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AGENDA

Thursday, 22 October.

♦ Late afternoon: Arrival at Rockefeller estate in Pocantico Hills, NY.
♦ 6:30 PM: Cocktails.
♦ 7:00 PM: Dinner.

Friday, 23 October.

♦ 8:00-8:30 AM: Breakfast.
♦ 9:00 AM-10:45 AM: "The March '77 Moscow Meetings: Preparation, Conduct and Aftermath." Introductory remarks: Viktor Komplektov and Mark Garrison.
♦ 10:45 AM-11:00 AM: Break.
♦ 12:45 PM-2:00 PM: Lunch at Pocantico.
♦ 2:00 PM-3:45 PM: "Regional Conflicts and the Deterioration of Superpower Relations." Introductory Remarks: Svetlana Savranskaya and Wayne S. Smith.
♦ 3:45 PM-4:00 PM: Break.
♦ 5:45 PM-7:00 PM: Free.
♦ 7:30 PM: Dinner.

Saturday, 24 October.

♦ 8:00 AM-8:30 AM: Breakfast.
♦ 9:00 AM-10:45 AM: Informal reactions to discussion of previous day (scholars only).
10:45 AM-11:00 AM: Break.

11:00 AM-12:45 AM: Continued informal reactions and planning of next steps (scholars only).

12:45 PM-2:00 PM: Lunch.

2:00 PM: Adjournment and departure.
SESSION 1:
THE MARCH '77 MOSCOW MEETINGS:
PREPARATION, CONDUCT AND AFTERMATH

JAMES BLIGHT: We have only until 5:45 this afternoon to cover one of the most significant periods of modern times. We don't want to cheat the topics, periods and episodes that came late in the Carter-Brezhnev years, so let's get seated and let's get going. While we're being seated, I would like to remind us of the active involvement in this project of some people who are not here today, at the official "launch" of the Carter-Brezhnev project. President Carter is aware of what we are up to, principally through Bob Pastor. He will participate in person at the appropriate time. Cy Vance set us moving toward this particular meeting last April, when janet, Tom Weiss and I met with him in New York. Cy admonished us to get moving because, as he said, "we're not getting any younger and there is potentially much to be learned." Cy would be here, of course, had he not taken on his current heroic mission of attempting to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. He sends greetings from his temporary home in Geneva. Georgy Kornienko has played a motivating role on the Russian side and wishes very much that he could be here, but his doctor recommended against air travel until he recovers more fully from a recent illness. Finally, I want to mention Walt Slocombe. Until yesterday, Walt planned on being here. But yesterday, he had an accident and broke a couple of teeth. He told janet yesterday that he is full of novocaine and therefore cannot talk. We had to agree with his assessment: that he would be at a distinct disadvantage coming to a meeting like this because he has, he said, strong views but (temporarily no ability to express them.)
VIKTOR KOMPLEKTOV: He could write them over there [on easels provided for this purpose; laughter].

BLIGHT: Ah, yes, the famous "Slocombe charts." Yes, I should have told Walt that we would provide an opportunity to revisit the charts of arms control options that became famous to all of you involved in the SALT II negotiations.

Okay, now, without further ado, let me mention how we'd like this to proceed. Each of the four sessions will be provoked by some "hired guns." In our first session, devoted to the March 1977 Vance mission to Moscow, Mark Garrison and Viktor Komplektov will lead off. The purpose of the opening provocations is to remind us of the issues and to recall as best you can the way the situation looked and felt at the time.

After the opening remarks are concluded, I will open up the discussion: first to the "actors" (or veterans) on each side, then to the rest of us. We will use the Joe Nye one-finger/two-finger, one-hand/two-hand, escalation dominance rule as to the order of speaking. If you have a comment exactly—I mean exactly—on a point being discussed, you should raise two fingers. This allows you to jump to the head of the queue. If you'd like to make a more general remark, or if you wish to change the topic of conversation, please raise one finger and I'll put you on that list.

JOSEPH S, NYE, JR.: But Jim, to make the system work you have to put a price on jumping the queue. You have to speak less than one minute in your comments.
BLIGHT: You have just heard it from the inventor of the one-finger/two-finger rule. If your comments follow a one-finger intervention, your remarks had better be short, perspicacious and punchy. So, let us begin with Mark Garrison and Viktor Komplektov.

MARK GARRISON: Who goes first?

BLIGHT: I'll leave that up to the two of you.

KOMPLEKTOV: Mark, of course.

GARRISON: Well, I don't know. If the objective is to provoke things we may not be the right two people to start because, as Viktor said last night, we have always agreed on everything [laughter].

KOMPLEKTOV: This is a "famous first": I cede the floor to Mark.

BLIGHT: There may perhaps be some present who missed the irony in Viktor's and Mark's voices. If so, as I understand it, we are witnessing the beginning a new era, with Mark and Viktor agreeing, even on this procedural point. That is, if we can get them to agree. Mark?

GARRISON: Actually, at first glance it might seem nicely symmetrical to have two guys who were in the Foreign Ministry and in the State Department in 1977 talk about the March
discussions. But in fact it really isn’t because, frankly speaking, I was not involved in the preparation of the U.S. SALT position. I didn’t know what our final position was until well after we got to Moscow. Viktor, on the other hand, was much more involved on the Soviet side, and so were his colleagues who are here today. However, I think we should take note of the fact that the Soviet position coming into those talks on SALT was relatively straightforward and simple. Perhaps, therefore, it did not require a lot of preparation.

In any case, thanks to the memoirs of Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski (particularly Brzezinski), and thanks to Ray Garthoff’s little book [laughter], I now know a lot more about the U.S. preparations. In addition, of course, there are people here today who have first-hand information. I do hope that we will go beyond the details of the SALT options and try to reconstruct, if we can, the underlying attitudes and objectives on each side. I also hope we discuss the differing and competing approaches of the two sides. To that end I think we ought to look at the priorities that some of the main players on each side attached to strategic arms control, and the function they believed was served by arms control, as well as whether and how to link SALT II to other issues. I think by going down that path we may get some answers to the questions on our agenda: what opportunity did we miss and why did we miss it?

The various memoirs give us a basis for sketching out where the principle Americans stood on these issues. Carter clearly put a high priority on nuclear arms control for its own sake. This was reflected, for example, in his inaugural speech and it is asserted at various points in his memoirs. At the same time, his actions on human rights showed that he thought SALT could be separated from the other issues that he considered important.
Vance put less emphasis on the danger of nuclear weapons as such, holding instead that the main problem was containing Soviet expansionism while, at the same time, moderating U.S.-Soviet tensions. It was in the latter context that he viewed the significance of SALT—as an important component of U.S.-Soviet relations and improving those relations. Vance accepted the fact of linkage, it would seem, because he thought that everything affecting the U.S. view of the Soviet Union, including human rights, had a bearing on the eventual ratification of an agreement. But of course, as we know, he favored quiet diplomacy in order not to impede the negotiation of the agreement.

Brzezinski says that he saw SALT as the principal test of Soviet intentions and possibly a way to halt what he viewed as the Soviet military buildup. This "litmus test" view was eventually embodied in the slogan "cooperation or confrontation," the choice being left to the Soviet Union. It also contained the seeds of direct linkage to the Horn of Africa issue, which had a brief prominence in 1978.

None of us, I trust, will forget another key player on the American side: Henry ("Scoop") Jackson--Senator Jackson, who was pushing Carter very hard on both human rights and on SALT. Jackson saw the relationship, as far as I could tell, as a completely zero-sum game which the United States should play to win. His 23-page memo to Carter in February 1977 ought to be one of the documents in our arsenal for studying that period.

Now, for the Soviet side I have mostly questions, following one observation. To me, it seemed that the Soviet leadership was not particularly alarmed by a high level of nuclear weapons, and in fact saw them as an important element of Soviet status in the world. Protracted negotiations, therefore, seemed to serve that purpose as well as a signed and ratified treaty. Since
the Soviet leaders seemed to see Carter as being particularly anxious to get a SALT treaty, they themselves practiced a form of linkage. If Carter wanted SALT he would have to recognize the new balance of forces in the world and the Soviet status as the other superpower. At least that’s the way it seemed to me. I’d like some reaction to this from our Soviet colleagues.

Now, as to my question for the Soviet side. In preparing for the March 1977 discussions, was any thought given to, in effect, trying to win Carter over by playing ball with him? I would be interested in how Ambassador Dobrynin and his embassy characterized this new president to your colleagues in Moscow, as you began to get acquainted with Carter, Vance and Brzezinski. I would also like to ask--I guess this is a second question: Was Brezhnev pretty much out of it, in terms of the discussions about strategy? If that was the case, was it Ustinov who was calling the shots? What was the relationship between Ustinov and Gromyko? And what role, if any, did Brezhnev’s staff--for example, Aleksandrov--play in all of this?

Finally, I’d like to register a couple of more or less operational thoughts. I was struck by how serious the White House took the correspondence--the letters between Brezhnev and Carter--in these early months of Carter’s presidency, and by the frequency of the letters back and forth. So I hope that we’ll put our minds to trying to get all of those letters, all of that correspondence, released so that we can analyze the effect the letters had. My other thought is that there are, of course, a lot of players on both sides whose views were not popular among many sitting at this table, and still are not popular. But they cannot be ignored if we’re going to try and understand what happened. I hope we’ll get into the question of how best to get their views and their input on this. Thank you.
BLIGHT: Mark has taken eight and a half minutes and has been, as usual, a model of clarity. But I remind you: eight and a half is more than five, which is what we should strive for. Viktor, since you and Mark have always agreed on everything, perhaps what we should do, to save time, is to ask you if you agree with everything Mark has said. Viktor [laughter]?

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, I agree with Mark's questions, yes [laughter].

BLIGHT: Ambassador Viktor Komplektov.

KOMPLEKTOV: Let me begin by touching on some of the items in the background in which the March meeting was held. I will start with a description of the 1976 presidential race. We should not forget that at that time the very word "detente" was dropped from the official U.S. rhetoric. When Ronald Reagan entered the race, I personally believe that he pushed both Jimmy Carter and President Ford far to the right of their original positions, as far as international issues were concerned. This is my first point. Then, as Mark noted, we cannot discount the influence of Senator Jackson. If you look through the chronology [compiled by the National Security Archive and distributed to conference participants before the conference], you will find a specific reference to February 4, 1977. Carter meets with Senator Jackson and they both agree that it is desirable to press for substantial reductions in strategic forces under SALT II. But, you know, it can be misleading to discuss these issues only in general terms. If we look specifically at what this would have meant, we discover that the reductions would have come mainly in the ICBMs, all kinds of ICBMs, and the heavy ICBMs—Soviet ICBMs—in particular. I don't know
whether you remember Senator Jackson’s theory at that time. He believed that in the natural evolution of technology, if there were no modifications and no new types of ICBMs (leaving aside SLBMs and other types), these heavy ICBMs would fade out naturally in 10 or 15 years, without being replaced.

I also want to draw your attention, again, to the chronology: specifically January 18, 1977, and the Tula speech by Brezhnev. He there defined our notion of detente as competing with each other, but emphasizing the resolution of our outstanding issues by peaceful means, through negotiations. But Brezhnev’s major point was that the Soviet Union does not seek superiority in any military capacity beyond what is needed for deterrence. I stress this word: "deterrence."

As far as I remember, this was the first time that Brezhnev or any of our political or military leaders mentioned deterrence as a rationale for our strategic forces. Militarily, we had always thought—that is, our professional military people thought and said publicly—that no matter what kind of nuclear strike we might receive, we must have the capability to secure a crushing retaliatory strike. But on January 18, 1977 Brezhnev said, for the first time, that our goal was deterrence. That was a big move forward in our military thinking. And note the date: two days before the inauguration of President Carter.

Now to the March 1977 meeting itself. We had been engaged in very serious preparations for the meeting. Well before the meeting, there was an exchange of personal letters between the two presidents, Brezhnev and Carter. In addition, Ambassador Dobrynin had a rather extensive talk with Secretary Vance on the eve of his departure for Moscow. So we knew the U.S. position before-hand, and they were completely unacceptable to us, in part because of some misinterpretations or misunderstanding about the distinction between the ballistic missiles and the
cruise missiles. This seemed to us to be inconsistent with the letters of our common interest, which had by 1977 been long-standing and had been negotiated at the Geneva talks. By "misinterpretation" I mean that each side misinterpreted the other, possibly because of incorrect translation. Sometimes missiles were called "ballistic missiles," sometimes "cruise missiles," and sometimes simply "missiles." That caused technical problems, but was somehow cleared up during a later round of talks.

We are accustomed to calling the March 1977 meeting a failure because we did not agree on far-reaching reductions, or "deep cuts" in strategic forces. I disagree with this interpretation. Let us look at that meeting with benefit of hindsight. From that point on our positions got closer to each other, closer to meeting halfway on the substantial issues concerning SALT. This resulted in 1979 in the signing the SALT II treaty. The treaty was observed by both sides and became a model for later developments.

In addition, I would say that because of the initiative that began in March 1977, the entire sphere of arms control and disarmament negotiation was enlarged through the establishment of several working groups, dealing with chemical warfare, conventional arms, and so on. As you know, these were pursued more aggressively ten years or so later, but the foundations for these discussions were laid during that period, in the Carter era generally and at the March meeting in particular. That is my second point.

My third point is this: that in looking back at those events, it seems to me that we--when I say "we," I mean both the United States and the Soviet Union--we had managed to reach all that we could reasonably have been expected to reach. No more, no less, under the circumstances. This was no small accomplishment, if we bear in mind the state of our domestic and
international political environment at the time, bearing in mind also some international happenings and events which were beyond our control. Then there were all the regional hot-spots that constantly got in the way of our good relations.

So I would say that, in general, the entire Carter period in Soviet-American relations was a sort of a transition from the euphoria of the early 70s on detente to a more clear-cut understanding of what can be done between our two countries to keep their relations in good balance. Well, of course we can go into Afghanistan, but this is another story. And despite Afghanistan, we managed somehow to save the SALT process, which later on provided us with the ability to discuss the intermediate-range ballistic missiles and and also the recent START agreement. Thank you.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Ambassador Viktor Komplektov. Ambassador Dobrynin, and then Ambassador Shulman.

ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN: Allow me just to make a very few remarks, in response to Mark Garrison’s question about what the embassy told Moscow about this newcomer, President Carter. I should say that at the beginning, we looked at the newcomer rather cautiously because we didn’t know how things would go. The most important issue for us at the embassy was continuity of the detente process. We tried to apprise the new administration, the administration of Carter from this perspective. This was the most important point. This was the big question on our minds, and providing an answer to it was virtually all we were supposed to do.
I would say attaching a few, let us say "reforms" on the [Vladivostok] treaty, seemed to us like an ambush. In addition, the human rights issue became very prominent in our way of thinking about the President and his new administration. Very early in the administration, we discussed this human rights issue--more than twelve times, I think. Also, I had to wonder, as you say: what were the names of your people in the State Department, in the White House, who I knew before, and who were willing to do their best to help Mr. Carter on human rights questions? On any question--even involving the President and Prime Minister Sadat--the President would say "I am not trying to needle the Soviet Union, but I am going to speak openly about human rights because this is my conviction." But I want to emphasize that the people in Moscow, they were human beings too. This constant repetition of human rights slogans got to them. To Leonid Brezhnev, in particular, the United States was a little bit "overly-public." This is what he said.

My own impression was that in the beginning, President Carter was so sure of our devotion to detente, that he had convinced himself that we would swallow anything for the sake of detente. I knew many people on our side who were in the middle of Soviet/American relations who worried that Carter's approach was dangerous for detente. They said: "he may do what he is doing but, please, not make so many public statements, which is definitely not desirable." But still Carter continued. Our hope was that this theme of human rights could have ended. Around the 15th, I guess, of February, there was a letter from Carter to Brezhnev in which he proposed a change in the future negotiations. But it wasn't really about SALT reductions. It was on human rights concessions. He wanted us to yield. He said your president should understand me. This is my conviction. Everybody knows it, so I'm going to press on it.
I must say: that was outrageous! So, in Moscow, there was no discussion. They viewed the letter and the address [at the UN, March 17, 1977] of the President, as a sign that Carter was yielding to pressure from the right wing to worsen our political relations. This is why there was a decision to answer President Carter in a rather strong way.

Carter's was also a futile position regarding human rights. He seemed to be in a rush to do all sorts of things. But the harping on human rights seemed to us to be really an indication of things—the kind of things—we could expect from this President. The letter from Brezhnev two weeks later was clear: deep reductions? We're not going to make any deep reductions. Brezhnev thought it was outrageous. I told President Carter: "he's not going to make this deep reduction because it is simply impossible." We already had an acceptable agreement which had been worked out in Vladivostok. That was what we wanted in Moscow. But no. President Carter wanted to go further and further. He kept insisting on some changes; he kept saying we should change it, we should have much more drastic reductions. I make no attempt to say whether it was fair or not fair for Carter to make such requests. Looking back, it is clear that those who put together the Carter proposal were opposed to peanuts [laughter]. Oh excuse me, I'm sorry [more laughter].

It is important to understand the Vladivostok talks. For Brezhnev it was very difficult to accept what he accepted, limited though it was. So now, a new proposal from Carter comes along that says, in effect: "why don't you just forget about the [Vladivostok] proposal that we negotiated. Now we're going to do something radically different." These were completely unacceptable conditions. Brezhnev couldn't go to the Politburo and say "now, too bad." Carter's approach was so unrealistic, from the Moscow point of view. This is where the suspicions
began. In our minds we began to think that perhaps the new proposal was meant simply to embarrass the Soviet Union. So this made it a very difficult proposal to accept because, as I mentioned, the Politburo was aghast. In Moscow, it generally looked like a propaganda ploy. It was connected, in general, with other [human rights] proposals—unacceptable proposals—which, so it appeared, were presented just for the sake of embarrassing us.

So overall, the new U.S. proposal in March 1977 created a difficult, a very difficult situation. He [Brezhnev] spoke about this error to Gromyko, and our military. He said: "there is already some agreement and suddenly all this was proposed by President Carter. He shouldn’t have done this at all." This was again such a step back—on SALT, on human rights. I was told: "Anatoly, we’re going to have trouble on this human rights issue for four years."

Thank you. This is the background. The new proposal was a rude violation of our previous understanding. We thought it wasn’t serious, but an attempt to harrass us, to embarrass us.

[Brief discussion in Russian between Dobrynin and Komplektov].

DOBRYNIN: Now, I should mention about Senator Jackson. You know quite well the president’s involvement with Senator Jackson. With Jackson, you see, it was an unfortunate incident ... I have to put it this way. Jackson wanted to go to Moscow, to be invited by President Brezhnev. We didn’t do it. Then, Carter asked Brezhnev to invite him [Jackson]. He said to me: "maybe you will convince him." Later, he got his invitation. First he said he would go. Then he said he wouldn’t.
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF: When was that?

DOBRYNIN: I think it was in 1977 or 1978.

GARTHOFF: Early 1977?

KOMPLEKTOV: It was in the last half of 1977, or early 1978.

DOBRYNIN: And so, it was quite alright. The condition under which he would accept the invitation was, of course, that he could visit with dissidents. Nowadays, of course, it would be really no problem. But at that time, it was really hard. I said to the Senator: "Conditions? Are you not going to the President of the Soviet Union on his invitation?" "So," he said, "I will have to once again decline unless you accept my conditions." This was the situation in those days.


MARSHALL D. SHULMAN: I would like to ask your advice. I would like to speak in order to ask Anatoly a question having to do with his remarks. But I would also like, if I may, to extend my remarks to the (substance) of what Anatoly said about the human rights issue, just to put it into the framework of the times. Is that alright?
BLIGHT: Pazhalasta.

SHULMAN: Here is the question, Anatoly, that I've wondered about, and I welcome the chance to ask you. Now, Cy and I have a different memory about your last meeting with him before the trip to Moscow. When you came into the last meeting with Vance before you went back to Moscow, at that time, were you aware then of what the final U.S. position was going to be? Or did you leave Washington under the impression that the U.S. would accept the "Vladivostok plus" formula? My memory is that, at the time of your last session with Cy, before you went back...

GARTHOFF: Excuse me, do you know the date on that?

SHULMAN: That was just about a week before the [Moscow] meeting. You see, a pattern, a tradition, had grown up to give Anatoly a little advance notice to give time to Moscow to think about it, and so on. And so Cy was having his last session with Anatoly before he went to Moscow. Now, I am not sure in my own memory whether at the time that Cy saw you, he knew what President Carter's final decision was going to be--in saying that it was the comprehensive proposal rather than Vladivostok. It was hanging, it was uncertain. So the question is: when you left to go back to Moscow, were you aware that the President's decision had been to put the comprehensive proposal first, or were you still under the impression, which you might have had at that time, that the U.S. was prepared to accept the "Vladivostock plus" formula?
DOBRYNIN: Well, I think that, first, I would put it this way (and Komplektov said the same thing): Carter felt he had to out-perform his predecessors. Supposedly, he was rather well-informed about the various positions. The most important thing for me is that Moscow was hit with a big surprise, which caused everybody to become emotional and, after that, there no way to discuss it.

But on whether I was surprised by what you took to Moscow? I don't remember thinking that it was all clear in my mind, your position. One thing was clear to me. You were retreating from the proposal. You were retreating. How far was not quite clear to me. Of course in the area of strategic weapons, the retreat was small, but in any case, it was a retreat. This was my impression. It wasn't the two or three-hundred missiles. It was the fact that you were retreating from a previous agreement.

SHULMAN: The point at issue, Jim, was this: I had the impression that one of the factors causing the Soviet response, when we got to Moscow was that they had not felt themselves forewarned about what our position was going to be, except that, while the delegation was in the air, there was a White House background press meeting that did lay out the comprehensive proposal. But my own memory of it was that when Anatoly was briefed before he left, our final decision hadn't yet been made. He was not forewarned that the weight would go to the comprehensive proposal. Now, I should add that Cy Vance was not happy with this. But now may I go on ... ?

ALEKSANDER BESSMERTNYKH: This is very, very interesting--this information. I was in the meeting, as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], with the ambassador and the secretary. The
secretary at that time gave him a briefing on the comprehensive approach. And at that time the ambassador said exactly what you [turning to Dobrynin] just said. We immediately recognized that it was very one-sided. At that time we didn’t know that there would be a second part of the position, which was the possibility of maintaining the (to us) preferable Vladivostok treaty. When the delegation went to Moscow, we in Washington only knew about the comprehensive approach.

SHULMAN: Well that tends to support Cy Vance’s memory... May I go on with my...?

BLIGHT: Bob Pastor has a comment exactly on this point.

ROBERT A. PASTOR: Actually, I wanted to ask a question before your discussion of human rights, on one of the points Ambassador Dobrynin made. On that late February first letter from Brezhnev to Carter: was the tone of it motivated largely by the concern about human rights?

KOMPLEKTOV: This was not on human rights, no, no. It was a new addition to the SALT proposal.

BLIGHT: On this too, Bill? Bill Taubman.

WILLIAM TAUBMAN: Yes, you mentioned the "two or three hundred." What are you referring to? Are you referring to the Carter notion expressed very early on to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, in which Carter held that 200 or 300 missiles might be enough? Or are you referring to something else?

KOMPLEKTOV: No, no. Two or three hundred cut in strategic weapons.

NYE: Oh, a cut!

DOBRYNIN: In response to Bob Pastor: it was a number of issues that upset Brezhnev. It's not a single issue in any single letter. There was pressure. "Several hundred" was first mentioned by Carter. Cy Vance mentioned it to me once before he left--but it was three or four weeks before he left for Moscow. I asked him about it and he said: "I don't know. Probably we will propose the cuts." But this was in conversation, not in the proposal that I saw. It was simply discussion.

GARTHOFF: But it was a reduction of 2 or 3 hundred?

KOMPLEKTOV: While preparing Brezhnev for that meeting with Secretary Vance, we knew already that he had abandoned the first agreement. Our main task was to find arguments for Brezhnev to put forward in favor of the Vladivostok proposals.

GARRISON: But you didn’t know that he was going to come with a fallback position that would give you an opportunity to start discussing the Vladivostok accord.
KOMPLEKTOV: But you know, we didn’t have enough time during Secretary Vance’s stay in Moscow to analyze both versions. As you know, the issue at Vladivostok was the state of the heavy missiles. But now, all of a sudden, the issue became the issue of the forward bases.


SHULMAN: In order not to talk too long now, I will postpone to a later point a response on the question of the two proposals. At the moment, I just want to enter an analytical point with regard to the human rights issue. This is one that we’ll want to come back to many times, I think, in different ways, but it does seem to be useful in our discussion of the human rights issue to make very clear that it was an amalgam of several things. There were several streams that were converging in American politics at that time that made up the human rights issue. It was not a homogeneous issue, it was a complex, it meant different things to different people and served different purposes.

One element of it obviously was that Jimmy Carter came to Washington out of an experience with the civil rights movement in America, and he was, in a sense, translating onto an international stage this same activism with regard to civil rights. As it happened, very early on after his election, he got a letter from Solzhenitsyn. His response to it was out of that pattern of civil rights activism.

There was also a second stream, however. This was a period when there was an adverse reaction in American politics to what was perceived as the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, and its lack of sufficient attention to the moral issues in international relations. There was a good
deal of sentiment that moral considerations had been neglected in the previous period. There was kind of a backlash.

Thirdly, it was also true that for those who were strongly against the Soviet Union and against SALT—essentially the hard-line position—the human rights issue also had a function as part of the political offensive against the Soviet Union. There was a strong feeling that this was an issue on which the Soviet Union was vulnerable and so the human rights issue was used by people who held that position in their political offensive.

There was also a fourth element that developed a little later on: the Jewish emigration issue. It centrally involved Scoop Jackson and Richard Perle and on the issue of linkage with trade, the Jackson-Vanik amendment and also the role in American domestic politics of dealing with Jewish groups on the issue.

There seem to me to have been at least those four streams that had somewhat a life of their own, and had different meanings for different people. I think when we come to following this up in our substantive work, it will be useful to make distinctions between them.

DOBRYNIN: Well, I quite agree with Marshall’s very good analysis. But as seen from real politics, from real diplomatic practice, from the standpoint of real foreign relations, domestic politics is a subject we really had not begun to deal with. I can easily admit that there was misunderstanding on both sides regarding the March 1977 proposals. But we had to ask ourselves: who is in charge of the foreign relations of this administration? President Carter continued to attack us in public, in public, in public! Always in public! I think Carter could
have toned down his human rights policy. At that time it was, very frankly, dangerous--to the Soviet Union and to the United States.

SHULMAN: May I just respond? I hear you and understand what you're saying. I think there's one other element that ought to be added to the discussion. That is how, in a significant way, the human rights issue has changed in international relations since that time. At that time, discussion of human rights was regarded as an interference in domestic affairs. What has happened since that time is that the prevailing practice has changed, and it is now accepted in international relations that a discussion of human rights is a legitimate element in international relations discourse. But it was different at that time. It's worth noting how it changed.

DOBRYNIN: During that Cold War period all agreed that SALT was the key element during at the time. But what happened? There was no continuity with the previous administration. There were no priorities with this new U.S. administration, quite frankly. Instead, the question was about SALT and human rights, SALT and Cuba, SALT and Ethiopia, SALT and Somalia, SALT and the Russian brigade there, SALT and Panama--you were even trying to do that. One, but only one, of those disturbing elements, from our point of view, was human rights.

KOMPLEKTOV: I do agree that the moral consideration was personal with President Carter. This may be why he came out so publicly in addressing the human rights issue. The administration's stance on this issue was rather discreet in comparison with others, but seems to have been applied directly and first of all to the Soviet Union. Do you agree?
SHULMAN: Sure. That's part of the Soviet, not on this part...

NYE: No, that's not true...

SHULMAN: You know, I think in the case of the present example that for many people, those who used it as part of a political offensive, what you say is true. I think for the President's part, that early on in his administration, when he did not yet have very much experience in international relations, that he was simply extrapolating onto the international arena his own convictions that he had carried over from his experience in the civil rights movement.

KOMLEKTOV: That's true, I agree. But I'm talking in terms of practical politics.

SHULMAN: Well, this was the first issue, you know, to come to the fore in this administration.

PASTOR: One interesting element of the human rights policy was that almost every government in the world felt that it was applied selectively to itself. You heard exactly the same argument from countries throughout the world. I certainly heard it from many governments in Latin America. "Why are you doing it only to us? If you were really serious about human rights," the Argentine generals would say, "Why aren't you applying it to the Soviet Union? You're not saying anything about the Soviet Union." They would say: "you're not really concerned about the Soviet Union, you're just applying it to us." So I think there was a generalizable policy there, which mostly...
KOMPLEKTOV: And yet you had better relations with Latin America during the very start of the Carter Administration. So it was a matter of degree according to which this issue was imposed in practical terms on one or another country.

DOBRYNIN: I think we have established that there are two different sides to the story. We're just trying to discuss the different views we had, for example, on human rights. What we're trying to discuss now is the beginning of the Carter administration. We discuss this proposal of SALT, and we try to tell from our point of view how it was. Human rights was not an issue, as such, for us, but a point of view. Emotionally, we were trying to deal with the constant talk about human rights, at the same time we were trying to save detente. Part of it was the way it was said. Secretary Vance also talked about human rights but did not do so in such a way as to issue a command.

BLIGHT: May I ask a question of people on this side of the table [turns to U.S. side]? I think we've heard a lot of very interesting conversation, some of it for the first time, as far as I'm concerned, about the way the Carter human rights policy came about, what it emerged from, and so on. But what about the discussion, very early before March 30th, 1977? Was there some awareness that the policy would create this kind of a response, and would get in the way of certain fundamental issues in SALT and the Soviet/American relationship?

BEISMERTNYKH: Jim, if I might inject something here, I would like to explain a couple of things. Human rights was not the main factor, but now we are discussing it as if it were the
dominant factor that influenced the beginning of our relationship during the Carter Administration. In 1976, actually nothing was happening in SALT. That was a very dark period. There were a lot of hopes that Carter would go on with the SALT process. That's something that should be kept in mind. Since February, 1976, nothing had been happening and then we heard Carter during the election campaign say that he would be much stronger with SALT, so we were encouraged. So he created a very hopeful situation for the start of the SALT negotiations.

Now second, the Soviet Union was in an interesting position. We had achieved parity and that gave us some self-confidence. But at the same time, we were very, very worried about any change in the situation. For example, we were concerned about the way the "China card" might be played. That was a constant, constant source of irritation and anxiety we had to bear in mind.

