASA. DALLAIRE WOULD GET AN IMMEDIATE ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 3 WEEKS TO RETURN TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS -- BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL, GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, KEEP THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL. AT FIVE OR SIX DAYS BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 3 WEEKS, DALLAIRE WOULD WARN THE PARTIES THAT THEIR TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT UNAMIR WAS PLANNING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT RESUMED WITHIN 3 WEEKS, UNAMIR WOULD WITHDRAW.

6. OPTION TWO: ONCE A CEASE-FIRE WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS, REDUCE UNAMIR TO A MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE. THE COUNCIL, "SUPPORT STAFF AND A SECURITY DETAIL OF AT LEAST 158 MEN" FOR AN UNMANNED TIME. THIS WOULD PRESUPPOSE THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT HEADED BACK TOWARDS THE ARUSHA FRAMEWORK QUICKLY.

7. POSSIBLE OPTION THREE: ALTHOUGH NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE SYG's OPTIONS, THE SECRETARIAT SUGGESTED THAT OPTION ONE AND TWO BE COMBINED. NAMAYE, AFTER 3 WEEKS HAS PASSED IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT STARTED THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE SIZE OF OPTION TWO.

8. THE SYG PREFERS OPTION ONE. FRANCE ALSO PREFERS OPTION ONE. NIGERIA ASKED FOR TIME TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION. OTHERS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS. ONE THING WHICH IS UNCLEAR, AND WHICH MANY MEMBERS OF THE SC, INCLUDING AMR ALBRIGHT, QUERIED WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NO OF WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS. UNPOINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO EXPLICITLY SPELL OUT WHAT THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNDER OPTION 1 OR 2 WOULD BE. ALL AGREED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND DEMANDS THAT THE COUNCIL MAKE A DECISION AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY TOMORROW, FRIDAY, 15 APRIL.


10. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SC INFORMAL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA, WORKED OUT AN ADDITION TO THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS. THE TEXT WOULD CLEARLY LAY OUT THE 5-DAY ULTIMATUM, AND PUT OFF ANY DECISION ON THE TWO OPTIONS UNTIL LATER.

11. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW, KEY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:

[REDACTED] -- DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

[REDACTED] -- DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN A RESOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED
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FURTHER DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL CONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA.

END TEXT.

COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT THE CGS TO MUCH, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT PRESSURE, IF THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE IN 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION: NON-AGREED LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),


RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,

STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,

EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,

WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS,

SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,

APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING HOSTILITIES, LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREACH OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI,

EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,

AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

(DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY)

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;

-- 3. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;

-- 4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, DEMANDS THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;


-- 7. (DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;

-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

-- (I) URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;

-- (II) ALTERNATIVE CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA;

-- 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES IN RWANDA (IN PARTICULAR
THE RWANDIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (I) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;

-- 11. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO Cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need throughout Rwanda and in this regard, appeals to the International Community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

-- 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 13. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, MADRID
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 April 1994
NUMBER: 1156
SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

1. The Security Council held two rounds of informal consultations today on the situation in Rwanda. Riza briefed Council members on the latest developments on the ground, pointing out while fighting was continuing, UNAMIR was not being targeted and had taken effective control of Kigali airport where the situation was basically quiet. He also informed the Council that an initial meeting between military representatives of the two parties had been held today under the auspices of UNAMIR. Feedback from the parties was expected, with a view to arranging further discussions on a cessation of hostilities.

2. Riza also recalled the two options presented to the Council yesterday on behalf of the Secretary-General and stressed that a decision to pull out or scale down UNAMIR in the absence of a cease-fire could create serious risks for the extrication of our personnel. He pointed out, however, that it was for the Security Council to take the appropriate decisions.

3. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that members of the Council had diverging views on the course of action which ought to be followed at this time. On behalf of the non-aligned caucus, Nigeria, supported by China, proposed that option A be adopted. The United States stressed that, if members of the Council insisted on taking a decision to day, it would
only accept a withdrawal of UNAMIR, as it believed that there was no useful role for a peace-keeping operation in Rwanda under the present circumstances.

4. The United Kingdom expressed a preference for option B. Russia took a similar position and, during the discussions held this afternoon, the United States modified its initial stance and indicated that it would be prepared to accept option B. The non-aligned group, however, maintained its position in favour of option A.

5. It was finally decided not to take any action this time, on the understanding that the Council President would make the attached remarks to the press.

Best regards. [Signature]

©
The members of the Council have had a thorough discussion today about the situation in Rwanda and its implications for UNAMIR.

They took carefully into consideration information provided by the Secretariat, as forwarded by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNAMIR Force Commander, as well as that provided by the Foreign Minister of Belgium.

Council members took note of and fully understood Belgium's decision to withdraw its troops in UNAMIR at the same time that it is repatriating the troops that have been providing security for the evacuation of foreign nationals.

They also took into consideration the willingness of other major troop contributing countries to maintain their troops with UNAMIR as long as there is a useful role for them to perform.

In the members' view, the immediate priority in Rwanda is the establishment of a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander have been in contact with both parties to try to secure this objective.

Council members urge the Special Representative to make every effort to facilitate a ceasefire. In this regard, the Council members welcomed the willingness of the Organisation of African Unity to promote a ceasefire in Rwanda.

Council members demand that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table.

The members reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country.
Council Members commend the efforts made by the leaders of the sub-region at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and urge the leaders of the region to persevere and intensify their efforts for peace, in cooperation with the United Nations and the CAU.

But, the situation is grave and Council members are determined not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk.

Council Members intend to keep under constant review the force levels and activities of UNAMIR and to take decisions in this regard at the appropriate time.
CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 

22:06 (4990)

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: WELLINGTON
CC: BEIJING, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BRUSSELS

C04323/NYK
WGTN UNSC
CANBERRA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, HARARE

15-Apr-1994
Priority
Routine
Routine
Routine
Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DSP1, EAB)

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C22009.

Summary

- Belgians mount intensive campaign for all of UNAMIR to come out of Rwanda with Belgian contingent.

- NAM press for resolution premised on maintenance of UNAMIR at current strength.

- US say that the only resolution they could countenance today would be one winding up UNAMIR.

- UK attempt to promote compromise based on Secretariat's option 2 (reducing UNAMIR to a political presence with necessary security protection) was acceptable to US but rejected by NAM and was ruled out by Secretariat because of security implications.

- Consensus was finally reached on Presidential proposal not to decide today on the future of UNAMIR but to convey the Council's insistence on a ceasefire and to signal a willingness to pull UNAMIR out should the situation become too dangerous.

Action

For information.

Report

Belgian Foreign Minister called President early this morning to advise of their intention to withdraw all Belgian troops, both those sent in to secure the evacuation of Belgian nationals and those in UNAMIR, by the end of the coming
weekend. Claes went on to paint a very grim picture of the situation in Rwanda and urged that all of UNAMIR troops be pulled out as part of the Belgian evacuation. He basically said that the remaining troops would have neither the equipment or the ability to protect themselves if the Belgians left. Subsequent contact with the Secretariat revealed that he had given a similar message to the Sec-Gen. We learned soon after that the Belgians had mounted a lobbying campaign, particularly in Europe, along the same lines and had made public statements to the same effect in Brussels.

2 Secretariat (Riza) agreed that Belgian assessment had to be taken seriously but at the same time said it did not square with what they were hearing from UNAMIR. While fighting was continuing between RPF and Government Forces and killings were being carried out behind the Government lines, the situation behind the RPF lines at least had stabilised. Both sides continued to affirm their wish for UNAMIR to stay and the Special Rep and Force Commander were holding direct talks with the parties today. Riza said that the Special Rep and the Force Commander continued to believe that the threat to withdraw was their best leverage over the parties, but indicated that the people in the field would prefer to be left with some flexibility on the point and not to be bound to a fixed time frame by a Council decision.

3 At the morning informal consultations, Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM caucus, reiterated their support for a modified version of the Sec-Gen's option A, viz maintaining UNAMIR at current strength. The US (Walker) then spoke to say that the US was conscious that the situation was very fluid and unstable but that if a decision on UNAMIR's future was to be taken today, then the only resolution the US could support would be one calling for the withdrawal of the force.

