Transcript of Oral Interview
of Jacob D. Esterline
by Jack B. Pfeiffer
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on the Bay of Pigs Operation
Tape No. 1 of 8

JBP What I would like to know first, is the origin of WH/4
and the selection of personnel for it, including your-
self, and such people as Drain, Stanulis, Droller; any
comments you could make about the selection of the
military personnel, particularly Hawkins, Egan, Gar
Thorsrud, Beerli, and these folks; and in line with the
military personnel selection, the involvement of the
Alabama Air National Guard -- how did they get into it.
Just take off from that as the first subject of conversa-
tion.

JE Well, as far as I know the origin of WH/4, from my limited
view is simply that some time in late 1958 when I was
finishing two years in Venezuela, I had correspondence

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with J. C. King about the fact that they were getting ready to do something about Cuba. I am guessing that he asked me whether I wanted to take the third year in Venezuela, or whether I wanted to come back for two years and involve myself in Cuba. My answer -- and I again repeat, I am somewhat vague on this -- but my answer must have been that I didn't want to spend more than two years in Caracas because I didn't particularly enjoy the tour there. So as a result of this correspondence, we were assigned back to Washington, arriving there some time in January 1960. Shortly after my arrival, WH/4 as it was called then was formed. There had been a nucleus of people who had been working on various and sundry problems which hadn't been structured within the division. One was Ed Stanulis who had, I really don't know how he came to the Division; another was a fellow named Bob Reynolds who was concerned with Cuban affairs at that time; and I think there was another retired colonel, since deceased, Jess somebody or other -- a very nice fellow. In late January or February we formed a Branch 4; and these people that had been working in this prior phase were joined under the Branch with Reynolds becoming our Deputy; Ed Stanulis, becoming
... I am not exactly sure for what at that time, other than the fact that he was the fellow that worked on Special Group papers because he had been doing that kind of thing. He was essentially the paper man; later, he became the Executive Officer, and Jess was ... he and Jess alternated in that position. We designed -- started to design at that point -- a very simple little kind of operation to return to Cuba and form a safe area ... a hard core nucleus that would be able to sustain itself and grow an organization which in time would be able to return power to the so-called democratic forces.

JBP Was the principal reason for your choice -- or King's choice of you -- because you had been involved in the Guatemala thing?

JE Yes, I was a headquarters officer in charge of Guatemala. I would think that was one of the reasons, plus the fact that I had extensive guerrilla warfare experience during the second World War in OSS; and the third thing, being that I think J. C. had pretty much confidence in my judgment.

JBP What about the selection of say, Dick Drain, and Droller. Were these your choices or were these others that came out of the bag and you were told, "here they are."
It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size ... it was obvious that the Division didn't have the personnel, the senior personnel to staff out the organization; or if they did have them, they weren't about to release them from the things they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think that when people like Dick Drain came back home from -- in Dick's case I think he came in from Greece -- where he had a pretty good record -- but he was not returning to headquarters to go into an assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller had been around headquarters for a long time, had been quite a bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of ... they were selected, not by us, but they were either told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation.

This same thing then true of the military selections, Hawkins, Egan, Gaines and this group ... were they ...
We had no military. The military people I think came in consideration, when we realized that we were going into a fairly sizeable operation, one in which people available -- or there weren't people available around the agency necessarily -- but everybody was getting a little older at that time and what not, so they had to look for people and a very special hunt was made for Jack Hawkins. I don't recall whether it was Dick Bissell, probably J. C. King or others that went to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and said, look, we want a man on detail, but we don't want you to just send somebody to us that you don't have a spot for, we really want a guy with eminent qualifications in this regard, and to the best of my knowledge, that is the reason that Jack Hawkins was selected, because of the experience he had during the second World War, plus his rather distinguished Marine Corps record up to that point -- I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment cost him his General's Star and a good many other things in terms of his record. Egan ... a similar search was made in the military establishment, through whom, I don't recall. But again, it was the same requirement for a guy that had high qualifications and airborne operations,
etc., and Egan was selected ... and Major Beal, the logistics officer for the operation, who has since become career agency officer and I guess is still with the agency.

JBP  I think he still is.

JE  I am sure he is, because he wouldn't be any more than 46 years old now, something of that sort. He came in at the same time, on the same draft, I guess, that Egan came in on. I can't think of any other military ... there were many military officers.

JBF  Stan Beerli was there, but I think that he ... it was through his association with Bissell ... 

JE  Well, yes, the DPD, at that time, had all of the air responsibility, and we were told that Stan Beerli and George Gaines and company would be the ones who would be handling all air operations for us and whatnot, and it was through them that also the fellow that handled all forward air operations ...

JBF  Gar Thorsrud.

JE  Gar Thorsrud joined us.

JBP  Was it true that these contacts with Gaines and Beerli with DPD ... that the Alabama Air National Guard got involved in it, because they knew the personnel, they
knew Reid Doster. Do you recall anything about that? Why was it the Alabama Air National Guard in particular that got called on?

JE I can only say that it had to be that the Alabama Air National Guard was called on (a) because they were a pretty active group of people and (b) because they had contacts with people in DPD, and they seemed to be very highly motivated, and there was a desperate need for back up pilots. There didn't seem to be any place at that time, I gather, that they could be gotten from, although I think we did on selected occasions ... I think we did use one or more Polish groups that had been used in Europe. I don't recall their indicators any more or what they were, but I know that on one occasion ...

JBP Yes, they doing some of the C-46's ...

JE One one occasion they flew me black out of Miami with a political group down to Guatemala sometime probably in late 1960. I think they were being phased out at that point, so. They didn't have a combat capability anyway.

JBP Well, what I am getting at then is that these were choices that were made and were no direct responsibility of yours -- that you didn't know any of these individuals
by first name, or call for them by name or anything like that. You mentioned Jack Hawkins's career took a slug from his participation in this. What about your own professional career?

JE Well, I guess that kind of put an end ot it for all practical purposes, although I had a promotion or two after that. But that is the name of the game -- if you let yourself get involved in one of these things, and it doesn't work, that's it.

JBP Who is Howard F. Anderson, who is reported executed by Castro as a counter-revolutionary on 19 April 1961. There is a memo from Wheedbe that I ran across -- to the DCI -- where he said Anderson was connected with the Agency. I have never run across that name except in that memo ... does it ring any bell with you?

JE The person you should ask that question probably is on the West Coast, if he is still alive ... Jim ... an old time chief of station in the Western Hemisphere ... Jim Noel. If Anderson was a gas station operator in Havana (who this was) and this is the fellow that was executed, [then] he had a connection with the Agency in the sense that he did things totally disconnected from
any of this for several years previously for the station. But he was never in any way, to my knowledge, he was never any way involved in the Cuban operation. I am not sure that we are talking about the same person, but I know that an "innocent" American who ran an Esso or some station like that -- a good sized station in Havana -- got trapped up in things and was executed as a spy, when in point of fact, he had nothing to do as far as the Agency was concerned. Now, whether he was doing things for some of these groups, which he might very well have been because of motivation, is something else again; but he wasn't doing it for JMARC.

JBP I got a memorandum that Dave McLean wrote back in 1972
... he talked to Bill Eiseman, and Eiseman said something like this ... that the money channel was from Jake, to Barnes, to Bissell, with J. C. King and Helms being by-passed. And then McLean went on to say that Eiseman said "J. C. would never back up WH/4 on anything." This gets me into the question of what was J. C. King's role in this ... the papers that I read indicate that he was fully informed, up to date, and participating at all times in this thing. Now, is this incorrect?
JE  Answer off the record at this point and concerned JMATE funds for J. C.'s project.

JBP  Did the Interamerican Defense Board ... did anyone give any consideration to the Interamerican Defense Board as a method of helping us out in our problem with Cuba? Was this ever discussed?

JE  With other countries?

JBP  In terms of supporting an anti-Castro program. Was there any thought given to the use of the Interamerican Defense Board?

JE  Not in conversations that I was privy to. That was more apt to have taken place in State Department under Rubottom and that group. The only thing I can relate the Defense Board to is that we obviously had extensive conversations with Nicaragua and Guatemala [it appears that the Inter-American Defense Board was being confused with a Department of Defense component]. As I told you, I actually, myself, executed with Ydigoras Fuentes the agreement -- which at the time that I did it (in true name), I thought "I suppose I'll be reading about this one day and I have to save that piece of paper." He [Ydigoras] said that piece of paper will never be exposed, and it hasn't to my knowledge.
JBP  I think I have a copy of it Jake ... what you are saying
    is true ...

JE  Well, so is he.

JBP  Now, instead of holding off on that, and since you have
    mentioned it, let's pursue that one a little further.
    How did it happen that you were the guy who was signing
    this kind of an agreement with the President of Guatemala.
    State said go ahead?

JE  State Said, Oh, we don't want to touch that; and Ydigoras
    said well, I am not going to do it, unless it is signed
    by some responsible individual. We looked around the
    agency and said to J. C., "J. C. this kind of ..."
    "No, no," he said, "I don't think I ought to do that."
    He said, "Jake, you are in charge of the project, why
    don't you do it." So being a brash young man, I said,
    "well, we were never going to get this thing going unless
    somebody signs it." So I flew to Guatemala black with
    Roberto Alejos, who is now a substantial banker in Miami,
    and with Bob Davis, who was Chief of Station there at
    the time, and I think, with the powers and full knowledge
    of the Ambassador, although I didn't meet him because I
    was there black. I went in illegally and left illegally.
    We drew up the particulars of the base agreement, if you
    will, Status of Forces agreement.
JBP  How about Bissell and Dulles, were they aware that you were going to do this?

JE  Oh, Hell, yes. Oh, hell yes. I went as an instructed delegate from Washington. The wording "an expendable pawn" ...

JBP  Well, it seemed to worked out better ...

JE  On the other hand, if you treat people right, they usually treat you right; and we always treated Ydigoras very well, and he treated us very well. But he said ... I admit it's something that's rarely happened. I've got to have a piece of paper that said I executed something with the US Government. No, I went on specific instructions from Bissell and Dulles..

JBP  Did Nixon have any direct role in our activity in the anti-Castro activity in the period from March 60 through January 61? He had a meeting with Castro ...

JE  I think he was a pretty heavy monitor as to what was going on during that time, and what not; and as I think I told you one time when we talked superficially about it ... I am one of those who feels it is very wrong to pick too much on Jack Kennedy because it was Nixon who, if we had kicked off things as we had hoped for, between
November and January of 60-61, it might not have worked, but it would not have been a major disaster. It would just have been another little thing, but Nixon, because of the election I am told -- this is not direct from him -- but I am told that Nixon thought well, they had better wait until the election before they mounted anything of that sort. Then after we lost the election, they felt that they didn't know whether they wanted to do it or not, and the end was that it just kept escalating and turning into the nightmares that became the Bay of Pigs, which they then dumped on Jack Kennedy's lap ... with him, without any real previous experience in anything of this sort.

JBP How do you explain if Nixon was saying back off from it ... how do you explain the sudden burst of activity, of the Eisenhower administration in the period ... well certainly all through December of 1960 and almost up to the day of the inauguration ... far greater concern on the administration's part in getting the force and building up the force and getting the force ready than had been true up to that time.

JE I can't explain it except in ... I can't explain it ... but I will say this, it probably has a political basis.
They realized that they had lost, and they realized that they were going to have to brief a new administration along with the British on the things that had been going on. I suspect that they didn't want to brief on something that would emerge that they hadn't been giving anything other than their full support.

JBP (asked question about General Cushman's role)

JBP ... \[...

JE Oh, he was a Nixon aide, and he was a great guy ... he was the guy to fellow behind all of these things ... that thought positively and in and Hawkins knew each.

JBP Did they ... 

JE Yes, and Cushman was the sort of a guy that if he wanted a brief ... and we briefed him on a number ... I briefed him on a number of occasions ... he always would take a very positive military stance on what you were doing once you had explained it. You could be sure if Cushman said I like what you're doing in high counsels and I'll take a positive attitude toward it in his briefing --
I suppose Nixon or somebody of the sort -- he would have done. I think he is a very forthright man.

JBP I wonder if you ever saw this thing here, this piece of paper that is identified as a "Must Go" list ... everyone's name is on there except Castro.

JE What do you mean "Must Go" list ...

JBP Well, that is what its ...

JE You mean to kill them?

JBP I don't know, Jake, this just fell out of the pieces of paper ... there was this list, and I don't know what it is, and I am simply trying to find out if anyone does know ... Bissell ... it meant nothing to him. As I say, Castro's name is not on there, but everybody else practically is on there.

JE Well, I know all these people ... now some of them I know personally, like Hernando Hart, another one ... you know I knew them personally. I entertained Hart in my home a number of time in Venezuela, the miserable bastard. I have never seen that list in my life. But, this is the whole top gang at that time. Now many of them were later eliminated from the power structure by Castro, and by Raul Castro. Raul was very well liked. They got rid of Olivares and Roca was pushed aside, (Vadropege?) was pushed aside, Hernando Hart was also half nuts at
this point, and he still is ... I guess he is still fairly prominent, but he is not really in the power structure. Abelardo Colome -- I don't even know who he is. I wish to help you, but I don't know.

JBP In the question about the assassination business ...

JE The only thing I can think of that list is something I didn't ... suppose to be some kind of dumb list of people to be removed. There were times, I think they were talking about political formulas ... could they arrive at some compatible arrangement with Castro ... would he purge himself. Would these be people that might have to be removed from the power structure.

JBP As I say, it has no meaning ... because this assassination question has come up ... I thought I would look at it and ask. One other question along the line of the assassination business ... in the requests to the support element that came from down south ... there were constant requirements for issues of Welrod pistols and silenced machine guns. Now, was this standard guerrilla warfare equipment that we are talking about here, or were these weapons that were being planned for assassination uses, or ...

JE No, I think it is for hit and run operations, where they could do their maximum damage and get out without
necessarily alerting and by some people ... I know of no within JMARC, as I knew it - I know of no attempt, no plans that were made to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the constant battle with Cubans during those years was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination, that if there was going to be an overthrow, it was going to be, obviously, a bloody operation; but no Cubans were going to be sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt." It was going to be a ground roots revolution.

JBP Now are you talking now about the people who were coming in to form the Brigade, or are you talking about the people that were the resistance leaders of the groups back in Cuba.

JE Well, we didn't know what the Hell they were doing, and we never did know -- and we still don't know what they were doing. I am talking about the people that were in the brigade, and I'm talking about the various political groups and what not that say you know the thing to do is to go in there and knock them off -- and they were just shot down the moment they raised anything of that sort.

JBP We have just touched, a moment ago, on the role that you played in the negotiation with Ydigoras on the
agreement on the base, did you have a role in the period of November 1960, when Ydigoras was faced with this revolt down there, and he put in a call for assistance ... were you involved in that one ... do you know what happened?

JE Yeah. We got this urgent call (unintelligible word) ... had to use our troops. We got it, and we looked at it and didn't know that to do with it. We called State Department and said we suppose this is critical ... the whole thing is going to go to pot. I suppose that it was Rubottom or somebody who was at that level over there that we called. They said, "well, I guess you better give him what he wants." So we gave him what he wanted and that was about the time that it was in motion and we got a call back from State Department saying they checked and they didn't mean it. But it was in motion at that point.

JBP What exactly was in motion? Two plane loads of Cubans on C-46's.

JE Two plane loads of Cubans on C-46's, and a couple of American pilots. The Cubans in the C-46's didn't accomplish anything other than the fact that the plane landed ... it has a certain traumatic impact,
but they did a very professional job of strafing in a certain area of known military targets. Completely, quoting American or United Fruit Company people that were there at the time ... that had lived around there for years ... and they witnessed -- some of them had been in the second World War -- and they witnessed this professional job that was done by Sig and Co.

JBP  Who was Sig and Company? [Connie Seigrist]

JE  Oh, I don't know ... they were DPD people.

JBP  The name doesn't ring a bell.

JE  Oh, he was a contract pilot ... he was out with Gar Thorsrud. I don't remember his full name, I only knew him by that name ... but they were highly professional pilots ... they flew this P-47, or wherever the fighters were, maybe it was the B-27.

JBP  If they were the air force that we had, they were the B-26's.

JE  Maybe they were B-26's.

JBP  Did the Cubans that were in those C-46's ... did they actually get out of the C-46's ...?

