U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

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PREFACE

This chronology is intended to serve as a road map to the major issues that arose in U.S.-Soviet relations during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. As the Carter-Brezhnev project progresses, the Archive will produce updates that reflect the addition of new sources and other improvements. To that end, we urge readers of this document to forward comments, suggestions and corrections of all kinds to the editor (see cover page). This is the best way to guarantee the most accurate, comprehensive and balanced reference tool possible. In this regard, we would like to thank Mark Garrison for providing corrections to an earlier version of the chronology. While the Archive cannot verify the dependability of the written sources we have consulted, we do accept full responsibility for any inaccuracies in rendering the information they contain.
1976 - The United States reaches agreement to sell military equipment to North Yemen and begins training Yemen Armed Forces. *(Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Crawford) Before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3/12/79)*

**January 2, 1976** - At a State Department briefing, officials outline U.S. policy objectives in Southern Africa. They identify the Soviet-backed incursion into Angola as the primary reason for U.S. covert military intervention. The briefing states that the Soviet Union and Cuba disrupted the potential for a peaceful compromise among the liberation organizations by supplying the MPLA with weaponry, thereby creating an unfair advantage for the MPLA. The United States believes that there is a real Soviet threat to southern Africa and that to fail to intercede would compromise the United States' relations with black Africa, especially Zaire and Zambia, at whose request Washington has committed itself to the Angolan crisis. *(NSSM-234, 1/2/76; Possible Contingency Action Regarding Africa, 1/10/76)*

**March 1976** - Ford suspends efforts to complete SALT II because of the election. (Garthoff, p. 801)

**May 17, 1976** - In the Revised Security Assistance Legislation request, Brent Scowcroft recommends that the President approve $25 million in Foreign Military Sales credits to Ethiopia. *(Brent Scowcroft to the President, 5/17/76)*

**June 30, 1976** - Ford signs into law the Clark Amendment, introduced by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) as an extension of the Tunney Amendment. The Clark Amendment prohibits assistance of any kind for "the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless the President determines such assistance is in the national security interest of the United States, and so reports to the Congress specifying the amount and the recipient of the aid." *(Angola and the Clark Amendment, 10/20/82; The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology, 2/89)*

**August 1976** - ACDA Director Fred Ikle announces that the Soviets are deploying MIRVed SS-20 mobile IRBMs. (Garthoff, p. 856)

**September 1976** - With Carter's authorization, Averell Harriman tells Brezhnev that Carter will support SALT II and then move on to reduce strategic forces. (Garthoff, p. 802)

**September 13, 1976** - Carter tells *U.S. News & World Report* that the U.S. should be "tougher" in pursuing detente. (Garthoff, p. 564)
September 29, 1976 - Carter praises the Jackson-Vanik amendment as a contribution to human rights and says that he had told Senator Jackson that he would act to "effectively implement" the amendment. Gromyko later cites the amendment as one of the conditions put on the Soviet Union by the United States that "slowed down many initiatives that would have smoothed Soviet-United States relations." (Gromyko, p. 293; Garthoff, pp. 569-570)

October 1976 - In a campaign memorandum to Carter, Vance writes that U.S.-Soviet issues are important but "should not be permitted to so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect relationships with our allies and other important issues, as has been the case in the past. Our principal goal must be to bring about continuing reduction of tension." (Vance, p. 446)

October 6, 1976 - During his foreign policy debate with Ford, Carter states that "The Soviet Union knows what they want in detente, and they've been getting it. We have not known what we wanted, and we've been out traded in almost every instance." (Garthoff, p. 564)

November 1976 - Carter tells Playboy magazine that "the policy of detente has given up too much to the Soviet Union and gotten too little in return." He also criticizes Ford for abandoning the term detente. (Garthoff, p. 564)

November 1976 - President-elect Carter sends a telegram of support to Soviet dissident Vladimir Slepak. (Garthoff, p. 568)

December 1976 - National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s," is released. The study says that current Soviet intentions could "be attributed to a combination of defensive prudence, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, a military doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, and a variety of internal political and institutional factors." At the same time, the authors note that "the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs give rise to the question of whether the Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objective the achievement of clear strategic superiority over the US." (NIE 11-3/8-76: Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s, 12/76)

December 1976 - "Team B," a group of military and civilian experts, produces an analysis entitled "Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View." CIA Director George Bush assigned the group to "take an independent look" at the data which went into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 in order to "determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening to U.S. security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs." Members of Team B, according to their report, were "deliberately selected" from among analysts "known to take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat" than the intelligence community as a whole. The team, led by Prof. Richard Pipes, records a number of criticisms of NIE 11-3/8, particularly its tendency toward "mirror-imaging," attributing expected U.S. forms of behavior to Soviet officials. This "conceptual flaw," the report notes, "is perhaps the single gravest cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in
past and current NIEs." (Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View, 12/76)

**December 2, 1976** - Carter's spokesman, Jody Powell, discloses that Brezhnev has pledged in a private communication that the Soviet Union would "go out of its way to avoid any crisis with the United States" and the incoming administration. (Garthoff, p. 585)

**December 3, 1976** - Carter meets with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and criticizes Ford for not completing the SALT II agreement reached at Vladivostok. When SALT II is complete, he will begin to seek reductions of strategic forces. (Garthoff, p. 802)

**December 22, 1976** - Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance meets with exiled Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik, who encourages the new administration to do more to encourage democratization in the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 569)

**December 27, 1976** - Carter states that he would like to participate in a summit meeting before September 1977 to sign a new SALT agreement and discuss areas of common concern. (Garthoff, p. 585)

**December 29, 1976** - Through a TASS release, Brezhnev responds favorably to Carter's statement about a summit meeting. (Garthoff, p. 585)
1977-1978 - South Yemen directly supports Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa. Since gaining independence in 1969 and becoming the first "Marxist Arab regime," South Yemen has had close relations with the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 654)

1977 - Some 1,300 Soviet technicians are currently in Afghanistan. (Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response, 1/10/80)

1977 - A Bureau of Intelligence and Research/CIA assessment of Soviet policy toward Ethiopia states that "a Soviet decision to provide limited military aid to Ethiopia would be aimed at eroding the U.S. position as sole military supplier" and recommends that the United States continue security assistance to Ethiopia for the time being "to slow down or limit damage to our interests and Ethiopia's movement away from the West and toward the Communist world...." (ICAR2)

January 1977 - General of the Army Nikolai V. Ogarkov becomes the senior military authority in the Soviet Union when he is made a marshall of the Soviet Union, chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister. (Garthoff, p. 586)

January, 1977 - Christopher John Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee are tried and convicted of espionage in Los Angeles. (Burrows, p. 183)

January 1977 - In his final report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld states that Soviet defense spending during the first half of the 1970s was at 4-5 percent and that it has increased since. "There appears to be an acceleration in the growth of Soviet defense outlays." He acknowledges that the strategic balance in warheads is 8,500 to 4,000 in the U.S.'s favor. (Garthoff, p. 794)

January 6, 1977 - The Charter 77 organization is formed, and issues a declaration demanding recognition of the human rights promised in the Helsinki agreements. (Weschler, p. 217)

Mid-January 1977 - In one of his last presidential decisions, Ford signs National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-345 directing the Pentagon to establish a workable antisatellite (ASAT) weapons system. (Garthoff, p. 759)

January 18, 1977 - In a speech at Tula, Brezhnev states that the Soviet Union does not seek military superiority or any military capacity beyond what is needed for deterrence. The Soviet Union wants to prevent first and second nuclear strikes and avoid nuclear war completely. He endorses SALT and other arms control programs and defines the meaning of detente. "Detente is above all an overcoming of the 'cold war', a transition to normal, equal relations between states. Detente is a readiness to resolve differences and conflicts not by force, not by threats...but by peaceful means.... Detente is a certain trust and ability to take into account the legitimate interests of one another." (Garthoff, pp. 585-586, 771)
January 19, 1977 - The Department of State approves the export of 23,8594 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to South Africa. (Comments to NRC on Nuclear Export License Application, 1/19/77)

January 20, 1977 - Carter signs Presidential Directive/NSC-1 and PD/NSC-2. The first establishes a Presidential Review Memorandum series (used to direct analyses undertaken by executive departments) and a Presidential Directive series (to promulgate decisions on national security matters). The second reorganizes the NSC and establishes within the NSC the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee, as well as other Interdepartmental and Ad Hoc groups. (Richelson)

January 21, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-1, PRM-3, PRM-4, PRM-7, PRM-8, and PRM-15 directing studies of Panama, the Middle East, South Africa, MBFR, an international summit, "North/South relations," and nuclear proliferation, respectively. (Richelson)

January 20, 1977 - Jimmy Carter is inaugurated the 39th President of the United States. (NYT 1/21/77)

January 24, 1977 - During a visit to the NATO Council, Vice President Mondale proposes increases in conventional forces and the development of an enhanced radiation (neutron) bomb. (Garthoff, p. 583)

January 24, 1977 - Prime Minister of Rhodesia Ian Smith rejects a British proposal for an interim government headed by a British commissioner and instead calls on Rhodesian whites and moderate blacks to negotiate an "internal solution" without the British. (Vance, p. 260)

January 24, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-4, directing a study of SALT issues. (Richelson)

January 25, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-16, directing a study of nuclear testing issues. (Richelson)

January 26, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-11, PRM-12, PRM-13, PRM-14, and PRM-17 directing studies of intelligence structure and mission, U.S. arms transfer policy, Korea, Philippine base negotiations, and U.S. policy toward Latin America, respectively. (Richelson)

January 26, 1977 - In a letter to Brezhnev, Carter acknowledges Brezhnev's statement at Tula and declares that the U.S. does not seek military superiority either. He states that he hopes to improve relations through a "rapid conclusion" of SALT II, early agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and agreement on MBFR. Carter also expresses interest in an early summit meeting. (Garthoff, pp. 565, 802)

January 27, 1977 - The State Department issues a statement in support of Andrei
Sakharov, sparking accusations by Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States is interfering in Soviet internal affairs. Dobrynin tells Vance that support for Sakharov is an unwarranted intervention in Soviet domestic affairs. (Garthoff, pp. 569, 572)

January 28, 1977 - Harold Brown forwards to the President a rapidly-prepared analysis of Carter’s proposal that Washington and Moscow cut to 200-250 the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Drafted in conjunction with the Joint Staff and DOD’s office of International Security Affairs, the paper raises a number of concerns about the effect of such reductions on deterrence, "crisis stability," "treaty stability," and other strategic issues. (Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1/28/77)


February 1977 - Daud announces a new Afghan constitution which provides for only one political party, purges members of the PDPA from positions in the bureaucracy and the army and appoints vocal anti-communists to the ministries of interior (Ghulam Haidar Rasuli) and defense (Abdul Qadir Nuristani). (Barnet)

February 1977 - Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam seizes power in Ethiopia and moves the country away from its pro-American stance. (Garthoff, p. 579)

February 1, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-9, which directs the Policy Review Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of European issues. The review should be completed no later than March 1, 1977. He also signs PRM-18, regarding the law of the sea. (Richelson)

February 1, 1977 - In his first meeting with Dobrynin, Carter again says that he wants to reach a rapid agreement on a simple SALT II treaty, separating the cruise missile and Backfire issues from it. After SALT II, he wants to achieve major reductions in strategic forces, even cutting the number of missiles to "several hundred." (Brzezinski, p. 152)

February 2, 1977 - Brzezinski provides Vance and Brown with a secret history of the SALT II negotiations under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The history, prepared by NSC staff member Roger Molander, describes the origins and scope of the Vladivostok agreement of November 1974 and subsequent efforts, including use of back channels, to resolve disputed issues. Among the contested items were verification of limits on MIRVs, ceilings on cruise missiles and the extent to which Soviet Backfire bombers should be included. Brzezinski cautions Vance and Brown to restrict tightly access to the history because the "SALT community" is generally unaware of the back channel communications between Nixon/Ford and Brezhnev. (SALT Negotiating History, 2/2/77)

February 3, 1977 - A meeting of the Special Coordination Committee reviews SALT II options. Carter reaffirms his support for deep cuts in strategic systems and the participants agree on the need for a comprehensive agreement. The SCC
commissions two working groups to develop alternative packages: one based on the Vladivostok agreement and the other based on significant reductions for both sides. (Brzezinski, p. 157)

February 3, 1977 - South Africa publicly reveals its role in the Angolan conflict. Two newspapers, the Rand Daily Mail and The Cape Times, have recently run articles which reported that the South African Defense Force (SADF) was asked by the United States and the West to commit its forces in the region to combat the Cuban-backed MPLA forces. "But when the crunch came, South Africa was left standing alone," according to one account. (South African Involvement in Angolan War, 2/3/77)

February 4, 1977 - The Soviets arrest and expel Associate Press correspondent George Krimsky on charges of espionage. This is the first ouster of a U.S. journalist since 1970. (Garthoff, p. 571)

February 4, 1977 - Responding to Carter's letter of January 26, Brezhnev emphasizes the need for a quick SALT agreement based on the agreement at Vladivostok. He states that the achievement of disarmament is the "central area of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. at the present time." (Brzezinski, p. 153)

February 4, 1977 - Carter meets with Sen. Jackson and both agree that it is desirable to press for substantial reductions in strategic forces under SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 803)

February 5, 1977 - In Pravda, Georgi Arbatov delineates the strengths and weaknesses of both U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. He concludes that both sides are in "approximate balance" and that there is a "parity in the correlation of forces." (Garthoff, pp. 771-72)

February 7, 1977 - The State Department expresses concern over the arrest four days earlier of Soviet dissident Alexander Ginzburg for currency violations. (Garthoff, p. 569)

February 8, 1977 - In his first press conference, Carter states that the United States has "superior nuclear capability." He also acknowledges that the United States and the Soviet Union "are roughly equivalent" in that either country could "destroy a major part of the other nation." (Garthoff, p. 786)

February 8, 1977 - Responding to Brezhnev's note of February 4, Carter states that U.S.-Soviet competition is expensive and can "become very dangerous" and that checking it requires nuclear arms limitations and the "exercise of deliberate self-restraint in regard to trouble spots...which could produce a direct confrontation." Regarding SALT, he refers to a quick agreement deferring cruise and Backfire issues or alternatively a more "comprehensive" one. As for human rights, the U.S. does not intend to "interfere in the internal affairs of other nations...But it will be necessary for our government to express publicly...the sincere and deep feelings of myself and our people." (Brzezinski, p. 154)
February 8, 1977 - During a news conference, Carter states that the U.S. has "superior nuclear capability." He also acknowledges that the U.S. and the Soviet Union "are roughly equivalent in that either could "destroy a major part of the other nation." Additionally, Carter comments that if the Soviets develop the ICBM, more, the U.S. will be unable to "pinpoint" the location of the Soviet ICBM. (Garthoff, p. 786; Weekly Presidential News Conference, PPP, Vol. I, 1977, p. 96)

February 10, 1977 - Vance states that the Byrd Amendment mandating the importation of chrome from the white minority-controlled government in Rhodesia is a "violation of our own often proclaimed devotion to international law." (Smith, p. 140)

February 14, 1977 - Commenting on his second letter to Brezhnev, Carter writes in his diary that he wants the Soviets to "understand the commitment I have to human rights first of all, and that it is not an antagonistic attitude of mine toward the Soviet Union—and that I'm very sincere about my desire to reduce nuclear armaments." (Carter, p. 218)

February 15, 1977 - Sen. Jackson provides Carter with a detailed SALT II proposal and recommends that the U.S. not "unnecessarily assume the burden of past mistakes" by simply starting with the Vladivostok agreement. (Garthoff, pp. 803-804)

February 15, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-19 and PRM-20, directing studies of Micronesia's status and cooperation with France, respectively. (Richelson)

February 15-21, 1977 - Vance visits Israel and five Arab states. (Sobel, p. 132)

February 16, 1977 - The Carter Administration declares its willingness to establish "normal" relations with Angola but indicates that the first step toward normalization must be the removal of Cuban forces from the region. (The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology, 2/89)

February 17, 1977 - Carter sends Sakharov a letter of support. (Garthoff, p. 569)

February 18, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-10, directing a comprehensive net assessment and review of military force posture. (Richelson)

February 20, 1977 - Tass states that U.S. support for Soviet dissidents would damage U.S.-Soviet relations. (Garthoff, p. 572)

February 24, 1977 - Due to human rights violations by the Ethiopian government against the Eritreans, the United States suspends all military aid to Ethiopia. (ICAR4; Garthoff, p. 631)

February 24, 1977 - Secretary of Defense Harold Brown testifies before Congress that the U.S. and Soviet Union have attained strategic parity. (Garthoff, p. 786)
February 25, 1977 - Answering Carter's letter of February 8, Brezhnev asserts that a new SALT agreement must be based on Vladivostok. In response to Carter's comments on human rights, he states that the Soviets will not "allow interference in our internal affairs, whatever pseudo-humanitarian slogans are used to present it." (Brzezinski, p. 155)

February 25, 1977 - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends confirmation of Paul Warnke as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as chairman of the U.S. delegation to SALT. (Basic Documents, pp. 154-158)

February 26, 1977 - After Vance denies the charge that the human rights campaign would hurt U.S.-Soviet relations, Pravda rebuts him. (Garthoff, p. 572)

February 28, 1977 - While Vance sees the Brezhnev letter of February 25 as "good, hard hitting, to the point," Brzezinski sees it as a "very sharp rebuff." Carter tells him that the letter has taken him aback. (Brzezinski, p. 155)

Early March 1977 - During an exchange with Carter on the "hot line," Brezhnev restates the Soviet commitment to Vladivostok. (Garthoff, p. 803)

March 1977 - Congress repeals the Byrd amendment which had mandated the importation of chrome from the white minority-controlled government in Rhodesia. Carter signs the bill on March 18. (Smith, p. 140; Brzezinski, p. 140)

March 1977 - Daud receives and accepts an invitation from the Soviet government to visit Moscow in April. (Ghaus, p. 174)

March 1977 - The Soviets agree to a U.S. proposal for ASAT negotiations but Washington takes another year to develop a position on the subject. (Garthoff, p. 759)

March 1, 1977 - Carter asks Vance to travel to the Middle East on his first overseas mission as Secretary of State, reflecting the need to attach a "very high and early priority" to the region. (Statement by the Secretary of State Before the House International Relations Committee, 3/1/77)

March 1, 1977 - During a White House meeting with exiled Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, Carter tells him that the U.S. has a "permanent" commitment to human rights. (Garthoff, p. 569)

March 7, 1977 - Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirms the Administration's commitment to making human rights an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy. (Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 3/7/77)

March 7, 1977 - Carter tells Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that he favors "defensible borders" for Israel. (Garthoff, p. 580)
March 7-8, 1977 - Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin meets with President Carter in Washington. (Sobel, p. 133)

March 8, 1977 - PD/NSC-4, the "Law of the Sea," is completed. (Richelson)

March 9, 1977 - In response to Arab protests about his statement about defensible borders for Israel, Carter tells journalists that a Middle East settlement would "involve substantial withdrawal of Israel's present control over territories." (PPP, 1977, I, pp. 342-343)


March 10, 1977 - At an SCC meeting, Brzezinski proposes that a SALT agreement include an ICBM freeze. Harold Brown responds favorably to the suggestion because its purpose is to restrict Soviet ICBM modernization. (Brzezinski, p. 158)

March 10, 1977 - After a bitter struggle in the Senate, Paul C. Warnke is confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). (Garthoff, p. 567)

March 12, 1977 - At a White House meeting, Carter is impatient with "merely staying within the Vladivostok framework" for SALT and wants to develop a "fundamentally new kind of proposal." Brown requests deep cuts in force levels so as to reduce Soviet strategic advantages. (McLellan, p. 40)

March 14, 1977 - Fidel Castro arrives in Ethiopia as part of an African tour to promote a peaceful solution between the "two revolutionary regimes" in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu and a "socialist federation." Somali President Siad Barre sharply criticizes Castro for his failure to understand the elements of the Ogaden conflict; he feels betrayed by Castro in the same way that he is beginning to feel wronged by Moscow. (ICAR1)

March 15, 1977 - In a letter to Carter, Brezhnev reminds him that SALT II should be "essentially a reflection of the Vladivostok understanding." (McLellan, p. 40)

March 15, 1977 - The White House produces Presidential Directive-6 (PD/NSC-6) on Cuba. (Richelson)

March 16, 1977 - During a news conference, Carter asserts that a Middle East settlement must provide for a "homeland...for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years." This is an issue that the Arab countries must address, whether or not they are negotiating with Israel. He acknowledges that both sides in the dispute have "doubts about us" but argues that the U.S. must "act [as a] kind of...catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another." (PPP, 1977, I, p. 387)

March 17, 1977 - During a U.N. General Assembly speech, Carter, commenting on human rights, stresses the importance of the "search for peace...[and] the search for

March 17, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-21, directing a study of the Horn of Africa. (Richelson)

March 17, 1977 - JCS Chairman George Brown forwards to Harold Brown a memorandum outlining the Joint Chiefs' trepidations about Carter's earlier proposal to cut to 200-250 the number of strategic nuclear launchers in U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Referring to a DOD analysis the secretary of defense sent to Carter on January 28, 1977, (see entry), General Brown's memo goes somewhat further in suggesting some of the problems of undertaking such major reductions. Specifically, the JCS fear that the cuts: would undermine the deterrence value of strategic forces, might spur the Soviets to adopt a first-strike strategy, and could inadvertently raise the influence of other nuclear nations. (Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces, 3/17/77)

March 19, 1977 - Carter and his chief advisers secretly agree on a new SALT approach, reportedly without taking into account the views of working level officials or intelligence experts. They agree on a proposal that departs significantly from the approach reached at Vladivostok by Ford. The proposal calls for reducing the overall equal aggregate of strategic missiles from the Vladivostok level of 2,400 to between 1,800 and 2,000, and the number of MIRVed launchers from 1,320 to 1,100 or 1,200. The cuts would mean a disproportionate reduction for the Soviets because all substantive reductions would come from the Soviet side. Other new features include: reducing the number of modern large ICBMs to 150 and the number of launchers with MIRVed ICBMs to 550; placing limits on ICBM and SLBM test firings; and imposing a 2,500-mile range for cruise missiles, allowing the virtual proliferation of land- and sea-based systems. The only U.S. concession will be to forego development of the MX. The U.S. would not include the Soviet Backfire Bomber in the aggregate if the Soviets do not increase its strategic potential. Vance and Warnke convince Carter to accept a fallback position based on Vladivostok but setting aside the controversial Backfire and cruise missile issues. NSC staff member William Hyland tells the policymakers that the new approach is ill-advised. (Garthoff, pp. 804-805, 806-807; Smith, p. 76)

March 21, 1977 - During a speech, Brezhnev argues that U.S. human rights policy is an effort to "find some kind of force against socialism in our countries." At the same time he emphasizes the importance of detente. (Garthoff, p. 572)

March 22, 1977 - At a meeting of the NSC, Carter leads a discussion of the new SALT proposal (see March 19 entry) in a way devised to secure support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his diary, Brzezinski writes that it was "stressed to [Vance] that the Soviets are likely to reject and ridicule our proposals, but that he has to stand fast." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

March 22, 1972 - Carter tells a Congressional group that criticisms of human rights practices would not impair U.S.-Soviet relations. He says that there is no need to worry "every time Brezhnev sneezes." (Garthoff, p. 572)
March 24, 1977 - Carter asks Congress to appropriate funds that would allow Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to double their operations and Voice of America to increase by 25 percent its broadcasts to the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 570)

March 25, 1977 - Around this date, Vance briefs Dobrynin about the new U.S. SALT proposal. The Soviet ambassador warns him that it is likely to be rejected. (Vance, p. 52; Garthoff, p. 805)

March 25, 1977 - In his diary, Brzezinski writes that if the U.S. is "not intimidated and keep[s] pressing, it is conceivable that the Soviets will come around and accept our first proposal, which in that case would mark a really significant turning point in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If accepted, it would mean a true impediment to a continued arms race,...and an arrangement which by and large would ensure political and strategic stability as well as parity." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

March 28, 1977 - At his first meeting with Vance, Brezhnev objects to continuing American "interference" in Soviet internal affairs over human rights policy. Later in the afternoon, Vance presents Gromyko with both the comprehensive and the deferral proposal, telling him that Carter strongly prefers the former. Gromyko, without Brezhnev present, pushes strongly for an agreement based on Vladivostok and reviews the Soviet interpretation of that agreement. They agree to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban, anti-satellite weapons, Indian ocean demilitarization, prior notification on missile test firings, constraints on conventional arms transfers, a ban on radiological weapons, ban on chemical weapons, and civil defense. (Vance, pp. 52-54; Garthoff, p. 573)

March 28, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-23, directing the development of a comprehensive U.S. space policy. (Richelson)

March 28, 1977 - Warned by Dobrynin that the new SALT proposal would be rejected, Vance arrives in Moscow where he presents the new SALT proposal (see March 19, 1977 entry) to Brezhnev. (McLellan, p. 41; Garthoff, p. 805)

Late March 1977 - The White House produces Presidential Directive-7 (PD/NSC-7) on SALT. (Richelson)


March 30, 1977 - Brezhnev rejects both the U.S. SALT proposal and the fallback position as steps backward from the progress made at Vladivostok. He tells Vance that the U.S. position is "one-sided" and "harmful to Soviet security." He believes that if the U.S. must reopen issues that were settled earlier then the Soviet Union will do the same, especially on issues involving Forward Based Systems in Europe. The Soviets assume that the U.S. would understand the need for a pledge that it would not expand its FBS or transfer strategic arms to allies. Vance and Gromyko agree to continue discussions in Geneva in May. Apparently, Brezhnev did not
participate in the evaluation of the U.S. proposal, choosing to leave it to Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov. He reportedly told them: "I appointed you to conduct the talks yourselves and you ruined them." (Garthoff, p. 566, 807; Vance, p. 54; Arbatov, p. 207)

**March 30, 1977** - In his diary, Brzezinski writes that "if the American public stands fast and we do not get clobbered with the SALT issue, I think we can really put a lot of pressure on the Soviets." Because of the U.S. proposal for reductions and the human rights campaign, "I can well imagine that the Soviets feel in many respects hemmed in. However, all of that could begin to collapse if any of our colleagues begins to act weak-kneed and starts urging that we make concessions." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

**March 30, 1977** - After the meeting with Brezhnev, Vance reports to Carter that the Soviets "have calculated, perhaps mistakenly, that pressure will build on us to take another position...In any case, we should not be discouraged." He holds a press conference and announces that the Soviets have found the U.S. proposals unacceptable and have made no offer of their own. (McLellan, p. 41; Garthoff, p. 808)

**March 30, 1977** - Following Brezhnev's rejection of the new U.S. SALT proposal, Carter quickly calls a press conference. He discloses some of the plan and states that it would accomplish a "fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the arms race." The proposed cuts, he declares, "would affect both of us about the same." To show progress, he announces the formation of eight U.S.-Soviet working groups on a comprehensive test ban, anti-satellite weapons, Indian ocean demilitarization, prior notification on missile test firings, constraints on conventional arms transfers, ban on radiological weapons, ban on chemical weapons, and civil defense. If agreement is not reached on the U.S. proposal, Washington will "consider a much more deep commitment to the development and deployment of additional weapons." (Garthoff, pp. 756, 809)


**March 31, 1977** - Gromyko holds a press conference where he details the U.S. proposal and Soviet objections. He declares that "[o]ne cannot talk about stability when a new leadership arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved before." Constraints on ICBMs are unacceptable while there are no limits on numbers of cruise missiles. He also emphasizes the importance of the Forward Basing issue and the nontransfer of strategic missiles. He and Vance will have "plenty to talk about" when they meet in May. (Garthoff, pp. 809-811)

**April 1977** - Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visits Mogadishu to press for a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somalia. (ICAR4)

**April 1, 1977** - Before Vance returns, Brzezinski holds a press conference where he defends the U.S. proposal. If the Soviets agree to it, the U.S. would be willing to
forego the MX, a weapon that could "be extremely threatening" to the Soviet Union during the early 1980s because it would provide "first strike capability against...land-based systems." (Garthoff, p. 810)

April 3, 1977 - The Committee on the Present Danger issues a new warning on the Soviet nuclear threat. (Garthoff, p. 810)

April 3, 1977 - Carter meets with Vance, Brzezinski, Warnke, et al to review the recent Moscow discussions. Brzezinski writes in his diary that Vance and Warnke "emphasized that the Soviets were quite cordial, in spite of their firm rejection." He believes that they do not recognize "the degree to which the Soviets are hostile to our proposal and the extent to which they want to put us under pressure." (Brzezinski, p. 165)

April 4-5, 1977 - Egyptian President Anwar Sadat meets with Carter in Washington. (Sobel, p. 136)

April 5, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-24, directing a study of the People's Republic of China. (Richelson)

April 7, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-25, directing a study of arms control in the Indian Ocean. (Richelson)

April 7, 1977 - Carter submits his proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to Congress. (CRS3, p. 32)

April 12-15, 1977 - Daud visits Moscow and, according to Afghan diplomatic sources, stalks out of a meeting with Politburo officials after reminding Brezhnev that he is the president of an independent country. Nevertheless, a 12-year agreement to develop Afghan-Soviet economic and trade relations is signed. Anthony Arnold claims that Brezhnev challenged Daud to "get rid of all those imperialist advisors" in Afghanistan, to which Daud replied that he would dismiss all foreign advisors when they were no longer needed. (Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment, 1/30/78; Garthoff, p. 894; Arnold, p. 65)

April 13, 1977 - Brzezinski publicly suggests a series of Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. (Garthoff, p. 574)

April 14, 1977 - Vance chairs a Policy Review Committee meeting to discuss Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-9, "Comprehensive Review of European Issues." An inter-agency memorandum which came out of PRM-9 outlines four options for dealing with Eastern Europe: (a) differentiate more sharply among the countries of the region depending on their relative independence from the Soviet Union; (b) establish closer ties to those countries with more liberal internal policies; (c) limit ties with countries with less open internal policies; (d) broaden relations with all countries of the region. Brzezinski argues for the first approach, which favors "polycentrism" and regional pluralism, while others, including representatives from the State Department, advocate the last option. Vance ends the meeting by noting a general consensus on merging the first two approaches and directs that
further studies be undertaken. (Brzezinski, pp. 296-297)

April 14, 1977 - Carter announces the United States' intention to sign Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (President's Announcement on Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 4/16/77)

April 15, 1977 - The Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council decides to maintain AID and USIS programs in Ethiopia at present levels; to continue non-lethal military equipment and military training of Ethiopians in the United States; to delay all other military actions; and to tell Somalia that "our military relationship with Ethiopia is on a downward trend." (Policy Review Committee Meeting on Horn of Africa, 4/15/77)

April 15, 1977 - Carter offers to meet with Brezhnev annually. He says that he sees no need to revise the U.S. SALT proposal. (Garthoff, p. 574)

April 20, 1977 - The White House produces Presidential Directive-10 (PD/NSC-10), "Instructions for the Tenth Session of the Standing Consultative Commission." (Richelson)

April 23, 1977 - Mengistu expels U.S. military advisers from Ethiopia and closes the U.S. intelligence station. (Garthoff, p. 579)

Late April 1977 - Vance and Warnke meet with Dobrynin and suggest a three-part package: a treaty lasting until 1985, with a weapons ceiling reduced from Vladivostok; an interim agreement for two-to-three years on difficult questions such as cruise missiles; and an agreement to deeper cuts and limitations on weapons development in SALT III. Dobrynin responds positively, suggesting that the third part be called a "declaration of principles." (Vance, p. 56)

April 25-26, 1977 - Carter meets with King Hussein of Jordan in Washington. (Sobel, p. 137)

April 27, 1977 - Carter submits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation bill to Congress. (Message from the President to Congress, 4/27/77)

April 28, 1977 - The United States announces a halt to pending arms deliveries and cancels the remaining $100 million in credits for arms sales to Ethiopia. (Garthoff, p. 632)

April 29, 1977 - The U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) transmits a Notice of Intent of the Department of the Air Force to sell certain defense articles and services to the Sudan. (ICAR3)

April 29, 1977 - Through a spokesperson, Brezhnev refuses to participate in any summit meetings until there is an agreement on SALT. (Garthoff, p. 575)

May 1977 - Discussing Mengistu's visit to Moscow, the Somali government points to "...the incontrovertible commitment of the Soviets to Ethiopia..." (ICAR4)
May 1977 - Vance and Gromyko agree in Moscow to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear non-proliferation. Initial working group discussions are planned to begin June 13. (Discussions with the Soviet Union on Termination of Nuclear Explosions and on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 5/24/77)

May 1977 - At U.S. urging, members of NATO agree to increase military spending at an annual rate of 3 percent in real terms. Washington also begins an effort to upgrade NATO conventional forces, including U.S. reinforcement capabilities. (Garthoff, p. 583)


May 7, 1977 - Ethiopia and the Soviet Union sign a joint declaration of friendship and a protocol on economic and technical cooperation. (ICAR2)

May 9, 1977 - Carter meets with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva. (Sobel, p. 138)

May 9-13, 1977 - The US and USSR hold bilateral talks in Geneva on radiological and chemical weapons. (Basic Documents, p. 168)

May 11, 1977 - At a meeting in London, Vance assures Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon that the U.S. will continue its "special relationship" with Israel. (Sobel, p. 139)

May 13, 1977 - The White House issues PD/NSC-13, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy." It concludes that arms transfers must be made only in circumstances clearly in the U.S. national interest. (Richelson)

May 14, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-26, directing a review of the ABM treaty. (Richelson)

May 17, 1977 - In a televised interview in Los Angeles, Carter states that if South Africa does not end its rule of Namibia, the government will face "strong action" by the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, France and Canada. He adds that the United States is "not supporting South Africa" and is doing all it can to persuade the Vorster Administration to abandon apartheid. (NYT 5/18/77)

May 18, 1977 - Vance signs the Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Warfare. (Basic Documents, p. 168)

May 19, 1977 - PRM-27 directs a study of chemical warfare issues. (Richelson)

May 19, 1977 - Carter announces the Administration's new conventional arms transfer policy. (Basic Documents, p. 169)
May 19, 1977 - During SALT discussions in Geneva, Vance formally proposes the three-part arrangement discussed with Dobrynin in late April and Gromyko quickly agrees. The package includes a three year ban on testing of any new ICBM types. Gromyko turns down a U.S. proposal to reduce heavy Soviet ICBMS from 308 to 190 and to place a moratorium on arming large ICBMs with MIRVs. He also insists that the proposal include the Vladivostok agreement on incorporating air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the ceiling on MIRVs. In addition, Gromyko seeks an exception to the ban on new ICBM tests: the right to test a single-warhead ICBM to replace old versions. Vance also raises the issue of a Soviet role in facilitating a reconvened Geneva conference on the Middle East, in which the U.S. and the Soviets would be cochairmen. (Garthoff, pp. 580, 811, 816; Vance, pp. 56-57, 191)