4 Prior to the lunch time adjournment, Hannay proposed that the Council adopt a resolution today based on the NAM draft and incorporating the Sec-Gen's option B entailing the maintenance of a military presence in Kigali with a much reduced military presence only to provide security for UN personnel.

5 We used the early part of the afternoon for informal discussions with US, Nigeria, France and UK. US (Albright) said, after talking to Christopher, that they could go along with Hannay's proposal. Gambari also indicated a willingness to explore NAM tolerance for Hannay's compromise. However, he paused when we raised the point which the British had conveniently overlooked, namely that option B was premised on the achievement of a ceasefire. We noted that the Belgians and the Secretariat all considered that the security of the airport was essential in current circumstances (which was why UNAMIR was deploying half of the Ghanain battalion there to take over from the Belgians) and questioned whether option B was credible in the absence of a ceasefire.
6 Riza and Baril (Military Adviser) subsequently confirmed our hesitations. They reiterated that option B was only sustainable if there was a ceasefire. Otherwise, the political presence would have no assured exit route if UNAMIR became the target of attacks. They were also gravely concerned at the implications of an announcement today by the Council that they would be withdrawing or scaling down UNAMIR. This risked both sides indulging in a scramble for territory and perhaps in attacks on UNAMIR to grab their equipment.

7 Word came out of the NAM caucus that they too had rejected the British proposal and Gambari told us he would prefer that there be no decision today rather than one which would signal a diminution of the UN's commitment to Rwanda. We then showed him a paper we had prepared, and with which the Secretariat expressed strong agreement, which would record the Council's position on the Belgian withdrawal, its insistence on a ceasefire and its determination not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk. Our initial draft also had paragraphs indicating the Council's willingness to consider a revised UNAMIR mandate if the parties agreed to a ceasefire and, conversely, to pull UNAMIR out if they did not and the situation continued to deteriorate.

8 After consulting his NAM colleagues, Gambari told us he could go along with the paper. The British, Americans and French also said they could live with it.

9 When the informal consultations resumed, Riza, at our request, gave his assessment of the security implications of any announcement by the Security Council today of a withdrawal or a suspension of UNAMIR. His assessment effectively put an end to the British proposal for the meantime. A substantial Chinese intervention to the effect that their Embassy in Kigali, which was continuing to function effectively and was reporting that there was no general animosity towards foreigners, also had a marked effect. We were able to advise, on the basis of consultations this afternoon, that Ghana and Bangladesh, the two major contributors to UNAMIR, were willing to maintain their troops in place as long as the UN considered they had a useful role to play.

10 Our paper was then circulated and found to be generally acceptable. Hannay lamented that the Council was not being more robust in its consideration of the situation in Rwanda but the limitations of the situation were made apparent when the US and Nigeria indicated that they would have difficulty with certain aspects of the draft - namely the paragraphs hinting at a willingness to contemplate an extension of UNAMIR's presence under a revised mandate (a problem for the US) and at a willingness to pull UNAMIR out 'in the absence of a ceasefire (a problem for Nigeria). Walker asked that both
paras be dropped.

11 At Hannay's proposal, the paragraphs that were deleted were replaced by one indicating the Council's intention to keep UNAMIR's strength and mandate under constant review. This addition, when coupled with the previous paragraph stating the Council's determination not to allow UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk retains the essential message to the Rwandan parties that UNAMIR may be pulled out if they do not agree to a ceasefire.

12 Given the political sensitivities, we judged it unwise to press for our paper to be converted into a presidential statement. Instead, it was agreed that it would be used as the basis of the President's comments to the press. We also made it available to delegations and, indeed, to the media. Copy of the paper as agreed is contained in our accompanying fax.

Comment

13 As we had pointed out at the morning informals, a decision not to pull out UNAMIR or to amend its mandate is itself a decision. We and the Secretariat consider that what was done today was appropriate to the political situation in the Council and to the circumstances on the ground in Rwanda. The Belgian campaign for total withdrawal was seen by Council members as motivated at least as much by a desire for political cover back home as by concern for UNAMIR's safety. Given what we were hearing from the field, it would have been precipitate and dangerous to have suddenly gone public with a resolution authorising total or even partial withdrawal at this stage. The Special Representative and the Force Commander continue to believe that UNAMIR are in no immediate danger and can continue to play an important role. We can only hope they are correct.

14 Whatever happens over the next few days, it is clear that the Council will soon have to consider the future role, if any, of UNAMIR. Today's discussions show that it will be no easy task to reach an agreed position.

End Message
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 150730Z FCO
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OF 150502Z APRIL 94
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YOUR TELNO 548: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Secretariat present to Council members two options for future of UNAMIR: to leave force in place at current strength minus Belgian contingent (the Secretary-General's preference); or to withdraw bulk of force leaving behind Secretary-General's Special Representative with staff and some 150 troops as security. Both options predicates on the existence of a cease-fire. No substantive discussion of options although some concern that Secretariat have not spelt out clearly enough the mandates relating to either option or taken into account the fact there is not a cease-fire. Secretariat explain that Force Commander wants to use threat of UNAMIR withdrawal to persuade parties to agree a cease-fire. Likelihood that Council may give the parties a five-day deadline to achieve a cease-fire, after which substantive decisions will be taken.

2. Inconclusive working group discussions on the NAM draft resolution. The key operative paragraphs remain in square brackets. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

3. At the informal consultations of Security Council members on 14 April, de Soto (Secretary General's Special Political Adviser) said that the Secretary-General had been following closely the events in Rwanda. He had been in direct contact with the Force Commander and the Special Representative as well as with Headquarters. De Soto wanted to make clear that the Secretary-General's letter of 13 April had been written following his consultations with the Foreign Minister of
Belgium. They had agreed that the Secretary-General would need to alert Council members of the need for a replacement battalion, or for reconsideration of the Belgian decision. It was in this context that the Secretary-General had put forward the suggestion of a possible withdrawal by UNAMIR. He had not recommended that UNAMIR withdraw.

4. Riza (ASG DPKO) gave a brief update on the situation on the ground. The fighting was at a lower level but still continued. A line of control seemed to be emerging across the city. There was fighting outside Kigali as well. An ICRC convoy had been attacked and several wounded. There had also been an attack on the airport (he subsequently indicated that the attack had been from the RPF). The talks between the parties which had been scheduled for 14 April had not happened. The Force Commander was now trying to reschedule the meeting for 15 April.

5. As far as the options for UNAMIR were concerned, the Secretary-General believed an abrupt withdrawal was neither feasible nor advisable. There had been a fundamental change in the situation in Rwanda and it was therefore not possible for UNAMIR to fulfil its original mandate. The Secretary-General saw two broad options. Both were predicated on a cease-fire. The first would be to keep UNAMIR in place at its current strength minus the Belgian contingent. They would redeploy into Kigali. The parties would be informed that they had three weeks to get back to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Certain conditions would have to be set. The parties would be responsible for security in the zones they controlled. Freedom of movement would have to be guaranteed for UNAMIR. The airport would remain a neutral zone. The intention would be to give parties the time to negotiate and to agree on a return to the peace process. It might not be exactly the Arusha process but the aim would be to achieve agreement on some kind of political solution. Six days before the deadline, the parties would be warned and the Force would prepare for a complete withdrawal. (Comment: although Riza did not make this point when Annan described this option to me in the margins of a P5 meeting on Bosnia, he said that the key purpose of this option would be for UNAMIR to secure the airport.) The second option was to reduce UNAMIR immediately to a minimal political
presence: the SGSR, his support staff plus at least 150 troops as a security detail. Total numbers would not exceed 200. This option assumed no immediate prospect of a settlement and that maintaining UNAMIR at a greater strength was not an option. If the Council were to decide to adopt the first alternative, which was the Secretary-General’s preference, and if there was no progress by the deadline imposed by the Council, then it would be possible to move to option 2 rather than withdraw the force totally.

6. Keating (NZ, Council President) said he had circulated a letter from the OAU Secretary-General enclosing a statement from the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism on the situation in Rwanda (faxed to AD(E)). He also drew attention to the press release by the ICRC. The representative of the ICRC had asked him to bring to Council members attention the ICRC’s concern at the publicity which emanated from Kigali, which implied the problems related to the RPF alone. This did not reflect reality.