JE  No, they fired out the window, but they never got out, they were never seen by anybody on the ground.
JBP  Did the planes actually land, Jake ... the C-46's, did they actually touch down?

JE  I am told that they touched down.

JBP  Like touch-and-go?

JE  I am told they touched down, turned around, and took off. But later I was challenged several times by people from the United Fruit Company, who were there at Puerto Barrios at the time, and they said, look we have been living around Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the precision that those fellows shot with, because they didn't kill anybody ... that they weren't supposed to kill -- I guess that is the way to put it. I mean, there wasn't a stray bullet anywhere, they strictly hit military targets.

But there was a case of a green light from State Department and then they said they didn't mean it. It was academic because it was done.

JBP  Another question about one of the political leaders ... after the administration changed in January 1961, did Lyndon Johnson have any role in the Bay of Pigs operation? To my knowledge he did not, he was in on some briefings.

JE  I don't know, I never heard his name mentioned in connection with it. I don't think Joe Califano did at
that time either. He came later.

JBP We mentioned a couple of moments ago, when we were talking about J. C. King ... made the comment that you weren't sure what J. C. was up to at all times, and you made some reference to some conversations with Pawley ... I have a question, and it is what was Pawley's relation to this whole operation ... and your relation with Pawley seems to have been quite close, too.

JE I think it was a hangover relationship from the things that Bill Pawley had done as quite a wheel with a number of very senior people during the Guatemalan operation ... that they felt that Bill, who had been very closely tied into Cuba ... that he was a very prominent man in Florida ... that there were a lot of things that he might be able to do, in the sense of getting things lined up in Florida for us ... and also his ties with Nixon and with other republican politicos. I used to deal with him quite a bit before J.C.
JE From my point of view, we never let Bill Pawley know any of the intimacies about our operations, or what we were doing. He never knew where our bases were, or things of that sort. He never knew anything specific about our operations, but he was doing an awful lot of things on his own with the exiles. Some of the people that he had known in Cuba, in the sugar business, etc. I guess he actually was instrumental in running boats and things in and out of Cuba, getting people out and what not, and a variety of things that were not connected with us in any way. He was a political factor from the standpoint...from J.C.'s standpoint. I don't know whether Tommy Corcoran entered in at this point...I think Tommy Corcoran was strictly in Guatemala. I guess Corcoran didn't come into this thing, at least not very much.

JBP His name turns up once or twice.

JE Yes, I met him once, in connection with Cuba, but I don't remember who...for J.C., but I don't remember why, at this point. It wasn't anything of any significance. My feeling with Pawley...he was such a hawk, and he was every second week...he wanted to kill somebody inside... It was from my standpoint...we were trying to keep him from doing things to cause problems for us. This was almost a standing operation.

JBP This is what I was wondering, because Tracy Barnes, I know on a number of occasions, seemed to make it quite clear that what the Agency had to be careful of was getting hung with a reactionary label, and then at the same time that was going on, here is all of this conversation back and forth with Pawley and his visits...

JE ...Really to keep him from doing something to upset the applecart from our standpoint. In that sense, I did fill that role in part for a long time; and the net result of the thing is that Bill thinks I am a dangerous leftist today. If I hadn't been a foot dragger, or hadn't taken all these dissenting opinions of this, things in Cuba would have been a lot better.
Was Pawley actually involved in the covert operation in Guatemala?

Yes, he, well I am sure he was, in a ...

I mean, with you as far as you...

Not I personally, but he was involved with State Dept. -- I said Rubottom a couple of times, I didn't mean Rubottom, I meant Rusk. He was involved...especially in Guatemala with Rubottom, or whoever Secretary of State was, and Seville Sacasa and Somoza and whoever Secretary of Defense was in getting the planes from the Defense Dept., having them painted over, the decals painted over and flown to Nicaragua where they became the Defense force for that operation.

I ran across some comment that he had made to Livingston Merchant...

They were good friends, and knew each other. But to my knowledge, he never had any involvement like that during the Bay of Pigs days, although you'd have to ask Ted Shackley about what they did later, because I think he ran some things into Cuba for Ted Shackley.

That is beyond my period of interest. He was involved in a great amount of fund raising activity, in the New York area apparently -- pushing or raising funds in the New York area -- wasn't Droller involved in this too? What was your relation with Droller...were you directing Droller's activities, or was Dave Phillips running Droller, or how did Droller...

Oh, I sort of ran Droller, except I never knew what Tracy Barnes was going to do next, when I turned my back. Droller was such an ambitious fellow trying to run in...trying to run circles around everybody for his own aggrandizement that you never knew...but Droller would never have had any continuing contact with Pawley, because they had met only once, and I recall Pawley saying that he never wanted to talk to that "you know what" again. He was very unhappy that somebody like Gerry...he just didn't like Gerry's looks, he didn't like his accent. He was very unfair about Gerry, and I don't mean to be unfair about Gerry -- the only thing is that Gerry was insanely ambitious. He was his own worst enemy, that was all.
You referred to him as one of the unsung heroes of the Bay of Pigs operations when you talked to the Taylor Committee. Did you feel the same way about Hunt?

No, I thought Benny [e.g. Gerry] was an unsung hero because he had to deal with Hunt -- I didn't want to say that.

We have talked briefly about Hunt once before...we talked briefly about his book, but am I mistaken in my estimate of Hunt...from what I see in the memos, and have read about the responsibilities that he had -- aside from what he said in his book and subsequent to the Bay of Pigs -- it looks to me like he did a pretty effective job of playing "hand-holder" for the Cubans.

Yes, he did a good job of that. The only thing...the only major error he made which affected security of the operation...

Lost his briefcase down in Mexico?

No, he did that too, but that never turned out to be anything very serious. He kept pushing us to take the Frente to Guatemala to meet the troops, and we put certain very strict caveats on it as to what was or was not to be done down there; and every caveat we put on, practically, was broken. They took pictures, they made speeches, and then they came back to Miami; and they gave the pictures to the press. Tony Varona, particularly, and another one whose name I forget now, in certain of the Cuban newspapers put out big spreads on their trips to their training camps where their troops were preparing for the invasion of Cuba. That should never have been allowed. He [Hunt] simply lost control at that point, and then persuaded us -- or persuaded Tracy I think -- that this ought to be done. This was over my "dead body." I never wanted the...Varona and these others, because the whole record of their lack of security had been input to me...had been well known most of their lives.

How many trips did the political representatives make... were there two trips down?

Well, there was only one major trip down, when Miro and Varona and the very nice old U.S. Naval Academy graduate, who had been Chief of the Navy of Cuba...Joaquin...I don't know of any...I don't recall more than one.

I had the feeling that there was one that sent Varona and Artime...
JE Well, Artime went on the one that I talked about. He was on it also.

JBP Then there was a later one, where they had Miro and Varona, both.

JE I don't recall, I know painfully of the one. I went down with Miro one time, because he almost had a heart attack over Guatemala City, and we had to give him oxygen and everything else. I thought that was the time that Varona was along, but I guess maybe I was incorrect. Miro may have gone down subsequent to then, because in any event, Miro was not responsible for any of these big security breaks that resulted from the Varona trip. I simply don't remember whether there were two trips.

JBP Do you know anything about the intergovernmental relationships in the Miami area...our relationships with the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization, etc...was there a centralized effort, or did these things just kind of fall out, on a case by case basis? Did we have any kind of a permanent working group set up down there.

JE No working group. Each one of those services, to my knowledge, had a referant that you would deal with. You mean now, in 60 or 61?

JBP Yes.

JE As far as I know, the Bureau had one guy or maybe two guys who were charged with relations with the agency.

JBP How did you keep posted on activities down there, did Reynolds give you written reports, or did Art Jacobs give you reports?

JE Art and Bob Reynolds only. I never had any direct reports from the security chief who dealt with many of these things. There were so many services, 6 or 7 services involved, and at that time, it was all done by the Office of Security. They had their reference route, including HEW. In case of
immigration, Customs had to be more than one per son, Customs had to have had a referent of their own and then they had to have a specific people at the airport, who our people would be identified to, whom they would deal with. The Park Service...there had to be a number of people cleared in the Park Service, because we had 8 or 10 or 12 bases down in the Keys in those years, and subsequent years, and the Park Service patrolled all those areas, and there was at least one man in the Park Service, officially, that knew when to tell his own people to "look the other way", and that sort of thing. The Navy, also, was called in as a referent, and at least one referent in the (unintelligible word). The Admiral, and whomever he designated.

JBP You mentioned a while back about your service in Venezuela, etc...at various times as the military force was being developed, etc. there was talk about recruiting, well two things... Cubans who were living in various other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, or Honduras, or Costa Rica or some suggestions that maybe we should recruit some soldiers of fortune from the other countries. I think that at one time you were in Bogota on some kind of a recruiting mission -- for pilots? Somebody go to Bogota to try to persuade...

JE I didn't, however, there could be, but I don't recall, that would have been DPD doing that.

JBP Well, anything you can tell me about thoughts of recruiting in other Latin American countries...do you...

JE I think that was "pie in the sky." I don't know of any non-Cubans that were ever recruited, other than the Alabama National Guard.

JBP How about attempts to recruit Cubans who were resident in other Latin American countries...anything of that?

JE Yeah, but that was when intelligence was a failure...they
were going to attempt to recruit Cuban diplomats in the Embassies.

JBP

Aside from that, how about recruits...soldier-types for the Brigade. I am asking because I am not clear in my own mind, from what I have seen...

JE

Well, I don't know, exactly. There may have been attempts in Mexico and they may actually have recruited some from Mexico, but not very many. I simply don't know the answer. Most of the recruits were ones that were coming out from Cuba or those that had come out from Cuba and were in the Miami area. Now, it is entirely possible that they picked up Cubans in Nicaragua. They could have picked them up in Puerto Rico, and they could have picked them up in Mexico -- and maybe they did -- or New York, because they were writing all over the place to each other, the Cubans themselves saying, look, I am going on, and you had better get in on it. I simply don't know the answer to that, Sorry.

JBP

I wonder if you would speak a bit about the adequacy of the training that the brigade got from the standpoint of the calibre of the trainees that they were getting, and also about the training itself -- this based, on your own experience in GW warfare training, etc. What I am getting around to, were these Cubans ready to fight? Were they adequately trained, or adequately motivated?

JE

Well, within the existing capability of the agency at the time, they were certainly screened very thoroughly and tested -- certainly the initial groups before the onslaught when they started just going out in the streets and sweeping them in. All of those people were put through an extensive testing at a little place called Useppa Island, up off the coast...

JBP

This is the first 60 we're talking about.

JE

The first 60. They were thoroughly screened, and then they went to Panama and they were given very intensive training, jungle warfare training...they were sort of the cadre; and I would think that they had...their motivation was certainly
stronger from my own knowledge of Cubans at that time... their personal motivation seemed to be stronger than that of the average American being drafted into the US services during the second World War, because they were so close to what had happened in their home land and the reports from the people doing the training were that they for the most part, of course, they had some misfits; and they had some plants in there, that had to be isolated, but for the most part, they took the training in good spirits and seemed to be developing a pretty good degree of competence, in leaders as well as the average fellow. Then when the thing got larger -- about the time we activated the camps on a fairly sizable basis in Guatemala -- we then...in addition to their own Cuban officer-corps, who had been through the air raid training and what not...and many of the, you must understand, had been in the Cuban army before, which you can't say too much for, other than the fact that they knew rudimentary discipline. They went through some very intensive training, and that is when we brought in a number of Americans from the military. It was more than Egan...I don't really recall how many people we had from the Special Forces...


Americans -- Special Force...they were all supposed to be highly competent trainers, and I am sure they were. I had never seen any individual reports those fellows wrote. But by the time we had got to the point that Hawkins and others thought there should be a formal military proficiency testing -- which was done with the authorization of JCS, I guess wasn't it, or at the request of JCS -- the indications were that they were at least as good as or better than, one of our normal combat companies -- untested combat companies in the U.S. ready to go into action.
JBP  Did you...
JE   I can't address myself to the Air Force group because I always had a lot of trouble about the air force group because...
JBP  That's right, it says so right here...
JE   I was a guerrilla, and I have been delivered, and fought in combat, and I lived by air drop. And they almost came apart a couple of times because there was never a god damn time that they would go into a drop zone, and I knew that the flares had been out. There was never a time that they hit the zone...they would drop anywhere from one to three miles, or so forth...so I was always very disturbed about the air delivery capability, etc.
JBP  I wonder if this is why in Nov. of 1960, Jake raised the question of handling the Cuban air crews who refused missions, who refused to go on second missions, or who lied about missions. This sounds like the basis perhaps for that.
JE   Well, I got at the point that I wanted to put an American on the [redacted] plane with the crew, because they hadn't been having any trouble -- the Cuban Air Force wasn't bothering them. I just felt the air crews weren't telling the truth about what they saw or didn't see, and I knew damn well where they were dropping [redacted] stuff because our intercepts...within 6 hours would let us know exactly how many miles away the Cubans had picked up the stuff that had been dropped...and then the messages coming in from the agents on the ground...these plaints and these bleats (?) about what happened to [redacted] that aircraft. Our fires were there, and they went all around us and did all kinds of things.
JBP  Did you actually spend any time observing the trainees and the training program yourself, or is this...
JE   No, I went down fairly frequently to the camp, including the Air Base; and I had the...I had the...I have worked...my God, the guerrillas I worked with in the Far East, these poor little brothers that I fought with for three years...I had
the impression, I must say that I generally, I guess you have to set Cubans aside, but having been in Latin America for a number of years, in and out of revolutions, and what not, I have a very -- or had, before I had seen what the Castro Cubans had done -- I had a pretty low regard for any Latin American's ability to fight in any meaningful way. But within the context of that, I had the feeling based on the training I saw in progress and the evaluation reports that I received from Jenkins and from Egan, and from others, and watching their firing demonstrations, I had the feeling that they were progressing reasonably well. But you must understand that when I...or at the times that I was going down to those things, I was thinking of their ability to perform more as guerrillas than in the sense of any integrated military operation where you would have in effect, almost a couple of battalions operating as they did operate later. What I am saying here, is that I didn't really have too much of a feel for that. I just had to depend on Hawkins and Egan for that, and Hawkins, in those critical days, spent more time there than I did...because he wanted to know. He didn't really totally trust...Egan was always a little too enthusiastic for Hawkins. He was a little bit fix of a doubting Thomas, and he would not necessarily buy the glowing reports that Egan would give...he wanted to see them himself, and I think Hawkins was reasonably assured, short of the fact they hadn't been seasoned in combat, that they were in pretty good shape, and I think that was the judgment of the JCS people. The JCS people went down to this...

JBP
Yes, they sent three Lt. Col.'s down, and they spent about a day and a half at most down there.

JE
Yes, but there were intensive exercises going on all the time they were there.

JBP
Hawkins did a study called "The Contingency Plan for Emergency Evacuation of the Cuban Brigade"...it is an undated report...
Well, Hawkins prepared this Contingency Plan for Emergency Evacuation of the Cuban Brigade probably some time between 11 and 15 Mar 1961 and my question is "Was there any serious consideration for evacuation plans and particularly, was there Kennedy and was Kennedy's Staff told that there was a guerrilla option at the Bay of Pigs?"

Yes, they were told that there was a guerrilla option, but it was a very damn poor option, compared to the original plan because the guerrilla option—if I recall—was to... if they got stuck in the Bay of Pigs area and they couldn't get inland... that they were supposed to go East, and that turned out to be swamps and everything else and whatnot. I guess if they couldn't have gotten through, or maybe they could, I don't know, but I am sure they were told there was this option, but it was not a good one.

You seem to be in some doubt, Jake, about what they were told... you were not responsible for telling them, or were you not responsible for developing the overall plan?

This was 15 years ago... I just don't remember.

Okay, all right.

I just don't remember. You asked me that... if you had asked me without that, I would have said that I didn't know whether there was an option or not, but I now recall that, yes, there was an option, that it had to do with... when they couldn't swing to the left, down into Pinar del Rio because that was all relatively developed area, and the option was hopefully, that if they couldn't hold it, they would swing up the coast, going east... in rough terrain where, the best information was at that time that there was no significant Cuban installations or forces.

