The Musgrove Conference
of the "Carter-Brezhnev Project"

"Salt II and the Growth of Mistrust"

Musgrove Plantation, St. Simon’s Island, Georgia, USA
6-9 May 1994

1. THE GOAL

The overall goal of the Carter-Brezhnev project is to discover
how and why two countries and two leaderships, each of which seemed
in early 1977 to desire better bilateral relations and a reduction
of nuclear danger somehow arrived, by early 1980, at a situation in
which relations were terrible, detente had collapsed, a nuclear
arms treaty lay unratified in the U.S., and the groundwork was laid
for a revival of intense Cold War rhetoric and military confronta-
tion the following year, following the election of Ronald Reagan.
That is the big question this project is in the business of trying
to answer.

The goal of the first conference, at Musgrove, is accordingly
to establish a kind of empirical "baseline" for the item of
greatest mutual interest to both the U.S. and Soviet Union: nuclear
arms control and the reduction of the nuclear threat. That is what
constituted the bulk of the relationship. That is where top-level
leaders began their own thinking about dealing with each other.
That is therefore where we begin: on the main line of concern
between East and West. That is the "point" of the exercise.

The "counterpoint," which grew to a whole series of dissonanc-
ies during the Carter-Brezhnev years, is the set of issues that
distracted leaders from their principal task of dealing with
nuclear arms control, issues that incrementally raised suspicions
about the seriousness of the other side in pursuing negotiations
along the main line. So we will at Musgrove also consider those
factors which the veterans themselves believe caused the SALT II
negotiations and the relationship to go bad.

In the conference following that at Musgrove, in March 1995
(possibly in Moscow), we will look in detail at two "extraneous"
factors that obstructed into the central relationship, one nominated
by each side. And in the final conference so far envisioned, in
Oslo, in August 1995, we will look at the point of no return in the
events of the fall and winter of 1979-80, centering on the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan and the U.S. response.
2. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Friday 6 May.

♦ Mid-Afternoon: Arrival at Jacksonville International Airport. Conference participants and guests are met by vans from "Island Express" and driven directly to their weekend residences: either at the Musgrove estate, or Sea Palms Resort, which is adjacent to Musgrove.

♦ 5:30 PM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 5:45 PM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 6:00 PM: Cocktail reception at Grove House, Musgrove Plantation.

♦ 7:00 PM: Buffet dinner, accompanied by welcoming remarks from Mr. Smith Bagley and Ms. Janet Shenk, Arca Foundation president and executive director, and the sponsors from Brown University.


♦ 9:00 PM: Logistical update: Janet Lang.

[Following adjournment for the evening, vans will shuttle between Musgrove and Sea Palms at regular intervals.]

Saturday 7 May.

♦ 7:45 AM: Breakfast. (Musgrove residents will eat at the Musgrove Boat House; Sea Palms residents will eat in a designated Sea Palms conference room, first floor, main building.)

♦ 8:30 AM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 8:45 AM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 9:00 AM: Conference called to order by Robert Legvold, chair of the sessions, at Grove House, where all sessions will be held.

♦ 9:10 AM, Session 1: "The Carter Campaign & Transition, and Nuclear Arms Policy." Two participants begin with five minutes apiece of leading questions regarding: the evolving views in the Carter and Brezhnev foreign policy inner circles on such issues as nuclear danger; possibilities for nuclear disarmament; the state of
the nuclear balance; thinking about deterrence and its require-
ments; about the meaning and legacy of the Vladivostok accords
negotiated by Brezhnev and Ford in late 1974; and about the
prospects for dealing productively with the one another on arms
control.

[In this session, and in all sessions, the provocateurs will
make generous use of the declassified materials from the U.S. and
Russia in the briefing books, which have been distributed in
advance of the conference.]

♦ 10:45 AM: Coffee break.

Moscow: Planning, Preparations and Expectations." Two participants
begin with five minutes apiece of leading questions on the origin
and development of the idea for the meetings in Moscow; what each
side thought could be accomplished; how each side prepared for the
meetings; what each side thought the dangers of such meetings might
be; and what was communicated to whom in advance of Vance’s arrival
in Moscow.

♦ 1:00 PM: Lunch at Grove House.

♦ 2:15 PM, Session 3: "The March 1977 Moscow Meetings: The
Confrontation and its Aftermath." Two participants begin with 5
minutes apiece of leading questions on each side’s view of: the
conduct of the negotiations; what went wrong, when, and in what
context; what surprised each side about the positions, arguments
and tone of the other; what each was trying to accomplish in its
press briefings on the heels of the break-up of the talks—
especially those by Foreign Minister Gromyko and National Security
Adviser Brzezinski; and what each saw as the lasting impact of the
mission.

♦ 4:00 PM: Adjournment for the day.

