DATE: 26 January 1978
TIME: 2:40 to 3:20 pm

SUBJECT: Horn of Africa; Middle East

PARTICIPANTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>USSR</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Secretary</td>
<td>B. N. Ponomarev, Candidate</td>
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<td>Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS</td>
<td>Member of the Politburo of</td>
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<td>D. Zarechnak, Interpreter</td>
<td>the CPSU and Secretary of</td>
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<td>the Central Committee</td>
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<td>Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin</td>
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<td>0. Krokholev, Interpreter</td>
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Secretary Vance began by telling Ponomarev that he wished to express some concrete thoughts concerning the Horn and how we could cooperate to solve the problems which exist there. He said that he would hate to see the situation in the area become exacerbated and have this lead to negative effects on our relations. We wanted to resolve the situation in such a way as to bring peace to the area.

The Secretary said there are certain basic principles which we base our approach on. The first of these is the principle of territorial integrity, which is a very important one to the African nations and is a basic part of the position taken by the OAU. The second principle is that a continuation of the conflict cannot but lead to further bloodshed, disruption, and disadvantage to both sides. So it seems that we must try to find a diplomatic solution through negotiations to resolve the differences which exist between the parties. This would first involve a cease-fire, and then a negotiated settlement.

The Secretary said that the negotiated settlement would have to be worked out between the parties involved, but one way to do this which seems to be attractive to both sides is to have some form of autonomy or semi-autonomy for the region with the consent of the people of the Ogaden.
Ponomarev said he would convey the Secretary's thoughts to the Soviet leadership, and that the Soviet side would think about what could be done.

Ponomarev said that with regard to the Cuban involvement, it would be more appropriate for the U.S. to talk with Cuba directly about this. He again emphasized that the Soviet side is very definitely in favor of a peaceful settlement in the Horn of Africa.

Ponomarev said there were also other problems in the area such as, for example, the problem of Djibouti, but we should not let such things complicate US-USSR relations.

Ponomarev said he would also like to use this occasion to speak about the Middle East. The Soviet leadership approved the document signed October 1 regarding the convening of a Geneva conference. And then, like lightning out of a clear blue sky, there came meetings between Sadat and Begin, and other meetings between Egypt and Israel, and the whole situation changed.

Ponomarev said the Soviet side is convinced that there must be a Geneva conference. He said it was his personal opinion that the US and USSR are strong enough to induce the countries involved to refrain from military activity and to bring about peace in the Middle East. For the past three years the Soviet Union has not sent any arms to Egypt and Sadat has been severely criticizing the USSR for that reason. The Soviet side has openly advocated a peaceful settlement and wants to guarantee, together with the US, secure borders for Israel. The USSR has said many times that Israel has a right to exist. Very often, when told by Arab leaders that Israel has no right to exist, the Soviet side has told them that they were wrong. As the Secretary knew, certain Arab countries and certain Palestinian representatives insisted that there was no place in the world for Israel. The Soviet leadership, however, has indicated at the highest level that it did not agree with such a position. This was not the national policy of the USSR. Israel is the state of the Jewish people, who have suffered a great deal from Nazism, and the Soviet Union supports the right of Israel to exist where it is. The USSR considers that the Israeli aggression of 1967 was wrong, and that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories. But Israel is a country and everyone must recognize it as such. The Soviet Union believes that this question must be settled and that there should be cooperation with the US on this question. The USSR was disappointed when separate peace negotiations began, that the US was pulled into this. The Soviet side is convinced that a peaceful settlement can be found if influence is exerted vis-a-vis Israel and the Arab countries. In this way, all hotbeds of confrontation could be eliminated and the people involved could breathe freely.
The Secretary said the US agrees that any solution to
the problem must be a comprehensive one and must come from a Geneva
conference. We hoped and expected on the basis of our joint decla-
ration all through the fall that a Geneva conference would be con-
vened at the end of December. Then certain events took place,
including the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem, about which Sadat did not
consult with the US.

At this point, Ponomarev interjected in English, "Really?"

The Secretary replied, "Really," and said that after
the visit took place it was seen as a real breakthrough in the wall
of misunderstanding. When proposals were made for direct negotiations,
the US thought that it would support this as a step towards Geneva. But
we do not regard this as a substitute for Geneva, since it is obvious
that there can be no comprehensive settlement without extending the
number of participants and broadening the scope of the negotiations.

The Secretary said that at present we are working on a
declaration of principles along the line of the principles which were
elaborated together with the Soviet Union and which, in essence, are
those principles which are indicated in the US-Soviet joint statement
of October 1. The principles would cover the following points:

a. the object of the talks must be a comprehensive
settlement;

b. there must be withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the occupied territories;

c. there must be true peace, as we agreed in our
joint statement;

d. the Palestinian problem must be resolved and
the Palestinians must participate in the deter-
mination of their future.

Real progress has been made toward such a declaration
on all of the questions except for the Palestinian problem. This is
the problem which they are arguing about now and on which there are
deep differences. But if that problem is solved, then we can use the
results as a framework to convene a Geneva conference with the partic-
ipation of all parties, as planned. These general positions are con-
sistent with those which we discussed with the Soviet side from the
beginning. It is a way to set guidelines for the Geneva conference
and a comprehensive settlement.
The Secretary indicated that he has been trying to keep the Soviet government closely informed about each step of what has been happening since the Cairo conference. He added, as a final point that he wanted to say, as he had in the beginning, that we are trying to convene a Geneva conference, as we had both agreed. We would hope that our two sides could work together to accomplish this.

Ponomarev said that there are no differences between us on this, but events are developing differently. Separate negotiations are hindering the convening of a Geneva conference, and nothing is coming of them. Ponomarev said that his own personal viewpoint, which he is expressing without consulting the Soviet leadership, is that we must go back to the agreement which the Secretary and Gromyko reached on October 1, and that we should not assist efforts to reach a separate settlement. Such efforts are bringing no results. We must return to the October 1 framework.

The Secretary said that the US opposes a separate settlement, and that it had made this clear to the two parties. They understand this, and they agree that a lasting settlement must be a comprehensive one.

Ponomarev said he would convey the Secretary's and the President's remarks to the Soviet leaders, and the sooner a settlement can be reached on the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the better.

The Secretary said that he agreed with this and thanked Ponomarev.