SECRETARY-GENERAL BREZHENnev received me in his office on the third floor of the Catherine Palace in the Kremlin midway through my visit to Moscow. He looked fit, vigorous and spoke without difficulty. Although there were some difficult things to say on both sides, I noted that the General Secretary made a particular effort to maintain a cordial atmosphere throughout our meeting which lasted 2 3/4 hours. The press release which we agreed on at the end referred to the meeting as "friendly and frank." GOVERNOR CARTER, SALT, immigration and ""willingness" complementing them on their intellect, and also noted that..."
Arbatov understands our faults and is frank in telling us about them. Brezhnev was happy that someone understood the U.S. since he did not. I told the General Secretary that I wish to applaud his commitment to peace. I thanked him and showed me a recent Ukraine publication which he promised to send to me. He noted that it was put out on the occasion of the dedication of a bust of him in his "homeland" when he became twice a hero of the Soviet Union (Aleksandrov interjected a double hero rates a bust in his home town; in Brezhnev's case, Dneprodzerzhinsk). Brezhnev said that was nice but he did not bring out the book to emphasize his words rather than dedication on the frontispiece "fighter for peace." He said these words expressed the hope and aspiration of the Soviet people and showed me several pictures of places he had spent his minority and said he would honor my request to sign the inscription page.

I told Mr. Brezhnev that one of the reasons I had come to the Soviet Union this time was to attempt to give him an understanding of a new personality of the American Secretary Governor Carter. While one could never tell about an election beforehand, I believed there was more of an even chance that Governor Carter would be president and Mr. Brezhnev would be having to deal with him. I told the General Secretary that Governor Carter was as dedicated as he to the cause of peace and was ready to work with him to achieve it. I placed special emphasis
on the fact that Governor Carter would be our first president who was also a nuclear engineer. I was sure that the General Secretary was as happy as I was that one of the first things Governor Carter repudiated was the current talk about the feasibility of nuclear war which could in turn dangerously lead to talk of total nuclear war. I told the General Secretary that I had given Governor Carter the record of our 1974 conversation. One of the first things that Governor Carter noted was that the General Secretary not only wanted to control but reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Brezhnev interjected that was a correct report of his intentions.

I also let the General Secretary know of Governor Carter's willingness to cooperate with Brezhnev's suggestion that visits be exchanged amicably between the leaders of our two countries. Said he Brezhnev thought it useful, he would gladly cooperate. I went on to say that Governor Carter recognized that one of the great difficulties of our relations is misunderstanding on both sides. I repeated the 1974 remark that there are many people in the U.S. who have undue but nevertheless fear of Soviet intentions. I said that the Secretary General might be surprised to know that there is considerable propaganda going about the U.S. that the Soviets are preparing a first strike as evidenced by an allegedly very active civil defense and commented that they don't know in the U.S. that there would be a second strike in a half hour. I went on to say that
this makes it very important that both sides give accurate information not of course of the details of warheads but of the fact of their capabilities so that people on both sides know that neither country has any intention of a first strike.

[This is one of the reasons why Governor Carter is so strong for induction. He asked me to insure that you understood that the current campaign rhetoric has no factual misunderstanding basis.]

Governor Carter has been travelling among the American people and although right wingers might be anti-Soviet, his impression might be in general with the people in the Soviet Union. Governor Carter wished that this point be passed on to you. He also requested me to ask you for some friendly gesture or statement of intention sometime before or after the elections which would get him -- or President Ford if he should be the winner -- in the right direction. [I noted that Governor Carter has always been very careful to speak as a candidate but that in my judgment he would become President. But at this point exclaimed Carter.] I went on that I did not like to say anything unkind about Khrushchev whom I both knew and admired but I must cite (as an example) his unfortunately warlike speech of January 6, 1961 which started our relations off badly and lead to unfor...
of the Kennedy administration. You should also note that Governor Carter is opposed to the Jackson amendment. He is inconsistent on issues relating to trade. I reiterated at this point the value of some overt demonstration or helpful statement to reduce tensions. Although I offered to stop then, Secretary Brezhnev asked me to go on and discuss matters I had in mind with some of the participants of my presentation. I noted that Governor Carter understands that Soviet cooperation is necessary for a Middle East settlement, that he fully anticipates Soviet cooperation, and that he believes it is in your interest as well as in ours. On internal affairs, Governor Carter intends in no way to interfere in the affairs of the Soviet Union but he is for supporting the Helsinki agreement in all of its provisions, in particular the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. I noted that Basket II is an important position and is taken seriously by the American people. The emigration of Jews is not a matter which can be put under the rug. It must be thrashed out to kempt and from the subject of controversy between us. At this point, Alekandrov and Sukhodrev interjected asking whether Governor Carter had now made a public statement of support for all of the Helsinki agreement. I said that I do not know but I recalled he had spoken in public about the reduction of arms in Europe (Brezhnev here commented to Alekandrov that this was odd, he evidently does not appreciate how strong the feeling is about Soviet failure to carry out fully Basket II provisions). With Brezhnev in agreement, I then continued with some specifics on ways Governor Carter believed we could restrict strategic
arms and cooperation relations.

