MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: June 17, 1979
TIME: 5:30-7:20 p.m.
PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT: International Issues

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Joseph Powell
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. D. Arensburger, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.
President L. I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Marshal D. Ustinov
Marshal Ogarkov
Mr. G. Korniyenko
Mr. L. Zamyatin
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Drafted by: D. Arensburger
June 17, 1979

Approved by:
President Carter said that he was very gratified with the spirit of detente which had originated in Europe under President Brezhnev's leadership, and with how this spirit contributed to peace and should involve further regions. Brezhnev had pointed previously to protecting the interests of our countries and our allies. Many differences existed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and they should be discussed fully and frankly. This will be done this afternoon. Though some of these discussions might be unpleasant, the President believed that it would be good to discuss them on a frank and sincere basis. There were some areas in the world where the U.S. and its allies had absolutely vital interests, for example, the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In areas like these, which were sensitive, we should exert maximum efforts on the part of both sides to avoid conflicts which could become serious. In other troubled areas peaceful resolution was always preferable. He was referring to such areas as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas it was important for both of us to try to discourage combat and bloodshed, and to encourage peaceful resolution of regional differences. The extensive military activities of Cuba were of deep concern to the American people. We regarded Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union, a surrogate or at least an ally, which was being supported, financed and equipped by the Soviet Union. There were some 40,000 Cuban military personnel throughout Africa, and Cuba was becoming increasingly active militarily in interfering in other countries, including in the Caribbean area and in Central America.

The President said that we have been deeply concerned by the violation of international borders in Southeast Asia. Viet Nam had fifteen divisions in Kampuchea and shows no inclination to withdraw from this incursion.
We condemned the violation of the Vietnamese border by the People's Republic of China. At this time the Soviet Union was becoming more and more active in naval and military activities using Vietnamese ports and facilities. That was of concern to us.

The President realized that our two countries had different perspectives with respect to these differences, but he hoped that together with the Soviet Union where possible, we would cooperate where possible, we should deal with such areas, as Namibia where we were trying to achieve through the U.N. a free country with a government of its choice. In Zimbabwe-Rhodesia we were trying to solve the problem to the satisfaction of the people of that area in a peaceful way and without combat. On the Middle East, we two countries had differences of opinion in the past and the present. President Sadat personally, had tried to bring together all parties in Geneva, including the Soviet Union, with a view to finding a solution to the differences in the Middle East. This was some two years ago, but Syria and a number of other countries refused and no progress had been made. President Sadat made an initiative -- the President would add that this was without consultation with us-- and went to Jerusalem. Much progress had been made, but so far it was limited to Israel and Egypt. This was consistent with U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and others, as well as the Joint Statement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It was a fact that Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai. Israel was prepared to negotiate treaties with all its neighbors. Palestinian rights, under the Camp David accord, would be preserved. Security of all states was to be guaranteed. The President hoped that the Soviet Union would give its support to this progress and encourage other states to do the same.
We expected all Security Council members to approve such U.N. supervision by U.N. emergency forces. But the U.S., in the interests of a peaceful resolution of these differences, had pledged alternative supervision if that was necessary. Still, we much preferred a U.N. force of emergency supervision of Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

The President continued that the United States had an interest in stability in this entire area of the world. In the past we always had good relations with Iran, though now they were not nearly as close as before. We had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran or Afghanistan, but we would support the independence of both these countries. It endangered U.S. lives that the Soviet Union was broadcasting allegations to the contrary. This was of concern to us.

The President, turning to the People's Republic of China, said that he was aware of the Soviet concerns as Brezhnev had stated on several occasions in his letters, but we felt that after 30 years normalization of relations between us and the People's Republic of China was long overdue. We believed that this new relationship would contribute to peace and stability and it was not directed against other countries of the world. We expected an increase in trade and an expansion of scientific and technical, and cultural exchanges, but this would not be done at the expense of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which we considered very important. We had nothing to conceal from the Soviet Union regarding that relationship. We also hoped that views between us on common and general concerns in this regard, including those which no doubt Brezhnev would be raising today, would be beneficial. Inevitably, we would have differences on how to resolve some differences between us and among other countries. But the President asked
Brezhnev to trust our good intentions. He was eager to listen to Brezhnev in order to understand the Soviet concerns and was sure that peaceful solutions to these differences would promote relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The President hoped that Brezhnev would agree with everything he had just said.