The reason I am asking this, is of course, what I am getting around to is Schlesinger's book... A Thousand Days where he
make a great point...he says that CIA emphasized, to quote Schlesinger,..."the ease of escaping from the beaches into the hills" and "CIA assurances about the escape hatches" being the thing that tipped JFK into his decision to go. Now, if we are talking about escape to the hills, we are not talking about ZAPATA at all, we are talking about TRINIDAD. No, you would be heading towards Trinidad, that would be 75 miles away, before you got an area... Well, if you are on the south coast, here is the east and... I mean here is the west and here is the east. On the other map, I'll show you... this is too big a scale for what I want to tell about. Now here is the Bay of Pigs... Well, in Trinidad, they would have gone up into this complex right here... from here in this area, they would have gone over into the swamp area, which had no heavy reinforcements, and hopefully worked their way around here, which you might have to admit, could have been... of course Cienfuegos was not a military stronghold at that point, to the extent that it is today, I don't believe, but they would have gone around in this area. It raises the question, you know... why was this place selected... because there was no other goddamn place that the water was such that you could get in... that there were no power concentrations. But when Schlesinger writes of that... emphasizes that, I think he is confusing it with Trinidad, because that was the whole guts of the Trinidad plan, that you weren't going to put in that many people, and if the appraisal of the country side, as we had reason to believe, that number of people could be sustained by their colleagues.

JE

Yes, this is my feeling about Schlesinger's comment, is that he got himself confused, and I am just wondering if that same confusion...

JE (He was just writing that as an apologist, anyway...)

JBP We mentioned the political leaders a moment ago... another question about the political leaders. At the time of the
invasion, the decision was made to hold these guys incom-
municado, at the time that they were going in. Who made
that decision, and why.

JE You mean, all of the political leaders incommunicado?

JBP Yes.

JE Well, I think we all did, because of the asses they made
of themselves when they fuzzed about... they had to see the
troops... and we let them go down to the training camp and
see the troops and they hadn't been back to Miami 24 hours
when it was spread to the newspaper.

JBP Was there any thought given to say bringing them into the
headquarters area and holding them there -- close to the War
Room and keeping them posted? Or, was this just inconceivable
...I don't know enough about it. Would you have done anything
like this?

JE There was never... no, I think not. I am not aware of anything
of that sort. Probably one reason that that would not have
been considered wise is that they had been moved up from
the Miami area... that itself would have triggered the fact
that something was afoot.

JBP Well, I think that at that time they actually were up in New
York, weren't they... two or three of them up in New York,
and then they moved them down to Miami and held them down in
Miami.

JE That is probably because they were just off on their own
devices at that point. The plan... if my memory serves me
right... the plan was the moment the thing hit... that they
were in... they were then to be briefed, and I think it
was a fellow by the name of Willard Carr who was supposed
to be helping Hunt at that time; and that was his job, to hold
them in line, once they realized that things were in motion.
But I am sure there must have been debate about whether they
were to be brought in and out before the fact, there would have
to have been debate about it and I am sure that the decision
would have been "no, that they can't hold... that they can't
maintain security."
JBP: Do you know anything about Dick Drain's diary... for example, he says that on the 3rd of April 1961, that you felt that Ydigoras and possibly with Somoza might run this operation anyway... Did you really think that if the United States said "no," that if Kennedy said "no," the Brigade can't go, etc., that there was a possibility that Ydigoras and Somoza would pick up? Or was this just emotional?

JE: No, no, no, I felt, I guess I was reflecting Álexio, who was my right hand man for...
TAPE 3

JE No, it was more likely Alejos... it was something more likely that Alejos more than Ydigoras would have said to me, that they weren't just going to let this thing fizzle like this... because they had taken all the risk. As far as they were concerned... they had all those people in there, training them and what not, and goddamn it, if we weren't going to do it, they would do it. Well, the answer is, how are you going to get them there? That same thesis... premise comes up again... is that after they were at sea, when we realized they weren't going to get the air support, the question was: could we have gotten them turned around? The answer to that, we thought at the time, and probably still think is that short of having the US Navy turn them around, they wouldn't have come back at that point.

JBP That they would have commandeered the ships and gone there anyhow.

JE

JBP... I have a note here that on the 4th of April 1961 you had a meeting with A.A. Berle of State concerning the recent visit of CRC representatives to Guatemala and I just wonder if you recall anything about this of any particular significance... there is no reason...

JE April of 1961?

JBP Early April '61.

JE That must have been a second visit and there must have been two visits, because the one that Tony Varona... caused so much trouble and pain for us all, that was well before they were into the operation. I think that the camps were functioning...
That was back in the fall of 1960, probably after the election, I think.

You mean after our election?

After the 1960 election.

Could have been...that would be in the early winter. The one in April must have been Miro Cardona. That is the one I went down on, I am sure that is right now, as sure as I can be.

Did Berle go along then? I don't recall.

No, this is the one that the Polish crews flew us down.

What about your relations with Berle?

Mine?

Did you have much contact with Berle? Or was it mostly J.C. King.

I think I met Berle twice. They were correct. He was an elderly...older statesman, a bit shaky in the hands at that point, but pretty alert mentally and...

Pretty hardliner in terms of the communists.

Oh, yes, very hardliner. At that point in the history -- he hadn't been 10 years or so before -- but he broke his pick on the Argentine situation.

I found one comment in the Berle papers which indicated that he had a number of meetings with J.C. King, and that at one time something came up and he wanted to get J.C. King, and couldn't reach him apparently, so he went to Bissell. Then Berle's comment in his own diary was that "J.C. felt somewhat embarrassed, because Bissell was his boss." Well I asked Bissell, I said, "did you know that King was dealing with Berle?" He said, "yes, I was well aware of it. I don't know what bit Berle that he made that comment," he said, "but I was quite aware that J.C. and Berle were negotiating back and forth."

Yes, you see that would not necessarily have meant Cuba either, because J.C. used Berle as an advisor, on...
Well, he was -- or in the comments that I was picking up he was -- addressing himself specifically to Cuba.

Was he?

Yes.

I know that I met Berle three times. I guess I went to New York once with J.C. -- in a snowstorm -- to talk to Berle; and then the other two times I met him in Washington with J.C.

Didn't Bissell meet Berle?

Well, I think I was present at one of those meetings.

Yes, there were a number of meetings where, well, you recall Berle was set up as the head of the Kennedy's Latin America Task Force, and dealt specifically with Cuba.

Yes, I know ; that I met... I am sure that I had at least one meeting in Berle's office at that time, and I met him in his apartment in New York with J.C. That was probably the first meeting that we had, and that was sounding him out I think on views... don't ask me when that was, but it was probably early in 1960.

Yes, he began... well, it was after the election in 1960 that Kennedy asked Berle if he would undertake the job of developing some kind of a Latin American program for the Kennedy administration and at that time. Berle begins to get into the act on it.

Well, it was before then, the first time I met him was before he came to Washington, but after he knew he was coming to the job, and we met him at his apartment. We went up in an 8 inch or 10 inch snowstorm is the reason I remember it.

Well, I think I remember him saying something about a heavy snowstorm that he got caught in. I've got a question that I think will take some time [See No. 26 Jake questions]... Maybe what you had better do, if you would, is read this, because it... well, it is this one here. What we're dealing with is change in concept that occurs from this small guerrilla-type force to the Brigade invasion, and there is some paradox in some of the things that are mentioned
in this particular memorandum.

JE        I guess it must have been Rusk that shot down the
TRINIDAD thing. As I think I said before, that's the last
meeting that I ever went to over in the White House, because
I sounded off when he had made some, what I thought was some,
idiotic suggestion for technical reasons. I don't think
Kennedy was at that meeting. That must have been the meeting
in which Rusk... that must have been the meeting that ruled
out TRINIDAD because they didn't have any airstrip in the
TRINIDAD area that we could say that planes were coming from.

JBP        That was the meeting of March 11, when they went up
with TRINIDAD...

JE        Was it in March that it was finally ruled out?
JBP        Between the 11th of March and the 15th of March, you
switch from TRINIDAD to ZAPALA.

JE        Well, you see here, you talk about Nov. 1960.
JBP        That's right.

JE        Well, so what we have to be talking about here, was
that this is when they began to say well that isn't enough
people in your hard core. You are going to have to increase
your numbers, and...

JBP        What you are saying here in 1960, is that you ruled out
our original concept." The original concept was a 60-man,
trained leaders taking in the guerrillas, and our second
concept is now seen as unachievable. Our second concept
and they say it here -- I don't say this, this is what
Bissell's memo says -- the second concept was 1,500\# to 3,000
man force to secure a beach with an airstrip, which is also
seen as "unachievable, except as a Joint/Agency/DOD action.
Our Guatemala experience demonstrates that we cannot staff,
nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed." Then
it goes on to say that the current concept is a 600-man
force to land by LST, to move inland to the mountains where
others can rally round and be supplied by airdrop. Now, my
question is, in 1960... in November, you are saying "no" to
the GW force, and \textbf{why} you in fact, I think, say "no" to
the GW
the 1,500-3,000 man force which you did in fact turn to for ZAPATA.

But, you are also saying in here, in Nov. 60, about taking the troops in and isolating them, and supplying them by air drop; and Tom Mann caught hell for that later on when he started to suggest this in February 1961. I am a little bit confused as to what the...talk to me Jake, about the changing concept. Why did...who made the decisions...was it Hawkins, was it you, was it Bissell or was it reading the newspapers, or reading the intelligence about the Castro buildup, how did this thing fall away from the GW...

Well, I think it fell away from the GW concept for the reason that I mentioned—that we thought by November we could put in that original force. But then for political reasons...the elections were coming up, that Nixon had said he was a candidate...no don't do anything now, wait until after the elections and then we will do it. It sort of was a big time lag until the elections, and he lost the election; and then I think again, the yesses and the noes on this would have to be coming from the White House, not from Bissell or anyone else. The thought, then based on whatever intelligence they were all reading, was "well, you just don't have enough people for this. That isn't enough people to swing with, is the way the thing looks to us."

Do you recall...you were in charge...you were Chief of WH/4...do you recall what you were pushing for? Say, with the elections held in November 60 and Nixon's defeat. What was your position...do you remember on this thing...what you were pushing...Did you want to go right where then?

I wanted to go right then, because I was worried about the buildup. I was worried about the Soviet help that was going in. I was worried about Soviet upgrading of the Cuban air, and I was worried about the work of the block Committees...
that is the taking over of the...they were systematically wiping out the resistance groups, and every week or month we waited, there were going to be that fewer number of groups of people that would still be alive, or out of jail, and able to do anything. I was pushing at that time to go on a smaller concept. I really didn't understand how we could work the bigger concept...when they began to talk about 3,000 people or something of that sort, although we were always a little behind ourselves in getting up to strength -- in what we said we were going to have at a given date -- I still felt at that time that it was a better course of action than going to something more exotic, because if it didn't work, it wouldn't be a major disaster...I sound like a broken record, but that has always been my thought on the thing. It would be just like another revolutionary... another coup didn't work or something of that sort. But I just can't tell you who it was at that point who said "well, we are going to have to go for bigger or more." But I know when that became the obvious thing that had to be done, I guess that must be when we began to develop TRINIDAD. When we were talking about the 60-man or 90-man, whatever you want to call it concept, there were still centers of resistance in the hills. You had 'em in Pinar del Rio, and you had 'em around Cienfuegos... that was a big group...and you had 'em in TRINIDAD and you had 'em in the Oriente, but we actually hadn't even intended to put all of these people into one place. They were going to be split and go into [various] areas, if I recall. Then when that obviously wasn't going to be approved, why we were told you had better double it...somebody said that, but I don't know, it must have been Rusk, or somebody, somebody in that group said to double it. The next thing was, well double that. That is when we all began to get very exercised. My recollection is...Jesus, it is so vague...by my recollection is that when we talked about TRINIDAD, how we could develop our plan to TRINIDAD, and get a man that could get to the hills...they could break into the hills...even then we weren't talking about more than three or four hundred people.
Maybe 600 or something like that was mentioned, but TRINIDAD
I don't think ever involved...from our planning, ever and
from my recollection, I don't think that it ever involved
a thousand people or anything of that sort.

JBP
There were between 600 and 800...was what they were
thinking about in terms of TRINIDAD.

JE
That seemed to be the maximum. Then when TRINIDAD was
scrubbed, that is when they said, well, you are going to
have to double the force, and that is when Hawkins and I
wanted to quit that part. Unfortunately we didn't say quit,
not that that would have changed anything, somebody else would
have...

JBP
Do you recall when the TRINIDAD plan actually got
formalized?

JE
Well, it must have been somewhere around February, but
it was developed for some time.

JBP
The call kept going on and going out for troops and build
up and buildup, and I just wondered if you recall actually
when.

JE
I didn't realize until I looked at that...that it was
as late as March that TRINIDAD was finally shot down. That's
the meeting at which I was wiped out of the White House.

JBP
You say it was after that meeting that you and Hawkins
were going to resign?

JE
Well, resign from the project.

JBP
Yes, that is what I mean.

JE
Yes, this looks (unintelligible phrase).

JBP
Is there anything else that we should talk about in
terms of this changing concept? Now, let's take one step
further, although I had it down for later on, but since
we are on it, why don't we go ahead and talk a little bit
about it. TRINIDAD gets shot down, and then four days later we come up with this plan for ZAPATA, now who actually developed that plan? You and Hawkins? and...

JE
I don't think I was in on much of the planning of that. I think that was Jack and his staff. I don't recall -- Egan must have been in the field at that time.

JBP
I just can't answer that myself, because I just don't remember.

JE
Well, I am sure they will remember...unless he was up on consultation. This had to be the planning staff that Jack had with him. But I didn't like it when I saw it, but there was no other. There didn't seem to be any other alternative based on all...we had a hell of a lot of OB information on Cuba at one time and you knew pretty much what you could and couldn't do, and based on the parameters that were established for us, Jack's staff...it had become so military at that point, that it has kind of gotten beyond my thinking or concept of the operations anyway. I wasn't thinking about a major war with your troop transports, and things of that sort. But they satisfied me that...when we went over [from TRINIDAD to ZAPATA]...that there was nothing else that we could do, that there was no other alternative, other than this: and it looked like from a mathematical point of view if we had certain basic ingredients -- mainly adequate air, adequate transport, adequate logistics, and their fighting ability was what it was supposed to be, and the Cuban Government didn't have any more than we thought they had, and the calvary wiped out their...we wiped out their Air Force -- that these people might be able to sustain themselves and might create enough shock action that what remnants were there would rise up. That is the story.

JBP
All right, let's try one more here. What, if any, was the direct contact between any of the key personnel in WH/4 and the resistance leaders? As far as I can tell, about the only two who claimed to have any people in the
hills that you folks talked to...when I say "you folks",
I mean the Agency people...were Artime and Ray...were there
others?

JE  Niño Diaz.
JBPA  Oh, yeah, yeah.
JE  Niño Diaz who turned out to be a big chicken...he didn't
go to jail because he said the water was too rough to get
on and go on shore.

JBP  Incidentally, when he went out on his famous expedition,
was there a representative from the Revolutionary Government
-- from the CRC -- with him on that ship? Do you recall? There
were one or two notes that I found where they
were talking about putting somebody on with him, so that if
he made his landing and for any reason was able to stick
there, then they would have a representative, and could claim
that he was a provisional government.

JE  I don't think so, because he and his people were trained
separately, in New Orleans, and what not...they were never really jointed in with
the group. He was supposed to be a real macho terror
in the Oriente area...he was supposed to have some good people
in...macho friends there, who were killed before he ever got
a chance to land. They were caught in that interim waiting
period for him, but there was always a little bit of suspicion of Niño Diaz, one way or the other, and the caliber
of the training crews that we had down with Diaz and his
people was not the same caliber of those in Guatemala. I
think that was really kind of a sop. I mean that they said
you ought to have another group, another arrow in the quiver;
and I think Niño Diaz was it. I don't know that he was ever
...I don't think that Hawkins & Co. ever took him very seriously.
Although they were getting training it was hoped that they
would...there was no reason to believe that they wouldn't
make that landing, and we were dumbfounded by that. We
thought that they would get on shore and be able to do things
for a while. It was a hell of a lot easier than the Brigade,
in point of fact, so we were nonplussed when they didn't.
Well, their claim of course, was that they couldn't
because the Castro forces were there, waiting for them
en masse.

Two fishermen with a canoe.

You mentioned that you had a thorough amount of expo-
sure to the training bases. Does the same thing apply to
Hawkins? Did he have a fair amount of exposure to the
actual training sites? Did he spend a fair amount of time
there.