-- I said that not only could we reduce numbers of new weapons but by flight tests our scientists are working hard, reducing flight tests would be a way to stop development. In addition, I agree not to deploy any new strategic weapons for a few years. Governor Carter is for expansion of cultural exchange and hopes we can get into such fundamental questions as energy and nuclear fusion. Success may be 30 to 40 years off but working together we could possibly speed it up. The immediate future, Governor Carter is interested in the development of trade, in particular the need to obtain MFN. I said that Brezhnev knows the difficulties but we must together develop a program in order to reopen an issue which came to such an unhappy conclusion because of the Jackson and Stevenson amendments. I went on that there is feeling in the U.S. that it is the Soviets who have benefited from trade but my thinking is that we both benefited. Governor Carter believes we should talk where there will be cooperation and where there will be competition between us. He is willing to expand areas as widely as possible. He realizes that we have different political and social systems but feels strongly that we must not take each other by surprise. (Having this plan in hand)

Brezhnev noted to Aleksandrov that this was quite a bit. Alexandrov responded to him that it was much for Brezhnev but it was necessary.)
I continued that on two points on which I said I was speaking for myself, namely that

--- There had been an overwhelming of detente to the

-- That detente had been --

for the American people.

I knew that the General Secretary respected President Nixon but

when he was in trouble he exercised detente at home. Americans

became as one wise man told me disillusioned with illusions.

I recalled that Secretary Brezhnev had said to me in 1974 - patience,

perseverence and step by step action was required for progress.

He had made it very clear (when I used the word illusion, Alexandrov

interjected they were substantive illusions)

--- I noted that the campaign Reagan conducted had stirred up

anti-Soviet emotions which has had an effect on the campaign. These are things which can be and must be

believed overcome.

I concluded that General Carter told me

that he wanted me to be the channel until the elections either
directly or through Dobrynin. I told the General Secretary

that I would be glad to answer any questions or take any

messages. Afterwards Governor Carter would have his own

Secretary of State and I will bow out. Governor Carter did not

the many people he would like to get into the act.
Partly reading and partly extemporizing, General Secretary Brezhnev began by expressing appreciation for a detailed explanation of Governor Carter's positions, he took particular note of the positions on strategic arms, Basket III and others. Brezhnev said that he was pleased to hear what I had said. He said that as regards the general Soviet approach to relations with the U.S., he had no reason to attempt to convince me because the whole world knows that the Soviet Union seeks relations which will be based on the basis of mutual advantage. He said that the Soviet Union is convinced that for such development there must exist certain necessary, objective prerequisites and a good foundation. He went on that as the result of efforts which were not simple but were what he called enormous, we now have accords and understandings which have achieved improvements not only in U.S.-USSR relations but for the world as a whole. Picking up my word, he said these are not illusions and Alekandrov added, these are real facts. Brezhnev said he had to emphasize that it was no fault of the Soviet Union that the process had slowed down, that on several major issues there was a fairly protracted pause. He said that he had spoken of the importance of strategic arms. He agreed with me. And indeed this was the important subject he had had to make one remark. He noted that on March 16 the Soviets had sent President Ford their latest proposal but had as yet received no answer. He asked, what does that mean? He said that surely if that is the attitude now taken by the Administration it is not a token of willingness or desire to achieve agreement. (I interjected here that when the General Secretary had finished his presentation, I would try to defend the Administration although I was not for President Ford. Brezhnev agreed.)
Brezhnev continued that this of course results in the Soviets harboring a wariness of the trends in American policy. He noted the trend manifested itself first and foremost in a renewed arms race and the American military budget which he believed was a record one. He complained that all of this was to the loud accompaniment of a mythical Soviet threat for which there were no grounds. \underline{I agreed with this analysis.}

Brezhnev continued that obviously forces were at work here (in the Soviet Union) who do not like either relaxation of international tension or development of U.S.-Soviet relations. He understood the Administration meting it out to these forces for reasons of a momentary nature but he felt this was a dangerous development.