Third, besides Jackson, there is another human issue we must mention: Brzezinski. Zbig Brzezinski, was an important part of the Russian reactive thinking about U.S. foreign policy. At that time, we associated Brzezinski's predominance in U.S. foreign policy formulation as an indication that the Carter administration would be very strong on East Europe. And East Europe was even, in certain ways, was even, maybe, more important than human rights for us. It was a very, very difficult problem for the Soviet Union at that time. We should recognize that.

And so, the start of the Carter Administration seemed to us to have set out on a mission of breakthroughs for SALT. But at the same time, the administration generated a lot of suspicions as far as East Europe was concerned, human rights was concerned, etc. So we had an intriguing situation. It was highly unusual. Normally, either you have a very strong dislike of the forthcoming administration or a very strong liking for it. Here we have conflicting cues.
That’s why, as the Ambassador [Dobrynin] said, we were cautious ... we were cautious, we were watching every single move of this administration. We tried to understand how it worked. And the first test was, of course, these SALT propositions. We had this comprehensive idea brought to us. To us, especially the professionals, it looked like a big step, you know. It was really a shock at that time.

Every month, every quarter of the year, Carter brought something else to us. You know there were submarines and neutron weapons. There seemed to us to be confusion as to what was important for Russia. It was very important—the Radio Free Europe programming and this sort of thing. All this was perceived by us as an indication that we had in Washington a very ideological administration, an administration that was going to be very politically ideological in those terms, in the terms of the seventies, you know. So when we analyze this, the specific issues like SALT, you’ve got to make sure to get the atmospherics accurate. In Moscow, there was a perception of a man—Carter—who came fresh, a little bit naive, you know, and was really trouble. They perceived him in the beginning as a nuisance and then as trouble. That was the gist of the Soviet thinking. We started bad, but the SALT process went on, and slowly improved the hopes and improved the relationship. And in 1979 when we had the signing of SALT II, the relationship was on top. It was good, on top.

SHULMAN: 1979? Oh no...

BESSMERTNYKH: No, no. The signing of SALT. For SALT it was...
SHULMAN: Relations had been in a general decline.

BESSMERTNYKH: The summit meeting ...

BLIGHT: The discussion of which will come somewhat later in the next session.

BESSMERTNYKH: June, 1979, was good. That was I think the top point of our relationship. In August, 1979, just two months later, we started to slide down, and we never recovered. We were going down, down, with the help of the Soviet situation, the help of our own introduction of troops into Afghanistan. But, it was a movement like this - down, up, down [makes sine wave movement with hand]. This was the frenetic relationship with the Carter Administration. First down, then a little bit up, then it goes back down.

You know, in two years we got used to these human rights "insults." If I may look backward for a moment from the standpoint of the present, I would say that human rights pressure exerted at the time helped the Soviet Union, in the sense that it speeded the reform of its domestic political system. Frankly speaking, because it was so embarassing, we had to give a little. And slowly we were giving a little. To me, 1977 was such a, it was such an unusual year ...

BLIGHT: I have a long list here. We've got roughly half an hour to go, so I'd like to involve some people who've not gotten a chance to participate in the discussion so far. Joe?
NYE: I had just a very short point to make. I think the Carter Administration really didn’t have priorities, and therefore it’s not surprising that it got confused. I saw it from the standpoint of another issue. I was in charge of nuclear non-proliferation. The President would go to the same government and press them on non-proliferation and human rights and other issues all at the same time, and when you tried to say "wait a minute you can’t do all this at once," it still didn’t get cleared up.

DOBRYNIN: Don’t you think this would mean that the lack of priorities was the real trouble in this administration? It was also my impression that they didn’t have priorities.

NYE: I think that’s right. In other words, let’s say that you have five priorities, which Carter had: non-proliferation, human rights, SALT and so forth. Well, then, you really have no priorities. And I think one of the problems, particularly in the early stages of the administration, was that it wasn’t clear what was the first priority. I saw this on other issues, and I think that what you experienced might have also been experienced by several other governments.

DOBRYNIN: I agree completely that this was a big problem at the beginning. Carter had no coherent idea or real plan for Soviet/American relations.

SHULMAN: Excuse me, if I may. Bear in mind the importance of the Notre Dame speech that came early on. But the important point, in relation to what Sasha [Bessmertnykh] said earlier, is that Carter’s policy developed through phases. The first phase was the inordinate fear of
Communism, which carried over from his campaign. He did have a plan, but it turned out that there were other plans, too.

**BLIGHT:** Svetlana.

**SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA:** This has been an interesting discussion about the perception of U.S. human rights policy in the Soviet Union. I would like to extend it a little bit. Reading Carter's memoirs, I was really surprised by how much time and attention he devotes to the political situation in the U.S. He seems to be so sensitive to the American political scene. It showed in his negotiations with the Senators during the Panama Canal treaty and then with SALT. I tried to find the exact quotation, but I couldn't. He says something to the effect that it's so much easier to carry out such a decision like SALT, for example, in a closed system like the Soviet Union. But then, my question is, and this is for the American side: What was your assessment, what was the assessment by the Carter administration of the Soviet political setting in the beginning of 1977? Carter was very sensitive to his own political setting, but he also knew, and the administration knew from the first correspondence with Brezhnev, that to Brezhnev the Vladivostok agreements were such a high priority, and that they were proud of what they had done. They perceived this as a real breakthrough for the Soviet Union. How did Carter and how did American leaders think? Was there any deliberation on that point?

**SHULMAN:** When it's appropriate, on your list, I'd be glad to respond, but I don't know if it is...
BLIGHT: It just became appropriate. The question was put. I'd love to have your answer. Marshall?

SHULMAN: Well, at some point it seemed to me it would be useful to have Ray or Joe or others respond on the meaning of the comprehensive proposal to different people. But at that point there were beginning to be divergences within the administration on how to read the Soviet situation, and what would be feasible. Secretary Vance's position was to proceed with the Vladivostok proposal, plus or minus, as a basis of the negotiations. I think he was fully aware of the problems Brezhnev had encountered in negotiating. He wanted to build on the Vladivostok agreement and thought that was the best way of getting on with the process.

There were others in the administration who thought differently. These were people who, I think, were sincerely interested in reductions, who had a very strong feeling that the deficiency of Vladivostok was that it left untouched what was the most serious issue in American security—the Soviet heavy missiles. The official calculation of the Joint Chiefs at that time was that anything over about 150 of the Soviet missiles meant danger for the United States. The prime objective of the negotiations at that point, was to get the heavy missiles down below that number.

Now there were still others involved in the drafting of the comprehensive proposal—perhaps there are others present who may talk more knowledgeably about that—who had obscure motives. Some of whom thought—and I think the President was among them—that the Soviets could be persuaded to go along with the more radical proposal, the more radical cuts. I remember myself thinking, personally, that the numbers had to come down.
Believe it or not, there were still others. I am thinking of Richard Perle's position, of Scoop Jackson's position, which I would describe this way: whether or not Brezhnev could accept it--and he probably couldn't--it was a good thing to push him on the issue. If he rejected it, well, so much the better, from that point of view. So there was a mixture, I think, of motivations about putting the comprehensive proposal before the Soviets in March 1977.

BLIGHT: I call on Ray Garthoff.

GARTHOFF: First, I would like to say something on the human rights issue. Ambassador Dobrynin suggested earlier that the Carter Administration had perhaps overestimated Soviet devotion to detente, and therefore thought Moscow would swallow that kind of human rights offensive. While I think that comes close to the way Brzezinski approached it, I don't think that reflects President Carter's approach. I think President Carter really didn't understand, that he found it difficult to understand, why his emphasis on human rights issues should be regarded as such an offensive measure--in both senses of the word "offensive"--in Moscow, and he really thought there was no real incompatibility between his human rights campaign, on the one hand and, on the other, his efforts to renew detente and move forward on the arms control issue. In this sense, perhaps there was some misunderstanding in Moscow as to what the human rights issue meant to the President although, as several of us have noted, there were those in the administration, as well as more broadly in Washington, who did wish to use the issue in an offensive way.
On the March '77 SALT approaches: it's been noted that some people in Washington saw the Soviet reaction to the proposal as a touchstone of overall Soviet intentions and, in addition, as an indication of their position on SALT. I don't believe it was a valid touchstone of overall Soviet interests or intentions, nor even of Soviet SALT positions such as, for example, the possibility of working on toward reductions on the basis of Vladivostok. Much has already been noted about the Soviet shock reaction to the unexpected U.S. proposal, which they saw as a change of position, as an abandonment of the Vladivostok-plus agreement. As Marshall just indicated, there were several different views, different ways of thinking on the part of various authors of the comprehensive proposal and of the overall package that was taken to Moscow.

I think both President Carter and Brzezinski thought in particular that they ought to be able to do better than Henry Kissinger, and they ought to be able to get some reductions, not just something that set a limit at current levels. They were impatient, especially Carter, and wanted to move as far and as quickly as possible. I think Secretary Vance and some others had some doubts, some reservations, about so early and radical a change. Nonetheless Vance and the others may have thought, incorrectly as it turned out, in the short run, that after an attempt, to get these reductions, things could settle back very quickly if it didn't work. Thus, according to this view, if Moscow was not prepared to move promptly to reductions, one could fall back to the Vladivostok approach, and move on from there. Over the months that followed, that is what happened.

But in March 1977 I think there was a failure on the U.S. side to appreciate that the authorized second alternative would also be troublesome and unacceptable to Moscow. There was a failure to distinguish sufficiently, in Washington, between Vladivostok-plus and
Vladivostok-minus. The thinking seems to have been: well, this is still Vladivostok, and if we just set aside these questions of the cruise missiles and the Backfire, that's still fine. Well, that wasn't what Moscow saw as Vladivostok, by March, 1977. They saw Vladivostok, in the first place, as having given a good first step toward the inclusion of cruise missiles.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, I agree. There were different interpretations of what was meant by "Vladivostok."

GARTHOFF: Second, there was the history of Vladivostok as it had developed from the end of 1974 and till the time that SALT II negotiations began in early 1976. Particularly important were the January, 1976 Kissinger sessions in Moscow. So that "Vladivostok-plus" was Vladivostock, plus some further areas of agreement that had been developed in 1975 and 1976 and had brought it to 90% completion, as various people on both sides described it. But what the United States offered as its second alternative was less than Vladivostok. It was Vladivostok, yet it opened up both these possibilities: unlimited American development and deployment of cruise missiles of various kinds; and keeping the issue of the Backfire bomber on the table as an issue to be resolved. This is, I think, why the proposal brought to Moscow by the U.S. was not of interest in Moscow. I think there was a failure in Washington to recognize this.

There were people in the U.S. bureaucracy who did recognize the potential problem and who were pressing for an early conclusion of Vladivostok-plus—that is, of the agreement that had almost been reached in early 1976. But these views, again, tended to be put aside at least to the
extent of saying: "well, we can always fall back to that, but let's move ahead with this other, more 'comprehensive' position."

At this particular point, I was out of the loop or, at most, on the periphery of the loop, just finishing up three years as a senior foreign service inspector. But I was back in Washington in early 1977 and I know from conversations then the nature of the discussions along this line. Incidentally, my own suggestion had been that we should move for Vladivostok-plus-'76 and, as a token move toward reduction, propose a reduction of 54 heavy missiles on each side. This would have involved our Titans, which were obsolete, and about 50 or so SS-9s that had not yet been replaced with MIRVed SS-18s. That would have been a small but not totally insignificant step toward reductions and toward dealing with the heavy missile problem. But I don't think that got very far in the deliberations.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Ray. Mark, on this point and then a question from Bill Taubman.

GARRISON: Actually, I'm responding to your earlier question about human rights, but it's basically the same answer that Ray gave on SALT. That is: yes, there were people in the bureaucracy who understood problems that might arise from the way human rights issues were presented. The Sakharov letter was probably the best example of that. The bureaucracy proposed a response that would have responded to Sakharov and that would have been responsive to American public views, but wouldn't have been quite so confrontational. After the response was changed, the letter went on to Ambassador [Malcolm] Toon to deliver. He came right back, risking the wrath of the White House, saying: "This is not the way to do it. Here's the way you
should do it." Of course he got short-shrift. But the main point is that all of that was immaterial. We had a president who felt strongly about this, and felt strongly about the way it should be presented to the American public. So that's history.

BLIGHT: Bill Taubman.

WILLIAM TAUBMAN: My question has to do with the Soviet reaction to this change in course by the U.S. side. You mentioned for example that Brezhnev had to argue with Marshall Grechko about the Vladivostok agreement, and that there were people in the Politburo who were not in agreement. Can you be more specific and concrete about who objected, and how they objected, to this new American approach? When the Americans turn out to want to change and not carry through with Vladivostok, does everybody understand instantaneously that this is no good? Is there discussion of this? Is it a kind of instinct? How does it work? And one more wrinkle on this. You all served in various Soviet administrations. Would this kind of reaction have been typical of any Soviet administration? Or was it peculiar to this one, the Brezhnev administration, at this particular time?

DOBRYNIN: Now, let me say something about the general character of the whole discussion in Moscow. There were, as always, several groups who presented their views. Two or three groups, plus of course our military people, who were suspicious about deep reductions. Everyone already felt that you [the U.S.] had the advantage in new technology, especially cruise missiles and so on. To be frank, the new U.S. proposal seemed to indicate that the Americans
were not actually serious about ever reducing their nuclear weaponry. Others asked: "why do we need this kind of equal reduction with the United States, when there are some important issues besides that? How could we just push them aside, issues like foreign bases, the British and French nuclear forces?" People said, emotionally: "The Americans want to put us at a disadvantage."

Sooner or later, many said: "we will begin to speak about the balance, or balancing, of interests. But before that we need parity of forces." Carter was proposing all these cuts: in half, in half, in half, in half. There you come with this strong proposal, as it was in this case, to cut in half our (as we considered) most important weaponry, the SS-18. You proposed to cut it in half! How did it look to us? It looked like a very imbalanced proposal which favored the United States.

So, there really wasn’t a discussion of the Vladivostok proposal. You asked about Marshall Grechko. He expressed the view of our military, that the balance put the Soviets at a disadvantage. That’s what he argued. The new proposal was definitely in favor of the United States even though, on the face of it, it was "comprehensive."

But let me reiterate my main point. The new proposal was unbearable to Russia, you see. The consideration of it immediately led to very emotional outbursts. Our leadership was offended. They felt they weren’t being taken seriously. So, the initial reaction was simply this in the Politburo: they simply didn’t want to discuss it. Brezhnev in particular: he didn’t want to discuss it. You know, the whole session at which it was considered last only about half an hour.
GARTHOFF: Wasn’t it closer to an hour?

DOBRYNIN: Yes, thank you, it was about one hour [laughter]. One hour! They simply did not want to discuss it. The members of the Politburo were outraged. They did not want to discuss it. I want to stress that this was no deliberation of the precise merits of the U.S. proposal. It was a venting of emotions at the outrageous proposal and manner of the Americans. Eventually, of course, this got ironed out and we produced the SALT II treaty. Well, this is basically how Moscow reacted to the proposal.

NYE: Did the extreme reaction have something to do with Brezhnev’s health and age at that point?

DOBRYNIN: No, no. People, in Moscow, at the time, particularly people who are...

KOMPLEKTOV: People realized that, on the eve of Vance’s visit to Moscow, we had no choice but to reject the U.S. proposal. When I say "we," I mean the people in the Foreign Ministry. But we did not disagree with our military people in our appraisal of the Carter position and how we had to react to it.

I come back again to what I said before: we must not think about SALT issues only in general terms. We must try to understand the specifics like Ray Garthoff, of the sort that Ray Garthoff just mentioned. For instance, take first that interim agreement, SALT I. It applied only to the limitation of ICBMs and SLBMs. So, what was left? Heavy bombers and ALCMs and
GLCMs. At the same time, you seemed to have had in mind that we were to come out very soon with MIRVs. You didn't know that we were falling behind. So there were always two balances: one written in specific documents for a given purpose and at a given time, and (what I will call) the "actual" balance. The same thing was true, I think, with your side.

I wonder if you know that the SS-18s were very close to Brezhnev’s heart. At the time of Vladivostok, we had a certain number--over 300--heavy ICBMs and we agreed to leave aside the issue of forward-based troops. So, there were always two balances, one at the surface, one beneath the surface. This is the interesting thing: that despite the usual divergences between the people in the Politburo and the bureaucrats in the different levels of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry, on the eve of Vance's arrival in Moscow, there were no diversions whatsoever.

SHULMAN: That’s an important point.

BLIGHT: It’s not only an important point, but I think it’s the point at which we ought to break.
SESSION 2:
THE SALT II PROCESS AND THE GROWTH OF MISTRUST

BLIGHT: We’ve got several years to cover, yet, so let’s get going. One of the characteristics of this process is that it tends to be full of surprises. I’d like to spring a surprise on you now.

Right after the break, Ambassador Dobrynin and a couple of us were talking about the discussion in the first session. Ambassador Dobrynin said, "well this is all very interesting, but it’s sort of academic though. It doesn’t really capture the feeling of what I imagined was going on in our leadership--about Carter, about SALT." This seemed to me important enough to prevail on Ambassador Dobrynin to bring up his point before the entire group. I’ve asked him to make a brief re-run of our conversation on the break. After that, we will then proceed right to Marshall Shulman, as planned. So, Ambassador Dobrynin, please.

DOBRYNIN: It was not my idea to discuss it here. It’s not my fault. It’s the chairman’s fault [laughter].

BLIGHT: Absolutely. It is all my "fault" [laughter].

DOBRYNIN: Very well. Now, I don’t want to sound too difficult. We all recognize that the positions that we are expressing are our own personal reflections. With all due respect, to all of you, I think that we are missing something essential in the problem we had with the Carter Administration. There was a human touch to discussions of foreign policy at the high levels.
I don't think a security threat mattered as much as the way we felt we were being approached by the U.S. side.

For instance, when we discussed this SALT issue. Just try to imagine, within the Politburo, what happened when we put the U.S. proposal on the table. The Marshall would sit and tremble with anger [pounds table; laughter]. And all the other members of the Politburo...

SHULMAN: You would all be embarrassed [more laughter]?

DOBRYNIN: In all of these meetings on the SALT negotiations, the Marshall would say, generally: "Well, we return to the same old business again today. Carter denounced our human rights record. He said we are: etc., etc., etc. Well, thank goodness that there are only 3 more years to go with Carter. So, I don't know about this proposal. Second, he made a speech today, another one. He said, you have to make a choice: confrontation or cooperation. He said he just wants us to follow one or the other. I ask you, comrades: what kind of president is this who makes such demands on us?"

So, by the time the SALT issues were put on the table, everyone was emotionally upset and terribly biased against anything the Carter Administration brought forward. It was the most difficult issue for us, this human rights issue. For us, it was just irrelevant, created for propaganda. But the people who had to deal with the SALT issue at the highest level were people, were human beings. Everybody was in a very agitated emotional state. Constant harping did no good, I can assure you.
Let us think about human rights, and let's think about the matters of peace and war embedded in the SALT process. From a practical point of view these endless "examples" of human rights deficiencies created a most unnecessary set of demands. Two emotionally incompatible demands were being placed on us: to negotiate a nuclear arms treaty in good faith and to accept all this ... it was regarded at the time as gratuitous abuse.

I will illustrate my point with reference to the SALT negotiations. Technically speaking, there was a problem with the Backfire bomber and your cruise missiles. But for us, if the Carter Administration had taken the whole issue of our delicate negotiations more seriously, they could have had their cruise missiles. That wasn't the key issue at all. For us, the main issue was the way you treated the Vladivostok negotiations. You simply dismissed them, absolutely. This was high-handed and completely unacceptable. When Secretary Vance and others arrived in Moscow, they said: we don't care about cruise missiles. We are here to begin reductions. So, it became a psychological issue for us.

I am talking about your country and my country then. As you said, or as Gorbachev would say, it was one nation, it was one reaction. Or as Stalin would say, do you agree the first time or the second time? It was as if demons, there were demons in you. It was an important emotional, psychological issue for us, this human rights issue. That was my impression.

BLIGHT: I think it's fantastic that a practitioner has introduced chemistry and psychology into the conversation here. And now we turn to "General Secretary" Shulman.
SHULMAN: I'll go to the drawing board if I may. I'd like to say first, to Anatoly: he makes an important point, and a valid point, that we have to take account of style, insight, the chemistry, whatever. The only thing is, Anatoly, you must be careful not to use "academic" to mean that it doesn't matter.

DOBRYNIN: I didn't say it doesn't matter. I just wanted to caution us against leaving out certain psychological considerations that seemed to me at the time to have been critical in our response to the March '77 proposals. Me, accuse you of irrelevance? Never [laughter].

SHULMAN: Well, sometimes people use "academic" to mean "it's of no consequence." In fact, the effort to get to an analysis that rises above the immediate event has to take account of the human factor. I quite agree with that.

Now, what I thought I might try to do, inspired by the discussion, is to suggest to you at least one mode of analysis to try to deal with these complex events. I suggest that the first thing we try to have in mind is that we're dealing with an interaction between three elements. They are, first of all, the U.S.--the internal situation, the leadership, the politics, the social changes, the economy, the external relations. The second element are the analogues that hold for the Soviet Union. Finally, there are the external factors: that is, the events in that period that moved things along, to which people reacted.

What we need to do, I think, in our subsequent analysis, is to take account not only of the March '77 meeting, but the relations over a period of time. The way to do that, I would argue, is to track each set of factors--to try to get as much insight as we can into the internal
factors in each country - the U.S., the Soviet Union. Then we ask: what was happening in the world, in international politics in 1977 and the period leading up to it. Finally, we must recognize the dynamism of the analysis. The interactions go through a succession of stages. What we are attempting is a close look at these factors in the initial phase of the Carter period, followed by a broader sweep through the ensuing months and years.

Let me illustrate by first looking at the case of the United States in that period. It’s important to bear in mind that a major element in the relationship was the host of simply unresolved issues in the United States about the Soviet Union. These were often highly contradictory, yet they often coexisted within an individual person. These were unresolved issues about the Soviet Union that really go back to the end of the World War II, having to do with how we ought to understand the Soviet Union and and the connections between its foreign policy and its internal policy. Often these conflicting views of policy towards the Soviet Union were rooted in a conflict of values.

There were two major groups, or two clusters. One embodied the view that the Soviet Union was unlimited in its expansionism, was ideologically driven and was, essentially, incapable of change. I remember when I first talked with John Foster Dulles, not long after he came to Washington. He went to his bookshelf and pulled out *The Foundations of Marxism and Leninism* and he said: "everything you need to know is right here. If you want to know what the Soviets are going to do, you should just look at this." This was, in its way, the extreme form of the mechanistic point of view. It held that ideology was all and that unlimited expansionism and totalitarianism were inevitable products of the ideology.
The alternative views, are, I am afraid, not well-represented in the [Harry] Gelman piece that was circulated before our meeting. In my opinion, he has set up the wrong dichotomy in the analysis of the Soviet Union. He describes, on the one hand, a hard-line analysis with which he associates himself, and is much like the one I have just attributed to Dulles. The analytic alternative presented by Gelman is the "defensive reaction." That is, proponents of this view believe we should interpret Soviet behavior as a defensive response. But there was another alternative, one that was more important in the events we are discussing, because it was, I believe, the view of Cy Vance, and thus was incorporated in the Vance position regarding the SALT proposal of March 1977.

At the heart of this "third way" of interpreting the Soviet Union was, along side the appreciation of its expansionist tendencies, the equally strong conviction that Soviet behavior was subject to pragmatic considerations. That is, the Soviet Union was containable; their behavior would depend upon the circumstances. Those who held this third view also believed that the Soviet Union sought to adapt itself to changes in the international framework. It was therefore possible, they believed, to compartmentalize negotiations with the Soviets on certain issues, like the military competition, even though competition might go on in a relatively unregulated fashion elsewhere. This was, if I may say so, a differentiated view. It did not take the view that detente meant a cessation of the competitive relationship. It was a position that was, in my view, was neither hard nor soft, but it was--at least it seemed to me--a realistic view that accepted the possibility of change. Indeed those who held the view argued that there were already important changes taking place in Soviet society in that period.
From the alternative views of the Soviet Union flowed two different streams of policy. Those who took the hard-line view—that the Soviet Union was unlimited and expansionist and incapable of change—quite logically embraced a policy that the optimal policy, from the point of view of the United States, was to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This hidden agenda wasn’t always articulated. But the hidden agenda of those holding the hard-line view was to apply maximum pressure in order to speed the collapse of the Soviet Union. That meant, for example, causing as much trouble as possible. It meant propagandistic broadcasts and political offensives. It meant maximizing the difficulties for the Soviets in their relations with Eastern Europe and with their own nationalities. It meant no U.S.-Soviet trade.

It also meant essentially no belief in the utility of arms control—it was said to be detrimental to United States interests, because it created a false sense of security. Those who opposed arms control on these grounds, for example Richard Perle, believed that arms control created an illusory sense in the U.S. electorate, and this in turn tended to weaken U.S. leverage, and so on. So these people were opposed, basically, to an arms control approach or to the possibility that negotiations about the military competition could be negotiated apart from other issues. Hence their fervent pursuit of linkage. These people were bitterly opposed to the alternative policy, which held that you could negotiate about some issues, and you could moderate the level of military competition, even though the interests were in conflict with each other and the confrontation would likely continue.

This clash of views concerning the Soviet Union did not take place in a vacuum. It’s important to understand that a mounting conservative tide was rising in American politics. It was partly a backlash against earlier periods, though there were many reasons for it, domestic and
foreign. But it was a period when the shadow of Ronald Reagan was already beginning to fall on the Carter Administration. This factor set off the initial period of detente from the later (Carter) period: we were beginning to see the effects of the Reagan challenge. The center of domestic politics in the United States began moving swiftly in a conservative direction. Well, "conservative" isn't quite the right word. Actually, American politics began moving in a right-wing direction. Cartago dilenta est—that Carthage is destroyed—gained prominence. One could discern movement to the right within the administration as the shadow of Reagan deepened, moving toward the election of 1980, partly as a result of conservative revulsion for some of the excesses of the anti-Vietnam protests and the like.

The human rights issue that we've already discussed at length was also becoming prominent. This was due in part, to the reaction against the earlier policies of Henry Kissinger, especially his astringent realpolitik. It was also due in part to a backlash against Kissinger’s manipulative approach to the Congress and amoral approach to the use of American military power. Externally, concerning the foreign policy of the United States, this was a period in which U.S. superiority was no longer unchallenged. Since the end of the sixties, when the Soviets achieved parity, they had the capability of reaching the United States with nuclear weapons. This fact accounts for a good deal of the anxiety that underlay the discussion of these issues in the U.S. There were also many important domestic developments, especially demographic changes in the United States. The geographical center of gravity of the United States had begun to move south and west. This fact, and a backlash in those regions against the effects of the civil rights movement on American politics meant, among other things, that support for the Democratic Party in the south and west was shrinking.
On the Soviet side, this was a period, as has been mentioned, of increasing immobility in the Soviet leadership. This became especially pronounced after 1974, with the onset of Brezhnev’s illness, and continued to the end of his regime. This was a period, for example, when we see a decline in the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union moved, during the seventies, from a regular growth of its GNP to a flattening of the growth curve, as the effect of the deficiencies in the economic system became more evident. The decline of productivity led to an awareness on the part of some people in the Soviet leadership that this was a systemic problem that had to be dealt with. The decline in the effectiveness of the apparat was also noticed: that is, the problems of bureaucratism, corruption and decline of competence. This was noted by many people—by Andropov, by Ligachev and others.

This growing awareness that their state was in decline led to pressures for reform which took several forms. There were some reformers within the system who sought fundamental changes. For example, Andropov undertook reforms when he became General Secretary. There were, in addition, many people in this period that we’re talking about—the period of 1977 to 1981—who were, in their respective fields, trying by incremental means to modernize and rationalize their system, whether in management of the economy, foreign policy or military policy. Sometimes the voices of the reformers were listened to, and sometimes they were not. But the pressure toward change was always there.

There were still others, of course, who were outside the system, who challenged it directly. These were the dissidents. But the appearance at this time of many dissidents reflected, in a way, the social changes taking place within the system. I mean, despite the fact that that period was called the period of stagnation, in fact, important things were happening in Soviet
society. Much of this occurred as a consequence of their movement toward an advanced industrial society. They were beginning to get significant growth in the middle class. They were beginning to see the growth of a technocratic group within the leadership and outside it. Functional pluralism was becoming a reality in the society. There was actually a good deal of movement in it, even though it is generally characterized as a period of "stagnation." These social changes were important.

Externally for the Soviet Union, this was the beginning of a truly global reach. Technology had given them the ability to reach distant parts of the globe. They greatly expanded the navy, but also their transport and communications capabilities. This meant, for example, that its relations with the African developing nations and movements were very different. As a result of logistical and other technological advancements, air transport and communications to and from these areas was now possible. The Soviet Union was operating on a global basis, whereas in earlier periods they could only operate peripherally.

Let me turn briefly to the external factors that need to be taken into account. These are due partly to changes in the military technology of this period. Take the cruise missile as an illustration. Here was a remarkable device which came together partly by chance—by the interaction of three different streams of technological development. There was first of all the development of a highly efficient jet-propulsion system which enabled an engine of about 180 lbs, linked with another one, to drive a system. There was the development in accuracy and terminal guidance which enabled a cruise missile to be accurate from great distances. Some had ranges of 1500 km with accuracy of plus or minus thirty yards. The system was also highly flexible, whether air-launched, sea-launched or ground-launched. Accordingly, it changed the
terms of the equation. As Viktor said, it did so because, in a way, it blurred the line between the strategic and the theater nuclear forces. Thus, we saw the ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs deployed in Europe, which were capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

This same effect can be seen in the development of MIRVs and radical improvement in the accuracy. These factors had finally changed the equation with regard to the vulnerability of the systems in question. Unfortunately, this led to a revival of the (in my mind) specious contention and that the strategic systems were suddenly vulnerable to a first-strike. In this period, satellite and U-2 photography was also advancing. In the Soviet Union, in this period, there was a lot of discussion about "STR", the scientific-technological revolution. This had in it the basic insight that as a consequence of the profound changes in science and technology, the terms of international relations were changing. There was an insight in this that was important: the new global reach of the Soviet Union was made possible and it began to change the nature of the economic relationships among the non-Soviet powers.