Brezhnev said that before setting forth his considerations on international problems, the subject of this meeting, he wanted to refer briefly to the question he had mentioned earlier this morning regarding further negotiations on SALT, in addition to he had already expressed in Vienna. He did not want to address in detail all the questions raised by the President. There could be differences of view on all of them and it was difficult at this point to envisage the solution with regard to these negotiations. However, it was impossible to escape the fact that before these negotiations developed it was necessary to consider a number of questions of principle. For one thing, the follow-on agreement had to include not only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but also other nuclear powers. Second, there must be full clarity to the effect that the follow-on agreement must involve U.S. forward-based systems, not only in passing, but in substance, because as was widely known, these systems were deployed nearest /the Soviet Union, and also its allies. Third, underlying the follow-on negotiations—and this was the holy of holies from which the Soviet Union would not depart—must be the principle of equality and equal security and necessarily account for all the factors determining the strategic situation. At present it would be normal to negotiate some kind of annual reductions say by 5%, in the levels of strategic offensive arms, independent of the other problem involved in SALT III. In other words, it was necessary to give further consideration to the follow-on negotiations. At this time we should ensure prompt entry into force of the SALT II Treaty which has been fully approved and which we will be signing tomorrow.
Brezhnev wanted to begin his discussion of international problems by making several general comments. The Soviet Union approached very seriously the matter of reaching some common understanding and even a degree of cooperation with the U.S. in world affairs. The Soviet Union attached major significance to this and was prepared to act in the appropriate spirit. This made it all the more important to note the factors which were preventing this. He already had occasion to note that mutual understanding and, to an even greater degree, cooperation between our two states, including cooperation in international affairs, was greatly hampered. One of the sides was attributing changes in the world, movements for national liberation and independence, as well as for social progress, to the will of one of the sides Brezhnev had been told that a rather strange theory had gained currency in the United States, a theory known as the arc of crisis, according to which the Soviet Union was allegedly reaching from Western Africa to Southern Asia, seeking to surround the Middle East, to the detriment of the United States and Western countries in general. Brezhnev wanted to say that this entire theory was an absolute fairy tale. Given such an approach to international events, it was hardly possible to make progress in international relations, including the settlement of world problems in which our two countries certainly could cooperate. Frankly, the Soviet Union was quite amazed at how lightly, spheres of vital interests of the U.S. were being announced in areas on the other side of the world. This was not only contrary to elementary norms of international law, but also complicated the international situation even more. At the same time, there were sufficient complications as it was.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was sure that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were able to make a major contribution to present international developments, but this could not be done by sowing fear and by suspecting the intentions of the other side. The way to do it was to strengthen understanding and
cooperation. That would help to resolve pressing international problems. In this connection, it was always necessary—not in words but in deeds—to respect the independence and sovereign rights of each country and not to permit a great power an attitude of national superiority in dealing with other countries. The Soviet Union wanted to interact with the U.S. in international affairs and if relevant understandings were reached and carried out—without an attempt to gain at the expense of others—Brezhnev was sure that there would be no lack of areas of cooperation of regional and worldwide importance.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union attached particular importance to European affairs. That was understandable, of course, because a large part of the Soviet Union was located in Europe and because its history was closely tied to Europe. Moreover, its location in Europe has always exerted a major, at times a decisive influence on the situation in the entire world. It was the chief concern of the Soviet leadership that neither the Soviet people nor any other people in Europe ever live through what the Soviet people had experienced in the years of World War II as a result of the Hitlerite aggression. That was the fervent desire of the Soviet leaders and they were resolute on that score. Brezhnev was able to say with satisfaction that the political situation in Europe today was better than ever in the past and that this no doubt was a result of the normalization of relations between our two states.

Brezhnev continued that naturally, the Soviet Union, as well as the U.S., had to take into account reality. This reality was that Europe included neighboring countries with different social systems, and that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. had allies and friends in Europe. Brezhnev could say for his part that the Soviet Union accepted this situation as constituting reality. Whether within the framework of the socialist commonwealth
or in its relations with Western countries or in terms of its European policy in general, the Soviet Union did not pursue an anti-American course or try to prejudice legitimate interests of the United States. And certainly the Soviet Union was not disseminating among the public the thought that the United States was an adversary or an enemy of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev wanted to expect a similar approach on the part of the U.S. with respect to the Soviet Union and its interests.

Brezhnev continued that the European situation did, of course, include elements which raised concern, such as efforts aimed at lop-sided, Brezhnev would even say self-serving, interpretations of the provisions of the Final Act of the European security conference, when some provisions were emphasized at the expense of others in order to make them use them as part of an effort to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In Brezhnev's view, it was in our mutual interest to implement all the provisions of the Final Act and to do so in a spirit of constructive cooperation and good will.

After all, that was the predominant substance of the Helsinki conference and of the document adopted at that conference. It was in this spirit that next year's Madrid meeting should be planned. The Soviet side planned to approach next year's Madrid meeting. He trusted that the U.S. would pursue a similar approach and that there would be no repetition of the negative experience of the Belgrade meeting. Today the climate in Europe was quite healthy, but such a climate could hardly be imagined in the absence of military detente on the continent. The Soviet Union saw the situation as follows. There was an approximate balance between the military and political forces of the two sides. The Soviet Union accepted that balance, did not upset it and did not intend to upset it. However, of late, NATO countries have accelerated their military preparations to such an extent that a question arises about these
military preparations. Could it be that the United States and its allies were no longer satisfied with such a balance and that they had decided to gain military superiority? If that was the situation, what sort of cooperation, what sort of strengthening of peace was there? That would mean a new round in military competition. The Soviet Union, for its part, believed that the only way of ensuring security and lasting peace in Europe was to retain the existing balance of forces and to reduce them on both sides without changing the balance. Accordingly, the Soviet Union was in favor of military detente.

Brezhnev continued by saying that it was his particular wish that the States-Parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe conclude a treaty on refraining from first use of nuclear or conventional arms against each other. Was it not clear that this would create a healthier atmosphere in Europe and between our two countries? To be quite honest, how could there be any objections to that? In this area, in addition to the Vienna discussions that had been referred to, discussed, the U.S.S.R. and its allies had submitted a package of specific proposals to the Western countries. All these proposals were still on the table and an answer was being awaited.

Brezhnev recalled that the participants had recently proposed holding a conference at the political level with the participation of all the European countries, as well as the U.S. and Canada, to discuss and agree on practical measures toward military detente in Europe, including confidence-building measures. Could a favorable reaction to this initiative be expected from the U.S.?

In conclusion, Brezhnev wanted to note that not everything was well with implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement regarding West Berlin, yet that was an important element in European stability. He had created that agreement in a spirit of cooperation and clearly it was in our mutual
interest to prevent any undermining or erosion of this agreement.

Turning to the Middle East, Brezhnev said that the President was well acquainted with the Soviet position of principle in its appraisal of the U.S. policy on that score. Brezhnev had written to the President about that. Now, at this personal meeting he wanted to re-emphasize this. The fact that the October 1973 Soviet-U.S. understanding on joint action in the Middle East was violated and supplanted by an anti-Arab policy did not bode well for peace in that area or for the relations between us. Brezhnev thought that it was clear to everyone now that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty had failed in the Middle East to resolve the Middle Eastern situation and had sharpened increased the dangers. It sufficed to look at the indignation and determination of the Arabs and to note the war which Israel, protected by Egypt, was, waging in Lebanon. This could at any time turn into a very serious conflict. It was necessary to prevent a resumption of armed conflict along the lines of the 1967 war, to prevent a major conflagration. Therefore, the positions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were fundamentally different at this time and not through any fault of the Soviet Union. To be frank, the Soviet Union was resolutely opposed to any efforts to use the U.N. for a separate deal between Egypt and Israel, be it by using U.N. troops in the Sinai or in some other way. The position of the Soviet Union with respect to the Middle East remained the same as it had been throughout. The Soviet Union believed that there would be no firm peace there without full liberation of the Arab lands occupied in 1967 and without the possibility an opportunity for the Palestinians to set up their own state, without the independence and security of all nations in that region, including Israel. As before, the Soviet Union considered it desirable for our two countries to interact using earlier U.N. resolutions as a foundation.
Brezhnev went on to say that Southeast Asia was again becoming a dangerous flashpoint of tension. The shameless expansionist policy of Peking in this area, its manifestation of superiority, led to Chinese aggression against Viet Nam. While this aggression was halted, it proved possible to put a stop to this aggression and the Chinese were forced to leave the territory, though not all of it, of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Nevertheless, Peking was once again threatening to teach Viet Nam another lesson, evidently having failed to learn the lesson itself. So long as there was any claim to such intervention, there would remain a military danger of war, especially in Southeast Asia. In fact, Peking makes no secret that its goal is to involve the world in a war in which it would remain on the sidelines. This time the people of Viet Nam have heroically rebuffed the Chinese aggressors. In this instance the Soviet Union had manifested great restraint and sense of responsibility in its actions. However, there is a limit to all patience. The Soviet Union had assumed obligations with respect to Viet Nam under its treaty of friendship with that country. He was sure that if the Chinese leaders were firmly told that methods of dictation, blackmail and threats were inadmissible in international relations and that the world would not tolerate Chinese aggression, there would be no need to be concerned over the situation in Southeast Asia. Brezhnev believed that it was this that major efforts should be focused.

Brezhnev said that as far as Soviet cooperation with Viet Nam was concerned, this was quite normal between two friendly countries, especially taking into account the military threat to Viet Nam from Peking. As for Kampuchea, it would seem that one could only be happy that the people of that country, revolted and finally freed themselves from a regime of rapists and killers imposed by Peking, a regime which the U.S., too, has called
abhorrant and inhuman. The new government of Kamwochea was restoring the economy and the dignity of its people.

