MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, W. A. H. AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, SOVIET EMBASSY, MARCH 26, 1979

I stopped in to see Ambassador Dobrynin about 6:00 p.m. on Friday, March 23. He was not feeling too well from some sort of sore throat, so I saw him in his residence office in his dressing gown. Irina met me at the front door and took me up to meet him. I stayed a little over a half hour and then broke it up as he was not feeling well and I didn't want to bother him further.

Dobrynin sounded very cheerful and seemed to welcome my visit. Whenever I asked him a question, he asked me what I thought about it. So I started the ball rolling that way.

He told me what he thought about China— that there was no reason why we should not be on good relations with China. He only wished they were. He of course had an adverse word to say about Brzezinski and how he was handling it. He said he realized we were not responsible for the attack on Vietnam. I made it very plain that I thought the Chinese had acted improperly in starting that attack shortly after their visit to the United States and it looked as if China was trying to use us against the Soviet Union— which I don't like.

Dobrynin has the impression that we are not too anxious about SALT, which I denied. He said if Cy would only give three days to it, we could settle the outstanding questions. He said we had been quite unreasonable at times. There was no way they could tell the difference
between M-2 and M-3—they looked exactly the same. Our argument was that we had an open society and they could learn the facts exactly. (This is the first I had ever heard of that)

Dobrynin said Brezhnev thought we should pay more attention to MBFR. They had recently proposed the reduction of 1000 tanks and 31,000 men in return for the reduction of 17,000 American troops. They had received no answer to that offer.

On the Middle East, Dobrynin said they were indignant that in October 1977 Vance had made an agreement with Gromyko to work together on a Middle East settlement, and then we dropped them. I said that was of course because of Sadat's initiative. Dobrynin maintained that we could not keep them out of any world event as important as the Middle East. (I agree with him on this and had already told Vance that I thought the Soviets should be brought into the Middle East talks in some way or else they would use their influence against any progress in a Middle East settlement.)

Dobrynin and I both agreed that a Summit Meeting would be helpful in eliminating misunderstandings. He said Brezhnev was anxious to meet with Carter, and I said that Carter was anxious to meet with Brezhnev but that Brezhnev was the one who had insisted on a SALT agreement before the meeting. I asked him about the site of the meeting, and he dodged the issue. I said it was obviously Brezhnev's turn to come to the United States and I asked whether it was Brezhnev's health that
was the problem.

Dobrynin suggested that the four of us get together for dinner within a couple of weeks so that we could have a good talk.