He said he would now like to ask what was Gov. Carter's stand on Vladivostok. Does he support it or does he not? He then said, returning to the basic issue of relations, the Soviet Union is pursuing a consistent line. He emphasized it was a line confirmed by the 24th (November 1977) Party Congress. The Soviets were in favor of not abating efforts. They were prepared to interact and cooperate with all those who take a similar approach.

He said he now wished to turn directly to Governor Carter. He noted that he was not acquainted with him and had no bias against him. His candidacy for the American presidency was a question for the American people and it was the American people who say what they want. At the same time Brezhnev said that the Soviets were by no means insensitive to the political line of the next president. He emphasized that the Soviets followed very closely the statements of both the candidates.

\underline{Comment: This is consistent with a point Arbatov made}
to me that many high level Soviets are taking our campaign statements very seriously, perhaps too seriously. Brezhnev said that on the one hand the Soviets could warmly salute Mr. Carter when he said that he is "in favor of good and friendly relations," that the "solution of major international issues is not possible without the Soviet Union" and when he spoke against the arms race and military budgets. Brezhnev continued, however, that at the same time, one could not fail to note Carter statements which would be hard to accord with a desire to improve relations. He asked how could one explain such Carter statements that in relations with the Soviet Union Governor Carter would take a harder line or that detente was only of benefit to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev added he believed there were several other statements which only could be taken as interference in Soviet internal affairs or those of other socialist countries. He also alleged that there was a statement belittling the role of U.S.-Soviet relations. Brezhnev said if this is true, he felt here that the Democratic candidate not only fails to take into account the realities of today's world but comes into contradiction with other of his statements on working for peace with the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev said although he hadn't heard of it and wasn't sure of it, he did not recall having heard a reaction from Governor Carter on a Soviet proposal to renounce development of new strategic systems which he had put forth at the 20th (or presumably the 25th) Party Congress.

Brezhnev went on that I had stressed the importance of strategic arms limitation. He said that the Soviets were in favor of neither side having an advantage; rather that equilibrium be the result. I interjected that I could have XXXX said this was exactly Governor Carter's view and
Brezhnev responded that this was good. He went on that it was not hard for the Soviets to detect that the American side in the SALT talks was seeking to avoid any limitation on certain of its own types of arms such as the strategic cruise missile while at the same time attempting to extend that definition to Soviet weapons which by no means had strategic capabilities. He said that he was referring to the Soviet bomber which was usually called the Backfire in the U.S. He emphasized that this was absolutely not a good approach, that the agreement must be on the basis of equality and equilibrium that there is no other way to achieve a strategic arms limitation agreement. Brezhnev added that although he didn't wish to go into it again in detail since he has said it publicly, he has made proposals to ban the Trident and the B-1 and similar weapons in the Soviet Union. He said this was not accepted by the U.S. and construction was continuing. (I interjected that only the Trident was under construction and Brezhnev responded he knew but the B-1 was being tested.) 

Brezhnev added two more points: 

--- that the Soviet proposal for a ban on underground testing had not been accepted, and 

--- there has been much discussion on European matters and he takes note that Carter recently said that if need be, he would strengthen NATO and send troops to Europe. (I interjected that I didn't recall these statements and Brezhnev said he read them a day or two ago.) 

Brezhnev went on, laughing as he said it, that in general on every issue the two candidates seem to try to vie in outplaying the other, that perhaps this was not inconsistent. He recalled
that in a recent "Jewish-Zionist" Congress, one announced support for the "poor Soviet Jews" and thanked the other. (I respond, "Well, they were poor a long time ago, too.") Again with some heavy humor, Brezhnev said I should not think he was trying to attack Governor Carter because he had no intention of heaping praise on President Ford either. He continued that he had read the other day that President Ford had received in the White House the Ukrainian Cardinal Shepty, who had been expelled from the USSR and whom even the Pope had forbidden to continue political activity. He asked rhetorically whether President Ford was trying to be more Catholic than the Pope. I responded by saying, why not and the General Secretary laughed. I continued that I would answer quickly: although I was not for President Ford, I said that no one really cares very strongly about this issue but there are many Ukrainians in the U.S. and if the Ukrainians are happy, the President will get some votes. I reiterated that I had said the act was not anti-Soviet. I continued that this was a good example of why Governor Carter said that the General Secretary should not pay attention to campaign rhetoric; that they must differentiate between this and policy. Brezhnev responded that therefore what was the true picture, what were people to think.