7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) asked what happened if there was no cease-fire. Both options were predicated on a cease-fire. How long would the Council be prepared to wait for one before taking a decision? This concern was echoed by Sardenberg (Brazil) and Gambari (Nigeria). The latter said that since UNAMIR was even now engaged in helping to secure a cease-fire it was illogical to suggest that for UNAMIR to remain there had to be a cease-fire. Pedauye (Spain) said it was unclear from the Secretariat’s presentation what mandate UNAMIR would fulfil under the two different options. Merimee (France) said he preferred the first option. But it was clear that under this option the security of the force would need to be assured. The Council could say that in principle it favoured the first option, but if within a specific time, say five days, a cease-fire was not in place and respected, then we would choose option two. The question of the cease-fire was essential. If there was no cease-fire and the security situation deteriorated still further then there was a danger of more UNAMIR casualties.

8. I agreed with Spain that the two options were more precise on force levels than on mandate. However the mandate must be described in any resolution adopted by the Council. I underlined that the Council should not seek to give either two
battalions or 200 men a mandate to protect Rwandan civilians. It was heartbreaking to have to say so but this was simply not achievable. I was as perplexed as others on the fact that both options were predicated on a cease-fire. This condition was very unlikely to be fulfilled given the fighting going on on the ground. It would seem to be more sensible to have a different articulation which would be to choose option two and then move to option one when a cease-fire had been achieved. Merimee's suggestion that the Council give a short deadline and then make a decision to withdraw the bulk of the force if there was no commitment to a cease-fire therefore had some merit. As far as the draft resolution was concerned, I understood that there was still disagreement on key paragraphs. I drew attention to the OAU text which was a carefully balanced one. Rather than the Council continuing to be held up on the disputed text, we should use the OAU language.

9. Albright (US) expressed concern that both options depended on a cease-fire. The truce was supposed to expire at noon on 15 April. The fighting would then continue. The airport was insecure. Given this, we needed a resolution to authorise an orderly evacuation.

10. Riza intervened to say that when he had stated both options were predicated on a cease-fire it had indeed begged the question of how a cease-fire would be achieved. He had hoped that by the time the options were presented to the Council that further progress would have been made on the ground towards this. The Force Commander had stressed that both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. His approach was to use this as leverage. A tight timetable should be drawn up for achieving a cease-fire during which UNAMIR would strengthen its presence at the airport and make preparations to withdraw. Both the SRS6 and the Force Commander wanted to use the threat of UNAMIR's withdrawal to pressure the parties into a cease-fire. He wanted to underline that it would be very difficult logistically and politically to withdraw then bring the force back. This was why the Secretary-General preferred option one.

11. Keating said that if the Force Commander was essentially asking for the Council's support to put pressure on the parties by setting a very tight deadline for a cease-fire then the resolution being drafted was perhaps not what was required. It
might be better to aim for a short Council decision giving the parties five days to agree a cease-fire and then taking a decision on whether to maintain or significantly reduce UNAMIR thereafter depending on the outcome. Since the NAM caucus had insisted on being able to consult before making any substantive comments on the options presented, it was agreed that Council members would suspend their consideration of Rwanda until 151600Z with the aim of adopting a resolution later that day. The US have since told us that shortly after the informal consultations the French, Nigerians and New Zealanders agreed three additional paragraphs for the resolution. These are:

i) Demands that all parties agree on a cease-fire throughout Rwanda.

ii) Decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is an effective cease-fire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda based on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

iii) Further decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is no effective cease-fire in place, the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

12. The working group discussions on the draft resolution earlier in the day had proved inconclusive. There was disagreement on references to the RPF and neighbouring countries and the key operative paragraphs therefore remain in square brackets pending consideration by Council members. (Text by fax to AD(EE).) It is likely however that the working group discussions will be overtaken by the apparent agreement on the five-day language as above.

COMMENT

13. If the Nigerians can persuade the rest of the NAM caucus, it is likely that a resolution will be adopted containing the language on the five-day option. The Belgian assessment is that a cease-fire within this period is extremely unlikely. The Council is thus likely to end up deciding on option 2 after the five days have elapsed.
14. Grateful for any comments you might have on the Secretary-General's options and on the language in para 11 above deskby 151300Z please.

HANNAY

YYYY

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PAGE 6
Subject: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Canada's view (St-Hillaire, Deputy, West and Central Africa and Maghreb Relations) is that at present UNAMIR is performing helpful functions both in terms of a good offices and humanitarian role without undue danger to the UN troops. While indicating that neither the original mandate nor the Arusha Accords now had much relevance, St-Hillaire said that Canada was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal, particularly while the UN was able to exert some beneficial effect on the situation. Canada's current preference was to maintain UNAMIR at its current strength of around 2000, which St-Hillaire understood to be the existing strength following the departure of the Belgian contingent.

End Message
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1374
OF 160432Z APRIL 94
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PART 1 OF 2

MY TELNO 1364 AND YOUR TELNO 557: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Belgian hyperactivity irritates Council members. Ghana and Bangladesh indicate readiness to maintain their contingents. NAM want UNAMIR to remain in place at its current strength. Americans refuse to countenance any Council decision other than withdrawal, but acknowledge that for the moment the NAM's preferred outcome does not require such a decision as UNAMIR is already authorised. NAM and most other Council members feel strongly that the Council should nonetheless take a decision on the matter, to resolve uncertainty and send an appropriate political signal. I suggest suspension of UNAMIR's deployment and retention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the field, with appropriate support, to continue efforts to secure a cease-fire. Key players (US, France, Nigeria) agree to my suggestion. But Nigerians fail to persuade all of the rest of the non-aligned, and Secretariat indicate that it would be difficult for a scaled down UN presence to remain without a cease-fire. After long discussion attempt to reach a decision is abandoned, which means UNAMIR stays for the moment, minus the Belgian contingent. Agreement to Presidential statement to the press that its mandate and force levels will be kept under constant review. How long solution by stealth holds will depend on developments on the ground.

2. Secretariat report that small Italian force has landed at Kigali airport and been asked to leave by UNAMIR.

DETAIL
3. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) opened informal consultations of the Security Council on 15 April by drawing Council members' attention to a letter he had received from the Foreign Minister of Belgium outlining his concern at the risk to UNAMIR in staying on in Rwanda. The Belgian contingent would be withdrawn over the weekend. For any UN personnel to remain after Sunday risked very grave consequences for their safety and security. Claes had also telephoned Keating to make the same point. The Belgian Mission had lobbied this and other missions heavily in the same sense during the course of the morning.

4. Riza (ASG, DPKO) gave an update on the current situation. The level of fighting was fluctuating. The Force Commander and Special Representative (SRSR) were continuing their efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. The Force Commander was moving to establish a strong presence at the airport in advance of Belgian withdrawal. The Belgian evacuation force would leave on 16 April and their UNAMIR contingent within 48-72 hours. A small Italian armed company had arrived without notice at the airport, where they remained. This was a worrying development since it had led to allegations that mercenaries were arriving. The Force Commander had asked them to leave.

5. Riza said, in commenting on the previous night's suggestion that the Council set a period of five days to see whether a ceasefire was established before reaching a decision on UNAMIR's future, that the Force Commander and the SRSR preferred that any timeframe for achieving a cease-fire be set by themselves, and not the Council. A public ultimatum would be unhelpful. They had also said that any message from the Council should address both the parties, and not single out one for blame.

6. Gambari (Nigeria, speaking for the NAM caucus) said the time had come for the Council to take a decision. He understood the concerns of the Belgians. The NAM caucus deeply regretted the loss of life suffered by their contingent. He also recognised the special relationship which had existed and continued to exist between Belgium and Rwanda. But however important Belgian views on the future of UNAMIR, they could not tell the Council how to respond to events in Rwanda. The Council should not be planning a withdrawal at this stage.
Both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. It was playing a stabilising role in a chaotic situation. Except for the perfectly understandable Belgian decision, no other troop contributors wanted to go. (Keating subsequently confirmed that he had had discussions with Bangladeshis and the Ghanaians and both were content to stay on in Rwanda). The level of fighting was low. UNAMIR was encouraging the parties to agree a cease-fire. The OAU had offered to play a pro-active role in trying to relaunch the peace process and had called for UNAMIR to remain. The NAM caucus would be sending a message to the OAU Secretary-General asking him to use his good offices together with leaders from neighbouring states, in particular Mwinyi and Museveni. Neither the Secretary-General nor his Special Representative wanted UNAMIR to leave. The question therefore was what tasks were appropriate for UNAMIR in current circumstances, and what force level would be best to carry them out. Gambari identified the tasks as being to help the civilian population of Rwanda; to help obtain a cease-fire; to promote the creation of a climate conducive to achieving a peaceful settlement; and to liaise with the OAU. A cease-fire was obviously critical to the success of the UN presence in Rwanda. The NAM believed a cease-fire was possible. Their preference was a modified version of Option 1 (para 5 of first TUR). The modification was that the force level should be what it was before the Belgians left, i.e. there should be a replacement contingent. They were flexible as to how long this option should be allowed to run to see if a solution could be achieved.