May 19, 1977 - The Washington Post reports that General John Singlaub, chief of staff of U.S. forces in Korea, has criticized Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Singlaub contends the move would "lead to war." (WP 5/19/77)

May 20, 1977 - PRM/NSC-28 orders a review of U.S. human rights policy. (Richelson)

May 21, 1977 - Carter meets with General Singlaub. The same day, the Defense Department releases a statement indicating that Singlaub is being reassigned from his post as commander of U.S. forces in Korea. (NYT 5/22/77)

May 21, 1977 - At Geneva, Vance and Gromyko announce agreement that "elimination of the continuing source of tension in the Middle East constitutes one of the primary tasks in ensuring peace and international security." They agree to work toward resuming the Geneva Conference in the fall of 1977. (Joint Communiqué Issued by the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Geneva, 5/21/77)

May 22, 1977 - In an address given at the commencement exercises at Notre Dame University, Carter states that his Administration's foreign policy goals vis-a-vis the Soviet Union include: freezing the further modernization and production of weapons, continuing reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, banning all nuclear testing, prohibiting chemical warfare, stopping the development of an attack capability against space satellites and limiting arms in the Indian Ocean. (Address by the President at Commencement Exercises at Notre Dame University, 5/22/77)

May 24, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-28, directing a study of human rights issues. (Richelson)

Late May 1977 - The United States begins negotiations with the Republic of Korea concerning the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. The discussions focus heavily on South Korea's desire to retain the "U.S. nuclear umbrella." (Koreans Intensify Discussion of Nuclear Option, 6/17/77)

May 26, 1977 - Carter explains the rationale behind his plan to withdraw troops from South Korea over a four-to-five-year period. He says that the U.S. has considered the issue for more than 25 years and that Washington has never had a
policy of "permanent placement of ground troops in South Korea." He insists that the United States "will leave there adequate intelligence forces, observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and a firm, open commitment to our defense treaty, so there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries concerning our support of South Korea." (Reply by the President to a Question Asked at a News Conference, Washington, D.C., 5/26/77)

May 26, 1977 - Carter signs Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Protocol requires all signatory nations responsible for territories within the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to apply appropriate denuclearization measures to those territories. (CRS2, p. 35)

Late May 1977 - Carter orders deployment of the Mark-12A warhead and NS 20 guidance system for use on 300 Minuteman III missiles. This step marks a major advance in the development of counterforce capabilities against Soviet ICBM silos and other hard targets. (Garthoff, p. 791)

June-July 1977 - Somalia increases its incursions into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and launches a large-scale invasion. (Garthoff, p. 579)

June 1977 - At SALT talks in Geneva, the U.S. proposes reducing the overall Vladivostok aggregate level of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers from 2,400 to 2,160. 2,160 corresponds to the existing U.S. force level. The Soviets still insist on 2,400 as agreed to at Vladivostok. (Garthoff, p. 813)

June 1977 - Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) talks begin on a tripartite basis (including the British) in Geneva. (Garthoff, p. 756)

June 1977 - U.S.-Soviet talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean begin. (Garthoff, p. 762)

June 1977 - Carter proposes the development of a neutron bomb. (Garthoff, p. 588)

June 1977 - Soviet leaders inform Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps that because of credit and trade restrictions they intend to reduce sharply imports of nonagricultural products from the U.S. The Soviets begin to turn toward Japan and Western Europe for industrial imports. (Garthoff, p. 589)

June 3, 1977 - The Soviets again tell the Carter Administration that a summit should not be held until there is an agreement on SALT. (Brzezinski, p. 166)

June 3, 1977 - Carter signs PRM-30, directing a study of terrorism. (Richelson)


June 7, 1977 - Tass states that Carter's human rights accusations are an "absurd and wild concoction" and that U.S. policy would damage U.S.-Soviet relations.
June 9, 1977 - Carter writes Brezhnev proposing a summit for sustaining the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. (Garthoff, p. 575)

June 10, 1977 - "Prospects for Eastern Europe," a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, is released. Among the document's main points are that "[u]nrest is likely to grow in Eastern Europe over the next three years," and that "Poland will be the most volatile [country]." (Prospects for Eastern Europe, 6/10/77)

June 11, 1977 - The Soviets arrest and expel Los Angeles Times reporter Robert Toth on charges of receiving state secrets. A dissident scientist had given Toth a copy of a paper on parapsychology. (Garthoff, p. 571)

Mid-June 1977 - The Somali ambassador meets with Carter to request military assistance. (Vance, p. 73)

June 16, 1977 - Brezhnev replaces Nikolai Podgorny as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Reportedly Podgorny had objected to efforts to strengthen detente. (Garthoff, pp. 586-587)


June 17, 1977 - Reports in the South Korean press discuss the recent U.S. decision to withdraw troops from the peninsula and local concern over the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons as well. There is an increased tendency to regard the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear capability as a consequence of U.S. troop withdrawal. (Koreans Intensify Discussion of Nuclear Option, 6/17/77)

June 21, 1977 - Menachem Begin becomes prime minister of Israel. (Sobel, p. 143)

June 28, 1977 - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves the export of 16,804 kilograms of slightly enriched uranium to India. (CRS3, p. 16)

June 30, 1977 - Carter states that he would like to meet with Brezhnev at a mutually acceptable time and place. He also announces that the U.S. will not produce the B-1 bomber but instead concentrate on long-range air-launched cruise missiles to be deployed on B-52 bombers. (Garthoff, pp. 575, 791)

Summer 1977 - Increasingly, the Soviets begin to exile human rights activists rather than imprison them at home. (Garthoff, p. 571)

Early July 1977 - Carter, concerned about press criticism of the U.S.-Soviet stalemate, asks Brzezinski for a report on Administration efforts to improve the relationship. Brzezinski outlines such initiatives as the SALT II proposals and talks on such issues as the comprehensive test ban, the Indian Ocean, conventional arms transfers, etc. He concludes that the "foregoing scarcely supports the Soviet claim that we are putting obstacles in the way of improved relations or have embarked on
some anti-Soviet course. We have already carried the ball while they have constantly complained in order to build pressure for concessions." (Brzezinski, p. 173)

**July 1977** - Carter requests acceleration of cruise missile development. (Garthoff, p. 588)

**July 1977** - German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau warn that a fervent human rights campaign would harm prospects for detente. (Garthoff, p. 570)

**July 1977** - An Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs is created to coordinate policy implementation. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**July 1, 1977** - After commenting on Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa, Vance says: "We will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa." (Address by the Secretary of State before the Annual Convention of the NAACP, St. Louis, 7/1/77)

**July 4, 1977** - Sadat accepts Begin's proposal that the Geneva peace talks resume in October. This agreement later breaks down as the two parties are unable to agree on conference arrangements. (Sobel, pp. 146, 158-163)

**July 5, 1977** - Brezhnev writes Carter that the condition for a summit is a SALT agreement. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**July 12, 1977** - During a news conference, Carter says that Moscow is "exaggerating" its disagreement with Washington over human rights policy and that he will continue to raise controversial issues in American-Soviet relations. He comments that Soviet statements, publicly attacking Carter and the U.S., are "erroneous and ill-advised." (Garthoff, p. 573; Weekly Presidential News Conference, PPP, Vol. II, 1977, p. 1235)

**July 13, 1977** - At a luncheon for visiting West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor is quoted as saying, "Brezhnev ... is promoting detente and ... needs our help." According to Brzezinski, Schmidt is anxious to act as intermediary in direct, private talks between Carter and the Soviet leader, an idea Brzezinski opposes. (Brzezinski, p. 307)

**July 15, 1977** - The United States, Great Britain and France secretly convey to the Somali government their willingness to provide defensive arms. (Vance, p. 73)

**July 21, 1977** - In a major speech at Charleston, South Carolina, Carter reiterates that the U.S. firmly supports its position on human rights. He asserts that "[p]art of the Soviet Union leaders' current attitude may be due to their apparent--and incorrect--belief that our concern for human rights is aimed specifically at them or is an attack on their vital interests." (Garthoff, p. 573; Remarks at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference, PPP, Volume II, 1977, pp. 1309-10)
July 28, 1977 - Warnke and Under Secretary Habib testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. (Basic Documents, pp. 171-178)

July 29, 1977 - Afghan Ambassador Abdul Wahid Karim visits Carter at the White House. Carter acknowledges Afghanistan's new constitution, particularly its human rights provisions and compliments Afghanistan on the implementation of the new joint commission on Afghan narcotics matters. Carter also acknowledges Daud's efforts toward economic development, saying: "We are ready to help" in this effort. (Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment, 1/30/78)

July 30-August 6, 1977 - Soviet satellites discover that South Africa is about to carry out a nuclear weapons test at its Vastrap test site. (Christie, p. 49)

August, 1977 - The Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany join in persuading South Africa not to carry out a nuclear weapons test. (Christie, p. 49)

August 1-11, 1977 - Vance makes a tour of the Middle East. (Sobel, p. 151)

August 4, 1977 - Carter signs an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act calling for sanctions against countries improperly engaging in nuclear trade. (CRS3, p. 36)

August 5, 1977 - On the last day of the preliminary meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the U.S. Commission issues a report that strongly criticizes the human rights record of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Garthoff, p. 570)

August 6, 1977 - The Soviet government informs Carter that a "Cosmos" satellite photograph reveals South African preparations to detonate a nuclear explosive in the Kalahari Desert. Carter orders an independent investigation which subsequently confirms the Soviet findings. Later, the Carter Administration warns South Africa against conducting a nuclear test. (WP 8/23/77; Spectror1, p. 221)

August 8, 1977 - The Soviet Union states that it is ready to cooperate with other states to block South Africa's creation of a nuclear arsenal which would threaten international peace and security. (WP 8/28/77; NYT 8/9/77)

August 14, 1977 - Carter, Vance and Brezinsky hold strategy talks on the South African nuclear situation. Carter orders a message to be sent to Brezhnev on August 15 confirming that the United States also has sufficient evidence to suggest that South Africa is preparing for a nuclear test which would bear international consequences. (See September 22, 1979, entry.) (WP 8/28/77)

August 14, 1977 - Vance meets with Carter to discuss the Secretary's recent trip to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The White House announces that Washington will "stay in close touch with the Soviet Union as a co-chairman of the Geneva conference" and that Vance will meet with Dobrynin later in the week to talk about his tour of the region. (Statement Issued by the White
August 18, 1977 - PRM-31 directs a study of U.S. technology export controls. (Richelson)

August 23, 1977 - The Policy Review Committee meets to discuss an inter-agency study on U.S. alternatives toward Eastern Europe and the related Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Brzezinski pushes for a more confrontational approach toward the region, including a more assertive stance in CSCE. According to Brzezinski, State Department representatives at the meeting are "horrified" at the idea. Brzezinski later writes that his goal is to "stiffen their backs even if we end up adopting a policy which is more designed to achieve compromise." Brzezinski also notes that the meeting produces agreement on the need for a degree of differentiation in U.S. policy toward the region. (Brzezinski, p. 297)

August 23, 1977 - Carter holds a news conference to discuss reports of an impending nuclear test by the government of South Africa. The President states that Pretoria has informed him that it does not intend to conduct any nuclear tests now or in the future. The United States vows to monitor the situation closely and to renew efforts to persuade South Africa to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (CRS3, p. 36)

August 24, 1977 - Carter signs Presidential Directive (PD)-18, which reaffirms the basic goal of maintaining "essential equivalence" in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. It also confirms a U.S. forward defense strategy in Europe and the decisions to maintain a rapid deployment force. PD-18 also endorses NSDM-242 (the Schlesinger doctrine on selective nuclear targeting) pending "further guidance for structuring the U.S. strategic position." If deterrence fails, the U.S. should have on hand a "secure reserve" of strategic forces for employment in the event of protracted nuclear war. U.S. military forces should be strong enough for retaliatory purposes, the document maintains, but also for ensuring that a nuclear war would end on the best possible terms for the U.S. In addition, Carter approves plans for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force. (Garthoff, pp. 788-789, 974; Brzezinski, pp. 177-178)


August 26-29, 1977 - During talks between Somali President Barre and Gromyko, the Soviets insist on Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden in Ethiopia. The talks collapse. (ICAR4)

August 29, 1977 - After Vance returns from talks with Arab and Israeli leaders, he meets with Dobrynin. The Soviets are interested in a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the principles of a Middle East settlement that could be made when Gromyko is in New York for the U.N. General Assembly session later in September. Vance encourages this and requests that Gromyko forward his ideas about a co-chairman’s
statement. (Vance, pp. 191-192)

September 1977-March 1978 - At various intervals, meetings of the CSCE occur in Belgrade. The Soviets and East European delegations try to reinforce detente through confidence building measures (e.g. arms control) while the U.S. emphasizes human rights issues. Reportedly the West Europeans are dissatisfied with the U.S. emphasis. (Garthoff, p. 764)

September 1977 - Dobrynin and Vance meet a number of times to discuss the draft text of a statement on the Middle East. In the statement, the Soviets commit themselves to the goal of normal relations between the Arabs and Israelis and refrains from supporting an independent Palestinian state. While the Soviets wanted to include the phrase "legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people," the State Department convinces them to remove the word "national" from the statement. (Vance, pp. 192-193)

September 1977 - While the U.S. and the Soviets are preparing a joint statement on the Middle East, Vance consults with Egyptian and Israeli diplomats about it. Because the text reflects U.S. views on withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination, Sadat is pleased with the statement while the Israelis are unenthusiastic. (Vance, p. 192)

September 1977 - The White House produces Presidential Directive-20 (PD/NCS-20) on SALT. (Richelson)

September 1977 - The Department of Agriculture surprises the State Department and White House by approving a Soviet purchase of 15 million tons of grain, which is seven million tons over the level agreed to by the Administration. Subsequently, the NSC staff clears all grain sales. (Garthoff, pp. 575-576).

September 1, 1977 - The Carter Administration declares that it will not make U.S. weapons available to Somalia, nor will it allow Saudi Arabia and Iran to pass on U.S.-made weapons. According to a statement, "providing arms at this time would add fuel to the fire we are interested in putting out." (ICAR4; Garthoff, p. 637)

September 9, 1977 - The U.S. informs the Soviets that there are three issues that need to be settled: reduction in the Vladivostok ceilings, limits on heavy missiles and a sub-ceiling on the number of MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, because of the B-1 cancellation, SALT II must allow the U.S. to deploy a large number of bombers armed with ALCMs without cutting into its force of MIRVed missiles. (Vance, p. 59)

September 10, 1977 - Vance meets with Dobrynin and asks for early responses to the questions raised the day before (see entry for September 9). He also gives Dobrynin a proposed statement that both countries would continue to observe the interim SALT I agreement during the SALT II talks. They agree that during Gromyko's visit later in the month a joint statement will be issued reaffirming the SALT I ABM treaty which is due for a review at the end of the year. (Vance, p. 59)
September 13, 1977 - Carter signs PD-21 directing that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe differentiate among those countries of the region which either conduct more open internal policies or are more independent of the Soviet Union. (Brzezinski, p. 297)

September 17, 1977 - China conducts an atmospheric nuclear test. (FAC, p. 5)

September 17, 1977 - Around this date, Dobrynin informs Vance that Moscow refuses to consider the U.S. proposal to reduce heavy missiles in exchange for a sub-ceiling on ALCM-carrying bombers. Moscow considers the heavy missile issue closed. Dobrynin gives Vance a proposed Soviet unilateral declaration stating that Moscow will observe the SALT I Interim Agreement after October 3. (Vance, p. 59)

September 19, 1977 - Carter meets with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan who agrees to accept a Geneva conference on the Middle East, subject to conditions that would preserve the Israeli position on a settlement. (Garthoff, p. 580)

September 20, 1977 - The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is abolished by P.L. 96-110. Its functions are reassigned to various Senate and House committees, including the Senate Government Operations and House International Relations panels. (CRS3, p. 37)

September 21, 1977 - Vance prepares to meet with Gromyko to discuss the Soviet position on South African nuclear matters. Vance is to request "quiet cooperation" with the Soviets on this issue. (Your Meeting with Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issue, 9/21/77)

September 22, 1977 - Gromyko and Vance meet in Washington to discuss SALT. Instead of focusing on the number of heavy ICBMs, Vance stresses limiting the number of all types of ICBMs with MIRVs. He proposes a sub-ceiling of 800 ICBMs with MIRVs instead of the 550 mentioned in March. Gromyko and the Soviet military react negatively to this as well as to a proposal for a new limit of 250 on heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs, which would allow the U.S. to continue a program to arm B-52s with ALCMs but would force the Soviets to scrap their bomber force and reduce by 58 their stockpile of heavy ICBMs. Gromyko proposes lowering the limit on total strategic launchers from 2,400 to 2,250, which Vance counters with a proposal that this number be reduced a full 10% to 2160. Gromyko suggests lowering the sub-ceiling on MIRVed ICBMS to 820, but attaches the condition that there be no sub-ceiling on heavy missiles and that ALCMs mounted on heavy bombers be counted in the MIRV ceiling as agreed to at Vladivostok. In addition, Gromyko proposes that testing and deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs of range greater than 600 kilometers be banned, and that no new ICBMs without exception be tested or deployed for the period of the treaty. He also reads a proposed unilateral assurance that the Backfire bomber is not an intercontinental weapon and will not be given intercontinental capability. (SALT, 9/22/77; Garthoff, pp. 812-813; Vance, pp. 59-60)

September 23, 1977 - Believing that Gromyko's concessions of the previous day
represent important progress, Vance and Carter present the Soviet foreign minister with a counterproposal. They drop the separate heavy ICBM and heavy bomber subceilings and instead propose converting the ICBM ceiling of 1,320 agreed on at Vladivostok into a hybrid ceiling covering both MIRVed ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. In addition they propose a ceiling of 1,200 on land- and sea-based launchers of MIRVed missiles. They also accept Gromyko's figure of 820 for launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. Because U.S. national technical means cannot distinguish between launchers of the single warhead SS-11 and the MIRVed SS-19, the Americans insist that all launchers that could take MIRVed missiles (such as those at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk) be counted in the MIRV ceiling, regardless of Soviet claims about the type of missile in the silo. Brzezinski believes that the Soviets were impressed with Carter because he was "very much on top of the data, well informed, quite skillful in shooting back immediately any Soviet argument." During a discussion of human rights, Gromyko belittles dissident Anatoly Shecharansky as "a microscopic dot who is of no consequence to anyone." (SALT, Joint Communiqué, Joint and Separate Statements, 9/23/77; Brzezinski, pp. 169-170; Garthoff, pp. 812-813; Carter, p. 220; Vance, p. 60; Smith, p. 68)

September 27, 1977 - Carter and Vance hold another meeting with Gromyko. They agree to honor SALT I until SALT II has been put into effect. The Soviets agree to a reduction in the overall launcher ceiling of 2,400 contained in the Vladivostok agreement. Gromyko accepts the hybrid ceiling of 1,320 for launchers of MIRVed missiles and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers as well as a separate ceiling of 1,250 on launchers of MIRVed missiles (instead of the 1200 proposed by the U.S.). This is a major Soviet concession because it imposes limits on their MIRV program. Gromyko also accepts a limit on ICBM launchers with MIRVs of 820. The limit on large ICBMs remains at the existing level (308 for the Soviets, none for the U.S.). Disagreements on Backfire, cruise missile limits and alleged SALT I violations prevent a quick agreement in the fall of 1977. (Vance, p. 61; Carter, p. 221; Garthoff, pp. 813-814)

Fall 1977 - Soviet tests of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs indicate better accuracy increasing their capacity to hit U.S. hard targets. (Garthoff, p. 791)

Early October 1977 - Brown discloses that the Soviets have developed a minor ASAT capability. (Garthoff, p. 760)

October 1977 - Carter predicts an agreement on SALT within "a few weeks." (Garthoff, p. 584)

October 1977 - For the first time, Brezhnev is identified as supreme commander-in-chief of Soviet armed forces. (Garthoff, p. 781)

October 1977 - Abandoning its earlier proposal for complete demilitarization of the Indian ocean, the U.S. proposes that both sides maintain current levels of naval forces and to abjure from changes in deployments or development of new bases. (Garthoff, p. 762)

October 1977 - Carter appeals to Sadat to make a "bold statesmanlike move" to
break the stalemate in the Middle East peace process. (Garthoff, p. 581)

October 1, 1977 - Following meetings in New York, Vance and Gromyko release a statement urging "a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict" within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference. Among other goals, the two governments seek participation of all parties to the conflict, including Palestinians, and guarantees for secure borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The statement adds: "In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the USSR affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977." This announcement comes as a surprise and is strongly attacked by pro-Israeli Americans; as a result, the peace process is stalemated. (Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, New York, 10/1/77; Garthoff, pp. 580-581)

October 1, 1977 - Vance meets with Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah and extends an invitation to Daud to visit Carter in the United States in the summer of 1978. Abdullah says that his government "wants a closer relationship with the new American administration and a 'very visible' U.S. presence in Afghanistan." Vance responds that the United States supports the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and will continue U.S. assistance programs. (Garthoff, p. 938; Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment, 1/30/78)

October 2, 1977 - Israel rejects the U.S.-Soviet statement of the previous day as "unacceptable" because it would involve the PLO. (Sobel, p. 159)

October 4, 1977 - Soviet news services continue to criticize the United States' decision to aid South Africa's nuclear program despite Gromyko's recent moderate statement at the U.N. General Assembly Plenary Session. (Non-Proliferation Issues at the 32nd UNGA: South Africa, 10/6/77)

October 4, 1977 - Carter speaks to the United Nations. On the defensive about his statements on the Middle East, he declares that the United States is not seeking to force a settlement on any country. (PPP, 1977, II, p. 721)

October 4-5, 1977 - Carter and Vance meet with Moshe Dayan to discuss Israeli reaction to the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of October 1. The United States points out that the Soviet position has been moderated and that Moscow has agreed not to refer to support of an independent Palestinian state. Dayan says the statement is "totally unacceptable to the Israeli government" because it contains the phrase "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Stressing Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for Geneva, Vance is able to reach agreement with Dayan on a working paper for convening the conference. (Vance, pp. 192-193)

October 6, 1977 - Carter approves Presidential Directive 21 on Eastern Europe, which Brzezinski has formulated. The U.S. would reward Eastern European countries that demonstrate greater independence from Moscow or undertake steps toward internal liberalization. (Note: Raymond Garthoff places the date of PD-21 in September.) (Garthoff, p. 574)
October 11, 1977 - The Israelis agree to a peace conference but only after the U.S. accedes to an Israeli working paper that weakens the mandate of such a conference. For example, the U.S.-Israeli paper gives Israel a virtual veto on PLO participation in the conference. This reaffirms an assurance that Kissinger had made in 1975. (Garthoff, p. 581)


October 21, 1977 - Carter transmits to Congress legislation that would authorize the transfer of about $800 million of U.S. military equipment to South Korea. The move is associated with the President's planned withdrawal of ground forces from the country, to be accomplished by 1982. (Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and the Senate Majority Leader, October 21, 1977)

October 27, 1977 - According to The Washington Post, Carter officially announces that "the United States will convert its [1963] voluntary ban on arms sales to South Africa into a broadened formal embargo, along with most members of the United Nations." This move, Carter says, "will demonstrate our deep and legitimate concern" about South Africa's suppression of Black Consciousness leaders and organizations. The revised embargo bans the sale of military spare parts as well as private aircraft computers, suggesting a shift toward banning other "gray area" items, classifiable for either civilian or military use. The United States continues to resist black African demands for full economic sanctions; in today's press conference, Carter reiterates his administration's dual interests--support for moderate actions against South Africa and attempts to keep open diplomatic efforts to effect change. (WP 10/27/77; Murrey Marder Article in Washington Post, 10/28/77)

October 31, 1977 - Carter signs the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1978 (P.L. 95-148). The law prohibits the financing of exports of nuclear equipment, fuel or technology to states that have not detonated a nuclear device. (CRS3, p. 39)

October 31, 1977 - The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 417, which condemns apartheid in South Africa and calls upon the South African government to abolish specifically cited oppressive measures, including the banning and imprisonment of opposition members and the policy of "bantustanization." (Basic Documents, pp. 1183-1184)

November 1977 - At the Belgrade meetings of the CSCE, the U.S. strongly challenges the human rights performance of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Also during the talks, the Eastern European delegations support a proposal for no-first-use of nuclear weapons. (Garthoff, pp. 570, 764)

November 1977 - As a concession in the CTB talks, the Soviets accept a proposal for a treaty of indefinite duration. Brezhnev also announces a unilateral moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, the chief of the Soviet
delegation tells Warnke that Moscow is ready to accept U.S. terms for verification through national seismic stations on each other's territory as well as thorough on-site inspection arrangements. (Garthoff, pp. 756-757)

**November 1977** - The Soviets and Americans hold a five-year review conference of the ABM treaty; neither side calls for reconsideration of the agreement. (Garthoff, p. 794)

**November 3, 1977** - Brezhnev writes in Pravda that the Soviet Union does not want to "upset the approximate balance of military power existing at present...between the USSR and the United States. But in return we must insist that no one else should seek to upset it in his favor." The Soviets do not want to maintain the balance for its own sake and support "starting a downward turn in the curve of the arms race" so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. (Garthoff, pp. 772-773)

**November 4, 1977** - The U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 418 calling on all states to review their arms trade arrangements and contracts with South Africa with a view to terminating them. In a statement following the unanimous vote, U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young characterizes the resolution as a "genuine compromise," demonstrating the ability of all members of the Security Council to work together to reach an agreement. (Resolution 418, Adopted by the U.N. Security Council, 11/4/77; Security Council Action on South Africa, 11/5/77)

**November 8, 1977** - Anwar Sadat informs Carter he is considering traveling to Jerusalem. The following day, he announces in a speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, "I am ready to go...to the Knesset itself and to talk to them." (Vance, p. 194; Address by the President of Egypt (Sadat) Before the Egyptian People's Assembly, 11/9/77)

**November 13, 1977** - Citing the continuous Soviet military build-up in Ethiopia since the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974, Somalia expels all Soviet advisers, abrogates the 1974 Somali-Soviet treaty of friendship and breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba. (McLellan, pp. 48-49; Garthoff, p. 579)

**November 17, 1977** - Sadat accepts an invitation from Begin to meet in Israel. (Sobel, p. 166)

**November 18, 1977** - The first test flight in the Pershing II program occurs. If deployed in Europe for striking Soviet targets, this system would have a flight time from target to destination of between six to ten minutes in contrast to the 25-to-35 minute flight time for U.S. ICBMs targeted against the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, pp. 799, 882)


**November 19-21, 1977** - Sadat visits Israel and suggests that he was prepared to make peace with and recognize Israel in exchange for an acceptable settlement with
the Palestinians. Arrangements for the trip are made by Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. (Sobel, pp. 167, 171)

**November 20, 1977** - Sadat addresses the Knesset on his proposal for achieving a "durable peace" in the Middle East. *(Address by the President of Egypt (Sadat) Before the Israeli Knesset, 11/20/77)*

**November 21, 1977** - The U.S.-USSR Standing Consultative Commission on the 1972 ABM Treaty completes its five-year review of the treaty, and issues a joint statement reaffirming the U.S.-Soviet commitment to that treaty. *(Basic Documents, pp. 183-184)*

**November 26, 1977** - The Soviet Union begins a massive sea and air lift of arms to Ethiopia. *(ICAR1)*

**November 26, 1977** - Sadat invites all parties to the Middle East conflict, including the U.S. and USSR, to a meeting in Cairo. Israel and the United States accept, while Lebanon and the Soviet Union reject the invitation. *(Sobel, pp. 179-181)*

**November 29, 1977** - Perceiving the Sadat visit to Jerusalem as a move to exclude Moscow from involvement in the Middle East peace process, Gromyko attacks the visit and privately informs the U.S. that he will not attend the Cairo conference to which Sadat has invited the Soviet Union. *(Carter, pp. 223-224; Garthoff, p. 582)*

**November 30, 1977** - Carter hails "an historic breakthrough" in the Middle East peace process, which he attributes to the "leadership" and "courage" of Sadat and the "gracious reception" afforded the Egyptian leader by Begin. Carter notes that the United States has "played a close consultative role with both of these leaders" and, "on several instances recently, acted as intermediaries at their request." The President asserts: "We have played, I think, a proper role." *(Statement by the President at a News Conference, 11/30/77)*

**Late 1977** - In a personal message to Carter, the Sudanese President writes: "We are truly alarmed at the extent of Soviet influence in our region....We expect and hope that the United States in the prevailing circumstances in Africa would respond favorably to requests of help from those countries ready and eager to defend themselves against the Soviet threat." *(Brzezinski, p. 179)*

**December 1977** - The first Cuban tank, artillery and aviation advisers arrive at the request of the Ethiopian government. *(ICAR2)*

**December 1977** - The U.S. and Soviet Union begin a series of talks on limiting the proliferation and transfer of advanced conventional arms (CAT). *(Garthoff, p. 761)*

**December 1977** - At the NATO ministerial meeting, Vance proposes East-West talks on Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces and suggests the creation of a NATO forum to discuss this question. *(Garthoff, p. 857)*

**December, 1977** - The Congressional Research Service issues a report on the
"Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy." The report concludes that international arms transfers continue on a "rather routine basis."
(Basic Documents, pp. 184-185)

December 1977 - Melvin Laird publishes an article in "Reader's Digest" charging that there has been an official U.S. cover-up of Soviet cheating under SALT I.
(Garthoff, p. 784)

December 5, 1977 - Following an anti-Egypt "Arab Summit" in Tripoli, Egypt severs diplomatic relations with Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and South Yemen. (Sobel, p. 181)

December 6, 1977 - Sadat accuses Moscow of using the Palestinians and Syrians as "agents" to undermine his peace efforts. Vance also issues a strong rebuke to the Soviet Union for its attacks against Sadat's initiatives. (Sobel, pp. 182-183)

December 8-11, 1977 - Hafez al-Assad meets with officials of five Arab states in an attempt to rally opposition to the Egyptian settlement. (Sobel, p. 183)

December 9-14, 1977 - Vance visits six Middle Eastern nations. (Sobel, p. 183)

December 9-15, 1977 - Vance travels to the Middle East, holding talks with Sadat and Begin as well as other regional leaders on the peace process. (Statement by the Secretary of State at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, 12/15/77)

December 14, 1977 - During a meeting with Dobrynin, Brzezinski presses him on the Soviet role in Ethiopia. Unless Soviet and Cuban war materiel stops flowing into the country, the U.S. will "stop restraining" neighboring countries from sending in troops. Dobrynin "gave me assurances that Ethiopians will not cross the Somali frontier once they begin to recapture the Ogaden." He also expresses concern that SALT will not be ratified. (Brzezinski, pp. 179-180)

December 16-17, 1977 - Carter and Begin meet in Washington to discuss the ongoing peace process. (Statement Issued by the White House..., 12/16/77)

(Richelson)

December 24, 1977 - During an interview, Brezhnev is critical of the U.S. for excluding Moscow from participation in the Middle East peace process. (Garthoff, p. 582)

Late December 1977 - In a letter to Brezhnev, Brzezinski inserts a note expressing the "hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts....I deeply believe that it is important for us, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid becoming involved in regional conflicts either as direct protagonists or through proxies...." (Brzezinski, p. 180)
December 25-26, 1977 - In statements in Pravda and Izvestia, the Soviet Union assails the Begin-Sadat summit. (Sobel, p. 189)

December 28, 1977 - Carter guarantees a SALT agreement within "this coming year." (Garthoff, p. 584)

December 29, 1977 - Carter begins a six-nation trip that includes Poland. He affirms the strength of the Polish-American relationship and appeals for a more universal recognition of human rights. (Replies by the President to Questions Asked at a News Conference, Warsaw, 12/30/77; FAC, p. 2; NYT 12/30/77)

Late December 1977 - The first Soviet SS-20 unit becomes operational. Brzezinski's deputy, David Aaron, and Pentagon officials meet with European defense officials to reassure them that additional weapons systems are not needed to counter the SS-20. (Garthoff, pp. 856-56)

December 30, 1977 - Brzezinski and Rosalynn Carter visit Polish Cardinal Wyszynski bearing a handwritten letter from the President. (Brzezinski, p. 298)

December 31, 1977 - Carter meets with the Shah in Tehran. During a toast at a State Dinner, Carter refers to Iran as "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." (Toast by the President at a State Dinner, Tehran, 12/31/77)

Late 1977 - A State Department assessment of Afghanistan's external relations during 1977 finds that U.S. interests in the region were well served by Afghanistan's improved relations with both Pakistan and Iran, as well as by Daud's "deft and able" handling of his country's complex relationship with the USSR. The Soviet Union "avoided any appearance of meddling in Afghan internal affairs," while maintaining its position as the major aid donor to Afghanistan. The Soviet government did, however, supply Afghanistan with "a few significant new weapons," such as SA-3 and SA-7 missiles. Daud's desire to visit the United States following a trip to Moscow in April is viewed as part of an ongoing balancing act between the two superpowers. No significant breakthroughs were made with China during 1977. Relations with the United States were reported as "excellent;" funding for the U.S. military training program for Afghan officers was doubled in the hope of offsetting, even if only slightly, substantial Soviet assistance to the Afghan military. (Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment, 1/30/78)
1978

**Early 1978** - The Sudan, along with Egypt, receives a huge U.S. aid boost in return for non-belligerence toward Israel. The increase makes the Sudan the second largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Africa, after Egypt. Khartoum views the aid as a "strategic backstop against...Soviet-backed subversion by Liberia and Ethiopia." (WP 5/24/90; ICAR3)

**Early 1978** - Carter accepts a State Department proposal that the CAT negotiations include discussions of specific geographic regions in order to use the talks to get the Soviets involved in talks on restraining activity in the Third world. (Garthoff, p. 761)

**Early 1978** - Vance and Warnke propose that Carter approve that the U.S. present the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament with a proposal for negotiations on a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons for presentation. Reportedly, Brzezinski sidetracks the proposal by routing it to Energy Secretary Schlesinger who strongly criticizes it. (Garthoff, p. 763)

1978 - The House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations, holds investigative hearings on Korean-American relations. (Spector2, pp. 20-21)

**Early January 1978** - Vance and Warnke propose to Carter that all SALT problems still at issue be resolved by the spring of 1978. (Brzezinski, p. 170)

**January 1978** - Gromyko proposes a joint U.S.-Soviet mediation effort to deal with the problems in the Horn of Africa; the United States dismisses the proposal because it would, according to Brzezinski, serve to "legitimize the Soviet presence in the Horn." (Brzezinski, pp. 180-181)

**January 2, 1978** - Carter visits India and addresses the Parliament, assuring his audience that the United States will provide the nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactor. (CRS3, p. 16)