Brezhnev continued by saying that clarifying the situation with respect to Africa was long overdue. The peoples of this area were asserting national independence and overcoming the economic and political inheritance of colonialism. As for the Soviet Union, it has consistently spoken out for full liquidation of the remnants of colonialism and racism in Africa and it respects the right of all the peoples of Africa, without exception, to attain peace and independence. The Soviet Union did not pursue any other goal. The President should not believe absurd tales to the contrary. The Soviet Union did not seek economic or strategic advantages in Africa. The Soviet Union did not strive to infringe on anyone's interests. This applied equally to Southern Africa. Wherever colonialists violate the rights of the people, the victims have the right to rebel and have the support of the Soviet Union in this. By the same token, no one could accuse the Soviet Union of being opposed to peaceful solutions, provided that they were real, not fictitious, and fully consistent with the interests of the Africans themselves. The Soviet Union was in favor of opposing neocolonialism by former colonial and racist regimes.

(U.N. resolutions are fully implemented with respect to the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, to end the delivery of arms and other assistance to racist countries, so no one could claim that/African Continent was a testing ground of the forces of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. After all, in the face of acute and explosive events such as those which occurred in Iran, our countries had succeeded in remaining calm and sober and thereby had prevented a confrontation. Brezhnev believed that such a policy should be adhered to in the future as well.

Brezhnev went on to say that the Soviet Union's traditional friendship
with Afghanistan was not aimed against any third country. In this country the people had made a social revolution of which, as Brezhnev had occasion to tell U.S. Senators, the Soviet leadership had first learned from foreign broadcasts and from the wire services. He added, "yes, that is the way it was." Naturally, it was in the nature of revolutions that a struggle was taking place against the forces of the old regime. But this did not provide grounds for outsiders to incite or provoke anti-government riots. Unfortunately, such interference was occurring. Brezhnev wanted to hope that the United States would not participate in such actions; that instead it would develop normal relations with Afghanistan.

Brezhnev said that again and again the U.S. was raising the matter of Soviet relations with Cuba. He wanted to say that the Soviet Union complied strictly with the 1962 understanding. It was not undertaken and was not undertaking anything that would be contrary to that understanding. This should be continued and one should not resort to arbitrary interpretations. Some people claim that here and there it was asserted that the Soviet Union was using Cubans to interfere in other areas. Nothing could be further from the truth. Cuba was an independent country and as an independent country Cuba rendered assistance at the request of legitimate governments which were threatened by aggression. This was fully in accord with international law and the U.N. Charter. Perhaps those who make noises in the U.S. concerning the Cuban actions have forgotten that during the American War of Independence the ranks of General Washington's army contained foreign units. On the other hand, Brezhnev could cite genuine instances of U.S. interference in the affairs of other countries and, of course, to the detriment of U.S.-Soviet relations. But the Soviet Union had no desire to do so.

One concern that the President had spoken of today pertained to
a military buildup in Viet Nam. The Soviet Union could not understand such a concern. The Soviet Union had no bases in Viet Nam and had no intention of establishing such bases. Soviet ships entered Vietnamese ports for business and for visits of friendship. Individual Soviet aircraft landed at Vietnamese airfields. But that was normal and generally accepted practice in international relations. It was not aimed against the interests of the U.S. or its allies. The threat to peace came from China, which had already carried out a blatant aggression against Viet Nam and which was now openly threatening to teach Viet Nam a new lesson. As for Soviet assistance to Viet Nam, under the friendship treaty it was being provided under the friendship treaty with that country as a victim of aggression and was designed to compel China to cease its expansionist policy, to regain its senses and to refrain from such actions.

Brezhnev continued that there was one other destabilizing factor in the Far East, one which did not originate with the Soviet Union. He was referring major to the military bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Many such bases were being maintained by the U.S. near the borders of the Soviet Union. Aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines were cruising the seas near Soviet territory and calling at ports of other countries near Soviet territory. This raised questions and constituted grounds for concern. Brezhnev said in conclusion that these were the considerations he had wanted to express on some international problems.

The President thanked Brezhnev for his remarks. He had listened with great attention and trusted that Brezhnev, too, had listened with equal attention and interest to our concerns. Obviously there were differences of opinion or a number of issues, but the President believed that we needed to continue our consultations in the hope of understanding each other's attitude
Despite political differences, we had general concerns and in his view this meeting in Vienna and the signing of the SALT II Treaty constituted an important step toward peace and could serve as a basis for further progress in resolving military and political issues. The President promised to hand over to Brezhnev after the meeting, during his departure a private note which had been discussed this morning, outlining some ideas which could be discussed later. He hoped that we could continue our efforts and that we would reach further agreement, though perhaps in less time than was required for the SALT II Treaty.