7. Walker (US) said that the US believed the Rwandan armed parties bore full responsibility for the continued violence and instability. The US did not believe that there was a role now in Rwanda for a United Nations peacekeeping force. They supported the decision of the Belgian Government to withdraw immediately, given the unique circumstances facing their contingent. The US did not believe the warring parties in Rwanda were likely to respect UNAMIR's mandate, or capable of guaranteeing the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda. There might be a role for the UN in facilitating negotiations among the warring parties, but that was for the SRSG not UNAMIR. The US would support a political initiative by the Secretary-General to promote reconciliation among the parties. But experience suggested that any serious negotiations amongst the parties would take place outside Rwanda. UN security forces would not be required. Walker underlined that US
opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda under current conditions was firm. It was based on a conviction that the Security Council had an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations were viable and capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that peacekeeping personnel were not knowingly put in an untenable situation. When the parties demonstrated that they were willing and able to work towards a peaceful settlement the US would be willing to reconsider whether renewed UN peacekeeping could facilitate lasting peace.

8. After Walker's intervention Gambari called for suspension of the meeting. His suggestion was not however immediately taken up, and a long and inconclusive discussion ensued. Keating pointed out that, if no decision was taken to withdraw the force then the status quo would continue, giving the Force Commander a little longer to see what he could do. At the end of the discussion I said that failing to take a decision would keep UNAMIR on the ground in a dangerous situation when we already knew it could not carry out its mandate. Furthermore we would be giving no signal to the parties or guidance to the Force Commander. A decision might be difficult to achieve given the NAM preference for the Secretary-General's option 1 and US insistence, that if a decision were to be taken today, it should be for total withdrawal. I thought it unlikely that UNAMIR was sustainable on the ground over time without the Belgians. If there was to be a withdrawal, it was essential that it should be an orderly one. Option 1 was most unlikely to prove a durable one. Option 2, on the other hand, should be sustainable. Careful consideration should again be given to the option of suspension of UNAMIR's mandate, leaving the Special Representative plus support and protection personnel in place. Vorontsov (Russia) agreed.

9. After the informal consultations Keating invited Gambari, Albright (US), Ladsous (France) and myself to discuss the way forward. Albright said that the US had been convinced by the Belgians. But they were also concerned that a wrong turn now in Rwanda would put an end to any possibility of US support for expanded peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa, particularly after the Somali experience. I argued again for a downsized presence, essentially to protect the SRSG. I circulated language which would have provided for the suspension of UNAMIR's deployment and maintenance of an interim UN presence, headed by the SRSG and including sufficient UN military
personnel to ensure its protection, to continue UN efforts in collaboration with the OAU and neighbouring states to resolve the Rwandan crisis in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement. I also proposed (and secured agreement to) language, based on the OAU statement, to replace those parts of the resolution which tilted against the RPF. Gambari confirmed that Nigeria wanted a resolution. He did not want the day to end without Council action. He undertook to commend my "middle way" to the NAM caucus. Ladsous said that he too could support it, though he would want it to be understood that the "suspended" UNAMIR might be deployed to a neighbouring country temporarily rather than being dispersed altogether. Albright spoke to Christopher, and indicated that she too could go along with it. Gambari however later told Keating and myself that he had been unable to convince all of his NAM colleagues (Djibouti and Rwanda itself are the hardest line in the caucus) to do so.

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10. Informal consultations finally resumed again late on 15 April. Riza reiterated the Secretary-General's view that an abrupt and total withdrawal of UNAMIR was neither feasible nor advisable. It was important to consider the impact on the ground if such a decision were taken. He also argued that both of the options for UNAMIR put forward by the Secretary-General had been predicated on a cease-fire. If the Council announced the suspension of UNAMIR's mandate it might set off panic and renewed military action. Both parties would scramble to seize the strategic positions currently held by UNAMIR, notably the airport. Riza said that a first meeting had taken place today face to face between the parties who had exchanged ideas. This was a positive step. He urged the Council to consider the Secretary-General's "third option", which was to agree option 1, with a deadline which, if not met, would lead to option 2. This would give time for the force to prepare withdrawal.

11. Keating said that the informal contacts he had held earlier in the afternoon had demonstrated there was still a wide divergence of opinion. We now had the advice of the Secretary-General, which was at odds with the views of a number of Council members. I said it was true that we had not reached a clear-cut conclusion on the question of force levels and mandate. But we had managed to agree on almost all of the rest of the resolution. It contained a (much needed) political statement of the Council's views on the need to return to the Arusha peace process. I suggested we adopting the text as agreed, simply noting that the force level and mandate would be kept under review. Walker (US) said he would be unable to get agreement on the adoption of such a resolution without overnight consultations with Washington.
12. Keating then circulated a non-paper, for possible use as the basis for remarks by him in his capacity as President to the press. He believed that it was essential - if there was to be no Council decision - for there to be at the very least a press statement, given the length of time the Council had spent discussing the issue. After further discussion it was agreed that the Council would postpone a decision on Rwanda. This would give more time for the situation on the ground to stabilise and allow the Force Commander and SRSG to continue their efforts to bring about a cease-fire building on contacts already made. Keating's text was agreed, with some amendments (see MIF) He spoke to the press on the basis of it.
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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: SECURITY COUNCIL AT IMPASSE ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE

REFTEL: USUN 1588
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON APRIL 15, THE US AGREED TO THE
PROPOSAL OFFERED EARLIER IN THE DAY BY WHICH
ENTAIRED AN IMMEDIATE DRAWDOWN OF TROOPS WITH A SMALL
PROTECTIVE FORCE FOR THE UN STAFF REMAINING IN RWANDA.
HOWEVER, THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL. THEY AND MANY OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S RECOMMENDATION TO KEEP UNAMIR’S FORCE AS IS FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE BELGIAN, AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS WAS BOLSTERED BY THE SECRETARIAT’S VIEW THAT RAPID WITHDRAWAL MIGHT ACTUALLY PLACE THE FORCES IN JEOPARDY WHERE NONE IS PRESENT. RECOGNIZING THAT IT WOULD BE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF UNAMIR’S FUTURE NEXT WEEK AND FOR THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT TO BRIEF THE PRESS ON THE COUNCIL’S DELIBERATION. END SUMMARY.

PRE-SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

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3. PRIOR TO THE AFTERNOON ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS, NEW ZEALAND AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, CALLED A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADORS FROM THE UNITED STATES, NIGERIA, FRANCE AND THE UK. HAD PREPARED LANGUAGE TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROPOSAL MADE IN THE MORNING SESSION (REFTEL), TO SUSPEND UNAMIR OPERATIONS IN RWANDA, WHILE LEAVING AN INTERIM UN PRESENCE. THIS PRESENCE WOULD BE HEADED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD INCLUDE SUFFICIENT UN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ENSURE ITS PROTECTION, AND WOULD CONTINUE THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE RWANDAN CRISIS. ACCORDING TO THE UK, THE SECRETARIAT ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 250-300 MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED.

4. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ABLRIGHT INFORMED THE GROUP THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF SUSPENSION. AGREED TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NAM CAUCUS. THE NAM, HOWEVER, DECIDED THAT THE SUGGESTION FELL SHORT OF WHAT THEY WANTED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S PREFERRED OPTION FOR ALL OF UNAMIR MINUS THE BELGIANS TO REMAIN FOR SOME DESIGNATED PERIOD OF WEEKS TO ENCOURAGE A CEASE FIRE AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES. ON THIS BASIS THE SECURITY COUNCIL MOVED INTO INFORMALS.