[From adjournment of session 3 at 4:00 PM until dinner at 7:30
PM, vans will be available for shuttling between Musgrove and Sea
Palms. Following adjournment, conferees are free to do as they
choose: swimming at either Musgrove or Sea Palms; tennis at
Musgrove (one court) or Sea Palms (twelve courts); golf at Sea
Palms; walking in the splendid walking paths on the Musgrove
property; or rest and relaxation in privacy.]

♦ 7:00 PM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 7:15 PM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 7:30 PM: Dinner at Musgrove Plantation, outdoors (weather
permitting) on picnic tables or (in the event of rain) indoors at
Grove House.

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[During dinner, conferees will be introduced to some local Gullah culture, via a performance by a local singing group. Following adjournment for the evening, vans will shuttle between Musgrove and Sea Palms at regular intervals.]

Sunday 8 May.

♦ 7:45 AM: Breakfast. (Musgrove residents will eat at the Musgrove Boat House; Sea Palms residents will eat in the Sea Palms conference room, first floor, main building.)

♦ 8:30 AM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 8:45 AM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 9:00 AM, Session 4: "The Evolution of SALT II: Intrinsic Obstacles to the Agreement." Two participants begin with five minutes apiece of leading questions regarding the point at which divisive issues intrinsic to the nuclear arms negotiations appeared, were taken into account and either resolved or tabled, such as: the controversies over the Soviet backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles; ceilings on the various weapons systems; and bargaining across the "triad" of weapons systems. Also to be addressed is the thinking behind each side's positions at various times: why each felt its bottom-line was, in fact, a bottom-line; and, finally, how the agreement became possible.

♦ 10:45 AM: Coffee break.

♦ 11:15 AM, Session 5: "The Evolution of SALT II: Extrinsic Obstacles to the Agreement." Two participants begin with five minutes apiece of leading questions regarding issues outside nuclear arms control that each side felt jeopardized the SALT II process and ultimately the stability of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. On the U.S. side, important issues would include Soviet (and Soviet-Cuban) activities in the Third World, especially (but not only) in Africa; Soviet human rights abuses; the Soviet military buildup; and Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. On the Soviet side, important issues would include U.S. unwillingness to include the Soviets in a Middle East peace settlement; regular interference in internal Soviet matters, such as its treatment of dissenters; U.S. attempts to court the Chinese, at the expense of the Soviets; and U.S. attempts to create friction between the Soviet Union and its East European neighbors.

♦ 1:00 PM: Lunch at Grove House.

♦ 2:15 PM, Session 6: "The Vienna Summit and the Signing of SALT II: The Event and its Aftermath." Two participants begin with 5 minutes apiece of leading questions regarding each side's approach to the summit; last-minute negotiations necessary in
Vienna for the signing to take place; first-hand perceptions of one another's leaders, Carter and Brezhnev; what was signified by the summit and signing for the relationship between the two superpowers; and what the expectations were, in the immediate aftermath of the Vienna meetings, for the treaty and for detente.

♦ 4:00 PM: Adjournment for the day.

[From the adjournment of session 6 at 4:00 PM until dinner at 7:30 PM, vans will be available for shuttling between Musgrove and Sea Palms. Conferees may use the facilities on either property.]

♦ 7:00 PM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 7:15 PM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 7:30 PM: Dinner at Musgrove Plantation, outdoors on the Boat House dock (weather permitting) or (in the event of rain) indoors at Grove House.

[Following adjournment for the evening, vans will shuttle between Musgrove and Sea Palms at regular intervals.]

Monday 9 May.

♦ 7:45 AM: Breakfast. (Musgrove residents will eat at the Musgrove Boat House; Sea Palms residents will eat in the Sea Palms first floor conference room, main building.)

♦ 8:30 AM: First group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 8:45 AM: Last group of vans leaves Sea Palms for Musgrove.

♦ 9:00 AM, Session 7: "Unanswered Questions, Unaddressed Issues, and Unresolved Controversies." The chairman will recognize any participant, whether veteran or scholar, who wishes to elaborate on topics that have, in the view of the participant, not received their due. Discussion will follow, as dictated by the interests of the individual participants.

♦ 10:45 AM: Coffee break.

♦ 11:15 AM, Session 8: "Summary, Conclusions and Lessons." Conference session chair Robert Legvold will initiate the session by presenting a brief summary and analysis of the discussions, emphasizing main themes and arguments. This will take 10-15 minutes. The chair will then ask for reactions to the sessions from the other participants, who will then have an opportunity to comment on the remarks of the chairman, or of previous speakers, or to present their own applications of what has been learned to the present and future state of U.S.-Russian relations.
1:00 PM: Adjournment of conference, lunch at Grove House, and departure of conferees via "Island Express" van service for Jacksonville International Airport.
3. PARTICIPATING VETERANS (& Positions Held, 1977-81)

From Russia:

Gen. Nikolai N. Detinov (Deputy to Defense Minister Dimitry Ustinov and SALT II representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU)

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.