Yes, I think he had about the same amount of time. He
didn't go down as often as I did, but he was there for
longer. He went down...he was gone for a couple of weeks
or more...sometime around April...it would have been in
April; and then I was actually down in the bases at the time
that the date was finally set for the invasion, which was
somewhere around 11 April...but

Five or 6 April is the date I've got...that's when Kennedy
gave the word.

Whenever it was, I know that within a few days of his
giving the word, the Soviets had it from Mexico. I recall
that very painfully. That was the thing that upset me -- that
R. Harris Smith knew that...because not very many people
were ever aware of that. It was one of Angleton's tightly
kept secrets. When Smith came in from the West Coast this
last year before I retired [June 1974], he came out to the
house. He was writing all of these things, and said he
wanted to ask me a few things. He said, "How about that
cable?"; and he had the whole story. He had the con-
tents of the cable of this Russian diplomat who had gotten
this information in Washington, and had gone to Mexico. One
of our sources picked it up there, and had come back; and
that really chilled me. I don't know exactly who had
given him that information, but that should never have been
generally known anywhere outside.

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When did you retire? 13 -- Dec. 73 or Dec. 74?

No, I retired in June 74.

We were talking about part of the judgment in terms of where the Brigade might go, and so on, based on the estimate of Castro forces, etc., did you -- because Bissell says he didn't -- did you ever ask that a serious study be done of the effectiveness of Castro's propaganda program, of his military training program, and what the hell was really going on in Cuba before this Brigade got off the ground? For example, one thing that struck me was that in January of 1961, before the Kennedy inauguration, there had been a serious mobilization of Castro forces. From that time forward, they went into what seemed to be a pretty hard training program for the milicianos and for the military; and I am just wondering if you had anything that your people or our Agency people worked on, or were they just depending on the SNIE's and NIE's, or what could you depend on?

That's it...plus current intelligence. We...I am sure there was never a formal...well, there was another reason for that, because we were never allowed to, at that time; and Bissell, rather than Dulles I guess it was, was pretty strong. We were never allowed to ask for anything that would give any indication even within our own Agency of what was afoot. Anything that might signal something, we were told to avoid. We still had intelligence coming out of Cuba, raw intelligence, which indicated all these things you talk about; which were the concern we had about the continuing delays and what not, plus the fact of the very serious rollups that we were being informed of -- weekly, I might say -- of resistance groups inside the island. But no formal study, I am sure, was ever requested.

Based on these kinds of things...the raw intelligence that you saw coming out etc., why didn't we feel that the milicianos were likely to collapse? That the milicianos were going to be of poorer caliber than the Brigade?
I think simply because we believed our own Cuban political leaders own troops -- that the milicianos were doing it only because they had to and they didn't have any heart in it.

Do you think the intelligence you had on Cuba internal activities and government, etc., was adequate at the time?

No, I think the Harris poll would have been more effective... I think a Harris or Gallup Poll would have been more effective.

No, I don't think... I think with the intelligence we had for what it was, was good; but I don't think we had any quantitative, or any qualitative, measure of just what the degree of infection with Castro was. How deeply wedded whatever the percentage of people were... well the story was 5% who supported him might have been, or how many other percentage were sympathizers, or... I am afraid that this is not a new thing, I think you will find this throughout history, as you go back over estimates...

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In his diary for the 28th of February, '61, Dick Drain noted: "Op Details to COPS and DC for next 10 days to free Jake for politicking." What the hell was that all about? Can you recall?

Politicking?... That goddamned Drain... with his own code. When was that?

On 28 Feb. 1961, "Op Details to COPS and DC for next 10 days to free Jake for politicking." If you don't know, don't worry, I intend to talk to Drain and ask him to explain that cryptic message.

Well, I wonder if that didn't mean that I was going down to hold the hand of Ydigoras, or some other... I wonder if that is when I went down to appease the Guatemalans... I wonder if that isn't what he meant by that. I was down
there for some time...they were getting very upset about all this, because when I signed that agreement with them, I said you know, it will just be two months...and then it was more than two months, and Ydigoras didn't forgive us for letting the Frente in there, after they shot their mouths off about the training camps in Guatemala. He really had internal problems over that. I think -- I am just guessing, but maybe Dick will have another idea -- but I think that may have been when I went down to try to hold the hands or appease the unhappy Central American leaders.

JBP

O.K. As I say, I will check with him. Now, he has another one here. Oh, yes, on the 2 of March...this is a follow on, apparently, Drain noted, "early 2:45 p.m. Jake, Davis, and Hawkins to DDP on battle of D.C." Now I wondered if this in any way relates to the other.

JE

You're going to have to talk to Dick about that. He is living in Washington isn't he?

JBP

Yes,

END...END...END...OF TAPE 3....
Well, I'll check Drain on that...the first couple of things. This is one that I may have asked you before -- when we talked very briefly -- but I want to try it again. Do you know if Tracy Barnes was ever instructed to brief Adlai Stevenson, and if he was instructed to brief Adlai Stevenson on the operation, how much detail he was supposed to go into with Stevenson?

He was instructed to brief Adlai Stevenson on the operation. I don't know how much detail he was supposed to have given, because I am not so sure that Berle may not have had some deal on how much Stevenson should be told in detail. That is about all that I can remember.

I am still fighting that one that I mentioned to you before of...

Well, but Bissell set him up to brief.

Bissell can't recall any detail. He says he is sure that Barnes briefed Stevenson, but he doesn't know what kind of detail it might have been in. That gets me back to Hunt's book [E. Howard Hunt. Give Us This Day] and Hunt's statement that Barnes briefed Stevenson in detail on the D-minus air strike, and then came back to Washington, and wrote a memorandum on the subject and that a copy of the memorandum was given to Lyman Kirkpatrick, which makes absolutely no sense at all.

Well, I think when you talk to Dick Drain, you will find out between his records and mine) that we were very unhappy when Dick sent Tracy up to brief, the...we understood the Ivy League ties involved in this thing, or what not, but we didn't really feel that Tracy understood it well enough himself to brief anybody. I guess it was Hawkins and Dick and I who were quite disturbed about this because it was so important at that time -- that this guy knew exactly
what the hell we were talking about. We just didn't think that Tracy really understood it that well, or if Tracy did, he couldn't articulate...he wouldn't articulate it that well. Tracy was one of the sweetest guys that ever lived, but he couldn't ever draw a straight line between two points, and with a briefing of that sort, he...

Would you make some comments, evaluations of the way you regarded some of these individuals such as Mann, Berle, Rusk, Goodwin, and the Kennedys from your contacts with them...Bundy or McNamara or any of these...what was your relationship with them...or...

Tom Mann I had known for some years and worked for and found him to be a very hard man to persuade on something, but when he decided there was really supposed to be a course of action, then he was "let's go all out for it." Which typified his support of our TRINIDAD plan. He said "this makes solid good sense to me," and he was shot down for it, as you know. They got very mad at him about it. Rusk...I think Rusk was just...was one of the first that wished mightily that there would be some other alternative...that he just didn't like the idea of an operation of this sort. He wriggled around to see if there couldn't be something else that could be done; and failing to come up with something of that sort, he sort of went along -- as a reluctant dragon. Berle, was certainly a man whose heart was in the right place. He was a hardliner, as you said; but I am inclined to think that Berle, at that point, still thought of the United States in the classical sense with its position in the hemisphere...that he was inclined as J.C. [King] to think of the United States as the colossus whose business was to get away with almost anything...without anything really very serious happening. That would underline a tentative...his approach to the problem. And Kennedy, I think was just an uninitiated fellow whose heart was in the right place who hadn't yet...
Are you talking about JFK now? or Robert?

Yes, JFK was an uninitiated fellow who had been in the wars, but he hadn't been exposed to any world politics or crises yet. If he had something else as a warm up, he might have made different decisions than he made at that time. I think he was kind of a victim of the thing. I blame Nixon far more than I do Kennedy for the equivocations and the loss of time and what not that led to the ultimate disaster. Goodwin, I just thought was a sleazy little self-seeker, who I didn't feel safe with any secret. His consorting with Che Guevara in Montevideo had rather upset me at the time, and Bundy didn't have any feeling for one way or the other.

How about McNamara did you get involved with him at all?

No.

Bobby Kennedy?

I wouldn't even tell you off tape. I didn't like him.

He's dead, God rest his soul.

Well, you know we were talking about Mann, and you pointed out that Mann was a hard guy to convince, but once convinced, he would stick to his guns. Why was there such opposition, particularly, I guess from Bissell and Tracy Barnes, to Tom Mann? They seemed to be hard after him at various points in the game, although Bissell speaks very highly of him -- he says that once Mann got over ruled, he went along and he didn't drag his feet at all...

I don't know, they were all Democrats, and...

Who do you mean?

Bissell and Mann.

Try to recall Jake here...although I ask it later on...what's this have to do with it, if they are all Democrats?

Well, I mean, this wasn't the question that somebody from a different administration that had suddenly raised their head or come on the scene and there would be any national politics involved in the thing. I don't know what their basis would be. Tom Mann was always a very close supporter of the Western Hemisphere Division. As I say, I worked for
him and I worked for Norman Armour, and I couldn't have had any greater support at any time. These were the post-Guatemala revolution days, and I was doing lots of things that were quite hairy at that time. I always kept Tom adequately informed, and if you discussed the thing in general terms and he didn't like it, he would tell you; but if you would bring him around to the point that he said "well, go ahead and do it, but be damn sure that you do it all out," that would be the end of it. He, I think, was one of those that felt that the prestige of the United States was getting very thin in the hemisphere -- in the sense of relating it to our gunboat diplomacy days when we could sort of rape the lock and there would be no problem with it. I think that he felt that the odds of being able to put everything into it were very slim; but, again, when he finally realized what the alternatives were, he finally said, "well, if this is it, then let's do that plan, and let's go the whole way on it." Well, I don't know...

JBP
You wouldn't fault Mann, then, in terms of his initial opposition to TRINIDAD -- largely on the basis of, I think...

JE
No, because I had many things in the past -- many go-rounds -- with Tom on something until I finally got him to agree, or he said I am not going to agree, and in this case, he finally agreed. No, I would...it would be very hard to fault Tom on the thing.

JBP
Let's see, oh, yes, on 11 March 61, Bissell's proposals for anti-Castro operations were forwarded to JFK and others. They recommended TRINIDAD as the most feasible operation, it showed other alternatives, including one which reflected the response to Rusk's desires for a "quiet" operation; and then Bissell noted that none of the alternative sites was remote enough to make for difficult access and none had a usable air strip.
Well, you've just put your finger on why we ended up with...here with the Bay of Pigs. There was an air strip down there that was the remotest place from any civilization, or any urban center.

Well, then, what I am saying is here, on 11 March, we apparently either hadn't considered ZAPATA as one of the alternatives and we had...

Oh, ZAPATA, that is the Bay of Pigs.

Yes, but for 5 days...what I am saying is, in five days, we had come up with a new alternative which we hadn't considered before.

Because we didn't know that it had to be so far away from everything.

O.K.

You know the reason that TRINIDAD was turned down from Rusk's point of view was that there wasn't an airstrip long enough for B-26's. He asked us if we couldn't...he said, "well, maybe you could..." and this is when I got thrown out of the meeting...well, he said, "maybe you could airdrop a bulldozer in." I said if I ever made a suggestion like that to Mr. Dulles, I should be summarily fired. I wasn't fired, but that is the last time I ever went to a meeting with Mr. Rusk.

When they made the shift, Jake, from TRINIDAD to the Bay of Pigs, did anyone really believe this was a better choice? Of your folks, who were involved?

Of course not, because it changed the whole equation for it.

Why didn't you call it off?

Well, goddamn it, that is when we wanted to quit, and Bissell said we were traitors, and Jack & Co., I guess hypnotized and gave themselves hypnosis to the point that they thought that even that had a probability of success if we had the other things which have become so famous...
the superiority and things of that sort. See, once you went into that operation and you had those ships going in there, you had to control the air or you couldn't protect your ships very well. Now, if anybody had told us in advance that we were going to lose that air and those Cuban T-33's were still going to be flying, or that the Navy, when they gave us air cover, meant that they were going to be at 33,000 feet instead of down on the deck where the T-33's were operating, we wouldn't have, with our power, gone forward with the operation. I don't say that that would have changed the ultimate outcome inland, but that would have been sufficient for us to say, "well, we can't do this," and we told Bissell that...we told Dulles that. We said we've got to have that...we've got to get control of the air, or these ships which are deck-loaded with gasoline can't operate, because they could go all of 5 to 6 knots per hour, 5 or 6 knots an hour.

JBP
Who actually ran the show beginning D-Day, and how did it work out from where you sat on D-Day? Do you think you knew what was going on?

JE
Once the...well, Egan was responsible for moving the troops from Guatemala to Cabezas, and Thorsrud was responsible for moving the people from there to loading; and they were jointly responsible for loading of the convoys. Once the ships were at sea, they were on their own, except for the information that would be signaled to the, from time to time. Rip Robertson was on one of the ships, and Lynch on the other. We fed them information for this...with the power of recall, assuming that they would have come back...I think the power of recall had passed because they went on radio silence before we ever got the word that we had lost our last air strike. There was no way of communicating with them any more, they weren't to respond to...I don't think we actually ever tried to call them back.
I've no indication about it...that they did mx that at all. Well, once they got to the beach, then the...

Once they got to the beach the ships had to leave because the T-33's were flying, and of course, that is where we suffered the loss of the Air National Guardsmen, because they tried to back up the Cuban crews, and go in with their B-26. That was on the last day.

Yes, well...

What I am asking you is with the set up...the commo set up the way it was, and the loss of the vessels that occurred very early in the day of the invasion, do you think that you were in close enough contact with the people on the beach to make wise decisions? Or should it have been turned over to Lynch and him told to hold fast with the BARBARA J. and the BLACAR down there and fight off the T-33's.

I felt always that it shouldn't be run from Washington. I felt that the controls should have been on one of the ships...but that would never be granted, it had to be run from Washington. A high level decision of somebody's, I think that Hawkins felt strongly, and maybe correctly, that he should have been allowed to go on one of the ships that was stationed right off shore, that he could run the operation from there...a straight military operation, once it got to that point.

There was one point in the planning where the two gunships were supposed to hang by the Rio Escondido and protect it, and I don't find that either one of them hung...was hanging close by that thing when it got knocked down. I am going to talk to Lynch when I go back.

Yes, he may be able to answer that. I don't know the answer, I know that when we realized what was happening, that we were not going to be able to get those aircraft with T-33's [sic B-26's], that we sent word to signal them.
them to get the ships out of the Bay if they could...
they ought to get them out to the 12 mile limit or something
of that sort, although we told Bissell that we expected,
when we realized what the situation was, we told him that we
expected to lose all those ships that next morning...
well, we were wrong, we only lost one.

JBP    We lost two.
JE     Two I guess.

JBP    With this one, I am somewhat puzzled about...why did
you guys tell them to take those gunships out of there...
because they in fact, seemed to be fairly effective, they
did shoot down one B-26, and they were the only things
...now I am not a military guy, and I don't know fix shit
from pineapple about it, but they were the only two vessels
you had in the area that struck me that had any possibility
of air defense at all. Why wasn't any consideration given
to leaving those guys in close to the beach and hope that
the Castro Air Force would attack them and maybe they could
get rid of a couple more...Christ, Castro only had 7 planes...
three of them were T-33's, granted.

JE     I didn't know that we had ordered them away from the ships.
JBP    They were out 20-25 miles.
JE     If that is right, I am sure it is, if you say so, the
reason I am afraid, simply was that at that max point, we
were not supposed to have any Americans anywhere in the...
anywhere near Cuba. We had Americans on the two gunships,
two LCI's. They were not LCI's, they were cutters of a sort.

JBP    They were LCI's I'm sure Jake.

JE     Well, that is a landing craft infantry.
JBP    That's what they were. That is one of my questions...
"Why did we pick the fleet that we did. Now, we get into this,
I know...
JE The only thing we could get for the money. We took the only thing we could find for the money we had available.

JBP Well, then, it was a money problem? or was it a plausible denial problem?

JE Plausible denial. You couldn't take anything that could be considered to be current with the US Navy, it had to be something that was in surplus.

JBP Now, I may be mistaken, but I thought by that time in our history, and we are talking about 1961 now, that we had released PT type boats, and other types of...

JE They didn't have the range. PT's didn't have the range, and they were too hard to maintain...too unreliable in other words.