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

5. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 15. A/SYG IQBAL RIZA BEGAN BY ADDRESSING ISSUES RAISED IN CONFIDENTIAL

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7. THE FORCE COMMANDER BELIEVES THAT ABRupt WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE "FEASIBLE, ADVISABLE, OR WISE," AND THAT ANY HINT OF WITHDRAWAL MIGHT CAUSE PANIC BY THE LOCAL POPULATION AND PLACE THE UNAMIR TROOPS IN HARM'S WAY. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A WITHDRAWAL OR SUSPENSION,

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TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: SECURITY COUNCIL AT IMPASSE ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE

RIZA CONTINUED, WOULD CAUSE IMMEDIATE MOVES BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF TO TRY TO CAPTURE THE AIRPORT, WHICH MIGHT PLACE UNAMIR TROOPS IN JEOPARDY. AN ORDERLY AND SAFE WITHDRAWAL, HE CONCLUDED, WAS PREDICATED ON A CEASE-FIRE. SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT KEATING LATER COMMENTED THAT "THE RISKS ASSOCIATED TO UNAMIR ARE A FUNCTION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS." RIZA ALSO NOTED THAT THE UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT HAS POTENTIALLY RAISED THE SECURITY RISKS, SINCE THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE ITALIAN PLANE IS LOADED WITH MERCENARIES; THE FORCE COMMANDER IS TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR ITS TIMELY DEPARTURE.

8. RIZA THEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE SYG HAS A CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR "OPTION A" - KEEPING UNAMIR FORCE STRUCTURE AS IS, WITH STRICT DEADLINES FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS - WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING TO "OPTION B" - AN ANGOLA-TYPE SCENARIO THAT INCLUDES IMMEDIATE DRAWDOWN TO A SKELETAL FORCE, IF "OPTION A" BECOMES UNWORKABLE.

9. BOTH ANNOUNCED THAT THEY SUPPORTED OPTION A. ADDED THAT IN ITS COMMUNICATION WITH CONFIDENTIAL
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GHANA AND BANGLADESH, THE TWO LARGEST TROOP CONTRIBUTORS REMAINING AFTER BELGIUM'S DEPARTURE, BOTH INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN.

10. KEATING THEN REVIEWED THE PROSPECT OF OBTAINING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONCERNING UNAMIR’S FUTURE: THE SYG PREFERENCES OPTION A; THE NAM PREFERENCES A MODIFIED OPTION A; AND THE UK AND THE US ARE SETTLED ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF OPTION B. SINCE THE COUNCIL IS UNABLE TO MAKE A DECISION, KEATING CONTINUED, PERHAPS IT IS WISE TO USE UNAMIR TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES; THAT IS, SUGGESTING TO THE PARTIES THAT UNAMIR'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IS PREDICATED ON A CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

11. KEATING THEN CIRCULATED A PAPER THAT BECAME THE BASIS FOR HIS BRIEFING TO THE PRESS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. AFTER SUGGESTED REVISIONS BY COUNCIL MEMBERS, THE FOLLOWING BECAME THE BASIS OF KEATING’S BRIEFING:

-- THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE HAD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION TODAY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNAMIR.

-- IT TOOK CAREFULLY INTO CONSIDERATION INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARIAT AS FORWARDED BY THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER AND THE SRSG, AS WELL AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS TOOK NOTE AND FULLY UNDERSTAND BELGIUM’S DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN UNAMIR AT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS REPATRIATING THE TROOPS THAT HAVE BEEN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

-- THEY ALSO TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER MAJOR TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR TROOPS WITH UNAMIR AS LONG AS THERE IS A USEFUL ROLE FOR THEM TO PERFORM.

-- IN THE COUNCIL’S VIEW, THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IN RWANDA IS A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF. THE SRSG AND THE FORCE COMMANDER HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BOTH parties TO TRY TO SECURE THIS OBJECTIVE.

-- THE COUNCIL MEMBERS URGE THE SRSG TO MAKE EVERY
EFFORT TO FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE. IN THIS REGARD, THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE OAU TO PROMOTE A CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA.

-- THE COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT BOTH THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

-- THE MEMBERS REAFFIRMED THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE

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SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12355; DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL; SECURITY COUNCIL ATIMPASSE ONUNAMIR'S FUTURE

AGREEMENT REMAINS THE ONLY VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDA CONFLICT AND SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE COUNTRY.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS COMMEND THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEADERS OF THE SUBREGION AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA AND URGE THE LEADERS OF THE REGION TO PERSEVERE AND INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS FOR PEACE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU.

-- BUT, THE SITUATION IS GRAVE AND THE COUNCIL IS DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL TO BE PLACED AT SERIOUS RISK.

-- COUNCIL MEMBERS INTEND TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW THE FORCE LEVELS AND ACTIVITIES OF UNAMIR AND TO TAKE DECISIONS IN THIS REGARD AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

ALBRIGHT

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A great part of the discussion of 15 April was devoted to the alternatives of UNAMIR’s operation. The Bel MFA wrote to the SC President that he intends to withdraw Bel units by the end of the week. He recommended that the SC pull out UNAMIR completely, until a cease-fire is arranged. He also informed about his readiness to hand over the materiel and equipment of the Belgian blue helmets to UNAMIR if the SC decides not to withdraw it.

(Note: This was just a small segment of the extensive and intensive Belgian diplomatic offensive directed toward the end of the week at withdrawing UNAMIR. Some important delegations evaluated this as a Belgian effort not to look stupid or irresponsible once they decided to pull out. However, they decided to pull out rather for understandable political reasons caused by their 10 soldiers having been massacred than for objective reasons following from the Rwanda situation. Judged by its results in the SC, this diplomatic offensive failed. It is true of course that the population – the Hutu – have a thing against the Belgians, though not against foreigners as such.)

According to the Secretariat, the French contingent left Kigali on 15 April and the Belgian contingent, including their UNAMIR unit, was to leave by the weekend.

The situation in the country continues to be fluid. However, UNAMIR controls the airport (where the Belgians are passing the baton to the Ghanaians) which both belligerent parties respect. The postponed informal meeting of RPF representatives and the interim government took place, under UNAMIR’s auspices. The RPF’s key partner will be the defense minister who maintains at least some control over the (disintegrating) army and even over the Presidential Guard. The Secretariat confirmed once again that both parties are interested in UNAMIR’s presence and agree with the mediating role of the SRSG.

The CZ delegation has established contact at the working level with the RPF representative in New York who emphasized that the RPF also considers the Arusha agreements as the only possible framework of further peace talks. The RPF’s attitude to the new govt is influenced by the lack of clarity on the other side. It is unclear who one should negotiate with (remnants of the original, pre-coalition dictatorial govt of Pres Habyarimana and the decimated interim government which, however, was never constitutionally ratified have varying degrees of influence).

The Secretariat repeated the SG’s earlier position on UNAMIR one alternative – let it continue even without the Belgians (i.e., with the strength of some 2000 men); the other – pull out everyone except technical and security support staff of the SRSG who would also stay in place (all told some 200 people). Both alternatives assume a cease-fire; the discussion, however, clarified that a cease-fire is needed not (only) for UNAMIR to be able to operate but (also) to allow the withdrawal of its possible surplus units. The Secretariat repeated that the SG prefers the first alternative and that he doesn’t consider it practicable, desirable or wise to pull out UNAMIR completely and immediately (as minister Claes would want).
Nigeria, on behalf of NAM, supported the first alternative. The US stated that if the SC were to decide today (i.e., on 15 April), the US would insist on completely pulling out the military component of UNAMIR but that they completely understand the complexity and changeability of the situation and won’t have a problem with waiting for two or three days more. The UK preferred the second alternative.

The Secretariat underscored that even if the second alternative were adopted it would not be possible to withdraw the units immediately. Positions of delegations with different views did, however, not converge. Amb Kovanda helped sort out the situation by pointing out that if the SC doesn’t decide otherwise, the first alternative will turn into the default position, albeit without making an actual decision and without a change of the mandate. (NAM of course anticipated this result all along. They pulled the rug out from under the feet of the notoriously poorly prepared US.) Even though this decision-non-decision is not ideal (the world might have been expecting a decisive reaction from the SC), it gives the SRSG and Gen. Dallaire the chance to continue their discussions with the parties about a cease-fire.