Gen. Sergei A. Kondrashev, Special Assistant to the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov.

Georgy M. Kornienko, First Deputy Foreign Minister (represented at Musgrove by Sergei Tarasenko).

Gen. Viktor Starodubov, Chief SALT II adviser to the Soviet General Staff and member of the SALT II delegation.

Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter and aide to Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko.

Sergei P. Tarasenko, Senior staff member, Department of U.S. Affairs, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

From the U.S.:

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser.

Leslie H. Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

Gen. William E. Odom, Special Assistant to the National Security Adviser for Soviet Affairs.

Marshall D. Shulman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Soviet Affairs.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State.

4. PARTICIPATING SCHOLARS (at the conference table)

From Russia:

Ilya Gaiduk, Institute of Universal History
Moscow, Russian Federation

Vladislav Zubok
National Security Archive
Washington, DC

From Norway:

Geir Lundestad
Norwegian Nobel Institute
Oslo, Norway.
Odd Arne Westad  
Norwegian Nobel Institute  
Oslo, Norway.

From the U.S.:

James G. Blight  
Brown University  
Providence, RI

Philip Brenner  
The American University  
Washington, DC

Dan Caldwell  
Pepperdine University  
Malibu, CA

Mark Garrison  
Brown University  
Providence, RI

Robert Legvold  
Columbia University  
New York, NY (Session Chair)

Robert A. Pastor  
Emory University  
Atlanta, GA

From Canada:

David A. Welch  
University of Toronto  
Toronto, Ontario  
Canada
5. OBSERVERS

Elizabeth Prawley Bagley
Georgetown University Law School
Arca Foundation Board

Smith Bagley
President
Arca Foundation Board

Thomas Blanton
National Security Archive
Washington, DC.

Peter Bourne
Biographer of Jimmy Carter (Chas. Scribner’s Sons, 1996)
Department of Psychiatry, St. George’s University

Malcolm Byrne
National Security Archive
Washington, DC

Dick Clark
Aspen Institute
Arca Foundation Board

Mary L. Estrin
General Service Foundation
Los Angeles, CA

Elizabeth Garrison
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James G. Hershberg
The Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
Washington, DC

Sherry Jones
Washington Media
Washington, DC

Anne Judge
Administrative Assistant
Arca Foundation

Mary E. King
Global Action, Inc.
Arca Foundation Board
6. SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETING TEAM

Paul Y. Baron
NORAB, Inc.
Annapolis, MD (engineer)

Irina Arm
RCL, Inc.
Los Angeles, CA (interpreter)

Andrei Falaleyev
Monterey, CA (interpreter)
7. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE RUSSIAN VETERANS

- Georgy M. Kornienko. Organizer of the Russian team at Musgrove. During the Carter years, first deputy foreign minister, with jurisdiction over all major U.S.-Soviet issues. GK participated in all major discussions with the Americans during the period: at Vladivostok, in Moscow, March 1977, at Vienna in June 1979 and on many other occasions. GK also attended most Politburo meetings at which U.S.-Soviet relations were on the agenda. Following his retirement in 1986, he completed a critical study of Soviet foreign policy with Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev. It has been published in Moscow and has some material on the Carter-Brezhnev period. GK has recently finished a book manuscript on the history of the Cold War, which has a chapter on the Carter years, focussed mainly on the arms control process. For the past several years, GK has spent a good deal of time examining archival materials from the Foreign Ministry and from the Central Committee, in the course of various research projects. GK led the Russian delegation to the fourth conference in the series on the Cuban missile crisis in Antigua, January 1991. (Due to a family emergency, GK cannot attend the Musgrove conference. He has asked Sergei Tarasenko to represent him at Musgrove.)

- Anatoly P. Dobrynin. To Americans, AD is probably the best known figure in the Soviet leadership in the period from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. He was ambassador to the U.S. throughout the Carter-Brezhnev years, and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. AD was in the center of virtually all significant U.S.-Soviet discussions held in the U.S. during the period, and many in Moscow as well. He had good personal relations with President Carter, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski. AD has for some time been in the process of writing the memoirs of his eventful life. Last year he was a fellow at the Harriman Institute at Columbia University. In December, he arrived at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, where he continues work on his memoirs. In the course of writing his memoirs, AD is reviewing a rich and varied array of documentation, including his own notes and diaries. He participated in the third conference in the series on the missile crisis (Moscow January 1989) and in the Pocantico Hills, NY conference that launched the Carter-Brezhnev project (in October 1992).