This was also the period of continued movement toward de-colonization. For example, the belated de-colonization of Portuguese Africa led to dangerous fluidity in its former colonies in Mozambique and Angola. Suddenly, because both the Soviet Union and the U.S. had acquired global reach, their competition could be extended to distant battlefields in southern Africa. Subsequently, this also occurred in Ethiopia during the Carter years. It was also the period of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, independent of all this, which became a factor in the Afghan situation, as well. It was a period also of the rise of Asia in the Pacific, specifically the importance of the role of China and the subsequent issue of the "China card" as a factor in the U.S.-
Soviet relationship. So, I'm suggesting this simply as a framework of analysis, Jim, for our subsequent work.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Marshall. To paraphrase Jimmy Carter, I've learned more about U.S.-Soviet relations in the '70s in the last fifteen minutes than I have in the previous 45 years.

DOBRYNIN: May I ask one question of Marshall?

BLIGHT: Well, he's the General Secretary.

DOBRYNIN: Oh, you have one now [laughter]?

BLIGHT: Marshall, will you accept a question?

SHULMAN: Alright, one question.

DOBRYNIN: In the beginning, the Carter Administration paid a great deal of attention to the domestic situation. Our understanding at the time was that after the SALT II treaty was signed, the Carter Administration would try very hard to influence the Senate and the public to ratify it. Then, after June 1979--after the signing of the treaty in Vienna--the administration seemed to withhold support, in a way. Sure, Cy Vance appeared before the Senate to support it. But all in all, there did not seem to be a real effort to convince the American public that ratifying the treaty

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was the best thing to do. Instead, we had that "brigade issue" in Cuba and, after that, all efforts to get the treaty ratified seemed to end. So ...

SHULMAN: Would you like me to respond, briefly? Well, it is true that many events intervened. One of the first was the decision by the Carter Administration to put the Panama treaty issue first. One of the consequences was that the support for SALT was somewhat weakened as a consequence of focus on the Panama treaty issue. The subsequent stages of the debate occurred as responses to the events in the world: that is, the African conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia, and then the phony brigade issue. The rising conservative tide meant that the process became ever so much more difficult.

There was, however, an effort by people in the administration, including myself, who were prowling around and trying to talk up the SALT issue. But as I see it, by the time the treaty was signed in ’79, June ’79, the battle was already lost, really. The relations had so deteriorated, at that point, that I think it was already hopeless. Some people said that SALT was buried in the sands of Ogaden. I never believed that. But I did believe that by that time there wasn’t enough political capital left. It’s illustrated in a way, by the career of Frank Church. Now here’s a man who had been a SALT advocate, and then in the face of the brigade issue, he loused it up in fighting for his political life. Moreover, he was defeated and it just illustrated the point that the political climate in the United States already had deteriorated too much to get support.

BLIGHT: Bob, I saw your eyebrows twitter when the Panama Canal treaty came was mentioned. A quick point from Bob and then I’d like to ask Bill to provoke us.
PASTOR: Well, actually, I think it would be better if I waited.

BLIGHT: Yes, okay. Bill Taubman.

TAUBMAN: The title of this session is "The SALT process and the development of mistrust." That suggests that we need to talk about details of the SALT process. Unfortunately I'm not about to do that [laughter]. I want to shift the perspective in order to launch what used to be known in the good old, bad old days as a provocation. It seems to me that the conference is largely organized around the very concrete and detailed study of certain incidents and episodes--questions like: Why did the U.S. propose what it did in March of '77? Why did the Soviets react as they did? Was there an alternative, namely Vladivostok, which would have been better? Had that been proposed, could we have reached an agreement? Had we reached an agreement, might that have prevented later clashes having to do with regional conflict, perhaps even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

This is the approach that Ambassador Komplektov took even further by saying we should talk even more specifically, not about missiles but about ALCMs and SLCMs, well..

KOMPLEKTOV: GLCMs.

TAUBMAN: GLCMs, rather [laughter]. Unfortunately, I don't know from ALCMs and GLCMs and SLCMs, and not that much about SALT. I haven't really worked on this period all that much, so what I'm going to try to do is make a virtue out of a necessity, and to compare this
period with other periods in Soviet-American relations, in order to make a devil's advocate point. The typical devil's advocate's point is to raise the question of whether there was an opportunity here that was missed at all—whether there was really much chance at all for any kinds of far-reaching and enduring agreements during this period. It seems to me that the burden of proof, in some ways, should be on those who argue that there was an opportunity missed, that this was a near miss, that things could have turned out very much differently than they did. I realize this changes the focus, it certainly moves it from chemistry and individual leaders. Maybe it moves it too far, but for the sake of the provocation, let me proceed.

I would begin by saying a word or two about the Gorbachev and Yeltsin period, that is, the period since the late 80s. Here is a period where, as we all know, we have gotten the agreements that eluded us in previous times. Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned that it took just one day to get perhaps the most radical agreement of them all. Well, if you ask why it was possible, I think several things leap to mind. On the Soviet side, there was the will to reach these agreements, and there was the power to get them through the Soviet political process. On the American side, at least toward the end of the Reagan years and in the Bush years, the Soviets had a partner willing to meet the Russians more or less half way. We could talk about that.

Now each of these terms really needs to be unpacked—I'll say a word about each of them. First, on the will to reach these agreements. On the Soviet side this reflected a de-ideologized view of the world. All of the notions that go under the heading of the "new thinking," the notion of security as mutual, the notion of the importance of internationalism, a kind of pro-Westernism, in substance and style. When it came to the power to get these agreements through the Soviet political process, I think this reflected a weakening of the vested interests that opposed them in
the Party, the military and other Soviet institutions. And we could talk, but I won’t, about what it took on the American side to produce a partner ready to deal.

If you go back and compare this with the three previous periods of the Cold War, which I’m going to oversimplify and refer to as those of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev--especially the late Brezhnev period we’re talking about here--you see it looks very different, and again I’m using a kind of shorthand. If one speaks about Stalin: well, Stalin obviously had the power to do almost anything he wanted, as witnessed by the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939. But he obviously didn’t have the will to agree with the United States on a long-lasting accomodation. At least he didn’t for very long, if he ever did at all, and I don’t think he ever did at all. On the American side he might have had a partner with FDR but, quickly with Truman, I think that kind of potential partner disappeared.

Now, on the Khrushchev period: at first I was tempted to reverse the sequence and say that Khrushchev had the will but not the power, but I don’t think that’s true. I think on both will and power his was a mixed situation. His view of the world and his endorsement of peaceful coexistence itself coexisted with the notion of struggle, often zero-sum in its nature. And although he had more power than most American presidents, I think even his power was limited. And the United States in that period--well, one could debate this in detail, comparing the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations--but on the whole I’m struck when I look back that we weren’t really ready either until, perhaps, after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

BLIGHT: That’s the last time you’re allowed to mention the Cuban missile crisis, Bill [laughter].

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TAUBMAN: Thanks for the warning, Jim. Now, turning to the Brezhnev period again: I was tempted for the sake of symmetry of the categories to say that you had neither the will nor the power to reach what I'm calling long, far-reaching, enduring agreements and accommodations. But again, I think the period, the picture, is mixed. If you focus on the will, this is still a period where the Soviet view of the world is highly ideologized, where the Soviet Union acts as a kind of superpower with an inferiority complex, where the element of nationalism, if not imperialism, is itself very strong. And when it comes to the power, this is a period in which the vested interests in the military (but not only in the military) which are wedded to the Cold War are stronger than they've ever been before, certainly stronger than under Khrushchev.

If one zeroes in on the personality of the leader, then if Khrushchev's explosive, emotional personality got in the way of East-West negotiations, then surely by 1977 Brezhnev's weakened, if not enfeebled, condition, also had an influence on these events we are discussing. On the American side, there's the division within the administration, the inexperienced President and the rise of the right wing.

In other words, to bring this to a close: looking back, it doesn't seem to me as if the preconditions were there. Now you might very well say that one needs to make distinctions more refined than I've made, and that I've posed a kind of bipolar choice between Cold War and what I call far-reaching, enduring, long-lasting accommodation. It might also be argued that there were alternatives in between, and that something like a SALT II agreement reached in 1977 on the basis of a Vladivostok proposal would have been one agreement which might have made a big difference. Perhaps this is so, and perhaps our further discussions will conclude that this is so, but I'd like to insert a plea that in our further discussions we remember all of the constraints on
both sides which, to use a famous Soviet phrase, made it "not accidental" that it was so difficult to reach agreements and when, even when they were reached, it was often hard to sustain them.

I'd like to make one last point. As we were talking during the tea break, the notion came up that many of the same obstacles which were there all along and which magically disappeared for a while under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, may be returning in a new guise. I think one of the things we should think hard about is whether that is the case: whether in a post-Soviet period, especially if more conservative forces come to power, we might find new obstacles, a sort of anti-Westernism not based on the old ideology but perhaps on an old Russian instinct. Maybe it will turn out that Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Yeltsin, with their internationalism and their pro-Westernism, will turn out to have been the exception that proves a rule that goes even beyond the Soviet period and creates obstacles to agreement in the future as well as the past.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Bill. That was a marvelous provocation. I have several from this side on the list, but I really believe after that we ought to call on Viktor Komplektov. Viktor?

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, one can agree or disagree with the analysis just given--that you gave to us--but it seems to me that we are wandering off our subject. And, for instance, we should not talk in this way about the SALT "process." First, about this talk about SALT in terms of ideology. Well, I can assure you, and I know that we had the will and the power to go ahead and to have the SALT agreement completed as soon as possible. This did not happen, in the first
instance, because of the cruise missile issue, as Marshall explained. Everybody knows that. Thank you.

**BLIGHT:** Joe?

**NYE:** Well, I can wait in line. I can wait in the queue. OK. When we think about SALT, what Bill Taubman raised is important: that you can’t think about it too narrowly. It’s possible that there was an agreement to be reached in SALT. But the question that many of the people who opposed SALT raised was unrelated to the technical details. Rather, they worried that it ratified the Soviet view of detente. The Soviet view of detente, if I may quote Yuri [Georgy] Arbatov, was, in his words, "to keep going through the lessons we learned in Angola, which is that you can essentially support the anti-imperialist movements and the Americans will have to swallow it. You can also keep building up military weaponry because nothing will be done about it." And I’m quoting that. We have Arbatov’s memoirs here, so I’m not trying to make this a provocation. I’m citing a Soviet source.

The reason this happened was, according to Arbatov, Brezhnev’s illness. He says on page 200: "Why did we, in the eyes of the world, become an expansive and aggressive power in the second half of the 1970s? My guess is that the military-industrial complex had grown to such proportions that it escaped political control." Later Arbatov says that it was government by committee that was the problem, because Brezhnev had become sick and so weak. The Soviets were governed by a weak leader--government by committee--and the military-industrial complex had escaped control. In this situation, according to Arbatov, the Soviets believed that the lessons
to be learned in the early 70s were that you could expand internationally, and expand military production, and also have SALT—you know, to stabilize things.

There were many people in the United States who opposed SALT on exactly these grounds. They opposed it as a symbol of an asymmetrical detente. Take, for example, Harry Rowan. Harry is the perfect example of this. I remember being with him on the day when we watched the same thing we saw on the television last night [the signing of SALT II], at a conference in Lake Tahoe. He was absolutely furious at the signing. I said: "Why? It strikes me that it’s not a great deal, but it’s not a bad deal either. It’s a very sensible, practical thing." Harry disagreed totally. He said: "it ratifies everything that’s been wrong since the early ’70s and reinforces the Soviet view of detente, which is totally asymmetrical." So there was a strong strand of thought which didn’t care about the GLCMs or the SLCMs or any of the numbers and the details as much as it cared about SALT being wrong because it ratified a detente that had gone wrong. And their view of why and how detente had gone wrong was very similar to what Arbatov describes in his memoirs.

I think that’s something we have to come to terms with, which is, as we have been asking: what went wrong? Is Bill Taubman right—that given what was happening inside Soviet society, there really wasn’t much hope until you had a new leadership? Or, was there really a hope that detente could have been made more symmetrical, without a new leadership? I think that is what Bill was trying to get at.

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, we can talk about the SALT agreement. And we can talk about the general conditions between the Soviet Union and the United States. These are two different
things. SALT was a matter of survival. So, from any point of view, from a philosophical point of view or from the point of view of real politics, the main factor involved in SALT, was, again, that this is a matter of survival. The other messages there, they interfered, they watered down the significance of this agreement with the Soviet Union. Arbatov's book has nothing to do with what I'm telling you about.

NYE: That's an important point, because I think many Americans felt that you could not separate SALT from other issues. That gets to the problem of linkage.

KOMPLEKTOV: But shouldn't many Americans also have remembered their, well, school exercises in case of nuclear attack? Right? Is "linkage" more important than survival? We could never understand this.

BLIGHT: Jim Hershberg, waiting patiently.

JAMES G. HERSHBERG: There are a lot of issues on the table, but it occurs to me that there is one episode that focuses all of these issues concretely and has always been murky. Marshall Shulman brought up the disparity in American political opinion--the different factions--and we've heard mention of Congress and Scoop Jackson. But we should also bring into that discussion the Committee on the Present Danger and the overlapping membership of "Team B," whose report, in 1976, we now know explicitly predicted that the Soviet Union was trying to move towards World War III.
To illustrate how basic the difference in opinion is, it goes all the way down to basic issues of human nature. Richard Pipes, was a leader of both "Team B" and the Committee on the Present Danger. In his famous 1979 article in Commentary, "Why the Soviet Union Believes It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Pipes uses the fact that the Soviets had lost 20 million people in World War II as evidence that they’re willing to lose millions of people to achieve their political goals. But from another point of view, represented by Vance and Marshall Shulman, the same piece of information could be used as a reason why the Soviets do not want to fight a nuclear war and why there can be a certain common interest in avoiding a nuclear war.

There is another another point which can be focussed by this episode: that of Soviet misunderstanding of U.S. public opinion. This recurs from the origins of the Cold War. We go back to FDR’s claim of having dissatisfied voters on Poland and and then to Soviet miscalculation of U.S. reaction in Korea, the Marshall plan, etc. The episode I’m thinking of is the Tula speech, January 18, two days before Carter was inaugurated. Brezhnev declared that the Soviets are not looking for superiority and do not believe they can win a nuclear war. But this speech can be interpreted in completely opposite ways. It can be seen as a tactical sop to public opinion in the U.S., without any great meaning, although somewhat interesting if it was really motivated by Soviet interpretations of the U.S. ideological debate.

Or it might be taken to indicate an important doctrinal change, one that really reflected the measured and considered judgment of the Soviet military and civilian leaders. In that case, it should be understood as a major step that should be taken seriously. Perhaps this led the Soviets to be more than a little disappointed when it wasn’t taken more seriously. Perhaps it
even contributed to Soviet ire and anger at the Carter Administration’s outlook in its first couple of months, especially in light of the fiasco in late March that we have been discussing. I think if any light can be shed on the origins and importance of the Tula speech, that might help us understand these issues at the very outset of the Carter Administration.

BLIGHT: Anybody want to... yes, Ambassador?

DOBRYNIN: On the Tula speech?

BLIGHT: Tula, yes.

DOBRYNIN: I don’t think the Tula speech represented a change of doctrine. Remember that during the election campaign, Carter spoke very often about the Soviet military threat, about the Soviets trying to get superiority. But he also spoke a great deal, you may recall, about radically reducing nuclear arms. So, that put pressure on the Soviet leadership to show the new president that they did not have in mind any specific doctrine, or general plan, to surpass the United States in military means.

This meant that you in the U.S. had a leader who, to say the least, confused us. He wanted to win the arms race and he wanted to stop the arms race. Now, during the campaign, we could not really talk with Carter about the things that he said, or that his opponent said. It’s a pity, because there were many in our delegation that knew the thinking of the Soviet leadership in these matters, and who could have told the President: we are not trying to make instability.
It would have been very beneficial if we could have sat down with the new president after he was elected, but we couldn’t do that. It was too difficult. Of course, we did not have good contacts with the new administration. It wasn’t clear who we would speak with, even if we felt we should do so. And the same issues were there.

Let me give you an example of our confusion in this matter. Some of his assistants came to us and complained that we--the Soviets--are trying to show that Carter is not really strong. But then, what does he do? He immediately tries to rush through SALT II with big reductions. Is this what a president does who is worried about appearing strong? When this kind of information came to us, we said to ourselves: “So, this looks a lot like the Carter campaign. Very confusing.”

This was the main reason why the Soviet leadership became wary and decided to try to reassure him, to reassure Carter, who was about to become president. The leadership did this first with the private letter from Brezhnev--an answer, a kind of private protest against the view that the Soviets sought superiority. They decided, really, to put it in a private “conversation,” and to make it clear that we don’t want to rule the world. We just want to be a little part of it. So this was also the real meaning of the Tula speech: to provide public reassurance and pave the way for the U.S. administration to be relaxed and ready to go to work. Work on what? The number one priority was, of course, to finish the Vladivostok treaty. The Tula speech was meant to prepare the way for finishing the job began in Vladivostok. That is my understanding.

BLIGHT: Thank you. Bob Pastor, then Ray, and then Mark.
PASTOR: Thank you, Jim. I’d like to take us back, just a step, to March ’77, before we get into the discussion of how the relations deteriorated. I was on the edges of these developments, understanding a few pieces of the puzzle, but not appreciating until now that March ’77 was a real turning point. The Carter initiative for comprehensive arms reductions, rather than the less ambitious Vladivostok accords seems to me to contain some of the seeds of the later breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union.

I think Ambassador Dobrynin explained very, very well—very clearly for me—how Carter’s message was received. But I think it might be useful if I provide a few insights as to where I think the president’s response was coming from and, in fact, where our country was coming from. I think, in terms of personal style and chemistry, as you said, there are two elements that are important. One is priorities, the second is presentation. Joe Nye is absolutely correct: the administration did not set priorities. I’ve gotten to know President Carter very well, even more since the administration than during my four years in government and I can assure you: this is a personal characteristic of Jimmy Carter. I would go even further than Joe. I think it is derived not just from a desire not to set priorities, but from a resistance to priorities—to the setting of priorities.

Why the resistance to priorities? I think it’s based on his feeling, a feeling shared with a number of people who’ve come from nowhere and who no longer believe people who are fond of telling them what they cannot accomplish. President Carter believes that he can always accomplish much more than most people believe. The feeling is strongest when the cautionary words come from a bureaucrat, or a person he interprets as a bureaucrat. When that happens, it is like pouring gasoline onto a fire. It only feeds his determination to show that he can.
Related to his resistance to setting priorities is his disinclination to make trade-offs. When presented with a trade-off and told he must choose, his instinctual reaction is to ask why he cannot have both. This occurs throughout the events we are discussing. The president thinks he can get both human rights and SALT. He thinks he can get both SALT and the Panama Canal treaty. In my opinion, this demonstrates a certain inability to understand that personal accomplishments are one thing, but political accomplishments are something else. To move a whole nation you do have to set priorities. The failure to do so was a serious mistake on his part.

We see the President’s mode of operation clearly in March ’77. You see, he set in motion a dozen tracks simultaneously. One of these was the Panama Canal treaty. Another was the SALT II Treaty. In fact, there were twelve initiatives set in motion simultaneously in January 1977. Which one received the most sustained attention depended, to a great extent, on the reaction to the initial proposals. In the case of Panama, Torrijos understood, perhaps clearer than Brezhnev did, that he had a very short time horizon within which to work. Therefore, if he wanted a Canal treaty, he was going to have to respond by the summer of ’77. If he didn’t, he understood that there would be insufficient time to get it ratified. March ’77 is so important because it was the launch date for all these varied initiatives. I was in a meeting with President Carter on the Panama Canal treaty at the same time Vance was in Moscow. The critical question arose: which was going to come first? To a very great extent, it was obvious that this was going to be determined more by the reaction than by the initiative.

I want to make just one additional point. While Brezhnev may, as Ambassador Dobrynin said, have loved Henry Kissinger, the American people didn’t in 1976. I think it is fair to say

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that Carter ran more against Henry Kissinger's foreign policy than he did against Gerald Ford.

What surprises me, on hearing our conversation this morning, was the extent to which Carter contemplated accepting the Vladivostok framework, even as a fall-back. Politically, he was absolutely right to distinguish himself from Kissinger in 1976-77.

He took it as seriously as he did because, I think, of the positive influence of people like Marshall and others who knew what the Soviet Union was about. But politically, I must say that I don’t think he could possibly have sold Vladivostok. I think he understood this and that is why he felt he had to come up with his own variation. That’s what they were searching for, in my view, by sending Secretary Vance to Moscow in March '77. My sense is that President Carter sought a very ambitious agreement because that’s his personal style. That he was willing to contemplate less radical alternatives was a significant achievement of Marshall and others who said: "look, the Soviets are over here, and you would like this. But maybe we should think of some median alternative."

This leads me to a comment about Brezhnev’s response to Vance in March '77. Brezhnev failed to understand the importance of bringing forth a counter-proposal, given that he was unable to accept Carter’s comprehensive proposal, something that built on a variation of the Vladivostok accords. If that had happened, I have no doubt whatever that SALT II would have taken precedence over Panama. Moreover, based on what I have heard here today, the character of U.S.-Soviet relations may have been fundamentally different in the years that followed. I agree completely with Marshall. By June '79, when the SALT II Treaty was signed, we’re in a different--a totally different--ball game. The crucial moment was March, '77. That was the turning point. The lack of a Soviet counter-proposal in Moscow seems to have set the stage for
the deterioration of relations thereafter. Let me, therefore, conclude with a question: Was any consideration given in Moscow to coming up with something other than Vladivostok as an offer—as an opportunity for Carter to use this as a way to begin to negotiate his own, politically necessary, agreement?

DOBRYNIN: The proposal brought by Vance to Moscow was unacceptable. To sit down again and discuss it all over again? This would take a year, at least. The questions were really very complicated. It would take a lot of time. So, as far as speed is concerned, how could we compete with the Panama Canal? Agree on a comprehensive arms reduction treaty before the Panama Canal treaty? I think it’s not realistic.

PASTOR: But why would it have to take so long? In fact, the Carter administration spent just two or three months coming out with a number of variations on Vladivostok. You had heard of the comprehensive proposal before Vance’s mission? So why not come up with a variation on that, based on the obvious political need on the part of Carter to have his own formula?

DOBRYNIN: Well, but look: you have to understand, we hadn’t even discussed it. It was barely realistic to expect agreement after seven years of negotiating [what became the] Vladivostok understanding. You expect, in one year, an agreement on a new, completely new basis? It’s not realistic.

I do not understand this comparison between SALT II and the Panama Canal treaty, this strategy of waiting to see which one should be negotiated first. There is no comparison! For
both the U.S. and the Soviets, the atmospherics over the years of negotiation for SALT were very
good. Very good. There was no question of putting SALT in "competition" with unrelated
initiatives. There was never any such thing. But now suddenly, with Carter, a retreat from
Vladivostok. Now we must talk about the reductions. Now we must discuss re-negotiations!
It took many years to reach that agreement. You need time to reach agreement--time, time!
That's my point. It had taken us three or four years to come to the Vladivostok levels--to get
to that position.

I must tell you that we too were thinking of the problem of ratification of the treaty in
the U.S. Senate. The main question in my mind was whether accepting your conception would
allow enough time for ratification in the United States Congress. I deeply believe that we would
have not had enough time, if, as you suggest, we would have accepted the Vance proposal in
March '77.

BLIGHT: Ambassador Bessmertnykh, then Joe Nye.

BESSMERTNYKH: I would like to say something about the subject of missed opportunities.

I think that we incorrectly put the SALT II issue under the category of "missed opportunity."

In an important sense, it is not a lost opportunity. At least from the inside of the process, facing
all the technical and political difficulties on a daily basis, the signing of SALT II was a--at least
it felt at the time like a--considerable achievement.

Of course, if we concentrate only on the atmospherics, particularly regarding March '77,
we might get the impression of a turning point where much was lost. But such surprises and
even misunderstandings is natural in the process of adjustment to a new administration. But soon both sides had an emotional and psychological need to achieve the treaty by the middle of 1979. This took just two years and a half to make this treaty, this SALT II treaty. If I may say so, it was a tremendous achievement for the two administrations, the Soviet and the Carter Administrations.

We must be careful not to confuse the two phases of the process: making the treaty and verifying the treaty. I think the fact that the treaty was made, and that it became the cornerstone of strategic thinking for the next decade, was a fantastic achievement of that time. Even though it was not ratified, the SALT II treaty remained politically relevant long after the Carter Administration left. The SALT II treaty worked, even though it was not ratified. Look at the START negotiations. They took eight years, maybe even more than that. I know how difficult it was to make. But, the SALT II treaty became a part of the START treaty. The thinking, the process, the numbers, certain theoretical and military-strategic approaches were already worked out in SALT II, before they went into START. In this way, SALT II contains the essential strategic thinking of the two governments. This is why I believe that the SALT II problem was an achievement, it was not an opportunity that was missed. The only thing that we missed was a chance to ratify it under the Carter administration.

But let me talk about the relationship between our countries. We must always try to remember that the Soviet-American relationship was never a normal kind of bilateral relationship. If you look at the relationship between the United States and France, or the Soviet Union and France or England or Germany: these were completely different. They were normal. I mean, assume a scale of 100% In normal relationships we will have, say, about 60% in trade between

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the two countries, 20% in cultural relationships, lesser amounts in academic, scientific and technological relationships and, finally, we’ll have about 10% invested in military-strategic relationships. Contrast these figures with those which characterize the Soviet-American relationship. I would say 95% of the relationship was in the military-strategic area. Therefore, there was only one yard-stick with which to measure the relationship and that was the SALT process. SALT lay at the heart of our strategic-military relations.

That’s why I said that in 1979 we reached the top level of the relationship. We signed the SALT II treaty, and this was the only meaningful yard-stick of the state of our relations. All the rest - trade, economic, culture, technological, political--all other facets of the relationship amounted, really, to only about 5% of our interactions. Of course, I do not mean for such percentages to be taken literally. They are figurative. But, I think, they are also indicative.

I think that now we are turning our relationship into a normal one. That’s why many strategic issues are getting easier to resolve: we’re normalizing the relationship in the real sense of that term. But when we think back to the Carter administration and think about the major goal--Salt II--that we achieved, I maintain that this was perhaps the greatest single step in normalizing and stabilizing the relationship between the two nations and the global strategic situation.

BLIGHT: Joe Nye, then Ray Garthoff.

NYE: Sometimes when we look back at history we think we can identify deep causal forces at work which we think produced what happened. In these cases, we are inclined to think that the
events are almost inevitable. Sometimes, however, forces operate at the level of domestic politics that interact with the deeper forces. Moreover, sometimes accidents at the level of the leadership seem to make a critical difference in the unfolding of historical events.

With this in mind, I want to come back to a point I raised earlier. I will again cite Georgy Arbatov, not because I necessarily believe him, but because he’s put his views out in memoirs for us to evaluate. I’d like to ask our Russian colleagues to say whether they agree with what Arbatov has to say. Here is the thesis: that the domestic conditions in the Soviet Union, in particular, the condition of the leadership, was an important part of history during the Carter period. It helps to account for the slowness of the Soviet response to the comprehensive arms reduction proposals in March ’77. Furthermore, if Arbatov is right—if Soviet government was government by committee in March 77—and, as Bob Pastor has said, Panama was government by one dictator, Panama was naturally able to respond much more quickly to a leader like Carter than were the Soviets.

Here is what Arbatov says in the memoirs:

I think the failure of the first contacts with the Carter Administration could be, to a great extent, attributed to the fact that Brezhnev was ill, that he had set much business aside and could no longer take direct part in negotiations himself. This became clear during Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s mission to Moscow in March, 1977. American mistakes do not relieve us of the responsibility for our inflexibility, for being incapable not only of quickly adapting to the changing situation but of putting on a grave face when we found ourselves in a game that was going back and forth. We should have avoided the impression of failure
during the first negotiations with the new American administration. These were the first high level talks with the United States and Brezhnev did not take direct part. It was conducted by Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov. As Andropov told me later: "When we reported the results to Brezhnev, he said bitterly, ‘Here for the first time I appointed you to conduct the talks yourself, and you ruined them.’"

Is what Arbatov says true? Does Brezhnev’s illness and incapacity explain Soviet rigidity in March’77? Or is there some deeper cause?

DOBRYNIN: Well, that’s simply not true.

NYE: Alright, then, why is it not true?

BEßMERTNYKH: You see, there is a common misconception about Brezhnev: that before he became ill he was personally in control of Soviet foreign policy and strategic policy. But I personally don’t think he was somehow "weaker" after a certain point. In my view, he was always in a kind of joint control of foreign and strategic policy with Gromyko and Ustinov. It is simply incorrect to assume that, once upon a time, Brezhnev ruled with an iron hand. He did not, even when he was at the height of his physical abilities. That’s the first part. He always respected the views of Ustinov and Gromyko. He never felt that the views of Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov should somehow be subject to his verification--that he should put their ideas to
a test or something of this sort. So when he got sick, actually nothing had changed. Nothing changed. Moreover, the four gentlemen who were actually controlling the policy didn’t change either. I mean, they didn’t grab the opportunity to increase their authority because Brezhnev was sick. But Georgy Arbatov is correct, I think, when he says that the Russian side—excuse me, the Soviet Union, rather [laughter]—should not have allowed the world to perceive such a total failure in March ’77, which was of course the very first significant encounter with the new American administration. I agree with that. But the reason for the Soviet response, whatever it may have been, was not Brezhnev’s illness.

DOBRYNIN: One more thing: you see, Georgy Arbatov was not very much involved with the leadership during that particular period.

BESSERTNYKH: Not at all.

DOBRYNIN: Not at all, really, during the Carter Administration.

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, this is all very interesting. But I notice an intriguing shift in our process of discussion of the SALT negotiations. Now we are being asked about possible motives for why the Soviet Union did not react more positively, or more "flexibly," at least in principle, to the March ’77 proposal. Never mind whether that proposal was bad or good. Suddenly it seems that the objective merits of the proposal are no longer worthy of discussion.
BLIGHT: Ray.

GARTHOFF: Well, I think a number of very useful things have been put on the table. Maybe the most basic question underlying a lot of them is the question of the extent to which political leaders in very different systems, particularly these two leaderships and systems in the late 70s, can realize the objective possibilities that are open to them? Both sides, as we’ve seen, were to a considerable extent imprisoned by domestic (and bureaucratic, if you will) political positions and influences. It was very, very difficult for President Carter to go forward with the last position—the Vladivostok position—taken by the previous administration. And as we have heard, it was also very, very difficult for Brezhnev to consider giving up what had taken years to achieve. He had had to make concessions along the way. He would have had considerable difficulty responding favorably to the March '77 proposal, even if he had realized that there were important possibilities for negotiating from a new basis that would be in the U.S.-Soviet mutual interest in the long run.

