SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5459

SUZMAN: I HAVE JUST HAD AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING WITH GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AMBASSADOR DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU. IT WAS EXTRAORDINARY ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE "DISCLOSED" WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET-BACKED MOVE TO OUST PRIME MINISTER AMIN. OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WE HAVE HINTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET-ASSISTED INTERNAL COUP, BOTH FROM GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU (KABUL 5246) AND EARLIER FROM SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILIY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK (KABUL 4688).

This time, the GDR ambassador went much further in spelling out Soviet dissatisfaction with the DRA, the Soviet dilemma about what to do, and the possibility of an internal party coup to eliminate Amin. He hinted that this might occur in August. END SUMMARY.
3. On July 17, I paid a call on Schwisau. He had called on Charge Flatin on July 9, and besides wanting to return the courtesy call, I welcomed an excuse to see him. We talked an hour. Of all the pro-Moscow Communist country ambassadors here, Schwisau is perhaps the most astute and intelligent, and certainly the most approachable. Alone among pro-Moscow Communist diplomats, he calls periodically on Western and third-world diplomats, and invariably likes to engage in candid political discussions about Afghanistan. He has been proved to be one of our most important sources of info about developments in the Kabul Communist diplomatic community and recently about Moscow's thinking.

4. Soviet dissatisfaction with the DRA: Yesterday we sent a report (reftel) analyzing the pressures seemingly building up for an internal change in the DRA leadership. What Schwisau told me at our meeting confirmed all this, including the existence of behind-the-scenes negotiations by Soviet Minister-Counselor Safonchuk with PDPA party leaders and others to bring about an internal change. Schwisau repeatedly said that the Soviets were deeply worried over the worsening situation in Afghanistan. He said, "They know the regime has little public support and is losing control of the country." While telling me this, he also said, "We are determined to save the revolution."

5. Schwisau clearly laid the blame for the DRA's troubles on Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin. He described Amin as "the strong man" in Afghanistan. "He personally runs the entire govt," he said, "controlling the army, the interior ministry, and he makes all important decisions." Amin has blundered badly, he said, in the way he has implemented the govt's economic and reform programs, and particularly in the way he has "harshly" acted against persons he suspected might oppose him.

Amin's
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6. Schwiesau dismissed Taraki as ineffective. He described him as an old, kindly teacher, philosopher, and writer who is well intentioned, and loves the adulation heaped on him in the press ("especially the pictures"). "We suspect," Schwiesau said, "that he does not know much of what is going on in the country."

7. Soviet maneuvers: Schwiesau confirmed that Soviet minister-counselor Safronchuk has been given the task, by Moscow, to bring about a "radical change" in the govt. Safronchuk was given this task, Schwiesau said, because, "it is not good for the Soviet ambassador himself to be seen holding these delicate negotiations." He continued, "if these negotiations fail, and/or Safronchuk were expelled as persona non grata, that would attract less attention and be less of a diplomatic embarrassment for the Soviet Union than if ambassador Puzanov were expelled."

9. As to what is likely to happen, Schwiesau clearly indicated that a military intraparty coup, deposing Amin and perhaps others, is what the Soviets intend. Schwiesau said there are now deep divisions in the PDPA Party, many of whose leading members are very dissatisfied with the present course of events and Amin's leadership. He said that what is needed is a new prime minister who is a "strong man" and not identified with "present" policies.

9. When I mentioned defense minister Watanjar as a possibility, Schwiesau acted as if I had caught him in a secret. After a pause, he said Watanjar is "not a politician, but of course the military is key to any change." Then he went on to observe that, since the revolution, Watanjar has never made a speech that was printed in the press and that his exact political views are not clear to the public, implying by this that Watanjar was "clean." Schwiesau went on, however, to hint that while Watanjar might play a role in a counter coup, he was not likely to be prime minister since "he was not experienced."
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17. Several times Schwiesau said, "we are now seeing the closing chapter of this govt." he must have used the term, "closing chapter", at least three times to me. As to when the change was likely to occur, schwiesau hinted that it could happen any time but would most likely take place in August. He said he was sending his wife to East Berlin soon for "three or four weeks rest," and later he told me he himself could not possible leave Kabul this summer since "August is going to be hot, and I don't mean the weather." Earlier in our conversation, he said that the situation within the govt was highly unstable and that security in Kabul could deteriorate any time, so fast in fact that it would be "impossible to evacuate dependents."

