SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

December 17, 1979

Time and Place: 8:45-9:45 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran

Participants:

The Vice President
State
Warren Christopher
Harold Saunders
Richard Cooper**

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Claytor

JCS
General David Jones
General John Pustay

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci

Treasury
Secretary William Miller**
Anthony Solomon**
Robert Mundheim**

White House
Hamilton Jordan**
Jody Powell**
Stuart Eizenstat**
Lloyd Cutler**
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC
Colonel William Odom
Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton***

**Domestic Issues Only
***Afghanistan Only

Energy
Secretary Charles Duncan**

Justice
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti**
John Shenefield**

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Political-Military Issues:

1. Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed the latest developments. Soviet forces had remained stable from July until recently, but now there is evidence of movement. Two new command posts have been created just north of the Afghan border, there is a buildup of air assets, and two divisions may be on the move. There are about 5,300 Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan and approximately 2,000 civilians, some with families. CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military forces and the need to beef them up at some point. Most of the countryside is now in rebel hands, but no major cities are expected to fall unless there are significant defections from the Army. We believe the Soviets have made a political decision to keep a pro-Soviet regime in power and to use military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than successful completion of SALT, or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT. They may be ready to dump Amin, but they have not found a suitable replacement.

The SCC, after some discussion, recommended a three part strategy. First, for the record, we will continue our diplomatic demarches to the Soviets on a private basis. There is no benefit in going public at this time. Second, we will explore with the Pakistanis and British the possibility of improving the financing, arming and communications of the rebel forces to make it as expensive as possible for the Soviets to continue their efforts. Third, we will attempt to increase propaganda pressure on the Soviets worldwide. We will recommend to our European allies that they encourage their press to pay more attention to the subject. We will also step up our efforts to cast the Soviets as opposing Moslem religious and nationalist expressions.