Later, of course, both sides became hung up over many issues and many details, most of which are truly secondary, though not inconsequential. In a broader perspective, questions of particular provisions, for example, on control of telemetry, of test missiles, and so forth, are really tertiary. But it is necessary to resolve them. Given the array of actors and interests in Washington and Moscow, this turned out to be no easy task. What seems most difficult is for officials in very different political systems to recognize that the object of the whole strategic arms limitation process was to serve security. Security interests, moreover, often seem to call for
caution. This has the effect of limiting one's own options and one's own readiness to react creatively to proposals that are genuinely new.

Joe Nye noted earlier that one source of opposition in the U.S. to the SALT process and the SALT II treaty would ratify the Soviet view of detente. This would, according to this view, therefore allow continued asymmetrical geopolitical competition in the Third World on terms which favored the Soviets. Now, in actual fact, I think that the pursuit of interests and influence in the Third World was not as asymmetrical as we tended to see it. But nonetheless, that view did exist in important segments of American opinion. Yet here again, the fundamental question was too often forgotten: did linkage of SALT II to regional issues really serve important U.S. security interests? Sure, if SALT were something that we were involved in as a favor to the Russians, then of course you could put all kinds of conditions on it. But this was not the case. Too often, we failed to keep firmly in mind that it was in our own security interest to reach accord on SALT, regardless of the outcome of conflict in Angola or elsewhere.

On the subject of mistrust in the SALT process: I would just note in passing that mistrust was introduced, as we have discussed, from many different sources and situations, especially as the Third World competition played itself out in those days. But mistrust was also introduced, I think, by the negotiating tactics in the SALT process itself. Each side had different views of what it needed to protect and, in pursuit of its own security interests, each side was often less than forthcoming in its response to the proposals of the other side. I agree with our Russian colleagues on one important point: that even without ratification, the SALT II agreement did set a practical restraint and did establish something of a common foundation for subsequent negotiations, in addition to establishing real, if partial, restraints on the strategic arms race. But this
being said, SALT II--and in this respect not only SALT II but SALT I and START--all failed to rise to the opportunity for real arms control. The basic failure here was MIRV control in SALT I, rather than what was or wasn't achieved in SALT II. But in any event, I think it was an incomplete and a less successful process than it might of been. Nonetheless it was on balance something that provided the foundation for the latest, most far-reaching and successful unilateral and negotiated agreements of the last year or two.

One footnote on Tula. I would emphasize, along with Viktor's attention to deterrence, that the Tula speech also contained the first statement by a Soviet leader of sufficiency for deterrence, both of which are important elements. It was seen not, as some have claimed in this discussion, as something entirely new, but rather as a new articulation. I'm told by the drafter of that passage that there were no objections from the military, and that only Ponomarev and Suslov were doubtful. But their doubts were, I take it, not about the substance. Rather, they were unsure about how to bring such a statement into line with prevailing ideology. But Brezhnev liked it, and so it stayed in.

I would like now to comment on something that has only been noted in passing. American reactions to Soviet pronouncements such as the Tula speech: specifically Sovietological reactions from in and out of government. As Jim Hershberg has noted, these reactions tended toward two very different lines, one of which saw the Tula speech as a promising development in Soviet thinking, and one of which saw it as a dark deception. In the open literature, these views were given famous expression in Pipes's article in Commentary, on the one side, and in my article in International Security a year later on the other. As Ambassador Dobrynin noted, Tula was in part an answer to charges in the election campaign of Soviet pursuit of strategic
superiority. I assume that the Soviets were responding in part—I’d be interested if anyone knows if this was explicitly the case—to the “Team B” leaks of late 1976. Just a week or so ago both the “Team B” paper and the “Team A” estimate were declassified. In those texts one may find, so to speak, inadvertent insights from the authors in “Team B.” For example, they refer to Suborov’s Nayka Poderzhat translated as The Science of Conquest, a particularly convenient translation, for their purposes.

DOBRYNIN: Well, I remember some discussions about the Tula speech. This particular paragraph which was introduced on sufficiency and deterrence was really done quickly.

GARTHOFF: Yes, I know, yes.

DOBRYNIN: This was Ponomarev’s, you say ...?

GARTHOFF: No, no, I said the only objection came not from the military, but from Suslov and Ponomarev.

KOMPLEKTOV: Yes, the military, the Soviet military, did not object to it because they knew that Brezhnev liked it. Their rule was: if it is a political decision, they would go along. But on the working level it was sometimes very hard to convince them.
DOBRYNIN: Just for your information: I think it is inappropriate, really, to compare President to President. They are not the same. At that time, when speaking of foreign policy, the proper comparison is the Politburo—those in the foreign policy departments. You cannot speak simply of the General Secretary at that particular time. Gromyko, for example, was very important.

BESSMERTNYKH: I was Gromyko’s personal assistant for four years. We would be asked to present papers regarding our positions on this or that. But we never knew whether they were for the Foreign Minister or the General Secretary or who ...

KOMPLEKTOV: At various stages of the SALT negotiations, we sometimes came out of the Politburo with two different positions: one by the Foreign Minister, one by the Minister of Defense. And it took us about, well, half a year before we learned how to work together.

BESSMERTNYKH: This was particularly true of the START talks. As I say, it was the same for both of us. The military hesitated because they saw no strategic advantage in the reductions that were being discussed.

DOBRYNIN: That was the new political secretary, Mr. Kokoshin. He had Defense, you had Foreign Ministry. It was different, then. You had real authority.

NYE: That’s a radical change, isn’t it?
DOBRYNIN: A radical change.

KOMPLEKTOV: Especially for Kokoshin [laughter].

BLIGHT: Waiting with the patience of Grizelda over here has been Wayne Smith.

WAYNE S. SMITH: Good Lord, Grizelda? [laughter]

BLIGHT: You have been waiting so long that I doubt whether you will remember your question, Wayne. But I know you'll make up a good one from scratch.

SMITH: No, I remember my question, or rather Bill Taubman's question. I thought that Bill raised a really central question: Was an opportunity missed here? Were the ingredients present for a real breakthrough? We've gone through times in the past in which a breakthrough seemed possible. Some of us remember the "spirit of Camp David" that characterized the talks in 1959 between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Then the Paris summit of 1960 collapsed and we had to start all over again. Was there really a chance here, was there something different. Like Bob Pastor, I was rather on the periphery of U.S.-Soviet relations at the time. But it certainly seemed to me that the ingredients for a breakthrough were present. You had, first of all, a President who had the will, the vision to change U.S. policy. And I think from the comments we've heard from the other side of the table today, there was also the desire for a new departure on the part of the Soviet leadership.
I want to re-introduce something Marshall said earlier, but slightly re-stating it. He said that one factor inhibiting President Carter’s natural impulse to transform the U.S.-Soviet relationship was the instinctual conservatism of the American people toward the Soviet Union. I would re-cast it this way: Carter was elected largely because he put forward an idealistic foreign policy. He told the American people, who were fed up with Nixon and Kissinger, that he wouldn’t lie to them. That drew a very positive response. I mean this was, after all, in the wake of Vietnam, following Nixon’s extended withdrawal (which, for a time, seemed to be anything but a genuine withdrawal) from Vietnam.

Perhaps even more importantly, Carter said during his campaign that he was not going to see every flashpoint, every war, every local or regional conflict that broke out around the world, in East-West terms. In other words, I had the impression that Carter was elected with a mandate to carry forward with a revolutionary kind of foreign policy. He was, so to speak, seeing beyond the Cold War context into which he was thrown by his election. What I’m suggesting is that a fantastic opportunity was present to achieve a breakthrough. Tragically, by failing to achieve it, the door opened to the ultra-conservatives who blamed Carter’s failure on a combination of Carter’s supposed weakness and the diabolical scheming of the Soviet Union. I think Marshall is absolutely right to suggest that the shadow of Ronald Reagan, was growing longer, almost day by day, failure by failure. Why did this happen? Why did Carter’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union fail? To me, it seems that a lot of subsidiary issues, especially regional conflicts, got in the way. These regional conflicts—especially in Angola, Ethiopia, and the second Shaba incident, were handled badly by both of us. Sometimes you were more inept than we were; sometimes the reverse was true. But we mishandled them; we...
misconstrued what was going on; we and it all broke down. And by failing to seize that golden opportunity—as it seems to me—the way was opened to the avalanche of reaction which we've had in the United States for the past 12 years. I think we would be well-advised to follow Bill Taubman's lead and make this the main concern of this project: was an opportunity missed?


GARTHOFF: I agree with most of what Wayne has said. But I would point out that in the election campaign, Carter had been equivocal on a number of important issues, including his attitude toward detente. More specifically, on military programs and arms control, he had surrounded himself with an array of advisers with very different views—from quite hard-line to accomodationists. Perhaps this was wise, in the period before the election.

But this created big problems, once he was elected. For example, we should recall Carter's selection of Paul Warnke to be director of ACDA and the fierce, closely contested battle over it in the Senate. The opposition to the nomination was led by many conservative Democrats, as well as Republicans. Another example: an important factor in Carter's decision to go with the comprehensive proposal in March '77 was, as has been noted, Senator Jackson's position. But subsequently, Carter got no credit whatever for having tried and failed to interest the Soviets in the comprehensive proposal. On the contrary, every step from then on was criticized as a retreat by the conservatives, within the Democratic party, as well as the Republican party. So while it's true that Carter was elected on a platform of change, the nature and extent of the change, as far as the issues we're discussing here, was quite ambiguous.
GARRISON: We're searching, I guess, for whether or not there was a missed opportunity. The case has been made by several people that, in the area of strategic arms control, there was no missed opportunity—that we actually did very well. Then the next question that arises in my mind is this: was an opportunity missed that would have taken the relationship a giant step further toward a breakthrough in the nature of the overall relationship, based on what was done in June of 1979. Actually, on the American side there seemed to have been at least some hope, if not expectation, that such a possibility would arise. That was why Tom Watson was nominated to go to Moscow: to follow up and the begin some concrete discussions with the Soviet leadership about where we went from there. I wasn’t in Vienna, so I’d be very interested in the reaction of those of you who were there. But my perception is that by the time that you got to Vienna, on the Soviet side, there was the feeling that--SALT II and that’s it! Nothing more! We--the Soviets--do not want to give the impression that everything is going to be just rosy in the future. We signed the SALT agreement and that’s it. We’re not going to talk about trade, we’re not going to talk about other things at all. In that context, then, it’s perhaps not surprising that after the June ’79, there was not the slightest hint of a change for the better in the overall relationship.

I guess what I’m saying is that, for one reason or another, there really weren’t any missed opportunities with regard to the nature of the relationship. The politics on both sides made radical change impossible. There really was no chance of a breakthrough towards a new relationship. So, maybe we don’t really have a subject here: “lost opportunities.”

BLIGHT: Tom Watson.
THOMAS J. WATSON JR.: Well, I hesitate to interject myself into a conversation on the subject of the SALT II talks with so many present who actually participated in them. But I've been thinking about nuclear bombs since I went on a Navy cruise in '48. I said to a Navy officer: "doesn't this nuclear business change everything?" The officer presenting the war plans said: "oh, now we can have our own way, you see." He made some gestures indicating how much of "the enemy" we could destroy, how the size of this loop he was making with his hands really wasn't changed at all. Then he concluded by saying: "Nah, there really isn't any difference. We'll still just move 'em out of the way." I thought, my God, if one Navy officer thinks this way then maybe a lot of people think of it like that.

I never went to Hiroshima, but I was involved in a lot of discussions of SALT when I was chair of the GAC [General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament], which some of you know about. I always wondered whether you negotiators or you servants or educators ever got concerned about the speed of the negotiations as compared with the speed of the proliferation, or the number of bombs that were being built. In a business, you'd have to say that's the most important thing, and then you would drive to the heart of that problem, and you'd get it controlled. Now you folks have the fate of the world in your hands. A business doesn't have that. If you make a big mistake in business you can always stop what you're doing, play around and go do something else. But you can't do that because the end of your policy is the detonation of a nuclear bomb and a terrible result.

It seems to me that the approaches that we took toward nuclear weapons over the last three or four decades, and the approaches that we're taking now, really aren't enough--haven't really gotten to the heart of the problem. Now, don't get me wrong. I think studying what my
friend Viktor really thought when he and I had talks back in those days—that’s very interesting. But, it doesn’t seem to me that it forwards the big program, which I guess is: how do we get the world out of nuclear danger? I ask this because I read now in the papers that the world thinks it is out of danger. There don’t seem to be many people around anymore who want to tell us that there is just as much nuclear danger as before, maybe more. That’s a very unpopular subject to discuss, it seems, but a necessary one.

So I’d like to make a proposition to myself and my friends, here, where I’m not afraid of inserting myself into this learned conversation, as I have now. The proposition is this: that we demolish virtually all of our nuclear weapons now. You give me 100 nuclear weapons with strategic capability and give anybody else—some enemy, say, 10,000. I’d say I’d be as safe as he would. The thing that bothers me is that we go through endless discussions here about things that, to be honest, do not seem to me to get to the real heart of the problem. They tell you how to negotiate. Sure, well, the American Arbitration Society could tell you a lot about negotiating too. But the horrible possibility and even probability of the destruction of the world through these weapons, hangs essentially unattended. And I worry about that, and I wonder if anybody else does.

BLIGHT: Not for the first time, I want to invoke the moderator’s prerogative here. I suggest that we conclude this section just before lunch with some reflections on what Tom has said. Apply it to the negotiating process with which so many of you are familiar—to the slowness of it. Is there a feeling, on either side, that maybe you don’t have forever to work with, that this is really the most important work in the world and that maybe there is a way to make it go faster.
and more, as Tom said, to "the heart of the matter?" Or, is the feeling one of: you take your lunch bucket into work, you work, you take your lunch bucket home? Tom has raised what I imagine is issue number one: how does what you do relate to risk of nuclear catastrophe? I invite some concluding reflections from participants in this process. Viktor and then Marshall.

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, I was a member of our delegation to the Vienna signing of SALT II. I remember thinking about all of those difficulties we had overcome. Hearing Marshall, I remembered all those times when it almost seemed pointless to carry on. But as Mark said, when we banded together with a single aim, we achieved SALT II, if nothing else.

I remember well the signing and meeting of President Carter and President Brezhnev. But what I remember most was something from an informal, sort of a cocktail hour, right after the signing ceremony, in the palace. And I can tell you, I was amazed at how happy all these people from the White House and the State Department were after the signing ceremony. These young people from the White House--you know, you remember them--they were just overwhelmed, they were drunk with joy. I had no idea know why.

So this is a kind of answer to your question, Tom. Could we have done a lot more? Could we have achieved a breakthrough? I don’t really know. But I come back to what I said before. Both sides had done, under the circumstances, what they could do, and it was not just a little. It provided the framework for all the reductions we have seen lately. All of them! This was not a small achievement.

BLIGHT: Marshall, since you started us down this road, how’d you like to wrap it up?
SHULMAN: I'd like to say a word about the March '77 discussions and then one thing about Tom's remarks. On March '77: I can understand what our friends and colleagues have said. I recall what I was thinking when I learned that the President's decision had been to go with the comprehensive proposal. I felt very confident that it would be rejected. I felt that there was no hope. As a matter of fact, I remember when I was packing my suitcase that night before the trip to Moscow, I sat there dejected for a long time with one shoe in my hand, thinking that this was going to be a disastrous trip.

But even though I had grave doubts about it, I still hoped that the Soviet response would be not just "no," but "no, but." If only the Soviet response had not been quite as abrupt and final as it was. If only you had said: we can't do this but let's come back to it, let's go on and see what we can work out. In that case, Cy Vance's position would have been greatly strengthened. He was constrained by the fact that he did not get the "no, but" answer. His great hope in going to Moscow--what he thought could be a realistic basis for negotiation, the Vladivostok agreements--was that with a "no, but" he would have the authority of the President to go into the comprehensive position. But he didn't get it, and the consequence was: it ended there. Would it have made a profound difference or a small one? I'm not sure. But I think it would have made a substantial difference in the negotiations in that period and might have made quite a difference in the future relationship, too.

Second, about Tom's point. Tom, in his usual way, brings a basic common sense to this issue. When things get lost in complexity, he goes to the heart of it. I think a couple things need to be said. One is that in the United States, there simply is not and has not been, a politically effective constituency for arms control. It has always been an uphill battle. This is
because, to a certain extent, the issues involved are counterintuitive for the American public.

Secondly, determined and effective political leadership still could have made a difference. I really believe the case could have been made to the American people with the kind of perspective that Tom was just talking about. But we still have not had that kind of leadership on Tom’s subject in the American political area.

**BLIGHT:** Thank you. We’ll have lunch in the room just to your left as you go out--the same room we had dinner in last night. We’ll reconvene at two o’clock.
SESSION 3:
REGIONAL CONFLICTS
AND THE DETERIORATION OF SUPERPOWER RELATIONS

BLIGHT: While we're finding our seats, I want to try to clarify something. A number of people have approached me since the beginning of our discussions with variants of these questions: Where is all this heading? What will be the outcome of these discussions? Where will we go from here? The one-word answer is that it's leading "forward" [laughter]. So, while we're filling in our chairs, I thought that it might be worth a couple of minutes of our time to let you know what's on the back of my mind as I listen to this conversation. In particular, and for whatever it may be worth, I'll offer some observations on how this method, which we call "critical oral history," works with this kind of material.

First of all, we must at some point focus our attention on an event. We needn't here today be in big hurry to do so. Today, we're surveying what is, for this method, a big expanse of territory as we try to get the lay of the land, preliminary to seeing what our investigative options might be. This method has proved to be especially useful in peeling back the layers of ignorance and misunderstanding of events that had some significance. If the event, or events, are not deemed to have been important, then the reconstruction of them is impossible to justify. That's the first point: I am on the lookout for events to revisit which seem both important and perhaps more than a little controversial.

The second point relates to what I mean by "importance" or "significance." We are looking for episodes that are highly focussed, but not because we wish to traffic in minutiae. Far from it. Rather, we are looking for events in which seem to be embodied the assumptions,
perceptions and characterizations of (in this case) the U.S. and Soviet leaderships for an entire period. Like the narrow neck of an hour glass, events of interest have the major strands of the era feeding into them. But they also have emerging from them significant consequences for the future. Sometimes these are called "turning points." This morning, I thought we had some interesting, usefully contradictory discussion about whether the March '77 Vance mission was, or might have been, just such a turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations during the period in question.

A final point concerns the motivation of those of us who organize such events as these and those who are asked to pay for them. It is this: we seek via our historical reconstructions to have some positive impact, or to raise the odds of such impact, on solutions to vexing and important contemporary problems. We are--none of us--in this solely, or even primarily, to get the history straight, even though that is what we spend much of our time doing. The Cuban missile crisis project, for example, was never conceived mainly as a historical exercise. At first, we--Joe Nye, David Welch, Bruce Allyn and I--looked for clues in the crisis to help us understand the requirements of nuclear deterrence, nuclear crisis prevention and nuclear crisis management. As you may remember, in the far-off days of the mid-1980s, these were then topics of obsessional concern.

Impact, I hasten to point out, is not identical to "lessons." Think of it this way: we do the history, including getting the documents, scholars and veterans of the events together. Then we draw our lessons. But unless people who are actually making the policies on which we want to have an impact are interested in our lessons, we may, from a practical point of view, have wasted our time.
I sense that in undertaking an enterprise like this one, dealing centrally with U.S.-Soviet relations during the breakdown of detente, we are entering new and peculiar territory. By that I mean that some people actually seem to believe that we have arrived at something like "the end of history," with the end of the Cold War. Thus, one encounters more skepticism than previously regarding the utility of the reconstruction of the recent past. At the same time, because the Cold War has, for the moment, ended, unprecedented opportunities exist for reexamining the events and era that shaped the outlooks of all of us. This morning, Bill Taubman alluded to one reason why we should stick to our knitting and ignore the "end of history" types: Once Russia recovers, she may indeed reassert her claim to being a Great Power and, when she does, we may wish that we had used the current "window of opportunity" (if I may borrow the title of a book co-authored by Bruce Allyn) to reach some data-based conclusions about East-West relations in an era of competition. But my main point is simply that we must strike a balance between skepticism about the relevance of history and unalloyed enthusiasm for every document or piece of testimony that comes our way.

So, where is this project going? In short, it will go where you--my collaborators--believe it should go. What I have tried to do is give you some idea of the parameters within which I believe our joint decisions must be made.

But enough abstraction. On with the show! So far, we have dealt almost exclusively with that part of the superpower relationship that Ambassador Bessmertnykh said might have constituted 95% of it: nuclear arms control, specifically the SALT process. This afternoon, we want to discuss those factors that, in the view of many, drove a lot of nails into the coffin of U.S-Soviet relations during the Carter period, namely, regional conflicts, a large number of which
broke out, or seemed to worsen, during the Carter period. Our provocateurs for this session are Svetlana Savranskaya and Wayne Smith. I understand that Svetlana will provoke us first. Svetlana?

SAVRANSKAYA: Thank you, Jim. In addressing the issue of regional conflicts—we in the Soviet Union used to call them "hot spots"—we should begin by looking at the international context. What did the world look like at that point, from the American point of view—from the American point of view and also from the Soviet point of view. Well, America just left Vietnam behind. The shadow of Vietnam was overwhelmingly strong in American public life, including in the American governmental circles. This obsession with Vietnam also created a perception—here I think the Soviet side will agree with me—of some weakness on the part of the new Carter Administration. I mean a weakness in foreign policy. Or, maybe not exactly weakness, but a sense that the new administration would be a little indecisive.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union had recently achieved strategic parity with the United States. The importance of this fact for Soviet leaders cannot be overstated. They had found their identity in the world as the other superpower. And they were just beginning to articulate the ways they thought they should act, as the other superpower. (I am sorry, Jim, but I am going mention the Cuban missile crisis).

BLIGHT: I forgive you, even if Mark Garrison does not [laughter].
SAVRANSKAYA: Well, we could say that maybe the first attempt of the Soviet Union to act as a full-fledged superpower was during the Cuban missile crisis. Part of Khrushchev's rationale seems to have been a search for respect from the U.S. that he thought was deserved by the other superpower. But of course, Khrushchev was premature. Because, or at least partly because, the Soviet Union was so far behind the U.S. in strategic nuclear weapons, he was forced to withdraw, defeated. But by the time President Carter came to office in January 1977, the Soviet Union had achieved parity with the U.S. in all meaningful ways. Now they would demand "proper respect"—what they thought was proper respect—from the United States.

Now, while the Soviet Union and United States were competing in the area of nuclear arms, something was happening in much of the rest of the world: the so-called "national liberation movements." I remember from school—especially from my university studies in Moscow—how much importance we Soviets placed on these national liberation movements. The whole world was perceived as moving from one stage to another. We believed we were living at a revolutionary movement for the whole world: moving toward a progressive, socialist future for the world, and the Soviet Union would be the natural leader of such a world. I hardly need to add that this is really different from the American view of world at the time, which was one emphasizing "containment" of the Soviet Union: of not letting Soviet, or socialist, influence spread to the areas of the world that were just emerging from colonialism. I have the feeling that this is really important: to understand the psychology of the Soviet leadership of the time, you must understand that they believed they were emerging as a superpower, and that the world was changing in a way that would eventually make them the most important superpower.
If we remember everything that was happening in the Third World by the time of the Carter Administration, we might even decide that the concept of "regional conflict" doesn't make much sense. Why? Because it seems to me that in the late 70s, the whole world had become "the region of conflict" for the superpowers. Everywhere we look--everywhere--we could find two opposing sides in a struggle for power. On one side was the Soviet Union supporting some forces which we called "progressive forces." On the other side there was the United States supporting some other coalitions, or groups.

KOMPLEKTMOV: Not a balance of terror, but a balance of terrorism, perhaps [laughter]?

SAVRANSKAYA: Well, yes, we called the groups we supported progressive movements, while we called the groups supported by the United States "terrorists," or "state-sponsored terrorists." For the leaders of the U.S., it was just the opposite. In this era of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, we must work hard to remember how different were our views of one another in those days, not so long ago. As an example, I want to read a short passage from President Carter's memoirs. He said: "what the Soviets depended on was enormous military power and their willingness to export arms to gain a foothold wherever an opportunity arose." To me, this little sentence--if we were to substitute "Americans" for "Soviets"--describes the Soviet perception of the American leadership as well as it describes the American perception of the Soviet leadership and their broad aims in the world. We had two world views that not only contradicted each other, but they were the inverse of each other.

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As Dr. Garthoff notes in his book—and I think it's really important for this project to understand it—there were two truths. Both sides, both arguments, were to some extent valid. Looking at any single situation, any single conflict, any developing African country, we saw things completely differently. And I think the American side and the Soviet side had some grounds to perceive it the way they did. We know what happened in those countries—in Africa, Asia and Latin America—the terrible tragedies that unfolded in those days because, or in part because, the United States and Soviet Union saw the world in such conflicting terms. We can, if we wish, look back in judgment on the leaders of those times, armed with the wisdom of hindsight. But I personally don't think this is productive.

I think it is much more interesting—and more in line with what "critical oral history" is about—to keep in mind the "two truths"—the American and the Soviet. Both, of course, over-simplify the world, painting it in white and black. Leaders on both sides, the American and the Soviet, tried as hard as they could to make over the world in the image of their own beliefs. This morning, we had some discussion, led by Marshall Shulman, about ideology versus pragmatism in Soviet foreign policy during the period. There is a big debate on this. Some of it was discussed in the readings Jim passed out as preparation for the conference. It is related to other questions, such as: was the Soviet Union motivated primarily by offensive or defensive goals, or ideological versus practical goals in foreign policy. These questions should also be applied to the American side. What was the balance in the Carter foreign policy between macho style and goals, on the one hand and, on the other, the attempt to bring moral judgment to bear in foreign policy?
Now I am going to mention the Cuban missile crisis again. At the Moscow conference, Robert McNamara said that if he were a Cuban leader in 1962 he certainly would have felt threatened by the United States. What McNamara did in Moscow is something we should strive for here: people from both the Soviet and American sides should try to see the situation from the point of view of the other. And I think this is really critical. If we are able to do this, all of us will understand the whole process better than before.

As an example--one among many that could be discussed--I want to talk a little bit about Nicaragua. In this country, America saw Communists coming to power, and little else. I'm over-simplifying, of course. Communists were coming to power and Ronald Reagan's rhetoric tried to make you believe that the Nicaraguan Communists were the first wave of a flood that would sweep all over Latin America. They were already in Cuba and had been there for a long time. They were in El Salvador. Who would be next? And behind every movement of the Sandinistas, according to Reagan and his supporters, the Russians were "pulling the strings," as they used to say. This was the political climate that President Carter had to contend with in 1979-80.

On the Soviet side, how much did we really know about the Sandinistas? Not very much, I think. What is clear is that they didn't have our unconditional support--I mean Soviet support. There were questions about the Sandinistas. Certainly, Soviet leaders were very willing to support a progressive liberation movement, especially if it was an anti-American movement, such as the Sandinistas eventually became. And of course we thought Somoza was a terrible dictator who was basically installed by the United States and unconditionally supported by the United States. So, the Soviet leadership believed, eventually, that the Sandinistas constituted a
progressive movement of the people of Nicaragua against the American "puppet," Somoza. So, on the one side the situation in Nicaragua looked like a sinister Communist threat, directed by Moscow. On the other, it looked like an indigenous movement of people to free themselves from a U.S.-backed dictator.

We can now see that the situation was so much more complex and nuanced than was generally believed in Moscow or Washington. After the elections of February 1990, it is quite clear that Nicaragua has many problems that are--well, just plain Nicaraguan problems. Of course, we don't have time in this conference to look at all, or even most, of the regional conflicts of the Carter period. But I would suggest that we try to frame our analysis of regional conflicts of the time within the idea of the "two truths" of the strategic superpower competition. This was the background of the times in which all issues between the United States and Soviet Union--but especially the regional issues--were understood. Thank you.

BLIGHT: I want to add something that Svetlana did not add: She finished her comprehensive exams for her doctorate at Emory University just hours before she left Atlanta for this meeting. To be so coherent so soon after such a traumatic event is awe-inspiring [applause]. Svetlana, may we assume that Bob Pastor deserves some of the blame for putting you through such an ordeal, but also some of the credit for the deep knowledge which obviously underlies your presentation today?

SAVRANSKAYA: Credit only, no blame [laughter].
SHULMAN: I was going to say: Svetlana must have a very good teacher. What a marvelous presentation!

SMITH: I hope she doing her dissertation on regional conflicts. It should be a dandy.

BLIGHT: Our second provocateur is a gentleman who is, alas, some years removed from his doctoral work. I call on Wayne Smith.

SMITH: Yes, Jim, a year or two beyond the dissertation, at least. Well, Svetlana has cautioned that we don’t have time to go into the individual regional conflicts, but that’s exactly what I’m going to try to do—in two or three broad brush strokes.

Before doing that, however, I want to react to part of the conversation this morning. Now, perhaps I read too much into certain conversations, but: I was under the impression that the purpose of this project was to look at the Carter "opening," Carter’s hope for a renewed and strengthened detente, essentially (what Jim calls) Carter’s "post-Cold War" foreign policy objectives, at least very early in his administration. I thought we were to look at these aspects of the Carter program and try to come to some understanding as to why it went astray, with the idea of not repeating mistakes of the past. Not only that, but I thought we were to look harder at the specific policies that failed then, because now, in a post-Cold War environment, there may be some positive lessons as well—things we ought to think about trying again, now.

With that in mind, I’m not sure I agree with Mark Garrison’s statement this morning: that there may not have been any "lost opportunities" during the Carter years. Mark’s point, as I
understand it--and it is a point assented to by both Ambassador Bessmertnykh and Ambassador Komplektov--was that, in spite of obstacles, we did reach the SALT II agreement and it was an important step forward. To Mark, and to several others, it seemed unlikely that the Soviet side was at that point willing (or able) to go beyond a kind of "minimal" SALT agreement to a broader accommodation and therefore, perhaps, there was no opportunity that was lost. It just wasn't in the cards.

However--and here I get around to my subject of regional conflicts--I would suggest, following Marshall Shulman, that there was a magnificent opportunity, briefly present in 1977, that was gone by the time the SALT II agreement was signed in June of 1979. By that time, the atmosphere had been so poisoned that, indeed, there probably wasn't any larger opportunity from that point forward. But the question we should ask is: why not? If there was an opportunity at the beginning of the Carter Administration to change fundamentally the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations, then what happened to it? Why did it disappear?

I submit that it was killed by a host of what Marshall referred to this morning as "external elements," or what Svetlana called "regional conflicts." As Marshall pointed out, one of the new elements of the situation inherited by the Carter Administration was the Soviet Union's having achieved global outreach to virtually every corner of the world. This was, in a way, what it meant to be the other superpower. Why, I even remember the Soviets mounting an airlift to take supplies to the victims of a Peruvian earthquake. The Soviet Union Jimmy Carter had to deal with had interests and activities in Africa and the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
Now, Americans, especially some Americans, saw that as an asymmetrical detente, as Joe Nye mentioned. But those people would have seen any Soviet attempt to improve their position as "asymmetrical," it seems to me. As Svetlana suggested, the Soviets probably saw their expanded global reach--and a lot of Americans saw it too--as an inevitable result of there being two superpowers, not just one. That is, the Soviets had a right to global reach, just as they had a right to try to achieve nuclear parity with the U.S.

So, there were two ways of interpreting the new Soviet ability to project itself into far-flung corners of the world. One could see it as a glass half-empty—that is the American glass half-empty: with the Soviets "stealing" what was "rightfully" ours. Alternatively, one could see it as a glass—a Soviet glass, in this case—half full, the Soviets having reached parity of nuclear forces and parity of what we used to call "force projection" to all parts of the Third World. I gather from our Russian colleagues that all of you share the view that the Soviet Union, having achieved these two basic forms of parity with the U.S., may indeed have been prepared to pursue some kind of broad and far-reaching accommodation with the U.S. This is why I question Mark Garrison's comment about there not being any lost opportunities of consequence in the Carter period. If we in the U.S. had been able to shift our angle of vision to seeing Soviet superpower status as half-full, rather than half-empty, who knows what we could have accomplished? To put it another way: if we had found it possible to see our competition with the Soviets in positive-sum terms, rather than zero-sum, an opportunity might have been grasped. But of course it wasn't, and both sides must shoulder the blame for it.

Let me turn now to a brief consideration of three regional conflicts as they presented themselves to American and Soviet leaders in the Carter-Brezhnev period. All three take place
before the June, 1979, SALT agreement--before the signing. I maintain that above all else, it was this cluster of conflicts that "poisoned the atmosphere" of U.S.-Soviet relations, as Marshall phrased it. These were followed, in 1979, by the Soviet brigade-in-Cuba issue, which Ray [Garthoff] and Bob [Pastor] will talk about, and by the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which simply added further fuel to the fire.

Number one, Angola. The (more or less) official U.S. view of the interventions in Angola has the Soviets flooding the area with arms and trying to take advantage of the situation. In fact, I think both sides were guilty of that, the Soviets no more so than the Americans. Now in January 1975, the three factions--the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA--met in Portugal to try to work out an agreement before Angola became independent later that year. Maybe it wouldn't have worked, even if outside powers had stayed out of the conflict. But at least it was the best hope--the [Alvor] accord was the best hope at the time, in January of 1975. Yet we find that only three weeks after the signing at Alvor, the "40 Committee" [an interagency group, chaired by Henry Kissinger, in charge of U.S. covert operations] and the NSC were authorizing money to go to Holden Roberto, head of the FNLA (and an old-time CIA retainer). Holden Roberto then goes over to the attack. The accords fall apart. And a bloody civil war breaks out.

I'm not saying that the U.S. was the only guilty party. We weren't. The Soviets and Cubans were also involved, as was Zaire, under Mobutu. But, certainly, the U.S. at that point gave no indication whatsoever of any interest in supporting or encouraging the Alvor agreements. Why? Because the agreements would have provided for the participation of the (Soviet and Cuban-backed, Marxist) MPLA in a coalition government until elections could be held. This was simply unacceptable to the U.S. government at the time under President Gerald Ford and
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Now, once the civil war started, both sides--the U.S. and the Soviets/Cubans--backed their respective allies. The situation was deliciously, if tragically ironic. The United States and the People’s Republic of China were backing Holden Roberto’s FNLA in the north, while South Africa--not the United States, yet--but South Africa was backing Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in the south. This tense situation escalated alarmingly over the course of 1975. On the bare facts of the matter, one has to say this is not a shining moment in the history of U.S. foreign policy. There’s no question that the first regular troops to intervene were the South Africans, who attacked in August from their base in Namibia to take over a hydroelectric project. There’s no question either that a South African armored column had crossed the frontier into Angola long before the introduction of regular Cuban troops. It’s also well known that at this point the CIA had liaison officers with the South African armored column. Therefore, we knew all about the South African invasion. If we hadn’t actually encouraged it, we certainly had indicated our acceptance. And there’s not a word--I’ve gone back and searched the files and newspaper stacks--and I have not been able to find one word in condemnation, in criticism or even an expression of concern out of the U.S. administration regarding the South African invasion. It’s not until something like two weeks later--almost three weeks later--that the Cubans arrived in substantial numbers to aid the MPLA, who were besieged in Luanda. Suddenly, foreign intervention in Angola is described by the U.S. government as a criminal act, so long as the accusation excludes the various kinds of intervention practiced by the CIA.

Now, outside parties could have done better. How? Well, there were certainly many "lost" opportunities for all outside parties to try to mount a major effort--a major diplomatic effort--to make the Alvor agreements work. The fact that the United States didn’t do so doesn’t
absolve the Soviet Union and Cuba from some responsibility. We all could have done much better in trying to avoid a civil war, to encourage an acceptable coalition government that would work, if only temporarily. But the U.S. perception was that it was all the fault of the Soviets and the Cubans, whose expansionism, out-thrusting and generally irresponsible behavior had created the whole mess. No doubt, the Soviets and the Cubans--I am sure about the Cubans--blamed the situation on the U.S. But in fact, due to the existence of the two opposing "truths," or world views Svetlana mentioned, there were no clean hands in the Angolan situation. As we know, the MPLA triumphed, due largely to Cuban and Soviet assistance, and also because the U.S. Congress cut off U.S. assistance to all warring factions in Angola. But the situation inherited by the Carter Administration remained very volatile.

This leads me to the second episode I want to mention--that known as Shaba II. In March 1977 ("Shaba I"), separatist gendarmes from Shaba province in Zaire (formerly called "Katanga") had invaded Shaba province from their base in northern Angola. The U.S. instinctively blamed the Cubans and, to a lesser extent, the Soviets, for putting the Katanganese up to it. That was a mistake. The Cubans and Soviets had nothing to do with it. Then in May 1978, the Katanganese tried it again. Again, the Cubans were blamed for instigating it, even though Fidel Castro personally assured us that they were not. My perception--I hope some around the table will have comments on this--my perception, perhaps wrong, was that by that point the Carter Administration had been kicked around on the issue of being soft and not responding sufficiently to some of these perceived Soviet-Cuban thrusts in the Third World. With Shaba II, the Carter Administration indicated very quickly that it would support the
Belgian-French airlift. My thought was that they wished this to be seen as a decisive U.S. rebuff, if you will, to a Soviet-Cuban thrust in the Third World.

But how was it to be so perceived when the front page of the New York Times proclaimed Fidel Castro’s denial? Castro had said the Cubans weren’t behind the invasion. Not only that, he said, the Cubans totally disapproved of it. In fact, Castro was actively searching for some way to get it turned off and for some way to cooperate in getting those guys back across the border and disarmed. But having stated apriori that the Cubans were behind the invasion, the U.S. had no choice but to say that Castro was lying. I submit that this was surely a lost opportunity. It was not in the interest of the Soviet Union, nor in the interest of Cuba, and certainly not the interest of Angola to have this invasion succeed. Why? Because it might draw a response from Zaire and its allies and threaten Angolan security (and the security of Cuban and Soviet personnel in Angola). What a marvelous, but lost, opportunity to collaborate on getting the Katanganese back across the border. But the U.S. played it the other way, the zero-sum way, asserting in word and deed that neither Cubans nor Soviets had any right to be in Angola and that, because they happened to be there, all manner of foul deed was to be attributed automatically to them, regardless of the facts of the matter.

Finally, I want to say just a few words about the Horn of Africa, where I think we all behaved with less acumen than we might have. The U.S. government was so badly divided on the issues that it is hard to discover “a” U.S. position or policy. This much seems clear: the Cubans and Soviets believed that the U.S. was behind Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden desert in July 1977. Conversely, the U.S.—at least Brzezinski and his faction—believed the Cubans and Soviets were behind the Ethiopian counter-offensive into the area in November 1978. We each
accused one another of aggression, carried out through our respective allies (which tended to shift in the Horn). In the end, the Soviets and Cubans saw U.S. machinations behind every move of Somalia’s Siad Barre, while the U.S. saw sinister Cuban and Soviet motives behind every move of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam. Moreover, the U.S.--again, I am referring to Brzezinski and the NSC, not to the Vance State Department--compounded the mistake by linking Soviet-Cuban presence in the Horn to SALT II. Thus, the idea made famous by Brzezinski--that SALT II is buried in the sands of the Ogaden--has some validity. But if it is so, it is in part because of our own, ineptitude.

But again, we were not the only ones who could have called for greater communication, for a broad diplomatic effort to try to prevent war between Ethiopia and Somalia. Efforts should have been made to involve not only the Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States, but also the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This was, I submit, not only a lost opportunity to work together on solving a difficult problem in Africa. It was more than this. It helped lead to the tragic situation of chaos we see now in that area of the world by shipping massive amounts of arms to the combatants. We all did this: the U.S., Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beyond that, because of the linkage that some in the U.S. government, including President Carter, seemed to apply to the Horn and SALT, we can say, I think, that East-West relations, SALT II and detente all really started to come apart in late 1978, stimulated by events in the Horn. But an opportunity was lost; lives were lost; and, in my opinion, all hope of a breakthrough--in either U.S.-Soviet relations or in U.S.-Cuban relations--went down the drain.

There is a common perception that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan killed detente. It wasn’t Afghanistan that put the skids to SALT II and destroyed detente, however. That may
have been the final straw that broke the camel's back. But it seemed to me at the time, and it seems to me now, that SALT II was destroyed by these episodes--U.S.-Soviet-Cuban episodes--in Africa and also, of course, by the Soviet "brigade" crisis, which we will discuss later.

BLIGHT: Thanks very much, Wayne, for a rousing, even-handed provocation. It occurs to me that if we move on with this process and hold a major conference, maybe we should hold it in the Ogaden Desert and all bring picks and shovels and try to find detente. If both Zbig Brzezinski and Wayne Smith believe it was buried there, then it must be there, still buried somewhere [laughter]. Marshall Shulman is first on my list.

SHULMAN: I'd just like to make a brief observation that, perhaps, ought to be further developed in later stages of the process. It has always been of interest to me that, even during the Cold War, even during the heat of some tense difficulties such as the African episodes Wayne has just described so vividly, there were always inter-adversary communications. For example, the American government and Anatoly [Dobrynin] had talks about whether or not the Ethiopian soldiers would massacre the Somalis in the Ogaden. Anatoly would come back and say: "they will not. But of course," he would continue, "we don't have anything to do with it. Why don't you talk to the Ethiopians?" Another example: When the Ethiopian troops were approaching the Somali border, there was a good deal of concern in Washington as to how far the Ethiopians (and Soviets and Cubans) were going to go, and what they were going to do. From these inter-adversary conversations we learned, I think, that they would not, for example, bomb Mogadishu.
We were almost always in constant touch about the limits and objectives of the various operations.

DOBRYNIN: What Marshall said is true. I remember that there was a lot of concern about whether the troops were going to cross the border of Somalia. I had to check. The answer was "yes, we are going to cross the border." I said: "are you sure about that?" They said: "yes, we are sure." And yet, of course, they didn’t cross the border. In those kind of situations--I mean--it was sometimes difficult to cooperate, in the way Marshall said, even when that was our intention. But it was our intention.

I would like to say a little bit more about this theme of cooperation raised by Marshall. Why? Because, the events you [gestures toward Wayne Smith] discussed now were only some of the things, which caused the erosion of the foundation--of the basis--of our [U.S.-Soviet] relations. There were others. Take, for instance, October 1st [1977]--the joint declaration of Middle-East cooperation issued by Gromyko and Vance. It was a good first step in learning how to cooperate--not just cooperate, but to collaborate--with each other on problems in other parts of the world. But then what happened? Sadat went to Israel, put up to it by Carter--or by the Carter Administration. We were excluded from the process and, I can tell you, we weren’t happy about it. Not at all! I checked with Zbig. His answer was, he didn’t want to have Russians involved. It was, very frankly, not really a civil answer. There was no cooperation but, simply the President acting unilaterally. I don’t know whether it was just Zbig’s point of view, or the Carter administration as a whole--to exclude the Russians. But it was such an antagonistic approach. As you said, Marshall, you were trying to cooperate, trying to collaborate, even about
difficult issues in the Third World. Unfortunately, Zbig, well, you know, he took such a militaristic stance.

Secondly, I want to speak more generally about the Russian position. It was really--I mean, really--there was no great plan to instigate a global war or even to take advantage of the United States at every opportunity. That is nonsense! It has been said here that "Team B" and other research--alleged research--concluded that the Russians did have a grand design to conquer the world. Well, let me tell you, it was a very bad design. It was no design at all. It was a design that gave us some broken pieces. Some design [laughter]! Well, you thought we were taking advantage of opportunities. But, really, in many cases we were--both sides--just overcome by events.

BESSMERTNYKH: But, of course, we--that is, both sides--helped to create these events, I think.

DOBRYNIN: Well, yes, of course, to a certain extent. But we wanted only to defend our position. I think, ultimately, what we were trying to do was to solidify our stake in the world at large. In my view, this had nothing directly to do with undermining the position of the United States. I would say this was always the view of the Foreign Ministry. The Party itself is a different matter. Or it could be, at times. You know, people like Ligachev--they are always against missile treaties and always for taking advantage in any way possible. Ligachev [laughter] didn't like Shevardnadze, when he gave up some of our missiles.
But at that time—during the Carter Administration—Brezhnev was prepared to reduce the level of nuclear arms. That is clear. That was not the issue, for him, or for us. This was peaceful coexistence. We had to develop detente with the Western countries. I don’t care what Arbatov says in his memoirs. We did not learn any such "lesson" from Angola as he suggests. That is ridiculous! Brezhnev placed better relations with the United States far above all these regional conflicts put together. And so did Gromyko. He looked rather casually at those conflicts in Angola, or Ogaden, etc. I really think, at the beginning—I am afraid that Gromyko didn’t look at these regional conflicts as a very big issue, politically. I personally cannot remember a single case where Gromyko even received an African ambassador. He never received them. To him, they didn’t matter.

Now, when something occurred that to us represented a kind of revolution—well, we always tried to be helpful to "progressive" revolutions, as we called them. If some government or movement said adamantly "we are trying to throw off the imperialist-capitalist devils, please give us some arms"—well then, you know, we would send in some things. Then we would get little-by-little involved in these kinds of situations, but without really thinking about any connections they might have with our relations with the United States. I think that if you would have asked Brezhnev or Gromyko at the time: "are you worried about how Angola will undermine the SALT II treaty?"—they would have looked at you in amazement. Sincerely! They would have told you that there is no connection—no connection whatever—between Angola and SALT, between Ethiopia and SALT, etc., etc. I know this. I know it for a fact.

I say this because I admit that it was a mistake in our diplomacy, in our foreign relations, not to have thought about the connections between events in these other countries—which we did
not take seriously at all—and our relations with the United States. It was a great mistake. And I speak personally here. We in Washington should have tried harder to convince Moscow of the connections people in Washington were making at the time—what you call "linkage." But realistically, it was not easy to convince ourselves—ourselves!—that such matters were real issues, that they could affect the foundation of U.S.-Soviet relations.

As Marshall said today, however, we were talking more or less all the time about these regional issues. Talking with one another, between Americans and Russians. A lot of the time, of course, we argued about who was "right." But not all the time. We were ready to discuss, really, the assumptions or any issues regarding any regional conflict. And it was at high levels. The usual way it went was: "what are you doing, or why are you doing this, and then why are you doing that?" Unfortunately, the purpose was not usually to just sit down and discuss the basic principles of what each side was doing. We were always hung up on particular issues, particular episodes, particular issues. In this way we all were sort of asleep to what was happening. Yes, the atmosphere was poisoned, as has been said here by several participants. But in all honesty we must say that together, without meaning to, we poisoned it ourselves.

BEZSMERTNYKH: I would just like to highlight, a little bit, some things the ambassador [Dobrynin] has just said. About the regional conflicts in Africa: yes, Gromyko was always getting some cables about them. I remember one time in particular. The deputy foreign minister responsible for Africa was there. Gromyko was reading a cable and he said "Lusaka, where is that?" And the Deputy Foreign Minister said "I believe it is in Africa" [laughter]. This anecdote shows, of course, the tremendous interest Gromyko had in African subjects [laughter].
Now, while it has so far been implied, I want now to be quite specific about something: there were two areas in foreign policy where the Foreign Ministry did not have so much responsibility. And those areas were Eastern Europe, as you called it, or "socialist countries," as we called them; and some countries in the Third World which were--as we used to say--going a non-capitalist way. The crises that we have been discussing (especially those in Africa), were in the kind of countries which were going in a non-capitalist way: Angola and Ethiopia. The primary responsibility for the development of the relationship of the Soviet Union with those countries was really with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Party.

Of course, we were involved, to an extent, at the level of diplomatic relations. But I can assure you that ours--the Foreign Ministry's--was not the last word about our relations with these countries. As soon as somebody came to power, or as soon as somebody seemed about to come to power, and said "I am going socialist"--then he was immediately the center of interest for the International Department of the Central Committee. Immediately they would start developing the relationship. This is one of the most important reasons, in my opinion, for a certain mix-up in our foreign policy, especially the disconnection between our Third World policy and our relations with the United States.

DOBRYNIN: And then the Foreign Minister would be ready to demonstrate that he was fond of this particular Communist. Very fond [laughter].
BESSMERTNYKH: Exactly. Gromyko was often a little bit jealous about control of the other socialist countries, but he never insisted that control over our foreign policy toward those countries be given back to the real foreign office.

SHULMAN: This was Ponomarev?

BESSMERTNYKH: It was Ponomarev. It was Ponomarev’s department. So, when we appear to evade the issue of what has happened here or there—in Africa, for example—it is because the so-called “grand design” to conquer the world and to undermine U.S. positions originated in the International Department. To Gromyko, this was an empty subject. He was never interested. He was not a part of it. He was never at home in such discussions. If he participated in the discussions, he was always very neutral, as I remember the talks. We were trying to get away with this; you were trying to take advantage of us on that, etc. Seriously, it was a simplistic approach, on the U.S. side, to this, and it was a simplistic approach from our side, from the International Department because, as I said, it was driven exclusively by ideology. We have rid ourselves of this problem only very recently, as you know.

BLIGHT: Yes, Viktor.

KOMPLEKTOV: I found very interesting the presentation made by Mr. Wayne Smith. I think that really—as I understand the main point—that there were a lot of misperceptions of each other’s intentions in the Third World. Of course, ideologically we—the Soviets—were associated
with the so-called national liberation movements all around the world. That's ideological, no more, no less. But, in practice, whatever "hot-spot" I look back on and analyze right now, I can say that we got involved in there because it was "available", but we did not instigate or promote any of these hot spots.

On the Nicaraguan situation--on the Sandinistas. Well, how come we tried to convince them not to go ahead with a proclamation of socialism and socialist transformation in Nicaragua? I was involved in all these events with the Sandinistas. Anyone who thinks we talked the Sandinistas into becoming socialists doesn't know anything about what really went on.

And, the last point. We were the first--that was in 1985--by the minister of foreign affairs--who made that move, well, just to disassociate ourselves, that is the Soviet Union, from some of these movements. Well, we said that. And we worked very hard to convince the Afghans first, and Sandinistas next, that what they did have were not socialist revolutions, but popular democratic revolutions. And I think we helped ourselves a lot by this ideological disassociation from them. It helped promote peaceful settlements and an end to all those civil difficulties. This action on our part was an important step on the way to democratic elections in Nicaragua.

SHULMAN: On the question of the support for national liberation movements: am I right in thinking that, in part, it was an answer to the Chinese, who were arguing, at the time of detente, that you were soft on capitalism? Was Moscow defending itself by saying: we are supporting national liberation movements--as a way of showing there was still fidelity to the revolutionary movements? Secondly, wasn't support for national liberation movements, in fact, a very flexible
concept? Couldn’t it be applied here, or not applied there, according to the practical circum-
stances?

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, in a small way--yes--that was an answer to the Chinese claims. But
our support for such movements started well before our conflict with the Chinese, when we were
friendly with them. Typically, we just associated ourselves with national liberation movements
when, at a certain moment, or at a certain stage in a particular organization we came to believe
it was in our interest to do so. I have the feeling that after we began having our differences with
the Chinese, we--that is, the International Department--we may have been a little--well--a little
less selective in our approach to certain organizations, because we believed we were, in a sense,
competing with the Chinese.

Marshall, you are quite right about the flexibility of the application of our expressed
support for national liberation movements. Of course, we wouldn’t have been involved at all if
it weren’t for our ideological commitments, in those days. But it is my impression that there
were almost always practical issues, as well, driving our decision to get involved with the
movements. Once, for example, we had a problem with our ocean-going fleet. It needed
maintenance, basically, and it was costly to have to bring all the ships back to port in the Soviet
Union. I can tell you: that had a lot to do with our "intense interest" in a certain faction in
Yemen. I think this also became an important source of support for our connections with Cuba--
the availability of ports of call far from the Soviet Union. These practical factors all entered into
our decisions. There was no design, either grand or not-so-grand, to fight the Americans all over
the world.
In his interesting remarks, Marshall said that by the time President Carter came to office, the United States had to recognize the Soviet Union as a global power with a global interest. We had "global outreach," as he said. But that is only half the story. As far as I see it or, really, as far as I saw it at that time, you recognized the Soviet Union only as a global threat to the interests of the United States--no more, no less. This was true, it seems to me, even for Carter. The U.S., even then, could not accept the Soviet Union as, in important senses, an equal, as a country may have a place, a role in the world analogous to that of the United States. This was the psychology of the United States: the Soviet Union could have no legitimate role in, for example, Africa. Shall we quote some of the statements made by the Reagan Administration about the Soviet Union--well--in connection with Nicaragua? You know: that the Soviet Union has no interests, and cannot have any interests, anywhere in the Western hemisphere? Right? To put it another way: according to the American way of thinking, the Soviet Union may think it has interests in, say, Africa, but it is wrong. Even then, psychologically, the U.S. saw itself as the world's only legitimate superpower.

SHULMAN: Sasha, I wonder if I could get you to say a bit more about the historical development of this dual approach to Soviet foreign policy you spoke about.

BEESMERTNYKH: Well, Marshall, perhaps I could add a word or two. I think the story--of the dual approach--begins much, much earlier, in the twenties. As far back as 1921, Lenin distinguished between two approaches. First, there was the International--the Communist International approach. That was almost completely ideological. On the other hand, there was
the Comintern approach, which became the Foreign Ministry’s approach to foreign policy—essentially a pragmatic approach based on an assessment of national interests. What is interesting is that, though the approaches are based on almost completely different principles, there was a tendency to ignore the differences, to pretend that, so to speak, we were all in the same business. In an important sense, we were not. As I said, this led to a lot of confusion and misunderstandings between the two bodies that ultimately became responsible for Soviet foreign policy: the Foreign Ministry and the International Department.

BLIGHT: On this point, I have Mark Garrison, Bob Pastor, Jim Hershberg, Svetlana Savranskaya and Bill Taubman. Let’s start with Mark.

GARRISON: I would like, just for a moment, to try to put this discussion into a little broader context—I mean Wayne’s point about perceptions of intention. It seems to me that the question here isn’t now, and wasn’t then: what are Soviet intentions in Africa. But what’s at issue was, and for us still is: how did each side see the other’s overall intentions? For my money, that’s the big issue underlying all these discussions about regional conflicts. Are those guys trying to bury us? Are they trying to undermine our position everywhere—at home, abroad, and so on? Are those guys trying to muscle in on our territory? If they are, will they stop at some point of their own accord, or will we have to stop them by force?

KOMPLEKTMOV: I am surprised to hear you talk that way, Mark. Have we tried to undermine your position [laughter]?
GARRISON: Well, Viktor, that's what happens when you get into academia. You begin to talk in big generalizations. But don't worry, I'll be resigning pretty soon.

BLIGHT: I am sorry, Mark, but the chair chooses to exert his prerogative and declares that you may resign now from neither this conversation nor from your academic post [laughter]. Not yet.

GARRISON: What I'm suggesting--what I'm trying to suggest--is that each of these issues that we've been talking about here should be thought of as going into a larger pot. Now, what's in that pot determines what I think you're up to and what you think I'm up to. And it includes a lot of things. It includes some things that, well, to take an example: my colleagues in the Foreign Ministry hammered on me day in and day out back in these days with accusations like "you're deliberately excluding us from the Middle East," or "you're making a military alliance with China, which is one of our most dangerous enemies," and so on. If you really believed things like that--and I bet you did--that kind of thing enters in a more general way into all the calculations on your side about the United States. On our side, probably more important than Nicaragua or Angola was the perception of overwhelming Soviet military strength, conventional military strength, in Europe. Whether true or not, that was the perception. It was one of Senator Jackson's main reasons for opposing SALT II. So, all of these things are important in and of themselves, of course. But my point is that when you add all these things up, when you try to draw a picture of what the other side is really up to, what are there real objectives--the picture that emerges is what tends to drive interpretations and decisions.
KOMPLEKTOV: Was it really that bad, Mark? Did we really make your life miserable?

GARRISON: Day in and day out.

KOMPLEKTOV: Really? I thought it was the other way around [laughter].

BLIGHT: Viktor, Betty [Garrison] has independently confirmed to me that Mark is right and you are wrong [laughter]. I call on Bob Pastor.

PASTOR: I think it is obvious that there were numerous misperceptions. But the main reason we’re here today, discussing these issues, is that each side perceived the other very accurately. At least, that is the sense I get from the discussion. That is to say, each side perceived that the other was trying to extend its influence in the world. Each was right. And each also perceived—though the validity of this belief is more questionable—that a gain by one side would, in the nature of things, constitute a loss by the other side. This is what we mean when we talk about the zero-sum world of the Cold War.

An initial effort to try to negotiate rules of the game was made by Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s, but it failed, for a variety of reasons, but mainly because each side was still looking for ways to extend its influence without unduly provoking the other. This was why, in those cases where real gains occurred, by one side or the other, there was a tendency to try to avoid taking credit for it. One had to be careful not to appear to do that which was actually being done: seeking gains at the others expense. The critical issue, as I saw it then and as I still see it, has two parts. One I’ll call “threshold” and the other is the cumulative effect that Mark was
suggesting, in which conclusions are drawn from a joint assessment of many actions. First, on thresholds: [Georgy] Arbatov is very clear in his memoirs that both sides extended political influence and economic aid to various groups in each struggle for influence in the Third World. We also know that both sides provided arms, on many occasions, to groups they supported. However, the introduction of troops, whether by the U.S. or the Soviet Union, or by allies such as Cuba, did represent the breach of a significant threshold. Arbatov says this directly, in his memoirs: the introduction of regular troops by an outside country was known, on both sides, to change the situation radically. After the introduction of troops, the situation was regarded as much more serious, much more dangerous.

With this notion of "threshold" in mind, it seems to me that the Soviet Union made two decisions that did irreparable harm to detente and to the chances that the SALT II treaty would be ratified. First, was the decision to supply and transport somewhere around 36,000 Cuban troops into Angola. All of us--Soviets, Americans and Cubans--were supplying the various factions. I accept that. But when Cuban troops began arriving in huge numbers, it was clear to us that a threshold had been passed. A rule of the game had been broken. The Soviets were trying to take advantage of us in an unacceptable way. Even more important, in my view, during the Carter Administration was the Soviet decision to deploy 17,000 Cuban soldiers under the command of a Soviet general in Ethiopia. This was viewed at the time as a reckless breach of a threshold--and therefore as simply unacceptable.

As you know, the debate over how to respond to Soviet (and Soviet-Cuban) actions in Angola and Ethiopia was heated and difficult. Almost everybody agreed that we needed to respond in some fashion. The debate brought out fissures within the administration that had been
there all along. Some people argued that the appearance of Soviet and Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia is not all that important and that, in any case, there is no appropriate way to respond that will not endanger detente and SALT. Secretary Vance tended toward this position. Others held that if we failed to respond, the Soviets and Cubans would be encouraged then to engage in further unacceptable adventures. Arbatov actually confirms this in his memoirs: he says that the Soviets were led by what they took to be success in Angola to take other steps.

Now I would like to put a series of related questions to our Russian colleagues. One unfortunate outcome of what I have called the Soviet-Cuban breach of an established threshold in Angola and Ethiopia was to make the domestic politics of the SALT process much more complex and difficult. All three of you [gestures toward Bessmertnykh, Dobrynin and Komplektov] alluded, though very generally, to the nature of the debate on the Soviet side. My question is this: did Soviet leaders weigh the potential impact on relations with the U.S. of these specific actions in Angola and Ethiopia? If they did, did they conclude that the U.S. would not act? Or did they conclude that, whatever the U.S. might do, U.S. action was not as important as the potential gain—in the Horn of Africa, for example. Finally, how do you see the two debates connecting? There seem to have been people on both sides arguing for confrontation and people on both sides arguing that—you know—that there are other things that are more important, that the quality of relationship, for example, would suffer, that SALT would suffer, if a confrontational position was taken.

DOBRYNIN: Well, I don’t believe that is a fair description of what happened. I can assure you that, for instance—well—you were much too noisy on the subject of ...
BLIGHT: Excuse me, Ambassador, did you say that Bob and his colleagues were too "noisy?"

DOBRYNIN: Noisy, NOISY! Everybody on the U.S. side was talking about Cubans, Cubans, Cubans. In Russia it was quite a disadvantage, really—to come to us with complaints about the Cubans. We are put in the position of middle-men. Essentially, you were asking us to go ahead and try to push the Cubans around.