He said he recalled meeting certain statesmen for the first time, saying that he didn't know them personally but he had heard what they said, therefore how was he to know about Governor Carter and President Ford? (Here Brezhnev turned to Alexandrov and said, "Am I interfering in U.S. internal affairs?"
He then turned again to me to say what he had told the president. He then said that the General Secretary at all for being confused and when he was finished would like to make a brief statement on the issue.

Brezhnev said he would like to send a brief message to Governor Carter that on the subject of trade and aid, please place no pressure on the USSR. "All" are in favor of development of trade without discrimination purely and mutual respect. He then said to me that on a personal basis he wished to note that the third American president with whom the Soviets had discussed trade. President Nixon promised, President Ford promised and now Governor Carter promised, but the cart was right still where it was. And the Senate and Congress continued to try to exert pressure on the Soviet Union.

He noted that a package deal had been expected and the Soviets had promised lend-lease repayment. I re-emphasized at this point that Governor Carter was preparing to discuss the issue.

Brezhnev then asked me not to misunderstand but said he had to mention that in the Soviet view the U.S. Administration had taken an unseemly attitude toward the MIG-25 which had made a "forced landing" in Japan.

He also said that he took note of my mention of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. He said that in the past five years 117,458 Jews have left. He chuckled that where they went, God only knew. They were supposed to go to Israel but often turned up elsewhere. He alleged that the restrictions applied only to those with strategic
secrets and that in the past five and one-half years there had been 2027 rejections, a total of only 1.5% of those allowed to leave. I asked how many were now left of the 2000, and he said that number remained.

He then said he took a good view of Governor Carter's statement that the Soviet and American leaders should meet annually. He felt in this connection it might be useful for Governor Carter and him to get together soon after the elections (if Carter wins). I interjected here that I wanted him to note that what Carter had accepted was Brezhnev's suggestion to President Nixon that there be annual meetings, and did so gladly, which Brezhnev said was so believed. When I asked whether the General Secretary was finished with all his scoldings, he said no, he had one more and asked why on earth had Secretary Kissinger taken it into his head to go traveling all over Africa. He said he even thought about it in bed; he couldn't do it sitting up. More seriously, he alleged to underrate Secretary Kissinger's desire to strengthen reactionary regimes condemned by the UN. He wanted that the counter to the UN resolution when he talked about a two year period before independence. Brezhnev noted that he was saying this in spite of many and fruitful meetings with the Secretary but of course he also talked to him frankly.
After Brezhnev had concluded his presentation, I began my response. I opened by saying that I felt as I do when a little boy being caught up by the head teacher being asked not only for my faults but for the acts of others. I said that it was a joke, but trusted the General Secretary understood my meaning. Brezhnev said he appreciated it.

I said that Brezhnev had asked me one question in particular—whether Carter was in favor of the Vladivostok Agreement. I wanted to let him know that General Carter felt feelings were too high. Brezhnev interjected whether I meant those of 2400 and 1320 to which I responded affirmatively. I continued that concerning the difficulties of the backfire and cruise missiles, I did not know Governor Carter’s exact position nor the full content of the Brezhnev-Kissinger exchanges. I continued that I was going to try to defend President Ford and Secretary Kissinger for not making more progress on Salt. I said that as an American, it was my duty. I also let the Secretary General know that he had informed the President and the Secretary that I would be coming to Moscow. Brezhnev interjected here to my surprise that he was aware of this.

I then went on that President Ford had been challenged for the Republican Administration by the extreme right. It was represented by...
Governor Reagan. I said that when even Senator Goldwater opposed Governor Reagan, he could understand just how extreme he was. He said it was fair to say that President Ford's hands were tied during this period because if he had acted otherwise, Governor Reagan would have accused him of giving in. The Salt subjects are so complicated that it is difficult to explain the Administration's position to the public.

(Brezhnev then said laughingly that he was going to try to bring to Governor Carter's attention that I had attempted to defend President Ford which I took in the same humor.)