The UK pointed out that we agree on 90% of the draft resolution and disagree only on what next with UNAMIR. He recommended adding a general para to the draft stating that “the SC carefully and continuously monitors the most suitable size and functions of UNAMIR”. Not even this formulation was acceptable of Friday; but since in the end we’ll have to say something, this formulation may well become the starting point for something further.

The SC President prepared his speaking points for the press which with minor changes were adopted without major problems as a reflection of the discussion. The SC will return to the matter on Monday 18 April.
Gharekhan informed SC members that the situation in Kigali is deteriorating further. The fighting is intensifying. Shelling has been directed at buildings which shelter refugees under UN protection. The Rwandese army is responsible. The attacks stopped after a protest of the UNAMIR Commander.

According to Gharekhan the chances of renewing the peace process are vanishingly small. According to the SRSG in Rwanda the governmental party is ready to negotiate a ceasefire. The RPF leadership has, however, refused UNAMIR's initiative to negotiate, pointing out that the govt party had not met its conditions (in our view partially justified). They also recommended that Unamir not continue in its mediation efforts.

Gharekhan observed that in view of the unclear situation and the fragmentation of Hutu command whose units are starting to slip out of control of the defense minister, Unamir personnel is in direct jeopardy.

He also mentioned that the SG is preparing a report on Unamir for the SC in which he will recommend withdrawing (partially or completely) UN and Unamir personnel. The report will be debated on April 24 and a resolution is expected on Thursday.

[The CZ delegation] contacted the Mission of Uganda to get a clearer view of its Govt on the Rwanda conflict. The conversation indicated that Uganda doesn't want to be dragged into the conflict and accused of fanning it. It considers the conflict as an internal Rwanda matter. On the other hand, it respects the right of Rwanda refugees in Uganda (largely Tutsis) to return home and join the fighting.

Uganda is ready to join peace negotiations but only with the agreement of both belligerent parties and the UN. It would prefer to leave the role of the main mediator to Tanzania and the OAU. It supports UN's continued presence in Rwanda and is in favor of continuing the UNOMUR mission under its current mandate.
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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE UNSC HEARD AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA APRIL 18, BUT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY ACTION AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY.
3. The UN Secretariat told the Security Council April 18 that UNAMIR was now mostly out of the countryside and only stationed in Kigali. Fighting in Kigali continues. The RPF controls the northern part of Kigali. Their offensive has slowed, either deliberately or due to resistance. The government's forces are resisting outside of Kigali. Ethnic killings continue, particularly behind government-held lines. There is neither a cease-fire nor a truce, although UNAMIR continues its efforts. The RPF will not agree to a cease-fire until the killings stop behind government lines. The RPF will not talk directly to the government, since to do so might imply recognition of the government.

4. The Secretariat informed the Council that 300 Ghanaians were withdrawing from the DMZ and would take control of the airport Tuesday, April 19. All Belgian UNAMIR HQ staff have left. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. The UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has made arrangements to send an advance team to look into aid shipments, but they cannot proceed to Kigali until there is a ceasefire. The Force Commander and SRSG will present further recommendations to the SYG within the next few days.

5. Nigerian Amb Gambari noted that the OAU is entering the diplomatic front, and has met with the RPF. The Rwandan Ambassador told the Council a meeting was scheduled for Saturday, April 23 in Arusha between the two parties. The President of the SC briefed the Council on his meeting with the Bangladeshi Ambassador. Bangladesh was still committed to UNAMIR, but increasingly nervous. If the danger increases, they hope the SC will review the situation. The President (New Zealand) reassured the Bangladeshi, and warned that premature announcement of UNAMIR withdrawal could be dangerous. The President said the Council needs to make a decision on UNAMIR by the end of the week.

Albright
To general disappointment, the SG did not submit his proposals today. Amb Gharekhan informed about latest developments. Further alarming information arrived from Human Rights Watch according to which some 100,000 people have been murdered; interpreting the fighting as strictly tribal is a terrible simplification.
Your file: 3/88/1

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**Subject**
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

**Summary**
- No recommendation yet from Sec Gen about UNAMIR future
- President underscores difficulty of Council not expressing any formal views on one of the most horrific tragedies and need for a decision by end of the week

**Action**
For information only

**Report**

2 In fact the secretariat did not come up with a recommendation from the Sec Gen on the future of UNAMIR today. The situation is evolving to the extent that it has been difficult to arrive at a clear recommendation. Our guess is that this is likely to be a result of a number of factors ie the force commander may be reviewing his own recommendations in light of the situation on the ground, the politics of making what would be a very difficult recommendation (if one were to be made to withdraw UNAMIR on safety grounds) for the Africans in light of the UN's activism and absorption with the question of Bosnia, and signs that at least some of the troop contributors may be getting cold feet. (In latter respect secretariat deny Reuters reports about troop departures. Only personnel to leave have been "non-essentials" is the unarmed observers)

3 Secretariat (Garekhan) provided a briefing however in which the situation was characterised as remaining tense. Fighting was intense yesterday morning (Tues) but had declined toward the end of the afternoon. The ICRC had
evacuated the wounded refugees from the stadium, the shelling of which by the "government forces" had left 40 dead and 100 seriously wounded. There had been heavy fighting at provincial centres outside Kigali.

4 UNAMIR is continuing with its efforts to get the parties to agree to a cease-fire and while the RPF still have difficulty with direct contacts with the "government forces" they were prepared to continue the discussions with UNAMIR to this end.

5 The Belge contingent of UNAMIR has completely departed, together with some 264 non-essential UNAMIR personnel. At present there are 1707 UNAMIR personnel left in Rwanda, mostly in Kigali. All but 87 of the personnel assigned to the DMZ in the north have already been relocated to Kigali with the remainder scheduled to have gone to Kigali today.

6 The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, especially the sanitary conditions at the stadium and hospital where the refugees are located. UNAMIR escorted some 18 ICRC trucks to deliver food to those in the stadium yesterday.

7 There is no change at the airport, both "government forces" and UNAMIR personnel are present. The RPF is not far away but not actually at the airport. There had been no progress in attempting to have it recognised as a neutral area. There is no deliberate hostility toward UNAMIR. The danger to them primarily comes from the risks of getting caught in the cross-fire or being caught in the "government" shelling of the stadium.

8 The UK reiterated the necessity to have a decision before the end of the week, noting that if the troop contributors decided (unilaterally) to pull out that would look "worse" than if the Council stayed "one step ahead" and decided to withdraw the force first.

9 At the conclusion of discussion President observed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to explain credibly why in the face of the most horrific killings the Council could remain formally silent. It is becoming difficult to explain why the Council is not pointing the finger at those responsible given that it was quite clear from the secretariat and from UNHCR reports that it was one particular party which was responsible. President also emphasised the importance of making a decision as soon as possible and that one merit of the NAM draft resolution (our fax 2438 of 14 April) was that it did address this issue.

Comment

10 President also had the opportunity to talk with the RPF representative and to impress on him the need for RPF to reach a cease-fire, though it is not difficult to see their
point about not wanting to enter formal negotiations with Rwandese "government forces" while those same forces are engaged in the current butchery.