JBP No other type of escort type vessel had been released to the Latin American world...

JE No, not to my knowledge. 'Well, destroyers, but you are not about to get a destroyer or anything of that sort. These were 110'...

JBP Well, some of them were...well larger than some... I am talking now about the things that we used to transport the troops...

JE I am talking about the ones that had armament on them, the BARBARA J. and the BLAGAR, but they weren't LCI's. LCI's drop the whole end don't they, and people come walking out of them?

JBP As far as I know they may have had the ends...I am sure they were LCI's, because I recall when Lynch talked to me on the phone, he referred to them as LCI's too, and I checked it out, and I am pretty sure they were LCI's. They had 11 machine guns on them, and a couple of recoilless guns...

JE Oh, yes, they were highly armed.

JBP But what I was thinking about, Jake, was in terms of the vessels that were carrying the troops, too -- that there were not other surplus US Naval vessels that might have been better armed or faster than what we had and would have been better...
Carrying that you see, to its logical conclusion, the first question you should ask is why in the hell were we fooling around with B-26's when we could have had I think what they called the C-5 or something.

A5D's were what they went after.

That's right, Christ, we couldn't get anything that looked like it was something that the Cubans wouldn't have, we couldn't have.

But, I think you can get a better rationale on that from Hawkins or Egan. I don't know where Hawkins is, but I suppose you do.

Let's see, he is in Colorado Springs, and Egan is in Fort Collins, Colorado; and Gar Thorsrud is in some place called Marana, Arizona. He retired.

Oh, did Gar retire? Yes, he was out at that airbase... the agency base for a long time near Phoenix or near Tucson... Mountain Home

Yeah, Mountain Home. I guess Marana is the town. I guess he is staying out of... well, I know he is, because I was talking to the AirOps guys, and... what did they tell me... oh yes, that he retired, and then he had gone to work for some private air line, and they had come to the parting of the ways very soon. They weren't real sure what Gar was doing now.

Is Egan still in service?

No, he is retired, Hawkins is retired, Beerli is retired, and Gaines is retired. How closely were you actually involved in the target planning for TRINIDAD and ZAPATA? Were you helping make the decisions as to where the troops should go when they landed at the beach? Was that the War Plans Group?

I passed my judgment... I either approved them, or I disapproved them. That work was done by Hawkins and his War Planning Group... I think, I know Beal was one
of his war planners, and Egan was in on a lot of that, and another fellow who retired and served with me in Miami was a war planner. Bill Dinsmore...they did most of that target work and what not...

JBP

When they made the switch from TRINIDAD to the Bay of Pigs, were you aware at all of the small boat problem that started to plague them almost immediately? Where they were going to have to take the troops, they were going to have to transport the troops off of the larger vessels into the shore by small boat, and do you know the problems that they had. A, with the acquisition of the small boats, and B, the equipping of the small boats and C, the failure of the small boats? This was something that struck me as...

JE

Again, you are going to have to have to get details on that kind of thing from Egan & Co. I was aware of the problem, the money was there to get what you could; and the problem there was that it was something that you couldn't have because it was still being used in the US, and it was just what was available that would work, as I recall.

JBP

Well, wasn't it...we may not be talking about the same thing. I am talking about the small aluminum boats, the 18 foot boats, the 14 foot boats, and so on, that were going to be used for carrying them in. They were getting these out of New York, and New York stores, and maybe Miami, wherever they could find them.

JE

Yes, rubber rafts, with motors.

JBP

Well, aluminum boats was what they were after, and I didn't know whether this was a problem...well, my reaction when I saw it first, was when Jim Burwell wrote a history for me on the support end for the Bay of Pigs operation, and my question to him was "Why didn't you fellows in Support say no?" What if the guys had said no to you, no, we can't get small boats...what would you guys have done...said goddamn it, get them?
It would have been inconceivable, of course that Support would have done a thing like that to you.

They wouldn't have said it. Jim Garrison at that time didn't let anybody say "No" to anything. We had $20 million dollars worth of armament on another ship that was standing out in the Gulf of New [sic] Mexico we had to bring back, you know, the resupply and what not. A couple of years later, I went out to the Midwest with Jim before he retired -- I guess he's dead now -- he made me go out to the Midwest with him. He took me out to that vast place and showed me row after row of arms, all kinds of things..."see all of that... you made me buy that, you bugger."

Can you tell me something about diversionary efforts that were anticipated aside from Niño Diaz on his activity? Plan Preston, Baracoa -- do these ring any bells...Sanchez Mosquerra?

I don't remember, I am sorry. I know we had a whole series of deceptions, and what not.

How about Sanchez Mosquerra? Does his name ring a bell?
He cost us $35,000 and we picked him up on the 27th of March in 61, and then phoned him out.

No, he doesn't ring a bell with me.

What about the adequacy of the photo intelligence that you had for this project, and particularly as it related to the Bay of Pigs. Do you have any comments which you could make on that?

I guess I continued with the work that I was doing out in Miami later, in the late 60's and 70's. First of all, one of the first problems was there were not really any adequate hydrographic charts, and there were very few current maps. We did get clearances so that we had aerial photography of the whole Bay of Pigs area at one time as I recall. But one of my recollections is
that based on the charts that were available -- and the aerial photography -- when it came to going in, it was determined that where the water appeared to be clear, it wasn't clear. There were reefs and that sort of thing there.

There were coral reefs out there.

JE

Now, whether that means that they were using antiquated maps, or whether they were just weren't where they thought they were, I don't really know, but the mapping...I am sure Hawkins will tell you...was quite a problem, getting adequate maps, particularly, the inland maps of Cuba, the Bay of Pigs area and those swamp areas, going to the east. As I recall, it didn't turn out to be like that, when people got in there.

END OF TAPE 4.
I raise this question Jake...particularly about that coral reef at Playa Giron. I talked to Jack Lawler who is down with the Imagery Analysis people, and he was telling me that he got called in, and he recalls that he was asked to look at 5 potential sites, now I DON't know and he couldn't recall whether one of these was the Bay of Pigs, or whether it was the TRINIDAD site that he had to look at. Now, because I recall -- we have the memo that says when the TRINIDAD thing was being presented, there were five alternatives -- that it might have been TRINIDAD. But then again, when they presented ZAPATA, they also presented five alternatives. I don't really...

They were called in on the Bay of Pigs, as well as...

Jack thought it was, and he said that he looked at the beaches and he made his selection, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. He does not recall finding any coral reef. He didn't know the story that the boats were being...had been hung MX up. But he did tell me that he was told to stay put, and he was briefed by two Navy commanders -- Lt. Commander -- who said "we are going to check you out with frogmen;" and within 24 hours he said the report came back to him that these guys verified his choices. Now, his presumption is that the frogmen went into the five beaches which would include the Bay of Pigs. Have you heard anything about this...do you know anything about this? Do you know if we got any frogmen in...

Never heard anything about frogmen. I suppose that could have been done from submarines without telling us, because JCS was in on it at that point; and Burke was much interested, but I've never heard that.
JBP That was the first mention that I have heard of it. I have another submarine question that we might get to later. Oh, yes, now this is one which refers to a January 1961 meeting, where you and Davis, and Mallard among others, were talking...

JE Now who is the last one?

JBP Mallard, he was the Navy or the Marine...let's see, he was the Navy guy, Mallard, Frank Mallard...Marine Corps. and he was sought for advice on Navy things too. That was Generals Woolnough and Davis, and they showed you folks some army photos of buildup -- Castro troop buildup -- in probable drop areas. I was just wondering if this brought back any recollection or reaction on your part to this photography, or whether this got involved in the planning for the invasion, or whether this simply referred to drop sites or for resistance groups...or do you recall anything at all.

JE The only thing I can recall about that is the date. I think they showed us that to make sure that we weren't planning on going in -- in any area where they had isolated these builds. (We're just coming into the warm season here...when the worms come in the tropics, they come in large amounts.)

JBP (Practice for your driver?)

JE (Oh, these don't hurt you.) No, that's all that was. They just wanted to be sure that we weren't planning to go into an area in which they were apparently waiting...

JBP Do you recall under what circumstances you actually found out that Kennedy had given the word that the invasion was to go forward? Were you in a meeting, or did this word filter down to you? Do you recall the circumstances of that?

JE I was coming back from Guatemala when I got the word I think I got the word in Miami that the green light had been given -- that I should hurry up and get back. I thought...I came in black -- I flew in black from Guatemala to Miami -- and at Miami I was told to call...they really didn't
give me the date at that point, but they said that the date had been decided and I should get back.

JBP

On 13 April 1961 Hawkins was down in Nicaragua and he sent back a widely talked about cable on the readiness of the Cuban force. Was this a put up job?

JE

What do you mean?

JNP

Did somebody ask him to send back a favorable report?

JE

I don't think so. I don't think so, because...why do you suggest that?

JBP

I simply asked the question...I don't simply ask the question...I asked the question in view of what I read about what occurred when the troops got in, and what their performances were like...

JE

Well, of course you seem to...people seem to forget these troops were running out of ammunition, and they knew they weren't going to get any resupply right then, and that sort of thing. I don't know how well, or how badly they... Have you ever interviewed anybody that was in on the beach?

JBP

No, I haven't. I have seen the interviews that Dave McLean did with some of the people that were there. What I have read have been the reports of the people as they were being interrogated by Castro, and the other things that I have looked at are the charts on the ammunition supply and what Castro said he picked up in the way of equipment and material, etc.

JE

Well, to answer you, I never heard anybody suggest that it was a put up job from Hawkins because THERE WAS TOO MUCH at stake on it. Christ, there was his career, that was on the line.

JBP

Oh, talking in terms of the beginning of the activity, you sent a memo to the DDP on 15 April 1961 and the subject was "JMATE Status Report." Where you were giving the DDP... you are giving Bissell now, the cover story on the B-26 pilots who participated in the D-minus 2 airstrike and you are telling Bissell that their cover story is that they are defectors from the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria. Why, on
on 19 April would you be telling Bissell this...I can't imagine that Bissell wouldn't know this, but...

JE Oh, he would want a formal piece of paper.

JBP Oh, O.K.

JE That would be just for the record. He probably wanted that to brief somebody in the State Department.

JBP Again, this may be one that you can't answer...that the War Planners were involved in basically...that when the D-Day Air strike...when the second air strike was ruled out and they were told to fly ground support for the troops that were on the beach, was there no kind of targeting priority that was set up for these guys and their B-26's.

JE When they were flying ground support?

JBP Yes, that was just the extent of it..."you are going to fly ground support"...they had no kind of a target list? Did they...

JE Oh, yes.

JBP Did they?

JE Sure, they did...

JBP Did you help draw that up...or was that...

JE No, that was done...well, I don't know if I did or not. It was something that I would have been aware of...

JBP Because I don't find in the stuff that I have looked at...I have not found evidence of what those targets might be, and I think it would be very interesting to know.

JE I think you will have to go to the people that were working and planning on that. But, yes, there were targets -- there had been targets all along.

JBP I know what was targeted for second strike and when that went out. Then what happens after that, I never found any records...

JE Now, when they were told to fly ground support, obviously a certain amount of target of opportunity enters into that;
and why that I mean that as the beachhead notified where they had located strong points those would be put on the list.

JBP: Sure,

JE: But, really, it has been so long -- I am sorry, but I just can't answer these things.

JBP: No problem. Were you aware of Castro's mobilization order after the air strike on D minus two?

JE: From intercept.

JBP: Well, yes, I mean, it was...you know anybody on the radio could have picked it up, they didn't have to...

JE: Yes, but we had quite...it quite in depth from intercept point. Now just as we were aware of the damage that some of the strafing operations that you were referring to...some of the damage that the strafing operations had done to the columns that they were preparing to move down towards the beachhead. These were done by our American pilots.

JBP: This was on the grounds of (barking Bassets as droll words)...targets?

JE: The same fellow -- Ziggy I think his name was -- (went in there on?) one devastating strike against one of their columns.

JBP: Did this create any particular reaction in terms of Headquarters planning...when you got the word that Castro was mobilizing his troops? After the initial airstrike?

JE: Well, that is when there...

JBP: No, now he has a whole day here to mobilize, you strike on a Saturday and immediately following the airstrike, he mobilized, because he...

JE: That's right, but he never mobilized -- there was never indication to anything available to me -- that he was at all aware that the Bay of Pigs area was...

JBP: No, because of general mobilization.
Yes, and they did that often. I mean he had lots of general mobilizations in those years, and they still do. If you read the COMINT on a regular basis, you will find that they were going through these mobilizations. We had no indication from the COMINT -- we thought we were reading pretty well -- we had no indication...we never had any idea that that was the area, nor did we ever have any indication either that he had ever spotted or was aware that that convoy was at sea and coming into that area either.

What you are suggesting is that this was just regarded as another mobilization, and even though we've XXX had the air strike, it is not likely to be any more significant an experience than what has gone on before.

That's right. The thing that we kept looking for was to find some indication that he knew that convoy was out there, and we never, never had a thing. Of course, on the other hand, at that point we didn't know...the thing that made me mad...very mad afterwards...we didn't know at that point that the Agency had the XXXX cable indicating that the Russians knew that the 17th was the date.

What date?

We were never told in the Task Force that the Mexican station had picked up that cable...had picked up that word from that Mexican...from the Soviet diplomat that he had been in Washington on the 11th, and had been told that the target date of the operation was the 17th. And that we picked that up on the 13th in Mexico, and we were never told that until long after the operation was over. None of us ... and in fact, the thing that got me upset with R.Harris Smith is, he said...he started talking about this cable XX and I said, "well, I am a little shocked that you knew about that." He said, "Yes, the other thing I was also told in the DDI is, that somebody had told them [DDI] that they [DDP?] didn't..."
deliberately didn't tell me [Jake] about it, because they
didn't want to upset me...they thought I had too many things
on my mind already." This really bothered me, to have
that in Smith's hands, because he could write that in some
goddammed book that would start some other investigation or
something of that sort. And I don't know whether that's true.
I don't know that I wasn't shown this because it might upset
me, or anything of that sort; and yet, the way he told it,
it sounded to me as if it was coming...it came from a very
senior official in the Agency, and he wouldn't tell me who
it was.

JBP  
    As I have said, I haven't picked that...

JE  
    But that really gravedled me...he said that they [DDI?] had
    also told him that I hadn't been informed because they
    [DDP?] didn't want to upset me at that point in the operation
    -- max and that would have been a vital piece of information
    for us to know at that point.

JBP  
    Good God, yes...what a help. We talked a while ago
about the troops and the training of the troops. I would
like to ask you again, on the basis of your own experience
as a troop trainer and with GW forces...how could you really
justify the use of some of these Cuban troops who were sent
out with the Brigade with less than two weeks of training?
Does this imply that what you were really counting on was US
support?

JE  
    No, we weren't. Now I am not so sure that there may
not have been a level where that was in question...developed
several times. From our standpoint, it didn't. And I
don't know that I was too aware that there were very many
people that only had two weeks training, back then.

JBP  
    Some only had one or two days actually...

JE  
    Well, you say that now. I don't contest it, but at that
point, I don't know that I was aware that we had very many
in that category. There must have been some people wanting
to get on the bandwagon in the end.
Well, of course, at the end...

That wouldn't apply to the hard corps of people that were trained...how many were there, do you have any idea?

Who only had a week or two weeks of training? I would guess on the order of probably 100 -- 150 I think they brought in the last contingent.

Out of two thousand. Well, that is kind of like when I was a guerrilla commander outside of (Michnau)in 1943 or 1944...when I had to commit US forces. They had some road building engineers of General Pick's -- they had building roads all their time in service, and so they gave them 3 days training and sent them in to try and bail us out there; and they didn't even know how to reload their M-1's. But, I must confess, somebody said this to me not too long ago, that I was not aware that we had anything like 100 people that had that little bit of training. But that wouldn't have changed any of my views...where I obviously was horribly wrong -- we were all probably -- wrong is...although I knew the internal resistance had suffered severe blows, and I felt that...and I know if we had moved the operation in February or in November or December...and had we moved it to TRINIDAD, it might not have worked, but there would have been five or eight hundred more people inside Cuba that would have been able to do something. We would have gone into an area where they could have dispersed themselves into the hills. You talk about a few days or a few weeks training, well, alright, that's...maybe that's fine; but you have to look at the greater problem and think of the whole concept which most of those people were working on, too -- even the ones that had the wrong training there. That was guerrilla training...which we never in those early days did anything in training, in terms of operating in anything other -- or larger -- than squads, or maybe at most a platoon or something of that sort. So that when the ships came, and the trainers had to begin to train, it was a sense of company or battalion movements, and what not -- that was a new ball game. One of the reasons I think they thought
they could get away with it...the number of those commanders, the military commanders **...** they had Cubans...had been fairly experienced officers in the Cuban Army, I mean, they had had large unit training, or they had participated in battalion and regimental operations, and so they were exactly neophytes. Christ, Jack, if you go back and read our own American history -- I just happen to be reading some more of that now -- and you talk **much** about some of our early continental Army, and even to the time that they fought, they never had any training. If you are talking about anything...they didn't even have training of squads.