11. Soviet interests: schwiesau said that no internal party "radical change" could occur here without soviet support, and that soviet interests would have to be taken into account by any new afghan govt. "After all," he said, "Afghanistan borders the soviet union and just as you have a special interest in anything happening in canada and Mexico, the soviet union has a special interest in Afghanistan." Thus, he said, a political solution has to take into account three factors: "saving the face of the soviets, saving the face of the afghan party (pda), and saving the face of muslims."
12. IN CONNECTION WITH SAVING SOVIET FACE, SCHWIESAU SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND REPUTATION WITH "OTHER PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD." IF THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN TO ABANDON THE PARTY HERE IN AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID, IT WOULD HAVE A "VERY UPSETTING EFFECT ON PARTIES ELSEWHERE WHICH WERE FRIENDLY WITH MOSCOW." THIS COMMENT TRACKS WITH HIS COMMENT MENTIONED ABOVE (PARA 4) THAT, "WE MUST SAVE THE REVOLUTION."

13. QUESTION OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. TOWARD THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, SCHWIESAU VOLUNTARILY RAISED THIS QUESTION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, INTERVENE MILITARILY IN AFGHANISTAN. "WERE THEY TO DO SO," HE SAID, "IT WOULD SOLVE ONE PROBLEM BUT CREATE ANOTHER." SOVIET INTERVENTION COULD ELIMINATE THE PRESENT GOVT THEREBY SOLVING ONE PROBLEM. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, CREATE ANOTHER PROBLEM; NAMELY, THAT THE "ENTIRE AFGHAN NATION" WOULD TURN AGAINST THE SOVIETS, JUST AS THE AFGHANS TURNED AGAINST THE "BRITISH INVADERS" IN THE 19TH CENTURY. HENCE, HE SAID, IT MADE NO SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY.

14. THE PARCHAMISTS: SCHWIESAU, IN DISCUSSING THE PARCHAMISTS, COMMENTED THAT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARCHAMIST WING. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN, EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADER, BABRAK KARMAL, AND AMIN WERE "RIVALS." SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMIN AND BABRAK KARMAL TO BE IN THE SAME GOVT. REFLECTING ON THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION, SCHWIESAU CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PARCHAMISTS HAD A WIDER FOLLOWING THAN THE KHALQIS WITHIN THE PARTY AND AMONG PARTY SYMPATHIZERS, BUT THAT THE KHALQIS WERE STRONGER IN THE MILITARY. THE LATTER'S STRENGTH IN THE MILITARY PROVED DECISIVE. SCHWIESAU OBSERVED, IN PURGING THE PARCHAMISTS. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD INFORMATION AS WE DID, THAT MANY PARCHAMISTS HAD BEEN RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PUL-E-CHARKI PRISON. HE SHOOK HIS HEAD. HE SAID THOUGH THAT, AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE IN THE CRISIS FACING THE DRA, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO BRING BACK PARCHAMISTS INTO THE GOVT. "IT IS NECESSARY TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE GOVT FAR BEYOND THE PARCHAMISTS." TWO OTHER THINGS NEED TO BE DONE TOO, HE SAID. ONE WAS TO RELEASE MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS ("EVEN PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED"), AND THE OTHER WAS FOR A NEW GOVT TO BE "FRIENDS WITH THE MOSLEM COUNTRIES."

16. HE THOUGHT IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MORE DANGEROUS TO THE GOVT THAN THAT OF PAKISTAN. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY, HE SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE SHIA POPULATION WHICH RELIGIOUS ELEMENT PREDOMINATED IN THE PROVINCES BORDERING IRAN AND IN THE PROVINCE MAKING UP THE MOUNTAINOUS CENTRAL MASSIF.

17. THEN, SOMewhat IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ABOVE REMARK, HE SAID THAT THE PUSHTUNS WERE POLITICALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ETHNIC ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY. HENCE, SINCE SO Many OF THE PUSHTUNS WERE "OPPOSING THE REGIME MILITARILY," THIS WAS ANOTHER SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM.

18. COMMENT: AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION, TOGETHER WITH EARLIER ONES MENTIONED, WE BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND ARE TRYING TO ENGINEER A "RADICAL CHANGE." WE ARE ALSO TEMPTED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS, BY MEANS OF SAPRONCHUK'S CONVERSATION WITH ME ON JUNE 24, AND SCHWIESAU'S TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH US ON JULY 9 AND 17, HAVE TRIED TO SEND US A SIGNAL. THAT SIGNAL SEEMS TO BE THAT, THEY ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE AMIN REGIME, THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE A CHANGE, AND I AM SPECULATING HERE) ARE HOPING THIS WILL NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON US. ONE COULD ALSO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, WITH THE OBVIOUS SLIPPING GRIP THE DRA HAS OVER THE COUNTRY, THE SOVIETS HOPE THAT BY BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE AND BROADENING THE BASE OF THE GOVT, AND BY POSSIBLY MAKING AMIN A SCAPEGOAT, THEY CAN AVOID LOSING THEIR INVESTMENT IN THIS MARXIST PARTY AND GOVT, AND AVOID A MAJOR BLOW TO SOVIET INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. AMSTUTZ BT #5459