Take the Cuban issue, as such. There were two aspects of our Cuban relations. One, strategic. The strategic issue is directly between me and you, Russians and Americans, through the understanding that was reached between Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1962. It’s true, from time to time there were difficulties, controversies. We would talk directly. You would ask: was the Russian brigade there, had it always been there, etc. We could ask about our fighters and bombers. We all remember the famous episode about nuclear submarines in Cuba, in—when was it?—1970. These were U.S.-Russian strategic issues. Once in a while we had a little mini-crisis, as with the Russian brigade business. That time, the strategic issue did interfere—I agree—with the SALT negotiations, or rather with the ratification.

The second issue is not strategic, between the U.S. and Russians, but is an international one. Now, you [gestures toward Pastor] ask whether a calculation was made in Moscow—whether what was going on in Angola or Ethiopia should or should not affect U.S.-Soviet relations. Well, not to my knowledge. I don’t believe so. But Sasha, you were in Moscow at the time [conversation in Russian between Dobrynin and Bessmertnykh]. Well, at least, as I remember, I was still being received as ambassador at that time [laughter]. I am being facetious. Seriously, I went to Moscow at the time. My impression was that none of these African -
activities were perceived as big decisions. I had a right to recall the protocols of the Central Committee, and the Politburo, later. Nevertheless, I never saw any single document which was very specific about Cuba--the role of the Cubans in regional conflict with the United States, and our position, and so on. All these were very complicated issues but not really connected to our relations--to U.S.-Soviet relations.

PASTOR: There was no calculation, no attempt, as far as you are aware, to assess the cost ...

DOBRYNIN: There was not a specific calculation. That is correct.

PASTOR: ...to U.S.-Soviet relations of the actions in Angola and Ethiopia?

DOBRYNIN: None.

BLIGHT: Next, I call on Jim Hershberg.

HERSHBERG: There are a lot of regional crises on the table for discussion. Each is fascinating in its own right. Some of them are superbly documented on the U.S. side by the National Security Archive. But there was one regional crisis with certain characteristics that are relevant to the central issue of SALT. I am talking, of course, about the Middle East, particularly the discrepancy between the collaboration on the October 1 1977, U.S.-Soviet communique and the Sadat visit to Israel after that. Thinking operationally, it would seem to provide a case that
is discrete, limited in time and, moreover, closely related to issues that arose during the Vance mission to Moscow in March of that year.

In reading the Archive’s chronology, prepared for this conference, and having read some of the documents, it becomes clear that by the late summer of ’77 things were looking up in U.S.-Soviet relations. They seem to have recovered from the blow suffered in March. Let me read two paragraphs from President Carter’s memoirs regarding the late summer of ’77. I’m reading from the bottom of page 223:

At least during this period, the letters [between Carter and Brezhnev] had a decidedly positive tone. Apparently the "post office department" in Moscow had decided to move forward on SALT, because we continued to make slow but steady progress. We were now working well with the Soviets on banning nuclear weapons tests of all kinds. Brezhnev was agreeing that we needed to have major reductions in existing arsenals, and he had not rejected the idea of ceasing all nuclear weapons construction, the same proposals I had put forward in my earliest correspondence with him.

Then came Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November ’77. The Soviet leader seemed to believe Sadat’s trip had been orchestrated by the United States for the sole purpose of further removing the Soviets from involvement in the Middle East peace process. The result of Sadat’s grand gesture was as Brezhnev had feared, but the primary initiative had come from Cairo, not from Washington. In any case, for a few months our progress on SALT was slowed.
Now this came right after an event that Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned, the October 1st communique. And I remember as a 17-year-old...

BLIGHT: Please Jim, don't rub it in [laughter]!

HERSHBERG: Okay, I remember as a young twerp—who was very interested in the Middle East—reading the newspaper about the news of the October 1st communique. Here was a case in which Washington had not been noisy—at least publicly noisy—about it beforehand. It seemed to come totally out of the blue, creating cognitive dissonance all over the place. It was an utterly amazing, almost unprecedented example of superpower cooperation in the Third World. And it was so startling that, as we now know, Sadat felt compelled to do the unthinkable—to go to Jerusalem.

If Carter is correct, then we must have here a classic case of misperception, the kind of miscalculation and miscommunication that helped lead—if I can mention the dreaded three words once again—to the Cuban missile crisis. The regional conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia and elsewhere tended to be mixed up with very complex issues involving (usually) two or more actors other than the U.S. and Soviet Union. The general pattern of the African conflicts seems to be: "you started it; no, you started it; we're right; no, we're right." But in the Middle East case, within a month you have a very promising example of cooperation and (apparently) a drastic misperception—all of which seems to bear directly on prospects for the SALT process. So, I think it would be very intriguing to investigate how the October 1st communique came about, and then
how there was such a monumental misreading of American intentions and actions with relation to Sadat's trip to Jerusalem (assuming, for the moment, that Carter's assessment is accurate).

KOMPLEKTOV: That was, you know, during the stage when our major subject was SALT. At the same time, though, we have Gromyko talking with the people from State--with Vance. You know, there were discussions, then drafts, about a Geneva conference co-chaired by both of us--by the U.S. and Soviets. That's all.

BEESMERTNYKH: May I? Well, of course, there's a little bit more to it than that. You see, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister detached themselves, in New York, to work on the communique. This was during the opening of the UN General Assembly session. It was very significant that Secretary Vance was present at all of the sessions, working on this communique. So we worked with the State Department and the statement progressed. It was interesting because the Secretary went each night--went to New York by shuttle and reported the progress to Gromyko. Next morning, he would be back with the ambassador [Dobrynin] continuing to work on it. It was fascinating to see this process--this process of really close collaboration between our two sides. It made all of us very hopeful.

DOBRYNIN: Yes. This was, as you say, real communication, side to side. Back and forth. Working on a common problem. Something new.
KOMPLEKTOV: You know what that was? That was really an example of a comprehensive approach to our relations. Somebody mentioned before the comprehensive version or approach to SALT—in the context of the March 1977 talks in Moscow. Well, maybe that was comprehensive about nuclear weapons, about missiles. Maybe not. But in this communique, we agreed on a comprehensive approach—both sides agreed—it was not one-sided, for a change.

HERSHBERG: So, against that background, in which you and the U.S. had agreed on a "comprehensive" approach to the Middle East, you felt that the Sadat trip to Jerusalem on November 19 was—was what?—a return to high-handed U.S. unilateralism? Is that right?

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, yes, but first, you missed one stage. About two weeks after the communique was issued—well, you could read it in the U.S. newspapers. All of a sudden, the U.S., well, sort of withdrew everything they had done in the preparation of it.

BESSMERTNYKH: No. Not two weeks. Two days! In Moscow, they would not believe us. In only two days, after all the work, all the cooperative work, everything collapsed.

DOBRYNIN: I talked to Gromyko before he went back to the Soviet Union. He said I don't know about you, but I don't understand what is going on. We seemed to have an agreement; we seemed so certain of our course. He said that it was impressive: everybody was making concessions. But to be honest, there was a pattern. As I said before, after events like this, when
Carter appeared to be going one way then would go off in another--well, the only rational conclusion is that he is not serious. This was very disappointing.

HERSHBERG: But what about Sadat's trip?

KOMPLEKTOV: All this is in answer to your question. True, it is an indirect answer, but still an answer.

BLIGHT: Marshall, then Joe Nye.

SHULMAN: I have a slightly different memory of these events. It was true that the negotiation of the communique was done largely through State, I believe. I agree with Anatoly, Sasha and Viktor: everything seemed to be going smoothly. Everything seemed to be in place for moving to a Geneva conference. But then, almost immediately after the communique was issued, there arose a huge outcry in U.S. domestic politics about it. The pro-Israeli lobby, in particular, along with their allies in the Congress, were especially vehement and vocal. This was followed by a conflict between State and the White House on it. Soon--perhaps in two days--as Sasha said, though I cannot remember exactly--the administration began back-pedaling as fast as possible away from the agreement.

DOBRYNIN: This was a real issue--a real issue.
NYE: We have something of a paradox on the table: here you have the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late '70s, both of whom hold the SALT process as a top priority. In addition, both governments regard Africa as relatively irrelevant and unimportant. I mean, Henry Kissinger couldn't have cared less about Africa. And as Russian colleagues have expressed it, Gromyko didn't care either. Yet, despite that, despite the fact that both had the same top priority, and who also regard another set of issues as much less important, what do they do? They get themselves into a conflict about something irrelevant which destroys what they both think is their first priority. I submit that as a paradox to explain.

I suspect the answer has something to do with the hold of ideology on domestic politics, and I think this phenomenon occurs in both societies. I was very intrigued by Svetlana's clear presentation of how ideological the Americans can sometimes appear to be in foreign policy. I think the Americans were more ideological than normal in the 1970s, because the traditional coalitions were shifting, the old Roosevelt coalition was breaking down and you were seeing real shifts in American political patterns. During periods like that, ideology becomes more important, I believe. Reagan, for example, was using ideological arguments and appeals to gain control of the Republican Party. We have heard something similar in what Svetlana has said about the way she was taught in the university, and in our conversations about the role of Ponomarev and the International Department of the Central Committee in dealing with issues of less-developed countries. This was also important in terms of Soviet domestic politics for ideological reasons.
It was a way to prove that peaceful co-existence might reverse the changing correlation of forces in progressive directions, and so forth.

In that sense, then, maybe the answer to the paradox is that both countries were going in opposite ideological directions. So the people who were centrally located--Gromyko, Kissinger, later Brzezinski and Vance--might have had one view, but it might be that they were unable to hold a relatively pragmatic, non-ideological consensus together. Why not? Perhaps because of the diverse ideological forces in the two societies. I’d be curious whether that explanation makes sense to our Russian colleagues. In other words, was ideology pulling you away from your primary interests toward your secondary interests, just as it was pulling us away from our primary interests to our secondary interests?

DOBRYNIN: Well, politically speaking, you are correct. But there was not precise information then about many of these issues.

BLIGHT: Bill Taubman.

TAUBMAN: On this very point: in the United States there was a debate within the government and outside the government, about this trade-off and how to play it. But in the Soviet Union, was there such a debate? You implied, Ambassador Dobrynin, that there were two ...

DOBRYNIN: Have you heard about it? Have you heard about this debate?
TAUBMAN: In the Soviet Union?

DOBRYNIN: That's right. Well, in Pravda, for example, or in Izvestiya or in some other publications?

TAUBMAN: No, I haven't. I was referring to the conversation earlier about the two wings of the Party, or two views of Soviet foreign policy, one in the Foreign Ministry and one in the International Department.

DOBRYNIN: I know, I know. I was only kidding about a "debate" in Pravda in those days, of course. Well, of course there was this--in general--a difference within the Party, as Sasha mentioned. Between the Ministry and the Party, so to speak. And personally, there always differences between Gromyko and Ponamarev, of course. But as Sasha said, it was more like a division of labor.

TAUBMAN: So it never reached the level of political argument, or discussion, about a course of action?

DOBRYNIN: Well, there were no discussions, academic discussions, like this one we are having today. Specific questions would come up and be dealt with.

TAUBMAN: It never reached the point, then, where ...
DOBRYNIN: It never reached the point of discussion, as far as I am aware, in which the Ministry said we must do this and the International Department said we must not do this, we must do that. In general, there was harmony. But as I said earlier, harmony came at the price of ignoring each other. Well, not ignoring. But not realizing the implications the decisions of each--the Ministry and the International Department--might have had for each other. Does that answer your question?

TAUBMAN: Sort of. Well, it adds another wrinkle. Thank you.

BLIGHT: Svetlana.

SAVBRANKAYA: I have two short remarks. First, Dr. Nye: you suggested that the regional conflicts in Africa were not important for the United States. I think I disagree with that. I think that in the case of Henry Kissinger, then, well, maybe. But I think that with Carter, you have a different story. I think Carter had a different policy toward the Third World, and a new attitude toward it. He began speaking about it in the campaign, and at the beginning of 1977. I think it mattered to him--what was going on in the Third World, and he wanted a U.S. foreign policy that was a little different from Kissinger’s, especially in regard to the Third World. Furthermore, I think he was serious. I don’t think he was just ideological in his Third World interest. That is my first remark.

My other comment is about the double-track Soviet foreign policy that we have been discussing. This is very interesting to me. On one track, we have the International Department
of the Central Committee supporting all the Communist movements everywhere in the world. On the other track, the Foreign Ministry seeks peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, as we called them then. Is there any institutional explanation for this phenomenon? For example: were there big differences in the selection and training of career diplomats versus Communist Party bureaucrats? I ask this because we all know that there were some really serious mistakes made in Africa, where we were ready to support, basically, any group of rebels, as long as they were willing to call themselves "Marxists." And not only in Africa. Do you think that, if the Foreign Ministry had been in charge of our foreign policy in Africa, we could have avoided making those mistakes?

NYE: Just one brief point of clarification on Carter versus Kissinger. I agree that Carter cared much more about Africa, but it was in a very different way. Dick Moose, who was the Assistant Secretary [of State] for Africa was my next door neighbor. We used to ride to work together, so I had a pretty good understanding of some of what Carter's attitude was toward Africa, at least as refracted through Moose. They weren't worried--Moose and other Carter appointees dealing with Africa--weren't worried much about whether an African country was developing a Marxist or quasi-Marxist government. They were more worried about the way their own agenda for Africa would be thrown off course by people in the Congress, especially on the right wing, who would criticize them for allowing Communists to go ahead unobstructed. So, in that sense, yes, they cared about Africa. But not in the sense that strong anti-Communists cared about it.
PASTOR: With regard to Africa, I think Carter melded the Kissinger/Brzezinski view of Soviet imperialism with the Andy Young/Dick Moose view. It's a very curious combination. You can see it better in his own words rather than in those who worked for him. It went something like this: if we are going to be in favor of the independence of African states, and if we are really interested in making them work, then any new Soviet imperialism is something that we need to resist as well. It was his way of trying to put together two very contrasting views.

BESSIONTNYKH: I would like to say something in answer to Svetlana's question about ideology and foreign policy in the Soviet Union. The International Department hoped, above all, that events in the world were going our way. In an odd way, in order to prove that events were going our way we had to, as it were, force them to go our way. This would prove the validity of the concept of the world revolution. That's why we were always in favor of non-capitalist regimes: because they would support the basic notion that world history is going the way it should--our way.

That's why it's very worth while discussing, for example, issues of peaceful coexistence. Why do I say this? Because some of the most frightening words Americans could utter were "status quo." "Status quo" was frightening. For to achieve a status quo will mean that we may be forever in the kind the situation as it is today. Or worse. It might be a sign that history is about to go the other way. So, fear of the status quo was somewhere in the background of many--I would call them--politically negative matters during the period we are discussing. In the Soviet Union, this was undoubtedly true. I have the impression that this was also true of the United States. Neither country at that time was satisfied with being merely an ideological force.
Each seemed to see portents in every development, either for the better or for the worse. Neither country could be satisfied with the "status quo."

SHULMAN: Jim, do you have more people on the list?

BLIGHT: Jump right in.

SHULMAN: I was going to ask you whether it would be appropriate at this point, to get into the relationship between the China card issue and the SALT negotiations. Or perhaps we should leave it aside for now. To some extent, it was a development in the '78-'79 negotiations. But, depending on which aspects we discuss, it may fall between the years '77 and '78.

BLIGHT: Yes, go ahead. Marshall will now play the China card.

KOMPLEKTOV: Oh, no, not again [laughter]!

SHULMAN: Now you know very well, Victor, that I have not played it before now. [Komplektov nods agreement]. Well, I'll ask Ray [Garthoff] to check me on this period because I'm not sure of the dating of it. I have a vivid memory of it, however. I think it was late in '78 when there was a meeting in Geneva and we were trying to, once again, wrap up SALT. It was the last session that Paul Warnke participated in. He was about to fly the next day to Washington. In a long session with Gromyko, we had about five unresolved issues. We reached
a tentative agreement on them, and we had SALT wrapped up. I think it was December, '78. Then Gromyko mentioned that if it went through, it would be possible for Brezhnev to come to Washington on the 15th of January. So, we had the understanding that this would be wrapped up and that there would be a signing in Washington on the 15th of January. Vance was to send a cable to that effect.

But then that possibility was leaked in Washington, and about the same time we announced that Deng Xiao-Ping had been invited to come to Washington on the 13th or the 14th, about a day before. As a consequence, when we came together on the following day, the whole thing fell apart. We then had to start over again and it wasn't until June of the following year that we actually got it wrapped up. There were obviously differences of opinion in Washington about how to play the China card and whether it was advisable to have a visit from Deng Xiao-Ping just before Brezhnev got there. On the other hand, from the Soviet point of view it looked like a deliberate provocation—the leaking of it. It looked, in fact, like an attempt to humiliate Brezhnev, by having him come on the heels of Deng Xiao-Ping. Do I remember it rightly Ray? Was that about it?

GARTHOF: Yes, that's absolutely right. I would only add two comments. First, the announcement of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and of Deng's trip was on December 15th. And the other fact is that this occurred after ...

PASTOR: But that meeting in Moscow to wrap up SALT was December 21st to 23rd, in Geneva, wasn't it? So a week before ...
DOBRYNIN: Actually, Vance gave me a letter from President Carter to President Brezhnev on
the 15th of December saying that ...

PASTOR: Before the meeting that Marshall just mentioned?

DOBRYNIN: Before. But our thinking was: Carter won’t do anything now to establish
diplomatic relations. Maybe by the end of December or the beginning of January, but not before
that. The timing made it impossible for Vance to get the credit for the treaty. Well, plans were
laid, plans were under way. But then suddenly, they changed. I couldn’t understand: Were we
supposed to do nothing about the Chinese? And I thought we would have a proposal, not an
agreement, but anyway an agreement. That really surprised us. It got in the way, this
formalizing the relations between China and the United States. This severely hurt relations
between us and the United States.

PASTOR: But what was the effect of that on the arms negotiations? Did Moscow think that
they were complete or virtually ...

SHULMAN: My memory of it was that we had practically wrapped it up. As a matter fact,
Warnke and I killed a bottle of Scotch that night, thinking that we had an agreement. And then
while he was packing, came the news on the overnight wire. And then the next day it was off.
GARTHOFF: That's right. SALT was basically set. But there was to be a meeting between Vance and Gromyko, set for the end of December. Before Vance left Washington, it had been agreed that there would be no announcement about the China business until after January 1st. Any announcement of China would have been after this final meeting. If that had happened, it would have been all on track. But while Vance was out of town, off to the Middle East, Brzezinski, I think, got this changed to a December 15th announcement. This threw off the order of these developments as they had been planned.

DOBRYNIN: Yeah. They changed that. But Vance didn’t ...

GARTHOFF: Correct. This was done in Vance’s absence, reversing a decision that had been made while he was there.

PASTOR: But what effect did it have on the SALT negotiations? What effect did it have?

DOBRYNIN: It forced us to go back to Moscow.

PASTOR: Postponed? The talks were postponed?

DOBRYNIN: We would continue, but it was rather, well ...
SHULMAN: A theme related to the subordinate point was that during that period Vance was very much occupied with the Middle East and was out in the area. That meant that he wasn't present for a lot of the debates going on within the administration in the formulation of the positions for the meetings with Gromyko.

BESMERTNYKH: I was told that he was asked not to call.

BLIGHT: One of the difficulties of these meetings is that the scholars have to sit and bite their nails while I refuse to call on them. This is doubly difficult when the person to my immediate left has been on the list for almost two hours. I call on Janet Lang.

DOBRYNIN: We'll give you one hour. Go ahead [laughter]!

JANET M. LANG: Good heavens! I just have one question. I want to combine a comment and a question that Joe [Nye] asked and Bob [Pastor] asked together with something both of them brought up earlier. I want to address it to both sides, both Americans and Russians. It relates to this issue of the paradox—"Nye’s paradox"—since Joe identified it. However much more important Africa and other developing countries became in the Carter period, it’s clear they’re subordinate to U.S.-Soviet relations, and the SALT process. You all seem to be saying: there’s a U.S.-Soviet dimension, and that’s sort of where the real action is, and then there’s everything else. Whether it’s disinterest, or the inability to connect them, to link them, these
actions in the Third World end up influencing what everybody explicitly cares about. That's Nye's paradox.

Now, let me turn to "Pastor's threshold's." Bob said that, in his view, there were clearly thresholds that, once crossed, required a response. His example was the introduction of Cuban and Russian troops in Angola and Ethiopia. My question is this: at what point does it finally trickle up to the highest level--where the focus is heavily on the U.S.-Soviet dimension--that what they care about is getting screwed up because of these things that they're inherently not as interested in?

We saw last night on the video of the Carter years how affected President Carter was by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. His words and, even more, his expression, conveyed his utter gloom about dealing with the Soviets and, of course, this meant implicitly that the SALT treaty was dead, and that detente was dead, too. Wayne said he thought detente was dead, or dying, long before that. We've talked to some Russian colleagues who say that the "brigade" issue sealed its fate for them. How does this work? How is it that the bad news, so to speak, is so long in coming and, when it does come, it seems always to come too late?

KOMPLEKTÖV: I can give you a very simple answer, janet. When there was a linkage with some serious problems, like the Soviet brigade and the SALT II treaty--then it hits you. But if they are not explicitly linked, well, it is always a little unclear what the implications are, you know.
LANG: But is the final awareness the result of a cumulative effect? Or, as seemed evident last night watching President Carter on the video, does it--can it--become apparent because of a single event?

DOBRYNIN: No, it couldn't be caused by only one thing. It happens over time. Like Mark [Garrison] was saying earlier: you begin to draw some general conclusions from these individual events. You see patterns.

LANG: Do you personally remember a moment when you said to yourself: "detente is dead," or "SALT is dead," or "U.S.-Soviet relations have really hit bottom?"

DOBRYNIN: Well, there really wasn't a specific action. But if you are asking: was there a point after which all attempts to improve relations were futile--then, yes, it was after the affair with the Russian brigade in Cuba. After that, there was no way we were going to recover. No way.

KOMPLEKTOV: That was the point ...

DOBRYNIN: Excuse me, you see, for us it was--for the Soviet Union--it was really so artificially made, the Russian brigade thing. It was so ridiculous. You see, our only choice, really, was: do we try to help this administration, or don't we? Ultimately we decided just to try to get over this whole incident. We came back to the one real issue. SALT. But for us it
was as if someone invented, deliberately, this issue, for what—to humiliate us? To kill SALT?
For what was it invented?

LANG: Well, we’re going to get into the brigade shortly, so if I could just do the teeniest little ...

DOBRYNIN: When are we going to go into this?

LANG: Next session. But just a teeny follow-up, if I may? Let’s say the brigade was the straw that broke the back of hope for rescuing detente. Whatever date you believe that these regional issues torpedoed it—did that get into explicit discussion, between Soviets and Americans?

DOBRYNIN: No, it’s just that it was in the atmosphere a little more. And more and more and more. There was no specific discussion. That’s a big issue. But at that time it wasn’t a big issue as such. We didn’t really know what happened—what hit us, you could say—until after it happened. We were too busy with the details of the Russian brigade, or this or that. But after a while, of course, we all realized what had happened, though to be honest we didn’t always understand why. That’s why we’re here today, eh [laughter]?

BLIGHT: It sounds as if we’re ready to launch right into the issues surrounding the Soviet brigade in Cuba, but I personally would like fifteen or twenty minutes to stretch my legs and get my mind geared up for it. We’re right at the break time. Let’s re-convene in twenty minutes.
SESSION 4:
THE CRASH, 1979-1980: FROM THE BRIGADE IN CUBA
TO THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

BLIGHT: We move now to the last session. In certain respects it is the most important. Unquestionably, it is the most dramatic. We all saw President Carter last night on the video, speaking to a reporter just after Soviet troops had crossed the frontier into Afghanistan, visibly affected by the recognition brought on by that event. The president said something to the effect that this single action taken by the soviets represented the most dangerous threat to peace since World War II. That is an overstatement, of course, derived from a remark issued in the heat of the moment. But there's no doubt that as 1979 came to a close, U.S.-Soviet relations, regional conflicts and even the nuclear threat seemed to have entered a much more difficult and dangerous phase.

We have already heard from several participants on both the U.S. and Russian sides some thoughts on how this state of affairs came to exist--how the brief euphoria connected with the signing of SALT II in June 1979 seemed to yield almost immediately to hints of a new Cold War on the horizon. In some discussions we have had with Soviet participants in these events--Svetlana has had several such discussions--two things have become clear: first, that the invasion of Afghanistan did not come, as it seemed to some at the time, "out of the blue": and second, that the peculiar episode during the summer and fall over the brigade in Cuba was, in many Soviet minds, intimately connected with the course of events that reached a kind of culmination with the Afghan invasion. As our Soviet interlocutors often put it: by the time of Afghanistan, there was no hope left for a revival of detente.
I'd like to ask Bob [Pastor] and Ray [Garthoff] to lead off the discussion. For those of you who are not old enough to remember, "Bob and Ray" was a team of radio comedians. Alas, there seem to be quite a few young blank faces in the group. Perhaps those of you who do remember the original "Bob And Ray" can explain the allusion. So, which of our own team is going to lead off?

GARTHOFF: Bob's going first.

BLIGHT: Okay, Bob and then Ray.

PASTOR: Well, as many of you know, I was working in the National Security Council during the Carter administration--on Latin America, from '77 to '81. I thought of myself as working for three bosses: Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance, all of whom I respect greatly. I am told that I am therefore one of a very small set of individuals: who worked for all three for four years and who retained a deep respect for all three. Everyone in this room is aware that in the period we are beginning to discuss, the relationships between these three extraordinary men became complex and difficult, sometimes very difficult.

I was director of Latin American operations at the NSC, but I did have one expedition into U.S.-Soviet relations. It concerned the brigade in Cuba issue. I remember the whole episode vividly, not least because, at the time it broke, I happened to be on my honeymoon. The crisis interrupted my honeymoon, which was the only vacation I ever had while I was in the Carter administration. I was rushed back to the White House and to Zbig Brzezinski's office where he
and Bill Odom, his special assistant for military affairs at the time, were ranting and raving about the existence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba. And I said ... 

BLIGHT: Excuse me, Bob, but what was the date of this?

NYE: Do you remember your honeymoon, Bob [laughter]?

PASTOR: Joe's laughing because he knows that we didn't go on our honeymoon immediately after we were married. I couldn't be ... I couldn't be spared at the time [laughter]. It was three months later--it was late August of '79, just before the public explosion. I guess it must have been right after [Senator] Frank Church [D-Idaho] was let in on it. After listening to Brzezinski and Odom, I said: "I don't understand what the problem is. It certainly doesn't seem to be serious enough to interrupt my honeymoon! And I think I was right. It wasn't.

I had spent the previous six months in charge of an interagency task force on the non-aligned movement, in which I had tried to steer the U.S. government into a different policy toward the movement. The previous policy had been to ignore it as unimportant, but then to complain loudly after their various (usually anti-U.S.) resolutions came out. I wanted us to engage and to encourage Third World nations to play a role in the non-aligned movement. And I wanted to engage the Cubans directly on some of the issues. My first reaction therefore, on hearing about the so-called brigade was: Castro will never believe we are serious. He will probably think that this is part of a strategy on our part to undermine the non-aligned movement and to humiliate him personally. (He was then head of the movement and he was host of the
non-aligned summit in Havana in the late summer of 1979). That prediction was accurate. Castro simply believed that this fuss over a Soviet brigade was part of our strategy. Apparently Ambassador Dobrynin also feels that this was part of a more general conspiracy in the U.S. government to humiliate the Soviets and kill ratification of SALT II and detente in the bargain.

I can assure you: there was no conspiracy, either to humiliate Fidel or the Soviet Union. Though the Carter Administration may have appeared to some to be coming apart at that moment, the main players were not consciously self-destructive, so much so that they wanted to try to embarrass either Fidel Castro or President Brezhnev. There was no conspiracy to embarrass anyone. The irony, of course, is that the U.S.--we in the Carter Administration--were the people who wound up embarrassed by this brigade episode.

In the article on the "brigade" contained in the briefing book for this conference, by [Richard] Neustadt and [Ernest] May, some comparisons are made to the missile crisis. The comparison is inevitable, of course, since both events are, in a sense, about what the U.S. took to be an unacceptable Soviet presence in Cuba. But two important distinctions need to be drawn between the two events. The first is that the brigade episode was not a real crisis; it was an artificial crisis. A real crisis--one in which we felt our interests and values were at risk--would have unified the United States and unified the Carter Administration. But because this was an artificial crisis, it exacerbated divisions within the administration that had begun to surface over many more important issues in the previous year and a half. Because the brigade episode had this divisive effect, it was very difficult for the administration to mount any coherent response.
The second key difference between the missile crisis and the brigade episode—which is important and sometimes forgotten by aficionados of the missile crisis is this: in the missile crisis, the U.S. government had several days—the better part of a week—to debate and discuss their options, whereas in the brigade episode, the information leaked almost immediately. What do you suppose would have happened in the missile crisis had the issue, had the information on the missiles leaked by, say, the third day? Right? You know what would have happened. At that moment, the Kennedy Administration hadn’t come anywhere near a coherent or unified decision. Its hand would have been forced prematurely. The decision-making process would have been a mess on an issue much more serious than the brigade. Who knows what would have happened? That’s essentially what happened with the brigade. The information leaked before anybody really understood what the truth actually was—what the information we were getting really added up to. Nobody knew for sure that the brigade had been in place since the early 1960s. Nobody in the administration really knew what a brigade was doing there in the first place. The most basic questions arose: why would the Soviets have a brigade—put a brigade—into Cuba? And why would they do so particularly at a moment like this, right after the signing of SALT II but before its ratification? Nobody understood that. Even more important than the timing of the leak was the spin of the leak. The information was brought out by a person—Senator Frank Church—who was thought to be one of the most liberal Senators. But Church seemed to be saying—you know saying—that SALT cannot be ratified unless the brigade leaves. Well, Brzezinski knew—in fact, everybody in the administration knew—that given that leak, it was impossible to contemplate a wide range of options concerning the brigade. So, we already found
ourselves in a box to begin with. Unfortunately, the entire debate in the administration was about how to try to get ourselves out of the box.

On this question, there were two basic views: Vance's view and Brzezinski's view. Both of them understood completely that ratification of SALT was very important—much more important than the brigade. But they had very different strategies for getting SALT ratified. Brzezinski felt that if we ignored the brigade, there was no way to get SALT ratified; that failure to act would provide still more evidence to the conservative movement in the country that the Carter Administration was weak on Soviet expansionism. He believed that there was no way the Senate would ever ratify it under those circumstances. So he advocated playing it up in a manner that would help to show that the Carter Administration was tough and, therefore, that you could trust in Soviet compliance with the SALT agreement.