Of course, you are talking different contexts, here. You know, you pick up club and you go after him -- after he fires his musket -- but if he's facing you with modern equipment, that is something different. Job, in view of your rather low opinion of Varona and I gather Miro... as certainly you told the Taylor Committee that you thought that Varona was a scoundrel, and I am not sure how your comment about Miro was, it seemed like he fell into the same category...

No, No, No. Varona is a scoundrel, hopeless. He is a scoundrel, a cheat, and a thief -- only to be surpassed by Aritme, who was all of those, and probably made, in addition to stealing money from us, probably made a lot of money in the drug traffic in the last few years, among other thugs. He is a good friend of Howard's [E.Howard Hunt], but I see the rogue. Miro was a nice, scholarly, intellectual lawyer who was slightly left of center, as people thought of it in 1960 or something of that sort -- not unlike Muñoz Marín in his political approaches and close associates. He wasn't a political leader, he didn't have any of the charisma to lead people, and that is the thing I think that was really was confounding us.

We were so strongly looking for young, dynamic leaders, and people would say, gee, Aritme is it. Well, he was young, and most of the others weren't. **The one fellow that** had all of those things which we at one point had looked at
when we were examining leaders within was this fellow
Alfredo Moore (?) who was a very... he was many years in jail,
he was wrapped up in jail in November [1960]. He was a
severe loss in terms of the internal movement in Cuba. He
is out of jail now, I understand, because I picked up the
Herald the other day, and he was being interviewed in Miami
after 15 years in jail or 14 years in jail, something of
that sort. Well, what I am saying is that I felt there was
going to be -- based on what we had available -- that there
was going to be more of... I didn't realize that the populace
had been cowed to the degree that they had been.

What about Manolo Ray in terms of leaders?

You mean, the today's commentator in Miami... Very
successful. No, No, that is Ray... Manolo Ray. Well, he was...

He never joined the CRC...

Well, he was so anti-CIA, Starting back in the early
50's... he was anti-US government, So the CIA was lumped
in with that -- probably because of the Ambassadorial image
we had in Cuba in those early 50's with Ambassador Gardner,
who distinguished himself when he was the American Ambassador
there by buying a thousand pounds of ice from the ice plant
every time they gave a cocktail party so he could have the
pool cooled properly. You know, that kind of thing, Ray
has never really been in sympathy with the U.S. His reasons
were probably not all that bad, and in those earlier years,
gave him an affinity with Castro. He wanted an independent
Cuba, and he didn't want the United States to be... to be a
continuous satellite to the United States. So he would
have ended up in the category of a political unreliable.
He did have a pretty good friendship with Jim Noel, whom
I mentioned earlier. Jim used to say, "Gee, can't we bring
him in more -- and everybody threw up their hands. Jerry
Droller would throw up his hands and say "you can't do
this." He would have been absolutely unacceptable to any
Cuban politician we had to deal with.
Jake With Varona and the strong support that Varona had and some of the problems that were associated with almost anyone of these Cuban leaders, how could you expect the members of the Brigade to shape up and really form a cadre. It strikes me that there were so many instances that are reported in the cable traffic of political dissidents creating problems among the Air Force people, among the ground troops, how could you really expect to weld a useful force out of that. I don't think this makes any difference whether we are talking about the period when we are working still with... maybe the guerrilla thing still in mind, up to the middle of November, or after that period. Almost from the very first, the cable traffic starts to pick this up.

Oh, yes, the United States in 1980, if we have a confrontation with the Soviet Union...

Were you aware of the degree of seriousness of some of these close-to-mutinies that occurred in camps?

Yes, and that is one of the reasons that I wanted to keep these...we had to draw more leaders from Miami, and most of them had an infinity with one of these leaders that was in exile. That was one of the reasons that we tried to keep them away from the political...we didn't want Varona and the others to go down, because in our own way, perhaps, we were trying to build an esprit in the fighting corps which was above their political views. The only way we could do that was to keep people like Varona and the other people out of there.

Weren't the troops actually happier after these guys came down? No?

I don't know. I was so unhappy that I don't know... because they just about ripped my whole relationship with the Guatemalan Government after they went down there, and
went back to Miami and shot their mouths off. Howard Hunt would write a piece of paper and say that they were happier after they went down...after these people came down. I don't think that was necessarily so.

JBP

My basis for asking the question, is my feeling -- as I say, right now I would have to go back and look because it has been some time since I did go through all the cable traffic -- but my feeling is, that after they went down that things did simmer down, and that there was a bit more cooperation after both of the visits that are in question.

JE

I don't think I can give you a good answer to that, because I was so colored by the problems that their going down caused...but I...no, I was well aware of those factional disturbances. I don't know how much you can...I don't know as a practical matter, though, you can ever solve a problem like that.

JBP

Alejos had the best suggestion. - He made it very early. - He said "either ship 'em out, or shoot 'em, and if you shoot them, bury them deep deep."

JE

Yes, I know, that's Carlos, he learned that from Ydigoras, that is how Ydigoras controlled his position forty years, so he must have buried them deep. I think he buried that piece of paper, too, along with (word missed -- Basset's barking).

JBP

I would like to ask you now, about a question that is very confusing to me, and again, I have to defer to the military on this, and that is this question of...

JE

Before you do that, let me come back to one thing...you say what the reaction of all these people was? It's time they had this about their political leaders, and they did this because it was essential to them; but what they wanted -- I think it was iterated, reiterated, ad nauseum --
they wanted American leaders. They wanted their people trained and [wanted Americans] to go in with them and to lead them. That's what they wanted, and I suspect that that would have made a big difference in their performance in there too.

JBP

Do you know of any promise that was ever made to any of the Brigade leaders?

JE

To the contrary...Egan and people used to say, "you can't tell those guys..." and I said, "Look, I don't even want to discuss this ever again. You know goddamn well right if we don't know what the rule is that nobody, but nobody goes down." And they said, "we realize this causes a problem," and I know it causes a problem, and Egan used to say, "you bastard," he said, "you led a battalion for how many years," I said, "that was all right, but that was a declared 'big war'." I know it's the truth, because there were factions when I was a guerrilla and what not... because I was an American who lived like a priest on a pedestal... I transcended all that. I almost got machine gunned a couple of times in political disputes, but transcended that...there are no questions in my mind...if in fact, they had two or three of these Americans that they had great respect for, and if they were in there leading them, it would have been a different ball game once that battle had started. There is no question about that, but that was never a factor in the equation. They knew that these Americans were not going in with them...I think they did...now this was the instruction to the Americans. I don't know what some Special Forces sergeant might have said, to them, or something of that sort.

END OF TAPE 5.
TAPE 6

JBP  [Paraphrase of question because of delay in switching tape recorder on: Jake, would you comment on the Headquarters Command Center for the operation.]

JE  During the Guatemalan operation, there was a forward base, known as [REDACTED] Lincoln in Miami... and Headquarters... it was actually run by Al Haney -- and Tracy Barnes was there part of the time. Headquarters was so unhappy with the way that thing was conducted -- not being informed and what not -- that although it was early-on suggested that once the thing [anti-Castro operation] started that the command shouldn't be in Washington -- the command should be somewhere down in the area -- nevertheless, because of the past history, you never got any support for this. I think it would be fair to say that Hawkins cherished -- up until the last moment -- that we might be able to have a forward-command-ship-or something of that sort where he could really run the operation directly without Cabell sitting in on top of him -- or you know the whole mess of people that would circulate in and out even to... including Walt Rostow. But there was never... to my knowledge there was never any possibility in getting clearance to really have the military command headquarters which wouldn't be hampered by politicians as Jack would have put it.

JBP  In the command center, as the invasion got started, you were there all the time, and Hawkins was there all the time, and Cabell was in and out?

JE  Cabell was in and out.

JBP  And Bissell was in and out? And Barnes, in and out -- or was he hanging around most of the time, or...
Well, I think he was in New York, part of that time with Miro. I don't remember him being around. Hawkins and I slept for about 3 or 4 or 5 days in the command center. We never left. We had sort of organized it. I think that most of the key staff, slept right there. We set up -- it was down in the old Quarters Eye -- and we set up one room there. We had bunks and what not.

And communication that you were getting were coming from the beach or were they sending from the beach via the BLagar, the command ship out there,

Relay.

Relay, all the time. Now, when the...

I don't think we could handle the distance to come directly from the troops. It had to be on relay.

When the plans were being developed for both TRINIDAD and for the Bay of Pigs, could you comment on the role of the Department of State. Was it basically Rusk who was involved in the decision making, or was it Rusk and Berle. On the Defense side, was it the JCS representatives, or who was it that you were actually dealing with? Do you recall names of individuals?

No, I'm sorry to say I don't even remember who the Assistant Secretary was at that point for Latin America.

Tom Mann.

Well, he moved out.

Yes, he had been appointed Ambassador to Mexico. I've got his name but I don't...

He was appointed Ambassador to Mexico and I guess Tom was sort of a reluctant dragon during that time that he was there as Assistant Secretary. He was one of those that we talked about yesterday, that'd like to find some other solution, but failing to find it, then he'd say, "well, if we are going to do it, let's do it right." That's when he got... I don't know if that is why he was moved out, but in
any event, he was moved out. I think the whole attitude of the State Department was that they wished this thing would go away and...or that they would agree to a next stage of the operation, but then they would throw some new block -- some new limiting factor in -- so that it was a continual battle up hill to achieve what we considered were the operational flexibilities that were required to make the operation go. The JCS, I think, as such, came in on it somewhat later in the game, I am not sure whether Nixon brought the JCS...

JBP

No...

JE

The JCS came in in Kennedy's time.

JBP

Yes, January, after they briefed Kennedy -- then he suggested that the JCS be brought in to it.

JE

I think that the JCS was the one that said we should increase rapidly...we should increase the strength of the people...or the numerical strength of the force. The JCS also made some additional recommendations, I believe, re training; and as you know, they then provided that training cadre with some 35 people that went down there when the operation began to take on the aspects of an invasion force -- which, in fact, it was, I guess.

JBP

Yes, that...well, they actually assigned that force of 38 trainers in January [1961], but the negotiations for that had gone on for an interminable period. Starting as early as November, 1960, as I recall, we kept going to DOD and asking for...and then dragging their feet, and so on. I can't understand why that was. Was it simply because JCS itself, hadn't been in -- because we were dealing with the Special Operations people in the Department of Defense.

JE

Well, of course, there was a fellow named Prouty who was not very helpful in those years, and I am sure you are familiar with the name Prouty. I think Mr. Prouty was finally...was moved out of the line of things when the JCS came in formally. I am not sure what Prouty's role would have been in that, but probably not very helpful. Well, Hawkins
and...well, let's say Hawkins certainly felt that as the numbers got larger, and the available qualified trainers in the Agency emerged, there were *un*limitations on the number of people. Hawkins was one of those who was aggressively pushing to get help in from the JCS, to upgrade the quality of the training.

JBP: You know, when the JCS did get into it and *revised* reviewed the overall plan, they made some recommended changes with the TRINIDAD plan. One point that they stressed very heavily was the extreme risk of loss of the thin-skinned ships if there was just one Castro aircraft flying that was armed with 50 caliber machine guns. Why didn't we pay more attention to that than we seem to have.

JE: We did. That was the whole basis of the air strikes that were considered to be so essential -- and we had very good photography in that respect. We knew, I told you, where every -- in the eastern part of Cuba and even in the West -- we knew where every Cuban aircraft was that posed a threat to these thin-skinned ships. That was the part of the equation -- that every craft that our B-26's couldn't, or didn't have the potentiality to negate, had to be destroyed on the ground.

JBP: JCS was aware of the planned air strikes when they did their evaluation, but they nonetheless raised this question. I just wondered...did we ever try to get more aircraft than the 16 to 20 that we and ended up with, or did we just assume, as you point out, that we were going to get them [Castro planes] either on strike one or strike two.

JE: Well, I won't say that we assumed that we were going to get them, but we assumed we were going to have sufficient use of our air power. You see, if our State Department had had its way, we wouldn't have been able to use airplanes. Even though it may not come through with anything...your reading, or have read...it was implicit, and it was a continual plea to Bissell, that we had to destroy all of those
planes on the ground. Those air strikes had to go, and it might even have to be ones beyond the programmed points if we didn't get all the aircraft. This was the pall...the pall that hung over us all that time. Were we going to be knocked off or were we not going to be knocked off with this air strike business. I really feel that if, and I don't like to speak for Hawkins -- and you will be talking to him -- but I really feel from my own recollection that if we had known that we were going to be cancelled out on that very critical air strike we would've tried to stop the operation, because we knew...we expected to lose every ship...not just two. Some of those ships, as I told you, were deck loaded with gasoline.

JBP

What about the T-33's, Jake. Question comes up at one of the briefings for...

JE

Well, we, in our go-round on these various things...I might say, you know, we went through the whole exercise on aircraft. We were just told, "forget jets you are not going to have T-33's, even though they have been diffused throughout the hemisphere, because they are not deniable...they are traceable. You are not going to have any jets." Then we went to the A-5, which was a high potential...the last of the piston planes the Navy used; but it was a very high performance fighter with a long range, really better range than the B-26, although we were able to compensate the B-26, by adding additional tanks and what not. But you still had a cumbersome aircraft that didn't have at all the maneuverability of the A-5, but we just were told that these were not deniable and it is not negotiable...just stop talking about it.

JBP

What about Castro's...the T-33's that Castro had. Did we...do you recall when we were talking about these aircraft, were we considering the possibility that Castro was going to be flying armed T-33's, against us. The reason I ask
this, is because as I say that when Gen. Gray was briefed on the 16th of April -- and this was on the invasion details, etc. -- there was no mention made of the T-33's, as such. Then in the Taylor Committee investigation, when they got into that, they talked to Beerli on the 25th of April, and Beerli made a comment to the effect that the capability of the T-33's had not been appreciated and they were not thought to be armed. Then, on the 8th of May, Gaines goes before the Taylor Group, and he said that the T-33's were considered; and on the 6th of May, Thorsrud had been before the Group, and he said that he knew the T-33's -- he had piloted the T-33's -- and they had considered them a danger.

Of course, this goes back to the problem, about who was running what. I never felt that we had adequate control of our air arm. This was a very unsatisfactory relationship. Mr. Bissell wanted it that way. We didn't like it. As a matter of fact, the only two people we could work effectively with at that time were Gaines, who was a very practical airman, and Gar Thorsrud; and we just...this was... Beerli probably wasn't even that close to it. That is why he made the remark that he did before the Taylor Committee, because I can assure you the T-33's...we knew they were training...being used in a training capacity, but we never made the assumption that they weren't armed, because they could be armed in a few minutes, so to speak and this was always considered that the T-33's [sic B-26's?] did not dare to take off, because we had no way of combating them. That was the reason for all the frenzy when the airstrike was cancelled and we failed to get all the T-33's. When the airstrike was cancelled, that was a frenzy to try to get the Navy to come in and fly air cover at 5,000 feet, or whatever, I forget what it was...during a certain time... it was supposed to be worked out with the Navy that we would have our B-26's up for a final struggle...
This was the hour...the problem of the hour air cover.

Well, the hour was part of the problem; but the other thing is the jets were at 20,000 feet. That served no useful purpose whatsoever, because we thought they were going to be down on the deck where they could protect the B-26's.

Do you know, incidentally, whether or not, during the two days -- the first two days in particular -- did we capture any Castro pilots? I don't have any evidence that we did, and I just wondered whether you knew if we actually shot down...or were any of those who were shot down xxx were captured.

I thought the ones that were shot down went into the water.

They did, this is why I was...