I continued that as late as May, I had lunch with the Secretary who was going to try to get some agreement on the cruise missile issue. I also said that Governor Carter had recognized that there might be an agreement but that he was definitely against making any political capital by attacking it. Governor Carter believed that the earlier there was an agreement to check arms, the earlier we could move to reduce arms. General Secretary then commented that that was exactly what had been talked about at Vladivostok—-as soon as Salt II Agreement would be signed, the U.S. and Soviet Union would begin to discuss reductions.
I said I did not know how many more things I could tell him about the Governor but among others Carter has come out for reduction in the Ford budget. I noted that Carter came out for this cut in spite of an apparently large flow of information from the Soviet Union that the South were building up their conventional forces in Europe — more tanks, troops, and quality of equipment. I then asked if I might take the rule of school teacher since I had been a pupil for a while, which Brezhnev said, please, please. I said that I had once given an opinion to Churchill about British politics which he did not like. Churchill lectured me that no one understands the politics of other countries and few are so gifted as to understand their own.

I said I wanted to explain something concerning the current campaign in the U.S. I said that in 1940 there were two Republicans running for the nomination for President—Taft, who was completely an isolationist and Willkie, who was more sensible. I, as a Democrat, contributed to Willkie to get the nomination away from Taft. Drawing a diagram, I then explained that if one looks at Taft on the extreme right, Roosevelt would have to move to the right even though he would still be left of Taft. However, if Willkie were in the center, then Roosevelt could remain on the left. In a similar matter, Ford was pulled farther to the right by Reagan, and Carter, although still left of Ford, had to move to the right in his public statements in order to avoid being isolated. I said if this had not happened that is, there had not been a Reagan pulling Carter to the
I then added a prediction that the General Secretary would like Governor Carter and that he would like the General Secretary. I was against Brezhnev's method of resolving the Vietnam question. I then said that I had come to the limit of my support for Ford and Kissinger. I noted that I always supported the Secretary General's policy of peace. I continued that concerning the question about the Secretary in Africa, I did not know too much about it but did think it did no good to impugn American motives publicly (Brezhnev turned to Alexandrov saying 'We made mistakes with our friends and so this country'). He moved around and this conversation could not be exact.

I then went on to express my opinion that Carter should be able to control the pentagon as Nixon & Ford could not.
noting that it was not a political book but a human book. I said it describes how he was brought up and his feelings. I noted that he had written it himself. I also gave the General Secretary a copy of my own memoirs of 1941-1946. I noted that I hoped that one day it could be translated into Russian as it had not been badly reviewed in the Soviet Union.

(INSETION AT TAB A) The General Secretary came around the table to say thank you and to ask me to accept his hand. The General Secretary said that he wanted to say once again that the Soviets were favorable to a meeting with the new U.S. administration. He thanked me for the meeting and was glad that my opinions on Governor Carter had his full knowledge and consent. He laughed that I had caught him by surprise in giving him the two books and picked up a design made of semi-precious ural stones to give me. I also passed him a pair of cuff links that I said my wife made sure I brought along. As we moved toward the door in response to my inquiry about Chairman Kosygin whom I had known since 1942. Brezhnev told me that he was expected to be back at work in a few weeks. We also discussed the weather this year which Brezhnev noted that the harvest expected to be better even than in 1973. He laughed that even the American projections about the Soviet harvest kept rising. He said that Carter would want to talk to him about the food. Salt came up as a point again and Secretary General asked me to remember one more important point — that he had dedicated his life to prevent nuclear
war. With considerable emotion he noted one political bomb aspect in a world war. I emphasized again the value of the Soviets saying something to relieve tensions which would then make it possible for Carter to respond. I said I was glad that Brezhnev did not talk of liberation wars the way Kruschev did; we opposed support for actual in movements.

We concluded our conversation by asking about the press and Alexandrov produced a statement. I emphasized that I was here as a private citizen and although Carter knew, it was my idea. After the first draft referred only to conversation as "frank" and it was explained that that word alone could be misinterpreted. Brezhnev agreed to add "friendly" as an description of the meaning. As we reached the door, Brezhnev pulled my assistant aside for a minute and asked him if he thought the conversation had gone right to which my assistant replied affirmatively.

My assistant also then let Alexandrov know what Brezhnev had told him and emphasized that Harriman's presentation was the only one the Soviets should accept as coming from Carter's policy. Aleksandrov made a point of his own—just as we asked the Soviets to understand campaign rhetoric, we should understand that the Soviets did not always control their press—as in the case of Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa.