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TAGS: PFOR, US, UR

SUBJ: REBUTTAL OF GROMYKO’S REMARKS ON US-SOVET RELATIONS

REF: MOSCOW 1670

1. In his January 30 meeting with you, Gromyko went to some length to put on the record the Soviet view of the factors behind the current state of US-Soviet relations and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While you properly called Gromyko on his most flagrant misrepresentations of the facts, we feel the points he raised should continue to be challenged.
2. WE TRANSMIT BELOW PROPOSED POINTS WHICH YOU AND EMBASSY STAFF MIGHT WISH TO MAKE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DURING A JANUARY 30 MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO DEVELOPED AT SOME LENGTH THE THEME THAT THE UNITED STATES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT STATE OF US-SOVET RELATIONS. IN SUPPORT OF HIS ARGUMENT, HE CLAIMED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD, EVEN BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, FOLLOWED A POLICY OF DAMAGING US-SOVET RELATIONS AND INCREASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION. I CANNOT ALLOW THE EXAMPLES CITED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO STAND WITHOUT REBUTTAL.

MINISTER GROMYKO ALLEGED THAT NATO'S 1978 ADOPTION OF A LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM UNDERMINED THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, THEN IN SESSION, AND DEMONSTRATED US HOSTILITY TOWARD THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF ARMS CONTROL. THE NATO LTDP WAS A RESPONSE TO THE STEADY GROWTH OVER MANY YEARS OF WARSAM PACT CAPABILITIES BEYOND ANY LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE OCTOBER 1964 THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES HAVE GROWN BY ONE MILLION MEN AND THE SOVIET ARMY HAS ADDED 25 DIVISIONS. OUR CONCERNS AT THIS RELENTLESS AND UNNECESSARY MILITARY BUILD-UP ARE SHARED NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES BUT BY ALL ITS NATO ALLIES AND MANY OTHER NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THE NATO LTDP HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US SUPPORTED AND CONTINUES TO SUPPORT EQUITABLE
AND EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN THE
UN AND OTHER APPROPRIATE FORUMS.

II. MINISTER GROMYKO ALLEGED THAT THE DECEMBER 13 NATO
DECISION ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF) VIOLATED THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY ESTABLISHED AT VIENNA, AND ON WHICH
THE SALT II TREATY HAD BEEN BASED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE
UNITED STATES HAD FORCED ON ITS NATO ALLIES THE VIEW THAT
EQUALITY IN EUROPE COULD BE REACHED ONLY AFTER THE DEPLOY-
MENT OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGED MISSILES.

THE RECORD OF THE VIENNA SUMMIT MAKES CLEAR THE UNITED
STATES COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PARITY OF STRATEGIC
FORCES AND TO EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY IN THE CONDUCT OF
OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL,
BUT MINISTER GROMYKO'S ATTEMPT TO APPLY THIS PRINCIPLE TO
THE SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS AND THE DECEMBER 12 NATO DECISION,
ARE INVALID.

-- FIRST, AS THE SOVIET SIDE IS AWARE, THE BALANCE OF
FORCES IN EUROPE WAS NOT ADDRESSED AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT
AND THE US AND ITS ALLIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET UNION'S
ASSERTION THAT A MILITARY BALANCE EXISTS IN EUROPE. IN
FACT, THERE HAS LONG BEEN AN IMBALANCE IN LONG-RANGE
THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET
UNION. RECENTLY, THIS IMBALANCE HAS GROWN AS SOVIET
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

-- THE DECEMBER 12 NATO TNF DECISION REFLECTS THE CONCERN
OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE OVER THIS INCREASING IM-
BALANCE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY
IN INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

-- FINALLY, MINISTER GROMYKO'S COMMENTS IGNORE NATO'S
PARALLEL OFFER TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATIONS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, AND ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THIS OFFER OR ANY NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THE US AND ITS ALLIES AGREE TO MANIFESTLY UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS IS HARDLY CONSISTENT WITH THE INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL CONDUCTED ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

MINISTER GROMYKO CRITICIZED THE UNITED STATES' HANDLING OF THE SALT II RATIFICATION PROCESS AND QUESTIONED THE SINCERITY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO SECURING RATIFICATION.

IN FACT, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE SALT II TREATY IS HIS HIGHEST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY. HIS RATIFICATION EFFORT WAS THE MOST INTENSE EVER MOUNTED FOR ANY SUCH PIECE OF LEGISLATION, AS THE UNITED STATES HAD REPEATEDLY ADVISED THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE TREATY WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE AND AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD INEVITABLY BE AFFECTED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOR.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO DEFER SENATE CONSIDERATION REFLECTED HIS RECOGNITION THAT CHANCES FOR RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY WOULD SUFFER APPRECIABLY IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. HAD THE USSR, NOT INFRADED AFGHANISTAN WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE TREATY WOULD HAVE BEEN RATIFIED BY THE SENATE. WITHDRAWAL OF THE TREATY DID NOT SIGNAL ANY REDUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO ULTIMATELY ACHIEVING RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT OR TO CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF CONTROLLING STRATEGIC ARMS. INDEED THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT ESPEC-
I. A time of great tension observing the mutual constraints imposed by the SALT I and SALT II Agreements will be in the best interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union -- and of world peace.

II. Minister Gromyko alleged that the US had made an artificial issue of the presence in Cuba of Soviet combat forces.

III. Soviet military activities in Cuba and the USSR's support for Cuban military intervention in third areas are destabilizing elements in regions already afflicted by political turbulence and socio-economic change. As such they are of natural and legitimate concern not only to the United States, but to the world community. The United States has made clear to the Soviet Union on numerous occasions that such activities will inevitably damage US-Soviet relations, and that the United States reserves the right to raise such activities with the USSR, even if they are not specifically addressed in our bilateral understandings on Cuba. The United States position on the presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, and the actions taken by the US in response to its confirmation of that presence, were consistent with this policy.

IV. Minister Gromyko noted that the Soviet Union had concluded that the United States was not serious in its approach to other arms control negotiations, citing those on CTB, CW, RW, CAT, and the Indian Ocean. He characterized the most recent Western MBFR proposal as providing no basis for further progress.

In fact, the US on December 6 provided the Soviet Union with a comprehensive and detailed statement of our position on the entire range of arms control negotiations in which

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