I don't know of any, I don't recall any. I think a Sea Fury, or maybe a T-33 -- or maybe two of them -- went down in the water...went into the water. As a matter of fact, I think the one Cuban plane that went down, might have been a T-33, if not, it was some other fighter they had.

The Sea Fury was the one with the C-46 flying low...the Sea Fury went in. Then another one that was shot down, was a B-26 -- a Castro B-26 that the gunship -- one or the other of the gunships -- the BARBARA J...

The BARBARA J. I think shot down. Yes.

That leads me into the next question, and that is this question of the hangup on the coral reef when they were headed into Playa Giron. Do you recall or know anything of the details of that? This would be with Gray Lynch's bunch when they were going in to mark the beach. Do you know if they actually had to blow a route through the coral or did they find a passage later on to let the ships in...or what? But three of the landing craft did get hung up on this coral reef, and then I've got it both ways -- I've got it that they discovered a passage, and I've got it that they had to blow a hole in the coral to get through.
I don't recall that they blew anything...that they blew a way through...but that's...I just don't recall it. I think that Robertson was one of the ones that got hung up so badly when he...

No, Robertson was...he was up with the HOUSTON. He was up at the south end of the Bay, and it was Lynch who was down at Playa Giron when they got hung up.

Well, then Lynch will be the one to talk to about this, I just don't recall.

Oh, did you ever hear any explanation as to why the HOUSTON beached in the particular place that it did? He went off to the west side of the bay where there was no fighting instead of off to the east side of the bay where the troops were. Did you ever get any explanation for that?

If I did, I don't recall. It may have been inadvertancy -- they ran aground. Beaching may be the wrong word x for it.

Well, maybe there was something wrong with his gear, I... well, we went through the question yesterday as to whether any thought had been given to the use of the BARBARA J. and the BLAGAR, as anti-aircraft batteries near the shore. I'll take that up with Lynch.

Yes, I think you will find out that there were firm orders that the BARBARA J. and the BLAGAR, once they had performed their mission, had to get out and be a certain number...regardless, because of the Americans on board... they had to be a certain number of miles offshore by daylight.

Who was it that made the decision that resistance elements -- whatever they might be -- inside of Cuba would be given no alert about the upcoming invasion?

Well, I think that was a compendium of views, most all of us -- that we didn't...no we didn't have any idea how... we didn't know how reliable these resistance groups were; and we had no confidence that they weren't penetrated.
This gets into kind of a hairy one, too, in view of what you have mentioned about this comment of R. Harris Smith's... because if the word had already been picked up that the invasion date was going to be on the 17th, and Castro knew it...

Then, its academic, then, we should have alerted those people. Well, I have made it clear, both on and off tape, that was one of the most disturbing things that I have ever heard... that I was deliberately not told this at that time.

Were Lynch and Robertson authorized to go ashore? Did you know they were going ashore?

I had no confidence they would obey my orders, and you see, you raised another very good point -- in retrospect, it might have been far better if they had disobeyed us and not taken those gunships back. Hell, if they had stayed in there, they might very well have been able... I don't know that they could... as I recall... I talked to Rip Robertson several times, and I am not so sure with those manual mounts that they could have gotten those T-33's. He said they were able to fire effectively at the slower piston... the piston planes...

The Sea Fury and the B-26's...

But, I think they actually fired on several occasions at the T-33's. He said they were just too fast for them, with the manual mounts they couldn't get them.

Incidentally, do you know anything about why they did arm those vessels in that particular fashion... with manual mounts... why didn't they put some kind of multiple mounted... automatic mounts, or...

Because it wasn't the kind of a thing that the guerrilla force would have. You have to realize that we were under... this was terribly harassing to Hawkins... you'll encounter this from him... we had to fight every inch. We had to fight
more with our own people to get any kind of armaments... and people would have had us going out there with Springfield rifles if they had their way.

JBP  
That is literally true...

JE  
This is one of the terrible things about it. Then finally we got B-26's and then the question, "how many would you be allowed to have." It wasn't money, because money was no great problem at that time. We tried not to waste money, but it was the criteria for deniability -- sterility -- which I think, in retrospect, was all a charade any way, if you look at it with a broad objective view. But, nevertheless, those were the ground rules that we were playing the game under. You can rightfully say, "well, then why didn't you finally say, 'we are not going to do it,' if these limitations are too great." Well, that's... I've asked myself that many times; and I can surely and forthrightly say that if I had known, as we watched the equation... the "x" factors multiply... if we had realized that the last straw that broke the back was going to be losing those airstrikes, we would not have wanted to mount that force at all. Because it was totally, pre-Hawkins and I talked about it a lot... it was totally predictable. If we didn't have the air superiority for a couple of days, until things could happen inside Cuba, we were dead. You understand now, I am not saying that that's why it failed. Whether the troops would have performed adequately once... if they had been able to get their communications trailers in, and if they had been able to get those additional supplies in as they had predicted, whether they would have had sufficient stamina among their leadership... I am told that certain of their leaders performed with considerable amount of valor, but...

JBP  
What was your understanding Jake, of what the Brigade was supposed to do when it got on Cuban soil? Was it your understanding that they were supposed to hold the perimeter established -- hold the beach; or did you understand that they
were to progress on further inland beyond the swamps; or what exactly was your understanding of what their function was supposed to be?

Now, this may not be precise...my recollection is that they were to establish the beachhead, consolidate it, and expand it to the point that the airfield could become active and additional supplies and backup could be brought in; and the Frente would go in and declare a provisional government. I believe there was some thought and very serious consideration given to the fact that if and when that happened there would be a recognition of this Provisional Government -- and hopefully that the resistance in other parts of the island would take effect at that point.

So this is then basically what we were looking at on the map this morning...the area right around...(unintelligible) Castro...establishing the airfield, at Playa Giron.

That's right.

We touched a moment ago on the support that the Navy was supposed to give, there was a misunderstanding on the time that...the Navy aircraft were still on the carrier, when the...

There was a misunderstanding on time and altitude.

And no explanation has ever been forwarded for that...that clears it up on either side.

Burke...at the time that we talked to Burke about it, he was practically in tears. I guess maybe he was...that the mistake had occurred.

After the Brigade collapsed and we undertook to pull out the survivors with the help of the US Navy, etc., Rip Robertson reported something that he called a "TS occurrence" on the night of either D+6 or D+7, when the U.S. submarine THREADFIN, which had been carrying Rip and Gray and the Cubans up in the Bahia de Cochinos was forced to return to sea. Do you know what that was all about? Did you ever hear anything about that?
JE  No, if I did, I have forgotten it, that doesn't ring a bell at all, but again, I think that either Egan or Hawkins will probably, or maybe they will say "that just doesn't ring a bell to me." You mean a Top Secret when you said T.S.

JBP  Yes, this is quoting Robertson...he said "T.S. occurrence." and T.S. means Top Secret, I can't make any other connection.

JE  I don't have a clue to what that would have been.

JBP  Well, I'll try that one on Gray. I've got a question now, about the Brigade membership...during the inquiry, the Havana inquiry by Castro of the Brigade members who had been picked up...a number of the members of the Brigade had claimed that they had been forced to enlist, can you shed any light on that...do you know whether there was anybody really forced to enlist against his will?

JE  Not to my knowledge, now, I think that might have been a device just to save themselves...in jailing the... once they became prisoners, actually, it was something they had to say. The only thing I can think of over and above that, would be whether people like Varona or...not Miro, necessarily...but other members of the Prente...whether they might have said, "if you don't enlist, and we go back, you are not going to be well off." I don't know whether they could have brought political pressure on or not. I suppose that could have...

JBP  Financial pressure -- no support for your family or yourself.

JE  Possibly, and that could have taken place, and we would not necessarily have known that, because, that's... it would have been a pretty hard thing for an American to become aware of.

JBP  Do you have any explanation for the recruitment of the five gentlemen who were executed by Castro, as criminals against Cuba? I was thinking particularly about Ramon Calviño Insua, Soler Puig; and Kim Young?
JE Well, we tried to prevent people like that from... they must have been recruited at the end...or in the last few weeks, as you say. I think what...I am sure that attention was paid...these people were always checked and screened to the extent we could, with indices that were available at that time, to make sure that we weren't bringing any common criminals...people of that sort. But on the other hand, screening was supposed to pick out double agents, but we ended up with 6 or 7 that we had to imprison up in the Peten in Guatemala, you know for some time, but it turned out, were not...

JBP We had 18 our there...

JE I don't remember how many, was it 18?

JBP Yes.

JE I don't know, I think some of them were not for that purpose...I mean, I think they were...

JBP They were dissidents...

JE They were dissidents, but there were some 7 or 8 that looked pretty clear, they had come in with the reporting functions of Castro.

JBP It is rather interesting that in the list of the Brigade members who died, they list 4 of the 5 guys who were executed, but this Ramon Calviño Insua, his name does not show up at all...I guess they didn't like him.

JE Even though he was executed.

JBP Even though he was one of the guys who was executed. The other four -- they all appear on the Brigade list. This is the list that was prepared by the Brigade itself, and these are honored heroes, etc.

JE I had another thought on this thing that you were talking about the late enlistees, and what not that came in...

JBP Jake, let me switch tapes here, this one is just about to give up...

END OF TAPE 6.
Late enlistees...

Yes, it was indicated that there had been a breakdown in our screening method apparently. When I made my last trip to Guatemala, several weeks before the thing went, to my shock and chagrin, I found a fellow names Fabio Freye there, who was from one of the millionaire families which had been disenfranchised in Cuba. Freye was at that time in Miami and a good friend of mine -- and the only Cuban at that time that knew me by true name. He was a successful broker -- sugar broker in Miami -- and he is hugely successful today. But Fabio, in addition to being a good friend and in addition to knowing me, had eight children; and this was the kind of a person that was never, never to have been allowed into the Brigade for a whole variety of reasons. To my, as I say, shock and chagrin, while I was in one of the camps, he walked up to me with great pleasure and said, "I'm here, even though you guys tried to keep me out." He apparently had brought in a contingent of some of his friends. I don't know how they persuaded -- how or who they persuaded among the screeners -- they Cuban screeners, because they shouldn't have been there. Freye was one of the few who -- when they were put on television -- he was one of the few who defied Castro. How they didn't get shot, I don't know... well, there was nothing against him, other than the fact that he was a member of the Brigade... they had nothing more against him than anybody else, except that he was highly defiant of Castro, and they tried to interrogate him on television. He was bailed out by somebody because his family still had a lot of money. He was finally ransomed, I think, for $100 or $200 thousand dollars... a year or so later, or something of that sort.
Well, what they did, they set bail on all of those guys in order of their priorities. There were, I don't know, several of them that were $200,000 and a lot of them $100,000 cases, and so on, down the line. This is the way that Castro had set that up. That business about the TV appearance... I found this interrogation was a strange way to run a war... as you say, I recall...

Well, during that period of the Cuban Revolution -- starting with the time that Castro took over -- TV was used because that was one thing that they could get to the mass of the people with. Although there were not all that many TV sets, wherever there was a TV set they would always have a huge group of people gathered around. You would get 30-40-50 people, something of that sort, sometimes, just to look at one TV set. I think it was simply a Castro device -- not so much for the benefit of the United States, although I assumed that they knew that we were monitoring their TV programs from Key West -- for mass advising of the people what was going on.

But, the fact that there were men such as Freye, who did defy these interrogators and right out in the open on TV, etc., this just...

Oh, yes. When I saw that broadcast and I saw this, I thought good Christ, that is the end of Fabio -- bad enough that he's there... but...

Do you know anything about Tom Schreyer's "Battle Report?"

No.

I have a...

I didn't even know that he wrote about it.

Well, I believe that what it was was an attempt to portray the Agency in a more favorable light after the collapse of the Brigade and some of the comments and publications that were appearing at the time. I wonder if you would
take a look at this, this is a session that you had with Mac Bundy on the 26th of April, and tell me what this is about...[gave Jake copy of note on session with Bundy]

JE
What promises were made to the Brigade on the last Tuesday re Air cover. After those meetings...I think in what this was about is after those meetings with the Navy we sent a message out...advising that from one half hour after nautical...I forget the terminology now, but one...

JBP
Romeo time?

JE
One half hour before nautical...the ending of nautical twilight until...for one hour...I guess for one hour after starting, with half hour before nautical twilight -- the ending of nautical twilight -- would be air cover from the Navy to protect the B-26's. The actual text of the message, I don't...of course, you probably have that, I don't know where that is...Did we have proper information on the location of the reefs around the Bay of Pigs? Well, if we can assume that those photographs were correct, that they were certainly current, you would think that we did know. I know that the charts -- the naval charts available -- were not very good. They were not very current, and this was always a problem of navigation -- and continued to be for years after the Bay of Pigs in operations in and around there [Cuba]. But, I can't really say whether we...whether the technical photography things that we were working from were correct, or whether the ships just got into the wrong place. Very often, you know, you will get this reaction when people get in there -- they think their navigation is perfect and they say, "well, goddammit there is not supposed to be anything here." But it may be that they're 200 yards or 500 yards, or 1,000 yards away from where they think they are. I just can't give you anything very meaningful on that. What does this say... "what was the actual text of the message given to Miro Cardona indicating to him that he would not
be receiving any help from the United States? On what? Well, I believe... I am guessing here, but I think that Miro was
claiming he had to have US support. You know you have these
things that have emerged in the years since...of people
saying well, if somebody had told them that they were going
to have the support of the US Armed Forces...that's appeared
in writing... That isn't anything I was ever aware of.
Now if any statements of that sort had been made, that would
have been in councils of the government that I was never
privy too, nor was I told anything about it; but that was
never part of our planning in the sense of the launching
of the Brigade.

JBP       Now, going back to the thing you mentioned yesterday,
some Special Force Sergeant telling some members...
JE        Yes, that could be the other...
JBP        Don't worry about it, we'll bail you out.
JE        But it is entirely possible, I suppose...informally,
in high government circles, they had said well, if these
guys really established that beachhead and consolidated it --
put in their Frente -- that the United States might even
do something, such as was done in the Dominican Republic. I
just don't know, so I can't really address myself to it --
except that nobody in the staff that headed, ever had authority,
or to my knowledge ever made a statement that yes, there
would be armed forces. That's about all I can add.

JBP       I've got...
JE        I don't even recall the meeting with Bundy, but I
obviously had one. Of course those were pretty traumatic hours
and days.

JBP       We talked yesterday about J.C.King and J.C.King's role.
I would like to refer back to a brief discussion that we
had back in October of 1973 when I was asked to do a
review of Hunt's book. I checked with you, and you made
passing reference to two or three things. One of the things
that you said, talking about King, was that he hadn't been
involved in the planning for JMATE, because of his known GOP affiliation. Do you still hold by that -- that his political party affiliation had anything to do with his role in the planning of this thing? I didn't understand what you meant by that.

I am not sure what I meant by it either. No, I am not really quite sure what I meant by that. I think the reason he didn't have any direct role after it became more than just another Western Hemisphere Division project is that the DDP really wanted to be in direct control, if you will, of my staff. In fact J.C. was sort of gently eased out of things...or maybe not so gently. I am not sure. J.C. really did not...in those latter months...really did not have any active role. He would go see Berle, or he would talk to people and what not; and I kept him advised on a daily basis, after our morning staff meetings, I would go brief him so that he, as a Division Chief, was current; but in the flow of authority, our orders came directly from Bissell. I don't think I even went to J.C., particularly in the latter days...my money authorities were up to their...they were larger than his. I recall being able to release...I am sure that I was releasing probably in excess of $100,000 or $200,000 at times, when we had the major expenditures for arms, ammunition, and things of that sort. Now, what I meant by that, maybe I mentioned it because everybody else was Democratic. It could be also that I could have been that J.C.'s affiliation with Pawley, who was an anathema to Bissell and a number of other people...it was a reciprocal view, I guess. I may have meant that because of his identification with those people that just were not very popular at that point. But, I think that would be a secondary consideration. It was primarily that Bissell wanted...there was so much riding on the operation that he wanted...had to feel that he was in direct control.

Where was J.C. ...
JE I felt the same way about the air. I found it was almost unworkable and impossible, because I never knew whether this air thing was going to work with Beerli or not -- most of the time, we were highly dissatisfied.

JBP Well, DPD was nominally -- the Cuban activity for DPD -- was nominally placed under your control, wasn't it?

JE Supposedly, the looks of it, but they...there were never any teeth in it. It's like saying the Intelligence Community was placed under Helms a few years ago. I mean, it was nominally placed under him, but you know and I know that he never had any control over it.