End Message
CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-01
ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01
PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 SA-01 PMB-00 /045W

O 210129Z APR 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5858
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ACCRA

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DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PYO, AND AF/C;
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PAGE 02

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE SYG DID NOT HAVE A REPORT WITH
UNCLASSIFIED

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES, THAT 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS WERE EVACUATED TO NAIROBI. ALSO 237 GHANAIANS WERE MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI AND THAT THE REST WOULD MOVE TODAY. NIGERIA REPORTED ON EFFORTS BY UGANDA AND THE OAU TO SEEK A CEASEFIRE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS GHAREKHAN REPORTED THE AIRPORT WAS OPERATIONAL BUT NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEW SHELLING OR PROPAGANDA AGAINST UNAMIR TROOPS. GHAREKHAN HOPED THE SYG REPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TOMORROW BUT WOULD NOT PROMISE. A NUMBER OF MEMBERS STRESSED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TO TAKE ACTION ON RWANDA BEFORE THE WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

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WHEN IS A REPORT NOT A REPORT
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3. AT INFORMALS ON APRIL 20 THE COUNCIL DISCUSSED
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RWANDA. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BEGAN BY ANNOUNCING THAT
CONTRARY TO HIS STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL THE DAY BEFORE,
THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT HAVE A REPORT FROM THE SYG ON
FUTURE OPTIONS. HE THEN GAVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE
SITUATION. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT FIGHTING HAD BEEN
INTENSE ON TUESDAY BUT SLACKED OFF IN THE AFTERNOON.
THIS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED FROM THE
STADIUM TO THE HOSPITAL. THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT THE
STADIUM WAS NOW PLACED AT 40. THERE WAS ALSO FIGHTING
AROUND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL NORTHWEST OF KIGALI.
GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE BELGians HAD LEFT AND AN
ADDITIONAL 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS HAD BEEN
EVACUATED TO NAIROBI LEAVING A FORCE LEVEL OF 1707. 237
GHANAIAN TROOPS OF UNAMIR HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO
KIGALI ON TUESDAY AND THE REMAINING 87 WERE EXPECTED TO
GO TO KIGALI WEDNESDAY.

4. NIGERIA PERM REP GAMBARI GAVE THE COUNCIL SOME
INFORMATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE SAID THERE
WAS MEETING IN KAMPALA WHERE UGANDA'S PRESIDENT TRIED
TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND THERE
WAS TO BE ANOTHER MEETING TOMORROW; ALSO THAT LEADERS OF
THE REGION HAD AGREED TO MEET IN ARUSHA ON SATURDAY.
THE SYG OF THE OAU HAD CONTACTED REGIONAL LEADERS TO
UNCLASSIFIED

COOPERATE ON A COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. GANBARI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED
THAT THE COUNCIL COULD RETURN QUICKLY TO THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON RWANDA AFTER THE SYG’S REPORT WAS RECEIVED.

MORE QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

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5. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL QUESTIONED GHAREKHAN
SEEKING MORE INFORMATION. BRAZIL ASKED IF THE 264
NON-ESSENTIAL WERE ALL OR MIGHT MORE LEAVE, SAYING THEY
HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT 500 UNAMIR TROOPS WERE LEAVING.
GHAREKHAN SAID THE REPORT OF 500 WAS NOT TRUE, BUT MORE
TROOPS MIGHT LEAVE DEPENDING ON THE DECISIONS OF TROOP
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND WHAT DECISIONS THE COUNCIL
TOOK. ARGENTINA EXPRESSED SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT THE
SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON
CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT, ANY SHELLING OF UN FORCES AND
ANY REPORTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH SIDES TOWARDS THE UN
TROOPS PARTICULARLY ANY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. GHAREKHAN
RESPONDED THAT UNAMIR TROOPS WERE AT THE AIRPORT WHICH
WAS STILL OPERATIONAL ALTHOUGH NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE
OPERATING NOW. UNAMIR DID NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD
ARRANGE FOR THE AIRPORT TO BE CONSIDERED NEUTRAL. ALSO
THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER ATTACKS ON UNAMIR AND NO
DELIBERATE HOSTILITY OR PROPAGANDA TOWARDS THEM.

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INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 EAP-01
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-01
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T-00 USIE-00 SA-01 PMB-00 /045W

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DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
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PAGE 02

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

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ACTION BY FRIDAY, THE CALL
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6. In response to a question by Spain Gharekhani said he "hoped" the report would be available on Thursday but could not promise that. This revelation prodled members of the council to stress the need not to go into the weekend without acting. UK Amb Hannay said that while troop contributors hold the ultimate power to decide if troops would remain, the council should try to stay one jump ahead of them. He said it was better to rationally decide to downsize the mission than have troop contributors do it for the council. Hannay concluded the council needed to decide soon, we "can't retire for the weekend without taking action."

7. New Zealand commented that as president he was encountering a number of countries not council members who could not understand why the council was not saying anything on "this horrific killing," as well as questions from the media why the council was not confidential.

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Pointing out who was responsible for this killing when they were receiving reports on who was at fault. Amb Keating said the council had good reasons why they had not adopted a resolution last Friday but he believed the council cannot go beyond this Friday without action.

8. Amb Cardenas of Argentina joined this chorus saying the council had to take a decision no later than Friday. He said the UNAMIR force may be evaporating through actions of troop contributors and that UNAMIR has been in limbo. He added that UNAMIR had a mandate not related to the present situation and that his government would be very disturbed if UNAMIR remained in this limbo. (Comment after the meeting Cardenas commented that this was crazy, that the Bangladesh wants to remove it troops and UNAMIR should be removed. End comment.)

9. The president said if the SYG report on Rwanda came out on Thursday he would try to adjust the schedule of work to allow an initial exchange of views. If not he would expect to discuss Rwanda on Friday.

Albright
SUBJECT: SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN AMB ALBRIGHT MET WITH SYG BOUTROS-GHALI ON A RANGE OF SUBJECTS (SEPTEL) APRIL 20, INCLUDING RWANDA. BBG TOLD ALBRIGHT OF HIS DILEMMA: THE OAU SYG, HIS
FORCE COMMANDER AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN KIGALI, UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI AND AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WANT HIM TO KEEP THE UN IN RWANDA.

THE DECISION ON RWANDA WILL EFFECT THE IMAGE OF THE UN. UN TROOPS MAY HELP TO DEFUSE TENSIONS. ALSO, IF A CEASE-FIRE IS AGREED, THE RWANDANS WILL NEED TROOPS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE CEASE-FIRE'S IMPLEMENTATION. THE OAU IS TRYING TO STAGE TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BBG DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A MASSACRE OF UN TROOPS, ALTHOUGH THE RISKS TO THE FORCES MAY INCREASE IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED. BBG WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE OPERATION IN RWANDA ONE LAST TRY. IT WOULD BE AN EASY THING FOR HIM TO DECIDE TO PULL OUT, BUT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIFTY THOUSAND ADDITIONAL DEATHS IN RWANDA.

3. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REMARKED THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UN TROOPS. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED BBG'S DILEMMA, AND PROMISED TO REPORT HIS CONFIDENTIAL REMARKS TO WASHINGTON.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
Debating the SG’s report and the subsequent [draft] resolution hit some roadblocks. The NAM group, on the one hand, insisted that UNAMIR units not only stay in the country but should in fact be strengthened. On the other hand the US would best pull out UNAMIR completely. The constant uncertainty is apparently driving our soldiers crazy.

After intensive negotiations a compromise was finally reached. Most of UNAMIR will be rapidly withdrawn from Rwanda (600 soldiers are to be evacuated by air as soon as April 22). At the same time, its mandate will be adapted. The core of UNAMIR will stay in Kigali, some 270 people, around the SRSG. They will also try to contribute to a ceasefire and to restoring humanitarian assistance, and they will also monitor the situation in the country, including the safety of the civilian population which in recent days has sought refuge under the protection of the blue helmets. The UN civilian personnel will be protected by a UNAMIR unit.
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SYG'S MILITARY ADVISOR, GENERAL BARIL, PROVIDED USUN WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE PLANS FOR UNAMIR TROOP DRAWDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW Resolution:
UNCLASSIFIED

- 900 troops, mostly from Bangladesh, will evacuate today and tomorrow, leaving about 600 in Rwanda.

- These forces will be in two groups, about 300 at the airport and about 300 in the vicinity of the stadium.

- The force commander will plan to draw down the forces near the airport and remain with a company of about 200 troops from Ghana and Tunisia and about 70 civilians (consistent with the SYG's option II). His draw down plans will remain flexible to the requirements on the ground.

- Displaced Rwandan civilians are currently in three locations: the stadium, the Hotel Milles Collines Hotel, and the King Faisal Hospital. The RPF is making arrangements for their evacuation now and no major problems are anticipated. The hospital area is firmly within RPF territory and those people should not be in immediate danger. The area around the stadium is also confidential.

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UNDER RPF control and will also be near the headquarters of the final detachment of 270 UNAMIR troops and civilian personnel. According to UN HQ, fighting continues in the city and they are reluctant to declare the civilians "safe" -- but they are not in immediate danger.

