MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

DATE: June 17, 1979
TIME: 5:30-7:20 p.m.
PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT: International Issues

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Joseph Powell
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. D. Arensburger, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.
President L. I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Marshal D. Ustinov
Marshal Ogarkov
Mr. G. Korniyenko
Mr. L. Zamyatin
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Drafted by: D. Arensburger
June 17, 1979

Approved by:
President Carter said that he was very gratified with the spirit of detente which had originated in Europe under President Brezhnev's leadership, and with how this spirit contributed to peace and should involve further regions. Brezhnev had pointed previously to protecting the interests of our countries and our allies. Many differences existed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and they should be discussed fully and frankly. This will be done this afternoon. Though some of these discussions might be unpleasant, the President believed that it would be good to discuss them on a frank and sincere basis. There were some areas in the world where the U.S. and its allies had absolutely vital interests, for example, the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In areas like these, which were sensitive, we should exert maximum efforts on the part of both sides to avoid conflicts which could become serious. In other troubled areas peaceful resolution was always preferable. He was referring to such areas as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas it was important for both of us to try to discourage combat and bloodshed, and to encourage peaceful resolution of regional differences. The extensive military activities of Cuba were of deep concern to the American people. We regarded Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union, a surrogate or at least an ally, which was being supported, financed and equipped by the Soviet Union. There were some 40,000 Cuban military personnel throughout Africa, and Cuba was becoming increasingly active militarily in interfering in other countries, including in the Caribbean area and in Central America.
President Carter said that he was very gratified with the spirit of detente which had originated in Europe under President Brezhnev's leadership, and with how this spirit contributed to peace and should involve further regions. Brezhnev had pointed previously to protecting the interests of our countries and our allies. Many differences existed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and they should be discussed fully and frankly. This will be done this afternoon. Though some of these discussions might be unpleasant, the President believed that it would be good to discuss them on a frank and sincere basis. There were some areas in the world where the U.S. and its allies had absolutely vital interests, for example, the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In areas like these, which were sensitive, we should exert maximum efforts on the part of both sides to avoid conflicts which could become serious. In other troubled areas peaceful resolution was always preferable. He was referring to such areas as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas it was important for both of us to try to discourage combat and bloodshed, and to encourage peaceful resolution of regional differences. The extensive military activities of Cuba were of deep concern to the American people. We regarded Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union, a surrogate or at least an ally, which was being supported, financed and equipped by the Soviet Union. There were some 40,000 Cuban military personnel throughout Africa, and Cuba was becoming increasingly active militarily in interfering in other countries, including in the Caribbean area and in Central America.
The President continued that the United States had an interest in stability in this entire area of the world. In the past we always had good relations with Iran, though now they were not nearly as close as before. We had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran or Afghanistan, but we would support the independence of both these countries. It endangered U.S. lives that the Soviet Union was broadcasting allegations to the contrary. This was of concern to us.

The President, turning to the People's Republic of China, said that he was aware of the Soviet concerns as Brezhnev had stated on several occasions in his letters, but we felt that after 30 years normalization of relations between us and the People's Republic of China was long overdue. We believed that this new relationship would contribute to peace and stability and it was not directed against other countries of the world. We expected an increase in trade and an expansion of scientific and technical, and cultural exchanges, but this would not be done at the expense of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which we considered very important. We had nothing to conceal from the Soviet Union regarding that relationship. We also hoped that an exchange of general concerns in this regard, including those which no doubt Brezhnev would be raising today, would be beneficial. Inevitably, we would have differences on how to resolve some problems between us and among other countries. But the President asked Brezhnev to understand and trust our good intentions. He was eager to hear from Brezhnev in order to understand the Soviet concerns, and was sure that peaceful solutions to these differences would promote relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The President hoped that Brezhnev would agree with everything he had just said.
Brezhnev wanted to begin his discussion of international problems by making several general comments. The Soviet Union approached very seriously the matter of reaching some common understanding and even a degree of cooperation with the U.S. in world affairs. The Soviet Union attached major significance to this and was prepared to act in the appropriate spirit. This made it all the more important to note the factors which were preventing this. He already had occasion to note that mutual understanding and, to an even greater degree, cooperation between our two states, including cooperation in international affairs, was greatly hampered by one of the sides attributing changes in the world, movements for national liberation and independence, as well as for social progress, to the will of one of the sides. Brezhnev had been told that a rather strange theory had gained currency in the United States, a theory known as the arc of crisis, according to which the Soviet Union was allegedly reaching from Western Africa to Southern Asia, seeking to surround the Middle East, to the detriment of the United States and western countries in general. Brezhnev wanted to say that this entire theory was an absolute fairy tale. Given such an approach to international events, it was hardly possible to make progress in international relations, including the settlement of world problems in which our two countries certainly could cooperate. Frankly, the Soviet Union was quite amazed at how lightly the interests of the U.S. were being announced in areas on the other side of the world. This was not only contrary to elementary norms of international law, but also complicated the international situation even more. At the same time, there were sufficient complications as it was.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was sure that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were able to make a major contribution to present international developments, but this could not be done by sowing fear and by suspecting the intentions of the other side. The way to do it was to strengthen understanding and
cooperation. That would help to resolve pressing international problems. In this connection, it was always necessary—not in words but in deeds—to respect the independence and sovereign rights of each country and not to permit a great power an attitude of national superiority in dealing with other countries. The Soviet Union wanted to interact with the U.S. in international affairs and if relevant understandings were reached and carried out—without an attempt to gain at the expense of others—Brezhnev was sure that there would be no lack of areas of cooperation of regional and worldwide importance.

* * * * *

Brezhnev went on to say that the Soviet Union's traditional friendship with Afghanistan was not aimed against any third country. In this country the people had made a social revolution of which, as Brezhnev had occasion to tell U.S. Senators, the Soviet leadership had first learned from foreign broadcasts and from the wire services. He added, "yes, that is the way it was." Naturally, it was in the nature of revolutions that a struggle was taking place against the forces of the old regime. But this did not provide grounds for outsiders to incite or provoke anti-government riots. Unfortunately, such interference was occurring. Brezhnev wanted to hope that the United States would not participate in such actions; that instead it would develop normal relations with Afghanistan.