**January 3, 1978** - PD/NSC-27, which establishes procedures for dealing with non-military incidents, is completed. (Richelson)

**January 4, 1978** - Carter meets with Sadat in Egypt in the course of a week-long overseas trip. (Remarks by the President Following His Meeting With the President of Egypt, Aswan, 1/4/78)

**January 6, 1978** - Vance returns the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. (NYT 1/7/78)

**January 6, 1978** - At NATO headquarters in Brussels, Carter promises that "as SALT II proceeds towards an agreement, we will intensify our consultations with all of you." (Address by the President Before the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels,
January 9, 1978 - SALT talks resume in Geneva. (FAC, p. 4)

January 10, 1978 - In Geneva, the U.S.-USSR Working Group opens talks on a chemical weapons ban. (FAC, p. 4)

January 10, 1978 - Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, owner and editor of the newspaper La Prensa, and the leading critic of the Somoza dynasty, is assassinated by gunmen in Managua. In retrospect, many observers cite Chamorro's violent death as the catalyst that led to Anastasio Somoza's overthrow 19 months later. (Chamorro Assassination Developments, 1/11/78; WP 1/12/78)

February 24, 1978 - The State Department announces that the Soviet Union has increased its military assistance to Syria. (Sobel, p. 214)

January 11, 1978 - In a memo to Carter, Brzezinski repeats his concern about the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and suggests that the U.S. has to find ways to make the war in Ethiopia more costly to Moscow in political and military terms. (Brzezinski, p. 181)


January 12, 1978 - Carter expresses "concern about the Soviet Union's unwarranted involvement in Africa" and expresses the "hope that we can induce the Soviets and Cubans not to send either soldiers or weapons to that area." (Garthoff, p. 591)

January 12, 1978 - Brezhnev writes Carter a letter, probably concerning SALT. (Garrison)

January 16, 1978 - A new "hot line" agreement goes into operation, replacing the system established in 1963. (FAC, p. 4)

January 17, 1978 - In Belgrade, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meeting. (FAC, p. 7)

January 17, 1978 - The United States rejects another Somali plea for arms. (Garthoff, p. 641)

January 19, 1978 - Congressman Robert Sikes (D-Florida) criticizes U.S. inaction on Somalia, stating that "arms for Somalia could have forced a negotiated settlement and kept the strategic Horn of Africa out of Communist hands." (ICAR2)

January 19, 1978 - In retaliation for the expulsion of a U.S. Embassy aide from Moscow, the United States expels two Soviet officials. (FAC, p. 6)

January 23, 1978 - Brezhnev warns NATO against introducing a neutron bomb.
(NYT 1/24/78)

January 23, 1978 - Carter releases his January 20 budget message requesting $500.2 billion for F-Y 1979 and setting defense spending at $117.8 billion. (NYT 1/24/78)

January 23-March 21, 1978 - Great Britain, the United States and the USSR meet in Geneva to discuss the comprehensive test ban. (FAC, p. 4)

January 24, 1978 - Carter issues Executive Order 12036, which reorganizes foreign intelligence activities and codifies what intelligence agencies may do under the law. (NYT 1/25/78)

January 25, 1978 - Carter responds to Brezhnev's January 12 letter covering SALT and the neutron bomb, and clearly referring to a secret deal in the Middle East. (Garrison)

Late January-Early February 1978 - With the support of Soviet and Cuban troops and advisers, Ethiopia begins a counteroffensive against Somali troops in the Ogaden. (McLellan, p. 49; Garthoff, p. 641)

January 30, 1978 - The United States terminates military assistance loans to Nicaragua for Fiscal Year (FY) 1979 due to human rights violations in the country. (MH 2/1/78)

February 1978 - Carter assures Mengistu that the United States intends to continue to support Ethiopia's territorial integrity unconditionally. (ICAR1)

February 1978 - Members of the NATO High Level Group (HLG) on TNF modernization reach agreement on the need for a program to update TNF forces including a capability to strike targets inside the Soviet Union. U.S. participants do not oppose this development but also did not expect it. (Garthoff, p. 858)

February 1978 - NSC staffer David Aaron meets with the Europeans to discuss possible deployment of enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bombs). After he returns, Brzezinski reports to Carter that the West Germans were willing to "support deployment of the neutron bomb should an arms control initiative not work out." Because of domestic opposition, the British Labor Government is even more hesitant to support a decision to produce and deploy neutron bombs. (Carter, p. 226)

February 1, 1978 - By a vote of 58-37, the Senate blocks the amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act calling for the use of $462 million in unspent funds for the B-1 bomber. On February 22, by a vote of 234-182, the House does the same. (FAC, p. 1)

February 1, 1978 - Carter issues a series of specific guidelines governing conventional arms transfer policy. (Basic Documents, pp. 185-186)

February 2, 1978 - In his first report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Brown states
that the "present disparity in defense spending between the United States and the Soviet Union--and still more the trend--is disquieting as an index of both Soviet capabilities and Soviet intentions." He points out that there has been a steady increase in Soviet military spending for more than 15 years. He also states that Chinese military capabilities are a "strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union." Nevertheless, the defense budget Brown presents, which provides for a 2.7 percent real increase in annual spending in FY 1983, reflects the Carter Administration's decision to downgrade estimates of the Soviet threat and to not match the first strike capability of the USSR against land-based missiles. (Garthoff, pp. 715, 794; FAC, p. 1; NYT 2/5/78)


February 3, 1978 - The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) joins the week-old general strike against Somoza's rule. (FAC, p. 23)

February 3-8, 1978 - Anwar Sadat visits the United States. (Sobel, p. 195)

February 4-5, 1978 - Sadat and Carter hold discussions at Camp David. (Sobel, p. 196)


February 9, 1978 - Carter submits the International Atomic Energy Agency Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards to the Senate for ratification. (Basic Documents, p. 186)

February 14, 1978 - Dobrynin assures Vance that Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border after they recaptured the Ogaden. (McLelland, p. 50)

February 14, 1978 - The Carter Administration announces plans to sell $4.8 billion worth of war planes to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Three days later, during a news conference in Providence, Rhode Island, Carter predicts approval of the sales by Congress. (PPP, Vol. I, 1978, p. 333; FAC, p. 4)

February 16, 1978 - Carter signs PRM-33, directing a study of science and technology in developing countries. (Richelson)


February 17, 1978 - In a memo to Carter, Brzezinski writes that "with major decisions ahead on SALT, the Horn, the P.R.C., I conclude that the Soviets are seeking a selective detente. U.S. actions should seek to maintain the emerging cooperative relationship in certain 'benign' areas, while increasing the costs of
Soviet behavior in the 'malignant' areas." (Brzezinski, pp. 560-561)


**February 21, 1978** - At a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Brzezinski links Soviet actions in Africa to progress on the SALT Treaty. Vance and Brown oppose the notion, and the Committee recommends that there be "no direct linkage between Soviet and Cuban actions in the Horn and bilateral activities involving either country and the United States." (Brzezinski, pp. 181-184)

**February 23, 1978** - Carter sends four human rights conventions to the Senate. (FAC, p. 1)

**February 24, 1978** - In a speech before the Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev states that there is an open road for further improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations but that certain "forces" in the U.S. oppose the relaxation of tensions. Tactfully criticizing the Carter Administration, he declares that the Soviet position on SALT has been "consistent and definite." He emphasizes the importance of quick agreement on SALT in order to move forward with military détente. He mentions "well known decisions" of the U.S. Congress that impede economic and scientific cooperation. (Garthoff, p. 592-593; NYT 2/25/78)

**February 24, 1978** - Brezhnev and Assad issue a joint communique announcing increased Soviet military assistance to Syria. (Sobel, p. 214)


**February 25, 1978** - In reply to Brezhnev's critique of February 24, the State Department warns the Soviets that their role in Africa may endanger relations. (FAC, p. 6)

**February 26, 1978** - Somoza announces that he will retain power until 1981, at which point he will leave the presidency and the National Guard. Nicaragua's opposition rejects Somoza's stance and new protests break out the next day. (Somoza Rally, 2/26/78)

**February 27, 1978** - As part of its annual policy assessment, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issues a report on U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan for 1978. The United States is to encourage Afghanistan's political independence and its political and economic development. The United States is not and should not become responsible for, or committed to, the "protection" of Afghanistan in any respect. Improved international and regional ties should be promoted, the Embassy argues, and Afghan reliance on the Soviet Union should be reduced by a diversification of Afghanistan's economic, political and military relationships with Iran, India, Turkey and the politically moderate countries of the Persian Gulf. (1978 Annual Policy Assessment--Part II: Approaches to Achieving Our Goals and Objectives, 2/27/78)
February 27, 1978 - Carter meets with Dobrynin. He writes in his diary that the essence of the discussion was the "fundamental importance of our relationship with the Soviet Union" and his concern about "the deterioration of the situation in recent months." (Carter, pp. 237-238)

February 28, 1978 - Brezhnev writes Carter a letter on SALT. (Garrison)

February 28, 1978 - The State Department releases a Senate Foreign Relations Committee finding that the USSR has generally complied with the I972 SALT agreements. (NYT 3/1/78)

March 1978 - Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov visit the Soviet Far East where they stress the need for military defense against China. (Garthoff, p. 599)

March, 1978 - William Kampiles, a watch officer at the CIA's Operations Center, sells a copy of the technical manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite to the KGB for $3,000. He is later convicted of espionage and sentenced to a 40-year jail term. (Ranelagh, pp. 668-669)

March 1, 1978 - During a discussion about the escalating conflict in the Horn of Africa, Congressman Thomas Eagleton (D-Missouri) notes increased Soviet support for Ethiopia. (ICAR2)

March 1, 1978 - Brzezinski complains about Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa stating that it would "inevitably complicate SALT." The next day, Pravda accuses him of "crude blackmail." (Garthoff, p. 592; NYT 3/2/78)

March 2, 1978 - Vance claims that there are 35,000 to 37,000 Cuban troops in Africa, including 11,000 in Ethiopia. (FAC, p. 21)

March 2, 1978 - During a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Vance insists that there is no linkage between SALT and the Horn of Africa. Brzezinski observes that "Soviet actions may impose such linkage" by poisoning the atmosphere. Brown and Vance both disagree, with Vance arguing that "[w]e will end up losing SALT and that will be the worst thing that could happen." (Brzezinski, pp. 185-186)

March 2, 1978 - Apparently because Vance disagrees with Brzezinski, Carter disclaims any linkages between SALT or test ban negotiations and Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa. He states that Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa "would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement...and therefore the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage." (Garthoff, p. 592; Reply by the President to a Question Asked at a News Conference, 3/2/78)

March 3, 1978 - Carter states that "good and steady progress" is occurring on SALT and that ultimately it will be necessary for him to meet with Brezhnev. He adds that he will continue to urge the Soviet Union to fully respect human rights. (Garthoff, p. 593; White House Statement On Belgrade Review Conference, PPP, Vol. I, 1978, pp. 453-4)
March 3, 1978 - Brzezinski writes Carter that the "Soviets must be made to realize that detente...has to be both comprehensive and reciprocal. If the Soviets are allowed to feel that they can use military force in one part of the world--and yet to maintain cooperative relations in other areas--then they have no incentive to exercise any restraint." (Brzezinski, p. 186)

March 3, 1978 - The United States and Hungary sign a trade agreement that grants Hungary most-favored-nation status. (NYT 3/4/78)

March 6-9, 1978 - President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito visits Washington. In a joint statement issued on March 9, Carter and Tito agree that there has been an improvement in bilateral relations over the last year and stress the importance of such efforts to limit the arms race as SALT, the mutual and balanced force reductions talks and the forthcoming special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament. (Joint Statement Issued by the Present and the President of Yugoslavia, Washington, D.C., 3/9/78)

March 9, 1978 - Adolph Dubs, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, refers to Afghanistan as "still very stable." He adds that Daud does not appear to face any opposition at present and that efforts to increase economic growth are continuing. (House, p. 134)

March 9, 1978 - Carter announces that Somalia has agreed to withdraw its army completely from Ethiopia and that "withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban military presence should begin." (Garthoff, pp. 591-592, 642)

March 10, 1978 - Carter signs into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). The Act prohibits U.S. exports of nuclear fuel and reactors after March 1980 to nations which have not accepted full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities unless the President issues a waiver of this requirement. The presidential waiver must, however, be submitted to Congress for 60 days of continuous session where it may be overridden by majority-approved resolutions from both houses of Congress. (Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 8638 Into Law, Washington, D.C., 3/10/78; Spector, p. 39; SIPRI, p. 201; CRS3, p. 1)

March 15, 1978 - The Chinese conduct an atmospheric nuclear test, its first since September 17, 1977. (FAC, p. 5)

March 16, 1978 - At the MBFR talks in Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact agree on procedures for estimating manpower. (FAC, p. 7)

March 16, 1978 - Vance meets with Dobrynin but has not seen the final text of a seemingly hard line speech (see March 17, 1978, entry) that Carter will deliver at Wake Forest. The next day Dobrynin is en route to Moscow. (Garthoff, p. 594)

March 16, 1978 - Congressman George McGovern (D-South Dakota) commends the restraint shown by the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Horn of Africa. (ICAR4)
March 17, 1978 - During a speech at Wake Forest College, Carter emphasizes the Soviet military build-up which gives Moscow "functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States." Noting his obligation to expand U.S. military forces, Carter states that "We will match...any threatening power...We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us." The U.S. intends to strengthen its forces in Europe and mentions the "excessive" Soviet build-up there "beyond a level necessary for defense." He also mentions an "ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power--to intervene in local conflicts...as we can observe today in Africa." The U.S. will not sign any SALT agreement that does not "preserve the strategic balance," cannot be independently verified and does not preserve U.S. military strength. Cooperation with the Soviet Union is possible but popular support for cooperation will decline if the Soviets fail to curb their military build-up or military activities in other countries. Subsequent briefings disclose that the speech was intended to counter opponents of SALT as well as to warn Moscow. (Address by the President at Wake Forest University, 3/17/78; NYT 3/18/78; Garthoff, pp. 593-594)

March 20, 1978 - Somoza "appears very tired," Ambassador Solaun reports to Washington after a luncheon with the Nicaraguan leader. "He is looking for some help from the U.S. toward calming down the country. He is worried about the economic situation, the FSLN, and opposition intransigence." (Meeting with Somoza: March 20, 3/21/78)


March 22, 1978 - The Soviet Union reacts to the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, noting that as a member of the London Suppliers Club, Moscow fully supports the control of nuclear materials, "will strictly observe the principles of non-proliferation, and welcomes the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act insofar as it advances these principles." (Soviet Official's Reaction to U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, 3/22/78)

March 23, 1978 - In a Special Coordination Committee meeting, the National Security Council discusses three options for U.S. policy toward Eritrea. They include: keeping America's hands off the conflict in Eritrea; seeking ways to reduce Ethiopia's requirement for a large Soviet/Cuban presence in the country, such as through mediation efforts; encouraging Eritrea to continue its struggle, thereby raising the costs of Soviet and Cuban involvement. (Special Coordination Committee Meeting on the Horn of Africa, 3/23/78)

Spring 1978 - The United Nations convenes a Special Session on Disarmament during which the French, among others, push for confidence building measures (CBMs) to be applied "from the Atlantic to the Urals." (Garthoff, p. 765)

Spring 1978 - Against a background of increasing Soviet military supplies to South Yemen, the U.S. agrees to a Saudi transfer of four F-5B trainer aircraft to North Yemen. The goal is to develop an F-5 squadron that would constitute the YAR Air Force. (Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Crawford) Before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
April 1978 - The U.S. proposes a bilateral ban on the development of new ICBM systems. (Garthoff, p. 814)

April 1978 - The NATO High Level Group (HLG) continues to discuss TNF modernization, with the U.S. providing data on possible weapons systems. (Garthoff, p. 858)

April 1978 - U.S. newspapers begin to feature stories about policy disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski. (Garthoff, p. 597)

Early April 1978 - In a report to Carter, Brzezinski criticizes the Vance-Warnke emphasis on SALT as a way to promote a more comprehensive U.S.-Soviet relationship. He argues that "it is clearly in the Soviet interest, and part of Soviet strategy, to focus attention on SALT....This leaves the Soviets free to pursue their political objectives elsewhere...[Unless] detente becomes comprehensive and reciprocal we face an increasing rebellion at home, and SALT will not be ratified." He proposes measures such as encouraging worldwide condemnation of the Soviet role in Africa, taking a more forthcoming approach toward Congressional pressure for defense spending increases and developing a technology assistance program for China. (Brzezinski, p. 317)

April 1, 1978 - In a major policy shift, the Carter Administration says it will urge Congress to repeal the arms embargo against Turkey. (NYT 4/2/78)

April 7, 1978 - Carter announces that he has "decided to defer the production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects [a neutron bomb]," but that U.S. actions will be influenced by the Soviet Union's efforts in conventional and nuclear arms control. (Statement by the President, Washington, D.C., 4/7/78; CRS2, p. 42)

April 7, 1978 - Brzezinski reads a presidential directive concerning Eritrea (possibly PD-32, see February 24, 1978, entry) at a Special Coordination Committee meeting. Its instructions include: "Support a negotiated solution more strongly. Repeated public statements deploiring violence and foreign military involvement. Let any foreign assistance to insurgents continue without our involvement." (The Horn of Africa, Angola and Rhodesia, 4/7/78)


April 7, 1978 - Brezhnev reacts to Carter's Wake Forest speech by criticizing "forces interested in the arms race and in charging an atmosphere of fear and hostility." He criticizes the U.S. government for "indecisiveness and inconsistency" and for "glancing back at those circles which [oppose] agreement and are doing everything to undermine it and free their hands for an uncontrolled arms race." Unless a SALT agreement is reached soon, all opportunity for an agreement would be lost. (Garthoff, p. 595)
April 10, 1978 - U.N. Under Secretary-General for Political and Security Affairs, Arkady Shevchenko defects. (NYT 4/11/78)

April 10, 1978 - Vance confirms Soviet agreement to negotiate the suspension of hunter-killer satellite (ASAT) tests and discuss conventional arms sales. (FAC, p. 5)

April 10, 1978 - Carter is receptive to Brzezinski's paper (see Early April 1978 entry) and agrees that Vance should be instructed to present "toughly stated overall analysis of the U.S.-Soviet relationship" in his forthcoming talks with Gromyko. (Brzezinski, pp. 317-318)

April 13, 1978 - In a joint declaration following meetings in Washington, Carter and Romanian leader Ceausescu express a determination "to strengthen and make irreversible the process of detente in Europe and throughout the world" and "to act resolutely for the adoption of a wide range of disarmament measures." (Joint Declaration by the President and the President of Romania, Washington, D.C., 4/13/78)

April 14, 1978 - PRM-34 directs a study of North Africa. (Richelson)

April 14, 1978 - In a weekly report to the President, Brzezinski writes about his concerns that "attacks on SALT will intensify between the treaty signature and delayed ratification. The process can be helped along if you take some decisions conveying toughness: MX, trade cutoffs to Soviets on petroleum technology, trade-off proposal on the neutron weapon, or open access to the P.R.C. on technology." (Brzezinski, p. 561)

April 17, 1978 - Defense Minister P.W. Botha claims that the United States knew about and encouraged the 1975 South African incursion into Angola and accuses Washington of abandoning South Africa in the Angolan conflict. Two days later, the Department of State declares that "the decision of the South African government to intervene in Angola was made unilaterally by that government in its own interests." (Defense Minister Attacks US, 4/18/78; Press Guidance on South African Defense Minister's Statement, 4/19/78; Defense Minister Promises Book on Angolan Details, 4/20/78)

April 18-19, 1978 - In Copenhagen, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) decides to keep the option of introducing a neutron bomb in Europe open. (NYT 4/20/78)

April 19, 1978 - The MBFR recesses for four months. (FAC, p. 7)

April 19, 1978 - In a meeting between Angolan President Neto and Brezhnev, the USSR pledges to continue support for Angola. (NYT 4/20/78)

April 20-22, 1978 - Vance meets with Gromyko in Moscow to discuss SALT. The harsher public rhetoric and talk about linkage have eroded the negotiating atmosphere and disagreements on major issues are not resolved. Some issues, however, are settled. The Soviets accept the U.S. figure of 1,200 missile launchers
with MIRVs and the Soviet second stage aggregate figure of 2,250. In addition, Vance proposes a ban on any new ICBM systems during the three years of the protocol and then a limit of one new ICBM system until 1985. No agreement is reached either on what types of ICBMs should be exempted from the freeze or on the Backfire. (Brzezinski, p. 171; Garthoff, p. 815, 816; Vance, pp. 99-100).

April 21, 1978 - Carter announces that he will slow down his controversial planned withdrawal of troops from South Korea. "In view of the crowded legislative calendar, and also because of other matters concerning Korea," Carter asserts, "there is a possibility that the Congress may not act now" on his October 21, 1977, proposal to transfer certain U.S. military equipment to South Korea. "In the light of this development, I believe it prudent to adjust the scheduled withdrawals." (Statement by the President, 4/21/78)

April 25, 1978 - In a speech, Brezhnev defends Soviet intervention in the third world, arguing that there is no contradiction between detente and Soviet relations with "countries liberated from colonialism." Charges that the Soviet Union has a "policy of expansion" are a "fabrication." He strongly supports detente and arms control and declares that in spite of "current oscillation," detente is the basis of relations with the U.S. (Garthoff, p. 596)

April 25, 1978 - The Soviet Union indicates that it will sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco "shortly." (Treaty of Tlatelolco Ratification Prospects, 4/26/78; Cuba, Moscow, and Treaty of Tlatelolco, 4/27/78)

April 28, 1978 - The official Afghan radio station announces that former Daud has been shot in the course of a coup and that a new revolutionary council has consolidated control over the capital. "The Constitution is abolished," according to radio broadcasts. A curfew is announced to prevent opposition to the new government.

In a memorandum to Vance, Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, points out that there is "fragmentary" evidence suggesting that the coup leaders are leftist and/or strongly Islamic nationalist. According to this memorandum, if the Afghan Communist Party is shown to be a key player in the coup, it is possible the Soviet Union was notified in advance and neither supported nor vetoed the move.

Saunders argues that the United States "need[s] to take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish. On the other hand," Saunders adds, "anti-regime elements in Afghanistan will be watching us carefully to see if we acquiesce in or accept the communist takeover." (NYT 4/29/78; The Afghan Coup, 4/28/78)

April 29, 1978 - The Committee of Free Trade Unions is formed for the Baltic Coast area in Poland. Lech Walesa and Anna Walentynowicz, who will both play a large role in the strikes of 1980, are leading members. (Weschler, p. 217; Andrews, p. 28)

April 30, 1978 - In an interview with The New York Times, Carter states his support
for Israel's peace objectives, explicitly opposing a Palestinian state and complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. (Sobel, p. 204)

**April 30, 1978** - The Shah of Iran tells U.S. presidential candidate George Bush that he views the communist seizure of power in Afghanistan as one more example of the Soviet grand design to encircle Iran. The Shah also speaks of his concern for the other Persian Gulf states, which he says are "run by a bunch of bedouins" who have no plans and are no match for forces determined to overthrow them. (*Military Conflict in Kabul, 4/30/78*)

**May 1978** - Under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the weapons laboratories and critics of detente, the U.S. backs away from its original proposal for an unlimited comprehensive test ban (CTB) after the Soviets have accepted it. Instead, Washington suggests a five-year comprehensive test ban. (Garthoff, p. 757)

**May 1978** - The Soviets unilaterally suspend ASAT testing until April 1980. This month and next, the U.S. and Soviet Union begin a two-year-long series of negotiations on the limitation of ASAT. (Garthoff, p. 759-61)

**May 1978** - The Broad Opposition Front (FAO) is formed in Nicaragua. It includes moderate Somoza opponents as well as the FSLN *Tercerista* faction, and is supported by the Church. (Sklar, p. 13)

**May-July 1978** - A series of visits to the Soviet Union by U.S. officials and scientific delegations are canceled to protest Soviet actions to check internal dissidence through arrests and trials. (Garthoff, p. 610)

**May 1, 1978** - The Afghan PDPA Revolutionary Council announces the formation of the first PDPA cabinet following the coup against Mohammad Daud. Nur Mohammad Taraki is named president of the Council and prime minister; Babrak Karmal becomes vice chairman and deputy prime minister; Hafizullah Amin takes over as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. (Anwar, pp. 110-112; Adamec, p. 188)

**May 1, 1978** - Begin visits Carter at the White House. Later in the day, he speaks of a possible breakthrough in negotiations, due to a "change of atmosphere" in U.S.-Israeli relations. (Sobel, p. 204)

**May 3, 1978** - Several Republican Senators attack the Carter Administration for a "frightening pattern of giving up key U.S. weapons systems for nothing in return." (Vance, p. 100)

**May 4, 1978** - In Spokane, Washington, Carter denounces Soviet intervention in Africa but praises Moscow for bargaining in "good faith" at the SALT talks. (NYT 5/6/78)

**May 4-8, 1978** - The United States and the Soviet Union meet in Helsinki to discuss limiting international transfers of conventional arms. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks, the two nations agree that "the problem of limiting
international transfers of conventional arms is urgent" and demands further consultations. *Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Helsinki, 5/11/78*)

**May 9, 1978** - Chinese-Soviet border tensions lead to a brief Soviet incursion into Manchuria. (Garthoff, p. 599)

**May 9, 1978** - In a joint communiqué, the United States and the USSR announce their agreement on all issues included in a treaty to ban chemical weapons except for the issue of verification. *(Joint U.S.-USSR Statement Made to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, 5/10/78)*

**May 11, 1978** - Four thousand Katangan rebels from Angola invade Shaba Province in Zaire. (NYT 5/15/78)


**May 12, 1978** - Carter attacks Cuba for intervention in Africa, human rights violations and subservience to the USSR. (NYT 5/14/78)

**May 12, 1978** - Vance addresses the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs on "issues facing the United States in Africa." Vance notes the United States' "active support for majority rule and racial equality in southern Africa" but indicates that the challenge facing the United States is the successful promotion of peaceful change. According to Vance, the United States must continue to work for "negotiated settlements in southern Africa" but warns that bilateral relations with South Africa will deteriorate if no progress is made. (Basic Documents, pp. 1141-1145)


**May 16, 1978** - The Administration notifies Congress of its plan to sell $414.4 million worth of arms to Japan and Iran. (FAC, p. 4)

**May 16, 1978** - The State Department releases a statement in both Washington and Managua: "The U.S. reiterates its policy of strict non-intervention in the internal political affairs of Nicaragua and our continuing desire for a steady non-violent transition to genuine democratic rule. Approval of AID projects for the needy is not intended as an expression of political support." (Pastor, p. 66)

**Mid-May 1978** - Reacting to congressional pressure led by Representative Charles Wilson (D-Texas), one of Somoza's strongest supporters on Capitol Hill, the Carter Administration releases $160,000 in military credits to Nicaragua. At the same time, the State Department reiterates its policy of "strict non-intervention" in Nicaraguan affairs, and support for a "non-violent transition to genuine democratic rule." (WP 5/16/78; Pastor, p. 66)
May 18, 1978 - In a trial that began on May 15, Physicist Yuri Orlov is sentenced to seven years in prison and five years of enforced residence for anti-Soviet agitation. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 5/19/78)

May 18-20, 1978 - French and Belgian paratroopers, flown in by U.S. aircraft, rescue European hostages taken by Katangan rebels in Zaire. Soviet spokesmen criticize this as U.S.-supported intervention. (Garthoff, p. 596)

May 19, 1978 - Pravda reports on the visit of Hafizullah Amin to Moscow, where he declares that Afghanistan is "linked by unbreakable ties of brotherly friendship and neighborliness with its great neighbor, the Soviet Union." Amin also states that Afghanistan will seek to improve Afghan-Soviet relations in the future. (Sen Gupta, p. 46)

May 19, 1978 - The White House discloses that 18 C-141 transport planes have been assigned to the French-Belgian airlift in Zaire. (NYT 5/20/78)

May 20, 1978 - Two Soviet U.N. employees, Rudolph Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, are arrested for espionage activities. Over CIA and State Department objections, they are later tried and sentenced to 50-year prison terms. (Garthoff, p. 613)

May 21-23, 1978 - Brzezinski visits Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders about U.S. strategic plans, technological assistance, plans for countering Soviet policy and political collaboration in Africa and other areas. Carter has instructed Brzezinski to tell the Chinese that the U.S. has "made up its mind" to begin a "new phase in the American-Chinese relationship." During his mission, Brzezinski talks about the "polar bear" to the north and states that the Soviets support "international marauders" in Africa. In his banquet toast, Brzezinski states that "[o]nly those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear the further development of American-Chinese relations." (Garthoff, pp. 599, 702; Brzezinski, pp. 209-219)

May 23, 1978 - The Carter Administration withholds export licenses for uranium to South Africa and for plutonium to Pakistan. (CRS2, p. 41)

May 23, 1978 - PRM-36, "Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa," directs that a review be undertaken of U.S. policy toward such presence. (Richelson)

May 24, 1978 - Vice President Mondale presents a "Program of Action on Arms Control" before the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. (Basic Documents, p. 190)

May 24, 1978 - The USSR tests a hunter-killer satellite. (FAC, p. 5)

May 25, 1978 - In a statement about the Zaire invasion, Carter charges that Cuba knew of the Katangan plans to invade and did nothing and that Angola bears a heavy responsibility for the attack. (Statement by the President at a News Conference, Chicago, 5/25/78)
May 26, 1978 - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee asks Carter for proof of his allegations about Cuba's foreknowledge of the Zaire invasion.  (NYT 5/27/78)

May 27, 1978 - At a White House meeting, Gromyko presents a major concession on SALT: agreement to freeze the number of warheads that could be deployed on various types of ICBMs.  This "fractionization freeze" means that the Soviets can deploy no more than 10 warheads on each SS-18 ICBM rather than the 20-to-30 warheads that the missile is capable of carrying.  The same freeze applies to SS-17 and SS-19 intercontinental missiles.  Carter accuses the Soviets of directing military operations during the Katangese foray into Zaire.  Gromyko makes Carter furious by denying the charge, saying that it is a "myth" and that the U.S. information is "fantastic."  They also debate human rights issues.  (Garthoff, pp. 596, 600; Vance, p. 103)

May 28, 1978 - Brzezinski supports Carter's accusation about Soviet involvement in Zaire and states that the Soviet Union is interventionist throughout the third world.  "This pattern of behavior" is incompatible "with what was once called the code of detente."  (Garthoff, p. 597)

May 29, 1978 - Vance writes Carter a memorandum requesting a review of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.  Trying to prevent a change in policy toward Moscow, he states that "we are coming to the point where there is a growing pressure on the part of some people to portray the competitive aspects of the relationship as taking clear precedence over the search for areas of cooperation."  He argues that some U.S. policies could promote tough Soviet actions to which the U.S. would have to respond.  For example, human rights policy could cause the Soviets "to crack down harder on...dissidents."  Vance also warns against trying to "play off China against the Soviets."  The U.S. should be more confident about Soviet competition in the Third World because Washington holds most of the cards.  He opposes linking Soviet behavior in the Third World to "issues in which we had so fundamental an interest as SALT."  (Garthoff, p. 601)

May 29-30, 1978 - The European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/CMEA) meet in Copenhagen.  (FAC, p. 7)

May 30, 1978 - At a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Vice President of Cuba Carlos Rafael Rodriguez denies Carter's charge that Cuba had foreknowledge of the Zaire invasion.  (NYT 5/31/78)

May 30-31, 1978 - NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Washington, agree to a major Long-Term Defense Program incorporating plans for improving NATO forces as well as increasing real military expenditures 3 percent annually.  In his memoirs, Gromyko cites this decision by NATO as one of the reasons why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan.  (Gromyko, p. 148; Garthoff, pp. 849-850)

May 31, 1978 - Prime Minister of Turkey Bulent Ecevit meets with Carter in Washington.  Carter says he is determined to have Congress repeal the U.S. arms
embargo against Turkey. (NYT 6/1/78)

May 31, 1978 - During a meeting with Vance, Gromyko wonders if the "explosion" of anti-Soviet rhetoric in the U.S. indicates a return to a cold war environment. Vance says that the Soviet arms buildup, Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa, and human rights problems explain the deterioration in relations. The U.S. does not want a cold war, Vance says; the best way to avoid one is to make progress on SALT. Gromyko rejects charges about a Cuban role in Shaba Province and protests the briefing on SALT that Brzezinski recently gave China. He proposes a ban on any new ICBMs for the duration of the treaty. The U.S. is not interested because of plans to develop the MX. (SALT, Cyprus, 5/31/78; Garthoff, p. 816; Vance, p. 101)

June 1978 - At the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR) in Vienna, the Soviets make a major concession by accepting the West's proposal for reductions to a common ceiling of 700,000 ground troops. (Garthoff, p. 765)

June 1978 - Carter issues Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-38 on "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control" calling for a review of the pros and cons of TNF modernization and the development of options. (Garthoff, p. 858)

June 1, 1978 - In response to escalating guerilla pressure on the Somoza regime, the United States releases part of a $12 million aid package to Nicaragua previously withheld because of concerns regarding human rights violations. (FAC, p. 23, Pastor pp. 67-70)

June 2, 1978 - The United States responds to an earlier Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) request for diplomatic relations by issuing a letter through the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that extends official U.S. recognition to the new government of Afghanistan. (Acknowledgement of and Response to DRA Request for U.S. Recognition; Includes DRA Letter, 5/17/78)

June 7, 1978 - Carter makes a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations at the U.S. Naval Academy. After stating that detente is "central to world peace," he declares that "[o]ur long-term objective must be to convince the Soviet Union of cooperation and of the cost of disruptive behavior." He strongly criticizes Soviets human rights abuses and issues a strong challenge to the entire Soviet system: "We want to increase our collaboration with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with the nations of Eastern Europe and with the People's Republic of China. We are particularly dedicated to...self-determination and majority rule" throughout the world. "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice." (Address by the President at the U.S. Naval Academy's Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, 6/7/78; Garthoff, p. 602)

June 8, 1978 - In an attempt to improve U.S.-PRC relations, the Carter Administration reverses an earlier decision and approves the sale of infrared scanning equipment to the PRC that was denied to the Soviet Union. (NYT 6/9/78)
June 8-16, 1978 - ACDA Director Warnke heads the U.S. delegation to the first round of Helsinki talks on banning hunter-killer satellites. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 6/18/78)

June 9, 1978 - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee says the Carter Administration has failed to produce evidence to support charges of Cuban involvement in Zaire. (NYT 6/10/78)

June 12, 1978 - Vance reads a pledge by Carter not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states if they are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or do not acquire such weapons. (Statement by the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 6/12/78)

June 13, 1978 - U.S. businessman F. Jay Crawford is arrested by Soviet police for black market currency operations. (NYT 6/14/78)