- General Nikolay N. Detinov. ND was the top assistant to Defense Minister Dimitry Ustinov, when Ustinov was Head of the Department for Defense Industry in the Central Committee of the CPSU. After Ustinov became Defense Minister, AD continued to work for him, though he never formally entered the Defense Ministry. AD was a member of the so-called "the little five": the group that drafted most important documents for "the big five"-- Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ogarkov, Andropov and Ustinov. (Kornienko was also a member of "the little five" or "working group".) ND was a specialist on nuclear arms issues. He was present at Vladivostok discussions in November 1974, at the June 1979 Vienna summit of
Carter and Brezhnev, and at many other top-level meetings during the SALT II process. (AD was recently described by a former high-level U.S. Defense Department official as "the Russian who knows everything about SALT.")

♦ General Sergei Kondrashev. SK was during the Carter-Brezhnev period special assistant to KGB chief Yuri Andropov, with special responsibilities for U.S. and European affairs. Since his retirement from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, he has begun a literary collaboration with David Murphy, a former CIA official, on a book dealing with Berlin and the German question. According to Kornienko (and Kondrashev), SK was often Andropov's "eyes and ears" on issues dealing directly and indirectly with U.S.-Soviet relations including, for example, internal dissent and human rights in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. SK was also, for a time, heavily involved with anti-U.S. propaganda (for example, he directed the Soviet campaign against the neutron bomb.) During his work on the Berlin book with Murphy, SK has begun to review and declassify KGB materials relevant to that project. He is doing likewise for the Musgrove conference, particularly on human rights issues, estimates of U.S. nuclear strength and on the situation in Eastern Europe.

♦ General Viktor Starodubov. VS has been described by several Russians as "the father of SALT" on the Soviet side. His involvement began in 1968-69, when the Soviets first decided to engage in arms control talks with the U.S. He was a member of the SALT I and SALT II delegations and participated in all major discussions leading to both treaties. He was also principal adviser to the Soviet General Staff on arms control, and later chief deputy to Gen. Nikolai Chervov. VS is now engaged in building the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, which he heads. He is currently overseeing the research and writing of a ten-volume work on the military history of Russia.

♦ Viktor Sukhodrev. VS served as principal English-Russian interpreter for all Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, including Brezhnev and Gromyko. He currently works in the Office of Political Affairs at the United Nations. VS has begun to prepare to write his memoirs and, in the course of doing so, has had occasion to review his voluminous diaries and drafts from his thirty-five years experience with Russian leaders. Although not a policy maker—something VS emphasizes—he was intimately acquainted with the entire leadership, he participated not only in all negotiating sessions but also in preparatory meetings, and he drafted most MemCons and communiques for Gromyko. He adds a lively psychological dimension to a leadership (especially Brezhnev) often regarded in the West as "grey" and mechanical. By all Russian accounts—confirmed in our conversations with him—he possesses a remarkable memory.
Sergei P. Tarasenko. A former career foreign service officer, ST worked during the Carter-Brezhnev period on the U.S. desk of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, under the director of U.S. affairs, Viktor Komplektov. He also served two tours of duty in Washington, DC, as well as serving in Cairo, Egypt and other major postings. During the Gorbachev era, ST became closely associated with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, rising quickly to become Shevardnadze's chief of staff, and accompanying the Foreign Minister on virtually every important foreign trip during his tenure in office, including all U.S.-Soviet summits. After Shevardnadze's resignation, ST became a prime mover in the Foreign Policy Association, which Shevardnadze founded after leaving office. Later, he joined Shevardnadze in Georgia, and remained with him throughout the early phases of the Georgian civil war, returning to Moscow in 1992. From January-July, 1993, ST was a senior research associate of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. He returned to Moscow in July 1993, where he has become active in Russian electoral politics.
8. CARTER-BREZHNEV PROJECT INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATORS


Carter Center of Emory University (CC), Atlanta, GA. Robert A. Pastor, director of Latin American studies; Svetlana Savranskaya, Carter-Brezhnev project associate.

Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. James G. Hershberg, Coordinator.

Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (MID), Moscow, Russian Federation. Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister for Western Hemispheric Affairs; Igor Lebedev, director of archives.

Institute of General History (IGH), Moscow, Russian Federation. Aleksandr O. Chubarian, director; Ilya Gaiduk, project research associate.

National Security Archive (Archive), Washington, DC. Thomas Blanton, executive director; Malcolm Byrne, research director; Vladislav Zubok, senior visiting scholar.

Norwegian Nobel Institute (NNI), Oslo, Norway. Geir Lundestad, director; Odd Arne Westad, research director.

Russian Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), Moscow, Russian Federation. Rudolf Pikhoia, director; Vladimir Kozlov, deputy director.