As often happened, Vance favored just the opposite approach. He wanted the administration to play it down, to convey the impression that the brigade was really quite a minor incident. This is because what he believed was important was the arms agreement—the ratification of SALT II. And, of course, Vance tried—he obviously tried—to communicate his sense of the matter in a message to Ambassador Dobrynin. He emphasized that while we realize the brigade itself is not a serious concern, it does, in the minds of some, raise issues of Soviet non-compliance with treaties and agreements. And this meant that the brigade did affect SALT—and importantly. What kind of difference did it make? I think it became a part of the rush of cumulative difficulty between the U.S. and Soviet Union noted by Mark Garrison, and also by Ambassador Dobrynin. But there was no opportunity to really discuss the issue, to understand the issue and thereby slow the cumulative rush toward a complete breakdown in relations. And
in this particular instance, the leak—the necessity of going public with diplomacy with an adversary at a critical moment—contributed to the problem.

Here I would like to draw a comparison to another episode of potentially greater significance than the brigade. It occurred the previous year and concerned the delivery to Cuba of MiG-23 aircraft by the Soviet Union. The question arose at that time as to whether the MiG-23s constituted a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Though the question was very sensitive, it was handled adroitly and successfully by Ambassadors Dobrynin and Bessmertnykh, and by Cy Vance and Marshall Shulman. Because—or in large part because—the relevant information was closely held, not leaked in a damaging way, the issue was resolved quietly to the satisfaction of both sides. I think that the issue was resolved well. The brigade was, by comparison, a trivial issue insofar as threats to U.S. security were concerned. The MiG controversy had been over whether the planes were nuclear capable. Nobody argued in the Carter Administration that the brigade was a security threat. But the leak, in my view, prevented sensible people on both sides from taking the sensible approach that had been taken the year before.

In the end President Carter went back and forth between these two views of Vance and Brzezinski—between the view that the episode should be played down and the view that a show of resolve was necessary. Why? Because there was sentiment for both views in the Senate, which would in the end have to vote SALT II up or down. Ultimately I think that Robert Byrd had the decisive impact on President Carter in suggesting that he not play it up. At the same time, Byrd argued that Carter should come up with some additional measures demonstrating a
fairly subtle point: that while the status quo was not unacceptable, since the status quo had been changed by the Soviets, we would change it as well.

Let me just say a word about the famous remark by Cy Vance that the status quo--by which he unfortunately was interpreted to mean the presence of the brigade in Cuba--was "unacceptable." My impression of what happened--I hope Marshall will correct me if I am wrong--is that somehow or other Zbig was able to get Cy Vance to make that comment. Zbig's early argument--Zbig's early thesis when the information about the brigade first arrived--was that "the status quo would have to change." But he knew that the brigade wasn't leaving. What he wanted to do was use it as an opportunity to take a series of ten specific steps--steps he had already outlined and tried, unsuccessfully, to get implemented. These included a joint task force on the Caribbean and a whole bunch of other things, including sanctions against the Soviet Union. What Zbig meant by the status quo being "unacceptable" was that we would add conditions after the Soviet Union decided not to pull out the brigade. Vance must have agreed with the sense of what lay behind Zbig's idea. But unfortunately, the rationale for the position was not given when it was stated by Vance, and the press misinterpreted him to be saying that the brigade had to go. Even when it was explained later, it did the administration no good.

I have always thought the brigade episode was an important event, even though the presence of the brigade in Cuba was not, in itself, an important security threat to the U.S. I think it led, in some ways, indirectly to the ultimate crisis over SALT with the invasion of Afghanistan. However, it is important to understand that Carter was determined to go ahead with SALT, even as he was making his October 1 speech to the nation, outlining the steps he was taking in response to the brigade in Cuba. Carter was determined to direct all of the energies toward that
end, just as he had done previously with regard to the Panama Canal treaties. I think the reason his reaction to the Afghan invasion was so harsh is that even in October and November 1979, he was absolutely convinced that SALT would be ratified—that he would find a way, even though it would not be easy. Janet remarked earlier about the look on President Carter’s face right after the invasion: that was a function of his belief, right up to the moment he heard the news, that both SALT and détente were salvageable. With the invasion of Afghanistan he knew, for the first time, that none of these goals were reachable.

This brings me, in conclusion, to some questions for our Russian colleagues. What kinds of calculations—political calculations—led to the decision to intervene with troops in Afghanistan? How did the issue of the ratification of SALT enter into it, if it did at all? Had you already concluded that Carter could not succeed in getting it ratified? Was there a perception, perhaps, that Carter was no longer committed to the ratification of SALT, as a result of the brigade episode? Was there nobody in the Kremlin saying that the brigade episode was largely a function of an inopportune leak? Didn’t anybody notice that it was a bigger embarrassment to the Carter Administration than to either the Soviets or Cubans? Or was there universal agreement that the brigade was a premeditated, manufactured attempt to humiliate both? What was the connection, in Soviet decision-making, between the brigade, the interpretation of the SALT process and the decision to go into Afghanistan?

BLIGHT: Thank you, Bob. I wonder whether it is better for Ray to go ahead now, since Bob has connected the brigade issue to Afghanistan, which is Ray’s subject. Or does it make more sense to follow-up on Bob’s presentation now, before Ray’s opening remarks on Afghanistan?
SHULMAN: I'd like to fill in something on the brigade. But it can wait a bit, if you like.

BESEMERTNYKH: Excuse me, I wonder whether I might just follow-up a little bit on the brigade. Is that all right?

BLIGHT: Please, go ahead.

BESEMERTNYKH: Let me just try to introduce a different perspective on the question. So far in our analysis we have concentrated on the shortage of the time for discussion by the U.S., caused by Senator Church's leak. Well, yes, the leak produced problems. There is no question about that. It was a mistake for him to leak the information to the press because the Carter Administration didn't yet know the facts of the matter and, of course, they therefore didn't know how they should respond. But from my point of view, the leak is not the main issue. I think this is an issue, of course. But this is not the basic issue.

There is a prior question. That is: why had the administration been working on this so-called "problem" of the brigade so intensively that Senator Church (and other Senators) received this top-level information? Senator Church's leak was actually a consequence of intensive development already going on within the administration. Church did not initiate the investigation of the brigade. Who initiated the brigade study within the administration? And then, who gave the information to Church, knowing--in all probability knowing--that this information could be exploited, by Church or others. Why was the study initiated? And who was behind it, within
the administration? Church comes in only at the end. These seem to me to be the important questions to address.

PASTOR: Well, one person, above all others, was essential to beginning the investigation into the brigade in Cuba: Senator Richard Stone of Florida. He was extremely nervous about his standing in Florida—he was up for re-election in 1980—because he had voted in favor of the Panama Canal treaties. He elicited a pound of flesh from us as a result of his giving his support to the treaties. Stone, like all the conservative Democratic Senators, were very vulnerable politically. They were feeling a lot of pressure from the right-wing of the Party, especially over SALT II, which the right-wing had hated all along. Stone, as a Florida Senator, was also receiving intelligence about issues and events related to Cuba, so when the reports started to come in about a brigade, he also received them.

So Stone wrote a letter to President Carter about it. President Carter then asked Secretary Vance to respond and, based on the intelligence at that time, Secretary Vance told Stone that there was no intelligence indicating any Soviet brigade or any other Soviet troops. But, Vance also told Stone in his letter that we were going to increase our surveillance of the island, just to be sure that no troops were being introduced. And so, the intelligence community was instructed to increase its surveillance of Cuba. This sort of intelligence gathering with regard to Cuba had apparently ceased during the late 1960s, and wasn’t resumed until 1979, following the letter to Carter from Stone. The important point, therefore, is that when our intelligence people picked up evidence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, they portrayed it as new information—as if whatever they were picking up had arrived only recently.
BESSMERTNYKH: That's a very important point. Because ...

KOMPLEKTMOV: It was new information.

PASTOR: Exactly! The intelligence was given to us as if the Soviets had moved troops to Cuba very recently. As if it were new information. They reported it as new information because they had not been looking for anything like that for the previous 13 years.

BESSMERTNYKH: Because otherwise it was really very artificial, almost--forgive me--almost like an attempt to sabotage the SALT treaty.

PASTOR: No, no. Remember when you told us a while ago that there was no conspiracy--no Soviet conspiracy--to take over the world [gestures at Bessmertnykh]? It's the same on our side. There was no conspiracy to dump the SALT treaty, at least not within the Carter Administration. Far from it. Carter and all of those around him saw it a big success. We all wanted it ratified. But we simply did not know that the presence of the brigade extended all the way back to the early 1960s. We had no idea. We were given the intelligence as if an important new discovery had been made.

DOBRYNIN: That's very important. Because we received the message--when the ambassador [gestures toward Bessmertnykh, who was in charge at the Soviet embassy in Washington, while Dobrynin was in Moscow] sent the cable. We went back and forth on this. Moscow received
the reply, I think, next morning, that stated that Sasha, Marshall, Cy Vance and myself were needed in Washington to discuss this matter. Marshall, do you remember this? We simply could not believe the story. We could not believe it! It was ridiculous—all this talk about a brigade—quote, unquote—that had just arrived in Cuba. But, my goodness, it had been there since 1962.

PASTOR: Yes, I see that from your vantage point, the whole thing looked fishy. But our main problem was that we had not been looking for anything like the brigade for many years. And when the information was leaked by Frank Church, we—and I cannot over-stress this—we didn’t have time to look into the matter and discuss it among ourselves. As I remember it, almost a full week elapsed after Church broke the information to the press before the intelligence community was able to sift through all their sources and discover that—yes—the brigade probably had been there for a long time, and that its apparent newness was a function of the time gap between searches, so to speak—that it was an artifact of having ignored it for so long.

DOBRYNIN: But my question is this: did Church bring this out after he spoke with Cy Vance?

PASTOR: Yes, and he spoke briefly with Dave Newsom [Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs].

GARTHOFF: Jim, let’s split the session and finish the brigade discussion first and then go on to Afghanistan.
BLIGHT: Yes, let's do that. Okay, we've got Marshall Shulman and then Wayne Smith, and then that portion of Ray's comments that are directly on the brigade episode. Marshall?

SHULMAN: What had happened is that many of our intelligence resources, particularly the interpretive stuff, had fallen way behind the times. We had transferred people who had been looking after Cuba to other duties, so that we were receiving material on Cuba that hadn't been subject to informed evaluation. We weren't tracking it very closely either. Senator Stone had been receiving little bits and pieces of information from emigres in the Miami area. As usual, they were reporting all kinds of things, mostly rumors that were not subject to evaluation by our people.

But Stone began to look into these reports that there were Soviet soldiers on the island. My memory of it is that there was a request to the Agency [CIA] to see what it had on the topic. I first heard of it in a little item that came my way indicating that there was evidence of Soviet troops in Cuba—and this turned out to be important—that may be a combat brigade. The reasoning, as I recall, went like this: it wasn't a communications unit; it wasn't a medical unit; so it must be a combat unit, since that is the only other category. The unit also had a brigade headquarters formation, which was a formation not very widely used by the Soviets, and thus fairly easy to detect. So—guess what? It came to be called a "combat brigade" although we hadn't actually spotted the brigade itself. It was the configuration of the headquarters that gave it away as a combat brigade.

When this intelligence first reached me, I called my friend Arnold Horelick over at the CIA on a classified phone. I asked Arnold: "so, what is this? Does this mean anything?" He
said, "oh, don't worry about it. This is a"--excuse me for my language--"this is a "CYA," that is, it's "cover your ... uh ... rear-end situation. It takes someone like Senator Stone to show that this is not like the situation before the Cuban missile crisis with Senator [Kenneth] Keating [R-NY], where we were on our toes." Based on my conversation with Horelick, I concluded that whatever it was, the brigade was of no importance.

PASTOR: Was Horelick aware of Vance's letter to Stone saying that there was no evidence for a Soviet brigade in Cuba?

SHULMAN: I don't know. I don't remember the exact date of that letter but I assume it was sent shortly before I had the conversation with Horelick. In any case, this little flurry occurred very close to the Labor Day weekend and Congress was out of town. In the State Department, however, we had a different problem: we had reports that Aviation Week and Space Technology was going to carry a story on the brigade in Cuba. And so there was a debate within the State Department about whom to inform: do we inform everybody--all the members of Congress--or just one or two congressional leaders? In the end a very selective group of people was called. They were chairmen of committees, the leaders of the House and Senate, and so on.

You all know, of course, that Senator Church was in a desperate fight for re-election. He felt he was vulnerable on these kinds of issues, especially on Cuba. He had visited Cuba some years before and had made friendly remarks about Castro--or remarks that were interpreted by some as being friendly toward Castro. I remember then that there was some back and forth after which Newsom--and I think Dan Daniels--thought that they had cooled off Church. They thought
they had convinced him to keep the matter quiet. But then to their surprise he made his statement. He not only revealed the information about the brigade, but then he went on to say that SALT should not go forward until the matter was resolved.

PASTOR: Vance’s letter was to Stone was on July 27th.

SHULMAN: I see, so that was a month before my conversation with Horelick. The next thing that Cy Vance did was to send a cable asking that Anatoly be brought back to Washington.

DOBRYNIN: I was on my vacation.

SHULMAN: Well, and, as I remember your mother and father were very ill at that time--were very sick. But Vance felt that it was absolutely essential to have that channel of communication. And I remember Anatoly coming in, and Vance said ...

DOBRYNIN: On that I agree. It was important to have the channel.

SHULMAN: Yes. Vance explained to Anatoly how this issue of the brigade had come up, and Anatoly sat there, just shaking his head in disbelief and saying "How am I ever going to persuade the people back home that this is what happened? They'll never believe me." In the meantime, we were beginning to get some retrospective analysis from our intelligence people. As I recall, the dates of the earlier observations began to push back into the 70s, but nobody yet
had pushed all the way back to '62. That wasn't until quite a bit later, as I remember. But in the meantime, alas, Vance made the statement that Bob referred to--it was a little bit like Bush's statement: "this will not stand." Vance said, essentially, that we will not accept the status quo, as Bob said.

As soon as Anatoly returned to Washington, more inter-adversary communication--as I referred to it earlier--began to take place. We discussed, for example, what could the Soviet Union could do that it would make possible for President Carter to say-- to make a public statement saying: "Now the situation is okay. We have taken care of it." Our first effort was to persuade Anatoly to persuade the folks back home in Moscow to move some people around, take some people out, show some ships moving--anything that would look like "action." The goal of this exercise was to get some evidence that--you know--the old status quo was no longer the new status quo. Anatoly said: "look, we've been burned on the Cuban brigade and before on the Cuban missile crisis, and we're not willing to do that."

But we persevered. Finally we produced a letter, which went through several revisions, but was the basis of the President's broadcast speech on October 1. It was basically what we wanted and needed, at that point. It contained the assurance from Mr. Brezhnev that the unit had not been used for any purpose off the island--it wasn't used anywhere else in Latin America, would not be used for such purposes and would not be augmented. That was as far as we could go in giving the President something to work with before his October 1st broadcast. The speech was intended to be a reassurance. This was not a threat. Parenthetically, I don't think we knew at the time of the October 1st speech that the unit went all the way back to 1962. I don't think we knew that.
In the period leading up to the President's speech, a lot of damage had been done. The brouhaha died down after the President's broadcast on October 1st. But in the meantime, the whole optimistic spirit had gone out of the SALT process. During that brief period, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee had given us an unambiguous reproach. In addition, many powerful political people were beginning to express opposition to the treaty. I believe that from that point on the prospects for ratification were very dim—very dim. Cy Vance did not agree. Vance believed, and the President believed, that it was still possible to get it through.

DOBRYNIN: Marshall, I can subscribe to your story. In Moscow, it was the same way— I mean about what you call "inter-adversary communication." We had the impression and the feeling that you tried, on the American side, to do the right thing, so to speak. I mean: to understand what this Russian brigade had to do with the statements between Kennedy and Khrushchev. But you see, the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding had nothing in it about troops. Nothing at all. It was all those people who opposed you, who opposed SALT, that were the problem. That's what we thought. You seemed to be under pressure from them to try to guess what kind of a thing was this Russian brigade and was this thing okay according to the 1962 agreement. It didn't make any sense to us, but there you were, trying to find out if those troops are allowed according to an agreement that had nothing to do with troops.

From the 10th of September when I arrived, until the first of October, we had a very distinct impression. We thought this was an attempt by certain elements on the American side
to use this brigade business to enlarge the 1962 understanding to include the exclusion of troops. We could not figure out what else this could be about.

BLIGHT: I call first on Wayne Smith and then on Ray Garthoff.

SMITH: Actually I think the brigade affair is far more puzzling than it has been presented because the time frame, as it has been presented so far, is too limited. I was director of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State until early July, 1979. It was around July the 10th or so. I was being transferred to Havana and started checking out of the Department of State. But occasionally I would go in and read the traffic. I believe I'm correct in saying that the first intelligence report--this was an intelligence community report, not just CIA or NSA, but an intelligence community report--that was dated July the 12th.

As Marshall and Ambassador Dobrynin suggested, we hadn't really focussed over the years on troops. Why? Because troops weren't part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. That agreement focussed our intelligence efforts on Soviet hardware on the island. We were trying to answer the question: were there any offensive weapons systems being reintroduced to Cuba? But then we increased our surveillance, shall we say, and we picked up indications that there was some sort of a unit there. But we had been saying over the years that--I'm not quite certain of the exact numbers, 3 to 5, 3 to 4 thousand Soviet military personnel in Cuba--were there in a mostly advisory capacity. So the idea that there were Soviet military personnel in Cuba there was not new at all.
On—I think it was the 17th, July the 17th—Senator Stone asked me to come by to say farewell. I think he wanted to make sure that I would get visas for him and for his constituents in South Florida, once I got down to Havana. In any event, as I was waiting to go in to see Stone, two majors from the Defense Intelligence Agency came out. I recognized them and something told me that they had been in there talking to Stone about the July 12th report. Indeed they had. When I walked into Stone’s office, he said: “so, what’s this I hear about a Soviet unit in Cuba?” There was no point in bluffing on this one—Stone was obviously well-informed. I said: “the reports are fragmentary, Senator. No conclusions have been drawn yet. But the same reports indicating there may be a unit there indicate that there’s no evidence of recent arrivals of Soviet troops. So whatever is there has been there all along, or has been there for some time. And anyway, it would seem to be a conventional unit, if it is a unit. So what difference does it make? (I mean, Bob was absolutely right. Why call the poor fella back from his honeymoon over a conventional unit that didn’t threaten anyone?) [laughter].

But Stone’s reaction was: “No. To get my vote on the Panama Canal treaties, the President promised me he would never permit a Soviet base in Cuba. But if there’s a Soviet unit there, that’s a base.” I said: “I don’t think that’s what the President meant. He was talking about weapons systems, not some kind of a base. You could have a quartermaster base and who would care?”

But that very afternoon there were hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. CIA Director Stansfield Turner and the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown were testifying, I think, on SALT. The hearings covered a number of subjects, but I think the focal point was supposed to be SALT. Stone raised the issue of the “unit” mentioned in the intelligence reports.
To my distress, both Stansfield Turner and Harold Brown replied that there was nothing really new there, that our intelligence reports didn't indicate there to be anything new in Cuba.

Well, technically that was right. I mean, the troops had been there all along. But the report certainly indicated something different from what we had been saying. We had been saying that the Soviet personnel are there mostly in an advisory capacity. Why not have said: "yes, there are some reports indicating there is some kind of a small unit there, as we've been saying, 3 to 5 thousand troops, mostly in an advisory capacity. But there do appear to be some connected with the headquarters unit of a brigade." Or words to that effect. Really, what difference did it make? It was not a violation of the 1962 understanding. I think had we been straightforward about it from the beginning, we wouldn't have gotten ourselves into a box. But Stansfield Turner and Harold Brown, for reasons I still don't understand—that have never been explained—simply denied the existence of any new information. (I had occasion at a dinner party one evening three or four years ago to ask Admiral Turner about it. Alas, he really had no answer. He simply said he had had a briefing paper in front of him, which he presented accurately to the committee. Why the briefing paper had been written the way it was, he had no idea).

Stone then immediately wrote the letter to the president, inquiring about the unit in Cuba. That would have been about July the 17th or 18th—when Stone wrote the letter. He then went over to Vance for answer. I went by the Department of State just about that time—the 18th or the 19th of July, something like that. I was crossing Memorial Bridge with my car loaded with trunks and so forth, headed to Miami, and I stopped at the Department to go up and see a friend of mine in the Secretariat who had the night watch. I just went up to say farewell. When I got
up there, he showed me the draft letter they had prepared for Vance, which corresponded exactly to what Stansfield Turner and Harold Brown had said to the committee.

Now, I should back up a minute and say that I had written a little note to the Secretariat after I came back from Senator Stone's office reporting the conversation and saying that we should be careful not to get out on a limb on this. There were, I said, intelligence reports indicating that there seemed to be some kind of a unit on the island and, if we took the position that there was nothing new, the limb might be sawed off behind us. Now, Church had, of course, chaired that hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July the 17th. Based on what Stansfield Turner and Harold Brown had said, Church made a statement. Senator Church gave a statement saying there is nothing new in Cuba--I've forgotten exactly the wording--but in other words, Church said that there is nothing new in the situation, that we have no indication of any change in the situation. But then the limb was sawed off behind him. Remember that this all occurs way back in July. This was not in August. The leak occurred near the end of August. That meant there was an entire month when we knew about the situation and might have been developing a position.

In retrospect, I think perhaps rather than going back and getting in my car and heading to Miami, I should have turned around and taken up the cudgels. But I had assumed--wrongly, it turned out--that since people were aware of this, someone was going to do something about it in the Department of State. As some of you know, Bob Pastor and have not always agreed 100% on everything [laughter]. But Bob and I have laughed about this one. Try as I might, I can't blame this one on the NSC at all. This was the fault of the Department of State and, to a certain extent, of Defense. We had the information. We had time to formulate a sensible
position. All we had to do was be straightforward about it. But we were not. For some reason, we were not. I'm absolutely convinced there was no intention on the part of the U.S. government to deceive, to mislead the Soviets. I think it was simply a matter of someone dropping the ball.

So finally you get to the point at which we are informed—that the Department of State was informed, that the Secretary and Dave Newsom found out—that there was going to be an article in Aviation Week on this brigade. Everybody realizes that something is going to have to be said. At that point, they begin scrambling around and then call Frank Church. Of course by this point Church is in the midst of a life or death bid for reelection. We in the State Department have put him out on a limb by telling that there was nothing there. He's made statements to that effect. Now we force him to eat his words.

My recollection of the notes back and forth on this is that when Church asked Vance if the State Department was going to make a statement, the Secretary said "no." Church then asked: "well, would you mind if I did?" And Vance, in his very gentlemanly way, said: "well, Senator, that would not be at all helpful, but of course the decision is up to you." I think Vance assumed that exchange meant that Church wouldn't leak it. But to Church, Vance had given him a green light to go ahead. Anyway, the brigade episode really does deserve study and analysis. I don't think any of us in this room today still understand exactly why it happened the way it did.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Wayne. Wouldn't this be absolutely hilarious, if only it had occurred in isolation and not in connection with all those other events that cumulatively caused detente to collapse?
HERSHBERG: Could I ask a clarifying question just on one point? A 10-second question?

BLIGHT: Yes. Ten seconds. The clock has begun to tick.

HERSHBERG: Okay. Several of you mentioned earlier that *Aviation Week* was going to bring the story out anyway. Was Church informed about this? If he was, then the leak looks like a pre-emptive strike on his part.

SMITH: The story was going to come out. No doubt about it.

HERSHBERG: Yes, but was Church told that?

SMITH: He *was* told that. Yes. He was told that it was going to come out. His question was: is the Department of State making a statement?" He was told no, and so he made one himself. You're right. It *was* a pre-emptive strike on his part, I think, and that's the way he saw it. That's not the way the Department of State saw it, of course. But put yourself in Church's position. You've been told authoritatively that there isn't anything there. You've made public statements on that basis. Now, suddenly, in the midst of your reelection campaign, your are told "oops, sorry, actually there is something there." And it may have come to his attention that we'd known about it for well over a month. He felt that he had to do something. He had to try to save himself.
BLIGHT: Yes, Bob Pastor.

PASTOR: I have what I think is a very simple question. It occurred to me, that perhaps Ambassador Dobrynin or Ambassador Bessmertnykh might be able to answer it. We had information that there were some troops in Cuba. They were, we thought, advisory. They were military advisors. But the new information we were getting suggested that the Soviets were organized into a combat brigade, with a headquarters attached to it. That there would be advisors—this made a lot of sense to us. But a combat brigade? We had a hard time explaining this, even to ourselves. Why would there be a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba? We never had an answer to that question. Could you answer that question?

DOBRYNIN: Well, really, I don't think it matters whether or not you call it a "combat brigade" or a "training brigade." It was a center for training. It was required for training. That is a fact. That is what it was for. What difference does it make if it has this or that kind of "headquarters," anyway?

PASTOR: But Fidel Castro was very clear—Jim Blight and Wayne Smith may recall this as well—when we were in Havana last January, Castro said to us that the unit was not a training brigade at all. He also said he was offended and indeed that he felt offended when the Soviets, under U.S. pressure—that's the way he put it, under U.S. pressure—described it as a training center.
DOBRYNIN: And so how did he describe it?

PASTOR: I think he described as an infantry unit—as a combat unit. It was left in Cuba—this combat unit, as I recall—as a gesture to the Cubans, because the Soviets had given up so much in the deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev—missiles, bombers and even some patrol boats, I think.

BESSERTNYKH: But I think the significance of the unit cannot be in the fact that it had a headquarters, or some other aspect of what looked to your intelligence to be similar to combat units. It seems to me ...

DOBRYNIN: Look, we could discuss how we felt about the circumstances which led to the Russian brigade being left in Cuba—how we felt about all that, for example. In any case, you yourself have just explained why the brigade was left and why it was there. It was there because it was there [laughter]—I mean it was there in 1962, and that it why it was there in 1979.

BLIGHT: I call on Ray Garthoff.

GARTHOFF: Well, I think the general account of what happened has been pretty well spelled out. I don’t know to what extent I ought to go back over some of what has already been covered. But there are some more—rather more precise—elements of it. But let me begin by saying that, first of all, President Carter had called off aerial reconnaissance over Cuba in
January, 1977, as a sign to Castro of our desire to improve relations. At Brzezinski’s urging, however, he had re-instituted reconnaissance in November, 1978, to check on the MiG-23 aircraft, which we have already discussed. At this point we were mostly flying SR-71s with lateral slant rather than draft overflight photography. But in March, 1979, in the period leading up to the summit and SALT agreement, Brzezinski signed a White House directive to the Director of Central Intelligence to check the situation in Cuba by re-analyzing existing information and authorizing the flying of new close-in SR-71 intelligence missions. They were to check out the situation before the Vienna summit and make sure there were no Soviet violations of the 1970 understanding on Cienfuegos, the ‘78 understanding on the MiG-23s or anything else that President Carter needed to bring up with Brezhnev.

This new information began to break through at just about the time of the summit meeting. In July, as has already been noted, some of this began to leak in public statements by Senator Stone. This occurred on July 11th and July 15th, when Stone went public. By the time of the hearings on July 17th, which have been noted--the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--a Senate staff aide had given Stone a tip about a recent build-up of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, perhaps as much as a brigade. So Stone asked Brown--Secretary Brown--and Director Turner and General [Eugene] Tighe, head of DIA, who were all together in a closed session about this apparent build-up of a brigade. Stone got a somewhat equivocal response, following which he said he’d make his concerns public.

I think the committee leadership as well as the administration witnesses wanted to set the public record straight as far as they were able. So Brown, Turner and Tighe--[Vice-Admiral] Bobby Inman [director of the National Security Agency] declined to join this group, this effort--
helped draft a statement on the spot that was issued by Senators Church and Javits on behalf of the committee, with Senator Stone dissenting. This is important because, as Wayne Smith correctly emphasized, Church had put himself on the line in this statement. The same day, John Carbaugh, an aide to Senator Jesse Helms, leaked the story of a Soviet ground force brigade in Cuba to ABC news. On the 19th, the intelligence community brought together, finally, these new reports, and they concluded at that time—that is the intelligence community as a whole concluded—that there was a headquarters—at least the headquarters—of a Soviet brigade and some units other than advisory groups. The purpose of the unit and its exact size was unclear.

As people in the intelligence community began looking more and more they found, for example, intercepted Russian communications from 1976 and 1978 referring to a brigade. In 1978 photographs of Soviet Army equipment and weapons in two camps near Los Palacios turned up. But at this point, it was still not clear that all this information signified that presence of a Soviet Army brigade. But then on July 20, Ted Koppel of ABC news broadcast on TV that "a brigade of Soviet troops, possibly as many as six thousand combat-ready men, has been moved into Cuba within recent weeks." He noted administration denials. Still, at this point, the story did not, for some reason, catch on, even though it was on ABC news. It excited little interest.

Then on July 24th Senator Stone—now sure he had an issue—wrote a letter to the president inquiring about all aspects of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. That's the letter to which Secretary Vance replied on the 27th on behalf of the President, in a letter cleared with Defense and CIA as well as the White House. The letter said essentially the same thing as the Church-Javits statement of July 19, with respect to ground forces. It also informed Senator Stone that no violations had been found of the 1962 and 1970 understandings on submarines.
But the intelligence effort soon paid off. Intercepted communications disclosed plans for a field exercise by this brigade, and on August 17th satellite photography revealed the men, weapons and equipment of a unit of small brigade size engaged in field maneuvers. On the 20th, the same military exercise area was vacated and the men and the equipment were seen at the two camps near Los Palacios. So, the National Foreign Assessment Center issued a coordinated intelligence finding, without dissent, on August 22nd, confirming, by collating all the different sources, the presence of a Soviet combat brigade, comprising three infantry and one armored battalions, 40 tanks, 60 armored personnel carriers, artillery, about 2,600 men under the command of a Soviet Army colonel. (The latter was known not from photography, but other means). But anyway, the unit had no observable connection with Cuban military forces. The word combat was used to characterize its weapons and equipment and to distinguish it from logistics or advisory units. It was not intended to designate its purpose, which remained unknown.