JBP You couldn't countermand any Beerli orders then?

JE And, I never knew whether he was giving ones that weren't compatible with what I wanted to do either.

JBP What kind of a management thing did you try to work out with Beerli? Daily meeting with him, or written record, or how?

JE We kept extensive memos of the things that we did, but as a practical matter, I finally got Beerli to name -- to designate -- one person whom I could be working with on a regular basis; and that was Stan [sic, George] Gaines. When that was done, that made it very much easier for us to operate, although it complicated Stan [sic, George] Gaines's relations, I think, with Beerli pretty much.

JBP Going back to J.C.King. Where was J.C.King when the invasion was actually going on? Was he around the war room... or do you recall...He wasn't in there with you and Hawkins?

JE He may have been in briefly, but I don't recall him...

JBP He was not a permanent fixture.

JE No, not that I recall.

JBP Well, the second item I was going to ask about, was, at the time that we talked back in 73 you faulted the Eisenhower Administration for not pushing forward with the small team concept. I think you have made that quite clear that this is where you fault Nixon in particular. Let's see what the other point was. Well, let's go back to that one,
because I remember yesterday we talked about this meeting that the DCI had when the DCI/DDP were getting ready to brief Kennedy after the election. On the 15th of Nov. 1960, in the meeting prior to the DCI/DDP briefing of J.F.K., the small team concept had already been discarded.

JE

Yes, but we still hadn't gotten up into the legions in a seven ship convoy, we were still maintaining a certain amount of a facade of a guerrilla warfare operation. Well, you know, the other... see the other thing about it there is that after the election, they said "well, go ahead, work on this new arrangement, but we're not going to do anything until...we are not going to do anything until the new administration comes in. Well, those were critical months that were lost... you see. I mean, this is when the... I mean Castro was no fool... the Soviets were no fools... they knew something was afoot, and they were working like mad to consolidate themselves and upgrade the quality of their armed forces, their army. Christ, they were bringing tanks into that Managua base by the hundreds. I don't know how many tanks there are in Cuba today, but there are a hell of a lot, and we were in mortal fear that the MIG's were going to get there... well, the MIG's in fact, did get there... I guess the MIG's were there at that time, but they weren't operational, at that time.

JBP

There was nothing out of a crate at that time.

JE

There were eight there, but they were not operational, as I recall. It was, simply critical weeks... several months were lost that gave Castro the time that he needed to upgrade his forces, which were not in very good shape. That's the thing that rankled me so deeply.

JBP

Berle's on record as making a very interesting observation right after the election, that if any positive action -- and he was talking about military acts -- against Castro were going to take place, the time to do it was right then, right after the election. I thought this was rather interesting in view of your comments. Let's see, now this is one
of these "if" things that the historians some times do... in terms of the organization and management of JMATE, one of the things that you obviously would have done differently, was to resolve the relationship with the air arm -- who was going to be in charge. Are there some other things that you would or wouldn't have done differently in terms of the management of the activity. Were there personalities that were involved that you would have -- if you were going to do it over, you wouldn't have had around, or you would have given more responsibility...or how much you can make...

JE

Well, in personnel I probably would have had a different political team. I wouldn't really have chosen Droller and Hunt, I think, for that aspect of things because Hunt, I didn't have very much confidence in. I had known him for a long time. (He's never done anything since to change my view of the lack of confidence that I had in him -- the lack of confidence in his good judgment primarily.) I certainly would have wanted a better arrangement with the...I wanted the air, the DPD Air to be really and truly under my control. I would have wanted to forget deniability to a greater degree and had slightly better armament and better aircraft than in fact we ended up with. Even in the Second World War, I didn't like B-26's, but although, again, they were just at that point giving us occasional air supplies, in the second World War. I would have had a forward tactical base for the conduct of the war, when it started, at which Hawkins or somebody like that would have been right there and in total control of what he was doing and authorized to take action such as keeping the BARBARA J. and, whatever the other ship was called, the BLAGAR, keeping them in close.

JBP

You would have had him on the vessel then, is that what you are suggesting right off the bat.
So I would have had him at some point, be it on a vessel or on land -- not on Cuba -- but someplace where he could be in direct control (contact?) with the forces, and not have to worry about a relay. You see, that is probably another reason they wanted to bring either the BLAGAR or the BARBARA J. out -- they were the relay point and they probably didn't want to take the chance in losing what communications they had with the beach. I think I would have been a little more lenient in the soldier of fortune aspect of things...of having two or three really deniable Americans (and I don't mean just tar-brushed Agency employees, but people that hadn't had agency connections) somewhere in that complex, it would have been gone in to give them this additional feeling of support they seemed to need. I don't think I'd have done much differently than that.

You mentioned yesterday, as I recall that Droller kind of fell into this job by default...am I recalling that correctly? Did you ask for Droller, or was he given to you?

I was told that I was taking him.

Now, this...

Considering his absolute lack of knowledge of the Latin mentality, his lack of Spanish language, and his rather heavy handed Germanic approach to things, which infuriated the Cubans, Gerry became much more valuable to me than Howard Hunt because he was more reliable. It is just... as I meant to say that he would not have been my hand picked candidate for the job, but neither would Howard; and, so, I don't want you to get the impression that Gerry... that we didn't work closely together, we did, but he just wouldn't...he was...there was nothing in Gerry's background that would particularly qualify him for that job. Everything he did -- he was working, you might say, from day to day.
Who picked him, do you know?
I suppose Tracy, or Dick, I don't know, I don't know.

What you say agrees with my impression of Droller. He was dreadfully ill suited for that job, simply because of his agency background, his natural background, and his language problem, in trying to deal...

It's possible that...I am am sure...he was probably...they were shopping him around at that time. He was a very senior 15. Even then he had probably been in grade for 7 or 8 years, and J.C. probably didn't see fit to turn loose a qualified person from the Division. It would have meant pulling out some Chief of Station, who...of which there were several that would have been qualified for the job, and J.C. didn't want to do that -- so that's probably how it came about.

What comment can you make about the propaganda operation in terms of the JMATE program. Do you think enough attention was paid to propaganda in the thing? We had the Swan radio set up and...

We had the best...that is we did have a strong man there. We had Dave Phillips, and he was really the best propaganda man we had in the Division. He had previous experience as a senior officer in the Guatemalan thing. He was certainly one of the stronger and more dependable members of the Staff, and totally fluent in Spanish. He was able to move in and around all sectors of things with total ease.

I talked to Dave and he said that when they changed the target from TRINIDAD to ZAPATA and he saw the Bahia de Cochinors, he said he nearly lost his mind. Well, when you talked to the Taylor Committee, you mentioned some of these points that you have just been over: that the command center was too far from the fight and, as you pointed out in response to other questions, that the operation had a very narrow margin to
start with, and as things were imposed on you, the
margin was cut even more severely. Then you made some
comment about the operation leaders weren't forceful enough,
especially with reference to the D-Day air strike. I assume
you are talking...you were talking here, about Bissell and
Cabell, is this what you had in mind?

JE
  Yes,
JBP
JE
  Cabell?

Because he was the guy...he was the Air Force General.
He was the fellow that the people would have listened to, and
he was great...he was the equivocator that let the thing get
away from him that night. He came in...I'll never forget
him coming in with a cigar, and he said "Well, we are going
to have to rationalize a little bit here, but things go wrong
about..." Hawkins and I looked at each other, and I said...
"General are you saying that we are not going to get that
airstrike," and he said "Yes." Hawkins said "Well, we've lost.
We are going to lose every ship." Cabell said, "Colonel,"
he said, "I don't know that that's right, I don't think I a
agree with that." I know we had a very...that's when I
wrote out a resignation to the Agency. That was before the
first shot had ever been fired.

JBP
This was on the night when they were already to disembark,
and the Air Force was ready to take off?

JE
Yes, well, Cabell said we would have to get hedgy about
this, because there is not going to be an airstrike. Well,
equivocated, he didn't speak in forthright terms, "to
whomever of Kennedy's group he was talking to. He didn't
tell them that "it is going to be a disaster if this doesn't
happen." If he'd said that, and they had said, "well, you
are not going to get the airstrike call it off," at least we
might have still had a few hours to try and call it off. Now,
whether they would have come back, or not, is something else.
He was talking to Rusk and then they had the idea... he and Bissell were with Rusk and Rusk was talking to the President and they refused to...

What I was really saying by that is if we were running this operation at this point, Hawkins and I, Cabell, who was not very deeply informed on it, shouldn't have been the one that was up there giving the facts in cold terms of what would happen if any further diminishment of the capability took place. Now, I would like to think that the reason that he failed so miserably, that he wasn't adequately informed, and didn't know any...and just wasn't...as I had said at that time, he had awfully clay feet. I don't know...before he died, we made friends again; but there was a long time that we didn't have much to say to each other.

Are you suggesting that Cabell wasn't fully informed about what was going on?

I don't know, whether he was or not. He never spent enough time around, in my judgment, to be informed to the point that he should have been. I don't think the right person was going up to talk, is what I am saying. We were the only ones that really knew, at that point, the total details of the operation and knew what the risks were in detail and what further diminishment of capability would be. When the equity became so great, I don't think just because a person is a GS-18, or because he had 4 stars on his shoulder, that he should have gone himself. He should have at least, if he had to go...he should have at least had one of the principal lieutenants charged with the operation -- and that would be Hawkins and myself. I have never understood why they would presume to go up when things were so critical and not have one or the other -- it didn't have to be me if I was too thorny for them. It could have been Hawkins, but somebody who knew intimately what, how soon, or how easily disaster could come should have been there.
What was the last time that you were involved in a
direct briefing with Kennedy?

I don't know that I ever had a direct briefing.

Were you ever in on any of the briefings that Bissell
and the DCI gave? I can't recall. I think maybe you were
in on one or two, but I don't recall the dates.

I don't recall, I really don't recall. I know that I
had...as I say, I had the one with Rusk -- when I got a little
brusk with Rusk -- about the suggestion that he made.

Let's see, I am going to switch this tape. I've got
another few questions that may...

END OF TAPE 7
After the Taylor Committee finished its work, a suggestion was made by Taylor in his letter of transmittal to Kennedy that all of the principals in the Bay of Pigs operation should be called together and given a briefing on the findings of the Taylor Committee. Were you ever called in for any such briefing? To my knowledge, this never occurred, and I just got access to the Taylor Committee Reports actually about a week before I came down here.

I had a couple of meetings with Burke subsequently in which he was...oh, so remorseful that he hadn't been more fully briefed...more in advance of the thing, so that he would have been able to live up to his reputation as...what'd they call him..."Twenty-knot Burke" or something. He wasn't able to live up to his reputation of taking the kind of action which he clearly saw had been indicated after the fact...that he wasn't aware of before the fact. That is the only meeting that I ever had with him.

Well, I don't have any other specific questions. Is there anything else that you would like to comment on at this time? Things that should get consideration for the history?

Oh, I don't know.

Any other folks that you think I should talk to beside those that we have already noted -- Egan and Hawkins and Thorsrud.

Well, have you talked to Droller?

No, I've never talked to Droller.

Well, I think you should talk to Droller about the political aspect of things. I think his contribution would be positive in that regard.
The subject of what?

You will have to keep him off the subject of Hunt, or he will become absolutely unintelligible. I think that Gerry, in the sense of the Frente... and I think he might also have some comments in terms of propaganda, because he worked quite closely with that... propaganda as related to the Frente. Dick Drain, certainly should be talked to.

I'm going to talk to him.

Dick is a very bright guy who came in with no axe to grind and pretty much retained that -- that role I would say -- throughout contact with the thing. I can't think of any other people that are really alive, and I don't even know whether J.C.King's alive, I know he was in awfully bad health the last time I heard.

Yes, I've not even attempted to contact J.C., because the stories I get are that his health is so bad...

I think he is senile, and...

This is what Dave McLean was telling me two years ago, and I have heard since that he has not improved at all.

No, he has that very bad palsey disease... Parkinson's disease, I think it is, and I understand that it has taken toll on him. I guess the other thing I sort of touched on before is that it has to be done at a level above the professional or the technician -- or however, you wish to refer to us -- although in my case, I'd been around the hemisphere for some years. I'd been a Chief of Station in a couple of major Latin countries, and had general understanding and knowledge of Latin America. But when you get into an operation, if its even foreseeable that is going to have the size that that one took on, it seems to me that at the political... international political level within government, as it relates to Agency and State Department, that there should be further explanation in depth. I mean, that is,
assessment of really of our -- the United States' xposition x
-- position in the hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere in
this case. A thorough examination of our position in the
Western Hemisphere and what (not so much the options) the
probable reaction...I mean a very serious consideration of
what the possible reaction throughout the hemisphere would be
to an operation of this sort...be it successful or not success-
ful. I mean, in other words, suppose it had succeeded,
suppose the Navy had come in and backed us up, and suppose
we had landed troops in Cuba, what in fact would that have
done to our relationship with the rest of the hemisphere.
Would it have "made it so much better" than has it turned out?
I don't know. I really don't know, because it would have...
would have been infinitely more traumatic than, for example,
the Dominican thing, which was pretty hard to live with. In
the Dominican intervention, we weren't really dealing with
the issue of clear cut...the Socialist, yes...the Socialist
State, we were really trying to keep...stop people from
killing each other and get Americans out -- at least, that
was the ostensible reason which was...it was not a clear cut
alternative between "isms." Now let me...I don't think these
kinds of things were ever really thought about in any depth.
I think their first reaction, was God, we've got a possible
Communist in here, we had better get him out just the way we
got Arbenz out. Well, if that kind of analysis in depth
had been done...I don't know, I it would seem to me that
it would go beyond even the Board of National Estimates as
it was constituted at that time. It would have to be
totally at the political level although there would be a
considerable input from a number of places. That alterna-
tives, some of them, perhaps, involving a number of years,
might have emerged from that...which would have meant that
there never would have been a Bay of Pigs. In other words,
was the reaction too rapid, not thought out at all well enough that we should immediately embark on it -- a "guerrilla" type operation" which we talked about at that time, because we had certainly capability...which turned out to be too limited.

JBP

Wasn't Tom Mann, in fact, raising these kinds of questions. Weren't/considerations that Mann kept pitching out?

JE

I don't remember, I... he talked about other options, and I suspect that he was talking along the lines that I maybe am talking now. I don't think that I was necessarily conscious of it at that time, nor did I ever have enough...

Tom was a very busy man in those years, as Asst. Secretary. Although I had known him on a personal and professional basis intimately during his years...during our years together in Guatemala, and then later when he was Ambassador to Salvador and other places. I didn't have very much opportunity ever, to see him. If I did go over it was to one of those little stereotype meetings that we would have with the Asst. Secretary...you would go in and sit down for 10 or 15 minutes, you would raise two or three things...

He was a very active Asst. Secretary...always on the road...with a multitude of other problems. Perhaps...I think you are correct, that that is what he was trying to get at; but he apparently didn't have the muscle to make it work. You see when...Was he the Asst. Secretary? Under Ike?

JBP

Yes, and he was carried on; and he held onto the job. He asked to be relieved, and they didn't relieve him when they changed the administration; and I guess it was along about February or the first of March that he was...

JE

He was relieved by, I can't remember...

JBP

Well, I can't remember who it was.

JE

Well, that's very...the question I ask, was a very...that was really a very strange thing...a strange combination, because Tom Mann was a Lyndon Johnson creature. Lyndon Johnson
made him. Their families were friends way back, and Tom's rise in the Foreign Service was fairly meteoric. He went up to...he got to be a Class 1 Officer when he was in his 30's, because he knew the right people...and he was bright, very bright. Good administrator.

JBP

I have a question in my mind, whether I should try and talk to Mann or not...I am undecided, I don't know... there is...The question would be whether he would talk. Well, I used his papers that are available in the Presidential Libraries, but he has been very, very cautious about talking to people apparently and he wanted to know clearly what I had in mind -- what use I intended to take with them.

JE

Well, you can certainly use my name with him, I think that we still...I haven't seen him in a long time, but I think that we still have a pretty good mutual regard for each other. You could tell him that you have talked to me at length, and that I had suggested that some of the things he was thinking about at that time have never been adequately considered and that was the exploration of other alternatives in the light of what our position was in that the Metropole Club -- if you will -- at that time. But, of course, with everybody so gunshy of everything these days, you know, I don't know.

END OF TAPE 8