To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of March 10, 1980

About our further foreign policy line in relation to Afghanistan and about a response to F. Castro’s appeal

1. Approve the considerations contained in the note of Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmanin of March 10, 1980 (attached).
2. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment 1).
3. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2).

CC SECRETARY
Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187  

Top Secret

To the CC CPSU

In accord with the instruction of February 28 of this year (P185/I) and in connection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (telegram from Havana No. 167) we report the following considerations.

Upon the determination of our further foreign political steps on issues which concern Afghanistan, including taking account of F. Castro’s proposal that Cuba provide its good offices to organize negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems to be necessary to take into account the following points.

The situation in Afghanistan and around it continues to remain complicated. Although the new measures which have been undertaken by the Afghan leadership inside the country and in the international arena is facilitating the stabilization of the situation in the country and the consolidation of the international position of the DRA, this process is going slowly. The combat readiness of the Afghan forces for the time being remains low. The actions of the foreign and domestic counter-revolution are continuing, dependent on the material, military, and political support from the USA, China, Pakistan and from a range of other Moslem countries with reactionary regimes as well.

Judging by everything, a successful resolution of the internal problems and the consolidation of the new structure in Afghanistan will demand not a small amount of effort and time, for the length of which the Soviet forces there will remain the basic stabilizing factor standing in opposition to the further expansion of the activity of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces.

Along with this, in the interests of creating more favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, it might also make sense to use the apparent interest in efforts to find a political solution to that issue which has begun to appear in Western and in Non-Aligned countries under the influence of our firmness on the Afghan issue. It is important, however, to direct the conduct of those searches in an appropriate way, to fill it with contents that are advantageous to us, in counterweight to the efforts of the Western countries, disguised as a political settlement, to achieve simply a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan so as to change the regime which exists there now.

In this regard, the thought expressed by F. Castro, that Cuba, in its capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned movement, would propose an initiative to make its good offices available in the matter of organizing negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, might turn out to be useful.

Accordingly, in L.I. Brezhnev’s response to F. Castro it will be expedient to express our favorable attitude to his idea about the provision by Cuba of its good offices in setting up negotiations between Afghanistan and its own neighbors and in working out corresponding guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. In this regard it is necessary, of course, to arrange with F. Castro that he from his side and we from our own should talk over this idea with B. Karmal. It is also necessary to explain to F. Castro our approach to a possible political settlement and in this regard the complexity of
the Afghan events, so that Castro realistically evaluates the situation and does not feed on illusions of a simple and quick achievement of a settlement.

Keeping in mind the task of providing favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation inside Afghanistan and the necessity for the world to get used to the new situation in that country and the Soviet Union's role there, our approach to a political settlement of the Afghan situation could harmonize both the initial and more long-range tasks. In this regard, the transition to a final resolution of the more long-term tasks would depend on the resolution of the initial tasks, so it is possible to constantly bring influence to bear on that process.

In its general appearance the outline of a political settlement could consist of a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and its neighbors, above all Pakistan, and systems of corresponding guarantees from the USSR, USA, and certain other states, each of which should be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the opposing side.

The first task should become the start of consultations between Afghanistan and its neighbors aimed at a normalization of their relations. In this regard, continue to try to ensure that the neighbor-countries of Afghanistan, and also the United States and other countries involved in anti-Afghan activities, from the very beginning of the political settlement process, undertake practical measures which would bear witness to the cessation of their interference, including military, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Directly link this demand with the possibility of the positive development of the process...

As far as the concrete content of the agreements which could be worked out between Afghanistan and its neighbors is concerned, in them, besides the consolidation of the general principals concerning respect for the sovereignty and readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in each others' internal affairs, obligations should be fixed about the cessation of armed and any other hostile activity from the territory of those countries against each other, and also about the problem of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, a ban on the enlistment and the use of refugees in underground activity against the DRA and the liquidation of refugee camps located directly on the border with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan and the resettlement of those of them who do not wish to return in remote regions of Pakistan and Iran could be discussed. In the final stage of the realization of such measures on the territory of Pakistan and possibly of Iran too, it would be possible to envision some form of verification with the participation of Afghanistan.

In the process of working out such bilateral agreements, evidently, there will arise the issue of mutual respect for the current borders between the participating states in the agreement, keeping in mind that Pakistan will strive to secure Afghanistan's recognition of the Durand Line. Historically, this issue is a complicated one for Iran. Its final settlement is directly connected to the development of the situation in Afghanistan itself and around it. Correspondingly, it would be inexpedient for the government of the DRA to prematurely -- even before the true position of Pakistan will become clear -- commit itself with a declaration about its readiness to recognize the Durand Line. According to tactical considerations, it is more advantageous for the Afghans to use this issue to receive from Pakistan maximal concessions on questions in which it holds an interest.

The negotiations aimed at the working out of concrete agreements should be conducted directly between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also between Afghanistan and Iran. This, on the one hand, would strengthen the position of the government of the DRA, and on the other would exclude the "internationalization" of a political resolution of the Afghan issue, which is undesirable for us. The role of Cuba in its capacity as chairman of
the Non-Aligned movement would consist of getting the bilateral negotiations started with the agreement of the participants and in a certain influence on their conduct through its provision of good offices, but not in the replacement of the direct negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

Agreements which are achieved in the course of these negotiations would be backed by appropriate guarantees, in the first place from the USSR and the USA, but also from certain other countries from among those which would be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the other side. Posing the issue in this way would allow Afghanistan to deflect, say, the candidacy of China.

Now it would be premature to determine the detailed content of the guarantees and the exact make-up of the participants, in so far as this will depend both on the contents of the agreements themselves and on the development of the situation. The main point of the guarantees should be that the countries which provide the guarantees will respect them and by their own authority will fortify the bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. The USA must accept as well the obligation not to conduct any sort of underground activities, including those from the territory of third countries, against Afghanistan and its government.

In the context of considering the guarantees it might be possible to pose as well the issue of the growth of the USA’s military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean both in terms of the threat to the security of the Soviet Union which that would create, and also from the point of view of the incompatibility of such actions with the task of stabilizing the situation in the Middle East.

During the consideration of both the guarantees and the overall problem of a political settlement, it makes sense to conduct the matter so that the governments of the participating states clearly understand that issues which touch on the system which exists in Afghanistan must not in any way be the subject of negotiations. In the same way it must be clear that issues which concern Afghanistan must not be considered and decided beyond the government of the DRA or without its participation.

Drafts of L.I. Brezhnev’s response to F. Castro and our appeal in this regard to B. Karmal have been prepared taking into account the considerations which have been put forth above.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko   Iu. Andropov   D. Ustinov   B. Ponomarev   O. Rakhmanin

March 10, 1980
No. 0212/gs

[Source: Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; Fond 89, Perechen 34, Dokument 5.]