Now, as this new information became known on the 22nd of August, most of the top administration figures were out of town. President Carter was on the paddle wheeler Delta Queen, on the Mississippi. He was informed about it the next day. Brzezinski was with his family vacationing in Vermont. In Washington it was concluded that since the brigade was not a new development, only one newly recognized and confirmed, there was no urgency and it was agreed to await the return of senior leaders after Labor Day. On August 27th, the National Intelligence Daily carried an account confirming the Soviet brigade. The, two days later, the journal Aviation Week queried the Defense and State departments about reports of the Soviet combat brigade. They had the information that had appeared in the National Intelligence Daily.
The Copley News Service also made an inquiry. Neither was given any information or confirmation and in fact, both decided they had no story and didn’t print any.

But that was not known immediately in the government. On the same day the deputies to the cabinet-level Special Coordinating Committee met to discuss the new intelligence. Dave Aaron, Brzezinski’s deputy, objected to a State Department proposal that the matter be raised with the Soviets. When Brzezinski was informed by phone, he asked Aaron to defer any action until after Labor Day, when the president, he and Brown would be back in Washington. But Secretary Vance decided to raise the matter with the Soviet embassy. Also, he authorized Under Secretary Newsom to call eight congressional leaders of both parties the next day and tell them about the brigade.

Only one of the 8 decided to do something about it--Senator Church. He was concerned personally because the information seemed to him to undercut the statement that had been issued under his name and Javits’s on the 19th, and he didn’t want to appear to have been a gullible tool of an uninformed administration. That’s when Church called Vance and tried to call the President, unsuccessfully. As Wayne and Marshall noted, Vance said "I know you’ll use your best judgment in what you say." Vance was asked whether the administration was going to make a statement. Church also asked Vance what would happen if he made a statement and Vance told him it would be harmful, but that only Church could make the decision. So that’s how we got into it.

Now as far as the brigade itself is concerned, I think it is clear from other statements made here that it was a regular brigade --"combat brigade" doesn’t say anything about an intention to commit it into battle. It was not a "training center." This was a euphemism that I
believe was introduced from Moscow at this time. That's what Fidel Castro has been complaining about lately. As Bob Pastor noted, Castro expressed his resentment over this several times in Havana last January—that it was called a "training center," or a "training unit" when it wasn't, and that he hadn't been consulted over the fact that it was going to be so described. I think it galled him to have the Soviets give the impression that his troops—Cuban troops—needed "training" by the Soviets in Cuba.

DOBRYNIN: Were there any changes that had occurred after this one—this change in the name?

GARTHOFF: No, Nothing changed.

KOMPLEKTOV: I remember when we received information from the Washington embassy in regard to the brigade issue that—that it could be very harmful to Soviet-American relations as a whole. We understood immediately that the administration was helpless. We didn't know the whole story, of course, as it has been told today at this meeting. But we knew that in some sense things had gotten out of control for the Carter Administration. So, we worked very hard at that time to provide the embassy with an explanation that would be acceptable to all parties.

You know, we had the sense that the administration was somehow taken prisoner—that they weren't really in charge anymore, in the area of Soviet-American relations. I mean this silly brigade controversy. I agree with Robert Pastor who said it was not a real crisis, but an artificial crisis. The administration was—this is my opinion—running away from elements in the U.S. who
opposed SALT, who opposed détente, who opposed everything about better relations with us. And now, after listening to all of you [gestures toward U.S. delegation] tell about the brigade, I am absolutely sure that whether we would have had Afghanistan--our Vietnam--there was no more opportunity, no chance for the ratification of the SALT treaty. I mean after the brigade business--SALT was finished before Afghanistan.

PASTOR: Do you say that because you think President Carter did not want ratification or because, in your judgment, he would be unable to win ratification?

KOMPLEKTOV: Because, you see, because the political situation was really--at that stage--it was beyond the control of the administration. And now here he was, beginning the year in which he must be reelected, and the situation is out of control. But to answer your question, I don't know whether Carter "wanted" ratification after the brigade thing. Maybe he did. But it was impossible. To us it was impossible, no matter what we did.

DOBRYNIN: It was really the last opportunity--the last chance--to reverse the trend.

BLIGHT: What I would like to do now is bring the discussion of the brigade to a perhaps premature conclusion. I agree with Wayne Smith's remark, to the effect that the more you look into the brigade episode, the more intriguing it gets. And the more--well--multidimensional it gets, full of peculiar interactions between U.S. domestic politics and the foreign policies of the U.S. and Soviet Union toward one another.
But we must turn now to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I have asked Ray Garthoff to lead off the discussion, which will go until 5:45, at which point we will break. Ray?

GARTHOFF: My subject as given to me by Jim Blight is "The Crash: From the Brigade in Cuba to the Invasion of Afghanistan," and the coming of World War II. Excuse me, I mean Cold War II [laughter]. I note that--not the mistake--[laughter]--I note that because I would say, looking back at the period, these events really didn’t lead to Cold War II.

DOBRYNIN: Or World War II either [laughter].

GARTHOFF: Or World War II either, as Ambassador Dobrynin points out [laughter]. They certainly signified an end of the detente of the '70s, which was of course already quite beleaguered. But I think we must understand the developments like the brigade and Afghanistan as part of a phase of the Cold War. There were periods of ups and downs at different times. There had been detentes in the '50s and '60s, as well as the one in the '70s. Certainly the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan--or to be more precise the American reaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan--knocked out the last props of detente in the United States. I think the most significant illustration of that was in the statement we all heard and saw last night [on a videotape] of President Carter’s. He said he thought he had learned more about Soviet intentions in the last week [the week of the Soviet intervention, late December 1979] than in the previous two and a half years of his administration.
The Soviet move into Afghanistan was generally seen in Washington as an escalation of a Soviet expansionist offensive in the Third World. The short-hand for this was Brzezinski's "arc of crisis," a term he coined in 1978. This so-called "arc" described Soviet initiatives, moving generally southwest to northeast: from Angola, to Shaba [province of Zaire], to the Horn of Africa [Ethiopia and Somalia], to Yemen, to Iran and finally to Afghanistan. I don't personally believe that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan fits very well with the "arc of crisis" concept. I think it was unwise and unnecessary. And it did involve, as one secondary motive, support for ideological advance and for the Afghan April revolution, which was under siege. But it also involved judgments about Soviet security interests that put it, I think, more into the—if you wish—into the historical lineage of [the 1968 invasion of] Czechoslovakia, more than it did of, say, Angola. The latter provided a better fit with the so-called "arc" of Soviet expansion. The former seems to me to have been more closely related to straightforward Soviet security interests.

In any event, the intervention came, as far as the United States was concerned, at a time when there was widespread concern about three aspects of Soviet behavior. The first was Soviet Third World expansionism as seen from Washington, and indeed from the United States as a whole, because it was a widely held view in this country. The second concern—which I think was an exaggerated concern—was the perception of a Soviet drive for military superiority. A third and, I would argue, separate concern was a combination of the first two, according to which the Soviet Union, having acquired a stronger military position, was now regarded as more assertive politically and militarily around the world. I myself think each of these was exaggerated, but it must be said that each became very widely believed during the Carter Administration.
The Carter Administration responded to the situation in Afghanistan with a number of sanctions, some merely punitive, and others intended (initially) to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The Soviet forces stayed, but the overall impact of these measures was to dismantle what was left of the structure of détente. Even some routine things that had preceded it were rolled back. President Carter himself referred to the occupation of Afghanistan as "the greatest threat to the peace since World War II," and as a direct threat to U.S. security. Taken literally, this means he saw it as a greater threat than the Cuban missile crisis or the Berlin crises.

One result of U.S. sanctions and other activity in the wake of the Afghan occupation was the cutting of a whole range of routine and cooperative arrangements in areas like science and the arts. The "Carter Doctrine" followed—a multi-faceted reassertion of containment, with special emphasis on U.S. determination to keep the Soviets out of the Persian Gulf. The administration also re-activated military containment. Many of the programs were already under way—like the MX—but they were given greater emphasis in the final year of the administration. Moreover, the "China card" was given another play when Secretary of Defense Brown paid a visit to China. Although Brown’s trip to Beijing was, in fact, announced at the time of the President’s October 1 1979 speech about the Cuban brigade, it led to further military ties to China in 1980.

Unlike several people who have spoken to the question, I myself think that SALT II ratification was still probable in June 1979. It may even have been possible in November or early December, after the brigade episode. It would have been a close call by that time, however. (Vote counters in the State Department and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were divided in their judgments). But after Afghanistan, ratification was completely out
of the question. Without Afghanistan—if the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had simply never occurred—the punitive sanctions would have been avoided. But the atmosphere was such that real progress in U.S.-Soviet relations was probably not possible during the year 1980.

I think we can see the Carter years as moving from a period of some effort—with uncertainties, to be sure, about how to proceed—but some effort to at the beginning to re-establish a detente that was already frayed by that time. This shifted over time to an emphasis on containment and a buildup of U.S. military power. I would also agree with Marshall Shulman that in addition to the items we have covered in our agenda here today, there were also other concerns. These included the military build-ups that each side attributed to the other; and the China card. Both are very important to bear in mind when considering U.S.-Soviet relations in the Carter years.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Ray. I'd like now to call on Ambassador Bessmertnykh to elaborate a little bit, if he will, on a conversation we had last night at dinner about Afghanistan. Several of us found his remarks fascinating, particularly with regard to Soviet decision-making. I would then like to call on Marshall Shulman and Mark Garrison to discuss the decisions that were taken in reaction to the Soviet intervention. I know from talking to Mark, especially, that this was a difficult moment for him in Moscow, and I expect the same holds true for Marshall in Washington. Ambassador Bessmertnykh?

BESSMERTNYKH: Yes, first, I would like to make a couple of general statements. One comment is this: in our discussions of Afghanistan—and the other issues as well—to me, there is
a certain sense of unreality about them. When we look back on these events, we say you did this and therefore we did that, and then this happened and then that happened because of it, etc. But, in my opinion, this is more--I would say--more optimal than real, than real at the time. In a peculiar sense, we give each other too much "credit," so to say, for knowing everything in advance. So, we say, for example, that the Soviet Union had a master plan to conquer the world, or something of this nature. Those of us on the inside, of course, as we have said, had no such experience of any master plan. Or even, sometimes, any plan at all [laughter]. Or, we may have thought there was a plot--or something like a plot--in certain parts of the U.S. government to kill the SALT II treaty. But then, of course, you tell us that there was nothing of the kind. And so on. In real life, so it appears, events, our relations and our policies depend more on accidents, coincidences and acting on very little real knowledge of what is going on. We have been through so many crises in this way.

Secondly, we must avoid making the mistake of thinking that Soviet foreign policy was made--or is made--in a manner similar to the U.S. way of doing things. In the U.S. case, you have your National Security Decision Memoranda, National Security Study Memoranda and the like. There is a subject, someone assigns a report, the report is written and read and a policy comes into being. It is all--from our point of view, on the other side--it is all very orderly, very organized, very precise, in a way. We don't have anything like that on the other side. Our methods of foreign policy making were very different. Foreign policy originated, basically, in the Foreign Ministry, except for matters that we mentioned, chiefly related to Eastern Europe and Third World socialist governments and organizations. The Ministry reached a position and then it was reported to the Politburo. If they accepted it, this meant that our line, our policy, was
"true," or valid, in a way. I think, myself, that this is why we often misunderstood each other. When, for example, we intervened in Afghanistan, you may have thought that—aha, well—the Soviets have a master plan, they have all talked about it at the highest levels and everybody agrees that this should be done. On the question of Afghanistan, I assure you—and not only on Afghanistan—this was very far from what happened.

The Afghanistan situation has always been even more curious than most of our decisions. Especially for those of us in the Ministry, we did not know then, and for many years thereafter, who decided to send the troops in, why they decided it, how that sort of process worked in 1979. We didn’t know. All we knew is that usual procedures were not followed; I mean the idea certainly did not come from the Ministry—from the working level, as was the usual case.

We didn’t have any answers at all, really, until the very last year—well, 1990 and 1991. At that time there was a special request by Gorbachev to find and to study the documents related to the decisions on Afghanistan—to find out how come it was done in 1979. It was curious: there were no good reports on it. Almost nothing at all. It was very peculiar. In addition, there was almost no useful information in the Defense documents, which was really odd, given the nature of the operation in December 1979. Oh, there were some very general statements, but that’s about all. So, those of us who were involved in this retrospective analysis tried to clarify the questions we were asking: how and why was it done; who, basically, took the decision—who endorsed the decision? None of us here [gestures toward Dobrynin and Komplektov] knew anything about this.

DOBRYNIN: We were in Washington. I was in Washington.
KOMPLEKTOV: You know, I do know that, for instance, Marshal Ogarkov and Marshal Akhromeyev: they objected strongly to the plans to go into Afghanistan. But they were told to just go ahead, and ...

BESSMERTNYKH: Yes, but the important question, of course, is: who said "go ahead." Because of the search first begun at Gorbachev's order, we now know the answer. (When I was minister I also instructed people to look into Afghanistan, on my own). Those who ordered it, who approved it, we now know were: [Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, [Defense Minister Dmitry] Ustinov, [KGB Head Yuri] Andropov and [Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Boris] Ponomarev. Note, again, the addition of Ponomarev's name to the three more familiar, more important names. This gives, I think, some clues as to how the decision was reached, or rather why it was reached. Ponomarev's argument undoubtedly was that this was needed to save the socialist regime in Kabul and this, of course, was needed to provide further proof that the course of history was going the socialist way--our way, of course, then.

It is interesting, but we have never been able to find any formalized documents signed, in the usual way, by the Politburo, authorizing the initial decision. We know who was, so to say, behind it--the four men I mentioned--but we have no evidence on it from official Politburo proceedings. Still, I think we can speculate in the following fashion. First of all, this was not, by any means, simply a military decision. Everybody knew this would have important, possibly grave, political consequences. This was known. This was believed. But perhaps one reason why the political cost was underestimated so drastically was that, from the Soviet point of view, the
presence in Afghanistan, and around Afghanistan—the military presence—had been steadily increasing over many months before the fall of 1979. Soviet troops were in Afghanistan many months before December. They were sitting there in Kabul. We had aircraft units sitting in some other cities. And of course there was what, to these men, was a desperate problem: do we move to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan after the arrest of the government? Do we put our "proper" men back in charge? The answer was "yes," we must do this, in a limited action.

I am convinced, at least, that this was Gromyko's thinking. I was his aide for four years. I knew him very well. There never lived a more cautious or prudent man. So, how did he come to support it—this intervention? I believe he supported it because he was convinced—wrongly, of course—but he was convinced that the whole operation would be over very quickly—in maybe three months, certainly no more than six months. If he thought—I am convinced of this—if he thought the operation would have taken as much as a year, he would never have supported it. Never. Gromyko would never have gone for it. He thought: we will go in there; it will be a fast mission, then we will be out of there; and there won't, therefore, be any more trouble over this with the United States. And I emphasize: Gromyko cared about relations with the United States. Afghanistan? Hardly.

It was not only Gromyko who was concerned about the political consequences of the decision. From the documents it is clear that a lot of attention was given to the forthcoming reaction in the world. It's interesting that the people who made the decision prepared for that day. They prepared—I don't know quite how to say it in English—for the "propagandist protection of the action." There was quite a list of actions to be taken to explain the move and protect it from different kinds of accusations. So, in a sense, they knew what they were doing.
they knew there would be strong objections from the U.S. and other countries; and they probably also had some disagreements over the action, as is shown in the lists of ways drawn up to protect the action from criticism—or to deflect the criticism. I am sure they disagreed over the future of Afghanistan as well.

One final point. The big movement of troops comes at the very end of the year in 1979. By that time, everybody involved in the decision had become convinced—absolutely convinced—that the SALT II treaty would not be ratified by the U.S. And not only in their minds. All of us were convinced of this. Therefore, they found it easy and natural to separate the question of Afghanistan from SALT. In a sense, with SALT, there was nothing to lose by intervening in Afghanistan. We felt for certain that the ratification process was dead.

DOBRYNIN: Just two days ago the Politburo decision on the 2nd of January, 1980 was published in Moscow. It allowed for the Minister of Defense to put 50,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This was a decision of the Politburo. All the members of the Politburo approved this specific decision.

SHULMAN: Do you remember when that was dated?

DOBRYNIN: As I said, January the 2nd.

PASTOR: But the invasion had already taken place. There were already a lot of troops there. So after—after they ...
DOBRYNIN: Yes, I recognize that. That is correct. Troops had already been sent in—quite a lot of them, in fact, by the 2nd of January. But on the 2nd of January, the Politburo as a whole voted to allow the Soviet command to raise the level of its participation to 50,000 troops. That is what I am saying—that the level of troops was set at 50,000 on the 2nd of January. Another thing about this document: it said, basically, go ahead and interfere with the independence of Afghanistan. Of course, this part was not publicized at the time, as you can imagine.

My impression is that these decisions at first were taken in independence, mostly, of considerations of relations with the United States. It was already a difficult time. We were having all kinds of troubles, as we have been discussing here today. Brezhnev realized this, of course. So, the overall impression seems to have been that a decision to go into Afghanistan could be made without much cost to us, either militarily—as Sasha has said, it was, or Gromyko thought it was, to be over in a few months. But also without international cost, because SALT was dead, because of the stupid brigade business and the like. Brezhnev knew we would be criticized. But so what? I think this was the view.

NYE: Why did Ogarkov and Akhromeyev oppose the decision to intervene? Viktor, you said that Ogarkov and Akhromeyev...

DOBRYNIN: But to them it was an entirely different situation. They are military men. Some of the military men had been there before. They knew what they would be getting into.
KOMPLEKTOV: I also had the very strong impression that these two generals had studied the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. They had studied it and learned some lessons from it. They did not want to make the same mistake. They turned out to be right. We did make the same mistake.

BEJMERTNYKH: There is also another factor in the caution showed by both the military leadership and by the Foreign Ministry. And I think there was another--there was another thing. The introduction of troops was basically done on the basis of information collected by the KGB, not much by the military intelligence. And that's why I think the military were not so eager to move ahead. They had no independent information at that point, and were wary of KGB assessments. The inter-agency situation was very interesting at that point and we need to learn more about it, in my opinion. Of course, we in the Ministry also had no information, except what the KGB provided.

KOMPLEKTOV: We should not allow ourselves to forget entirely that the Americans were, I believe, stepping up their activities in the area, especially in the north of Pakistan. This kind of thing was always used in conversations involving Ponamarev and his people to bolster their position. He found such information useful [laughter].

BLIGHT: On this point Ray? Yes, go ahead.
GARTHOFF: There had, as the Soviet governor later claimed, been a number of requests from the Afghan government for Soviet troops to come into the country beginning in March 1979. These requests were carefully evaluated, I think. But at least in the early period-- that is to say the middle of 1979--I think all of the local representatives--KGB, the military advisory group and the embassy-- all of them recommended against the introduction of Soviet forces. But then things began to change, especially when [Pro-Soviet Afghan leader Nur Mohammed] Taraki was assassinated in September. The Soviets at that point became much more concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. Certainly, they wished to get rid of [Haflzullah] Amin. But one reason that the military command--the Soviet General Staff--was opposed was that they believed that the intervention would become much more drawn out and much more difficult that many supposed. The intention was, from the beginning, to keep it as limited as possible and to end it as soon as possible. That led to the decision at the beginning of January to put on a ceiling of 50,000 troops. Somewhat later, I don't know just when, the ceiling was raised to 108,000, but that was the maximum. Our estimates of 120,000 were pretty close to that. But they did hold to that ceiling, unlike what we did in Vietnam.

KOMPLEKTOV: Well, we are talking about Afghanistan. Of course, it's quite clear that mistakes were made by our country. This cannot be denied. But, as I said before, no matter what we had done with regard to Afghanistan, the situation in this country--in the United States--was such that the chances for a ratification of the SALT treaty were very, very bad.
DOBRYNIN: I would also like to make one remark somewhat related to our discussion. We were so much involved in Afghanistan. We were physically so involved, with troops. Emotionally as well. The longer we stayed, the more emotional it got, as you know. But now, what are we doing? What are you--what is the United States--doing? Nothing! The bloody war is still going on. It is a terrible situation. The United Nations said "we won't stay in there, in Afghanistan." But we should still be concerned--our two nations--about Afghanistan, right now. Maybe this is something we should think about, that we should talk about, after this colloquium. Don't we--the United States and Russia--don't we have some interests in improving stability there? Don't we have some responsibilities there, after all of our involvement?

SHULMAN: I have two sets of observations: one having to do with the events leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan and the other dealing with the U.S. reaction to it. My impression was that during the summer of 1979, especially from mid-summer on, a series of major study groups--I believe at least three of them--went to Afghanistan from Moscow, led mostly by military people. The last big one was--who was it who was the chief of the armed forces?

GARTHOFF: Pavlovsky. Ivan Pavlovsky, Commander-in-chief of ground forces.

SHULMAN: Yes, thank you, Pavlovsky. That's right. Pavlovsky led a major study group that went to Afghanistan from about the middle of August until sometime in October. We were aware of the visit at the time. My impression was that you [the Soviets] were facing a deteriorating situation. You had been through the episode of having Taraki, who had come through
Moscow on his way back from Havana, going to Kabul and then losing in a shoot-out. Amin then took over. Amin was a very difficult man, a nationalist, and he immediately demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador from Kabul. Amin seemed to be a very strong nationalist when he took control.

As Amin was taking control, the situation was deteriorating—the situation was becoming very violent, very unstable. These study groups were looking into what could be done to stabilize the situation. The last study group, I believe, fanned out to the major centers, even to Iraq and elsewhere, in search of solutions to the growing instability. There was deep concern about the fundamentalist movement. In any case, it appeared to me at the time that what the Soviets were faced with was a range of options: from a minimum response—beefing up the military assistant groups—and a maximum response—a major invasion with a million-plus forces required; and then something in between—which was, I think, what was settled on. The immediate goal appeared to be taking the five major communication centers, securing them, and then rebuilding the Afghan forces to enable them to complete the pacification elsewhere.

Taking control of the five major communication centers was, I think, viewed as a kind of "insurance." They thought they could do this in a matter of a few months, and then get out quickly, before a big brouhaha developed in response to the action—they thought they could get out of there before world opinion would have a chance to coalesce against them. This was obviously a military miscalculation, wherever may have been the locus of decision.

Now about to the American reaction to the action. The first point I want to make is that there is an interesting parallel to the Korean War, in two respects. First, there was an argument at the analytical level about the overall significance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Was
it to be understood primarily in terms of its local significance? That is, was it done primarily to prevent the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan itself—a deterioration that might have had serious adverse consequences for the Soviet Union itself? This is the way I tended to view it. Or was it, as others argued, part of a broader strategic offensive, one consistent with the so-called "arc of crisis" idea put forward by Zbig Brzezinski? This was illustrated dramatically at the time on the cover of *Time* magazine, which showed arrows from the Soviet Union running to all of the oil-producing areas of the Middle East. The idea was that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of an offensive to secure the Straits of Hormuz, to cut off our access to Arab oil fields, our access to Africa, and so on. There was an animated debate within the administration. And it divided people in the same way that I spoke about earlier, in a more general context. As in all such cases, analytical judgments were driven and colored by one’s assessment of Soviet intentions. I remember some of those discussions. They were very intense.

We had seen this kind of debate before, after the invasion by the North Koreans of South Korea in June 1950. The same questions were raised within the government: was this action to be understood as a local event, concerned primarily with control of the Korean peninsula? Or was it to be seen as merely the first wave of a general offensive? As we know, a consensus arose that the North Korean invasion was to be seen as part of a general offensive and this was what, in fact, propelled the subsequent discussion in NATO.

I remember that Gromyko attended a Fourth of July reception somewhere in Europe in the summer of 1950. He was quoted there as saying—whether he actually said it, I don’t know—but he was quoted as saying that what happened in Korea could happen in other divided or countries. There ensued an alarm concerning Germany and the defense of Germany. This, in
turn, led to a debate, first within the United States government and then within the Council of Western Foreign Ministers--about steps toward the rearmament of Germany and then the inclusion of Germany in NATO.

So, we had the case of Korea and the case of Afghanistan. Similar debates occurred within the U.S. and other Western governments, but the debates led to quite different policies. Let me point out one other parallel between the Korean and Afghan cases: the lack of clarity on the part of the U.S. regarding whether or not a given area was of primary interest. We all recall Truman's and Acheson's misleading signals in this regard in 1950. Well, in the Afghan case, we had not reacted forcefully in April of 1978 at the time of the overthrow, when the pro-Soviet Taraki took over. We had not declared at the time that events in this area of the world fell, in our view, within our circle of primary interests.

One final point of commonality between the Korean and the Afghan cases. In 1950, Korea was not initially regarded as falling within our central interests. In 1979, Afghanistan certainly did not fall, by anyone's stretch of the imagination, within our primary interests. Even strong advocates of the "arc of crisis" argument did not believe it did. Rather, in each case, it was the nature of the aggression, the nature of the act itself, that met with almost uniform disapproval, within the Truman and Carter Administrations. So, in the case of Afghanistan, even those who rejected the broader "arc of crisis" interpretation--and I was one--nevertheless supported punitive measures, at least some of them. Why? Because almost all of us thought, as a matter of principle, that when Soviet troops crossed the border into Afghanistan they had done something that was simply unacceptable. This should not be allowed to stand--to use a currently popular phrase. It was felt that a response of some kind was needed, a firm response.
BLIGHT: Thank you, Marshall. Unless there are very strenuous objections, I'd like to give the last word to my distinguished director, Mark Garrison.

DOBRYNIN: Of course, of course. I second the motion. Well, Mark?

BLIGHT: Motion carried [laughter]. As an added incentive for Mark to exercise his gift of perspicacity, I direct your attention to the windows, through which you will see the sun about to set on the beautiful grounds here at Pocantico. As soon as Mark gives us the last word, I encourage all of you to get up, stretch your legs and find a good spot from which to watch the sun set over the hills.

DOBRYNIN: So, everything depends on Mark. How long will you keep us, Mr. Director [laughter]?

BLIGHT: You carry an enormous amount of responsibility on your shoulders, Mark. Take it away.

GARRISON: Well, yes, it is a lot of responsibility. When I asked for just a second, I was not expecting it to be the "last word." So don't expect anything profound. But, I first raised my hand because I thought Marshall was going to come to the conclusion that differing analyses about what caused the invasion led to differing policy recommendations. That was not the case, as he pointed out. I can tell you that, from the embassy's point of view in Moscow, we didn't
do a lot of thumb-sucking analysis about why you did it—why you went into Afghanistan. But it was perfectly clear that a very strong response was needed and practically everything one could think of should be put into the response.

I wonder if there might be another parallel to Korea. That of course is this: the other side—the Soviet side—didn’t know ahead of time how strongly we would feel about a given action. I guess I would like to ask a question of Viktor, because he was, in many ways, my counterpart then in Moscow. I had a feeling that along about the middle of December, when there was already some concern in Washington—quite a bit of concern, actually—about what was beginning to develop in Afghanistan. I wondered then, and I still wonder, whether it meant anything to you that at that particular point you got a letter to Brezhnev from Carter, not on Afghanistan, but about Kampuchea—something about the border between Thailand and Kampuchea. I look back on the period, wondering what your side was thinking. Did you feel as if you could ignore our complaints and warnings about Afghanistan because, while you were hearing about it at the Shulman level or at the Garrison level, you still hadn’t heard anything from President Carter about this?

KOMPLEKTOV: That is a good question. You know, it is hard to tell whether something that we didn’t do—something your side didn’t do is related to something we did. But I am reminded by your question of what I think is a mistaken impression given in the chronology of events we received before the conference. There are references to Afghanistan all through it, from the beginning of the Carter Administration to the end. And, while it is true, of course, that things were going on in Afghanistan all the time, it is not true, as far as I remember, that we—Soviets
and Americans were discussing Afghanistan in any of the period before—I don’t know—before November or December 1979. I don’t remember any meetings between Vance and Gromyko or any other meetings where we discussed Afghanistan. I mean: no meetings specifically to talk about Afghanistan. None in your mission. None in our mission. On that, I am correct?

GARRISON: I don’t remember any off-hand.

KOMPLEKTÖV: Well, this chronology sort of gives the impression that the Afghan issue put a big shadow over Soviet-American relations in the Carter period as a whole. But it did not. Until the beginning of the excursion into Afghanistan, we didn’t know—I certainly didn’t know—that this was such a big issue. I don’t think anybody thought this on our side. That is why I do not quite agree with Bessmertnykh here: on his point that the people who made that decision really appraised correctly the possible world and U.S. reaction to the action in Afghanistan. I remember having some discussions with our people at the time—in December 1979—and there was an uproar about the U.S. reaction. Everybody said that we didn’t expect any reaction more severe—stronger—than after the Czechoslovakia attack of ’68. And it was completely unanticipated at that time. No, the decision—the fundamental decision—was made sometime in October, I believe, after the return of the Pavlovsky group from Afghanistan. Between that time and late December 1979, I don’t remember anybody on your side, Mark, raising the issue. I mean, as you said, at the highest levels—not at our low level [laughter].
BLIGHT: I see for the first time Tom Blanton's hand. Since Viktor has already countermanded my goal of giving Mark Garrison the last word, I'd like to call on Tom for the benediction. Tom?

BLANTON: I'd like to add just one small note of irony. Let's assume that, as Viktor said, the calculation among the decision makers was that the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan would not be greater than the reaction to the Czechoslovak action in '68. It is therefore ironic that we were told (at one of Jim Hershberg's programs at the Wilson Center) by a retired State Department historian that Zbigniew Brzezinski specifically ordered a study of the Czechoslovak '68 invasion, and the U.S. reaction to it, at the time of the Afghan invasion. Brzezinski asked for it to be sent directly to him so he could read it immediately. The State Department historian indicated that Zbig had passed it on to President Carter, who had actually hand-annotated various side portions of the history with his own comments. The gist of many of the president's comments indicated that, in his view, the U.S. should have reacted more forcefully in 1968.

HERSHBERG: And just to steal 10 seconds. Another question arises: whether the stronger-than-expected response to Afghanistan had anything to do with the fact that the Soviets did not go into Poland the following year, 1980, when many indicators suggested they would.

BLIGHT: It is now 5:45 PM, our appointed hour of adjournment. I would personally like to thank all of you for making this initial foray into the fate of detente during the Carter-Brezhnev years such a rich exercise--the first of many, as I imagine it. See you all at dinner.