MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, W. AVERELL HARRIMAN AND USSR
AMBASSADOR ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, USSR EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

At my suggestion that we get together, I called on Dobrynin for about an hour's chat over a cup of tea. We agreed that the Brezhnev talk with Kennedy was useful. It gave Brezhnev a chance to let off steam which I said he liked to do and was a healthy thing. Dobrynin agreed. Although he wasn't present, he rather poo-pooed the idea that all these Jews were to be allowed to go to Israel as Kennedy had stated. I said that I understood that Brezhnev had agreed to the statement. He was not present but evidently read a memorandum of the conversation (although he didn't say so), but he maintained that nothing in writing had been submitted by Kennedy. I said I assumed that was true, but I think probably Kennedy asked permission to make the statement that he did and Brezhnev said he had no objection. Dobrynin questioned this, but he agreed the talk was useful and hoped that everything that Brezhnev said was passed on. He assumed it was (to the President and Cy).

He said the Warnke visit was useful but not specifically productive. He said Warnke always handled himself well, and they appreciated a chance to talk and to get the information he gave them, although Paul was not able to give them specific
answers on the subjects still at issue. I said that I understood that both Vance and Warnke were optimistic about reaching an agreement, and he said, "Well, it all depends on how the meetings with Gromyko go this year." If they go as well as they did last September, we will certainly have an agreement in a couple of months. If they blow up as they did last May, it will be a different story. I underlined that, as he undoubtedly knew, since September Vance was the spokesman and Brzezinski had kept quiet. He said he had noticed that and understood that what I said was true. I said under these circumstances I expect the conversation to go well.

We talked a bit about the China card. I emphasized what I had got from my visits to Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Ceausescu as well as the others said it was stupid to try to play China against the Soviet Union. All of them were keen for our improving our relations with both Russia and China but not to play one against the other would not be productive. He agreed, of course, and said that China was trying ti stir up trouble which I admitted was true. I told him that I was satisfied Tito would tell the Chinese that he favored detente and SALT and reduction of the armaments in Europe and that it would be very useful for the Chinese to hear that. He said that was his impression as well.
We exchanged views about the three countries, and I told him a bit more about the trip which appeared to interest him, but he never admits that I ever tell him anything that he doesn't know already which is probably true. But I undoubtedly give him details which are not available to him and which interest him.

This whole conversation was useful. I told him I declined to go to China this year as I didn't want to get mixed up with the China card, but I might consider doing it next year and what did he think. He said he thought it would be useful and would not be misunderstood.

He said that he would be going to New York to meet Gromyko next week and after the first of October suggested we get together, perhaps the four of us. I heartily agreed.

At a certain point I said I believed that both Cy and the President wanted to come to an agreement on SALT as quickly as possible. I thought it would be just as well if it dragged on till after election. The important thing was for the President and Brezhnev to get together, and that after that things would go more smoothly in the future.

I have found in my experience that the men the President had seen had all come away with a very good impression. I was sure this would be true of Brezhnev, and Dobrynin
agreed providing something like SALT came out of it.

He brought up the question of Tito's succession and agreed with the opinions that I had gotten in Hungary and Romania that there wouldn't be any major shift in policy. He said that's what Moscow thought.

At one point he had a lot of vigorous things to say about the people that thought that they had world military plans, and made a case for the generals being overcautious defensively. I told him that was my greatest difficulty in defending their position - they had gone too far in the buildup against NATO, and they were suffering an American opinion of that act, and I wished he could put a stop to it. He said, "Well, you know how those generals are."

I explained that U.S. then was very much on its side. In fact, I explained about our trying to force them against them.