June 13, 1978 - Izvestia publishes an article about U.S. diplomat Martha Peterson who a year earlier was apprehended concealing a cache of gold, money, cameras, etc. for a Soviet agent. At the time of the incident, the Soviets have not made public their decision to declare Peterson persona non grata. They are now making the incident public because U.S. espionage activities continue and the U.S. is wrangling with the Soviets over alleged espionage activities by Soviet U.N. employees in the U.S. (see entry for May 20). (Garthoff, p. 613)

June 13-14, 1978 - In Brussels, the United States and a group of industrial nations discuss a $1 billion aid package for Zaire and agree in principle to extend emergency aid. (NYT 6/15/78)

June 15, 1978 - Representatives from Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories brief Carter on the need for further nuclear tests and the difficulties in monitoring small Soviet detonations. This briefing leads Carter to cancel his earlier decision for a total test ban. (Garthoff, p. 757)

June 16, 1978 - When the last French units leave Zaire, the U.S.-Zaire airlift ends. (NYT 6/17/78)

June 17, 1978 - A high-ranking State Department official says the Pravda article detailing the fact that the present course of the United States is full of serious dangers to peace reflects a downward slide in U.S.-USSR relations. (NYT 6/18/78)

June 17, 1978 - According to an article in Pravda, there has been an "acute struggle going for quite a time now in the ruling circles of the United States over detente and relations with the Soviet Union." The U.S. is "whipping up the arms race" and "deliberating worsening bilateral relations with the USSR." The "present course of the United States is fraught with serious dangers...for the entire course of development of international relations." (Garthoff, pp. 604-606)

June 19, 1978 - Vance testifies before the House Committee on International
Relations that detente is a "two way street." The future of the relationship depends on actions by both countries: "As the relationship between our two nations continues to evolve, both sides will continuously be making choices between an emphasis on the divergent elements of our relationship and an emphasis on the cooperative ones." Carter personally approved Vance’s statement. (Garthoff, p. 607)

June 19, 1978 - The U.S. Embassy in Kabul obtains a Dari-language document entitled "Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan." The authenticity of the document is not confirmed. If genuine, the Embassy believes, it would "leave little doubt" as to the Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet nature of the PDPA. The Embassy believes that the document is genuine, but questions its date. It probably predates the coup in April and may be the Party's founding document from 1965. The document states that the PDPA's "ideology is the practical experience of Marxism-Leninism." Since the overthrow of Daud in April, however, Nur Mohammad Taraki has denied that the PDPA is a communist party and says accusations to the contrary stem from "international reactionary circles." ("Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan Proclaims a Belief in Principles of Marxism-Leninism, 6/19/78"

June 20, 1978 - At the opening of the 11th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress, Tito accuses both superpowers of intervention in Africa and Third World countries. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 6/21/78)

June 20, 1978 - In a major speech on Africa, Vance states that the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops in Africa "raises serious concerns," that apartheid in South Africa can only have an adverse impact on relations with the United States and that the United States will increase efforts to promote Zaire-Angola reconciliation. (Address by the Secretary of State Before the Annual Meeting of the U.S. Jaycees, Atlantic City, 6/20/78)

June 22-25, 1978 - The United States holds bilateral talks with the Angolan government at the latter's invitation. The talks are cordial and identify significant areas of agreement and disagreement. The U.S. intends this dialogue to: produce Angolan cooperation toward a settlement in Namibia; improve Angolan-Zairian relations; move toward an internal reconciliation; bring about a withdrawal of Cuban troops; and expand the U.S. dialogue with the Angolans to permit a more "normal" relationship. No date is set for subsequent meetings. (US/Angolan Bilateral Talks in Luanda, 7/6/78)

June 23, 1978 - Responding to questions about the Brzezinski-Vance relationship, U.S.-Soviet relations and Soviet attacks on Brzezinski, Carter states: "I'm the one who shapes the policy after getting advice from him and others." He comments that there is "overwhelming cooperation" between his advisers and that American policy is developed in "complete harmony." The U.S.-Soviet relationship is "stable," Carter maintains, adding that the U.S. aims at cooperation, but "we're not going to let the Soviet Union push us around." (Garthoff, pp. 607-608)

June 24, 1978 - President Ahmad Hussein al-Ghasmi of North Yemen is murdered. Shortly afterwards, President Salem Rubayi Ali of South Yemen is killed by South
Yemeni security forces, which have been trained by Cuba and East Germany. Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, with backing from the Soviet Union, emerges as the new ruler of South Yemen. In July, Carter sends Department of Defense representatives to North Yemen to initiate a new military aid program in an attempt to "counter Soviet influence." The U.S. fears that if North Yemen is weakened, South Yemen will move closer to Moscow. (Garthoff, pp. 655-656)

June 25, 1978 - In Minsk, Brezhnev criticizes the United States for trying to "play China off against the USSR." (FAC, p. 6; NYT 6/26/78)

June 25-26, 1978 - U.S. Ambassador Donald McHenry pays an unofficial visit to Angola. He does not meet with Neto. (NYT 6/27/78)

June 26, 1978 - Soviet citizens Chernyayev and Enger are released to Ambassador Dobrynin and the Soviets agree to surrender Jay Crawford to Ambassador Malcolm Toon. (NYT 6/27/78)


June 29, 1978 - After two U.S. reporters in Moscow are ordered to stand trial on slander charges, the State Department warns the Soviets to "reflect very carefully" on the larger implications of this matter. (Garthoff, p. 622)

June 30, 1978 - Carter signs a letter to Somoza, which calls Somoza's recent moves on human rights "important and heartening signs" and urges him to take further steps toward political reform. ([Complimenting Anastasio Somoza Debayle on Advances in Nicaragua's Human Rights Situation], 6/30/78)

July 1978 - Libya signs an accord with India for nuclear cooperation. The relationship breaks down, however, when India limits that cooperation to peaceful areas. Libya responds by terminating its oil shipments to India. (Spector2, p. 153)

July 1, 1978 - As part of a Cabinet purge, Babrak Karmal is dismissed as Afghanistan's deputy prime minister and named ambassador to Czechoslovakia. (Urban, p. 20)

July 4, 1978 - In an address on Soviet television, Ambassador Toon soft peddles human rights. (FAC, p. 6)

July 10, 1978 - Dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Alexander Ginzburg are put on trial for treason and anti-Soviet agitation. (FBIS, USSR National Affairs, 7/10/78; NYT 7/11/78)

July 12, 1978 - Carter announces plans to review U.S.-Soviet trade, technological and scientific exchange programs. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 7/13/78)

July 12-13, 1978 - Against the background of the Soviet decision to try dissidents
Shecharansky and Ginzburg, Vance and Gromyko meet in Geneva to discuss SALT. Gromyko asks if the recent spate of anti-Soviet rhetoric in the United States signals a change in U.S. policy in Soviet-American relations. On SALT, lengthy discussions bring the two sides closer to overcoming a major stumbling block: whether the agreement will allow both sides to deploy one new type of ICBM (whether MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the treaty period. Vance also tells Gromyko that after the three-year protocol expires, the U.S. will keep the option of deploying the MX. Gromyko objects to any deployment of a mobile MX because of the verification problem it raises. The U.S. also presses for fractionation—that is, limits on reentry vehicles per missile, with various limits for each missile type (e.g. four for the Soviet SS-17 and ten for the MX)—but the issue is not resolved. Another contested matter is the U.S. proposal to exempt conventionally-armed cruise missiles from the agreement. The Soviets object because of the impossibility of distinguishing nuclear-armed missiles from the conventional type. The two sides also discuss limitations on the number of cruise missiles per bomber, the Backfire problem, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On the CTB treaty, the two sides still have trouble reconciling their positions on verification and the term of the treaty. (SALT, First Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/12/78; SALT, Second Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/12/78; Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/13/78; Vance-Gromyko Meeting, SALT; CTB, 7/13/78; Garthoff, pp. 816-817)

July 13, 1978 - In a separate session during their meeting, Vance tells Gromyko that Israel and Egypt have both put forward proposals regarding the West Bank and Gaza, and have advanced propositions for a more general declaration of principles on which to base a comprehensive agreement on the Middle East. (Third Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/13/78)

July 13, 1978 - Alexander Ginzburg is sentenced to eight years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The next day, Anatoly Shecharansky is sentenced to 13 years in prison and labor camps for treason, espionage and "anti-Soviet agitation." (FBIS, USSR National Affairs, 7/14/78; NYT 7/14/78, 7/15/78)

July 15, 1978 - Supported by a Cuban-and Soviet-trained people's militia, Ethiopia launches an offensive against Eritrea. (ICAR1, ICAR2)

July 15, 1978 - Carter approves a sale of $600 million in weapons to Iran. (NYT 7/16/78)

July 18, 1978 - Journalists Whitney and Piper are convicted of libel, ordered to pay a fine and print retraction within five days. They pay their fines in absentia on August 4. (FAC, p. 7)

July 18, 1978 - Because of Soviet repression of dissidents, the U.S. government denies Moscow an export license for a Sperry Univac computer for purchase by TASS and imposes new licensing requirements for the export of equipment for oil and gas exploration. (NYT 7/24/78; Garthoff, p. 611)

July 18-28, 1978 - The United States and the Soviet Union meet in Helsinki to discuss curbing arms sales. (FAC, p. 4)
July 18-19, 1978 - The Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers meet in London. Vance attends the meetings. (Sobel, p. 209)

July 19, 1978 - After a five-year deadlock, MBFR talks recess. (FAC, p. 7)

July 20, 1978 - Around this date, Carter is irritated when he learns that Vance and Blumenthal want new initiatives on trade with the Soviet Union and that Blumenthal favors reconsideration of the recent restrictions on trade with the Soviets. (Brzezinski, p. 325)

July 20, 1978 - The United States confirms requests by the Shah for 70 F-14 fighter jets. (FAC, p. 4)

July 21, 1978 - At a meeting of the Organization of African Unity, Angolan leader Agostinho Neto expresses hope for diplomatic ties with the United States, but not at the expense of Cuban withdrawal. (FAC, p. 18)

July 25, 1978 - PD/NSC-36, "Nuclear Weapons Policy," is issued. The directive changes the primary objective of U.S. nuclear targeting from economic targets to military and political ones. (Richelson)


July 31, 1978 - Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev indicts U.S. efforts to use trade "as an instrument for political pressures on the Soviet Union." (Garthoff, p. 611)

August 1, 1978 - A front-page article in The Washington Post, headlined "Carter Letter to Somoza Stirs Human Rights Row," states that the June 30 letter was intended to "give Somoza an encouraging pat on the back" and that "State Department officials are concerned that revelation of the letter...will raise questions about the credibility and sensitivity of the Administration's human rights policy." The article concludes that Carter's human rights aims "seemed to veer back and forth, drawing charges that its policy toward Somoza is confusing, inconsistent, and ineffective." (WP 8/1/78)

August 15, 1978 - Alexander Podrabinik is sentenced to five years of internal exile for reporting Soviet psychiatric abuses. (FAC, p. 7)

August 17, 1978 - In a message to the House of Representatives, Carter announces his veto of the defense authorization bill, which cuts $800 million from military programs affecting U.S. NATO contributions. (Message To The House of Representatives Returning H.R. 10929 Without Approval, PPP, Vol. II, 1978, p. 1447; FAC, p. 7)

August 22, 1978 - The United States and the USSR issue a joint communiqué on banning chemical weapons. (FAC, p. 5)
August 25, 1978 - Ex-CIA employee William Kampiles is indicted for selling documents on spy satellites to Soviet agents in Athens. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 8/26/78)

August 25, 1978 - Among other Senators, Robert Byrd requests that any SALT agreement be submitted as a treaty. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 8/26/78)

August 29, 1978 - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Vary Vaky convenes the first interagency meeting to address the crisis in Nicaragua. There is general agreement that unless a moderate coalition government replaces Somoza there will be a marked political polarization in the country leading to a Marxist victory by the FSLN. Vaky insists that the United States must take the lead in assembling the coalition government. (Pastor, p. 79)

September 1978 - Comprehensive test ban talks falter after Carter reverses the U.S. position by labelling small nuclear tests as "experiments" and considering them permissible under a test ban. (Garthoff, p. 616)

September 1978 - The cabinet-level Special Coordination Committee establishes a U.S. position supporting the modernization of NATO's long-range nuclear forces. After this decision, Brzezinski meets with officials in London, Rome and Paris to ascertain European thinking. He informs the Europeans that the U.S. perceives no military necessity for modernization but will support it if it addresses European political and security concerns. (Garthoff, p. 858)

September-October 1978 - During SALT discussions, Gromyko offers to remove the 2,500-kilometer limit on strategic ALCMs on condition that the U.S. accept a 600-kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs and on applying limits to all ALCMs. This, Gromyko argues, would be the only way to secure a verifiable agreement on cruise missiles. The Carter Administration becomes interested in the Soviet position. Moreover, the U.S. decides to accept Soviet assurances on the Backfire and to hold the option of developing a comparable U.S. bomber, an extended-range version of the FB-111. The two sides also agree on a Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva just before Christmas and begin to plan tentatively for a summit in mid-January 1979. (Garthoff, pp. 818-819)

September 3, 1978 - Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) starts a six-day visit to the USSR, where he holds a secret meeting with dissidents. (FAC, p. 7)

September 6-17, 1978 - Carter, Sadat, and Begin meet at Camp David to negotiate a framework for Middle East peace.

September 7, 1978 - Jay Crawford is convicted following a trial that began on September 5 and is given a five-year suspended sentence. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 9/8/78)

September 7, 1978 - In Tehran and several other cities, the Iranian government declares martial law for a six-month period. The next day, massive protests break out in response. (NYT 9/9/78, 9/10/78)
September 7, 1978 - Congressman Robert Sikes is critical of continued delays in U.S. military and economic assistance to Somalia and North Yemen, stating that a potential threat to oil supplies exists in the Middle East. (ICAR4)

September 7-8, 1978 - Warnke, in Moscow, tells the Soviets that the U.S. is ready for the "endgame" for SALT II, the final stage in the negotiating process. The Soviets are doubtful. The key elements in the new U.S. negotiating package are: deployment of one new type of ICBM by each side, no limits on SLBM testing and deployment, a freeze on the number of warheads carried on each type of existing MIRVed ICBM, a limit of 10 warheads on the one new ICBM allowed, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs and a ban on heavy mobile missiles. Warnke asks for Soviet assurance on Backfire capabilities and production rates. (Vance, p. 105)

September 9, 1978 - After months of isolated engagements, full-scale battles between the National Guard and FSLN commandos and supporters begin in Nicaragua. (Nicaragua)

September 14, 1978 - Somoza places the entire country under martial law for 30 days. (Nicaragua)

September 17, 1978 - Fighting between Sandinista forces and the National Guard spills over the border into Costa Rica. (Nicaragua)


September 17-18, 1978 - U.S. Special Envoy William Jorden begins an eight-country diplomatic tour of Latin America to gauge official sentiments toward a mediation process for the crisis in Nicaragua. (Pastor, pp. 84-87)

September 18, 1978 - The three-power meeting of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR on a comprehensive test ban, which began on January 23, resumes. (FAC, p. 5)

September 19, 1978 - The Egyptian Cabinet unanimously approves the Camp David agreements. (Sobel, p. 230)

September 20, 1978 - South African Prime Minister John Vorster resigns and takes on the role of president. Initial reports attribute the move to health reasons, but later analyses indicate that Vorster was forced to step down following a scandal involving Department of Information use of funds for unauthorized political purposes. (WP 9/21/78)

September 20, 1978 - In response to the Camp David Accords, Brezhnev recommends that Carter use the Geneva Conference format rather than the Camp David format. Gromyko also reacts to the Accords saying the Israelis benefitted from the meeting while Sadat and the Arabs "gained nothing." (Carter, pp. 406-407)
September 21-24, 1978 - Vance travels to the Middle East to seek Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, and Syrian support for the Camp David Accords. (Sobel, p. 227)

September 22, 1978 - Brezhnev assails the Camp David Accords as "a separate collusion that covers up the surrender of one side and consolidates the fruits of aggression on the other," adding that the accords "can only make the situation in the Middle East even more explosive." (Sobel, p. 227)

September 22, 1978 - Carter transmits the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Uses of Environmental Modification Techniques that was signed in Geneva on May 18, 1977, to the Senate. He says the convention "represents one more advance in the field of arms control. (Message From the President to the Senate, 9/22/78)

September 22, 1978 - The U.S. Senate passes by voice vote an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill, which prohibits funding for assistance to Nicaragua and Afghanistan unless it "serve[s] to promote democratic process" in those countries. The bill is expected to pass quickly. (Senate Amendment on Aid to Afghanistan, 9/22/78)

September 26, 1978 - Vance adviser Marshall Shulman testifies before the House International Relations Committee on the U.S. and Soviet reasons for reducing and controlling tensions. He discusses the role of differences in U.S.-Soviet perceptions in contributing to misunderstanding and tensions. Shulman reaffirms the necessity for both countries to curb politico-military competition and to establish cooperation on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the situation. (Garthoff, pp. 615-616)

September 26, 1978 - Public Law 95-384 states the "sense of the Congress that further withdrawal of ground forces of the United States from the Republic of Korea may seriously risk upsetting the military balance in that region and requires full advance consultation with the Congress. The legislation requires the President to notify Congress of the effect of any future plans to redeploy American troops on both Koreas, on military and economic relations with Japan, on the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese military balance and on the Soviet-Chinese military situation. (Public Law 95-384, 9/26/78)

September 27-28, 1978 - At the time Gromyko and Vance hold another meeting in New York, relations are improving. Soviet dissidents are receiving lighter sentences and Jewish emigration is at its highest level. The Soviets do not object to Washington's efforts to normalize relations with China as long as they do not appear to be anti-Soviet. Gromyko insists that SALT include a strict, straight-line range limit of 600 kilometers for GLCMs and SLCMs. Vance accepts this limit because it will hold for only three years. Gromyko asks why cruise missile limitations cannot be incorporated into the treaty itself instead of just into the protocol. He also offers to remove the 2,500-kilometer limit on strategic ALCMs on the conditions (1) that the U.S. accept a 600-kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs and (2) that there be limits on the total number of ALCMs and on the number of ALCMs per bomber. Gromyko argues that is the only way to secure a verifiable agreement on cruise
missiles. The two also make progress on new missile types, Backfire, MIRVing of
cruise missiles, and implementation dates. Vance and Gromyko also debate the
U.S. decision to end the bilateral talks on the arms race and naval deployments in
the Indian Ocean area. Gromyko expresses disapproval of the Camp David
agreement. (Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting on SALT, 9/28/78; Garthoff, pp. 818-
819; Vance, p. 106; Carter, pp. 231-232; McLellan, p. 120)

September 28, 1978 - Defense Minister Pieter Botha becomes prime minister of
South Africa. Vorster becomes the president, replacing Nicholas Diedericks, who
died on August 21. (NYT 9/29/78)

September 28, 1978 - The United States approves a $56.5 million sale in oil
equipment to the USSR. (FAC, p. 7)

September 28, 1978 - The Israeli Knesset approves the Camp David Agreements by
a vote of 84-19, with 17 abstentions. (Sobel, p. 231)

September 28-December 14, 1978 - The MBFR holds its winter session. (FAC, p. 7)

(PD/NCS-41), "Civil Defense." The next document in the series, PD-42, is entitled
"Civil and Further National Space Policy." Its creation date is unknown.
(Richelson)

Fall 1978 - The Soviets move to resume talks on Indian Ocean demilitarization, but
the U.S. declines the offer. (Garthoff, p. 762)

Fall 1978 - Increasingly, Carter Administration officials feel that unless a SALT
agreement is reached soon, the negotiations will collapse. Carter hopes that
progress made at Camp David on Middle East issues will help create momentum for
SALT. (Garthoff, pp. 817-818)

Late 1978 - The White House produces Presidential Directive-43 (PD/NCS-43),
"S&T [Science and technology] Cooperation with China." (Richelson)

October 1978 - The Mitre Corporation's study on breeder reactors, "Nuclear Power
Issues and Choices," is reviewed by Soviet officials. Their reaction is that it is a
"covert attempt to slow breeder development in other countries and thereby retain
the U.S. monopolistic position...." (Soviet Views on Nuclear Energy and Non-
Proliferation, 10/3/78)

October 1978 - The HLG delineates several TNF modernization options, including
GLCMs, SLCMs and extended range Pershing missiles. (Garthoff, p. 859)

October 1978 - "The fourth-ranking man in the Soviet Politburo," (thought to be
Andrei Kirilenko) visits Kabul, according to East German Ambassador to
Afghanistan Hermann Schwiesau. (High-Level Soviet Visitor Reportedly Visited Kabul
Last October, 8/8/79; High Level Soviet Politburo Member Visited Amemb Kabul Last
October, 8/14/79)
October 1978 - Ian Smith, the leader of white minority regime in Rhodesia, visits the United States to lobby for repeal of the trade embargo and to call attention to Soviet support behind the guerrilla opposition in Rhodesia. (Smith, p. 141)

October-December, 1978 - As fighting in Nicaragua continues, Somoza negotiates with the opposition but the two sides are unable to reach a substantive agreement. (Nicaragua)

October 1, 1978 - Carter concedes that the U.S. uses spy satellites. (FAC, p. 5)

October 3, 1978 - A newly-formed OAS mediation team meets in Guatemala to attempt a settlement of the Nicaraguan civil war. (Nicaragua)

October 6, 1978 - Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini arrives in Paris from Baghdad. (NYT 10/7/78)

October 9, 1978 - The U.N. Disarmament Conference opens its first session in New York. (FAC, p. 5)

October 10, 1978 - ACDA Director Warnke announces that he will resign as chief U.S. arms negotiator on October 31. Carter names retired General George Seignious as his replacement on October 20. ACDA Deputy Director Ralph Earle takes over the SALT talks in Geneva. (NYT 10/10/78, 10/21/78; Garthoff, p. 818)

October 12, 1978 - Egypt and Israel open negotiations for a bilateral peace treaty. (Sobel, p. 236)

October 12, 1978 - Somoza extends martial law until April 30, 1979. (Nicaragua)

October 13, 1978 - Soviet officials Chernyayev and Enger are convicted of espionage, dismissed from the United Nations on October 19 and sentenced to 50 years in prison on October 30. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 10/15/78)

October 13, 1978 - Eighty-six members of Congress sign a letter to Vance urging the Carter Administration to "suspend all aid to the Nicaraguan government" for fear the aid would send "a misleading message of support" for Somoza. (Pastor, pp. 98-99)

October 13, 1978 - Carter, Vance, Warnke and Brzezinski agree on a procedure for handling the Backfire issue. Carter insists on a written statement that the Soviets are producing 30 Backfire annually; he rejects oral confirmation because "Gromyko is a liar [and] is the only person with whom he has dealt in international affairs who is a liar." To see how the Soviets react, Warnke proposes, and Carter agrees, that the proposed letters will be given to the Soviets as "illustrative." (Brzezinski, p. 328)

October 16, 1978 - Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Poland is elected the 264th Pontiff and takes the name John Paul II. (Pastor, 268)
Mid-Late October 1978 - It is revealed that the government of Pakistan has engaged in a secret effort to build a uranium enrichment plant capable of producing weapons-grade uranium. (Spector2, p. 41; PK [Pakistan] Nuclear Intentions, 10/23/78)

October 18, 1978 - Carter announces that crucial components for a neutron bomb will be produced. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 10/19/78)

October 21-24, 1978 - Vance meets with Gromyko in Moscow but the talks produce "little movement," according to Vance. (Vance, p. 107; Garrison)

October 23, 1978 - The USSR tests a cruise-like missile. (FAC, p. 5)

October 23, 1978 - Brown sends a memorandum to Carter that the Soviets are supplying MiG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba. His purpose is to alert the President to the domestic political sensitivity of the MiGs not because they bear any special military significance. (Garthoff, pp. 618-619)

Late October 1978 - The Mitre Corporation's study on breeder reactors, "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices," is reviewed by Soviet officials. Their reaction is that it is a "covert attempt to slow breeder development in other countries and thereby retain the U.S. monopolistic position...." (Soviet Views on Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, 10/3/78)

October 27, 1978 - King Khalid of Saudi Arabia visits Carter in Washington. (FAC, p. 3)

October 30, 1978 - The United States discloses that Cuba received up to 20 MiG-23 jets from the Soviet Union in early October. (FAC, p. 22)

October 31, 1978 - At a meeting in Washington with Crown Prince Reza of Iran, Carter expresses his support for the Shah. (NYT 11/1/78)

October 31, 1978 - In an address before a conference on U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Department of State Director of Policy Planning Anthony Lake outlines measures taken by the United States to encourage peaceful change in South Africa, including: 1) demonstration of the U.S. belief in racial equality; 2) involvement in issues of concern to the black South African community; 3) encouragement of peaceful settlement of the Namibian and Rhodesian situations; and 4) warnings that a lack of progress will alienate South Africa and lead to a deterioration in U.S.-South African relations. (Basic Documents, pp. 1186-1189)

Late October 1978 - Vance and Gromyko continue SALT discussions in Moscow. Before Vance's arrival, Warnke and Soviet negotiator Vladimir Semenov agree that missile telemetry that is relevant to treaty verification is not permissible. When Vance arrives, he tells Gromyko that the Soviets missed an opportunity to achieve a SALT agreement when Carter made his proposal to put limits on cruise missile ranges. During the discussion Semenov retracts the agreement on telemetry with Warnke and Gromyko denies that telemetry has any bearing on the treaty. The next
morning, Warnke and Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko resume discussion of telemetry, with the Soviets emphasizing the legitimacy of encryption while Warnke stresses the need to restrict it. Before Vance leaves, he informs Brezhnev that Carter wants an early summit meeting. Brezhnev replies that a summit depends on settling all SALT issues. (Vance, pp. 107-109; Garthoff, p. 818)

November 1, 1978 - The Soviet Union and the PLO assail the Camp David Accords in a joint communiqué. (Sobel, p. 234)

November 1, 1978 - At a news conference, Vance says there will be no arms sales to the PRC. (FAC, p. 4)

November 3, 1978 - The Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a treaty of friendship. (Garthoff, p. 618)

November 7, 1978 - During a speech, Hafizullah Amin describes the Saur Revolution of April 1978 as an "historical extension of the Great October Revolution" in Russia in 1917. (Afghan-Soviet Relations on the Eve of Taraki's Trip to Moscow, 12/6/78)

November 11, 1978 - Carter criticizes the failure of the CIA to predict foreign crises and developments. Administration aides later leak his complaint to the press. (FAC, p. 2; NYT 11/23/78)

November 12, 1978 - Carter's approval of a $3 billion increase in funding for civil defense is disclosed. (FAC, p. 5)

November 15, 1978 - Press leaks about the October 23 Brown memorandum on the Soviet MiGs in Cuba cause a political uproar and lead to Vance-Dobrynin meetings in which the Soviets provide assurances that the jets are not nuclear capable. (Garthoff, p. 618)

November 16, 1978 - The United States announces that reconnaissance flights over Cuba will resume. (NYT 11/17/78)

November 17, 1978 - Brezhnev writes to Carter concerning Iran. (Garrison)

November 17, 1978 - Vance and Dobrynin discuss the presence of MiGs in Cuba. (NYT 11/19/78)

November 19, 1978 - In a formal response to a warning from Brezhnev not to intervene in Iran, Vance denies any U.S. intention to do so. (FAC, p. 16)

November 20, 1978 - Ethiopia launches another offensive against Eritrea. (ICAR1)

November 20, 1978 - The Soviets sign a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia. (Garthoff, p. 618)

November 21-23, 1978 - Donald McHenry and Ambassador Moose visit Angola.
November 22, 1978 - Carter responds to Brezhnev's November 17 letter on Iran. (Garrison)

November 22-23, 1978 - At the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow, Ceausescu refuses to increase Romania's contribution to the Warsaw Pact and to sign the pro-Arab declaration. (FAC, p. 8; NYT 11/28/78)

November 27, 1978 - Brezhnev promotes several allies at a Central Committee meeting, including Konstantin Chernenko. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 11/28/78)

November 28, 1978 - Carter rejects a proposal by Vance, Kreps and Blumenthal for a review of U.S.-Soviet trade policy in order to lift restrictions on exports and expand economic cooperation. (Garthoff, p. 611; Brzezinski, pp. 324-325)

November 29, 1978 - Carter issues a statement defining further "qualitative and quantitative" standards governing U.S. arms transfers. (Basic Documents, p. 201)

November 30, 1978 - In a press conference, Carter states that Soviet authorities have provided assurances against any violation of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis settlement and that there is no evidence of any nuclear weapons in Cuba. (PPP, 1978, II, p. 1721)

November 30, 1978 - Vance urges South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha to respond "quickly and affirmatively" to an Angolan invitation to discuss the demilitarization of the Namibian/Angolan border. Vance believes these discussions have considerable merit for the early implementation of U.N. Resolution 435. (South African/Angolan Relations, 12/1/78)

Late 1978 - Ahmed el Shahat, head of the Foreign Liaison Office of the Libyan People's Congress, states "unequivocally that Libya is seeking nuclear weapons." (Spector2, pp. 154)

December 1978 - The CAT talks collapse after internal State Department-NSC disagreement and U.S.-Soviet disputes over the problem of defining which regions of the world should be subject to restraints on conventional military sales. (Garthoff, p. 761)

December 1978 - A U.S. study team is sent to the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area to look into the availability of base facilities in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia and Kenya. The facilities are needed for the prospective Rapid Deployment Force. (Garthoff, p. 974)

December 1978 - The U.S. turns down a Soviet suggestion to resume the suspended talks on Indian Ocean arms limitations. (Garthoff, p. 620)

Early December 1978 - Carter Administration officials work out a method for handling telemetry under SALT. Although CIA Director Stansfield Turner strongly
supports an outright ban on telemetry encryption, U.S. negotiators will simply provide the Soviets with an example of the encryption of a missile test in July that is incompatible with the U.S. interpretation of restraint on encryption. (Brzezinski, p. 329; Garthoff, p. 819)

**Early December 1978** - Plans for a SALT summit in Washington during the week of January 15, 1979 are leaked to the press. (Garthoff, p. 819)

**December 4-7, 1978** - Owing to improvements in the human rights situation, a trip to Moscow by Kreps and Blumenthal marks the end of the boycott on high-level non-arms control contacts imposed the previous summer. Kreps and Blumenthal also announce approval of sales of some of the oil-drilling equipment originally denied in August. (Garthoff, p. 615)

**December 5, 1978** - Afghanistan and the Soviet Union conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation. The treaty, signed by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Brezhnev in Moscow, envisions a 20-year commitment for "cooperation in the military field." Taraki vows at the same time that Afghanistan will remain nonaligned. The treaty allows Afghanistan to call on Soviet military assistance if needed. State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter III says that "our initial reaction is that the treaty seems to reaffirm the basic thrust of previous agreements between the USSR and Afghanistan," but officials acknowledge in private that U.S. concern is greater than official statements indicate. (Garthoff, p. 901; Anwar, p. 152; NYT 12/6/78; BS 12/7/78)

**December 5-15, 1978** - In Mexico city, the United States and the Soviet Union hold the fourth round of talks on limiting conventional arms sales. (*Joint Communique by the United States and the Soviet Union, Mexico City, 12/19/78*)

**December 6, 1978** - While at a ceremony commemorating the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Carter urges the Senate to ratify the 1925 International Genocide Convention. (*Address by the President Before a Group of Human and Civil Rights Leaders at the White House, 12/6/78*)

**December 8-9, 1978** - Blumenthal visits Romania. There, he reaffirms the importance to the United States of Romanian independence and friendship and expresses support for Romania's dispute with the Soviet Union. (NYT 12/9/78)

**December 14, 1978** - China conducts an atmospheric nuclear test. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 12/24/78)

**December 15, 1978** - Brzezinski meets with Dobrynin and shocks him by telling him "out of the blue" that the U.S. will, that same day, issue a communiqué with China announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations as of January 1. Dobrynin's "face turned kind of gray and his jaw dropped." (McLellan, p. 122; Garthoff, p. 708)

**December 15, 1978** - Carter announces that China and the United States have agreed to establish diplomatic ties on January 1. (*Joint Communiqué Issued by the United States and the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 12/15/78*)
December 19, 1978 - During a television interview, Carter tells Walter Cronkite that he has just received a personal message from Brezhnev that is "very positive in tone." He observes that "without any doubt our new relationship with China will not put any additional obstacles in the way of a successful SALT agreement and also will not endanger our good relationships with the Soviet Union." If the SALT talks in Geneva are successful, Carter will invite Brezhnev to come to Washington in mid-January. (NYT 12/20/78; Garthoff, p. 620)

December 20, 1978 - Tass rebuts Carter's statement of the previous day. Brezhnev's letter did not object to the normalization of relations with China, according to the report, but it did express concern about the direction of U.S.-Chinese relations and objected to the anti-hegemony clause in the joint U.S.-China statement. In any event, the Soviets want to delay a summit until after Carter has met with Deng Xiaoping. (Garthoff, p. 620)

December 21-23, 1978 - Vance and Gromyko meet in Geneva where they discuss a possible summit meeting in mid-January at which a SALT agreement could be signed. New issues develop, however, that slow the completion of an agreement. Gromyko raises the question of remote-piloted drone vehicles. Vance requests authorization for agreement on two issues—one of which is encryption of missile test telemetry—resolution of which would expedite a mid-January summit. By this point, Gromyko will concede that the Soviets have the right to encrypt wherever it does not impede verification. Vance is willing to accept this formula but Carter and Brzezinski reaffirm the harder line position that was approved earlier in the month. The U.S. is demanding that the Soviets accept a compromise that would give it the right to challenge telemetry encryption under the treaty. Gromyko is perturbed by the reference in the U.S.-China communique on "mutual opposition to hegemony." He asks Vance to tell Carter that "[i]n the view of the Soviet leadership all this resembled some sort of political game on the broadest possible scale." Vance responds that the U.S. is not aiming its China policy at anyone and that Washington would be even-handed regarding the transfer of non-military technology to China. (McLellan, pp. 120, 122; Garthoff, pp. 619, 819; Vance, pp. 110-111)

December 20, 1978 - In an address to the Foreign Policy Association in Washington, D.C., Brzezinski says the SALT treaty will not weaken U.S. security, but he expresses concern over the Soviet build-up of forces in Europe and over the stability of countries around the Indian Ocean. (NYT 12/21/78)

December 21, 1978 - The Soviets publish the full text of Brezhnev's message to Carter of December 19, which the U.S. president called "positive." The point is to show that the letter raised questions about the U.S. relationship with the PRC. (NYT 12/22/78)

December 21, 1978 - The U.S. abstains on a vote in the U.N. General Assembly favoring sanctions against South Africa for its "defiance" of a U.N.-supervised election process in Namibia. The measure passes without a single negative vote. (CRS4, p. 20)
Late 1978 - By this time, some 30,000 Soviet Jews have been allowed to emigrate, nearly double the average for the four preceding years. (Garthoff, p. 615)

December 27, 1978 - Carter receives a letter from Brezhnev who warns that SALT II might be jeopardized if the U.S. fails to stop its European allies from selling weapons to China. (McLellan, p. 123)

December 29, 1978 - Shahpour Bakhtiar is named prime minister of Iran. (FAC, p. 44)
1979

1979 - Carter approves $500 million in assistance to Poland. (Brzezinski, p. 299)

January 1979 - During the State of the Union address, Carter invites Brezhnev to a summit meeting. (Garthoff, p. 729)

January 1979 - Carter sends to Congress his report on U.S. government actions regarding non-proliferation, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/79)

January 1979 - At the western summit meeting at Guadaloupe, Giscard d'Estaing, Callaghan, Schmidt and Carter discuss SALT and European defense issues. Schmidt promises to accept long-range TNF missiles in Germany as long as his is not the only European country to do so. He also pushes for a parallel program to negotiate arms limitations as a way to offset domestic opposition and to further detente. Giscard concurs and Callaghan offers to participate in the program. Callaghan states that it will be necessary to include European medium-range nuclear delivery systems in SALT III. (Garthoff, pp. 859-860; Carter, p. 235)

January 1979 - A group called "Americans for SALT" announces that it will lobby for ratification of the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 730)

January-April 1979 - While Brezhnev and Carter correspond over SALT issues, especially the encryption question, Vance and Dobrynin hold a number of meetings to resolve technical issues such as limits on missile testing and allowable number of MIRVs. In a major breakthrough, the Soviets agree that key parameters of existing ICBM types cannot be changed more than 5 percent. In return, the U.S. gives up the right to test multiple warheads on long range ALCMs, SLCMs and GLCMs during the terms of the protocol. (Vance, pp. 134-135; Garthoff, pp. 820-821)

January 1, 1979 - The United States and China formally resume ties. (NYT 1/2/79)

January 1-9, 1979 - Ethiopia launches its third offensive against Eritrea. (ICAR1)

January 2, 1979 - In his first public appearance in two months, the Shah of Iran announces that he is willing to take a vacation as soon as the government of Prime Minister-Designate Bakhtiar is firmly in place. (FAC, p. 44)

January 5, 1979 - The co-sponsor of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade to Soviet emigration policies, Representative Charles Vanik, says he might favor removing curbs for the Soviet Union. (FAC, p. 37)

January 5, 1979 - Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe Gen. Robert Huyser begins a month-long series of meetings in Iran with military leaders. (FAC, p. 44)
January 5, 1979 - PRM/NCS-44, "Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum FY 1980-82," is completed. (Richelson)

January 6, 1979 - Bakhtiar and his 14-man civilian cabinet are installed in Iran. From Paris, Khomeini requests that workers disobey the new government and calls for a national day of mourning in memory of the 2,000 killed in the struggle against the Shah in 1978. (NYT 1/7/79)

January 10, 1979 - Despite the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations, Brezhnev tells a group of visiting U.S. Senators that he wants to sign the SALT II accord quickly. (NYT 1/11/79)

January 11, 1979 - Vance tells reporters that the Administration supports the Regency Council, formed by the Shah, with Shahpour Bakhtiar as the prime minister. (Statement and Replies by the Secretary of State to Questions Asked at a News Conference, 1/11/79)

January 14, 1979 - Carter announces that he will send SALT II to the Senate as a treaty instead of an executive agreement. He warns the Senate that failure to sign the treaty will harm U.S.-Soviet relations. (NYT 1/15/79)

January 16, 1979 - The Shah of Iran and Empress Farah leave Iran for Aswan, Egypt. (NYT 1/17/79)

January 17, 1979 - Carter responds to Brezhnev's December 27 letter about U.S. allies selling arms to China. (Garrison)

January 19, 1979 - In response to Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe, NATO reports that it is considering deploying new intermediate-range U.S. missiles. (NYT 1/20/79)

January 22, 1979 - In a meeting between former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Khomeini, the Ayatollah expresses hope that the United States will not intervene in Iran. (NYT 1/23/79)

January 22, 1979 - The Carter Administration's budget is released. It includes the 3 percent increase in defense spending for NATO promised in 1978 and steps to strengthen U.S. capabilities in Western Europe. (NYT 1/23/79)

January 22, 1979 - India and the Soviet Union sign an agreement for scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (CRS3, p. 13)

January 23-February 16, 1979 - The United States and the Soviet Union meet in Bern for the second round of ASAT talks. (Garthoff, p. 760)

January 24, 1979 - At the invitation of the Soviet Union, the Pope meets with Gromyko. (FAC, p. 34)
January 25, 1979 - Carter discloses a mid-January promise to Brezhnev that the United States will not sell arms to Taiwan. (NYT 1/26/79)

January 25, 1979 - In his military posture statement for FY 1980, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones stresses the danger of Soviet advances in strategic and conventional forces and asks Congress to support an increase in military spending to be able to match or surpass Soviet capabilities. He states that the Soviet "emphasis on military power threatens to upset the delicate balance of stability in the global power arena." (Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/25/79)

January 26, 1979 - The NSC's Policy Review Committee meets to evaluate the impasse in Nicaragua. There is a consensus, according to Robert Pastor's account of the meeting, that the longer Somoza stays in power the higher the chances are of a Sandinista takeover, although CIA Director Stansfield Turner reports that Somoza has a better than even chance to stay in power until 1981. The Committee agrees to impose symbolic sanctions against Somoza, including voting against multilateral loans to Nicaragua and withdrawing the U.S. Military Group. (Pastor, p. 116)

January 29-February 1, 1979 - Deng Xiaoping meets with Carter in Washington and the U.S. re-establishes full relations with the PRC. During the visit, Carter authorizes Brzezinski to begin special talks on intelligence coordination that eventually culminate in an agreement on collecting technical intelligence on Soviet missile tests. On first day of the talks, Time magazine publishes Deng’s comments: “We must proceed from the establishment of a united front against hegemonism,” that is, a united front against the Soviet Union. Also during the talks, Deng states that China is going to teach a "lesson" to Soviet-allied Vietnam. (Garthoff, p. 718-721)

February-April 1979 - While Brezhnev and Carter correspond over SALT issues, especially the encryption question, Vance and Dobrynin hold a number of meetings to resolve technical issues such as limits on missile testing and allowable number of MIRVs. (Garthoff, pp. 820-821)

February 1979 - During the Iranian revolution, the U.S. loses significant technical intelligence monitoring stations. The loss of these stations, important for monitoring Soviet missile tests, later causes senators such as John Glenn (D-Ohio) to refuse to support the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 940; Vance, p. 354)

February 1, 1979 - In a joint communique, Deng Xiaoping and Carter state that they will continue strengthening their friendly relations and cooperation and that both countries are "opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or domination over others." (Joint Press Communiqué Issued at Washington, D.C., by the President and the Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2/1/79; Garthoff, p. 720)

February 6, 1979 - At the U.N. Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the Soviet Union and six Warsaw Pact allies propose ending nuclear weapons production and gradually eliminating stockpiles. (NYT 2/7/79)

February 8, 1979 - The United States announces the end of military aid to Nicaragua and the reduction of some economic aid. (NYT 2/9/79)

February 8, 1979 - Over one million Iranian marchers, joined by the military, call for Shahpour Bakhtiar's resignation in favor of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. (NYT 2/9/79)

February 8, 1979 - Vance instructs the AID mission in Nicaragua to reduce the size and scope of its operations. (Nicaragua)

March 8-13, 1979 - In an effort to work through the final obstacles to a peace agreement, Carter meets with Sadat and Begin in Cairo and Jerusalem. (Sobel, p. 248)

February 9, 1979 - Harold Brown issues his annual defense report. It changes the previous policy focus, emphasizing the ability of U.S. forces to respond to any level of Soviet attack. (NYT 2/10/79)

February 9, 1979 - Carter announces that his planned troop withdrawal from South Korea will be held in abeyance pending an assessment of recent developments in the region and a review of North Korea's military situation. (Question and Answer Session with Editors and News Directors, 2/9/79)

February 10, 1979 - The U.S. Defense Department confirms that Cuba received a Soviet submarine on February 7 and two torpedo boats on February 9. (NYT 2/11/79)

February 11, 1979 - After the Iranian army withdraws its support of Bakhtiar's government, he resigns. Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and SAVAK chief Nematollah Nassiri are seized by armed civilians. About 11,000 political prisoners escape from jail. (NYT 2/12/79)

February 14, 1979 - Leftist guerrillas attack the U.S. Embassy in Iran, trapping Ambassador William Sullivan and his staff. They are later freed by Khomeini forces. (NYT 2/15/79)

February 14, 1979 - U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs is kidnapped and taken by force to a room at the Kabul Hotel where he is later killed during a rescue attempt by Afghan security forces. U.S. officials had explicitly asked that no action be taken before consulting them. Later, despite repeated requests, authorities refuse to allow U.S. officials to examine the "rescue" scene. The United States is convinced that the Soviet advisers on the scene refused to let U.S. diplomats negotiate for Dubs. One week later, the Carter Administration decides to make deep cuts in the U.S. aid program for Afghanistan because of the killing. The aid cuts are decided upon to protest the incident and because of the "abysmal"
human-rights record" of the leftist government. (The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, 2/80; WP 2/22/79)

**February 15, 1979** - The United States issues a formal protest to the Soviet Union about Soviet anti-American activities in Iran. It states that such activities and the possible Soviet connection to the murder of Ambassador Dubs in Afghanistan could strain relations and delay the conclusion of SALT. (NYT 2/16/79)

**February 17, 1979** - China invades Vietnam. At the outset, the U.S. sends a note on the hot line recommending that the Soviet Union not take any steps that could worsen the situation. The U.S. indicates it would also exercise restraint. Soviet leaders respond with accusations of U.S. complicity in the incursion. (Garthoff, pp. 721, 723; Carter, p. 237)

**February 19, 1979** - Kabul rejects the U.S. protest over Dubs’ February 14 murder and denies allegations of a Soviet advisory role in his death. (NYT 2/20/79)

**February 20, 1979** - In a speech at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Carter states that the events in Iran, Afghanistan and Southeast Asia will not mandate a revision in U.S. policy. He warns other countries, namely the Soviet Union, against interfering in Iran. (Address by the President at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 2/20/79, NYT 2/21/79)

**February 23, 1979** - White House Press Secretary Jody Powell confirms the Administration's intention to match Soviet limits on strategic weapons even if the Senate does not ratify the SALT treaty. (NYT 2/24/79)

**February 24, 1979** - Vance meets with Dobrynin and cautions against Soviet military involvement in the Vietnam conflict. (Garthoff, p. 724)

**February 25, 1979** - In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador to Iran Vladimir Vinogradov, Khomeini stresses his policy of nonalignment with foreign nations. (NYT 2/26/79)

**February 26, 1979** - During his Supreme Soviet election speech, Gromyko criticizes the U.S. for "playing--to put it mildly--the 'China card'....If this is being done to pressure the Soviet Union, such attempts are futile and can only yield the opposite effect." His basic point is to warn the U.S. against Chinese exploitation of U.S. support. The same day, a Radio Moscow commentator warns against a Chinese plan to precipitate a U.S.-Soviet war. (Garthoff, p. 725)

**February 27, 1979** - The Soviets are angered by Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal's visit to Beijing during the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. (Garthoff, p. 722)

**February 28, 1979** - Brzezinski proposes to Carter that a "consultative security framework" be established for Southwest Asia as the basis for reasserting U.S. influence. This contributes to the promulgation, 11 months later, of a policy for U.S. involvement in the region that comes to be known as the "Carter Doctrine." (WP
February 28, 1979 - The United States accelerates deliveries of defensive arms previously committed to North Yemen in response to requests by that government.  
*(Statement Issued by the Department of State, 2/28/79)*

March 1, 1979 - Some 2,400 U.S. scientists pledge to restrict cooperation with the Soviet Union until dissidents Shcharansky and Orlov are released.  
*(NYT 3/2/79)*

March 1, 1979 - The Senate confirms George Seignious as director of ACDA.  
*(NYT 3/2/79)*

March 1, 1979 - The State and Defense Departments announce that the listening post in Kebban, Iran, is now closed. Some officials say that this will damage the ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty; State Department officials deny this.  
*(NYT 3/2/79)*

March 2, 1979 - During his election speech, Brezhnev responds favorably to Carter's summit invitation and says he is optimistic about prospects for a SALT agreement.  
*(Garthoff, p. 725)*

March 5, 1979 - Vance warns Dobrynin against a Soviet-Cuban role in the Arabian Sea.  
*(FAC, p. 39)*

March 6, 1979 - Carter orders a task force into the Arabian Sea.  
*(FAC, p. 39)*

March 9, 1979 - Carter approves a $390 million aid plan for North Yemen. On March 16, the arms aid, provided with assistance from Saudi Arabia, is shipped. A few months later, the Soviet Union makes an arms deal with North Yemen twice the size of the U.S. deal.  
*(NYT 3/10/79; Garthoff, pp. 657, 659)*

March 12, 1979 - It is shown that the Soviet SS-18 missile is capable of carrying 14 warheads, four more than provided for in SALT.  
*(NYT 3/14/79)*

March 12, 1979 - The United States estimates that there are 800-100 Soviet advisers in South Yemen, perhaps half of them military, and 500-700 Cuban advisers, half of whom are military.  
*(Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Crawford) Before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3/12/79)*

March 14-September 1979 - According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the number of Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan increases to between 3,000 and 4,000. Many of them are said to "have taken over roles that exceed strictly advisory ones," although no evidence exists of Soviet troops participating in actual combat operations. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has forced some Soviet personnel to take on "direct security responsibilities," particularly at Bagram Air Base where some 400 Soviet troops are stationed.  
*(Dialogue on Afghanistan, 10/19/79)*
March 15, 1979 - *Pravda* and *Izvestia* report that by promoting the Middle-East peace accords, the United States is seeking to extend its military and political hegemony in the Middle East following the loss of its foothold in Iran. (Sobel, p. 249)

March 16, 1979 - On the same day that Carter sends weapons to North Yemen, the Arab League arranges a "cease fire" between North and South Yemen. Two weeks later, President Saleh of North Yemen and President Isma'il of South Yemen announce "talks on unification." Later CIA analyses indicate that reports the U.S. had received on the conflict between the two countries were exaggerated. Raymond Garthoff writes later that there is no evidence of Soviet involvement in the conflict. The Soviet Union was interested in power over a harmonious, rather than conflicting, North Yemen and South Yemen. (Garthoff, pp. 657-659)

March 16, 1979 - Assistant Secretary of State Vaky instructs the U.S. Embassy in Managua to maintain a distance from the Somoza government: "We do not believe that we can now fruitfully reengage ourselves bilaterally in internal discussions with the GON [Government of Nicaragua] and the opposition." (*GON Desire to Reinvolve the U.S.*, 3/16/79)

March 19, 1979 - Brezhnev writes a letter to Carter, complaining that the U.S. first included Moscow in the Middle East peace process (October 1977) but quickly excluded the Soviets. (Garrison)

March 19, 1979 - The U.N. Security Council meets to discuss South Africa's raids into Angola. All nations present (Angola, Zambia, Portugal, the USSR, Ethiopia and Algeria) condemn Pretoria and the western powers which support it and feel that South Africa, by repeatedly attacking Angola, is acting with the sole aim of wrecking the Proximity Talks. (*Security Council Discussion on Angola*, 3/19/79)

March 19, 1979 - According to the program "Special File," broadcast on the Russian Television Network on July 14, 1992, Prime Minister Kosygin reads to Soviet Politburo members the transcript of a telephone conversation he has had with Afghan Prime Minister Taraki. The date of the conversation is not given. Kosygin begins by asking Taraki to "outline the situation in Afghanistan," to which Taraki responds: "The situation is bad and getting worse." Asked for his proposals, Taraki says: "We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms." He presses the Soviet Prime Minister: "Why can't you send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive [sic] tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them." Kosygin demurs, saying: "You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you." (FBIS, SOV-92-138, 7/17/92)

March 23, 1979 - The United States warns the Soviet Union against interfering in the fighting in Afghanistan between rebel and government forces. Noting recent increased movement of Soviet advisors and military equipment into Afghanistan,
State Department spokesman Hodding Carter says that while aid to the pro-Soviet government would not be considered interference, actual participation in combat by Soviet forces would destabilize the whole area. He says that there is no indication that Soviet troops have engaged in combat against the Muslim rebels. (WP 3/24/79)

March 24, 1979 - The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) agrees to send 18.5 tons of uranium to India. (FAC, p. 32)

March 25-28, 1979 - The Soviet Union reportedly intensifies arms supply efforts to the Afghan government, including the provision of 25 large helicopters designed to drop Afghan troops into remote areas where rebel tribesmen are contesting government control. State Department officials express doubts that the Afghan military will be able to fly the helicopters themselves and speculate that Soviet advisors will have to ferry Afghan troops to battle areas, thus increasing the chances of direct Soviet involvement in actual fighting. (WP 3/28/79)

March 26, 1979 - In Washington, Sadat and Begin sign a peace treaty ending the 31-year state of war between Egypt and Israel. (Sobel, p. 252)

March 26, 1979 - Vance and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan sign two agreements. One guarantees U.S. military and political assistance in case Egypt violates its pact, and the other guarantees continued supplies of oil to Israel. (Sobel, p. 252)

March 26, 1979 - The FSLN announces the merger of its three factions, the "Proletarian Faction," the "Protracted People's War" and the "Insurrectionalist Tendency," also know as the "Third Force," or Terceristas. (FAC, p. 61)

March 27, 1979 - Hafizullah Amin is appointed Afghanistan's prime minister while retaining his position as foreign minister. Nur Mohammad Taraki maintains his positions as president, secretary-general of the PDPA and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. A new 18-member cabinet, all of whom are Khalqis, is named. (Sen Gupta, pp. 69-70; Urban, p. 31)

March 28, 1979 - The House Committee on Foreign Affairs approves an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act introduced by Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois), stating that "[n]one of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the amendments made by this title may be made available for assistance for Afghanistan unless the President determines, and reports to Congress, that assistance for Afghanistan is in the national interest of the United States." (House Committee Cuts Aid to Afghanistan, 3/28/79)

March 28, 1979 - The Soviet Union is reportedly building a submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba. (FAC, p. 60)

March 29, 1979 - Vance meets with Dobrynin to discuss the only two outstanding SALT issues to be resolved--encoding of missile-test date (telemetry) and defining new missile systems. (FAC, p. 32)
March 30-April 11, 1979 - Ethiopia launches its fourth offensive against Eritrea. (ICAR1)

April 1979 - In elections contrived by Ian Smith in Rhodesia to win support for his regime from the United States, Bishop Abel Muzorewa is chosen as the Prime Minister. (Smith, p. 141)

April 1979 - Deng Xiaoping tells a visiting group of American Senators that the PRC will share intelligence with the U.S. and help monitor Soviet conformance with any future SALT agreement. (Garthoff, p. 726)

April 1979 - NATO establishes a Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters, chaired by the State Department director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, to develop an arms control proposal to accompany TNF modernization. (Garthoff, p. 860)

April 1979 - The core structures for the Osirak and Isis reactors in Iraq are destroyed. A French ecological group claims responsibility. However, others believe that the attack was actually carried out by Israeli agents. (Spector2, p. 176)

April 1979 - Brzezinski chairs a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting on Afghanistan. Brzezinski and the committee members, in assessing growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, agree to "be more sympathetic to those Afghans who [are] determined to preserve their country's independence." According to Brzezinski, Vice President Mondale is helpful in overcoming reservations expressed by David Newsom from the State Department. (Brzezinski, p. 427)

April 1, 1979 - The Israeli Cabinet approves the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. (Sobel, p. 254)

April 1, 1979 - The CIA prepares a report on the "International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." The report assesses the strategic implications of nuclear weapons capabilities and threats in a variety of troubled geographical areas. (International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 4/79)

April 8-12, 1979 - In a major offensive, FSLN soldiers attack and take control of Estel and surrounding areas. Subsequently, the Sandinistas are forced to retreat. (Diederich, p. 238)

April 2, 1979 - The State Department angrily refutes "slanderous and baseless" Soviet allegations that the United States is interfering in Afghanistan, suggesting that the charges are a "smokescreen" to hide the increased Soviet military presence in the country. (WP 4/3/79)

April 4, 1979 - In an address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Brzezinski says a SALT agreement would be a good foundation for better political ties. (NYT 4/5/79)
April 4, 1979 - Former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto is executed, having been found guilty of conspiracy to murder of one of his political opponents. On April 6, a $40 million economic and military assistance aid package to Pakistan is cut after the Carter Administration concludes that Karachi is building an enrichment plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. Warren Christopher meets with President Zia-ul-Haq, but fails to persuade him to cancel the facility. The cut-off is required under the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. (CRS2, p. 44; Spector2, p. 83; Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 14, April 11, 1979, 4/11/79)

April 5, 1979 - The Conference on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) holds its 200th session in Vienna. (FAC, p. 36)

April 5, 1979 - In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Harold Brown says that the SALT treaty allows for the development of Trident, MX mobile ICBM and cruise-missiles, and that the Soviet Union does not have a military advantage. He also states that SALT represents a foundation for establishing enduring political relations with the Soviet Union. (NYT 4/6/79)

April 5, 1979 - The Commerce Department confirms that a $6.8 million UNIVAC, cancelled in July 1978, was sold to the Soviet Union. (NYT 4/6/79)

April 5, 1979 - Alexei Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces, arrives in Kabul with six other Soviet generals for a week-long visit. The inspection tour results in more Soviet arms and advisors being sent to Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 902; Sen Gupta, p. 87; IHT 4/14-15/79)

April 10, 1979 - The Egyptian People’s Assembly ratifies the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 329-13. (Sobel, p. 254)

April 12, 1979 - U.S. intelligence officials reveal that up to 100 Soviet military advisors have been killed in Afghanistan in the last month. Currently, some 3,000 Soviet personnel are believed to be in the country, at least 1,000 of which are fulfilling military functions. (NYT 4/13/79)

April 13, 1979 - Brezhnev writes a letter to Carter. (Garrison)

April 15, 1979 - A Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report says that Carter’s strategy to curb conventional arms sales to Third World countries is failing, while the Soviet Union and other Western suppliers are making major inroads, especially in Latin America. (FAC, p. 32)

April 16, 1979 - CIA Director Stansfield Turner says it will take five years to fully restore the intelligence capability that the base in Iran provided for monitoring Soviet missile tests and development. (NYT 4/17/79)

April 16, 1979 - Fearing a nuclear race in the Indian subcontinent, the United
States offers Pakistan fighter jets and help on a nuclear power plant. The Administration also backs a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. (FAC, p. 32)

April 17, 1979 - Harold Brown rejects Turner’s assessment of the loss of the Iranian intelligence base, stating that the necessary capabilities will be restored in one year. (NYT 4/18/79)

April 18, 1979 - Brezhnev and Kosygin are reelected president and prime minister of the Supreme Soviet. (NYT 4/19/79)

April 19, 1979 - The U.N. Security Council’s South Africa Arms Embargo Committee agrees to delay any decision recommending a ban on nuclear cooperation with South Africa until an open meeting can be held to discuss the issue in further detail. (South African Arms Embargo Committee Meeting April 19, 4/21/79)

April 19, 1979 - Chinese Prime Minister Deng tells a group of visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee members that the United States is free to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT from its soil. (NYT 4/20/79)

April 23, 1979 - In Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union begin the third round of ASAT talks, which extend to June. A fourth round scheduled for early 1980 never occurs because of the invasion of Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 760)

April 23, 1979 - The White House reports that the Soviets have deployed a new SS-21 missile in East Germany. The Administration says that this will increase the possibility of a spiralling arms race in Europe. One month later, the White House states that the Soviet Union has not deployed the new missile in East Germany, but that it intends to some time in the future. (NYT 4/24/79, 5/24/79)

April 23-24, 1979 - The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meets at Homestead Air force Base, Florida, to discuss the Soviet build-up in Europe. (FAC, p. 36)

April 25, 1979 - Carter begins to campaign for the SALT II agreement with a speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Convention. He says that the SALT treaty allows for immediate verification and for flexibility in U.S. strategic options. ((NYT 4/26/79; Garthoff, p. 822)

April 26, 1979 - The U.N. Disarmament Conference ends today with the United States rejecting the 20-nation draft convention banning chemical weapons on the grounds that it would hinder private U.S.-Soviet talks on the subject. (NYT 4/28/79)

April 27, 1979 - In exchange for the release of convicted Soviet spies and former U.N. aides Chernyayev and Enger, the Soviet Union releases dissidents Alexander Ginzburg, Mark Dymshits, Edvard Kuznetsov, Valentin Moroz and Georgi Vins. (NYT 4/28/79)
April 27, 1979 - Vance, Blumenthal and Dobrynin meet to discuss possibilities of increased U.S.-Soviet trade in the wake of the impending SALT II agreement. (NYT 4/28/79; Garthoff, p. 730)

April 27, 1979 - U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Frank Tucker reports to Washington that a more anxious mood is taking hold in Nicaragua, with greater hopes being pinned on the U.S. role. "There is a growing consensus that time is running out on the possibility for peaceful change." (Nicaraguan Atmospherics, 4/27/79)

May 1979 - Pentagon planners present "Consolidated Guidance No. 8" to Brown. The guidance proposes U.S. assistance in strengthening the Chinese military strength so that China could assist the West in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 750)

May 1, 1979 - For the first time since 1968, Soviet military units march in a May Day parade. (NYT 5/2/79)

May 2, 1979 - In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs panel, Warren Christopher discusses the guidelines that were used by the Carter Administration to apply its concern for human rights to the conduct of foreign policy. (NYT 5/3/79)

May 3, 1979 - By a vote of 77-12, the Senate approves additional funds for the development of the mobile MX missile. (NYT 5/4/79)

May 4, 1979 - PRM-46 directs a study of U.S. policies toward Central America. (Richelson)

May 7, 1978 - Vance and Dobrynin resolve the remaining substantive issues on SALT including the removal of the environmental shelters covering Minuteman III silos that Ford had promised in 1974. (Garthoff, p. 821)

May 8, 1979 - Carter aides disclose that secret U.S.-USSR "diplomatic soundings" on MBFR began in Washington in late March. (FAC, p. 36)

May 9, 1979 - The U.S. Embassy in Kabul outlines two possible scenarios for Afghanistan. The first is "a 1968 Czechoslovakia-type situation," likely if the Soviet Union feels that the "Afghan Revolution" is endangered. Political preparations for Soviet intervention may have already begun with repeated accusations of U.S., Pakistani, Iranian and Chinese support for the Afghan rebels. The second, more probable scenario, according to U.S. Charge d'Affaires Bruce Amstutz, is that Moscow will avoid direct involvement in Afghanistan's domestic turmoil, possibly resulting in a situation similar to Vietnam. Amstutz adds that Soviet activity in Afghanistan has "increased perceptibly in recent weeks," although not to the extent reported in the world press. (The Current Soviet Role in Afghanistan, 5/9/79)

May 9, 1979 - Agreement on a SALT treaty is announced. Instead of the large cuts originally sought by Carter, the agreement affirms the Vladivostok limits of 2,400, to be reduced to 2,250 by January 1, 1981. The two sides agree to a ceiling of 1,200 for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, with the total of land- and submarine-based missiles
and bombers equipped with multiple missiles not to go beyond 1320. No missiles may have more than 10 warheads and the various missile types already in existence may only carry the number of warheads with which they have previously been tested. Each side may deploy one new missile but it may have no more than 10 warheads. Modifications of existing missile types are constrained. Heavy bombers count against the total number of launchers and against the MIRVed launcher subtotal when they carry cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers. Missiles that are not allowed to be deployed may not be tested. Each side agrees to avoid measures that impede the ability of the other to verify that tests and deployments are in compliance. Encoded transmissions are banned when the coding impedes verification. Accompanying protocols ban, until December 31, 1981, the deployment of SLCMs or GLCMs with a range of over 600 kilometers. Regarding the Backfire bomber, Dobrynin and Vance agree that at the summit Brezhnev will make assurances about the Backfire's capabilities and Carter will respond with a U.S. understanding of the actual rate of production. Brezhnev will not contradict the figure which will make the production rate part of the formal negotiating record. *(Statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 5/9/78; Garthoff, p. 729; Smith, pp. 78-79; Vance, pp. 134-135)*

**May 24, 1979** - A State Department memorandum suggests that the Soviet Union may be moving ahead with plans to remove Afghan President Taraki and other members of the Khalqi leadership, possibly replacing them with exiled Parchami leaders including former Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal. According to the State Department, the Soviet Union may be annoyed at the carelessness manner in which reforms are being undertaken by the Khalqi government, without first building the popular support or institutional framework necessary for these reforms to be successful. The Soviet leadership is probably concerned with its image among Third World and Muslim nations. The memorandum concludes, "I'm sure the Soviets will turn loose of the Afghan tar baby, although they may try to engineer some changes at the top." *(Soviet-Afghan Relations: Is Moscow's Patience Wearing Thin?, 5/24/79)*

**May 29, 1979** - The FSLN's "final offensive" begins with a large column of soldiers crossing the Costa Rican border into southern Nicaragua. Other military uprisings, using stockpiled armaments, begin throughout the country, including in and around Managua. Heavy fighting and popular strikes paralyze the country in the following months. (Diederich, p. 249)

**May 30, 1979** - In an address at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Brown says that since 1962-63 the Soviet Union has been trying to develop the capability to attack U.S. land-based missiles by surprise. (NYT 5/31/79)

**Late Spring 1979** - The HLG decides to support deployment of a combination of about 200-600 Pershing II and GLCM missiles. (Garthoff, p. 861)

**Mid-1979** - Public opinion polls show that Carter has an approval rating of only 30 percent of the public. (Garthoff, p. 741)

**June 1979** - Senator Jackson assumes leadership of the Congressional opposition to
SALT II. General Edward Rowny of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resigns from the Army in order to oppose the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 732)

June 1979 - According to a Soviet source, the freighter "Al-Kasum" arrives in Karachi, Pakistan, carrying weapons for the Afghan rebels. The weapons, which are mostly Soviet-made, have allegedly been purchased by the CIA for the mujahidin. (Urban, p. 29)

June 2-10, 1979 - During a visit to Poland, the Pope celebrates the first pontifical mass in a communist country and meets with Polish political leaders. (NYT 6/2/79)

June 4, 1979 - The Sandinistas call for an "insurrectional general strike" in Nicaragua which succeeds in paralyzing the country. (FAC, p. 61)

June 5, 1979 - The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union resume Geneva talks on an overall nuclear test ban. (FAC, p. 33)

June 5, 1979 - The Soviet Union tells China that the aim of the talks to be held in July or August will be normalizing relations. (NYT 6/6/79)

June 6, 1979 - Somoza declares martial law in Nicaragua. The 90-day decree imposes a curfew and suspends constitutional articles on arrest, detention and freedom of movement. (Enactment of Martial Law, 6/7/79)

June 6, 1979 - Averell Harriman briefs Carter on how to negotiate with the Soviets. He states that "Brezhnev looks on this meeting as one of the great events in his life, and has done everything possible to avoid failure" on SALT. "His deepest commitment is to keep war away from his own people." Because of the Soviet Union's poor system of exchanging information, "Brezhnev will not be adequately briefed on some of the American attitudes and concerns. It is very important that you not surprise or embarrass him....He is old, human, and emotional." Any concession that the Soviets make will come "belatedly, and most likely from Brezhnev himself." (Carter, pp. 241-242)


1979 - Sometime between June and November, the White House produces Presidential Directive-50 (PD/NSC-50), "Arms Control." (Richelson)

June 7, 1979 - Carter announces that the U.S. will proceed with development of the MX mobile ICBM system. Brzezinski convinces Carter to support the development of a heavier 92-inch diameter missile rather than a smaller 83-inch diameter model. He believes that the larger missile will increase chances of SALT ratification; in addition, it could carry the largest number of reentry vehicles permitted under the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 731; Smith, p. 83; Brzezinski, p. 336)

June 7, 1979 - The new U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, is sworn in. (FAC, p. 61)
June 8, 1979 - A Trident missile has its first successful submerged launch. (NYT 6/10/79)

June 10, 1979 - Managua explodes in a popular uprising with "unusually heavy firefights," the U.S. Embassy reports. (Nicaraguan Situation Report No. 2--11:00 a.m., 6/10/79)

June 13, 1979 - One hundred and thirty members of Congress demand the restoration of military aid to Somoza in a letter to Carter. "Your continued inaction and lack of support for the Nicaraguan people and their legal government headed by Somoza would condemn them to the same systemic totalitarianism which has denied the Cuban people their basic human rights for two decades." The letter is reprinted in The New York Times and The Washington Post in the following weeks. (NYT 6/18/79; WP 6/22/79)

June 14, 1979 - Senator Jackson addresses the neoconservative Coalition for a Democratic Majority and announces his opposition to the SALT II treaty. Moreover, he accuses presidents since Nixon of pursuing a policy of "appeasement" toward the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 731)

June 15-17, 1979 - Carter meets with Brezhnev at Vienna, where they sign the SALT II agreement. Carter and Brezhnev agree to two points that do not appear in the text of the agreement: telemetry cannot be encrypted to evade the treaty and the Soviet Union will limit production of Backfire bombers to 30 per year. Carter provides Brezhnev with proposals for SALT III; major points include: no encryption of telemetry, conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty, pre-notification of missile tests, restrictions on nuclear fuel sales and a moratorium on the production and deployment of any new missiles and launchers in the context of the reductions anticipated under SALT III. Carter also proposes an annual 5 percent reduction from SALT II force levels. Brezhnev supports halting production of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles, but wants the nuclear delivery systems of China, France and Britain included. The summit communique mentions support for "international detente" but is the first one since 1972 not to mention the "principle of peaceful coexistence." Soviet leaders strongly argue for reaffirming the principle but Brzezinski rejects it because he believes that Kissinger had made a mistake in accepting the Soviet formulation in the first place.

In one of his statements, Carter criticizes Soviet policy in Africa and Vietnam. He also declares that improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations will not be at the expense of relations with Moscow. Regarding Afghanistan, Carter states that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union should interfere in its internal affairs. In response, Brezhnev rejects U.S. concerns about Vietnam and strongly attacks the Chinese for wanting to incite a world war. He asks that the U.S. join the Soviet Union in preventing attacks on the Afghan government. The two sides disagree over human rights issues. Brezhnev claims that human rights is not a "legitimate" item of discussion because it is so "sensitive." Carter responds that the Soviets "voluntarily signed the Helsinki accords, which made this issue a proper item in state-to-state relations." (McLellan, p. 124; Garthoff, pp. 732-740, 762; Carter, pp. 247-260; Brzezinski, pp. 340-344)
June 16, 1978 - Carter signs PRM-37, "Chemical Weapons". (Richelson)

June 18, 1979 - A White House statement asserts that Carter also supports SALT II and continued detente because of their impact in other parts of the world outside Europe. (The White House, PPP, Vol. I, 1979, pp. 1050-51)

June 18, 1979 - Upon his return from Vienna, Carter supports SALT II and a renewed detente before a joint session of Congress. He argues that SALT was not a "favor we are doing for the Soviet Union" observing that it was a way to reduce the risk of war. He never mentions detente and observes that SALT II will not end U.S.-Soviet competition; "there will always be some degree of tension in the relationship." Carter says he warned Brezhnev that the Soviet backing of Cuba in Africa has a "negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations." (Garthoff, p. 740-742; FAC, p. 53)

June 18, 1979 - Around this date, Carter declares "Captive Nations Week" for the week of July 15, 1979. (Garthoff, p. 744)

June 22, 1978 - PRM-38 directs a study of long-range theater nuclear capabilities and arms control. (Richelson)

June 22, 1979 - Carter transmits the SALT treaty to the Senate. (Message From the President to the Senate, 6/22/79)

June 23, 1979 - As a sign of a greater civilian role in military detente issues, the Soviets create the Scientific Research Council on Problems of Peace and Disarmament, chaired by Nikolai Inozemtsev. (Garthoff, p. 784)

June 25, 1979 - As the Senate battles over ratification of SALT II, Gromyko refuses to consider further amendments or renegotiation. Any of the proposed amendments would have killed the agreement because they were not acceptable to Moscow. (Garthoff, p. 743)

June 26, 1979 - J. Bruce Amstutz at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reports on a meeting with Soviet diplomat Vassily Safronchuk in which the Soviet denies "that the Soviets would consider bringing in Soviet troops to save the DRA....Reflecting on our conversation, I think he genuinely believed what he was telling me, namely that Soviet physical intervention would be more harmful than helpful for Soviet interests, and therefore it would not occur." (Meeting with Soviet Diplomat: Part II of III--Soviet-Afghan Relations, 6/25/79)

June 26, 1978 - Carter signs PRM-39, "Economic Implications of a Middle East Peace Settlement". (Richelson)

June 27, 1979 - The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee meets. The Committee asks the U.S. representative about the prospects of providing a State Department nuclear expert as promised in an earlier meeting. The U.S. representative has no information to offer. Committee members decide to
invite Dr. Ronald Waters of Howard University as an expert and set July 6 as a tentative date for the next meeting. *Arms Embargo Committee Meeting June 27, 6/29/79*

**June 27, 1979** - Maintaining that the SALT Treaty is "fatally flawed," Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee) says he will block the treaty as it stands. (NYT 6/28/79)

**June 29, 1979** - The North Atlantic Council gives NATO's official endorsement to SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 742)

**June 29, 1979** - The Soviet Politburo discusses sending a special military unit to Afghanistan, according to the Russian television program "Special File" of July 14, 1992. On December 6, 1979, according to a document described as "protocol 176," the Politburo again considers the issue (see entry). (FBIS, SOV-92-138, 7/17/92)

**June 29-July 1, 1979** - Carter makes an official visit to South Korea. He reaffirms the close alliance between the two countries, his intention to proceed with implementation of South Korea's "force improvement program" and Washington's commitment to come to the aid of Seoul in the event of a threat from North Korea. *(Joint Communiqué Issued by the President and the President of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 7/1/79)*

**June 30, 1979** - The Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council meets to redefine U.S. foreign policy toward Nicaragua. Assistant Secretary Vaky instructs the Embassy in Managua not to rush Somoza on his departure date because "what follows...it too uncertain as yet." On the issue of a successor government, the Embassy should encourage "opposition elements" to lead a care-taker government. Also, the Embassy "should urgently explore ways of preserving some kind of effective by reconstituted Guard presence so as to avoid leaving the FSLN as the only organized military force." *(Nicaraguan Scenario, 6/30/79)*

**Early July 1979** - Carter accepts the Special Coordination Committee's recommendation on 108 Pershing II missile and 464 GLCMs for deployment in Western Europe. 108 Pershing IIs were proposed because the U.S. already had 108 Pershing IA launchers in Germany. 464 GLCMs would keep the total under the ceiling of 600 proposed by the HLG. (Garthoff, pp. 861-862)

**July 1979** - A secret Central Intelligence Agency document on Israel is prepared noting Israel's growing missile capability. It briefly describes the "Gabriel" missile, an indigenously produced and built naval surface-to-surface missile and the "Shafir," an air-to-air missile. *(National Basic Intelligence Factbook: Israel, 7/79)*

**July 1979** - In his testimony on behalf of SALT II, Vance declares that no matter how competitive U.S. relations with Moscow are in other parts of the world, arms control is one area of U.S.-Soviet relations where it is in the U.S. national interest to make agreements. The treaty improves strategic stability, reassures U.S. allies and reduces the chances of proliferation. He warns that rejection of SALT II would
cause "severe worsening" in relations with Moscow and would be a "terribly severe blow" to NATO. (McLellan, pp. 143-144)

**July 3, 1979** - *The New York Times* reports that a June 17 Chinese broadcast announced the successful test of a ballistic missile. (FAC, p. 33)

**July 9-October 1979** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds extensive hearings on SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 742)

**July 10, 1979** - Adolfo Calero, who later becomes head of the Nicaraguan resistance known as the Contras, meets with U.S. Embassy officers to express his concern that the United States has failed to bring about a political solution to the Nicaragua crisis. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo comments that "Calero's attitude is representative of the doomsday view we get from most moderates in the capital." (Oppositionist Views: Adolfo Calero, 7/10/79)

**July 10-11, 1979** - U.S. negotiator William Bowdler meets with a five-person Junta organized by the Sandinistas in June. According to Robert Pastor, the Junta members indicate that they expect power to be transferred directly to them and express their willingness to incorporate reformed elements of the Somocista National Guard into a Sandinista army. Brzezinski and his deputy, David Aaron, view the meeting as a "turning point," according to Pastor. Brzezinski calls a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting at which it is decided "to bring the crisis to a head." On July 11, Bowdler presents an ultimatum to the Junta: expand its membership or face "alternative" approaches to the transition. (FAC, p. 62; Pastor, pp. 170-171)

**July 11, 1979** - Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that they back the treaty, but want the United States to increase military spending. (NYT 7/12/79)

**July 12, 1979** - Paul Nitze testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the SALT II agreement is "unequal" in its legal and practical effects. He says that "in net terms, the strategic balance will move from a position not far from parity to one of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority." (NYT 7/13/79; WP 7/13/79)

**July 14-26, 1979** - Ethiopia launches its fifth offensive against Eritrea. (ICAR1)

**July 17, 1979** - Somoza relinquishes power and leaves Nicaragua for the United States. (Nicaragua)

**July 18, 1979** - Francisco Urcuyo, Somoza's "constitutional" successor, quits office after being president for just 43 hours, and flies to Guatemala. Col. Mejia and other National Guard officials also go into exile. From Costa Rica, members of the Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction fly to the Nicaraguan city of Leon in preparation to enter Managua the next day. (Pastor, p. 186)

**July 18, 1979** - As part of Carter's reorganization of his personal staff and cabinet, he appoints Hamilton Jordan as White House chief of staff. (NYT 7/19/79)
July 19, 1979 - Marshall Shulman briefs the North Atlantic Council on the Vienna summit. A number of permanent representatives endorse the U.S. effort and express hope that the Senate will ratify the SALT II agreement. (June 19th NAC Briefing on the Vienna Summit, 7/19/79)

July 20, 1979 - The FSLN's Government of National Reconstruction formally assumes power in Nicaragua. The Junta issues decrees which void the constitution and dissolve Congress and the National Guard. (Nicaragua)

July 20, 1979 - Former IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, Jr. is named ambassador to the Soviet Union to succeed Malcolm Toon. (FAC, p. 38)

July 20, 1979 - Carter announces that he will continue to delay withdrawing American troops from South Korea because: recent intelligence reports indicate that North Korea's military strength is greater than previously believed; Washington wants to wait for signs of North Korea's willingness to restore a military balance to the region and reduce tensions; and the Administration wants to reassure its allies of its "steadiness and resolve" in the face of a "steady growth of Soviet military power in East Asia and the eruption of renewed conflict and new uncertainties in Southeast Asia." (Statement by the President, Washington, D.C., 7/20/79)

July 21, 1979 - By a vote of 74-73, the Senate passes the Export-Import Control Act that sharply limits Alaskan oil sales and give the Defense Department more control over strategic imports to communist countries. (NYT 7/22/79)

July 23, 1979 - The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) begins its hearings on SALT. (NYT 7/24/79)

July 24, 1979 - The United States accepts the new Nicaraguan government and agrees to continue diplomatic relations. (NYT 7/25/79)

July 25, 1979 - The State Department announces that U.S. government dependents and non-essential personnel are to be evacuated from Afghanistan due to deteriorating internal security conditions. The evacuation order will affect some 100 people. (Afghan Government Complains about Evacuation of American Dependents from Afghanistan, 7/25/79)

July 27, 1979 - Carter tells visiting editors that he will not increase defense spending to get the Senate to ratify the SALT treaty. (FAC, p. 33)

July 31, 1979 - Henry Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favoring ratification of the SALT agreement if the Senate requires military spending increases and also links future SALT talks to Soviet international restraint. (SFRC, II, pp. 159-160)

Early August 1979 - Vance and Brown inform the Senate that the Administration remains committed to the NATO goal of a 3 percent annual real increase in military spending. Senate critics of SALT such as Henry Jackson (D-Washington), John
Tower (R-Texas) and Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) write to Carter asking for a 4-5 percent increase. Carter refuses to raise military spending merely to ratify SALT. (Vance, pp. 356-357)

**August 1979** - According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, at about this time Moscow concludes that there is no favorable alternative in Afghanistan to President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin. However, the Soviet Union is said to have decided to support the more moderate Taraki against Amin. *Dialogue on Afghanistan, 10/19/79*


**August-September 1979** - A number of Soviet dancers and figure skaters defect while on overseas tour. During one incident, which caused a furor in the Soviet Union, the U.S. detains an Aeroflot airliner for three days until it could be determined that a departing Bolshoi dancer was departing under her own free will. (Garthoff, p. 744)

**August 1, 1979** - Carter admonishes the Soviets, Czechoslovakia and East Germany for human rights restrictions "inconsistent with their pledges made at Helsinki." (Garthoff, p. 744)

**August 1, 1979** - The U.S. announces that the Soviet Union is authorized to purchase an additional 20 million tons of corn and wheat during the next 14 months. This is not a concession to the Soviet Union but does help make 1979 the best year ever in U.S.-Soviet trade. (Garthoff, p. 744)

**August 2, 1979** - Brzezinski gives a speech in which he warns the USSR against deeper involvement in Afghanistan and asks for non-intervention in the Persian Gulf. (Brzezinski, pp. 402, 427; NYT 8/3/79)

**August 6, 1979** - To counter the recent growth of Soviet weapons directed against Western Europe, the United States discloses its July offer to deploy 200-600 medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. (NYT 8/7/79)

**August 10, 1979** - Nicaraguan Deputy Interior Minister Edén Pastora meets with U.S. officials and warns them that his government would turn to Eastern bloc countries for military supplies if the United States refused to sell weapons to Nicaragua. (CRS1, p. 2)

**August 12, 1979** - On August 5, The Washington Post reported that the Space Research Corp. (SRC), a U.S.-based company founded by Gerald Bull, has made at least seven secret arms shipments to South Africa, possible with support from the U.S. government. In June 1980, Bull and a former SRC associate receive six-month prison sentences for selling artillery equipment to South Africa. A British press account later alleges that the equipment was used in connection with South Africa's suspected nuclear test on September 22, 1979. (Danaher, p. 147; *Space Research*)
**Corporation: Test of Washington Post Article, 8/5/79**

**August 17, 1979** - Thirteen Soviet generals and six colonels, led by Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces Gen. Ivan Pavlovskiy, arrive in Afghanistan for what becomes a two-month stay. His visit is not announced in the Kabul press. Prime Minister Amin has given lower-ranking officials at the defense ministry permission to sign routine agreements with the visiting Soviet officers. U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Kabul Bruce Amstutz reports that the delegation could indicate either an effort to improve the counterinsurgency operations of the defense ministry or an attempt to "lay...the detailed contingency groundwork for the future intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, should Moscow eventually decide that that step is necessary."  
(Pavlovskiy Mission to Kabul, 9/2/79; [Continuation of the Steps Taken to Begin an Intelligence Relationship with the Bazargan Government], 9/19/79; Garthoff, p. 905; Arnold, p. 81)

**August 22, 1979** - After meeting with Soviet officials and dissidents, a 14-member congressional group ends a three-day Moscow visit.  
(NYT 8/23/79)

**August 23, 1979** - The United States grants Bolshoi dancer Alexander Godunov asylum; his wife returns home voluntarily.  
(NYT 8/24/79)

**August 23, 1979** - U.S. Ambassador Pezzullo offers some comments for the State Department’s upcoming congressional presentation on Nicaragua. On allegations that Cuba will control the evolution of the new Nicaraguan government, Pezzullo writes:

> Optics can be misleading. The Nicaraguan Revolution gives every evidence of being an authentic Nicaraguan phenomenon...The Sandinista movement represents a societal consensus that a radical change was needed. Realistically, we face only one option: To continue our economic and political support to the Nicaraguan people and government so that they can pursue their own destiny in a peaceful, and democratic manner.  
*(Congressional Presentation on Nicaragua, 8/23/79)*

**August 29, 1979** - The Soviet charge d'affaires in Washington is summoned to the State Department regarding the issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.  
(*Statement Issued by the Department of State, 8/31/79*)

**August 30, 1979** - Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin tells a group of visiting U.S. Senators that the Soviet Union is willing to limit production of the Backfire bomber to 30.  
(NYT 8/31/79)

**August 30, 1979** - Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) discloses that U.S. intelligence has confirmed the existence of a Soviet combat brigade on Cuba of ground forces, numbering 2,300-3,000 men. He calls on Carter to "draw the line on Russian penetration of this hemisphere."  
(Garthoff, p. 828)

**August 30, 1979** - The CIA station in Los Angeles cables Kabul and CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, that an Afghan informant has supplied the
agency with information on the assassination of Adolph Dubs. In return, the informant requests that the CIA send money in the name of a rebel faction to a bank account in Tehran. ([A. Information on Assassination of Adolph Dubs, B. Request to Washington to Send Money to Afghan Rebel Account in Iran], 8/31/79)

August 31, 1979 - The State Department announces: "We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit." The announcement continues: "Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000-3,000 men. The unit includes armored, artillery, and infantry elements. In addition, we estimate that the Soviet maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba." (Statement Issued by the Department of State, 8/31/79)

September 1979 - To bolster impressions of a tough stance in relations with the Soviet Union, Carter signs PD-50 which requires that any arms control proposal be consonant with military planning. (Garthoff, p. 746).

Early September 1979 - Based on signals he has received from Polish sources that Moscow is interfering with Poland's economic situation, Brzezinski briefs Carter on his view that events in Poland reflect "a significant change in the Soviet world and a sign of decreasing Soviet control." He recommends stepping up contacts inside Poland and boosting economic aid. (Brzezinski, p. 464)

Early September 1979 - Soviet troops estimated at brigade strength arrive in Kabul, possibly to protect Soviet citizens and facilities. ([Continuation of the Steps Taken to Begin an Intelligence Relationship with the Bazargan Government], 9/19/79)

September 4, 1979 - The United States and the Soviet Union end talks on banning chemical weapons. (FAC, p. 33)

September 4, 1979 - Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Frank Church announces that the SALT hearings will be delayed so that the committee can investigate the reports of Soviet troops in Cuba. On the same day, Vance, Brown and Brzezinski meet to discuss possible options to Soviet activity in Cuba. (NYT 9/5/79)

September 5, 1979 - Soviet diplomat Vladilen Vasev asks Warren Christopher what the "legal basis" is for U.S. objections to the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. He delivers a note (which the State Department does not release) denying the presence of "organized Soviet combat units." Soviet military personnel and a training center have been in Cuba since 1962; since then there has been no change in their number or function." (Garthoff, p. 538)

September 5, 1979 - Vance tells the press that the Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for many years but that the United States nevertheless "regard[s] this as a very serious matter affecting our relations with the Soviet Union." He goes on to say that "I will not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo." (Remarks and Replies by the Secretary of State at a Press Conference, Washington, D.C., 9/979; Smith, p. 215)
September 7, 1979 - The U.S. decides to deploy the MX missile in deceptive, multiple-launch-point mode. The mobile 200 MX launchers would move randomly among 4,600 widely spaced concrete shelters in valleys in Nevada and Utah, making it the largest construction project in history. (Garthoff, p. 746; Vance, p. 365)

September 7, 1979 - In a televised statement, Carter requests that the Soviets respect the Administration's concern over its brigade in Cuba, even though, Carter concedes that the brigade poses no danger. (NYT 9/8/79)

September 7, 1979 - In an interview, Carter states that SALT should be ratified on its own merits and should not be linked with Soviet troops in Cuba. (NYT 9/9/79)

September 10, 1979 - A CIA field officer reports that Pakistan leader "General Zia has ordered that no weapons, ammunition or other supplies of Chinese origin should be supplied to Afghan insurgents who are being covertly supplied by the government of Pakistan." (Discussion of Afghan Situation during the Visit of a Chinese Military Delegation to Pakistan, 10/30/79)

September 10-27, 1979 - Vance meets with Gromyko twice and with Dobrynin six times to discuss the Soviet brigade issue. The Soviets refuse to withdraw military personnel; all they will agree to state is that they do not intend to change the status of their military training center. (Garthoff, p. 538)

September 12, 1979 - Taraki returns to Kabul from Havana and Moscow. According to Raja Anwar, during his stopover in Moscow, Taraki met with Gromyko and Babrak Karmal. Gromyko is said to suggest that Taraki dismiss Amin and his closest supporters and send them out of the country. (Anwar, p. 168)

September 13, 1979 - Brzezinski prepares a memorandum for Carter stating the need for a "more assertive tone in foreign policy." Brown agrees with the paper and observes that "the President has a simplistic and naive view that the Soviet leaders are like ourselves." In his memorandum, Brzezinski writes that "[y]ou may not want to hear this, but I think that the increasingly pervasive perception here and abroad is that in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviets are increasingly assertive and the U.S. more acquiescent. State's handling of the Soviet brigade negotiations is a case in point. I recommend that in the future we will have to work for greater White House control." Carter comments: "Good." (Brzezinski, pp. 518, 565)

September 14, 1979 - Intending to assassinate Hafizullah Amin, President Taraki invites the prime minister to the Presidential Palace along with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov. Amin arrives at the palace before Puzanov, accompanied by two other officials. Upon entering the main corridor leading to Taraki's room, guards suddenly open fire, killing the two officials but only wounding Amin who escapes down a staircase and flees in his car. Arriving at the Ministry of Defense, he places the armed forces on a full-scale alert, orders Taraki detained in the palace, then telephones Puzanov to describe the attack. Puzanov condemns the incident. (Anwar, pp. 170-172)
September 14, 1979 - In the wake of the failed attempt on his life, Amin orders tanks from the 4th Armored Corps to enter Kabul at 6:30 p.m. and surround important government buildings and town squares. (Anwar, pp. 170-172)

September 16, 1979 - After the Ogaden war, President Barre of Somalia expresses disappointment with Soviet support of Ethiopia, but seeks U.S. military and economic assistance. To gain U.S. support, he creates a new Constitution. (ICAR4)

September 16, 1979 - At 8:00 p.m. local time, Kabul Television announces that Nur Mohammad Taraki has informed the PDPA Politburo and the Revolutionary Council that he is no longer able to continue his duties. These two bodies, at a session chaired by Foreign Minister Shah Wali, are then reported to have named Hafizullah Amin general secretary of the PDPA and president of the Revolutionary Council. Amin retains his position as prime minister. Kabul Television also reports that four people died at the Presidential Palace, including Sayyid Daud Tarun. (Hafizullah Amin Takes Over Rule in Afghanistan, 9/16/79)

September 17, 1979 - The United States grants asylum to two more Bolshoi dancers, Leonid and Valentina Koslov. (NYT 9/18/79)

September 18, 1979 - Brzezinski says the Soviet brigade in Cuba is part of wider Soviet-Cuban military cooperation in the Third World. (NYT 9/19/79)

September 18, 1979 - Soviet forces near the Afghanistan border are placed on modified alert following the coup by Amin. (WS 9/19/79)

September 19, 1979 - Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin send a message of congratulations to Hafizullah Amin, three days after the announcement that Amin has been named PDPA general secretary. (KT 9/19/79)

September 22, 1979 - Vance advises the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to make a "short, non-substantive courtesy call" on Hafizullah Amin, indicating that the United States "share[s] Amin's publicly expressed desire for friendly relations." Vance asks that the meeting be as low-key and non-confrontational as possible. (Charge's Proposed Call on President Amin, 9/22/79)

September 22, 1979 - A U.S. Vela reconnaissance satellite detects a flash of unknown origin over the South Atlantic. Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency asserts--and other observers agree--that the flash resulted from a clandestine South African nuclear test, separate investigations by the United Nations and the United States conclude that the flash was probably not from a nuclear device. (CRS3, pp. 45, 47)

September 24, 1979 - Ludmila Belousa and Oleg Protopopov, the Soviet Olympic skating couple, defect to Switzerland. (FAC, p. 38)

September 24, 1979 - Members of the Nicaraguan junta, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Sergio Ramirez Mercado and Alfonso Robelo Callejas, visit Carter. (FAC, p. 29)
Late September - Gerald Ford calls for deferring a vote on SALT until Congress approves a 5 percent real increase in military spending. (Vance, p. 365)

September 26, 1979 - Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Saunders expresses concern over the growing involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs. (Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 9/26/79)


September 27, 1979 - U.S. Charge d'Affaires Bruce Amstutz is "received warmly" by Afghan President Amin in Kabul. During their meeting, which is publicized in the local press, Amin again calls for improved relations between the United States and Afghanistan. (Implications that DRA Seeks Better Relations with USG: A Commentary, 10/1/79)

September 28, 1979 - Carter transmits to Congress a notice of intention to withdraw Ethiopia from the Generalized System of Trade Preferences. (ICAR2)

October 1979 - The North Atlantic Assembly releases Detente and Prospects, which reaffirms earlier NATO decisions to make the pursuit of detente official NATO policy. (Garthoff, pp. 746-747)

October 1979 - Senior NATO officials have reached agreement on the LRTNF deployment plan and the arms control approach. Belgium and the Netherlands, however, have not decided to participate. As part of the LRTNF arrangement, NATO has consented to a U.S. plan to withdraw 1,000 nuclear munitions from the 7,000 stockpiled in Europe since the 1960s. (Garthoff, pp. 863, 866)

October 1, 1979 - Brezhnev warns NATO against creating long-range theater nuclear forces. (Garthoff, p. 745)

October 1, 1979 - Carter announces that the U.S. has reinforced its position in the Indian Ocean. (Garthoff, p. 762)

October 1, 1979 - In a major televised speech, Carter discusses the Soviet brigade issue, stating again that the "presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us." He reports that the Soviets have called the unit a "training center" and that they have agreed not to change its "function or status." In addition, Carter specifies a number of unilateral steps that the U.S. will undertake: increased surveillance of Cuban and Soviet military activities, enhancement of U.S. rapid deployment capacities around the world, establishment of a permanent Caribbean joint task force with headquarters in Florida, an increase in military exercises in the region and a boost in economic aid to the region. He mentions that the U.S. is reinforcing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. He also notes the importance of ratifying the SALT II agreement. In off-the-record remarks to the press, the President states that Brown will be visiting Beijing in a few months and might
discuss transfer of dual-use (civilian-military) technology to China. *(Address by the President to the Nation, 10/1/79; Garthoff, pp. 843, 846)*

**October 1, 1979** - In a speech announcing the creation of the Caribbean command, Carter again insists that the Senate not link Soviet troops in Cuba to SALT. *(NYT 10/2/79)*

**October 1-7, 1979** - During a visit to the United States, the Pope addresses the United Nations General Assembly, warning against a spiraling arms race. He meets with Carter on October 6; both men plead for world peace. *(NYT 10/3/79)*

**October 3, 1979** - A think piece by Harold Brown suggests that the United States should increase China’s military potential so that China will be an ally in case of war with the Soviet Union. *(NYT 10/4/79)*

**October 3, 1979** - Vance reaffirms the United States’ ban on the sale of arms to China, apparently to calm Soviet fears of strengthened U.S.-PRC ties. *(NYT 10/5/79)*

**October 3, 1979** - The U.S. Department of Agriculture announces the sale of 25 million metric tons of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union over the next year. In a separate announcement, U.S. aides disclose that Defense Secretary Brown has banned the sale of advanced computer technology. *(FAC, p. 38)*

**October 3, 1979** - In a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Bruce Amstutz estimates that the number of Soviet uniformed personnel in Afghanistan is now 7,200. This number, the Embassy believes, is probably on the conservative side and includes 4,200 Soviet combat personnel and 3,000 military advisors. The latter often serve in combat against rebel forces and thus can at times be categorized as combat troops. Some shift back to advisory roles once their regions have been stabilized. *(Soviet Combat Troops in Afghanistan, 10/3/79)*

**October 4, 1979** - The NATO High Level Group recommends the approval of the U.S. offer to deploy 200-600 medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. *(NYT 10/5/79)*

**October 4, 1979** - The *New York Times* reports on the Pentagon "Consolidated Guidance" paper on military aid to China (see entry for May 1979). Vance responds to the leak by declaring that "We are not going to sell arms to the Chinese." *(Garthoff, pp. 750-751)*

**October 4-8, 1979** - Brezhnev visits East Berlin to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic. *(NYT 10/7/79)*

**October 5, 1979** - The Senate Intelligence Committee issues a cautiously favorable report on SALT II, saying that it will help U.S. monitoring abilities and prohibit deliberate concealment. *(NYT 10/6/79; Garthoff, p. 742)*

**October 6, 1979** - The United States announces that the first reconnaissance flight
over Cuba since November 1978 resumed on October 5. Its mission it to take
tables of Soviet troops. (NYT 10/7/79)

October 6, 1979 - Pope John Paul II visits Carter. In their speeches, both men call
for the world wide promotion of human rights and arms limitations. (NYT 10/7/79)

October 6, 1979 - In a major speech at East Berlin, Brezhnev charges that the
purpose of NATO plans to deny LRTNF systems in Western Europe is to "upset the
balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the
NATO bloc." He proposes to reduce the number of MRBMs deployed in the
western sections of the Soviet Union if NATO does not deploy additional TNF
systems. Brezhnev argues that the number of medium-range nuclear delivery
systems in the European USSR have not increased during the 1970s and that there
has been a slight reduction in the number of MRBMs, their aggregate megatonnage
and the number of medium bombers. This speech marks the beginning of a
propaganda campaign, carried on through December, against the NATO TNF
decision. (Garthoff, pp. 864-865)

October 7, 1979 - Brezhnev calls for separate theater nuclear force reductions and
announces the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet military personnel from East
Germany to the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 768)

October 8, 1979 - A joint Soviet-East German communiqué is issued, reiterating the
troop-cut offer and warning on nuclear missiles. It states that NATO plans to
deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe is a threat to detente. (NYT 10/9/79)

October 8, 1979 - Former President Nur Mohammad Taraki is killed on President
Hafizullah Amin's order. His death is announced by the media the following day.
(Garthoff, p. 908; Anwar, p. 181; Urban, p. 38)

October 9, 1979 - At a news conference, Carter rejects Brezhnev's TNF proposal
and says that NATO should modernize its forces before discussing mutual and
balanced reductions of troops and arms with the Soviets. He states that the Soviet's
planned troop reductions are not constructive as they would allow the Soviets to
modernize at the expense of NATO. (NYT 10/10/79; Garthoff, p. 865)

October 10, 1979 - Carter discusses SALT ratification with the Congressional
leadership. He favors the Byrd-Cranston compromise that consists of a five-year
defense commitment and a provision that for SALT II to continue in effect SALT
III negotiations must make discernible progress. (Carter, p. 264)

October 11, 1979 - Brezhnev writes to Carter concerning TNF. (Garrison)

October 11, 1979 - Senator Church issues the "understanding" that SALT would be
ratified if Carter pledges that Soviet troops in Cuba are not combat-ready. (NYT
10/12/79)

October 11-14, 1979 - During a visit to New York, Castro addresses the U.N.
General Assembly on October 12. In an October 13 meeting with U.S.
Congressmen, the Cuban leader calls the Soviet troop issue a "sham" controversy created by the United States. (NYT 10/13/79; NYT 10/14/79)

October 12, 1979 - Vance and Gromyko meet to discuss disarmament matters unrelated to SALT. (FAC, p. 33)

October 13, 1979 - An ACDA FY 1977 report on arms spending states that the Soviet Union spent $140 billion, the United States $101 billion and China $35 billion. (FAC, p. 33)

October 14, 1979 - The Pentagon discloses the soviet plan to increase the 2,100 nuclear warheads in Europe to 3,250 by 1985. (NYT 10/15/79)

October 14, 1979 - West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt urges the West to accept Brezhnev's October 6 offer. (NYT 10/15/79)

October 16, 1979 - Marshall Shulman testifies before Congress that neither Washington nor Moscow are "satisfied with the current state of our relations." He observes that "perhaps the strongest source of concern to the U.S.S.R. remains whether the United States will enter into a military supply relationship with China." Shulman also implies that the U.S. will seek Congressional approval for Most-Favored-Nation status for China without seeking the same for the Soviet Union. Regarding Afghanistan, he states that the 1978 coup "brought this previously neutralist government into close alignment with the Soviet Union." (Garthoff, pp. 751-752, 948)

October 16-Early November 1979 - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins to debate a draft Resolution of Ratification for the SALT treaty. The committee adopts more than 20 conditions to ratification, but no amendments to the treaty. One of the conditions, proposed by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), requires that prior to ratification the President "shall affirm that the United States will assure that Soviet military forces in Cuba (1) are not engaged in a combat role, and (2) will not become a threat to any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere." (Garthoff, p. 847; Vance, pp. 365-366)

October 16-17, 1979 - Pakistani and U.S. officials meet in Washington, D.C. to discuss a broad range of regional and international concerns. The U.S. delegation includes Vance and Under Secretary David Newsom. The U.S. officials confirms that Washington will use "whatever leverage we have in Kabul" to encourage restraint from the new Afghan regime in regard to Pakistan, as well as "continue to impress upon the Soviets that we expect them to respect Afghan independence and to refrain from interfering in Afghan internal affairs." (US-Pak Talks: Regional Issues, 10/24/79)

October 22, 1979 - The Shah of Iran flies secretly to New York for surgery and cancer treatment. (FAC, p. 45)

October 23, 1979 - Carter transmits to Congress a proclamation extending most-favored nation treatment to the People's Republic of China. (Letter from the
President to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, 10/23/79)

October 23, 1979 - Czech dissident Vaclav Havel and five others are convicted of subversion and threatened to prison terms of up to five years. (NYT 10/24/79)

October 23, 1979 - Carter submits to Congress the U.S.-China Trade Agreement. (Garthoff, p. 752)

October 24, 1979 - In formal discussions between U.S. and Pakistani officials, the United States "reaffirm[s] that in the event of Afghan aggression against Pakistan we would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant...." This discussion foreshadows the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent change in U.S. policy toward aid to Pakistan. (U.S.-Pak. Talks: Regional Issues, 10/24/79)


October 25, 1979 - The United States discloses the fact that there was a possible nuclear explosion in South Africa on September 22. (FAC, p. 33)

October 27, 1979 - Senator Robert Byrd is cited in The Washington Post as stating that before the combat brigade flap the Senate would likely have approved SALT II. Now the outcome is "problematical." (Garthoff, p. 847)

October 29, 1979 - In response to the October 23 conviction of Czech dissidents, the United States temporarily recalls Ambassador Francis Meehan. (NYT 10/30/79)

October 31, 1979 - The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee meets to discuss recommendations to the Security Council regarding nuclear collaboration with South Africa. There is a disagreement over the strength of the recommendation, with the nonaligned countries, along with China, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, recommending a total and unconditional cut-off of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa and others supporting a Norwegian proposal banning collaboration "unless South Africa accepts full-scope international safeguards." The matter is referred to a subcommittee for further discussion and recommendation. (South Africa Arms Embargo Committee Meeting on Nuclear Matters October 31, 11/2/79)

November 1979 - Helmut Schmidt proposes that the MBFR participants consider agreeing that the forces of no country in either alliance should comprise more than 50 percent of the total force on that side after reductions have been made. In this way, the Soviets would not have to be concerned about Bundeswehr force levels being expanded while U.S. forces are decreased, while the West would not have to worry about the Soviets taking parallel action. (Garthoff, p. 767)

November 1979 - Carter signs PD-53 on strategic command, communication, control and intelligence. The purpose is to make a war-waging capability possible
by safeguarding telecommunications facilities after a nuclear war begins. (Garthoff, p. 788)

November 1, 1979 - A CIA cable reports an increase in the number of Soviet military personnel stationed in Kabul during September and October. (Increase in Soviet Military Presence in [illegible], 11/79)

November 2, 1979 - The United States, Great Britain and France abstain from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution which condemns the South African government for its attacks on Angola and demands that it stop such aggression from bases in Namibia. The resolution also calls upon the United Nations to aid in strengthening the defense of Angola and the Frontline States. (DOS Bulletin, p. 18)

November 4, 1979 - Brezhnev extends his October 6 offer and proposes that negotiations begin without delay. (NYT 11/6/79)

November 4, 1979 - The U.S. Embassy in Tehran is attacked and seized by Iranian "students following the Imam's line." Sixty-six Americans are taken hostage in an effort to force the United States to extradite the former Shah who is undergoing medical treatment in New York. (Iran Chronology, pp. 94-96)

November 5-12, 1979 - The head of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, visits the United States. In a November 6 meeting with members from the State Department, Savimbi reaffirms his position against U.S.-Angola normalization but admits quietly that if the United States found it advisable to normalize relations with Angola it should be done through a negotiated settlement and through reconciliation. His goal is a phased withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and power sharing between the MPLA and UNITA, initiatives also sought by the United States. (The US Visit of UNITA President Jonas Savimbi, 11/7/79; Savimbi Channel to US, 12/6/79; Exchange of Information on Angola: Savimbi Visit to the US, Internal MPLA Situation, 12/18/79' Letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Pertaining to Meeting between Jonas Savimbi and Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 11/19/79)

November 9, 1979 - By a vote of nine to six, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends ratification of SALT II. (NYT 11/10/79; Garthoff, p. 742)