- If the situation becomes untenable near the stadium, UNAMIR plans to evacuate through the airport if viable or by road to Uganda. General Baril also mentioned the possibility of Belgian support for emergency situation, but he could not confirm a commitment.

- General Baril reports that the exit roads from Kigali are in relatively good shape, that UNAMIR will have more than sufficient transportation assets, and that they are comfortable with the security situation along the road out.

3. In accordance with the new resolution, the remaining forces will support the SRSG in his mandate to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda. Also, the Secretariat will ask the Council to keep the situation under close review to adjust remaining force levels.

UNCLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL
Shooting is continuing in Kigali. The RPF controls the hills above the city and the North and North-West of the country. They control the town of Byumba in the North. The RGF (Rwanda Government Forces) control the North-East and the South. A representative of Medecins sans frontiers (MSF) which had been taking care of a hospital in the southern town of Butare visited the SC President. Soldiers of the RGF and of the Presidential Guard recently entered there, murdered all the Rwandan personnel of the hospital, then returned and murdered all the patients. According to the MSF representative, his organization never experienced anything of the sort, anywhere.

The meeting in Arusha did-didn’t take place: the RPF deputy didn’t have the mandate to negotiate anything with govt representatives. He did, however, announce a unilateral cease-fire which the RPF will declare at midnight local time, 25 April. However, whether the RPF will extend it, will depend on conditions (which Gharekhan did not specify).

Note: This situation leaves the SC quite perplexed, also because the Rwandan sits there, albeit usually silently. A clear genocide is taking place, of the governmental and presidential-guard Hutu units against the Tutsi. No matter how one considers the numbers, there used to be some 1.2 million Tutsi before the war and certainly 100,000 of them have been killed off. The regional organization (OAU) looks at the situation from the point of view of the country’s stability or possibly of the legitimacy of the government: it is striving for a cease-fire, holds both parties on the same level. Is this not as though we wanted Hitler to reach a cease-fire with the Jews? (Sure the comparison is wanting but the proportions are the same.)

The CZ Delegation will talk to some colleagues from among the “non-non”, to see whether we couldn’t react in some other way than by withdrawing UNAMIR, of which only 450 men remain in the country.
Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Genocide reported by Medecines Sans Frontieres
- Council considers what, if any, options it may have to take action in this appalling situation

Action

For information and thoughts on appropriate Council action.

Report

2 Sec Gen of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) called this afternoon to brief the President on events over the weekend at Butare hospital administered by MSF. Butare is the second largest city in Rwanda and is in the southern part, under the control of the "government forces". MSF noted about 40% of its population was of Tutsi ethnic background.

3 On Friday the government army forces rounded up all the local staff of the hospital and killed them, saying they would return to kill all the patients the next day. On Saturday they came back and killed all 170 patients being treated by MSF. The patients had been injured in earlier conflicts with militia and with the army forces and were being treated for machete wounds. In answer to President's question, MSF confirmed that those doing the killings were wearing regular Rwanda army uniforms and emphasised that this was the most brutal act they had experience of in their 20 year history as an organisation.

4 MSF also reported that 140 people under the protection of the ICRC travelling to Zaire had been killed. According to MSF when the killing started the Presidential Guard began to
systematically kill people on a "list" of about 1500 of those in opposition to the President. This included Hutu members of the opposition. In more recent times the "government forces" had moved to targeting all Tutsis. If the situation did not improve in the south then, according to MSF, there would be no more Tutsis in the south "within a few weeks".

5 Because the MSF now had no staff and no patients in Butare they had withdrawn from their operation. Since then they had visited the Dutch and Belgian Foreign Ministers as well the King of Belgium to draw attention to what they described as a clear policy of genocide on the part of the Rwandan government forces.

6 MSF appealed to the Council to implement "safe areas" around hospitals. They said that there were many people in need of medical assistance who were afraid to get attention especially when they knew it was not safe even in the presence of ex-pat medical staff. (In their experience in the past, this had usually provided some measure of security). If the UN could implement a security perimetre around the hospitals, people would be able to travel from places of hiding in the bush or in their homes. This is "the minimum" MSF was seeking from the international community for immediate assistance. In their opinion this could work. Butare is only 2 1/2 hours drive from the Burundi border and their staff did the journey regularly.

7 In the short term, there would be 2 million people in the south (coming mostly from Kigali) who were in dire need of food, water and other basic necessities. This will require a major aid effort MSF noted.

8 President briefed Council on this call and Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided briefing on weekend events. The situation in Kigali remains very tense. There were no significant changes. The RPF continues to have control of various positions in the hills around Kigali and the north and north-east remain in their control, while the south and south-west are in the control of the "government forces". Elsewhere, the RPF forces were advancing but had slowed under opposition from the "government forces".

9 Over the weekend some 1000 UNAMIR troops had been evacuated from Kigali. Now there are 444 remaining (including 72 military observers). Although the evacuated personnel spent time in Nairobi over the weekend (to see if there was any prospect of progress at the cease-fire talks which had been scheduled for Saturday in Arusha), most had now been repatriated to their own countries. (The secretariat commented privately to us that the repatriation of the Bangladeshi forces had not been entirely unwelcome by the Force Commander).

10 As to the Arusha cease-fire talks, coordinated by Tanzania as the Arusha peace "facilitator", these had not
taken place as scheduled for Saturday. Although the Tanzanian government had asked UNAMIR to airlift the "interim government" party from a border location in Zaire, a short distance from Butare, the "interim government" had not showed up at the appointed time. This meant that they were not even in Arusha for the talks.

11 The RPF had showed up but was not, in any event, prepared to talk with the "interim government". It would however have been acceptable to them to talk with the Rwandan army (not represented at Arusha). The RPF position was that it wanted to present Tanzania and the OAU (represented at Arusha by its Sec Gen) and the UN with a unilateral ceasefire, but subject to certain conditions (previously reported). If the conditions are met, the unilateral cease-fire was due to come into effect at midnight tonight (Mon), local time.

12 The Under Sec Gen for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hanson, visited Kigali with a small team of UN agency reps over the weekend. The visit was to assess the urgent needs of the people of Kigali. UNAMIR continues to provide protection for people in the stadium and the Force Commander is trying to arrange "swaps" to get people to safer areas.

13 After a pause, and initiated by Argentina, there followed a long discussion in the Council as to what the appropriate response, if any, there might be. Argentina (supported by Czech, Spain and Pakistan) noted that each time the Council met it received a briefing on the atrocities in Rwanda and that it needed to show that it was not "indifferent" to the situation. Argentina proposed that the President make this clear to the media.

14 The UK disagreed and said that instead there was a need for the Council to support the efforts of the OAU and neighbouring countries in their efforts to get the parties together to talk about a cease-fire. It was readily agreed that the President could call in the ambassadors concerned to convey the Council's view (calls have been set up for tomorrow for this purpose). The UK also noted that the Council was in the "unenviable position" of not wanting to make statements on the one hand which it could not follow up on, or of hand wringing concern without action on the other. Filling time with empty resolutions was also a "sterile" activity Argentina added.

15 Spain then suggested that some thought be given to what if any responses the Council could make. In FR Yugoslavia a tribunal was created together with a special investigating commission, in Liberia an ad-hoc commission of enquiry had been established to look into the Hrbel massacre. Could not something similar be done here, at the very least to open a file in which the evidence of the MSF could be deposited so that over the longer term action is taken to have the perpetrators of this genocide held responsible?
16 At this point, the US (Albright) made what she described as a "very difficult proposal", she noted that in any similar situation, the Council would ask the President to call in the Ambassador of the state concerned to ask, on behalf of the Council, for an explanation. In this connection she had in mind asking why did the "interim government" not show in Arusha. After a long pause, Rwanda volunteered the information that a "Minister for the Interior" of the "interim government" had travelled to Arusha from Dar es Salaam to the talks on instructions from the "interim government" and that it was the RPF who refused to enter negotiations with this Minister.

17 In summing up this very difficult and depressing discussion, President noted that it would be very important for the Sec Gen to continue his efforts and that he would call in the ambassadors of the neighbouring countries as requested to convey support for regional efforts, and that it would be important for delegations to reflect on the discussion, recognising there might be a range of options (identified by Spain), while not overestimating the Council's ability to do something about the situation. He agreed to make a statement to the media which would convey this together with the discussion of the MSF information.

End Message