November 10, 1979 - Carter sends Congress a request for a $75 million aid and loan package for Nicaragua. In the coming months, the Nicaraguan aid bill becomes the subject of extreme partisan debate in Congress. (NYT 11/11/79; FT 11/28/79)

November 12, 1979 - After Iranian Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moinfar declares an oil cutoff, Carter suspends all oil imports from Iran. (NYT 11/13/79; Proclamation No. 4702, Issued by the President, 11/12/79)

November 14, 1979 - Carter issues Executive Order No. 12170, announcing the freezing of all Iranian government assets in American banks. (Executive Order No. 12170, 11/14/79)

November 15, 1979 - Carter responds to Brezhnev's October 11 letter on TNF.
November 15, 1979 - PD/NSC-54, "Civil Operational Remote Sensing," is completed. (Richelson)

November 19, 1979 - In its majority report, the Senate backs the treaty as it stands, but it requests an increase in arms spending. (NYT 11/20/79)

November 20, 1979 - After the White House hints that "other remedies" (military action) will be used in Iran if diplomatic efforts fail. Carter orders the second Navy task force to the Indian Ocean. (NYT 11/21/79)

November 20, 1979 - The Grand Mosque in Mecca is attacked by a group of Muslim fundamentalists. The attack may have been a response to Khomeini's call for an uprising by Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle East. (NYT 11/21/79)

November 21, 1979 - Anti-American mobs attack and burn the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and two American cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore, Pakistan, in response to radio broadcasts from Iran claiming U.S. and Israeli involvement in the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on November 20. (NYT 11/22/79)

November 22, 1979 - In Bonn, Gromyko warns NATO and West Germany against deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, saying it would threaten detente. (NYT 11/23/79)

November 28, 1979 - In order to gain Senate support for the SALT II treaty, Carter announces the acceptance of a 5 percent rise in the arms budget over the next five years. (NYT 11/29/79)


Late November 1979 - Soviet Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov sets up headquarters in the Soviet city of Termez near the border with Afghanistan; Warsaw Pact forces are placed in an advanced state of readiness. (Arnold, p. 91)

Late 1979 - The United States considers applying economic sanctions against Pakistan to further limit its ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program. (Spector2, pp. 83-84)

Late 1979-Early 1980 - The Policy Review Committee and Special Coordination Committee hold meetings to discuss continuing U.S. "quiet assistance" to Poland. (Brzezinski, p. 464)

December 1979 - At the MBFR, Western countries make a new proposal for a multi-phase reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The Soviets view the proposal as inequitable because of the divergence between U.S. and Soviet reductions under the proposal. (Garthoff, p. 766)
December 1979 - Carter decides to increase the U.S. defense budget to its highest level ever. In his memoirs, Gromyko cites this as one more reason why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan. (Gromyko, p. 148)

December 2, 1979 - A pro-Khomeini mob of 2,000 attacks the U.S. Embassy in Libya. The United States asks for compensation for fire damage done to the Embassy. (NYT 12/3/79)

December 2, 1979 - The Shah of Iran leaves the hospital and is granted sanctuary at a San Antonio, Texas hospital. (FAC, p. 46)

December 2-16, 1979 - Eritrea launches a counter-offensive against Ethiopia, causing a military stalemate. (ICAR1)

December 4, 1979 - A special National Security Council meeting is held during which administration officials decide to explore the possibility of improved access to military facilities in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. (WP 12/4/79)

December 4, 1979 - The Senate Armed Services Committee issues an unfavorable report on the military aspects and implications of the proposed SALT II treaty. They conclude that the treaty, "as it now stands, is not in the national security interest of the United States." (Report from the Senate Armed Services Committee to the Senate, 12/4/79)

December 5, 1979 - State Department spokesman Hodding Carter alleges that the role of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan has expanded, especially in the area of command-and-control functions. Reports of Soviet personnel assuming combat roles cannot be confirmed. Soviet military advisors are now estimated to number between 3,500 and 4,000 and Soviet civilian advisors around 1,500. (Excerpts from Noon Briefing: Afghanistan, 12/5/79)

December 5, 1979 - As West Germany approves the deployment of missiles, the Soviets withdraw 1,000 tank units from East Germany to undermine the decision. (NYT 12/6/79)

December 5-6, 1979 - At a Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin, the Pact softens its stand on missiles in Europe and calls for broad East-West disarmament talks. (NYT 12/7/79)

December 6, 1979 - In conference, the House and Senate back the FY 1980 $131 billion military appropriation, including $284 million for a nuclear submarine and funds for Pershing medium-range missiles for Europe. (FAC, p. 28)

December 6, 1979 - At a Politburo meeting, Soviet leaders discuss the situation in Afghanistan, according to the Russian television program "Special File," broadcast on July 14, 1992. The program describes an "extract from protocol number 176" which deals with a request from President Hafizullah Amin. The protocol
reportedly reads: "Taking into account the situation that has emerged and Amin's request we deem it expedient to send to Afghanistan a special unit--trained for these purposes--of the General Staff's Chief Intelligence Directorate, numbering in total some 500 people, in uniforms which do not betray its membership of the USSR armed forces." The document refers to a decision to this effect of June 29, 1979, (see entry). The document continues, envisioning sending the unit to Afghanistan "during the first 10 days of December this year." The document ends with "Comrade Ustinov agrees" and is signed: "Andropov, Ogarkov." Other documents purported to come from top-level Politburo and Central Committee meetings are read on the televised program describing Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (FBIS, SOV-92-138, 7/17/92)

December 10, 1979 - Vance begins a tour of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to seek support for economic sanctions against Iran. (FAC, p. 46)

December 10, 1979 - In a speech by Vance, which is read by Assistant Secretary of State George Vest to a West Berlin press group, the United States says it is adamant about the deployment of missiles in Europe, but that it would discuss long-range missile cuts with the Soviet Union. (NYT 12/11/79)

December 10, 1979 - By a vote of ten to zero (with seven abstentions), the Senate Armed Services Committee recommends against ratification of SALT II, stating that without major changes, the treaty was "not in the national security interests." (Garthoff, p. 743)

December 11, 1979 - U.S. Ambassador to India Robert F. Goheen writes Assistant Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering arguing that the supply of nuclear fuel to India should be maintained. He says that ending U.S. assistance would adversely affect U.S. non-proliferation goals for the region, as IAEA safeguards on the Tarapur fuel would probably no longer apply. (U.S. Nuclear Fuel Supplies to Tarapur Power Reactors Should Be Maintained), 12/11/79)

December 13, 1979 - Carter writes to Brezhnev about border issues between Kampuchea and Thailand. (Garrison)

December 13-14, 1979 - At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels, the Council backs missile deployment. In his memoirs, Gromyko cites NATO's decision as another reason why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan. (Gromyko, p. 148; NYT 12/15/79)

December 14, 1979 - In response to NATO's decision to deploy new missiles, the Soviets state that they are no longer willing to withdraw any troops from Europe and that the basis for talks on arms reductions has been threatened. (NYT 12/15/79)

December 14, 1979 - The NATO Ministerial group expresses concern over the build-up in Warsaw Pact military strength, including Soviet theater nuclear and conventional capabilities. (Final Communique of the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 12/14/79)
December 16, 1979 - Saudi Arabia reopens the Grand Mosque in Mecca and says the attacks of November 20 were done by 500 disciplined guerrillas, not religious extremists. (FAC, p. 40)

December 16, 1979 - The White House discloses a letter from 16 Senators which asks that the vote on SALT be postponed until after the 1980 presidential elections. (NYT 12/17/79)

December 16, 1979 - Pentagon aides confirm that the USSR is building its first nuclear aircraft carrier. (FAC, p. 33)

December 17, 1979 - At a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Brzezinski obtains approval to publicize more intensely the situation in Afghanistan and rising Soviet influence there. (Brzezinski, p. 428)

December 20, 1979 - In Vienna, the West rejects a plan by which the United States would remove 13,000 and the Soviet Union 30,000 troops from Central Europe. (FAC, p. 36)

December 21, 1979 - Carter announces that he will call on the United Nations to vote for economic sanctions against Iran. (NYT 12/22/79)

December 22, 1979 - Brezhnev responds to Carter’s December 13 letter regarding Thai border issues. (Garrison)

December 22, 1979 - A State Department official says that the Carter Administration has expressed its concern to the Soviet Union several times in the last several days over the build-up of Soviet troops on the Afghanistan border. (NYT 12/23/79)

December 22, 1979 - Carter announces that the United States has told the Soviet Union that their effort to block economic sanctions against Iran would strain U.S.-Soviet relations. (NYT 12/23/79)

December 24, 1979 - Soviet Minister of Communications Nikolai Talyzin arrives in Kabul with a large number of aides. (Arnold, p. 94)

December 26, 1979 - The Soviet Union carries out a 150-plane airlift of troops and field equipment into Afghanistan. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter says that the Soviet military build-up on the border of Afghanistan has reached the equivalent of five divisions. (WP 12/27/79)

December 27, 1979 - Hafizullah Amin dies in the course of a Soviet-backed coup. An initial attempt to poison him, then hold him at the headquarters of the Soviet Medical Corps while Parcham leaders stage the uprising fails. At precisely 6 p.m., both Amin’s residence and the Army General Headquarters are shelled by Soviet tanks, which have surrounded both buildings. At the same time, Pul-e-Charki Prison is taken by Soviet troops in order to ensure the safety of Parchamis being held there. A Soviet attempt to take control of the Kabul television and radio
station is met with fierce resistance, but the facility is finally occupied at 6:30 p.m. At 6:45 p.m., Soviet Tajik troops, under the command of Sayyid Mohammad Ghulabzoi and Asadullah Sarwari, enter Amin’s residence, calling to Amin that they are there to protect him. Amin orders all lights extinguished. He is later found in his chair with a bullet in his head. It is unclear whether he committed suicide or was hit by a stray bullet. (Anwar, pp. 187-190)

December 27, 1979 - The Soviet government expresses its approval of the coup in Afghanistan, distributing a speech by Babrak Karmal which denounces Hafizullah Amin as an agent of American imperialism. (NYT 12/28/79)

December 27, 1979 - At 22:40 Greenwich Mean Time, Kabul Radio’s Dari Service announces:

Because of the continuation and expansion of aggression, intervention, and provocations by the foreign enemies of Afghanistan and for the purpose of defending the gains of the Saur revolution...and on the basis of the treaty of friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation dated 5 December 1978, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgent political, moral, and economic assistance, including military aid, to Afghanistan. (Sen Gupta, p. 187)

December 27, 1979 - The U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to "deplore the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan." In the months following the Soviet invasion, Carter embargoes the export of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, stops the sale of computers and high-tech equipment, boycotts the 1980 Olympics to be held in Moscow and withdraws the Salt II Treaty from the ratification process in the Senate. He also announces a new policy later dubbed the Carter Doctrine, which states that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault against the vital interests of the United States. (Bhasin, pp. 72, 137-138)

December 28, 1979 - Two motorized rifle divisions begin crossing the Amudarya River between the USSR and Afghanistan and two more prepare to follow. All four head for Herat, Kandahar and Kabul to secure the major cities and airfields. (Garthoff, p. 913)

December 28, 1979 - Members of Carter’s Cabinet meet at the White House to consider the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A preliminary decision is made to send Warren Christopher to consult with President Zia of Pakistan. Plans are also made to further enhance U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt regarding Afghanistan. It is decided to send a strong message of protest to Brezhnev on the hotline. (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, p. 949)

December 28, 1979 - Carter telephones British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga and Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq to
consult about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each head of state reportedly agrees that the Soviet move is a "grave threat to peace." (P 12/29/79)

**December 28, 1979** - Carter sends Brezhnev a message on the hot line stating that the invasion of Afghanistan is a "clear threat to the peace" and "could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations." He urges quick withdrawal of Soviet forces and a halt to intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. (Carter, p. 472)

**December 28, 1979** - Vance states in a cable that the "very substantial military buildup" of Soviet forces along the Soviet-Afghan border signifies that the USSR has "additional military objectives beyond the change of government in Kabul." (Our Assessment of Recent Events in Afghanistan, 12/28/79)

**December 29, 1979** - White House Press Secretary Jody Powell publicly calls the movements a "Soviet invasion" for the first time and places the number of Soviet combat troops involved at 25,000 to 30,000. (WP 12/30/80)

**December 30, 1979** - Responding to Carter's message of two days earlier, Brezhnev states that he has sent Soviet troops to Afghanistan in response to requests from Kabul. The troops will withdraw when "the reasons which prompted the Afghan request to the Soviet Union disappear." Reportedly Carter sees the response as "devious" and an insult to his intelligence. A few hours later, during a television interview, Carter says that this "action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office." (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, pp. 949-950)

**December 30, 1979-January 4, 1980** - High-level Carter Administration policy makers meet to discuss policy toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Brzezinski believes that some limits on grain sales, further technology transfers to China and a large aid program for Afghanistan are sufficiently punitive and strategically important. Carter later writes that Brzezinski was "remarkably sober, concerned about future relations with the Soviet Union." Carter, however, is "determined to make them pay for their unwarranted aggression." He contemplates further steps such as a boycott of the summer Olympics scheduled for Moscow "as the most severe blow." (Carter, pp. 474, 476; Brzezinski, p. 431; Garthoff, p. 951)

**December 31, 1979** - In an interview, Carter says Brezhnev was "not telling the facts accurately" when he claimed that the Soviet Union had been "invited" by the Afghan government. Carter also states that "my opinion of the Russians has changed most [more] drastically in the last week than even the previous two and one-half years before that." Pakistan and other Third World countries suggest a U.N. Security Council meeting to condemn Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (Replies by the President to Questions Asked at an Interview with Correspondent Frank Reynolds of ABC, 12/31/79; FAC, p. 40)

**December 31, 1979** - The U.N. Security Council passes a resolution giving Iran one week to free the hostages before it imposes sanctions. Included is a statement that
Kurt Waldheim will go to Iran. *(Resolution 461 (1979), Adopted by the U.N. Security Council, 12/31/79)*

**Late 1979** - As part of the CBT talks, the U.S. proposes to establish, for verification purposes, a seismic station at the Soviet reactor center at Obninsk. *(Garthoff, p. 758)*

**Late 1979** - The U.S. and China reach agreement on establishing intelligence collection facilities in China for observing Soviet missile tests. *(Garthoff, p. 719)*
1980 - Because of the Afghanistan trade boycott, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union drops by almost 60 percent from 1979 to 1980, from $4.45 billion to $1.96 billion. By contrast, Soviet-European trade increases. For example, Soviet-French trade rises 100 percent and Soviet-German trade grows by 65 percent. Various contracts canceled by U.S. firms are taken up by their European competitors. (Garthoff, pp. 969, 977, 979-980)

1980 - The Carter Administration increases commodity credit guarantees for Poland to a level of $670 million. (Brzezinski, p. 299)

Early 1980 - When Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing meet in Paris they agree that detente has become "more difficult" because of the "Afghanistan incident." They warn that "detente would probably not be able to withstand another shock of the same type." Schmidt declares that "[w]e will not permit ten years of detente and defense policy to be destroyed." Giscard speaks of keeping Europe out of U.S.-Soviet conflicts; the "balance of power in Europe is a separate problem." (Garthoff, p. 978)

Early 1980 - The Soviets accept the U.S. proposal to establish a seismic station but the U.S. has to backtrack because the tightening up of technology transfer after the invasion of Afghanistan prevents shipment of the seismographs. (Garthoff, p. 758)

January 1980 - Carter transmits to Congress his report on U.S. actions regarding non-proliferation. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/1/80)

January 1980 - Bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms talks and anti-satellite ASAT weapons negotiations cease after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 969)

January 1, 1980 - In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council discusses the specifics of a plan to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan. (NSC Discussion of Support for Pakistan, 1/1/80)


January 2, 1980 - U.S. military officers maintain that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates the inability of the U.S. armed forces to react to a crisis. According to spokesmen of the U.S. Navy, the invasion of Afghanistan in itself has no relevance to U.S. national security but it does raise the question of "[h]ow the hell are you going to get there" if more vital interests in the region are attacked. (WP 1/3/80)

January 3, 1980 - Carter asks Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter later writes that the invasion was "the worst disappointment to me
personally" because of the impact on SALT. (Letter from the President to the Majority Leader of the Senate, 1/3/80; Smith, p. 224; Carter, p. 473)

January 4, 1980 - In an address to the nation, Carter denounces the Soviet invasion of the "small nonaligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan" as a "callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter." He announces that he has requested the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II and outlines a series of other steps the Administration will take in response to the Soviet action. Among these are embargoes on exports of grain and high technology to the Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S. will delay opening any new U.S. or Soviet consular facilities, curtail Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters and provide Pakistan with military and economic assistance "to defend its independence." (Address to the Nation by the President, 1/4/80)

January 4, 1980 - The Carter Administration decides to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean because of the recent crises in Afghanistan and Iran. According to an administration spokesman, it needs access to facilities to support a naval fleet in case of an emergency. (NYT 1/5/80)

January 5, 1980 - The U.S. Mission to the United Nations is instructed to tell the South Africa Arms Embargo Committee that the United States has reliable information that Soviet-made tanks have been shipped to Rhodesia via South Africa, thus violating sanctions against both Rhodesia and South Africa. (South Africa Arms Embargo: Shipment of Soviet Tanks to Rhodesia via South Africa, 1/5/80)

January 5, 1980 - A press account reports a "hush-hush decision...[within the Carter administration to] do everything possible to ship weapons to the Moslem insurgents" in Afghanistan. According to William Beecher, the weapons supply is to be coordinated with China and with Egypt, which has agreed to provide anti-aircraft missiles obtained from the Soviet Union before Sadat expelled Soviet advisors in 1972. In exchange, the United States will supply Egypt with more up-to-date U.S. weapons. (BG 1/5/80)

January 5, 1980 - Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland announces that Carter has directed the Secretary of Commerce to "suspend all grain shipments to the Soviet Union in excess of the 8 million tons per year which we are committed to sell under our five year grain sale agreement. The President has also directed that exports of other agricultural products to the Soviet Union be suspended." Reduced U.S. grain sales will cause a shortfall of 17 million tons in the USSR's 34-million-ton import target for 1980. (U.S. Suspends Shipments of Agricultural Commodities to the Soviet Union, 1/5/80)

January 5-9, 1980 - Harold Brown travels to Beijing to discuss security matters with the Chinese government. According to one report, "the secret part of his agenda deal[s] primarily with Afghanistan." Brown reportedly obtains Chinese government permission for planes carrying weapons to Afghan rebels to overfly Chinese territory. Chinese arms supply to the rebels is also assured. Brown refuses to provide any details of possible joint actions, however. He does add later, however,
that China and the United States have "taken a big step in strategic relations." (WP 1/10/80; Brzezinski, p. 424; CT 7/22/81)

**January 6, 1980** - *The New York Times* reports that U.S. officials are divided in their interpretation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some characterize the intervention as the most serious international situation facing the United States since World War II. State Department officials, on the other hand, see the intervention as a "predictable reaction to the Soviet Union's fears that it was losing control" in Afghanistan and a logical extension of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a reference to Soviet military protection of socialist, Soviet-aligned countries. Regardless of how Soviet intentions are interpreted, U.S. officials agree that the move should be met by a "credible American response." (NYT 1/6/80)

**January 7, 1980** - Carter expresses his commitment to sending military aid to Pakistan for their defensive needs in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Replies by the President to Questions Asked at an Interview with John Chancellor of NBC, 1/7/80)

**January 7, 1980** - Carter approves the State Department recommendation that favorable action be taken on the still-pending export licenses for nuclear fuel to India. (*Instructions for Seeking Government of India Assurances in Connection with Shipments of Nuclear Fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station*, 1/10/80)

**January 8, 1980** - In spontaneous remarks to members of Congress, Carter states that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the "greatest threat to world peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union...The Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgement our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan...would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies." (*Remarks by the President to a Congressional Group*, 1/8/80; Garthoff, p. 972)

**January 10, 1980** - PD/NSC-55, "Intelligence Special Access Programs: Establishment of the APEX System," is completed. (Richelson)

**January 12, 1980** - In his first speech since late December, Brezhnev defends the Kremlin policy toward Afghanistan and attacks Carter for his "lies" and "harsh accusations" about the invasion. Brezhnev reiterates his government's contention that Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government and declares that Soviet policy will not be altered in any way by U.S. actions. (WP 1/13/80)


**January 13, 1980** - In comments to the press, Brezhnev states that "[i]t was no simple decision" to send troops to Afghanistan. Intervention was necessary, he says,
because there was a "real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border....In other words, the time had come when we could no longer fail to respond to the request of the government of a friendly Afghanistan....To have done otherwise would have meant to watch passively the origination on our southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state." Brezhnev asserts that Harold Brown was in Beijing at the time to coordinate with the Chinese assistance to forces making military sorties into Afghanistan. (Garthoff, pp. 928-929, 932)

January 14, 1980 - Nicaragua abstains when the U.N. General Assembly votes on a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The vote passes, 104 to 18, with 18 abstentions. (CRS1, p. 3)

January 14, 1980 - The U.N. General Assembly passes a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The vote is 104 in favor, 18 opposed and 18 abstentions, a large enough margin to avoid the possibility of a Soviet veto. (Amstutz, pp. 325-326; Resolution ES-6/2, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 1/14/80)

January 14, 1980 - In an interview with Time magazine, Brzezinski says that Soviet military action in Afghanistan has "imposed a severe strain on detente" and has had an "adverse impact" on SALT II. He also states: "Without SALT, the world could be confronted by a more acute arms race between the two superpowers." (Replies by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Questions Asked at an Interview with "Time," 1/14/80)

January 15, 1980 - Former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon says that he had sent "almost daily" warnings to Washington of Soviet intentions to intervene militarily in Afghanistan just prior to the invasion. (WP 1/17/80)

January 15, 1980 - In a New York Times interview, Vance refers to two competing explanations of Soviet motives for the invasion of Afghanistan: 1) that it is the first step in a move toward the south, or 2) that it aimed at preventing deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan because of the possible impact on Soviet Central Asia. He declares that "I don't think it does any good to try, at this point, to psychoanalyze which of these was the reason--or what combination of them...there must be a sharp and firm response." He wants the Soviets to "recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan." (NYT 1/16/80)

January 16, 1980 - The State Department contradicts former Ambassador Malcolm Toon's assertions that he had consistently warned of Soviet intentions to invade Afghanistan by pointing out that Toon had sent numerous cables downplaying the possibility of a Soviet invasion. Spokesman Hodding Carter says that a number of cables bearing Toon's signature argue that the chance of a massive invasion is slim. (WP 1/17/80)

January 17, 1980 - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi comments on India's nuclear policy and on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. She states, "we do not believe in producing atom bombs. But, we should have the freedom in developing nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes." She further declares that "India does not support outside intervention in any country," but adds, "the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan Revolutionary Council." (Mrs. Gandhi on Nuclear Policy, Soviet Intervention, 1/17/80)

January 18, 1980 - As part of a dramatic turnaround in U.S.-Pakistan relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter proposes giving $400 million in military and economic assistance to Islamabad as an emergency exemption to the Symington Amendment. However, President Zia-ul-Haq calls Carter’s offer "peanuts" and presses instead for a security treaty with the United States. Brzezinski and Warren Christopher meet with Zia-ul-Haq and hold out only the promise of more aid, continuing to warn that a Pakistani nuclear test would end all U.S. efforts in this regard. (Spector2, p. 85; U.S. Assistance for Pakistan, 1/18/80; Zia Criticizes U.S. Aid Offer in Interview with U.S. Press, 1/18/80; Zia’s Remarks to U.S. Newsmen on U.S. Aid Offer, Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue, 1/18/80)

January 20, 1980 - Carter announces on "Meet the Press" that the U.S. will send a message to the International Olympics Committee, stating that unless the Soviets withdraw their forces from Afghanistan within a month, there will be no participation in the Moscow Olympic Games. (Carter, pp. 481-482)

January 22, 1980 - The Washington Post reports that Soviet policy toward Afghanistan is formulated by a special "quick reaction group" in the Politburo. The "inner circle" probably consists of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, KGB chief Yuri Andropov and Politburo member Boris Ponomarev. The group was formed because of Brezhnev’s illness, with his consent. Fred Halliday alleges that the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was decided after several days of discussion within the Politburo. Politburo member Mikhail Suslov was the strongest advocate for Soviet intervention, supported by Brezhnev, Ustinov and Gromyko. Andropov, however, was somewhat wary of direct intervention, and his support within the Politburo is unknown. (WP 1/22/80; Sen Gupta, p. 88)

January 23, 1980 - A press report indicates that thousands of Soviet bureaucrats have been transferred to Afghanistan to run the government. East German intelligence agents are helping to direct the security forces. As the Soviet Union tightens its hold on the Karmal government, Afghan administrators are being dismissed or executed. The Afghan government orders all non-communist news reports off the air and refuses to grant visas to foreign journalists. (WS 1/23/80)

January 23, 1980 - Indian Foreign Minister P.V.N. Rao expresses "grave concern" over the decision by the United States to "rearm" Pakistan. (Indian Foreign Minister Expresses "Grave Concern" over U.S. Moves to Rearm Pakistan, 1/23/80)

January 23, 1980 - In his State of the Union address, Carter stresses the major significance of U.S.-Soviet relations to world peace. The relationship has "not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation." At present, the United States’ basic purpose is to lead other nations "in meeting the challenge of
mounting Soviet power."

Carter also describes a "regional security framework" for the Gulf, which later becomes known as the Carter Doctrine:

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Moscow later criticizes this assertion of U.S. vital interests in an area "which lies thousands of miles away from the American shores" as an attempt to maintain "the dominant position of American monopolies in the region." Brezhnev exclaims, "[n]obody will intimidate the Soviet Union." (WP 1/24/80; Sen Gupta, p. 101; Brzezinski, p. 443)

January 24, 1980 - A Carter Administration official tells The New York Times that the status of the Persian Gulf region has been elevated to that of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, all "areas where Washington is prepared to risk a conflict to contain Soviet influence." White House aides admit their surprise at "how few military options the United States had at its disposal" in the Persian Gulf. (Tahir-Kheli, p. 98)

January 29, 1980 - By a vote of 88 to 4, the Senate joins the House of Representatives in recommending that the United States boycott the Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan. (WP 1/30/80)


February 1980 - Carter writes to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stating that he will proceed with the two pending export licenses if he receives "certain assurances" reaffirming earlier statements that U.S.-supplied fuel would be used only at Tarapur. These assurances are also understood to rule out peaceful nuclear explosions. (Talking Points for Mr. Pickering to Use in Delhi, 2/25/80)

February 1980 - The Central Intelligence Agency reports to a congressional committee that if a South African nuclear test indeed occurred on September 22, 1979, then "Israel is the leading candidate" among the states which might have conducted it. (Spector2, p. 133)

February 1, 1980 - Vance says that Presidential Special Envoy Clark Clifford was "more dramatic than necessary" when he said recently that a Soviet push to the Persian Gulf would mean war. "I would have used different language," says Vance, because it is a mistake to "draw lines" which could force the United States to take a position that it would later regret not being able to defend. (WP 2/2/80)
February 1, 1980 - The United States announces that it is now willing to sell India sophisticated military equipment that it had previously refused to transfer to any country in South Asia. The U.S. offer to discuss the sale of guidance systems for aircraft and "smart bombs" is conveyed by presidential envoy Clark Clifford in a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. (WP 2/5/80)

February 1-3, 1980 - Brzezinski and Warren Christopher visit Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for negotiations on the Soviet invasion and to lay the groundwork for a regional security framework. The United States offers Pakistan $200 million in economic assistance and $200 million in military assistance. Zia refers to this offer as "peanuts," claiming that it is "not the quantity of aid but the quality of the U.S. commitment." Zia wants stronger assurances that the United States will protect Pakistan against Soviet intervention, citing China as an example: "They did not give that much aid, but their word is as good as gold with us." (Brzezinski, p. 448; Tahir-Kheli, p. 76; LAT 2/2/80)


February 12, 1980 - Marshall Shulman says in a published interview that he thinks the Soviet government invaded Afghanistan out of "a broad fear of the creation of a crescent of militant Islamic, anti-Soviet nations" on its southern border, not because it is seeking to gain control over Middle East oil. While he concedes that some Soviet officials and the Soviet military did consider the strategic opportunities, he believes that the real motivation was political instability in Afghanistan. (DSD 2/12/80)


February 16, 1980 - The Soviet Union begins to move five more battle ships into the Indian Ocean in response to the increased United States naval presence. The Soviet fleet, comprised of 31 ships, is the largest Soviet naval contingent in the region in recent history. The U.S. fleet consists of 20 ships, including 13 warships. (WS 2/21/80)

February 20, 1980 - Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Suslov accuses Carter of "directly violating his promises and assurances" over the SALT II treaty (which Carter has refused to submit for ratification in the Senate). (WP 2/21/80)

February 20, 1980 - The Soviet Union denies a U.S. claim that Soviet tanks have been shipped to Rhodesia through South Africa (see January 5, 1980, entry). (U.N.'s South Africa Arms Embargo Committee Agrees to Send Note to Soviets on Soviet Tanks in Rhodesia/South Africa, 4/10/80)
February 25, 1980 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Harrop states that one of the U.S. objectives in the Horn of Africa is to "limit Soviet influence in and access to the Horn." (Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2/25/80)

February 26, 1980 - Carter sends a letter to Yugoslavia's President Tito, saying that the United States would be willing to participate in a "guarantee" of Afghanistan's "true neutrality" given a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops. (WP 2/27/80)

February 26, 1980 - Leonid M. Zamyatin, a high-ranking official of the Soviet Communist Party, calls on Carter to stop supplying aid and arms to "mercenaries" in Afghanistan. (NYT 2/27/80)

February 27, 1980 - The Soviet Union hints that it might be ready to pull its troops out of Afghanistan, but U.S. officials firmly discount the significance of these hints. The London-based Evening News quotes Soviet officials as being willing to accept U.N. peackeeping forces, while Brezhnev expresses interest in U.S.-Soviet talks to visiting American businessman Armand Hammer. American analysts see the initiatives as an attempt to split a "wavering" European alliance and to derail U.S. attempts to lead a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. (WP 2/28/80)

February 27, 1980 - The House of Representatives passes the $75 million Nicaraguan aid package by the narrow margin of 202-197. (Nicaragua)

February 28, 1980 - Carter holds a meeting in the Oval Office to determine how to react to indirect communication from Moscow that the USSR may be willing to withdraw from Afghanistan if the United States reconsiders its stance on boycotting the Olympics. (Brzezinski, p. 435)

February 29, 1980 - Vance and Dobrynin discuss the situation in Afghanistan. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter denies reports that further talks are scheduled for next month and dismisses speculation that the two countries are near an agreement to end the crisis. Hodding Carter reiterates U.S. insistence that Soviet troops be withdrawn before a solution can be reached. (WP 3/1/80)

March 1980 - Four high-ranking Sandinista leaders meet with Soviet government officials in the Soviet Union and sign agreements on economic, technical, scientific and cultural cooperation; they are also reported to sign a "mutual support agreement" between the FSLN and the Soviet Communist Party. (CRS, p. 3)

March 1, 1980 - Central Committee official Valentin Falin observes that it was inconsistent for Carter to play up the Soviet threat and then expect the Senate to ratify SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 825)

March 1, 1980 - The President of the South African Atomic Energy Board, Dr. De Villiers, dismisses the possibility that South Africa has diverted uranium to military uses. (South Africa Nuclear Policy, 3/1/80)
March 3, 1980 - Vance warns that sanctions against the Soviet Union will remain in place until all Soviet troops leave Afghanistan. Saying that the Soviet government shows no signs of ending the occupation, Vance gives the first indication from a senior Carter Administration official of the likely duration of the sanctions. U.S. officials say that the speech is meant primarily for Western European allies, who have complained about the "lack of clarity" in the U.S. sanctions. Vance outlines "five key objectives" of the Carter policy:

1. to impose a heavy price for the aggression through economic sanctions;
2. to encourage a withdrawal of Soviet troops through efforts on the part of the international community to create a truly nonaligned, neutral government;
3. to manage East-West relations in a way that "preserves their essential framework" and allow a resumption of détente when the crisis ends;
4. to work with Southwest Asian countries to strengthen the "security, stability, and independence of the region;"
5. to make a renewed commitment to "building the basic military and economic strength of America." (WP 3/4/80)

March 3, 1980 - In a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Vance states that "our relations with the Soviet Union have been and will be essentially competitive." Nevertheless, he states that it is not in the U.S. interest "even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation." (Garthoff, pp. 968-969)


March 5, 1980 - Carter has a meeting with Schmidt. He writes in his diary that the Chancellor "was primarily on the defensive because I persisted in asking what more the Federal Republic would do to help us in Afghanistan, and what actually they had done that provides pressure on the Soviet Union. The answer to both those questions apparently is 'Nothing.'" (Carter, p. 500)

March 9, 1980 - Zia-ul-Haq discusses with American scholar Selig Harrison why he decided to reject the U.S. aid package. Zia states that the effort to pair reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral agreement with an aid package was viewed as an inadequate response to the Soviet invasion. He adds that the U.S. offer implied that the amount of aid was tied to the degree of assurances given. (U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Zia Expounds to American Scholar, 3/9/80)

March 10, 1980 - The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 takes effect. (CRS4, p. 11)

March 11, 1980 - South Africa's arms production company, ARMSCOR, confirms that it confiscated ammunition and 10 Soviet tanks allegedly sent by Libya to Ugandan leader Idi Amin in April 1979. According to The Times of London, the tanks were to be shipped to Uganda through Kenya, but Kenyan authorities refused
to allow the arms to be taken across their territory. The tanks were confiscated when the ship carrying them stopped to refuel in Durban. According to U.S. sources in Cape Town, some of the tanks apparently made it to Rhodesia. (South Africa Admits Seizure of Soviet Tanks, 3/12/80)

March 12, 1980 - The Department of State transmits its approval of military sales to Somalia to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (ICAR4)

March 20, 1980 - The Soviet Union refuses to resume negotiations over rules for implementing provisions of SALT II. Soviet negotiators announce in Geneva that they will not continue discussions since Carter has refused to place the treaty before the Senate for ratification following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The talks have been recessed since December. (WP 3/21/80)

March 20, 1980 - The United States and China agree to pursue separate but "mutually reinforcing" efforts to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Meetings between Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin and Vice President Walter Mondale focus broadly on aid to the anti-Soviet rebels. (WP 3/21/80)

March 28, 1980 - Brzezinski informs Carter that there is continuing inter-agency disagreement over the explanation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. "I lean toward those who see the invasion as part of the current phase of Soviet assertiveness. Soviet behavior is symptomatic of the long-term historical drive, with military power supplanting Marxist ideology as its basic dynamic source. The drive toward the Persian Gulf is a historic element of Soviet foreign policy." (Brzezinski, p. 567)

April 1980 - After three months of negotiations led by Great Britain, the Rhodesian problem is solved as Robert Mugabe replaces Muzorewa as Prime Minister and majority rule is established. In his memoirs, Brzezinski calls the settlement of the Rhodesian problem a success, stating that it "foreclosed a major avenue for Soviet and Cuban meddling in southern Africa." (Smith, p. 143; Brzezinski, p. 143)

April 4, 1980 - The Soviet news agency Tass announces the ratification by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of a Soviet-Afghan treaty (probably signed on March 14, 1980) "on the conditions for the temporary stay of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan territory." The treaty is also approved by Afghanistan's Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers. (Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response, 2/16/82)

April 7, 1980 - Carter issues Executive Order 12205, implementing economic sanctions against Iran. (Executive Order No. 12205, Issued by the President, 4/7/80)

April 7, 1980 - Harold Brown says that there is increasing evidence that the Soviet Union is using nerve gas against the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan. Afghan refugees, in separate, independent interviews, have allegedly described symptoms which match those caused by the nerve agent Soman. (WP 4/8/80)

April 8, 1980 - State Department officials outline potential policy options regarding
authorizing nuclear fuel for export to India in light of the fact that the government of India has not been particularly forthcoming on the "assurances" sought by Carter in his February 28 letter to Indira Gandhi. (Fürapur Fuel, 4/8/80; Tarapur Fuel Options Paper, 4/15/80; Tarapur, 4/23/80)

April 10, 1980 - During a meeting with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Carter downplays the significance of Soviet motivations for intervening in Afghanistan: "We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude. Regardless of its motives, there can be no doubt that the Soviet invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sealanes." (PPP, 1980-81, I, p. 635)

April 10, 1980 - The Afghan government claims Afghan rebel forces are using U.S.-made chemical grenades in Afghanistan. (Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response, 2/16/82)

April 11, 1980 - Gen. Aleksei Yepshev, chief of the Political Department of the Soviet armed forces, says in a signed article in Pravda that all the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to "guarantee the security of such Marxist nations as Afghanistan against attacks by imperialism." While all Warsaw Pact members except Romania have supported the Soviet intervention, only the Soviet Union has sent troops into Afghanistan. Moscow has called for a meeting of European communist parties to discuss--and presumably endorse--further "military assistance" to Afghanistan. The Italian, Yugoslav and Spanish communist parties have already indicated that they will not attend such a conference. (NYT 4/12/80)

April 12, 1980 - In response to the movement by the Soviet Union of additional military units into Afghanistan, Carter states that the Soviets are "threatening the advantages of detente, now and in the future." (Replies by the President to Questions Asked at a News Conference, 4/12/80)

April 22, 1980 - The Nicaraguan government extends its "state of emergency" for a period of one year. (Nicaragua)

April 17, 1980 - The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee sends notes to the governments of Libya, France and the Soviet Union asking them to investigate the recent arrival of Soviet tanks in South Africa and Rhodesia. (Soviets, Libyans Respond to U.N. Arms Embargo Committee Notes on Soviet Tanks in Southern Africa, 5/30/80; U.N.'s South Africa Arms Embargo Committee Meeting--April 23, 4/25/80)

April 21, 1980 - Vance submits his resignation to Carter based on concerns arising from the planned hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The resignation is to take effect after the mission, which is set for April 25. On April 28, Vance meets with the President who formally accepts his resignation. Edmund Muskie is later appointed to replace Vance as secretary of state. (McLellan, pp. 160-161)

April 21, 1980 - The United States concludes military and economic accords with
Oman and Kenya, granting the United States access to air and naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Oman will receive $100 million in aid for the use of the bases; Kenya will receive roughly half that amount. Also, renovation of the bases will cost some $100 million. (NYT 4/22/80)

April 23, 1980 - Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko arrives in Paris for a three-day visit, his first to a Western country since the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet military reportedly refuses to consider a symbolic gesture of removing a few divisions from Afghanistan for the trip. (WP 4/24/80)

April 23, 1980 - Responding to a letter from the U.N. South Africa Arms Embargo Committee, the government of Libya asserts that the Soviet tanks recently discovered in South Africa and Rhodesia were originally being transported from Libya to Uganda. The Libyan letter adds that legal action is being taken against the company responsible for delivery of the tanks. (Current Foreign Relations..., 5/30/80)

April 25, 1980 - A secret U.S. government attempt to rescue American hostages held in Iran ends when a helicopter and refueling aircraft involved in the operation collide at a desert staging area in Iran. (Iran-Contra Chronology, p. 30)

April 27, 1980 - Seven U.S. naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier "Constellation," arrive in the Indian Ocean, raising the fleet strength to a record 34 ships. Three more ships are expected to arrive within the week. (NYT 4/28/80)

April 27, 1980 - H.N. Kaul, a respected Indian journalist who is senior correspondent for the independent Press Trust of India, says that the Soviet Union has moved medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles into Afghanistan. Kaul, who has just returned from Afghanistan, argues that the missiles could be intended either to counter U.S. intercontinental B-52 bombers or to threaten the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Kaul's accusations are considered serious because of India's generally pro-Soviet stance and Kaul's personal reputation. (WP 4/28/80)

May 4, 1980 - In remarks on Radio Moscow, Georgi Arbatov declares that the Soviet brigade flap was an example of a U.S. campaign against an alleged "Soviet threat" and that opponents of detente tried to "poison the political environment" by bringing up the Soviet brigade even though it had been there for many years and was no threat to U.S. security. (Garthoff, p. 845)

May 5-June 18, 1980 - Liu Huaqing, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, tours industrial and military facilities in the U.S. During the visit, Vice Premier Geng Biao and his party meet with Carter, Brown, Mondale and others. They also tour military facilities and discuss the Afghanistan situation. (Garthoff, pp. 986-987)

May 8, 1980 - Edmund S. Muskie replaces Cyrus Vance as secretary of state. (Principal Officers, p. 3)

May 9, 1980 - Carter delivers a foreign policy speech in Philadelphia. In the
speech, he discourages "inordinate fear of communism," but also calls for the application of western power in a firm fashion to deter the new surge of Soviet assertiveness. He states that foreign policy must involve a "fusion of power and principle" to bring about "global change and progress." (Brzezinski, p. 460)

May 13, 1980 - Walter Mondale alleges that the Soviet Union is building a major airfield in Afghanistan with which to threaten the Persian Gulf. Mondale retracts the statement when U.S. intelligence sources inform him that no such base is being built. (WP 5/14/80)

May 14, 1980 - The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) begins monitoring an underground radio station which claims to be "the official voice of the Special Anti-Communist Forces broadcasting from Nicaragua" after the station reports that rebel troops are preparing an operation in a major western Nicaraguan city. (CRS1, p. 4)

May 15, 1980 - The Warsaw Pact releases a major policy statement calling for disarmament, detente and a "political settlement" of the Afghanistan situation. The statement, signed by Soviet President Brezhnev and the leaders of the other six members of the Warsaw Pact, comes shortly before the first high-level U.S.-Soviet talks since the invasion of Afghanistan. According to the statement, "once any forms of outside interference directed against Afghanistan are completely discontinued, the Soviet armed forces will begin to be pulled out from Afghanistan in accordance with the Soviet declarations." (WP 5/16/80)

May 16, 1980 - Muskie and Gromyko meet in Vienna for three hours but make no progress toward resolving the crisis in Afghanistan. Regarding the meeting, Gromyko writes in his memoirs: "Everything Muskie said confirmed that the Carter administration was drifting in the direction of raising world tension, sharpening Soviet-US relations and widening the gulf between us on nuclear issues." (Gromyko, p. 296; WP 5/17/80)

May 19, 1980 - Without informing Washington, Giscard d'Estaing meets Brezhnev in Warsaw. (Garthoff, p. 979)

May 31, 1980 - Carter signs a Special Central American Assistance Act containing $75 million in grants and loans to Nicaragua. (Nicaragua)

June 1980 - Carter signs PD-58, aimed at preserving the continuity of government during wartime—especially the security of the National Command Authorities. (Garthoff, p. 788; Richelson)

June, 1980 - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee releases a "Critique of United States Policy on Conventional Arms Transfers". (Basic Documents, p. 217)

June 1, 1980 - The Pentagon announces that it is withdrawing 1,800 Marines that the United States had sent to the Arabian Sea in response to the Iran and Afghanistan crises. A spokesman says that Washington does not rule out the possibility of sending them back to the region if the situation warrants it. (WP
June 4, 1980 - A press account reports that Poland, Hungary and Romania have privately informed the Soviet Union that they consider the invasion of Afghanistan a serious and damaging mistake. While the Warsaw Treaty countries—with the exception of Romania—have publicly supported the Soviet action, privately they have been extremely anxious about the intervention. In the words of one East bloc official, "Call it what you like, when you put troops across someone else’s frontier, it's invasion...." (CSM 6/4/80)

June 4, 1980 - Arturo Cruz, Sr., the newly appointed member of the Nicaraguan Junta, travels to Washington, D.C., to meet with Carter Administration and congressional officials and to convince them not to "fear that Nicaragua wishes to align itself with the Soviet Union and Cuba." (Nicaragua: Conditions and U.S. Interests, 11/19/81)

June 13, 1980 - Babrak Karmal attempts to commit suicide according to rumors circulating in Kabul. During the next week, however, the Afghan leader makes several public appearances, seeming "cocky as always." (Situation in Afghanistan, 6/19/80)

Mid-June 1980 - Shortly before Schmidt leaves for Moscow to meet with Brezhnev, Carter worries that the Chancellor is taking a softer position on TNF deployment. He sends him a tough letter that Schmidt characterizes as "astonishing." (Garthoff, p. 868)

June 17, 1980 - The Senate rejects a Carter Administration proposal to supply the Nicaraguan government with $5.5 million in military aid as part of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act for FY 1981, effectively shelving the possibility of military assistance to Nicaragua for 1981. (CRS1, p. 4)

June 18-19, 1980 - Carter approves two additional shipments of low enriched uranium to India amid mounting congressional opposition. (Spector, p. 39; CRS3, p. 47)

June 20, 1980 - Carter warns U.S. allies in Europe against the "false belief" that they can maintain détente with the Soviet Union while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. Carter strongly disputes Moscow's argument that Soviet actions in Afghanistan should not damage the essential "fabric" of détente. "The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace or still enjoy the benefits of cooperation while pursuing a policy of armed intervention," Carter insists. (NYT 6/21/80)

June 23, 1980 - Brezhnev reaffirms Moscow's long-term commitment to Afghanistan in a speech before the Communist Party Central Committee which is made public today. Radio Moscow also announces the partial withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. This withdrawal, reported yesterday by Tass, involves one division of soldiers and 108 tanks. (WP 6/24/80)
June 23, 1980 - The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party asserts that the "rapprochement between aggressive circles of the West, above all the United States, with the Chinese leadership is taking place on an anti-Soviet basis, hostile to peace. The partnership of imperialism and Peking hegemonism is a dangerous new phenomenon in world politics..." (Garthoff, p. 988)

June 24, 1980 - Muskie concedes that, in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Senate hostility to SALT II, prospects for further arms control are "diminished." (Basic Documents, p. 216)

June 25, 1980 - The United States informs the Soviet Union that it is ready to support a "decent and constructive" resolution of the Afghanistan crisis which will protect the "legitimate security interests" of the USSR. The proposal offers Soviet officials a face-saving way of withdrawing from Afghanistan, providing for a transition government which will lead to a neutral, independent Afghanistan. (WP 6/26/80)


Late June 1980 - After a tense meeting with Carter, who is irritated that the Europeans are continuing detente policy, Schmidt visits Brezhnev in Moscow. (Garthoff, p. 979)

June 30, 1980 - A number of prominent Democratic Senators circulate an appeal to other members of Congress for support of a joint resolution to override President Carter's approval of nuclear fuel to India. (CRS3, p. 47)

July 1980 - As U.S. negotiations with Somalia draw to a close, Ethiopia requests recalling U.S. Ambassador Fredric Chapin on grounds of alleged interference in Ethiopia's internal affairs. (ICAR2)

July 1980 - At the MBFR talks the Eastern delegations take up Schmidt's proposal (see November 1979 entry above) that no participant have more than half of the total level of conventional forces for its alliance. They also are willing to consider special steps to assure that forces withdrawn are not restored. In addition, the Eastern delegations reply to the Western proposal of December 1979 (see above) by calling attention to unilateral Soviet reductions of 20,000 troops and call for initial Soviet reductions of 20,000 and 13,000 by the U.S. (Garthoff, p. 767)

July 2, 1980 - Strikes for higher wages break out throughout Poland after an announcement of meat price increases. Strikers are generally appeased with salary hikes of between 10 and 15 percent. However, as soon as a strike is settled in one factory, another begins. This pattern continues throughout the month. (Weschler, p. 218; Andrews, p. 285; Cynkin, p. 40)

July 7, 1980 - Responding to a question about the linkage of SALT II and Afghanistan, Muskie states: "I think we had a fighting chance of getting ratification
before the invasion of Afghanistan...I can't conceive of being able to rally support of the Senate to achieve ratification of SALT II unless there is a significant change in Soviet behavior." (Replies by the Secretary of State to Questions Asked at a Question-and-Answer Session Following an Address before the Foreign Policy Association, 7/7/80)

**July 11-20, 1980** - Strikes are called in Lublin, Poland, paralyzing the town, along with its rail link to the Soviet Union, for four days. The strikers draw up 35 demands. Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski negotiates a compromise, and the strikers return to work after a nine-day absence. (Andrews, pp. 25-26; Weschler, p. 218)

**July 18, 1980** - A report from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research suggests that the Soviet Union has "long-range intentions" in Afghanistan. The report claims the USSR will only agree to negotiate the withdrawal of its troops from the country after the Muslim insurgency has been brought to an end. (Moscow's Afghan Strategy, 8/28/80)

**July 19, 1980** - Fidel Castro is the featured speaker at Nicaragua’s official anniversary celebration of the Sandinista revolution. (NYT 7/20/80)

**July 19 - August 3, 1980** - The Soviet Union hosts the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. (Terry, p. 80-81)

**July 25, 1980** - Carter signs Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which outlines a counter-vailing nuclear strategy. It is immediately leaked to the press. The directive represents an effort to synthesize the acquisition of strategic forces and strategic nuclear doctrine on the basis of a war-fighting capability and concept. (Garthoff, p. 789; Richelson)

**July 31, 1980** - Polish Communist Party leader Gierek leaves for a three-week working vacation in the Crimea with Brezhnev. The talks will determine whether Poland will receive financial assistance from the Soviets. (Andrews, p.26)

**August 1980** - Due in part to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States agrees to send military aid to Somalia, and Somalia agrees to give U.S. armed forces right of access to military facilities in Somalia. Meanwhile, Cuban and Soviet troops remain in Ethiopia. (ICAR4; Smith, p. 156)

**August 8, 1980** - The State Department reports that the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan by Soviet forces is "highly likely." (Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response, 2/16/82)

**August 11-September 7, 1980** - The Non-Proliferation Treaty Second Review Conference is held in Geneva. The Conference reports that between 1975 and 1980, 21 additional states have signed the NPT. By the end of the proceedings there is general agreement on the need for full-scope safeguards, but no amendments are proposed. A thorough and detailed examination of the implementation of all provisions of the treaty is produced. (CRS3, p. 47)
August 14-15, 1980 - Over 50,000 workers at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk go on strike. Their demands include wage increases and reinstatement of fired workers. (Andrews, p. 28; Weschler, p. 219)

August 16, 1980 - The Polish Government's accession to striking workers' demands is rejected by the workers, who prefer to press for broad political change: the right to form independent trade unions. (Andrews, p. 28)

August 18, 1980 - State Department spokesman David Passage declares that Poland's difficulties are "a matter for the Polish people and the Polish authorities to work out." (Cynkin, p. 42)

August 18-19, 1980 - Strikes spread to the Szczecin shipyards and elsewhere along the Baltic Coast, and then throughout Poland, until 174 factories and shipyards are affected. (Andrews, p. 31-32, 285; Weschler, p. 219)

August 20, 1980 - The Soviet Union resumes jamming of Russian language broadcasts from the West. The State Department protests this action as being "in clear disregard of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act concerning the dissemination of information." (Cynkin, p. 42)

August 20, 1980 - In a speech at the Naval War College, Secretary of Defense Brown supports the development of a "countervailing," or war-fighting, nuclear strategy to counter the perceived Soviet war-fighting strategy. (Garthoff, p. 789)

August 21, 1980 - The number of striking factories in Poland grows to 253. (Andrews, p. 32)

August 22, 1980 - The first issue of a strike bulletin, "Solidarnosc," is printed in the Lenin Shipyard. (Weschler, p. 219)

August 21-31, 1980 - Polish officials repeatedly meet with leaders of the "Solidarity" Interfactory Strike Committee. (Andrews, p. 32-34; Weschler, p. 219)

August 25, 1980 - Against the background of an increasingly volatile situation in Poland, especially the Solidarity trade union's effectiveness in opposing Communist Party control, Brzezinski urges Carter to send letters to West European leaders Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Schmidt, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the Pope. The purpose would be to stress Washington's interest in these developments and initiate a dialogue aimed at developing a common Western approach. Carter sends the letters, which also raise concerns about the possibility of Soviet intervention; this leads to consultations among the allies about contingency plans in the event the Soviets move in. (Brzezinski, p. 464)

August 27, 1980 - The Polish government requests more U.S. grain credits. The request is handled cautiously, according to U.S. officials, in order to avoid "provoking" the Soviets. (Cynkin, p. 43)
August 28, 1980 - Muskie issues a statement expressing sympathy for the Polish people and their struggle, but indicating the U.S. will do nothing to provoke the Kremlin. He states that the "U.S. Government will refrain from any words or actions which might complicate the resolution of Poland's current difficulties in a manner consistent with the aspirations of its people." (Cynkin, p. 43)

August 31, 1980 - Lech Walesa and Deputy Premier Jagielski sign the Gdansk Agreement by which strikes are ended and the Polish government makes significant concessions to the workers. (Andrews, p. 34-35; Weschler, p. 219)

Early September 1980 - The AFL-CIO decides to extend financial help to the Solidarity trade union. Carter instructs Muskie to tell the Soviets that Washington had nothing to do with the decision. Brzezinski prevails on the secretary of state to tell the Polish ambassador as well, in a gesture meant to show the U.S. does not view Poland as a "vassal of the Soviet Union." (Brzezinski, p. 464)

September 1, 1980 - Pravda publishes an article under the by-line "Alexei Petrov" that is harshly critical of the Gdansk agreement. Soviet criticism of the Polish government's handling of the situation continues through the Fall. (Cynkin, p. 44)

September 1, 1980 - In a campaign speech on Labor Day, Jimmy Carter states that, "the working men and women of Poland have set an example for all those who cherish freedom and human dignity." These are his strongest comments to date on the Polish crisis. (Labor Day, Remarks at a White House Picnic for Representatives of Organized Labor, 9/1/80; Cynkin, p. 46)

September 5, 1980 - An NSC Special Coordination Committee meeting is held to assess the policy implications of intelligence reports indicating that the Soviet military may be contemplating intervening in Iran. (Brzezinski, p. 451)

September 12, 1980 - Carter announces $670 million in credits for Poland to procure four million tons of grain. (Agricultural Commodity Credit Guarantees to Poland, Remarks Announcing Approval of the Commodity Credit Corporation Guarantees, 9/12/80; Cynkin, p. 48)

September 16, 1980 - To quell Soviet fears that the new countervailing strategy provides for a U.S. first strike capability, Muskie states that it "does not signify a shift...to a first strike doctrine. It does...strengthen the credibility of our capability to retaliate against any nuclear attack...." He also states that the strategy is consistent with the SALT II treaty and arms control goals (i.e., it is mainly for deterrence). (Statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9/16/80)

September 17, 1980 - South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung receives a death sentence for sedition against the Seoul government. Secretary of State Muskie releases a statement noting Washington's "deep concern" and "strong feelings about the extreme verdict." (Statement by the Secretary of State, 9/17/80)
September 18, 1980 - The House passes four resolutions disapproving Carter's decision to approve the export of nuclear fuel to India. However, the Senate fails to do the same and Congress does not override the Administration's action. (CRS2, p. 48; [Congratulations on Prevailing in the Battle of Supplying Nuclear Fuel to the Tarapur Reactors], 9/25/80; [Authorization to Export Fuel to Tarapur; Letters between Senator Frank Church and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie Attached], 9/26/80)

September 19, 1980 - Soviet military activity increases along Poland's eastern and western borders. (Cynkin, p. 49)

September 20, 1980 - In an address to the Polish Alliance, Carter equates the Polish people's struggle with the world-wide quest for human rights. Apparently in response to increased Soviet military activity on Poland's borders the day before, Carter pledges non-interference in Poland and calls upon the Soviet Union to do likewise. The Soviets do not oblige. (Niles, Illinois, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Dinner of the Polish National Alliance, 9/20/80; Cynkin, pp. 49-50)

September 22, 1980 - The strikes in Poland end, as the Gdansk settlement is extended throughout the nation. Thirty-six union representatives meet in Gdansk under the name "Solidarnosc." Karol Modzelewski is named the official spokesperson of the union. (Weschler, p. 220)

September 22, 1980 - Iraq mounts a surprise attack upon Iran, launching the Iran-Iraq war. (Spector2, p. 177)

September 24, 1980 - Walesa, the chairman of the independent trade union Solidarity, applies for its legal registration. (Weschler, p. 220; Andrews, p. 286)

September 25, 1980 - Staff Secretary Christine Dodson circulates an agenda and discussion paper for a PRC meeting scheduled for the following day in the White House Situation Room. The document outlines U.S. policy objectives toward Poland, considers options for economic assistance, and contains a "Contingency Checklist." The list outlines proposed U.S. responses to three possible scenarios: (I) "Imminent use of force by Polish Government against Polish workers," (II) "Indications of imminent Soviet intervention," and (III) "Actual Soviet Military Intervention." (Agenda and Discussion Paper for PRC on Poland, 9/25/80)

September 25, 1980 - Muskie and Gromyko meet in New York and agree to hold talks on TNF arms control in mid-October. (Garthoff, p. 868)

September 28, 1980 - Anti-government demonstrations break out in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas label the uprisings a "counterrevolutionary plot." (Nicaragua)

September 30, 1980 - In a major statement, Assistant Secretary of State Moose is critical of America's absence from Angola, stating that it strengthens the influence of the Soviets and Cubans, prevents the United States from trying to create a peaceful solution there and impedes the expansion of trade and business opportunities. (Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 9/30/80)
End September-Early October 1980 - By this time, Brzezinski sees "portents of possible Soviet intervention" in Poland. He begins to convene meetings of the Special Coordination Committee to go over contingency plans. (Brzezinski, p. 465)

Fall 1980 - Carter authorizes a CIA program to funnel approximately $1 million to anti-Sandinista labor, press and political organizations in Nicaragua. (LAT 3/3/85)

October 1980 - At the MBFR talks, the West responds to the Eastern bloc proposal of July (see above) by stating that agreement on the data base was necessary before agreement was possible on the exact size of reductions in the first phase. (Garthoff, p. 767)

October 1980 - The Carter Administration and several Islamic states commit themselves to a significant increase in the level of aid to the Afghan rebels, with particular emphasis on heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. (CT 7/23/81)

October 3, 1980 - Solidarity holds a one-hour warning strike to protest government delays in issuing the Gdansk Agreement pay increases. (Andrews, p. 286; Weschler, p. 220)

October 4, 1980 - Brzezinski reports on the situation in Poland, warning of possible Soviet intervention. He recommends that Presidential letters be sent to Giscard and Schmidt. (Orbis, p. 33)

Mid-October 1980 - President Babrak Karmal meets with Brezhnev in Moscow. The Soviet news agency Tass reports that discussions centered on reaching an agreement with Pakistan which will end Islamabad's support for the Afghan rebels. The meetings conclude with a joint statement by Brezhnev and Karmal that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan only when resistance to the DRA government comes to an end. (Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response, 2/16/82; Sen Gupta, p. 103)

October 14, 1980 - Muskie remarks that the Soviets are linking their behavior in Afghanistan to the hard-line approach taken by the United States toward them, including the Senate's rejection of the SALT II treaty and the escalation in defense expenditures. (Remarks by the Secretary of State at a Press Briefing, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 10/14/80)

October 16-November 17, 1980 - A preliminary series of TNF arms control talks takes place in Geneva. The talks lead nowhere because of diametrically opposed positions. The U.S. position, based on a NATO agreement, is to limit talks to land-based LRTNF ballistic missile systems, such as Soviet SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, the Pershing II and GLCM systems, excluding all sea-based and aircraft systems on both sides and including only U.S. and Soviet systems. The Soviets want to include all U.S. FBS and to take into account French and British nuclear strike forces when setting levels for U.S. forces. The Soviets propose lower levels for the U.S. than for the Soviet Union on grounds of "equality" and "equal security" for the Soviet Union
in relation to all Western nuclear strike forces. (Garthoff, pp. 868-669)

**Late October 1980** - By the third week of the month, the Special Coordination Committee has prepared a series of possible penalties to be applied to the Soviet Union in the event of an armed intervention in Poland. (Brzezinski, p. 465)

**October 20-21, 1980** - The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meet in Warsaw. No references are made to Poland. (Cynkin, p. 53)

**October 23, 1980** - The Special Coordination Committee approves "a series of specific steps designed to penalize the Soviet Union severely in the event of military intervention" in Poland. These decisions are then used as the basis for allied consultations. (Brzezinski, p. 465; Cynkin, p. 53; Orbis, p. 33)

**October 24, 1980** - The registration of Solidarity is delayed by a Warsaw court because the registration does not recognize the Party's role. Solidarity refuses to change the wording and threatens to call a general strike if the registration is not processed by November 12. (Weschler, p. 220; Andrews, p. 286)


**October 28, 1980** - East Germany announces new, extreme visa requirements designed to curtail drastically travel to and from Poland. (Cynkin, p. 54)

**October 29, 1980** - It is announced that Polish Party Secretary Kania will make an "emergency trip" to the Soviet Union. (Cynkin, p. 54)

**October 29, 1980** - In the afternoon, Brzezinski meets with CIA Director Stansfield Turner to discuss, among other things, the possibility of Soviet intervention in Poland and possible responses of other governments. (Orbis, p. 34)

**October 30, 1980** - While on the campaign trial, Carter reiterates American support for the human rights struggle in Poland. (*Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Remarks to Members of the Polish Community, 10/30/80*)

**November 1980** - Eritrean representatives meet with Soviet and Ethiopian officials in Damascus to discuss a seven-point peace plan proposed by the Eritreans. Disunity among the Eritrean groups is cited as one factor in the eventual failure of the peace initiative. (ICAR1)

**November 1980** - Babarak Karmal claims that the Soviet Union supplies 80 percent of Afghanistan's foreign aid. (*Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation, 12/81*)


**November 9, 1980** - Nicolae Ceausescu, alone among East European leaders,
declares that Warsaw's difficulties are "problems of the Polish people and the Polish Party," and that the country "should be allowed to develop without any outside interference whatsoever." (Cynkin, p. 56)

**November 10, 1980** - The Polish Supreme Court rules that Solidarity is a legally independent organization and need not refer to subservience to the PUWP in its charter. Solidarity responds by withdrawing its strike threat. (Andrew, p. 62; Weschler, p. 220; Cynkin, p. 55)

**November 20, 1980** - The U.N. General Assembly adopts Resolution 35/37 calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. *(Resolution 35/37, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 11/20/80)*

**Late November 1980** - Brzezinski writes a memorandum to Muskie and Brown detailing a series of dire consequences he foresees in the event the Soviet Union mounts a military intervention in Poland. In his memoirs, Brzezinski notes that he sends the memo partly in the belief that it might leak and in that way help make clear to Moscow the seriousness Washington attaches to the issue. In fact, he personally gives background briefings to the press on the subject. He writes that he wanted to avoid the U.S. mistake of 1968 in not describing to the Soviets the costs of any contemplated move into Czechoslovakia. (Brzezinski, p. 465)

**Late November, 1980** - The Soviet leadership begins to covertly organize a new Polish leadership composed of hardliners. (Orbis, p. 16)

**November 26, 1980** - In Brzezinski's morning briefing of the president, possible Soviet intervention in Poland comes up. He is directed to write memos to Brown and Muskie soliciting ideas. (Orbis, p. 34)

**November 30, 1980** - U.S. intelligence reports that the East German border with Poland has been restricted. (Orbis, p. 34)

**December 1980** - Ethiopia launches its sixth offensive against Eritrea. The attack is seen as a "symbol of the breakdown of the [mediation] process" started by the Eritreans in November. *(ICAR1)*

**Early December 1980** - In the first half of the month, Brzezinski later writes, the situation in Poland comes to a head. (Brzezinski, p. 465)

**December 1, 1980** - First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Polish Army Tadeusz Hupalowski and Franciszak Puchala fly to Moscow to familiarize themselves with details of Soviet plans for intervention. These plans call for 15 Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak divisions, and one GDR division to be ready to cross the Polish frontier on December 8, 1980. The invasion will take place under the guise of "Soyuz 81" exercises. (Orbis, p. 16)

**December 1, 1980** - Brzezinski reports to Carter that the Polish situation has become "critical." He notes a complete closure of the Polish-East German border, increased readiness of Soviet troops, accelerated preparations at airfields and rail
depots, and the like. (Orbis, p. 35)

**December 3, 1980** - Brzezinski meets with Muskie, Brown and Stansfield Turner to discuss Poland. They agree on the need for a public statement by Carter (see next entry) and a message to Brezhnev on the same theme. (Brzezinski, p. 465)

**December 3, 1980** - Carter declares: "The United States is watching with growing concern the unprecedented buildup of Soviet forces along the Polish border and the closing of certain frontier regions along the border....The United States has no interest in exploiting, in any fashion, the Polish difficulties for its political ends....Foreign military intervention in Poland would have the most negative consequences for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular....I want all countries to know that the attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland." *(Statement by the President, Washington D.C., 12/3/80)*

**December 5, 1980** - At 9:10 a.m. on Friday, CIA Director Stansfield Turner makes a secure telephone call to Brzezinski to pass along "reliable information" that the Soviets are set to send a number of divisions into Poland the following Monday morning. The information prompts a Special Coordination Committee meeting on Saturday and an NSC meeting on Sunday. CIA reports indicate that Polish authorities will crack down on Solidarity while the intervention is underway and that there will be major public resistance and bloodshed. (Brzezinski, p. 466)

**December 7, 1980** - At a 9:00 a.m. NSC meeting on Sunday, Carter decides on a number of steps to take in light of information that Moscow may be planning a move into Poland. He will make a strong public statement and communicate privately with key foreign governments to urge that they help to deter the Kremlin. Following an afternoon Special Coordination Committee meeting, the Administration briefs congressional leaders and the press on the developments. Brzezinski also telephones the Pope, with Carter's permission, as well as members of Solidarity's leadership in order to warn them of a possible official crackdown. (Brzezinski, pp. 466-467)

**December 7, 1980** - Carter sends a hot-line message to Brezhnev concerning the CIA's report of December 5 that the Soviets will invade Poland. Carter warns of the serious consequences that would follow such an action. He also states that any intervention would merit the transfer of advanced weaponry to the Peoples Republic of China. The Soviets do not respond. In addition, the White House issues a statement reaffirming the position presented in its December 3 statement. *(Situation in Poland, White House Statement, 12/7/80; Cynkin, p. 72)*

**December 8, 1980** - Carter feels that world condemnation of the USSR invasion of Afghanistan is hindering military intervention in Poland. He notes in his diary: "We're continuing our worldwide effort to arouse...interest in the Soviet moves...The Soviets have not denied our public statements, and Brezhnev has not answered my hot-line message" for the first time. (Carter, p. 585)
December 9, 1980 - The NATO allies meet to discuss possible actions in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland. Contingency plans include an increase in defense spending, closing of Western ports to Soviet vessels, a cut-off of credit to both Poland and the Soviet Union, recalling of ambassadors, and a boycott of the CSCE talks. (Cynkin, p. 74)

December 10, 1980 - Soviet forces continue to gather near the Polish frontier. The CIA estimates that the most likely period of movement would be December 11-16. (Orbis, p. 45)

December 12, 1980 - At a White House breakfast meeting, the possibility of a boycott against the Soviets is discussed. News of this possibility is leaked to the Wall Street Journal. (Orbis, p. 47)

December 12, 1980 - Brzezinski sends a memo to Harold Brown entitled "Weapons for China," asking for DOD evaluation of possible weapons sales to China as a sanction taken against the Soviets. (Orbis, p. 48)

December 12, 1980 - NATO issues a communiqué directed at the USSR. Reiterating the benefits of detente, the communiqué announces that any violation of the "basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and independence" will result in the end of detente. Any threat of intervention will force the Allies to "react in a manner which the gravity of this development would require." (Cynkin, p. 75)

December 25-27, 1980 - Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Czybek flies to Moscow to meet with the Soviet leadership. At the conclusion of the talks, the Poles issue a communiqué stating that Brezhnev "wished the Polish people success in the difficulties that have arisen on the path of socialist development and expressed confidence that, under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party, this task will be accomplished." (Cynkin, p. 78)

Late 1980 - Both delegations in the CBT talks have instructions not to raise the issue of seismographic stations unless the other one does. (Garthoff, p. 758)
January 1981 - Carter signs PD-62, which represents a further development of the war-fighting ideas embodied in PD-59 (see entry for July 25, 1980). (Garthoff, p. 788)

January 1981 - In his final report to Congress, Brown declares that Soviet military spending "has increased steadily and significantly by an average of 4-5 percent a year...The Soviet trend has continued even as the rate of growth in Soviet GNP has declined." In actuality, according to Garthoff, after 1976 Soviet military spending increased only 2 percent annually. (Garthoff, p. 795)

January 1981 - Carter sends to Congress his report of the government's non-proliferation activities during 1980. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/81)

January 6, 1981 - The CIA sends the White House an intelligence report detailing Nicaragua's involvement in providing arms for the Salvadoran rebels for their "final offensive." (Pastor, p. 225)

January 7-14, 1981 - Pre-implementation negotiations on Namibian independence are held in Geneva under U.N. auspices but collapse without an agreement on a date for a cease-fire and the implementation of the U.N. proposals. The South African delegation claims that "trust and confidence" between the parties concerned must be established before implementation can begin. However, the negotiations are successful in granting Namibian parties an opportunity to take part in the discussions. (Current Foreign Relations..., 1/21/81; FBIS, 1/15/81, p. U2)


January 16, 1981 - The Special Coordination Committee suspends the last installment of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. (Pastor, p. 228)

January 20, 1981 - Ronald Reagan is inaugurated the 40th President of the United States. (WP 1/21/81)

January 20, 1981 - Moments after Reagan is inaugurated, the remaining American hostages depart Tehran after 444 days in captivity. (WP 1/20/81 [special edition])